Very Final Thesis Democracy and Terroris PDF

Democracy and Terrorism: Current Trends in Terrorism and
counterterrorism: Application of Domestic and Israeli Counterterrorism
Lessons

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Public University

by

Yehuda J. Lev

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

July 2013

American Public University

Charles Town, WV

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Acknowledgements

The initial research that led to this monograph would be hard to imagine without
the author’s personal life and career experiences. However, while what had
originally, to be a concise, relatively short document, became impossibility in
light of the writer’s wish to truly add a substantial document to the general
academic database on the topic of democracy and counterterrorism.
A special effort has been made to use as much credible, balanced and up-‐ to-‐ date
literature as possible as well as the latest other media publications. Among a long
list of intelligence and counterterrorism writers, experts and analysts, it was the
vast contribution of Daniel Byman, Peter l. Bergen, Boaz Ganor,Audrey Kurth
Cronin, Paul R. Pillar and Ami Pedahzur that played a major role in shaping this
work.
Furthermore, the American Public and Military University National Security and
Counterterrorism curriculum and its professors, especially Brigadier General U.S.
Army (Retired) Ronald S. Mangum and the Director of National Security Program
and Military Studies Program, Doctor Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D. played an
important role in guiding and encouraging the author through the shaping,
creation and publication attempts of this work.

July 2013.

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ABSTRACT Of THE THESIS

The U.S. has so far failed to defeat Islamist terrorism. Through research and
comparative analysis of related literature, this work suggests that there are
lessons to be learned from Israel’s counterterrorist model and applied to the U.S.
model. Most of such lessons focus on changes to the effectiveness of the U.S.
intelligence community and U.S. public resilience.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
ACKNOWLEGEMENTS………………………………………………………………………………… 2
I. ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………..………… 3
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………… … 4

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW………………….............8
III. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………… 9
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………………… .11
PART TWO: MODERN TETTORISM CHALLENGE: WHAT TO EXPECT?
PRACTICAL AND ACADEMIC APPROACHES………………………............................. 43
V. FIGHTING TERRORISM EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT GIVING UP ON THE VERY
FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY – A FALLACY OR ACTUAL POSSIBILITY..44
VI. FIGHTING TERRORISM ON A NATIONAL LEVEL……………………………………..52
VII. COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE COLLABORATIVE
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APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY…………………………… 57
CHAPTER PAGE
VIII. EXAMINIG THE EFFICACY OF TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL TOOL……….. 62

IX. TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: ARE TERRORISTS
LIKELY TO OBTAIN AND USE WMD?................................................................. 73
PART THREE: DEMOCRACIES AT WAR: THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI CT
PARADIGMS TESTED………………………………………………………… 90

X. THE COUNTERTERRORISM MODELS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL
A BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………………………..91

XI. CAN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI DEMOCRACIES ULTIMATELY DEFEAT
TERRORISM?.......................................................................................................................92
XII. THE WMD TERRORIST THREAT TO ISRAEL……………………………………..103
XIII. THE ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORIST APPARATUS…………………………….109
XIV. THE SHAPING OF ISRAEL’S COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGM……….. 115
XV. ISRAEL’S OFFENSIVE CT TOOLS: MORAL, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL
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PERSPECTIVES……………………………………………………………………………….128
Overview………………………………………………………………………………………..128
CHAPTER PAGE
Targeted Killings……………………………………………………………………………. 130
Other Israeli Counterterrorism Measures: Defensive and Punitive
Counterterrorism Measures………………………………………….......................... 145
Overview…………………………………………………………………………………………145
Israeli Administrative Counterterrorist Measures……………………………. .152
Israel’s Punitive CT Measures……………………………………………………………153
XVI. THE ISRAELI CT MODEL: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS……………………. ..156

XVII. CAN LESSONS FROM FIGHTING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM BE
APPLIED TO THE STRUGGLE WITH AL QAEDA?......................................... . 159
General Lessons from Worldwide Struggle with Terrorism……………….167
International Cooperation in the CT struggle……………………………………167
Intelligence and Counterterrorism: the Nature & Quality of Intelligence
Needed to Disrupt Terrorism: The U.S. and Israeli perspectives……….. 171
XVIII. THE UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGM: THE USE OF
LETHAL FORCE IN THE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM: MORAL,
LEGAL AND EFFICACY ISSUES………………………………………………………… 183
XIX. OTHER U.S. CT MEASURES………………………………………………………… .. 194
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Administrative: The Patriot Act……………………………………………………….. 194

Torture and Indefinite Detention…………………………………………………… 195
CHAPTER PAGE
Renditions and Extraordinary Renditions…………………………………………...198
EPILOGUE………………………………………………………………………………………………202
XX. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY………………………………………………………….. ...203
XXI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………….. . 204
XXII. METHODOLOGY: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS……………………………………...209
XXIII. REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………….....212
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
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“The worst enemy of any progress is a closed mind”
INTRODUCTION
The current American model of combating terrorism in its various forms failed
to secure the American people against future terrorist attack. Moreover, it is
incapable of granting security against possible weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) attack on the Homeland. Despite the fact that no currently known
security means can assure complete fail-‐safe protection -‐ searching for new,
additional ways to weaken, if not destroy terrorism -‐ is highly indicated.
Certain nations and governments are open to changes even in well accepted,
often proven effective, existing counterterrorist measures. America has made its
initial step towards modernization of its counterterrorism paradigm, after the
end of the cold war. In a recent book, Find Fix Finish: Inside the
Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-‐Qaeda,
writers Peritz and Rosenbach launch a probe into the development of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy. This process began with the transition from slow,
hesitant, irresolute responses, (e.g. Beirut 1983, Somalia 1993, Tanzania and
Kenya 1998, USS Cole 2000 etc.) into a more mature strategy, which currently
focuses on the problem of “fixing” i.e. pinpointing the exact location of the
terrorist target; and thus – the “intelligence heart” of the problem.
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“ The fundamental assumption of the Cold War – that neither side
wanted to risk annihilation – was null and void, since the terrorists
were willing to martyr themselves…the find-‐fix-‐ finish doctrine [of
the cold war as seen in Korea or Vietnam] had to evolve as well…
the finishing is relatively easy. In this world it’s the finding that’s
the hardest-‐to-‐do function, it’s the intelligence thing” (Peritz and
Rosenbach 2012, 5).

Intelligence, remains the heart of the U.S. counterinsurgency/counterterrorism
capability problem, in the short and middle term. Arguably, in the far future
terrorism will be dealt with through soft power, or smart power, reaching out
for the “hearts and minds” of the population, in the midst of which, terrorists
thrive. Both, the United States and Israel are two closely allied democracies
sharing the threat of terrorism. This paper discusses various measures and tools
used by the United States and Israel in their struggle against terrorism in
general, suicide terrorism, and the WMD threat from transnational terrorists.
Can lessons from the long Israeli counterterrorist campaign be applied to the
American counterterrorism strategy? Some claim that the American political and
social system is completely incompatible with the Israeli one. This writer begs to
differ.
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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW

Main research question and hypothesis, in the context of literature review
The state of Israel is an example of a vibrant and thriving democracy, flourishing,
despite a perpetual state of emergency and the constant need to protect its
citizens from Palestinian terrorist attacks. Israel has been engaged in
counterterrorist struggle, for over sixty-‐four years, of its existence. There is no
other state in the world that combated terrorism on a daily basis, for as long as
Israel. However, this alone is not a guarantee that the Israeli counterterrorism
model is better than other state CT models. Some claim that Israel “feels” like a
police state. This inconsolably contrasts with the American democratic
principles. Such misconception stems from the fact that Israeli security deeply
penetrates many walks of the daily life, of its citizens, and it overtly infringes on
certain civil rights that may be held as “sacred” by some. It is important to
understand, that for the average Israeli citizen, who served/s in the IDF,
protected the very homeland of his ancestors and himself -‐ terrorist threat is a
daily thing; theoretically, never further than a minute, or a few yards away.
Israelis do not feel threatened by the fact that “there are many armed people
everywhere,” and that the General Security Services (GSS aka Shabak or Shin
Bet) theoretically can and very often are monitoring, tracking or arresting
security suspects. This is why they exist. This writer suggests that the Israeli
perception can be summarized in the following: “ If I have done nothing wrong,
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why should I be afraid of the police? Or, why should I fear the GSS/FBI
eavesdropping on me; or reading my e-‐mails, if I have nothing to hide?” This is
the small price the vast majority of Israelis willingly pay for their security. Any
suggestion that Israel “feels like a police state” is misinformed, possibly
stemming from biases and mass media distortions -‐ rather than from a true, in-‐
depth “ Israeli experience. Could the U.S. possibly open up to consider possible
application of hard-‐learned lessons, from the Israeli counterterrorism
experience? Indeed, the situations of the U.S. and Israel versus terrorism are not
alike. Agreeably, the day-‐to-‐day threat to the U.S. Homeland is lesser than the
daily terrorist threat to Israel and Israelis. Terrorist attacks were never a part of
everyday American life. However, both countries face the ultimate threats of
suicide and WMD terrorism. Arguably, most of America’s struggle with terrorism
is overseas, in far away lands, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Saudi
Arabia or Yemen; while most of the daily Israeli counterterrorist struggle takes
place takes place within miles from Jerusalem, Haifa or Tel Aviv and very often,
also inside Israel’s sovereign territory. Accordingly, the intelligence
undertakings, and the problems of “fixing” the location of the targets, faced by
the two countries are often different. There is also a major difference in the size
of both countries, and the cohesiveness and cultural homogeneity of their
societies; not to forget the uniqueness of each of the two respective societies in
terms of historical experience. This writer hypothesizes that while it is indeed,
impossible to apply all the Israeli counterterrorism experiences to the U.S.
situation and counterterrorism needs, there are some valuable Israeli lessons
that can, and should be applied to the American CT strategy. Accordingly, the
purpose of this work is to seek and analyze literature pointing to possible
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beneficial lessons, that can be gleaned by studying the Israeli counterterrorism
model -‐ and applying the relevant concepts to the American counterterrorism
strategy in order to augment it.
In 2006, Larsen and Pravecek have posited, in their Comparative U.S.-‐ Israeli
Homeland Security research that,
“ Despite the benefits that may accrue from adopting some of these
lessons, the United States is unlikely to adopt many of them.
Differences in country size, culture, attitudes toward security,
historical experiences, and bureaucratic design contribute to the
propensity of the United States to continue developing a homeland
security strategy with the least impact on individual civil liberties
and its population’s accustomed way of life” (Larsen and Pravecek
2006, XiV).

Consuella Pockett, (2005) preceded the above-‐mentioned study in her own,
pointing with some degree of protectiveness over American achievements, to
some applicable lessons from the Israeli Homeland Front experience. She
contends,
“ There are certain lessons the United States can learn from
Israel’s 35-‐year battle against terrorism. We must not forget
however that…many of Israel’s security initiatives are simply not
practical or feasible for implementation within the United
States…Furthermore, the Home Front Command is a well
established organization that has been in existence for nearly 12
years, while the Department of Homeland Security is a relatively
new organization…The fact that the Home Front Command [in
Israel] is much more established organization than the U.S. DHS
explains the vast progress it has made…” (Pockett 2005, 2).

Although major differences exist between any two democracies, their respective
political and legal systems, cultures and life styles; this should hardly be a
sufficient reason to wave their respective counterterrorism lessons aside as
irrelevant.
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Review of literature regarding American and Israeli approaches to
information sharing
Although the sharing of terrorism-‐related information within the U.S.
intelligence community has supposedly improved, there is still a lot to be desired.
In 2010, Mark Hoseneball, writing for the Daily Beast posited,
“ More than nine years after 9/11, America’s intelligence sharing system
continues to be impeded by legal and technical difficulties. As a result, important
intelligence reports may be slow to reach those officials who could to take action
on them”(Hoseneball 2010). Moreover, Anthony Quiggin states,
“ At present, no indication exists that the US government will solve
its intelligence and internal information-‐sharing problems in the
foreseeable future. At the same time the DHS model of a
centralized bureaucracy trying to control all aspects of an issue
does not appear to be functioning well, at least on the information
sharing level.” (Quiggin 2007, 142).

Arguably, the same can be posited regarding the law enforcement cooperation,
its intelligence sharing and collaboration. Yet, the Israeli intelligence-‐sharing
example seems different. Indeed, the Israeli intelligence community has had it
share of turf wars, “stove–piping,” and other information sharing problems, in
spite of its relatively small size. However, after the Israeli 2006 relative debacle
in Lebanon, the Israeli IC has regrouped by way of shrinking the bureaucracy
involved in the intelligence sharing process.
“ The IDF and police were brought inside Shin Bet’s command
center to ensure that they had access to all information. Local
commanders could reach out directly to Shin Bet [the Israeli
General Security Service or GGS] regional leaders, decentralizing
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information sharing…The situation is hardly perfect…Yet by the
standards of U.S. intelligence, where coordination is more
cumbersome, Israel’s sharing of information is impressive”
(Byman 2011, 343).

Interestingly, only five years earlier, the Israelis thought that following the 9/11
tragedy, the “stove-‐piping” issues of the U.S. intelligence community were solved,
and suggested learning from the U.S. new approach, as described by Ami
Pedahzur (2007) in his book The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against
Terrorism:
[The Israelis thought that]“… instead of implementing

organizational reforms that will end up in new series of struggles
between various agencies, the agent model that is employed in the
United States should be adopted, with certain adjustments. The
idea is to establish a main headquarters for the struggle against
terrorism that will serve as a hub of a network that will send out
its arms to each and every one of the various intelligence
thwarting forces…Representatives of all the forces in charge of
coping with terrorism will be stationed full-‐time at the
headquarters. Their job will be real time coordination…”(Pedahzur
2007, 146-‐147).

Review of literature regarding the challenge to U.S. national security from
terrorist acquisition of WMD.
This work extensively addresses also the issue of nuclear terrorism, and the
additional challenges stemming from the possible connection between suicide
terrorism and WMD. While not the main purpose of this paper, this writer
additionally observes that there seem to be a strong link between suicide
terrorism and the threat faced by both, the American and the Israeli people. The
United States is currently engaged in a race against time, with terrorist groups
like al-‐Qaeda, which pursue a two-‐decade-‐long quest to obtain WMD and use
them against the U.S. Homeland. Although little was written about al-‐Qaeda’s
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intentions to destroy Israel, the threat has been expressed in its fatwas, as well
as in Iranian official declarations. Al-‐Qaeda, has literally, committed to killing
millions of Americans, while using nuclear or biological weapons. It is of further
concern that the U.S. might loose this race, lest it will accommodate some
adjustments to its perception of civil, humanitarian and moral rights, and unless
it adapts new/adjusted set of laws and rules-‐of–engagement vs. al Qaeda, and
like terrorist groups. These ‘adjusted’ rules must enable America’s only real,
short-‐term, line of offensive-‐defense: the Intelligence Community and the
Military -‐ to act with minimal constraints. Uri Fisher, in his article on the realism
in the options of deterring terrorism, suggests,
“ The U.S. must ask whether it wants to be a nation that is

associated with targeted killings, assassinations, and threatening
families of terrorists to establish deterrence…. Concern over the
cost of compromising our ideals undoubtedly undermines efforts
to make our enemies believe we are willing to punish them no
matter at what expense. To effectively deter terrorists the U.S. will
have to accept the price that comes with violating some human
rights, responding with overwhelming force, alienating certain
allies, and even eliminating those assets and people that terrorists
may hold dear” (Fisher 2007, 15).

Are only suicide terrorists linked to a potential WMD attack on the U.S., or is such
an attack likely to be conducted by non-‐suicide terrorists as well? It is another
secondary, hypothetical suggestion, that it takes an international group like al-‐
Qaeda, which has access to extensive funds, contacts with Transnational
Organized Crime (Rollins, Wyler and Rosen 2010), and which employs the
‘services’ of suicide terrorists – to carry out a major WMD attack on the
Homeland (The White House 2011). However, it can be argued that a local group
can execute a lesser attack, one involving chemical or radiological, crude
weapon. This, in fact, is well established in Graham Allison’s book, Nuclear
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Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (2004). Allison outlines several
scenarios of nuclear bomb construction arguably, with relative ease. However, in
truth, such is not the case. Far more worrisome is Allison’s precise description of
some of the “ready to go,” small enough for a suitcase or a backpack tactical
nuclear weapons, with a yield of from 0.25 KT and higher, found in the Russian
and U.S. nuclear arsenals. (Allison 2004, 46-‐49).
There is no current information on other nations’ possession of such, tactical,
nuclear weapons. (This is however, arguably, a relatively easy feat to achieve
such capability by a nuclear-‐weapons state actor). It is in this context, that the
issue of suicide terrorism is addressed in this work.

Review of literature regarding the SUICIDE element of current terrorism
Current international terrorism is strongly characterized by its suicide terrorism
element. Suicide terrorism, just like any other type of terrorism, despite its
particular, indiscriminate bestiality and the carnage it brings -‐ still has its
advocates; moreover, it still justifies the old adage “ one’s man terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter.” Unfortunately, terrorists are (usually) not
insane; or lone, unsupported “wolfs.” Certain groups and individuals, within the
general, Muslim population support al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates. Robert Pape, and
K. Feldman, in their book Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide
Terrorism & How to Stop It (2010), posit,
“Understanding that transnational suicide terrorism is a rare

phenomenon largely associated with the progressive radicalization
of specific types of groups of individuals with multiple national
loyalties under extremely unusual circumstances has important
implications“(Pape 2010, 82).

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Walter Laqueur, in his book, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty First
Century, (2003), and in various shorter essays, reiterates that terrorism by
default, has always had its antagonists, as well as its supporters and it comes in
various shapes and forms. “ No all-‐ embracing definition [of terrorism] will ever
be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have
been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in
manifestation and aims”(Laqueur 2007).
Most probably, the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre signaled a new
terrorist era of indiscriminate, international terrorism targeting whole societies.
It was one step behind suicide terrorism.
“ The enduring image of the 1972 Olympic Games remains a

terrorist in a ski mask, instead of an exhilarating athletic
performance… Terrorism became more prominent in the world’s
consciousness…because terrorists continued to choose targets for
their symbolic value and for maximum media coverage. …[At first]
they did not want a lot of people dead – but they did want a lot of
people watching.” (Responding to Terrorism: Challenges for
Democracy 2003).

Currently, the term ‘terrorism’ signifies a deliberate and systematic use of
violence against civilian populations during political conflicts, executed by either
state or non-‐state actors, aiming at terrifying whole populations and thus
creating coercive pressure to change political decisions of governments to fit
terrorist goals.
Between 1968 and 2006 there were at least 24,930 terrorist incidents
worldwide (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base n.d.). These incidents took place in
at least 146 out of 196 currently existing countries. Moreover, suicide terrorism
became prevalent, with Americans becoming one of its main targets. Between
1980-‐ 2003 there were about 350 suicide terrorist attacks around the world -‐ of
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which fewer than 15% could be considered as directed against Americans.
However, during a six-‐year period from 2004 to 2009, there were 1,833 suicide
attacks – of which 92% targeted Americans and America (Pape 2010, 2). While
many instinctively point to September 11, 2001 as a “game changer,” suicide
terrorism, can be argued as used often throughout history; the Sicarii zealots; the
Hashashin, or the Kamikaze pilots, embarked on missions knowing that their
chances to survive were nil. Arguably, suicide terrorism cannot be deterred by
threat of retaliation against the attackers. Suicide terrorism thus is the ultimate
fanatic expression of terrorism, and thus most likely to be linked to WMD, as an
ultimately destructive and lethal terrorist tool. President Obama in his 2010 and
2011 NSS contends that the ultimate threat to the U.S. is
“…presented by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is

immediate, persistent, growing, and evolving. The recently
updated National Security Strategy (NSS) underscores this by
stating “… there is no greater threat to the American People than
weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by
pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their
proliferation to additional states.” (DTRA Procurement, Defense-‐
Wide 2011, 4).

Review of literature regarding Al-Qaeda’s WMD threat to attack the United
States and its allies
In 1998 al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, declared that acquiring and using
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was his Islamic duty -‐-‐ an integral part of
his jihad. Systematically, over the course of two decades, he dispatched his top
lieutenants to attempt the purchase or development of nuclear and biochemical
WMD. He has never given up this goal. Indeed, in a 2007 video he repeated his
promise to use massive weapons to destroy the global status quo; destroy the
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capitalist hegemony and help create an Islamic caliphate. (Mowatt-‐Larssen
2010). Following 9/11, in 2002, an al-‐Qaida spokesman Abu Gheith wrote:
We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4
million Americans – 2 million of them children – and to exile twice
as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.
Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and
biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies
that afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical
and biological weapons “ (Abu Gheith 2002).

This threat did not diminish; actually, it may have escalated:
“ The probability that the U.S. will be hit with a weapons of mass
destruction attack at some point is 100 percent, Dr, Vahid Majidi,
the FBI’s assistant director in charge of the FBI’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction Directorate, tells …It would most likely employ
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons rather than a nuclear
one” (Kessler 2011).

This issue is still widely disputed. Proponents of the theory that a WMD terrorist
strike is imminent are often seen as “alarmist” and at the same time those who
contend the opposite, are often perceived as naïve. Although deterrence, as a
strategic concept is mostly inapplicable to countering terrorism -‐ this suggestion
too, is debated. International terrorists have no land, no nation to defend and
they are willing to sacrifice their own lives to advance their goals. However,
Ayman al-‐Zawahiri in Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner (2001), emphasized
the importance of a land-‐base/s; a safe haven/s, to be used as an “address” to
attract international volunteers, to conduct their training, and as a base to stage
attacks from. Furthermore, the terrorism expert Daniel Byman posits that,
“Al Qaeda’s own thinkers stress the importance of maintaining a

haven and seems to have little faith in decentralized, bottom-‐up
efforts…Ayman al-‐Zawahiri contended even as his movement was
being expelled from Afghanistan that, “the Mujahid [fighter for the
faith] Islamic movement will not triumph against the world
coalition unless it possesses a Islamist base in the heart of the
Islamic world “ (Byman 2011, 3).

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Moreover, the analyst Stewart Patrick, in his book, Weak Links: Fragile States,
Global Threats and International Security, posits:
“…for financial or political reasons, a nuclear-‐armed rogue state

might provide nuclear technology – or even weapon – to other
pariah regimes or terrorist groups with fewer qualms about using
one. And even if they did not intentionally do so, as former U.S.
senator…Sam Nunn has pointed out, “ The more countries that
have this fissile material, the more likely the risk of diversion or
theft of fissile material becomes” (Patrick 2011, 110).

Patrick adds,
“ Probably the greatest WMD threat involving nonstate actor

comes from al-‐Qaeda…A July 2007 U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate stated that al-‐Qaeda “will continue to try to acquire and
employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in
attacks, and would not hesitate using them. Other nonstate actors,
such as organized criminals or militant groups, could also attempt
to acquire WMD materials for political leverage, or to sell them to
rogue states or terrorist groups” (Patrick 2011, 111).

And yet, it is Stewart Patrick, who also negates some of the proliferation fears:
“ On the whole, however, concerns that weak states – particularly

the weakest states – will acquire or transfer WMD are probably
overblown. Poor countries generally do not have the financial
resources or human capital to develop or purchase the technology
and equipment needed to produce a nuclear weapon…The
exception that proves the rule is North Korea, a totalitarian regime
willing to starve its population in order to pursue nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons…the greatest proliferation
threat…may come from a handful of relatively strong
states…primarily Syria, Russia, Iran, India, China and Egypt – all
have civilian nuclear programs as well as well known or suspected
WMD stockpiles” (Patrick 2011, 117).

Currently, there is no overtly known source, state or otherwise agent, ready and
willing to supply terrorists with WMD; particularly with the most devastating
nuclear and biological devices. However, the instability and the questionable
security of such weapon’s sources in countries like Russia, Pakistan, N. Korea,
Iran, Egypt or Syria, along with the remote possibility of such weapons being
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“shared” with terrorist group, by a rouge state (e.g. N. Korea or Iran), can not be
overlooked. This threat is reiterated in view of the current, (February 12, 2013)
third N. Korean successful nuclear test, the continuous N. Korean threat-‐
escalation (towards S. Korea and the U.S.) and the Iran – N. Korea collaboration
on the nuclear issue.
“Indeed, Iran's nuclear weapons program bears many striking

similarities to the research being undertaken in North Korea. The
delivery system for Iran's nuclear device is an advanced form of
the Soviet-‐era Scud missile – just like the North Koreans. And
Iranian scientists are working on a project similar to the North
Koreans which would enable them to attach a nuclear device
comprising enriched uranium to the missiles…the fact that North
Korea has been able to detonate three nuclear devices with
relative impunity will only serve to encourage Iran that, when the
time comes, it will be able to test a device of its own without any
unwelcome interference from the West” (Coughlin 2013).

Review of literature regarding the concepts of Deterrence and Punishment
in the context of counterterrorism
It seems logical to suggest that rogue states, and unstable states with civilian
nuclear capability, may become a likely source of WMD materials acquired by
terrorists. On the other hand, it is just as logical to argue, that no ‘sane’ state-‐
actor, rouge as it may be, would agree to relinquish the control it has over WMD
or their precursors and share such weapon with a terrorist group, which is
virtually uncontrollable – and thus expose itself to international punishment, or
even a massive retaliation by the target country. With that in mind, on February
6, 2013 the governments of U.S., U.K. and France released a Joint Statement on
Nuclear Terrorism in which they undertake “to share the collective
responsibility to inform and strengthen international measures designed to
secure sensitive information, technology or nuclear material from access by
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terrorists, and to develop emergency response measures” (The White House
2013).
The U.S. needs to develop a better ability to identify the origins of possibly
illegally obtained WMD, and to be able to attribute illegal WMD transfer by a
state to a terrorist group. However, even if that is achieved, it will remain
difficult to prove that such transfer was done with the consent of a specific
government, and not by some rogue, non-‐state element within that state. Some
posit that the U.S., in order to preserve its deterrence must be ready to retaliate,
on the basis of even limited and imperfect information about the origins of the
WMD, or the precursors needed to build it.
A punishment should be in place also for negligence and carelessness in this
respect:
.” The U.S. must clearly communicate its willingness to severely

punish those states that, because of mismanagement of CBRN, risk
loss or theft of critical materials from their storage facilities. Such a
policy stance would be extremely contentious and may damage the
relationship of the U.S. have with a number of states. However,
until CBRN attribution becomes certain to establish a meaningful
deterrent mechanism against states that knowingly transfer
sensitive materials the U.S. must also threaten those states that do
not adequately secure their CBRN materials” (Fisher 2007, 8).

Philip Geelhood in his 2009 thesis suggests a more cautious approach to the
culpability of a state actor:
“ The analysis of deterrence theory…indicates that an inviolable

redline should be broadly established to deter the purposeful
transfer of nuclear materials or weapons to terrorists; this line
should only be shifted to include unintentional transfer [by] only
those few adversarial states that possess nuclear weapons or
fissile materials that may potentially sponsor terrorist groups, and
with whom the real potential for security cooperation is
nonexistent…” (Geelhood 2009, 72-‐73).

Regarding the effectiveness of deterrence against suicide terrorism,
23
Graham Allison, in his book Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable
Catastrophe states,
“…the ground troops of Islamist terrorism are unaffected by a fear
of death, making deterrence inoperable as strategy. Even if Osama
bin Laden and his deputies wish to stay alive to carry on jihad, they
operate in the dark alleys and caves of the world, without a home
base against which the United States could retaliate.” (2004, 130).

This statement somewhat flawed. It would be wrong to assume that all
terrorists, even suicide terrorists “ have nothing to loose,” in spite of their
declared willingness to die for their cause. Terrorists are after all, human beings
with their circles of family and friends. Their families occasionally have valuable
personal assets and cherish their personal lives; which they stand to lose, as part
of punishment inflicted on terrorists or as unfortunate and tragic “collateral
damage.” As in the case of bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri and others, it would
be wrong to think that al Zawahiri did not grieve over his wife and son, killed in
one of the allied airstrikes targeting him. Indeed, some of the ‘ground troops’ of
al Qaeda may fit the title “desperados;” this however is almost never the case of
top al-‐Qaeda’s leadership. They want to remain alive and to continue sending
others to do the “holy” work. Thus, there may be some degree of deterrence
affecting terrorists, after all. However, the loss of one’s loved ones can also serve
as motivation for even more stubborn terrorism. For some individuals, suggests
the analyst Ami Pedahzur in his book Suicide Terrorism, (2005) -‐ the “crisis,”
some individuals were, for example, subjected to, e.g. the loss of a loved one/s,
could well be one of the precipitating factors motivating predisposed potential
individuals, (terrorist or not), to become suicide terrorist, in their quest for
revenge. (Pedahzur 2005, 125).
24
The fact that all international terrorist groups are led by leaders that
usually does not entertain the idea of self-‐emulation, leads to an early
speculation, that most suicide terrorist attacks cannot be attributed only to the
suicide bombers alone; in the vast majority of the cases, the planning, the
mobilization, the training and the indoctrination, that leads the suicide bomber
to self-‐emulation – are done by some level of group leadership. (Pedahzur 2005,
170-‐181). In that respect, it may be posited that, that in all likelihood, a group led
by a surviving leader may become the culprit behind a prospective WMD attack
(especially, a nuclear or biological attack), whereas the chances of survival for
the actual person/s who sets and detonates the device -‐ are very small. The
leadership of his group is usually, remote from the attack, and survives. In the
example of 9/11, the 19 terrorists were a select group, trained by a high echelon
of al-‐Qaeda -‐ which indeed survived.
Graham Allison (2004), bases his theory of “ultimate preventive catastrophe”
not on deterrence, but on massive preventive measures, which he summarizes
as the “Seven Yeses” [seven major undertakings we must do]. Interestingly, the
U.S. government, whether it read Allison’s book or not, is in fact very much
engaged in following much of Allison’s recommendations. The sad fact remains,
that some of the key issues are not addressed well enough.
• Making the prevention of nuclear terrorism an absolute national

priority. (U.S. government does just that).
• Fighting a strategically focused war on terrorism. (We do just that).
• Conducting a humble foreign policy. (U.S. does poorly).
• Building a global alliance against nuclear terrorism. (U.S. observes very
slow progress).
• Creating the intelligence capabilities required for success in the war on
nuclear terrorism. (The U.S. must improve sharing and HUMINT
capabilities)
• Dealing with dirty bombs. (America should improve detection
capabilities).
25
• Constructing a multilayered defense. (The United States needs massive
improvement in this area).
(Allison 2004, 199-‐201).

Review of literature regarding the use of targeted killings: efficacy and
legal issues.
Daniel Byman in his 2009 article expresses his opinion on the topic of targeted
killings for the Brooking Institute. He posits,
Killing terrorists is difficult, is often ineffective, and can easily
backfire. Yet it is one of United States’ few options for managing
the threat posed by al Qaeda…U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan has
killed dozens of lower –ranking and at least 10-‐mid and high-‐
ranking leaders from al Qaeda and the Taliban”(Byman 2009).

Interestingly, in 2006 Byman wrote an article with an near-‐ identical title, in
which he carefully outlined the risks, as exemplified by the Bush administration’s
abolishing of many, long-‐standing U.S. limits on punitive and preventive actions
and the need for authorization of special measures, (including secret prisons;
domestic surveillance without court authorization; holding of enemy combatants
and their rendition to third countries for interrogation). All of which caused
international outcry, and have caused many Americans to question the
legitimacy of their government’s CT policy.
In 2005 Jerry Smith evaluates in his thesis, the effectiveness of Israel’s
counterterrorism strategy. He derives some interesting insights:
“ When a suicide attack occurs, the Israeli citizens want action to
be taken…the Israeli government sees [the targeted killing] as an
opportunity to solve two problems at the same time. They can take
out the senior key figure of the terrorist organization responsible
for the attack, while also giving the victim’s families some sense of
justice” (Smith 2005, 57).

26
Diane Leigh Maye contrasts this point of view in her 2006 thesis on the same
topic. Leigh Maye evaluates seven Israeli “ actions aimed at countering
“Palestinian resistance.” By addressing Palestinian terrorists as resistance, Leigh
Maye is rendering Palestinian terrorism, certain “legitimacy” as combatants of a
guerrilla war. In a highly biased, but interesting paper, she focuses on “targeted
assassinations” (as contrasted with “killings”); home demolitions; collective
punishment; border controls; administrative detention; controls on terrorist
financing, and technological advances. (Leigh Mae, 2006, V). Maye correctly
posits that Israel’s policy of targeted killings has come under severe scrutiny by
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; she also correctly assesses the
poor efficacy of targeted killings as “root problem solution” in the long run:
“ The assassinations have not thwarted number of attacks…nor do they have
history of ending the terrorist organization’s existence. To the contrary, the
attacks may have provoked an even stronger response…” (Leigh Maye 2006, 39).
However, Smith contends:
“ International law prohibits assassinations…[however] terrorists

are considered to be “common enemies of humankind”…Many
times after a leader is removed there tends to be
internal…struggle…furthermore, group will tend to spend more
time and resources to stay alive…the Israeli policy of targeting
“ticking-‐bomb terrorists does not deserve the kind of
condemnation it is receiving…” (Smith 2005, 35).

Moreover, Byman highlights the Israeli practice of targeted killings and
emphasizes Israel’s General Secret Service’s and the IDF’s uniquely transparent
approach and nationwide-‐garnered support, towards these unfortunate, yet
sometimes, absolutely necessary kinetic operations. (Byman 2006, 108-‐111).
27
The United States is a firm, unrelenting, believer in democracy.
Democracies vary, among other things -‐ in their respective perception of their
citizen’s rights as humans and as citizens; as well as in their perception of the
“human rights” of terrorists. Most current counterterrorism measures, used by
Israel, (e.g. blowing up houses of terrorists; the security barrier; enhanced
interrogation; targeted killings etc.) are occasionally contested not only by the
terrorists themselves and the Arab countries; but also by the Israeli legal system
and by Israel’s otherwise closest allies, including the United States. Furthermore,
Israel’s CT practices are severely scrutinized also by segments of the Israeli
population. Naturally, one of the most contested methods is “targeted killings” of
terrorists. Arguably, this method would probably, be less contested than it is, if
the actual casualties of these strikes would have been terrorists only. The so-‐
called “collateral damage” is severely criticized. However, the vast majority of
Israelis support the hard line of their government. Had the American people
shared Israel’s experience of daily suicide bombings, they too, might have
decided, that “better red than dead”; meaning: if the current system is incapable
of defending me – it’s time to re-‐evaluate, and possibly change it, using whatever
measures needed to assure survival. Alas, the world is not perfect, and the U.S.
population and other allied populations include people that often see targeted
killings and especially targeted killings of Americans-‐turned-‐terrorists, as
questionable, or even outright illegal under the 5th Amendment to the
Constitution of the U.S. and under International Law.
The near-‐total opaqueness of the application of drone strikes, by the CIA, does
not help the case for killings without “due process”. Many free press articles
28
cover the debate over this and other CT issues. David Brooks writing recently in
the New York Times suggested,
“ [Machiavelli] puts too much faith in the self-‐constraint of his
leaders. Machiavelli tells us that men are venal self-‐deceivers, but
then he gives his Prince [aka Obama] permission to do all these
monstrous things, trusting him not to get carried away or turn in a
monster himself. Our founders were more careful. Our founders
understood that leaders are as venal and untrustworthy as
anybody else. They abhorred concentrated power, and they set up
checks and balances to disperse it. Our drone policy should take
account of our founders’ superior realism. Drone strikes are easy,
hidden and abstract. There should be some independent judicial
panel to review the kill lists. There should be an independent panel
of former military and intelligence officers issuing reports on the
program’s efficacy.”(Brooks, David. 2013).

It is interesting to recall Francis Fukuyama’s End of History in that context. In
2008 Fukuyama suggested, in an interview to the Daily Beast, an “upgrade” to his
1992 original thoughts,
”… Democracy is built around institutions that are quite difficult to
put into place, especially the rule of law…I did not imagine back in
1992 [that] the U.S. could become so controversial and damaging to
the prospect of democracy…there needs to be a re-emphasis on the
use of American soft power” (Fukuyama In Philips 2008).

Contrary to the thoughts of Fukuyama is afore mentioned Daniel Byman’s
suggestion in his 2011 article,
“ The aggressive U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has played an
important role in weakening al-‐Qaeda and should be continued.
The Drone campaign will not end al Qaeda presence in Pakistan,
but it does keep the organization on the run and reduces its
operational effectiveness.” (Byman 2011).

On this very topic of targeted killings, Richard Murpy and Afsheen John Radsan,
wrote their legal analysis and assessment, of Due Process and Targeted Killing of
Terrorists. There, on page 405 they state,
“…under Boumediene, [Boumediene vs. Bush] the executive has a

due process obligation to develop fair, rational procedures for its
29
use of targeted killing no matter whom it might be targeting
anywhere in the world. To implement this duty, the executive
should, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Israel (among
others), require an independent, intra-‐executive investigation of
any targeted killing by the CIA. These investigations should be as
public as is reasonably consistent with national security. Even in
war on terror, due process demands at least this level of
accountability for the power to kill suspected terrorists” (Murpy &
Radsan 2009, 405).

Yet another legal opinion, by David Kretzmer, suggests that unless realistic
standards of conduct for states involved in armed conflicts with terrorist groups
exist, these states actions may be no better -‐ than the actions of the terrorists
themselves, when they resort to targeted killings (both acting in “an
environment infected by lawlessness”). However, Kretzmer adds that whatever
the lawlessness rules may be, they are better than none. (Kretzmer 2005). With
due respect to Kretzmer, this statement is contradictory and confusing. In yet
another legal opinion by Kristen Eichensehr, published in the Yale Law Journal,
she criticizes the Israeli Supreme Court, asserting that the Israeli Supreme Court,
in its first ruling on the issue of targeted killings, has weakened the international
law’s protection to all civilians, by extending the meaning of “direct
participation” of terrorists in terrorism:
“ terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus
are lawfully subject to attack only when the directly participate in
hostilities. But the court also expanded the traditional definition of
“direct participation”…By disregarding the “direct participation”
requirements’ important evidentiary function, the court weakened
the protection that international law affords to all civilians, not just
to terrorists” (Eichensehr, 2007).

To summarize, the morals, humanity and the legal posture, of targeted killing is
highly disputed, as is its efficacy. However, while the whole array of
30
counterterrorist current tools is badly flawed, it is, arguably, the best we have –
in the short term.
When thinking about more distant future, something that strategists should and
must do, new elements, still in their early stages of development, such as the
application of soft power, smart power, state building, democratic institutions
creation, etc., should be considered with much more vigor than has been thus far.
Review of literature regarding preparedness. Can we outlive a WMD
attack?
On the American home front, while the older American generations still recall
the “fallout shelters” and the nuclear attack drills of the Cold War era -‐ for
younger generations, this is (arguably, prematurely) only nostalgia. Graham
Allison, is totally convinced that nuclear terrorism is inevitable even today,
despite all the efforts to mitigate it. If such threat indeed materializes, it will be a
real catastrophe. The U.S. will arguably, survive a single nuclear blast. However
horrible, such calamity will not topple the United States.
“ …Not even close. It would be a devastating, world-‐changing

event, but the United States would live to fight another day.
However, the country should have a plan on how to soften the
blow, respond, and ultimately recover from an attack”(Frost
2012).

In view of the current nature of international terrorism, there is a strong and
renewed need for educating the American public about the new “real world” of
terrorist threats:
“Very little, if any, anti-‐terrorism training is conducted in U.S.
schools or the population at large. In Israel, on the other hand,
there is a much greater focus on the citizen’s responsibility to
31
prepare for, and respond, should a terror attack or natural disaster
occur…the complementary Israeli programs include Israel’s
layered response…” (Larsen and Pravecek 2006, xii).

It stands to plain logic that effectively drilling the population in various
contingencies, (chemical, radiological, thermonuclear and biological), creating a
better preparedness of the homeland for dealing with conventional and other
terrorist attack/s, and better preparing the U.S. emergency medical services for
just such contingencies -‐ all these are measures should be led by the US
government, but executed mostly by state and local agencies. Current U.S.
regulations indeed provide for significant federal intervention, yet the
bureaucracy involved is still hindering the executive federal capability. As we
have seen so far, we were absolutely unprepared for 9/11, but much worse,
years later -‐ we were still unprepared to deal with a “mere” hurricane. As Katie
Frost observes,
“ The United States has spent billions working to prevent the
catastrophe of a nuclear terror attack but has done little to prepare
for it…The creation of the DHS…left many onlookers scratching
their heads, unaware of who held authority…The lethargic
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 highlighted the flaws in
FEMA’s national infrastructure and its capability to assist a
devastated community. There is little evidence of substantive
improvement since then…Assuming national assistance doesn’t
arrive in force for at least two days, the lion’s share of initial
response will land on the shoulders of state and local responders”
(Frost 2012).

Moreover, in spite of New York City, being perhaps the most prepared
municipality in the nation it is still “woefully unprepared for nuclear terrorism.”
Frost continues:
“ A featured strategic goal [of the] DHS is developing a “culture of
preparedness,” yet …nothing focuses on the education and
knowledge of the public…We need commercials, billboards, and
vast expansion of the Citizen Corps program…Preparedness
32
programs should also be incorporated into high school curricula…”
(Frost 2012).

For the Israelis preparedness is a way of life. This is an integral part of coping
with terrorism, as well as with the inherent wish of Arabs and Muslims to
annihilate the Jewish state. It is an existential question. Israel does not have any
significant “strategic depth, “to depend on. Israel is no larger than New Jersey.
During the 1991, U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Israelis had a taste of the true meaning
of the “whole country” being under the Iraqi Scud attacks. The HAGA (i.e.
HAGANA EZRAHIT aka Civil Defense) which being an offshoot of the IDF, and in
charge of Civil Defense, was quickly revised, augmented and renamed the Home
Front Command, (HFC aka Pikud Ha’oref). HFC became an integral Command
within the IDF. In a strategic foresight of things to come, the HFC efficiently
distributed millions of gas masks and atropine self-‐injectors, along with massive,
national education effort that prepared every Israeli residence, and every single
Israeli individual of all ages, to the eventuality of the feared WMD attack. (In
1991 the focus was on chemical WMD). Although Larsen and Pravecek also posit
that,
“ Israel is also way ahead of the United Sates in its practice of
sharing information between bureaucratic organizations…and in
requesting and sharing responsibility for civil defense. The
Mossad, Shin Bet, and the local police units share a common
intelligence pool, and work together closely when
necessary”(2006, 86-‐87),

such was not the case, at the time when Larsen and Pravecek’s work was
published. 2006 arguably, signifies the beginning of the welcome change
described above (the actual GSS reform initiative began in the 1990s). It was not
for some time that the fruits of the changes started to be felt.
33
It may be a constructive idea to consider some of the above-‐mentioned current
Israeli practices, through the eyes of the American needs, and adapt what is
possible.
Both, the United States and Israel are forced to use extraordinary measures to
deal with their respective terrorism problems. Despite the fact that Americans
do not feel the day-‐to-‐day terrorist threat, as the Israelis feel it -‐ the civil
populations of both countries are in danger. The threat shared by the Israelis, is
not only personal, but also national and existential. In some ways, younger
Americans are luckier than Israelis, because they seem to lack the tragic element
of imagination required to perceive the nature of an existential threat. Certain
elements of that perception may have been was lost with the end of the Cold
War. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 shook the American public to the
core, but like Pearl Harbor, they did not create a realistic existential threat. In
truth, arguably, the threat to the United States is not existential. Many claim that
President Obama’s reiteration of the nuclear and other WMD threats to America
is overblown, as a result of the “heritage” of the previous administration’s V.P.
Cheney stating in February 2009:
“…that such [ true WMD] an attack was “high probability”…In other
words, if there were an attack on the United States that killed many
tens of thousands, it would be the Obama administration’s fault,
since in Cheney’s telling, it was the Bush administration’s extralegal
policies that kept America safe after 9/11, including safe from
terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction” (Bergen 2011,
229).

Even if America were to be attacked by a terrorist nuclear device, this would not
threaten the very existence of the United States. An existential threat to the U.S.
can come only from a massive nuclear threat from a major nuclear power; such
34
threat is currently, arguably, unrealistic. One of the challenges of this paper is,
the understanding of the extreme asymmetry and contrast, between the
convictions/intentions of al-‐Qaeda-‐core’s leadership -‐ and the super-‐
humanitarian convictions of some good folks everywhere; who are convinced
that no matter how terrible the terrorist’s deeds and intentions are – they should
still be treated in a humanitarian way, afforded a fair trial and a due process. As
we recall, while according to the Bible, the Ten Commandments tell us “Thou
Shalt Not Kill,” (Exodus 20:13), under certain circumstances, when a foe
attempts to kill you – you have the legal right to kill him first in self-‐defense.
(“The one who is going to kill you shall be killed before he succeed").
This understanding underscores the spirit in which terrorist threats should be
treated. This is the underlying attitude, around which a consistent, coherent CT
strategy/tactic should be built and applied.
On October 16, 2003 Donald Rumsfeld, then the Secretary of Defense, addressed
a letter to the top echelon of the U.S. counterterrorism administration. He asks:
“Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror? Is DoD

changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security
environment?...We have mixed results with Al Qaida…Have we
fashioned the right mix of rewards, amnesty, protection and
confidence in the US? Does DoD need to think through new ways to
organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on
terror? Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or
losing…Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are
recruiting, training and deploying against us?” (Rumsfeld 2003).

In 2012, Audrey Kurth Cronin, suggests the following reply:
“ Ten years into a trillion dollar effort to answer the attacks of

September 11, 2001, it is difficult to tell whether U.S.
counterterrorism is achieving its intended effects…experts still
debate whether or not the United States is winning the fight
against al Qaeda”(Kurth Cronin, 2012, 1).

35
And yet Cronin also admits that “…al-‐Qaeda repels rather than
attracts…only two percent of Muslims in Lebanon, five percent in
Turkey, and 15 percent in Jordan support al Qaeda…ratings for
Osama bin Laden [before his death] had dropped off a cliff: in
Jordan they went from 56 percent in 2003 to 13 percent in 2011
and in Pakistan from 52 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2011”
(Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011 In Kurth Cronin 2011, 11).

It seems that some major shift in the United States CT strategy is required. This is
a change that goes way beyond whatever wisdom can be arguably, gleaned from
the application of lessons learned from another country fighting terrorism, like
Israel. Arguably, al Qaeda’s major vulnerability, as self-‐admitted, by this group’s
current commander, Ayman al Zawahiri in his 2005 letter to Abu Musab el
Zarqawi urging the latest to prepare to the U.S. withdrawal by refraining from
further alienation of the Iraqi masses, (a mistake exemplified in Taliban’s deeds
in Afghanistan) – is its difficulty to continue mobilizing popular support. The lack
of public support was and is a fact far from lost on the al Qaeda core leadership.
“ While bin Laden has enjoyed a certain amount of personal

popularity in much of the Muslim world, that has not been
translated into mass support for al_qaeda in the manner that
Hezbollah enjoys such support in Lebanon. That is not surprising –
there are no Al Qaeda social welfare services or schools. An al-‐
Qaeda hospital is a grim oxymoron. Even al-‐Qaeda’s leaders are
aware of the problem of their lack of mass support”

(Bergen 2011, 301). The alluded-‐to shift is a philosophical and a pragmatic one.
The United States relates to its counterterrorist struggle in the context of global
counterinsurgency, instead of fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates in a more
simplistic counterterrorist context. Current US model as seen in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Middle East, Africa and South Asia tends to attribute a measure of
“legitimacy” to al Qaeda’s struggle, by portraying it more as insurgents, than the
plain terrorists they really are. Moreover, counterinsurgency campaign is much
more costly, and in this case disproportionate: “ At a time when there were more
36
than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, the total number of al-‐Qaeda operatives
in…Pakistan was …’more than 300’…and the number in Afghanistan was,
according to Leon Panetta…’50-‐100, maybe less.’ The imbalance is
obvious”(Kurth Cronin 2012, 19). Thus the response to al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates
should arguably be, more along the lines of the Israeli response to Palestinian
terrorism; however, avoiding the inconsistency exemplified in the Israeli CT
model of “action/reaction.” Some experts claim that al Qaeda is declining; we
should thus allow it to continue to decline and avoid invigorating it through
exaggerated media coverage and highlight their mistakes. Furthermore, the
method of polarization of the internal disputes and arguments, within the group
and between it affiliates, should be fostered, through a clever manipulation of the
existing differences within the Islamist movement regarding their various
differences (e.g. attitudes towards killing of innocents, the application of Shari’a
law, who is a real Jihadist and who should be labeled as apostate or infidel etc.).
As wisely put by Cronin,
“ For a decade, the United States has struggled to find a counter

narrative in the fight against al Qaeda, a way to shore up
moderates without tainting them…Our role should be to avoid
directly interfering, even as we support the emergence of
pluralistic forces that could represent a counter-‐mobilizing force
that inspires millions of young Arabs…Now Americans must
reverse the widespread impression that the only change they
support is change they effect, and shrink the tendency to be so self-‐
centered as to miss an historical paradigm that may be delivering
the best answer to al-‐Qaida imaginable” (Kurth Cronin 2011, 23).

It is with this nagging question in mind enter this paper.
37

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Counterproliferation Papers; Future Warfare Series No. 36. U.S.A.F
Counterproliferation Center: Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/buildingpopres.pdf.

Kretzmer, David. 2005. Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-‐Judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defense? The European Journal of
International Law Vol. 16 No. 2.
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/2/171.ful.pdf.(accessed February 11,
2013).

Kurth Cronin, Audrey. 2012. U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism. ORBIS:
(January 4).
http://policy.gmu.edu/portals/0/pdfs/Cronin/Grand_Strategy_and_CT_Orbis_Cr
onin.pdf. (accessed February 15, 2013).

Laqueur, Walter. 2003. No End to War. New York: The Continuum Publishing
Group Inc.

Laqueur, Walter. 2007. Terrorism: A Brief History: Historical Context for the
Phenomenon of Modern-‐Day Terrorism. AMERICA.gov.
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-‐
english/2007/May/20080522172730SrenoD0.6634027.html

Leigh Maye, Diane. 2006. Measures of Effectiveness: Israeli Counterterrorism
Strategies and Tactics During the Al-‐Aqsa Intifada. PhD assr. Naval Postgraduate
School. Monterey. California: (September).
www.dtic.mil/cgi-‐bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457277 .
40

Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Pravecek, Tasha L. 2006. Comparative U.S.-‐Israeli
Homeland Security. The Counterproliferation Papers: Future Warfare Series No.
33: USAF Counterproliferation Center: Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base:
Alabama. http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/comparativeusisraeli.pdf
See also: http://tinyurl.com/azz5mxa. (accessed January 15, 2013).

Mowatt-‐Larssen, Rolf. 2010. Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat:
Hype or Reality. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard:
(January).
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_
mass_destruction_threat.html. (accessed February 6, 2013).
Murphy, Richard and Radsan, Afsheen John. 2009. Due Process and Targeted
Killing of Terrorists. Social Science Research Network: (March1).
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349357.

National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 2011. The White House.
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf

Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.
New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Pape, Robert A. and Feldman, James K. 2010. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of
Global Suicide Terrorism & How to Stop It. London: The University of Chicago
Press.

Patrick, Stewart. 2011.Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and
International Security. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.

Pedahzur, Ami. 2005. Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity.

Pedahzur, Ami.2007. The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle Against Terrorism.
New York: Columbia University Press.

Peritz, Aki and Rosenbach, Eric. 2012. Find Fix Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism
Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al- Qaeda. New York: Public
Affairs.

41

Pockett, Consuella B. 2005. United Sates and Israeli Homeland Security: A
Comparative Analysis of Emergency Preparedness Efforts. The
Counterproliferation Papers: Future Warfare Series No. 33: USAF
Counterproliferation Center: Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base: Alabama.
http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/usandisraelicompare.pdf

Quiggin, Thomas. 2007.Seing the Invisible: National Security in an Uncertain Age.
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Rollins, John, Wyler Liana Sun and Rosen, Seth. 2010. International Terrorism
and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for
Congress. CRS Congressional Research Service: (January 5).
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/134960.pdf

Rumsfeld, Donald. 2003. Global War on Terrorism. Global Security. Memo:
(October 16). www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeld-‐
d20031016sdmemo.htm. (accessed February 14, 2013).

Smith, Jerry D. 2005. The Effectiveness of Israel’s Counter-‐terrorism. PhD assr.
Strategy.Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey. California: (March).
http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2005/05Mar_Smith.pdf

The White House. 2011. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
National Security Council: (July 25).
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-‐crime

Zawahiri, Ayman. 2001. Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. Serialized in Al-‐
Sharq al Awsat (London): (December). Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, document FBIS-‐NES-‐2001-‐1202. Maintained online by FAS.
http://fas.org/irp/world/para/aymanh_bk.html

42

PART TWO: THE MODERN TERRORISM CHALLENGE -‐

WHAT TO EXPECT? PRACTICAL AND

ACADEMIC APPROACHES

43

V. Fighting International Terrorism Effectively Without Giving up on the

very Foundation of Democracy – a Fallacy or an Actual Possibility?

Current U.S. experience in Iraq, Eurasia, South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
attest to multiple challenges regarding the effective confrontation of
international terrorist groups. Transnational groups like al-‐Qaeda are few, but
more localized terrorist groups that share al-‐Qaeda’s convictions and are loosely
connected with this amorphous group -‐ seem to pop up recently like mushrooms
after a rain, in many places in the world. Following 9/11, the notion was that
although the US embarked on a world-‐wide anti-‐terrorism campaign, the focus of
this struggle was at first Afghanistan and many thought that a successful
elimination of al-‐Qaeda in Afghanistan will deal a death blow to world’s fanatic
Islamism. However, such was not the case. While the U.S. and its allies have been
stubbornly fighting al-‐Qaeda core in Afghanistan, this terrorist entity’s
philosophy obviously resonated well with the emotions of large segments of
Muslim populations around the world. Moreover, the U.S. counterterrorist
strategy identifies many Islamist terrorist groups as “part or affiliate of al-‐
Qaeda.” This approach is arguably, wrong. The onset of this perception can be
traced back to 2001-‐2002, when America took its fight not only to al Qaeda core
in Pakistan, but also to the Taliban, which indeed supported al Qaeda but was
never a part of it. In fact, while US troops fought the Taliban, al-‐Qaeda core
cleverly retreated into the high Tora Bora Mountains and caves and the U.S.
command repeatedly declined intelligence (CIA’s) suggestions to follow and
“finish” them; thus completely decimating al Qaeda. (Bergen 2011, 70-‐75).
Although many Muslim terrorist groups retained their independence from al-‐
44
Qaeda, they are strongly influenced by al-‐Qaeda’s religious and political views
and many of them became al-‐Qaeda’s ‘affiliates’, spreading the Islamist terrorism
throughout the world. Moreover, directly al-‐Qaeda-‐sponsored groups flourished
as well and seem to be the constant focus of current counterterrorist efforts.
Some of the more active ones are for example, Lashkar-‐e-‐taiba and Tehrik-‐i-‐
taliban in Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban; the Jemaa Islamiyah in Thailand,
Singapore and the Phillipines; the Al – Shabaab in Somalia, AQI – in Iraq; AQIAP –
in Arabia and others. Like the mythological Medusa, or like cancer Islamist
fanaticism keeps spreading. One of the challenges of this paper is to come up
with suggestions how to better confront the U.S terrorist challenge.
On at least two occasions, both as Director of the C.I.A. and as Secretary of
Defense, Leon Panetta belittled the presence of al-‐Qaeda’s combatants in
Afghanistan, stating in 2010, that there were only about 50-‐100 or so al-‐Qaeda
fighters left in Afghanistan. (Huffington Post 2010). More recently, in September
2012, Mr. Panetta said that: “ he views rogue Afghan troops and police turning
their guns on allied forces attacks as the ‘last gasp’ of a Taliban insurgency
[historically, but possibly wrongly, linked with al-‐Qaeda – and perceived as “one
and the same”] that has not been able to regain lost ground “ (Telegraph 2012).
Just shortly later, in January 2013, David Wood, Reporting for the Huffington
Post, asked Secretary Panetta, how the administration could justify continued
U.S. involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in view of the
facts that after spending $641 billion; 2,162 dead Americans, and 18,188
wounded -‐ the Pentagon reports that this insurgency, that was supposed to have
been beaten -‐ is still active and resilient; the Afghan government is still corrupt;
and the Afghan security forces are still unable to fight “their own” war. Panetta
45
responded: “ We have poured a lot of blood and treasure into this war… We have
made a lot of progress… and we’re not gonna walk backward.” (Huffington Post
2013). However, strong words alone do not win wars, and the fact remains that
according to the Pentagon, despite hard fighting by U.S., Allied and Afghan forces,
“ the insurgency has nevertheless retained its capability to carry out attacks at
almost the same level as last year.” (Huffington Post 2013). In an excellent
article, the terrorism expert Audrey Kurth Cronin suggests in 2012, that the U.S,
should separate its struggle against al Qaeda from its fighting other terrorist
groups. Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been indeed
severely decimated, but the numbers of the allied forces facing al Qaeda do not
add up, and they point to a gross disproportion in the US involvement in Eurasia.
If indeed the number of al Qaeda Pakistan was in 2010 reportedly, “somewhat
more than 300” (Leiter 2010), and the number of al-‐Qaeda Afghanistan, is as
stated above 50-‐100, why was the size of the American and allied forces in
Afghanistan close to 100,000 (in 2010)? It seems clear that the US NSS views all
Islamists as al Qaeda, which is wrong. By doing so the U.S. is playing into the
hands of al Qaeda by portraying it as a massive movement, at a time that it is in
fact, already small and arguably, continuously losing ground. Moreover, the US
all-‐inclusive strategy attributes certain degree of “legitimacy” to al Qaeda and its
affiliates by treating it more as an insurgency and thus, like a form of “legitimate
guerrilla warfare” struggling for self determination.
“Terrorism…i.e. the deliberate targeting of civilians by nonstate

actors for symbolic political effects is never legitimate…Al Qaeda’s
terrorism is causing a backlash that is killing the group and, while
no one wants innocent people to be targeted, the United States is
foolish to interfere with that backlash…framing al Qaeda as a
“global insurgency” is a mistake…[it is} a formula for national
46
bankruptcy, strategic irrelevance, and loss of American primacy”
Kurth Cronin 2012).

Currently, America and its allies are faced with Islamist terrorism all over the
Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa, in the Sahel and in the African Horn.
The latest development being NATO’s involvement in Libya, France and U.S.
involvement in Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, as well as continued activity in Somalia,
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Sudan. At the same time, we can’t omit
the ominous developments in Syria; the persistent instability in Pakistan; the
“green-‐on-‐green” Afghan military attacks against the US and allied forces. Nor
can continuous terrorism in Iraq, the state sponsored terrorism by Hezbollah,
the Iranian nuclear threat, and the terrorist activity of the Hamas and other
Palestinian factions be ignored. One may ask: is this an Arab Spring, or rather the
radical Islamist one?
Where has the United States and the West gone wrong? For one thing, it has
gone wrong by failing to follow its own NSS, that attempted to separate the
former administration’s “war on terror” from the current “war against al-‐Qaida
and its affiliates”. While the Obama administration, in its wish to diminish the
scope of the struggle from a “worldly” one, to one more focused on al Qaeda -‐ it
in fact did little more than change the struggle’s name. Indeed, the war in Iraq
came to an official end and American troops were mostly withdrawn; yet it is too
early to claim a final victory in view of the ongoing subversive activity there
(Markey and Kareem 2013). Moreover, Obama’s declaration regarding the
planned pull out from Afghanistan by 2014 and the current commitment to
withdraw 34,000 US troops there by early 2014, was met with a lot of
skepticism. This skepticism is the result of wrong American framing of the war
47
against al Qaeda, and the war with the Taliban as one. Such approach has little to
do with advancing real American interests. In fact, it delays the US
disengagement from its longest war yet.
“ In Afghanistan, for example, formerly disparate forces have

aligned against the United States (the Haqqani network, numerous
Taliban factions, drug lords, war lords, and so forth), neighboring
Pakistan is providing sanctuary and to some degree supporting
them, we are saddled with propping up a government in Kabul that
lacks legitimacy, and our aims have grown so dramatically since
2001 that it is difficult to see how our aims will be able to achieve
them…The operation in Afghanistan should never have been about
protecting civilians and holding territory, but about eliminating
the possibility of al Qaeda attacking the United States again”
(Kurth Cronin 2012, 19).

Democracies indeed face severe dilemmas when confronting terrorist violence.
As the world has learned, massive or even moderate, military intervention often
alienates the population and paves the path for increased terrorist support. It
also damages the legitimacy of existing governments, their police and security
forces, their judiciary and thus – the rule of law -‐ as we’ve seen in Pakistan,
Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and recently in Libya, Algeria and Mali. The
inability of a certain regimes to exercise their authority over part, or all of their
sovereign territory, provides new “safe haven” opportunities to transnational
terrorism and transnational organized crime. In this respect, the democratic
world faces two challenges. First, the current counterterrorist paradigm of
‘fighting fire with fire,’ may seem almost contrary to the concept of democracy,
and thus – contradictory to the upholding of democratic fundaments and
principles, such as humanitarian behavior, high moral standards, ensuring civil
rights, preserving a system of checks and balances and the rule of law. Second,
democracy, unlike the amorphous notion of say, ‘establishment’, is a more
48
concrete concept. We have erred before and we are probably erring currently by
attempting to “impose” democracy upon countries, regimes and peoples that are
not yet ripe to understand and absorb the depth of the meaning of democracy.
Have we created a real democracy in Iraq? It seems that at the very best, Iraq
may serve as a “laboratory” for ideas about how to wring stability out of chaos –
which is arguably, the number one policy challenge of the twenty-‐first century. Is
it even remotely possible, that Iraq, of all places, might offer some new ideas
about how situations of widespread anarchy can be combated? Some claim, “it is
the beehive that produces the honey.” However, if this analogy is used for the
outcome in Iraq, it seems that Iraq is a nested by hornets, yellow jackets and
wasps, rather than bees.
”…[Iraq] was the case that despite a continuing plague of suicide
bombings, significant sections of the country were slowly
recovering from large-‐scale violence, as well as from the effects of
decades of brutal dictatorship? The very U.S. military that had
helped to bring about anarchy in Iraq was now worth studying as a
way to end it, both here and elsewhere in the Third World”(Kaplan
2006).

Democracies come in many forms and sizes. There are no two identical
democracies; and yet, many share the principles of certain set of freedoms, a
government freely elected of the people, by the people and for the people and the
rule of law. Some regimes, in spite of names like “the democratic republic of X”
etc., are not truly democratic. The fact that some Middle Eastern and African
states are autocracies, does not attest to their being exactly “ bad, “ but rather
suggest that their constituents, (many of whom were until not too long ago ruled,
by capitalistic, colonial powers), are not yet ready to accept and assimilate
democratic principles. Unfortunately, often-‐ruthless autocrats, currently rule
some of these countries, while other countries and territories are in effect, ruled
49
by de-‐facto terrorists (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, etc.). Timur
Kuran in his book, The Long Convergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle
East, suggests that Islam’s economic restrictions and not Islam’s cultural
restrictions, held back the progress in countries where Islam was the main
religion. He claims, “ if the region’s autocratic regimes were magically to fall, the
development of strong private sectors and civil societies could take decades”
(Kuran 2011, 281-‐283). Interestingly, back in 2001 the Freedom House stated,
“…the gap in freedom has only widened over the last twenty years. While every
region of the world has registered significant gains for democracy and freedom,
the countries of the Islamic world have experienced a significant increase in
repression” (New Study Details 2001).
A decade later the Arab Spring arrived. In its 2013 report the Freedom House
stated that,
“ Worst of the Worst…Nine [countries] have been given the

survey’s lowest possible rating of 7 both political rights and civil
liberties: Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Two
territories, Tibet and Western Sahara were also ranked among the
worst of the worst…In [Middle East and North Africa]…a region
notable for sectarian polarization, civil strife, and repressive
autocracies, freedom scored some grudging but nonetheless
impressive gains in 2012. Gains: Tunisia…Libya and Egypt…moved
from Not Free to Partly Free. Declines: Syria suffered by far the
worst repercussions from the Arab Spring. Declines were also seen
in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, and the United
Arab Emirates” (Freedom in the World 2013).

Overall, the current outcome seems a little more positive than a decade ago; thus
we are indeed facing a slow process. After all, it took France over eighty bloody
years to come out of the French revolution and gradually implement democratic
principles, which gradually spread through the world. The American Civil War
50
which lasted only 5 years, was in many ways an industrial war, not only a war
about civil freedom -‐ and its end did not signify an automatic transition to ‘true
democracy,’ despite of the fact that much of the French “original” ideas were
already born and ready to adopt. If an important single lesson should be learned
from the US attempt to ”impose” democracy upon Iraq, it probably is that it does
not work well in the long term.
“…even if the brave demonstrators in Tunisia or Egypt or
elsewhere do succeed in permanently overthrowing their
dictators, their prospects for lasting freedom have nothing to do
with rhetorical support from Washington, but depend rather on
whether those countries have the broader political and economic
infrastructure necessary to sustain democracy. If our experience in
Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything it is that the removal
of tyranny alone is insufficient to create stable democracy”
(Calabresi 2011).

As currently seen in both Egypt and Tunisia the slogans “freedom” and
“democracy” are still contested there on a daily basis, while the situation in Iraq
is grave and the forecast is arguably, pessimistic.
A volatile and contradictory mixture of self-‐interests and unrealistic democratic
ideals often propels the United States grand strategy for national security. This is
arguably, the reason behind the fact that so far, “soft power” was used limitedly
and its track record is far from exciting. Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are still at
the very best week, failing or failed countries, torn by ethnic, religious, social and
financial cleavages.
Current day terrorism in its transnational variety, may be the result of activity on
the part of a movement, a loose network or even a common idea, whether
secular, religious or nationalist/political in nature. Be the case as it may, the
repeated attempts to eliminate terrorism by military means alone continuously
prove to be faulty. Is it possible that this has been due to the lack of consistency
51
and inability to see the suppressive military option all the way through? Israel,
for example, has been fighting Palestinian terrorism mostly through military
offensive/defensive means for over 65 years, and the end of the Israeli -‐
Palestinian conflict is still uncontainable. The anti-‐Israeli terrorism continues.
The Basque separatist movement in Spain (ETA), born in the 1950s officially
announced its readiness to disband only in November 2012.
It was however, not the result of a successful military suppression; nor was a
military success the reason for the near-‐termination of the IRA activity in
Ireland. For all we know, the IRA resurfaced again, after the official 2006 IRA’s
“turning its back on violence.” Even in June 2012, a day before Queen Elizabeth II
shook hands with a former commander of the IRA, the Belfast police fought
youths throwing Molotov cocktails as part of the newly rising tensions there.
(IRA 2012). It should have been clear, especially in the aftermath of the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars that military intervention alone, however massive
and potent, will not only fail to eliminate terrorism against Americans and
America; it also acts as a catalyzing agent in building distrust, hatred, and
grievance to anything perceived as self-‐centered, Western or American.
VI. Fighting Terrorism on a National Level.
There is a major difference between fighting terrorism on the national level and
fighting terrorism internationally. The terrorist threat to U.S. is somewhat hard
to compare with the terrorist threat to Israel. While the US has to fight both
homegrown and foreign terrorists, Israel is relatively safer from homegrown
terrorism, and its “foreign terrorism brand” is right next-‐door, making
counterterrorism much more “localized” than America’s global perception of a
52
global war on terrorism (GWOT). Hamas, Hezbollah and other Palestinian
factions, pose mostly, a localized threat and in spite of Hezbollah’s and Hamas’
proliferation in the international community, this does not make the existential
threat to Israel larger. It does however, magnify the overall threat to the United
States, both globally and internally, due to America’s globally widespread
interests and its democratically inherent openness to Hezbollah and Hamas
sleeper cells to be created and activated, within the American Homeland.
On the national level, terrorism is typically fought by a three-‐prong approach:
1). Using the judicial model, according to which terrorism is viewed as a crime.
2) Frequent application of the military model, which responds to terrorism as an
act of insurgency and revolt against the authority of the state.
3). An attempt to erode the support base of terrorists, through successful
resolution of the grievances that led to the conflict in the first place. All three
counterterrorist measures have been used by the U.K. in Ireland; by Spain in the
case of the ETA and in Sri Lanka, in its dealings with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE).
It may be argued that Israel as well, used and still uses all three approaches, but
a coherent pattern, and the strategy of such use, if present, is lost on this writer.
Terrorists easily target democracies because of their relatively open political
systems. By contrast, North Korea’s ultra-‐suppressive regime probably does not
experience any acts of terrorism, because the police-‐state regime is so
suppressive that no insurgency is realistically possible. The same is arguably,
happening in less suppressive systems in Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Iran. Another
example of “successful” suppression of terrorism on a state level is the case of
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government’s system has
evolved from liberal into an suppressive one, due to the inability of an open
53
political system to cope with massive terrorist attacks, that took the form of
political assassinations (of political leaders), political kidnappings, attacks on the
military and indiscriminate killing of non-‐combatants by suicide terrorists.
However, as a trade-‐off, the open political system, evolved to a highly
suppressive one, often described as brutally disregarding human rights, acting
with complete impunity towards its military’s involvement in political
assassinations and disappearances. (Denyer, 2012).
Sri Lanka has obviously chosen to sacrifice its civil liberties, as the only way to
effectively deal with the LTTE, which has been until 2009 possibly, the most
sophisticated and ruthless nationalist/separatist terrorist group. As we have
seen in the case of the LTTE, suppression of human rights, if chosen, as an
acceptable CT approach can be effective, yet the cost of such success may be too
high and may in fact lead to the erosion, or even dismantling of democratic
structures. An argument can be made, that such is the case of the U.S.A and its
2001 Patriot Act, which has somewhat infringed on rights and civil liberties of
the American people, in a manner unprecedented since the Civil War. The
judicial rulings allowing the FBI to demand, without a specific warrant, judicial
oversight or public review, information from Internet services providers, are an
example of such an infringement. In truth, the Patriot Act of 2001 is not
realistically endangering the American democracy in any way because the U.S.
population as well as its legislature are acutely aware of the current situation
and monitor the situation constantly.
In Russia too, critics claimed that the government’s harsh and suppressive
response to Chechen Islamist terrorism, hurt Russia’s relatively new democratic
institutions. Indeed the measures taken by the Russian government following the
54
Beslan school tragedy (2004) included a revision of Russia’s territorial
administration. Currently, democracies forego a “sobering” process, as a result of
a better understanding that confronting current Islamist, religious and
nationalist fanaticism, is different from other forms of terrorism. Democracies
must develop a unique understanding that Islamist international terrorism
requires specific adaptation and a specifically tailored set of defensive measures.
The U.K. in 2001, shortly after 9/11, passed the Anti-‐Terrorism Crime and
Security Act, leading to the creation of an extra-‐judicial option allowing for
indefinite detention without trial of non-‐British nationals suspected of linkage to
terrorism. In order to avoid criticism based on singling those affected by the new
act, the Act was revised in 2005, to include all Britons as well as foreigners. (MI-‐5
Legal Framework 2012). As expected, this provision was harshly criticized and
seen as opposed to the British 1998 Human Rights Act and as incompatible with
the European Convention on Human Rights. The eventual compromise suggested
that terrorism cases would be thus treated and investigated as criminal acts; a
“solution” adapted partially, also by the U.S. legal system. However, the U.S. has
yet to solve this legal issue further, since it still indefinitely holds certain
suspected individuals against which there is not enough unclassified criminal
evidence (i.e. when open trial might endanger intelligence sources or unique
methods) – indefinitely (i.e. Guantanamo DF). In the same vein, the very concept
of democratic application of counterterrorism contradicts itself, because it
suggests applying noble, moral and humanitarian rules, to a war against a sub-‐
state adversary that fights in asymmetric way, projecting its deepest disrespect
and disregard to democratic morals and norms.
55
The same question rises when a given democracy is expected to provide
humanitarian, economic or military aid to underdeveloped countries.
The so-‐called ‘developed world’ is tasked with helping other, underdeveloped or
all together, failed states. The flow of humanitarian aid to the needy countries is
at times obstructed due to these countries involuntarily serving as safe havens to
terrorist groups. Such is the case of Yemen, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Niger, Mali,
Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, the FSU republics and currently – Syria, among others.
The U.S. attempts to deal with this issue by making the recipients of USAID sign
on agreements conforming to anti-‐terrorist conditions. In many cases a major
chunk of the help to weak nations is in the form of military aid, which aims at
stabilization of local regimes and their respective security forces. It is
unfortunate, yet arguably unavoidable, that large part of an aid given to a
country in need -‐ is military in nature, because such “aid” does little for the
immediate relief of poverty and disease, needed so badly by local populations. At
times, Western help is deliberately given to countries, which were previously
observed as repressive (e.g. Pakistan, Egypt or Indonesia).
In an attempt to prevent certain countries from falling into the hands of fanatic
Islamists, democracies, are at times forced to choose what is perceived as the
“lesser evil,” by supporting undemocratic, suppressive, autocratic leaders, as
long as they help the West to obstruct terrorism. (Large 2005).
Uganda is one of the countries that currently have a “Western outlook”
regarding counterterrorism. New Ugandan CT legislature uses a definition of
terrorism so broad, that it may be used even to prosecute members of local trade
unions involved in an illegal strike or other form of peaceful, civil disobedience.
(Statement by Honorable… 2011). But not all countries, even among the new
56
and developing ones, are ready to endorse and accept new counterterrorism
legislations, at a heavy price to their civil rights. For example, in 2003, in
Mauritius the president and his deputy, resigned after the Prevention of
Terrorism Special Measures Regulations have been affirmed and applied. In
another example, Kenya withdrew similar legislation after strong public
opposition. It enacted such legislation only in 2012 after a long and stubborn
political struggle. (Kibaki signs historic anti-‐terrorism… 2012). A survey of
Caribbean, African and Asian nations regarding anti terrorism legislation
conducted in 2004, states that: “for many, the fight against terrorism in the
Commonwealth has meant that justification has been found to further limit their
existing freedoms” (in Large 2005). The unwillingness of certain new countries
to adopt anti-‐terrorism legislature has been often harshly criticized by U.S. and
the West and in some cases, resulted in strained diplomatic relations.
VII. Combating Transnational Terrorism: the Collaborative Approach of the
International Community.
International cooperation in counterterrorism is conducted on both regional and
fully-‐flagged international level. Such cooperation is based on formation of
regional and international organizations. Thus, the UN is the umbrella for
international organizations, while regional organizations such as the EU, the
African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, or the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -‐ act mostly on the regional
level. The complexity of coordinating counterterrorist policies and activities
57
among such diverse agents can be disheartening, yet ultimately, it means
collaboration and cooperation in the gathering of intelligence; its analysis and
dissemination; law enforcement cooperation through the Interpol and direct
international cooperation; conduct of joint interdiction operations; cargo
security and inspections; cooperation in the fields of port and aviation safety;
cyber security; terrorist movement monitoring; telecommunications monitoring;
financial oversight of suspicious/criminal banking activity, as well as joint
military maneuvers and exercises. Moreover, in certain cases, like Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya or Somalia and Mali – the international cooperation includes war
cooperation.
The counterterrorist international activity is closely scrutinized by various
Human Rights organizations. At times, “seasoned democracies” like the United
States, the U.K., France or Israel, choose to pursue a certain counterterrorist
tactic, which does not follow the strict international rules of war because the
Geneva Conventions does not directly apply to terrorism. One must keep in
mind that the Geneva conventions were created and evolved following WWI and
WWII. The legal status of International Law is very challenging when applied to
international terrorism. The struggle with international terrorism, which has no
sovereign nation-‐state-‐base willing to take the responsibility and the
punishment for their deeds, is very problematic. Due to many “gray areas, new
nation states often seek to follow in the path of the older democracies, which
serve as a model. This may initiate a problem: “If an established democratic
power utilizes military tribunals in non-‐war settings, claims ‘exception’ from the
Geneva conventions or international law, or advocates ‘targeted assassination’ or
the use of torture, this sets a precedent and an example for others.” (Large 2005).
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While this example may be currently pointing to American behavior, it certainly
is not an American-‐alone attribute. However, while for example, Israel, a vibrant
democracy, also resorts to targeted killings of terrorists -‐ Israel is considered “an
odd one:” it is not a party to the NPT, and occasionally uses “questionable”
interrogation techniques, and other undemocratic, CT measures. However, there
is little doubt that new state-‐actors are more strongly influenced by the
American model, than by the Israeli one. It is much easier to ignore the Israeli
deeds and example, but much harder to disregard the American role model.
Moreover, since 9/11 democratic reforms are no longer a prerequisite for
becoming a member of the international community. In fact, the U.S and its allies
cynically support autocratic regimes. Autocracies such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
Arab Emirates, Yemen, Columbia and others are reinforced not based on the
virtue of their humanitarian or civil practices, but rather as long as they
participate in international counterterrorist efforts. Less-‐than-‐democratic
nations, for example Russia, or some of the FSU republics, are not only “not real
democratic” models; they are often outright contrary to the very essence of
democracy. It seems that currently the concept of democracy is increasingly
challenged as the best, most effective and just form of governance, at least as far
as fighting terrorism is concerned.
Following well over a decade of intense fighting al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates by the
U.S. and its allies, including the indigenous Afghan forces, and likewise attempts
in Iraq, suggest that al-‐Qaeda may have been temporarily threatened and
suppressed -‐ but it was by no means eliminated. On the contrary, al-‐Qaeda and
affiliate resurgence seems obvious in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other
locations in the Middle East and Africa. In fact, supporters of al-‐Qaeda are often
59
described as freedom fighters, rising against the U.S and the Middle Eastern
suppressive autocracies, which were and still are supported, by the U.S.-‐led
“hypocritical West.” That is the West, that while supporting autocracies in the
Middle East attacked the Taliban in the name of democratic values. (Wright
2006, 237-‐8; 416-‐17). On November 12, 2012 the Organization for Security and
Cooperation In Europe (OSCE) convened in Vienna. Its 57 member states,
represented by more than 180 counterterrorism officials, law enforcement
officers, the judiciary, and civil society experts met in order to “examine good
practices on upholding the rule of law in preventing and combating terrorism
through an improved, adequate criminalization of terrorist offences, and
establishing effective criminal procedures. While, such events, and their outcome
are of great value, it is important to keep in mind that due to the legislative and
constitutional differences among the large number of new and old states,
effective outcomes are likely to be partial and slow to take hold. Ann Witkowsky,
Acting Principal Deputy Coordinator of the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in the
U.S. Department of State stated on that occasion,
“ The international community has made great strides over the

past decade in tactical counter-‐terrorism – taking individual
terrorists off the streets, disrupting cells, and thwarting
conspiracies, but to be effective over the long term, our national
and collective efforts must also focus on strategic
counterterrorism” (Strong Rule of Law 2012).

This statement underscores the fundamental weakness of current international
stance on fighting international/ transnational terrorism. Since different states
apply different laws to combating terrorism, current day terrorists, exploit the
borderless EU, the corruption in Russia and other FSU republics, the weakness of
the new African ‘democracies’, the porous African borders and can move rather
60
unhindered, almost anywhere. There is a fundamental lack of common strategic
approach, uniform laws and law enforcement procedures. This obstacle can be
surely understood in view of the existing weakness even on the tactical level,
where the laws and procedures of each country come into play. How can a
strategic approach, unifying all countries under counterterrorism legal banner
be achieved when the interests of different state actors are so varied and often
contradictory? Is there a way other than the state actor’s military, law
enforcement, and the judiciary, to realistically further approach
counterterrorism? A French representative to the above mentioned convention,
the Judge, Jean-‐Paul Laborde, in his address suggested,
“ All of us recognize that focusing entirely on militaristic, police and harsh law
enforcement measures will in the long run weaken what we need most in the
fight against terrorism – the support of the people” (Strong Rule of Law 2012).
This is arguably, a flawed perception. It may take the population years to “adjust”
to living with a constant threat of terrorism, yet if people are educated about
terrorism and accordingly more vigilant and prepared, they will not necessarily
weaken. There should be an international new trend of building national and
international resiliency to terrorism.
“…resilience is a key attribute in being prepared to deal with crisis
and adversity whether it comes in the form of attack, a disaster, or
a combat situation, and to recover in its aftermath. Resilience is a
skill that can be improved both for individuals and communities,
through building confidence, efficacy, problem solving skills, and
social connectedness” (Kindt 2006, 31).

The case of the U.K. people during WWII Nazi Blitzkrieg can serve as a good
example. Moreover, Israel too, with its 65 years of continuous “living with
terrorism” can attest to the resilience of its civil populace under continuous
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terrorist threat. Furthermore, during the 1950s and the 1960s, the American
population learned to live with a constant threat of a nuclear annihilation. It
learned and assimilated some tools and behaviors that may be ridiculed today,
for their efficacy in the event of a nuclear attack; nevertheless, these skills and
tools helped the American people build their resilience and to persevere under
the stress of a nuclear threat. Each situation, each threat, nuclear, biological or
else, demands a focused, continuous effort to build, or to restore the resilience of
former decades and update and upgrade it, according to the characteristics of
current threats.
VIII. Examining the efficacy of terrorism as a political tool
Terrorism, in all its current presentations is designed to terrify the civilian
population and create enormous pressure on governments. Pressure so severe,
that the respective government cannot deal with and either give-‐in to the
terrorist demands -‐ or collapse. The assertion that terrorism is a “weapon of the
weak,” is only correct in the context of comparison between the robust military,
bureaucratic and economical power and the limited combatant ability of
terrorist groups. There are many theories attempting to explain the motivation
of terrorists, as well as theories attempting to define the best tools to eliminate
terrorism.
It is fairly uncontroversial that it is the state that establishes the opportunities
for violence within society. In the same vein, some suggest that,
“…the state is efficient at killing and unrestrained states are far

more deadly than the most destructive oppositional groups. The
trick as states try to build capacity in low capacity places like
Afghanistan and Iraq is to build a state capable enough to reduce
violence but restrained enough to refrain from wide-scale
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repression.”…Building rule of law, and strong and responsive
institutions are the answer to reducing violence” (Young 2012).
” It possibly resonates well with some, but it is arguably, like asking, “to eat
the cake, and still have it.”
In most cases of current terrorism, the terrorists do not necessarily end up
winning and attaining their goals; or at least they do not gain a decisive, final
victory over the state. It may seem hard to negate the claim that blowing up the
Madrid train in 2004, the London subway in 2005, or the Beslan 2004 massacre
in Russia, not even to mention 9/11, were “successful” terrorist acts. It is
however, imperative to switch at least temporarily, from the tactical perspective
and to observe much wider array of terrorist attacks throughout the world, from
a different point of view. No matter which terrorist group we are dealing with,
they all have their ultimate goals, which usually are the destabilization of an
existing regime/system, its collapse and its replacement by an alternative system
sought as appropriate by the terrorists. Analysis of terrorist groups and their
ultimate aims, methods and successes reveal that groups are more often than
not, self-‐destructive and generally ineffective in the long run. Instinctively, one
would assume that terrorist decision-‐making process follows the strategic
model; but that is not necessarily so. Abrahms (2008, 88-‐93), suggests several
tendencies of terrorist groups and organizations that contradict strategic
thinking:
1. Terrorists do not achieve their declared political goals by attacking
civilians. Attacking civilians makes governments more resolute and
stubborn in their struggle with terrorists.
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2. While terrorism may be thought as ‘last resort’ – terrorists never use
terrorism as such. (There are however, escalations in the forms of
terrorism). Terrorists very infrequently seize opportunities to renounce
their violence and become parties to peaceful solutions. Typically,
terrorists reflexively reject government proposals to compromise, even if
these offer significant concessions towards their formal political goals.
3. Certain terrorist attacks, such as kidnappings or bombings and suicide
bombings, are often carried initially by anonymous perpetrators, which
preclude the target countries from even suggesting political concessions.
There is no one to talk to. (E.g. the September 11, 2001 attacks were not
initially claimed by bin-‐Laden).
4. Even when faced with continuous failures to achieve their goals, or even if
their claims have been resolved (e.g. the LTTE in Sri Lanka 1998, 2001)
terrorist organizations often resist disbanding.
5. Terrorists can be much more effective if they would have strategically
planned their actions.
6. Terrorist organizations, according the strategic model, should disband
when it becomes clear that they fail to advance their political goal, yet
they sometimes persevere for decades. This is possible, because terrorist
goals are very often “flexible.” Goals that change with the passage of time,
while the organizations remain. Such for example, is the case of al-‐Qaeda
and its mujahedeen, who first fought the Soviets, in Afghanistan and than
switched their target to the U.S. (after the Soviet demise and withdrawal).
However, their ultimate goal was updated/adapted according to the
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change of target. Only during the 1990s al-‐Qaeda developed the idea of
replacing the West with a caliphate etc.
These “trends” are puzzling, and challenge the strategic model of terrorist
organizations. These puzzles undermine several core assumptions:
1) That terrorists are motivated by rather stable political goals.
2) That they logically weigh the expected outcomes of their actions.
3) That they opt to use terrorism, because of its perceived political effectiveness.
Since psychiatric studies ruled out the possibility that terrorists are insane, it
implies that maybe their official statement of their goals, does not reflect their
number one objective. What is the terrorist number one objective then?
Abrahms (2008, 94) suggests an alternative explanation for terrorist bonding in
groups and organizations, by introducing the ‘natural system model’: “ There is
comparatively “strong theoretical and empirical evidence” that people become
terrorists not to achieve their organization’s declared political agenda, but to
develop strong affective ties with other terrorist members.” Does this make
terrorist stronger? Does it make terrorists more effective? Maybe so, but
according to Abrahms, only if we fail to apply all our most common strategies to
each terrorism case:
1) Punitive strategies and a strict no-‐concessions paradigm (mostly favored by
state leaders).
2) The belief that terrorism can be defused through political accommodation,
and the envigorating of the fire under a stalled peace processes (if such is
present).
3) Using the model of state building and democracy promotion.
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The socio/psychological natural system model should be given a serious
consideration. Several of the concluding counterterrorist suggestions established
by Abrahms and others, should clearly be further studied, and arguably,
implemented; not in place of the previously mentioned three common
approaches, but rather along with them. A greater investment in the absorption
of dislocated populations, such as “the angry Muslims of Europe” or the Muslim
communities in the United States -‐ is necessary. Democratic societies must
improve their records of fighting bigotry and xenophobia. However, no
appeasement is suggested; instead -‐ intelligence penetration of Muslim
communities and terrorist organizations is a must. Patient cultivation of double
agents and insertion of undercover operatives into such communities and group
is very risky, but cannot be ruled out. Further cultivation of HUMINT in general,
is the way to proceed. This does not mean dropping the other strategic tools, but
rather accommodating all available tools and using them more wisely.

Some studies attempt to prove that terrorism tend to be almost completely
ineffective. In 2008, a study conducted on 648 terrorist groups between 1968-‐
2006 in the RAND-‐MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, showed that only about
4% obtained their strategic goals. This study also found that “all terrorist groups
eventually end.” Most of the groups in the sample studied, ended by joining the
political process. Military force has rarely been the primary reason behind a
terrorist group’s end. (Jones & Lubicki 2008). Interestingly, religious groups
proved to be much more resilient than others. However, none of the religious
groups that ended has achieved a victory since 1968. Furthermore, In 2008 Max
Abrams concluded that when terrorist attacks are combined with indiscriminate
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force (as in suicide terrorism), bargaining result is not likely; the pain suffered
by the population significantly decreases government’s readiness for
concessions.
“ …since the first intifada, Palestinian violence has created

pressure on Israel to change the status quo. Paradoxically,
terrorism has simultaneously convinced Israelis that Palestinians
are not committed to a two-‐state-‐solution, which has eroded
support for making territorial concessions…”(Abrams 2008, 75).

And yet, Audrey Kurth Cronin does not see the Palestinians (for example) as
necessarily incompetent actors. Even if terrorist do not reach for the most
catastrophic weapons (WMD) – a terrorist attack may, in her opinion,
dramatically change the policy or perception of a major state actor. Moreover,
terrorism might prompt a negative “domino effect” leading to regional war, and
even a nuclear war. (Kurth Cronin 2009, 166). For example, if al-‐Qaeda or its
affiliate, were to obtain access to a Pakistani or Russian nuclear missile and
successfully targets the U.S. or an European ally, or Israel, this may cause a
retaliation against the source country of the nuclear device and thus cascade
down to a more extensive nuclear war. While this is a very remote possibility, we
should never completely rule it out. Kurth Cronin persuasively advocates her
seven possible terrorist group’s termination modes: decapitation, negotiated
settlement, achievement of aims, implosion of the group, forceful suppression,
tactical reorientation, and finally, as she precipitates al-‐Qaeda’s end, she
suggests, that it might fully transform into an insurgency. Kurth Cronin sees little
hope for al Qaeda’s end, resulting from decapitation, (as indeed seen today, after
bin Laden’s demise). The prospective killing of al Zawahiri, is not necessarily a
wise move. (He is an unpopular successor to bin Laden and we may even benefit
from him remaining as a leader). Further decimation of al-‐Qaeda by Special
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Forces and drone strikes is believed by many to be ineffective as well; and may
possibly enhance Al-‐Qaida’s mobilization capability. However, a possible group-‐
implosion or “Transitioning out of terrorism and toward criminality or full
insurgency is the final, worrisome precedent for al Qaeda” (Kurth Cronin 2009,
191). While the alluded, possible transfer into a criminal entity may be
questionable, there are stubborn claims of al Qaeda mingling with TOC in West
Africa, in the Sahel, in the Tri Border Area of South America (TBA), as well as
profiting from Taliban’s involvement in Afghan drug trade. (Ehrenfeld 2011; see
also Shanty 2006 and Bronstein 2010). While al Qaeda core is sometimes
claimed to be uninvolved in direct profiting from criminal activities, its more
remote tentacles, especially in Latin America, and Africa, as well as its indirect
affiliates, are indeed heavily involved in transnational criminal activity (Roth,
Douglas and Wille 2004?).
The variety of contrasting opinions expressed by respected scholars and analysts
can be confusing. It seems that Audrey Kurth Cronin, Max Abrahms, Rebert Pape
and many others, based their opinions regarding the actual efficacy of terrorism,
on large and convincing databases. While some scholars suggest that terrorism is
an inefficient coercive tool, others think otherwise. Contrary and clashing views
in the academia are common. Yet at times, such contrasts are the result of
analyzing the issue at hand, from a very specific perspective, rather from
different factual data. If the issue is viewed from a different point of view the
outcome may be different. For example, although the PLO (during the first
intifada, 1987-‐1993) did not score politically against the Israelis, the PLO’s
failure made way for the rise of the religious Islamism in the form of Hamas and
other radical Islamist factions, which perpetuate terrorism until this very day.
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Furthermore, terrorism, as a punitive action against the state, may not be as
ineffective as it may seem; as can be seen in the approach to the effectiveness of
suicide terrorism by Robert Pape. Unlike Abrahms, Pape suggested in 2005, that
of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 1980-‐
2003 period, seven correlated with significant policy changes by the target
government. Such for example, is the case of Hezbollah attacks against the US
military in 1983 (Beirut Embassy and Marine Barracks attacks); the Hezbollah
attacks against Israeli military and GSS headquarters and military HQ in Lebanon
(Tyre) in 1983-‐1982 respectively; Hamas attacks in Israel in 1994, and in 1994-‐
95; or the Sri Lankan government entering sovereignty negotiations with the
Tamil Tigers (LTTE), in 1993 and again in 2001. (Pape 2005, 64-‐76).
And yet, as Pape further clarifies, terrorist ‘victories’ are limited to a rather
tactical scope:
“ suicide terrorism can coerce states to abandon limited or modest
goals, for example, by withdrawing from territory of low strategic
importance, or, as in Israel’s case in 1994 and 1995, by temporary
and partial withdrawal from a more important area. However,
suicide terrorism is unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals
central to their wealth or security “ (Pape 2005, 75).

In his 2010 Book Cutting the Fuse, Pape further expands on the reasons behind
suicide terrorism, which are not to be separated from terrorism in general. In
several examples involving the U.S. robust military presence in the Gulf, in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, he successfully proves that the U.S. occupation is
more significant contributor to Islamist terrorist attacks than Islam as a religion
alone. (Pape 2010, 329). To be sure, Pape makes his case not only based on the
American “imperial” experience; he asserts that his data base includes, for the
first time, complete and exact data of terrorist attacks between the years 1980-‐
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2009, (Pape 2010, 7). Pape’s statistic data suggests that since 2004 the world has
witnessed a substantial growth in suicide terrorist attacks, nearly 500% more
than all the years from 1980-‐2003. (Pape 2010, 9). Among his more prominent,
non-‐American examples, are the Israeli-‐Palestinian conflict (analysis of
Hezbollah and Hamas) and the struggle of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Some of his
main conclusions are:
• Over 95% of all suicide attacks are a response to foreign occupation.
• Transnational terrorists like al-‐Qaeda are motivated by foreign
occupation.
• Suicide terrorism poses the greatest threat to the United States and its
allies today:
“…While it is true that chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
are more destructive than airplanes hitting buildings, it is the
potential marriage of any mass casualty technology with suicide
operations that most increases the danger of an attack – since
having individual terrorists guide these weapons greatly increases
the odds of success.” (Pape 2010, 330).

• In order to curb terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular,
the U.S. and its allies and particularly Israel, should try to reduce their
reliance on foreign occupation, as a main strategy ensuring national
interests.
• Terminating military intervention in the struggle with terrorism
completely is impossible; especially when attempting to obtain short
term, tactical goals.
To elaborate more on the topic of the effectiveness of terrorist
groups, a wide range of studies suggests that the increase in the violence
of terrorist acts and the growing pain to the target public -‐ the lesser is
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terrorist’s coercive effectiveness. There is a tendency to view terrorist
more discriminate attacks, singling military personnel or other
government officials -‐ as guerrilla attacks, which gives the terrorists
certain “legitimacy.” Overall, studies show that acts of terrorism in
general, create more support for right-‐winged political leadership in the
target countries. Although Israel is an obvious choice to prove this
statement, such trends are not unique to Israel. In a study published in
2011 by Christophe Chowanietz, he analyzes the reaction of mainstream
political parties to acts of terrorism. This is a statistical analysis of 181
terrorist incidents in five countries (Germany, Spain, France, U.K. and
U.S.), over the period 1990-‐2006. The overall results point to the
conclusion that as terrorist attacks happen repetitively, they are more
likely to cause more criticism. The attack’s magnitude, in terms of
casualties and damage, will also cause intensive rallying around the flag.
As previously stated, the public of a country attacked by terrorists is
unlikely to support concessions to the terrorists and is likely to support
harsh measures to be taken by the government in retaliation. In the case
of Israel for example, terrorist attacks cause the public to increasingly
believe that the Palestinians are not really motivated by a relatively
modest goal of a two-‐state solution and they rather seek to harm Israelis
no matter what.
“ I was ready to divide the land but they are not…because they say
‘either them or us,’ I say ‘us’…as long as the other side
[Palestinians] is not ready to recognize our right to exist as a
nation state of the Jewish people, I am not ready to forego a
millimeter. I am not even willing to talk about territory. After land-‐
for-‐peace [the Oslo accords of 1993] became land–for-‐terror and
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land-‐for-‐rockets, I am no longer willing to bury my head in the
sand” (Leibler 2012).

In a much similar way, the Chechen terrorism in Russia convinced the Russian
population that the Chechens will harm the Russians no matter what, on top of
any separatist demand they may have (Abrahms 2011, 591). It is thus puzzling
why terrorists, in view of the poor fruits for their toils, are still perpetrating
terrorist acts. For one thing, terrorists not necessarily read terrorism related
studies; moreover, while not insane, they may very well be wrongly convinced
that their efforts will eventually yield the desired results. Interestingly, al-‐Qaeda,
the Hezbollah and the Hamas, all relate to three prominent victories to prove
their way correct: the U.S. and French pull out from Lebanon after the 1983
suicide attack; the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the U.S. pull
out from Somalia in 1994. All three cases in question portray what is better
perceived as guerrilla warfare, than terrorism. Another important explanation
for the perpetuation of terrorist acts, is the fact that,
“ Whereas terrorist acts generally fail to promote government

concessions, the violence against civilians can perpetuate the
terrorist group [life] by attracting media attention, spoiling peace
processes, and boosting membership, morale, cohesion, and
external support.” (Abrahms 2011, 592).

Eventually, no matter how one looks upon the terrorist phenomenon, there is no
realistic way to totally discredit its effectiveness. This however is a far cry from
declaring terrorism effective. Thus, each case of terrorism, each terrorist group
must be studied within the context of the root reasons for its creation, the
society within which it operates, its targets and its declared goals.
Moreover, in spite of the constant gradual decimation of al Qaeda, it is by far the
most resilient and pervasive international terrorist movement. Al-‐Qaeda is
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arguably, the hardest terrorist idea to find, to contain, to fix and to defeat,
because of its global scope and outreach.
Unlike the case of Israel and the Palestinian conflict, however distant may the
Israeli-‐Palestinian peace settlement be – it is still closer than the ultimate defeat
of al Qaeda, which will arguably, keep on evolving and morphing for many years
to come.
IX. Terrorism and WMD: are terrorists likely to obtain and use WMD?
Once convincing arguments have been made regarding the efficacy of terrorism,
and how to deal with it the best we can, in its “conventional” form, the likelihood
of a terrorist incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
must be assessed.
For the purpose of this paper the definition of WMD will include the CBRN
weapons only and will explicitly exclude conventional explosives.
Based on the previous part of this paper, some may conclude that if al Qaeda
follows the Strategic Model and indeed fights to obtain political, nationalist
and/or religious goals – it is very likely to continue the terrorist campaigns of its
choosing. As can be deduced from current affairs, while al-‐Qaeda core has been
heavily depleted, it is not dead, not as an idea nor as an actual group.
In fact, no matter what is the actual motivation behind the perpetuation of
terrorist activity, this activity is certain to continue in the foreseeable future.
Although suggested by many, perhaps the most eloquent positing of this truism
is that of Walter Laqueur’s:
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“ Even in the unlikely case that all global conflicts will be
resolved…this will not necessarily be the end of terrorism…there
are bound to be ups and downs as far as the frequency and the
political impact of terrorism is concerned. But there is a huge
reservoir of aggression, and for this reason terrorism will be with
us as far as one can look ahead.” (Laqueur 2003, 231).

No popular claim suggesting the demise of terrorism in general and suicide
terrorism in particular, can be pointed to. Furthermore, as Pape has posited
before, “…it is the potential marriage of any mass casualty technology with
suicide operations that most increases the danger of an attack …” (Pape 2010,
330). It is common logic, that although terrorists mostly fail to achieve their
ultimate goals, terrorist violence as a coercive tool works at least to a certain
degree. Moreover, although a mute question, at this point – it remains to be seen,
whether the coercive power of terrorism will be enhanced should terrorist
combatants obtain effective weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Although the United States would most probably, survive a single, major WMD
terrorist attack, (even a nuclear one), the results of such an attack would be hard
to imagine.
While many analysts project that terrorist WMD attack on the U.S. and/or its
allies is a fait accompli, this assessment should be revisited from the viewpoint of
pure logic, scientific data and the existing intelligence. As currently as the end of
2012, some analysts like the Pentagon’s outgoing counsel general; Jeb Johnson
was quoted as saying to the Oxford Union:
“there will come a tipping point…at which so many of the leaders
and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or
captured such that al Qaeda as we know it…has been effectively
destroyed…At that point…our efforts should no longer be
considered an armed conflict” (Zakaria 2012).

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However, it remains questionable, whether the al Qaeda ideology could be
defeated so soon, the answer to this question is not as logically forthcoming as it
may seem. While curbing our military offensive may indeed be logical from the
economic perspective, we must keep in mind that all al-‐Qaeda needs in order to
resurrect, is a single, successful, high-‐magnitude attack. Such attack is possible,
and arguably, forthcoming.

Suicide terrorism is not often affiliated with anything even remotely close to
insanity. Ariel Merari states in his book, Driven to Death that, “…personal reason
for committing suicide cannot be found in the case of most suicide bomber
nowadays” (Merari 2010, 13, 221-‐222). Merari also makes a clear distinction
between personal suicide (which stems from personal, intolerable emotional
pain), and a terrorist-‐group-‐related suicide bombing; whereas the suicide
bombing is seen by the community and by the perpetrator, mostly as an altruistic
deed. (although it carries some personal “benefits”). Thus, if we disregard for the
purpose of this paper, the unlikely possibility that a terrorist WMD attack will be
perpetrated by some “crazy professor lone wolf” -‐ we are dealing with
individuals, which either may perpetrate such an attack in order to further their
political, nationalist and religious goals; or do so, for less logical reason of
gaining the ‘best media coverage’, more supporters and new volunteers,
recognition and funding for their group etc., as well as their, afore mentioned,
social need for ’camaraderie.’ The most likely reason is some form an
“amalgamated” version of all reasons mentioned. Arguably, it would be
impossible to get a better media coverage, and world attention -‐ than al-‐Qaeda
got through the September 11, 2001 ‘conventional’ attacks. It seems that the
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repetition of a similar-‐sized attack would be satisfactory. Yet some analysts
believe that terrorists feel that escalation is a must. Laqueur for one, suggests
that, “ It is only a question of time until radiological, chemical, or biological
weapons will be used more or less systematically by terrorist groups; the first
steps in this direction have been made”(Laqueur 2003, 226). We have learned
from such “first steps,” mentioned above by Laqueur, that seemingly, the realistic
chances of terrorists actually building an effective weapon of mass destruction,
from scratch are very small, due to the technical & scientific complexity and the
hardships involved in obtaining the nuclear/biological or chemical and/or
radiological materials.
In the period between 1993-‐ 1995 the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group
which was formidably organized, very well funded; possessed several real estate
properties (used for conducting WMD related biological and chemical
experiments); as well as medical doctors, chemists and biologists -‐ failed to
successfully disperse the sarin nerve agent (of which they successfully produced
tons of), which is an easier task than dealing with, the manufacturing and the
deployment of a stable biological or nuclear weapon. (Fletcher 2012). Aum
Shinrikyo was a religious cult, without realistic nationalist grievances. However,
it wanted to put an end to the word, in the form they new. (Aum Shinrikyo Closer
Look n.d.).
Al Qaeda’s leadership has much more realistic goals, both political and religious.
As expressed in bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa [judgment/ruling]:
“…On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the
following fatwa to all Muslims
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -‐-‐ civilians and
military -‐-‐ is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in
any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the
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al-‐Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and
in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam,
defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance
with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all together
as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no
more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in
God…We -‐-‐ with God's help -‐-‐ call on every Muslim who believes in
God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill
the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever
they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and
soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's
supporters allying with them, …” (bin-‐Laden 1998).

While the 1998 fatwa is very specific about who to kill and why, it does not
explore bin Laden’s intimate thoughts as to how to bring total destruction on the
“Crusaders and Jews”. In fact, bin Laden’s strategy’s was well linked to the
concept of a “War of a Thousand Cuts.” It seem clear that knowing that he did not
have the ‘ultimate weapon of destruction,’ bin Laden linked his terrorist
campaign directly to causing immense economic harm, so well exemplified in
9/11. “ It is certain, that Sept. 11 was intended to create a serious economic
setback for the U.S.
“According to [the Americans’] own admissions [said bin Laden on
Al Jazeera interview in Nov. 2001]”the share of the losses on the
Wall Street market reached 16% they said this number is a record.
The gross amount that is traded in that market reaches
$4trillion;so if we multiply 16% with $4 trillion to find out the loss
that affected the stocks, it reaches $640 billion of losses”
(Gartenstein Ross 2011).

Bin Laden new that this description falls short of the actual full damage, incurred
through adding up the building and construction losses, lost productivity etc.,
reaching the figure of $1 trillion; an estimate, believed to be overall accurate. In
an October 2004 video, Osama made clear that al-‐Qaeda sought to involve
America and its allies in economically draining wars, not only on American soil,
but also all over America’s allied Muslim world. (Gartenstein-‐Ross 2011).
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Furthermore, following the major crisis of the U.S. economy in 2008, America
became so economically weak, that since then, al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates may be
perceived as indeed pursuing the ‘thousand cuts,’ bleeding America to
bankruptcy.
“ To bring America down we do not need a big strike…In such an
environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is
more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and
less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security
barriers America worked so hard to erect.” (AQIAP to INSPIRE in
Gartenstein-‐Ross 2011).

However, that was not bin-‐Laden’s only plan. Al-‐Qaeda has attempted to
manufacture weaponized chemical agent in Afghanistan in the 1990’s and
unsuccessfully used chlorine gas in Iraq, under the tutelage of Abu Musab al-‐
Zarqawi. Al-‐Qaeda’s core leadership arguably never officially supported
Zarqawi’s attempt. Although occasionally, training its volunteers in Afghanistan
in the use of chemical agents, bin-‐Laden kept on asserting that acquiring of more
potent WMD is an Islamic duty, and offered a number of explanations for the
rationale of using such weapons as means to “escalate the killing and fighting
against you (Americans), ” …on grounds of destroying an international
conspiracy to control the world…” (Mowatt Larssen 2010). Bin-‐Laden’s threats
were not empty ones: he signaled a very specific reason for using WMD in al-‐
Qaeda’s quest to destroy the global status quo, and thus to create optimal
conditions for the overthrowing of the autocratic regimes of the Middle East. Bin
Laden’s argument was that although Islam outlaws weapons of mass destruction,
they are justifiable as means to counter the American hegemony. In order to
destroy America and the West, bin-‐Laden advocated the ultimate WMD (and thus
the nuclear and the biological ones), that can cause real mass casualty and not
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“secondary,” small size attacks, through the use of chemical or radiological
weapons. "If Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants had been interested in . . .
small-‐scale attacks, there is little doubt they could have done so now…" (Mowatt-‐
Larssen 2010).
Al-‐Qaeda spent at least a decade attempting to steal, buy or construct improvised
nuclear device (IND) and possibly, to also obtain or create from scratch –
biological weapons.
There are claims that al–Qaeda indeed attempted to develop a weaponized
anthrax weapon, a project supposedly, supervised personally, by al-‐Zawahiri.
(Joscelyn 2008).
Although in 2011, some cracks appeared in the FBI case against the late Bruce
Ivin (Markon 2011), these cracks, never pointed to al-‐Qaeda as the culprit behind
the anthrax letters case of 2001. At worst, this case may remain ‘unsolved.’
Nevertheless, the United States started ramping up its bioterrorism strategy in
2009, with President Obama’s overt acknowledgement that the damage from a
massive terrorist biological attack is on par with a nuclear attack:
“ When it comes to the proliferation of bio weapons and the risk of
an attack, the world community faces a greater threat based on a
new calculus. President Obama fully recognizes that a major
biological weapons attack on one of the world’s major cities could
cause as much death and economic and psychological damage as a
nuclear attack.” (Tauscher 2009).

The Reagan’s and Bush Sr. administrations were already deeply involved in the
issue of biological weapons, vis a vis Soviet Union’s Gorbachev, as part of the
Cold War. (Hoffman 2009, 306, 350, 366-‐367).
Yet, there arguably must have been some obviously highly classified
information, that led Hillary Clinton, while speaking before the Review
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Conference Of Biological and Toxin Weapons in Geneva, on December 7, 2011, to
state,
“ In 2001, we found evidence in Afghanistan that al-Qaida was

seeking the ability to conduct bioweapons attacks. And less than a year
ago, [2011], al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for
– and I quote – “brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to
develop a weapon of mass destruction.”(Clinton 2011).
Furthermore: crude, yet effective weapons, may be produced, with little means
and effort, even by less than “scientists” and these weapons may effectively
sicken many. Many pathogens are daily used in legitimate biological research,
and thus may be deviated to serve dual purposes. At times, a legitimate research
aimed at saving lives, may also be used to manufacture deadly diseases.
Moreover, the detection tools developed so far are very slow and inadequate.
PHYSorg advised in January 2013, that new, faster and improved equipment has
recently surfaced. (PHYSorg 2013). Additional information about some advances
in the field of bio detection has been posted also on other websites (New Bio-‐
Detection 2013).
Regarding the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1975, Secretary of State, H. Clinton
suggested that despite the fact that countries that have never joined the
Convention no longer claim that acquiring biological weapons is their
legitimate goal - the international community must improve its domestic and
international capabilities of bio - detection and response-time. “We need
public health systems that can quickly diagnose outbreaks…and mobilize the
right medical resources and personnel. By making any one country more
secure, we make the international community more secure at the same time”
(Clinton 2011).
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In truth, the microbiological and biological engineering knowledge and
technology are already spread all over the world. There is no stopping this
Genie. It is utterly up to the individual state actors to safeguard the
microbiological knowhow.
Theoretically, each country, as well as terrorist group, ‘can take their pick’ of
any bacteria or virus strands, since these exists freely in the nature and they
can hire scientist/s to “improve” their ‘bug of choice’ through genetic
engineering. However, in order to successfully weaponize bacteria or virus,
the major problem is to stabilize the bio agent and make it viable for an
extended period of time; then find a tested and successful way to deliver the
bio agent to the target. Since, once the out of the bottle, the results of a bio
attack are at best a well-educated guess and the disease spores can spread
uncontrollably, there is always a probability of a “blowback” (the disease
causing the sickening of the population of the aggressor as well). For that
reason, although a well equipped laboratory can produce the spores of choice,
the only effective way to protect oneself from a biological attack, is by having a
pre-emptive intelligence, and protection capability. Such capability not only
discloses the potential perpetrator, but also the bacteria/virus involved and
thus allows for faster identification of existent contamination and a
simultaneous inoculation of the population against it (in case of a viral attack
e.g. smallpox), or distribution of appropriate antibiotics to fight mass bacterial
infection (e.g. anthrax, plague etc.). In fact, the potential horrors of biological
warfare, mortality and economically wise, can be even more troubling than a
localized, limited yield nuclear attack (such as Hiroshima’s). With the
development of biological warfare, this type of ‘weaponry’ by default, became
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the “weak man’s nuclear bomb” and it indeed questions the actual deterrence
of the nuclear powers. A pre-emptive, (or retaliatory) bio attack, may take
some time (hours, days or weeks) to recognize (due to bacteria’s/virus’s
incubation period), and may be very difficult to attribute to any specific
aggressor. Since in the case of Islamist fanaticism we are often faced with
suicide terrorism, it is easy to imagine a suicide “bomber” or several
“bombers” infected with a certain very contagious and lethal disease (or a
combination of deadly bacteria and viruses), boarding planes destined for the
U.S. or any allied country and all they have to do is shake hand, sneeze, or,
…just breathe…(Hoffman 2009).
While there is no good, fact-‐based, answer to the question, why
terrorists and especially al-‐Qaeda, have so far failed to realize their WMD
threats; there is a good possibility that such efforts were timely thwarted and
kept classified in the archives of the intelligence community. On the other hand,
it is possible that while a less threatening WMD (chemical or radiological) could
have been obtained by al-‐Qaeda, it might have been perceived as ‘not effective
enough,’ and was thus shunned by the group. This suggestion is contested in
view of the U.S. 1998 strike on the Sudanese ‘ pharmacological’ facility of Shifa.
“ The U.S. Department of State released a concise official rationale

for the bombing of Shifa: The facilities the U.S. attacked on August
20, 1998 were central to the bin Ladin network’s ability to conduct
acts of terror around the world. ...the U.S. has reliable intelligence
that the bin Ladin network has been actively
seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction–including
chemical weapons–for use against United States interests.
Therefore, the U.S. also attacked one facility in Sudan associated
with chemical weapons and the bin Ladin network. This facility is
located within a secured chemical plant in the northeast
Khartoum area. U.S. intelligence over the past few months has
indicated that the bin Ladin network has been actively seeking to
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acquire chemical weapons for use against United States interests.
Bin Ladin has extensive ties to the Sudanese Government and its
industrial sector. The U.S. is confident this Sudanese Government-‐
controlled facility is involved in the production of chemical
weapons agents” (Barletta 1998, 117).

Some of the other common explanations for absence of WMD terrorist attacks in
the U.S. are:
• The protective measures, hastily erected by the DHS and the government,
prevented the repetition of attacks. (This reasoning was favored by the
Bush administration). In view of the failure of FEMA during Katrina crisis
of 2002, the above suggestion about the efficacy of the U.S. preparedness
is hard to take seriously.
• Tightening of immigration procedures prevented another 9/11. While
almost certainly the improved border security turned away, or nailed few
suspicious characters or prospective terrorists, it certainly did but little to
deal with the homegrown brand. Moreover, it is probable that al-‐Qaeda’s
leadership has foreseen such U.S. steps and possibly started to rely more
on non-‐Arabs, with foreign, European or Asian passports.
More than 300 million (!) people are legally admitted into the U.S. every
year. Arguably, at least a few of them are Middle Eastern.
“ If terrorists haven’t filtered into the country in potentially

damaging numbers, this can’t be because of U.S. border security. It
must be because they aren’t trying very hard or because they are
far less dedicated, diabolical, and competent than the common
image would suggest “(Mueller 2006, 117).

• Terrorists are very patiently lying down, and patiently waiting for “the
right moment.” While it may take a long time to plan an attack, the length
of this “time-‐out” is relative. The preparation of 9/11 took only about two
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years. They did not allow years upon years to lapse between the next
operations and Madrid, for example, took less than six months to plan and
execute. In view of the fact that the Iraq invasion, served as a harsh
provocation -‐ one would expect an attack in the U.S. soon after 2003. Yet,
“ In May 2003…al-‐Zawahiri, promised attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan and shortly thereafter, Osama
himself cited Italy, Japan, Australia, and the United States as targets. “
(Mueller 2006, 179). Only three years later, some of the Middle Eastern,
countries mentioned in the threats (not all, despite a direct threat) were
attacked.
The history of biological threats, as stated before, goes back to the Cold War.
However, back then they were not linked to terrorism. In 2003, the U.S.
government, after weighing the intelligence regarding al-‐Qaeda and WMD, issued
a warning, that there was a high probability of an al-‐Qaeda WMD attack in the
next two years. (Mowatt-‐Larssen 2010). In view of the disclosures regarding the
possibility that the Bush administration’s intentions to invade Iraq, relied on”
inadequate intelligence,” the whole WMD scare “may” have been a
disinformation at best. However, administrations have changed, and political
convictions of the present administration remained convinced in the seriousness
and merit of al-‐Qaeda’s WMD threat. President Obama reiterated this threat
(with a specific focus on nuclear attack) as the biggest threat to the existence of
the U.S. in his 2010 and 2011 National Security Strategy. Moreover, the
magnitude of the terrorist WMD threat is reiterated also by the fact that it is
repeatedly stated in other major documents reflecting this Administration’s
policy.
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“ The Danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security.
Terrorist organizations, including al-‐Qaida, have engaged in efforts to develop
and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – and if successful, they are
likely to use them.” (NSC 2011, 8).
In the same document, President Obama also repeats that the major threat to the
United States continues to be from al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates, and that while bin-‐
Laden’s demise marked “ the most important strategic milestone” in the
American efforts to defeat al-‐Qaida, “…al-‐Qaida continues to pose a direct and
significant threat to the United States” (NSC 2011, 3).
The presidential reiteration of the nuclear and other WMD threats, points out to
an extremely high level of the presidential confidence in the quality of the
intelligence at his disposal. While different analysts may suggest bias or
alarmism, it seems that the administration is indeed convinced that the threat is
very real and possibly imminent. For the sake of addressing this issue in a
balanced way, additional points of view will be addressed.
As President Obama posited, bin-‐Laden’s demise, is certainly not the end of al-‐
Qaida and its affiliates. Moreover, the theoretical WMD threat to the United
States is not totally limited to al Qaeda, as the threat’s source. However unlikely,
other groups, allegedly unaffiliated with al Qaeda, may surprise us all with a new
threat and new capabilities. One potentially significant, threat in this respect, is
the threat from Hezbollah. Already back in the 1990s, the world faced a diffusion
of suicide terrorism a tactic:
“ …despite the profound theological differences between the

Salafist/jihadist views of Al Qaeda and the Shiite Hezbollah, Bin
Laden sent his operatives to talk to the Hezbollah leadership. They
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came back with what were effectively operational blueprints for
how to plan and execute suicide attacks, especially against hard
targets like embassies. The East African embassy attacks resulted
in part from this example of diffusion. In the 1980s Hezbollah was
really thought of as an innovator…The subsequent history of
suicide terrorism is best thought about as a diffusion process”
(Horowitz 2008).

Islamist fanaticism is likely to thrive also because for a decade, while bin Laden
eluded the U.S., he very likely became a ‘model martyr’ and an example to follow.
Current events in the Middle East, the African Horn, the Sahel and North Africa,
as well as current developments in Eurasia and South Asia, all point out to the
fact that bin Laden’s philosophy is still well entrenched in the hearts of many
followers, all around the world. All the social, political and religious forces that
triggered the Islamist terrorist threat are still in place. Moreover, bin-‐Laden’s
death, or even a complete destruction of al-‐Qaeda (if it were to happen), are very
unlikely to significantly undercut fanaticism and terrorism and only time will
tell, if the U.S. and its allies will prevail in the face of the continuing radical
Islamist threat (Cordesman 2011). We now know, that bin-‐Laden’s death indeed
did not cause any al-‐Qaeda implosion, but we are still wondering as to what will
happen next. In his excellent book, The Longest War, Peter Bergen dedicates a lot
of serious thought and ink to the severity of al Qaeda’s WMD attack threat.
Bergen suggests that in attacking America on September 11, 2001 bin-‐Laden
expected a cascade effect that will bring about something like Samuel
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. But that did not happen. (Bergen 2011, 92).
It seems that his call for a holy war was not accepted by the Muslim masses.
While anti American demonstrations were held in several major Muslim cities
like Jakarta and Karachi, these demonstrations were not really massive and
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impressive. Moreover, the vast majority of the Muslim governments reacted by
supporting the fight against, nor for, al-‐Qaeda. “ Bin-‐Laden’s grand project of
transforming the Muslim world into a militant caliphate has been a resounding
failure” (Bergen 2011, 93). Moreover, 9/11 caused the occupation of additional
Arab lands by the United States and at the same time, the Middle Eastern
autocracies became even stronger than before. While the Bush administration
became alarmist, regarding the possibility of a future al Qaeda attacks on the U.S.
– the administration was not alone in sharing such frightening image of the
future. Bergen suggests, that for years after 9/11, surveys by foreign Policy
magazine of about one hundred of the country’s top foreign policy experts,
showed that about one quarter of them consistently believed that a very large-‐
scale attack by al-‐Qaeda was likely within months, while some two thirds
expected such attack within five years. (97). Even years later, in December 2008,
the congressionally authorized Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism concluded in its report:
“…it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will
be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more
likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a
nuclear weapon” (World at Risk 2008, XV).

On November 8, 2001 bin-‐Laden supposedly said to a Pakistani journalist Hamid
Mir who interviewed him, that if the United states were to use nuclear weapon
against al-‐Qaeda, al-‐Qaeda would possibly retaliate with chemical and nuclear
weapons of its own. Mir also claimed that al-‐Qaeda has nuclear weapon and
keeps it as a deterrent (Mir 2001). While it is true that bin-‐Laden possibly
entertained the idea of obtaining a nuclear weapon, and according to Peter
Bergen, he turned to a retired Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin,
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shortly before the 9/11 attacks (Bergen 2011, 215-‐217) -‐ the two meetings
between bin-‐Laden and the nuclear scientists lead to nothing, but with the arrest
and the interrogation of John Walker Lindh, the CIA learned that allegedly, “ the
second wave of the 9/11 would involve WMD.” In June 2002, Abu Ghaith, al-‐
Qaeda’s spokesman, (and bin Laden’s son in law, who was recently arrested and
awaits a trial in the U.S.) explained the “logic” behind al Qaeda’s plan to use
WMD:
We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4
million Americans – 2 million of them children – and to exile twice
as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.
Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and
biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies
that afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical
and biological weapons “ (Abu Gheith 2002).

Abu Gheits statement was followed by a 2003 fatwa by the Saudi cleric al-‐Fadh,
who religiously “sanctioned the use of WMD to kill American civilians, while
comparing the catapults of Mohammad’s times with…WMD.
Interestingly, al Qaeda has always made their grandiose WMD intentions
publicly clear,
“…despite the fact that privately some al Qaeda leaders were
aware that their WMD program was strictly an amateur affair…
Another wing of al Qaeda assessed, correctly as it turned out, that
these types of weapons [WMD] would only bring small tactical
benefits because the group was likely to only acquire or build
weapons that were quite primitive. But even al-‐Qaeda “doves”
understood that they should call those primitive devices (Bergen
2011, 219).

While Bergen belittles the terrorist threat of WMD terrorist attack, and bases his
analysis on well compiled incidents, and even scientific assumptions as to the
prospective threat of a crude radiological detonation. Based on Graham Allison’s
findings in his 2004 book Nuclear Terrorism, there are at least two options that
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al-‐Qaeda could use if it realistically desired to obtain a nuclear weapon. One
option would be to use the black market and TOC connections to purchase a
tactical nuclear device of a very low or moderate yield of 0.25 KT (Allison 2004,
47-‐49) from the Russian arsenal (It remains unknown, how well are these
weapons currently secured), or to build a crude nuclear device, which would
promise only partial nuclear explosion, and thus not a fully developed chain-‐
reaction (fizzle), yet potent enough to be catastrophic. Scientists of the Nuclear
Control Institute in Washington D.C. declare, that in order to build a nuclear
device terrorists would need only10 kg of Pu 239, or 52 kg of a 94% enriched U-‐
235. (Carson et..al. n.d.). Some variation on the quantity of fissile material needed
to build an IND is presented by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission of
the UN, but the risks remain the same. (Ferguson and Potter 2009). There are
many claims reporting the theft, or unexplained disappearance of various
amounts of both, Pu 239 and HEU. And yet, according to Peter Bergen, back in
2002 a former UN weapons inspector David Albright concluded that, “it was
virtually impossible for al-‐Qaeda to have acquired any type of nuclear weapon,
[other]… U.S. government analysts also came to the same conclusion” (Bergen
2011, 222). If such was indeed the final verdict on the topic, it suggests that
President Obama and his administration, reiterated the nuclear threat only “to
protect their back” in a case of an attack. The truth is probably somewhere
between the alarmists and those who belittle the nuclear threat. In any case, this
threat cannot be just overlooked. Continued awareness, increased preparedness
and general vigilance regarding WMD terrorist threat must be exercised.
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PART THREE: DEMOCRACIES AT WAR: THE AMERICAN
AND ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGMS TESTED
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X. The Counterterrorism Models of the United States and Israel:
Background
There are major differences between the United States and Israel, with regard to
the mutual threat of terrorist attacks.
Both, the US and Israel face the terrorist threat. While Israel lives with a daily
terrorist attack threat, since its independence, the U.S. has experienced many
terrorist incidents throughout its existence, however, most of the terrorist
incidents that occurred on US soil, were relatively small, and not very concerning
to the America public as a phenomenon, with one or two exceptions: the 1995
bombing in Oklahoma City, and the 1993 attempt to topple the Twin Towers of
the Trade Center by al Qaeda.
Israelis have faced, since the 1948 declaration of independence, a continuously
evolving, mostly escalating terrorist process, with occasional lulls. Both
countries experienced a surge in terrorist activities with the onset of suicide
terrorism. For Israel this process begun in 1982, with the Hezbollah bombing of
against the Israeli GSS headquarters in Tyre, Lebanon.
For the U.S. this process started back in 1983, with the Hezbollah suicide attack
on the Marine Barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon; and later, the Libyan
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988.
For the sake of objectivity, it is of value to mention that entirely unrelated to
Israel or the US, 1980 was the year the suicide bombings started worldwide. This
phenomenon was arguably, started by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Iraq.1983 was also the beginning of the Sri Lankan LTTE suicide terrorist
activities. While suicide terrorism, is not new, it was restarted in the 1980s after
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a long break, since WWII, and its targets were primarily overseas Americans, and
American property there.
“In the 24-‐year period from 1980 to 2003, there were just under
350 suicide terrorist attacks around the world – of which fewer
than 15% could reasonably be considered directed against
Americans. By contrast, in the six years from 2004 to 2009, the
world has witnessed 1,833 suicide attacks of which 92% are anti-‐
American in origin. America has made progress in bringing
Western institutions to Iraq, but democracy has not proved to be a
panacea for reducing terrorism…” (Pape and Feldman 2010, 4).

While anti American terrorism, in general, and suicide terrorism in particular, at
no time in American history, actually threatened the American public on a daily,
and widespread basis; from the very onset of such attacks against Israel was
accepted as a direct threat to the Israeli civilian public, and moreover, it was
perceived as a symbolic threat to the very continued existence of the Israeli
society and state.
XI. Can the American and Israeli Democracies Ultimately Defeat
Terrorism?
The definition of ‘defeat’ can be misleading and it is yet another open-‐ended
question whether or not, defeating terrorism means killing, or forever
imprisoning every single terrorist. Audrey Kurth Cronin posits,
“ Ten Years into a trillion dollar effort to answer the attacks of
September 11, 2001, it is difficult to tell whether U.S.
counterterrorism is achieving its intended effects, much less
explain how it fits within a viable American grand strategy. As
dramatic changes unfold in the Arab world, experts still debate
whether or not the United States is winning the fight against al
Qaeda” (Kurth Cronin 2012).

The 2012 -‐ 2013 dramatic events, be it Ben Ghazi attack on the American
diplomatic mission on September 11, 2012; the hostage taking by a large scale,
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and well planned, multinational Islamist terrorists on the East Algerian gas plant
on January 23, 2013 (Amir 2013); the July 23, 2013 massive suicide terrorist
attacks on the Iraqi Abu Gharib and Taji prisons, (Schreck 2013) and the
liberation of several hundreds of major al-‐Qaeda operatives or the July 30, 2013
Taliban attack on Pakistani prison in Peshawar further, and the freeing of close
to 200 Islamist fighters (Shah Sherazi 2013) -‐ support the above Cronin’s
question.
Has al Qaeda indeed been weakened, or has it just changed its strategy and
spread out, like a metastasizing cancer? Are our allies and we successful in
diminishing the number of prospective terrorists (al-‐Qaeda and other Islamist
volunteers)? Are our allies effectively denying al Qaeda and it affiliates safe
havens? And most importantly: are we ready to absorb a future attack and are
we able to effectively respond to one? So far the US government have pursued a
mostly, open – ended strategy/policy, with the actual cessation of all US military
activities overseas only somewhere in the dim future. The Obama
administration, doubtlessly, realizes the huge costs of the U.S. massive
deployment in Afghanistan and is indeed taking the steps required to withdraw
and thus help the U.S. troubled financial status.
However, Both the U.S. and Israel are still adhering to terrorist “body counts” as
metrics to estimate counterterrorism success. We don’t know any better and
sadly, body count is a poor indicator of al Qaeda’s capability to hit us once, or
more than one time, and maybe even to hit us with WMD. After all, as said before,
all al-‐Qaida needs to resurrect, is one single devastating attack. Somewhere along
this longest U.S. war, the American leadership lost the focus on what arguably,
should be our strategic target – the decimation of al Qaeda, and our battle
93
calculus was expanded to include the Taliban, which should not be confused with
al Qaeda and it is very questionable if the U.S. should be still fighting it. Yet
another question is whether or not The West should be fighting al Qaeda’s
affiliates and which ones, of the so many, should it fight and how?
While there is a general agreement that al Qaeda core, (in Afghanistan/Pakistan),
has been effectively diminished, the most dangerous and active al Qaeda
“branch” is currently in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). Moreover, al-‐Qaeda’s North
African branch (AQIM) and the Iraq node, (AQI), are also very potent and
dangerous. Furthermore, we also face homegrown American-‐born or bred, al-‐
Qaeda affiliates. The American public has not been educated in terrorist attack
preparedness. If al Qaeda will successfully attack the homeland, it will bring
back, not only the traumas of the past; it will challenge the American economy,
and its national interests and shake the very core of our democratic structures,
morals, norms and beliefs. Since it is clear that assuring 100 percent
impregnability to terrorist attack is impossible, the U.S. government must clearly
focus our counterterrorism strategy on attainable goals, or else we may be
engaged in chasing “al Qaeda’s shadows” forever. Kurth Cronin states,
“ Fear is not a strategy. Zero risk is a fantasy. To regain their
balance and perspective after a decade of action and apprehension
about al Qaeda, Americans and their government should return to
the basics of strategic thought, particularly the relationship
between ends, ways and means”(Kurth Cronin 2012).

In view of the fact that completely defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates seems out
of reach at this point, should the international community attempt to diffuse
terrorism by resorting to nonviolent measures, reconciliation, peace processes,
and democratization? Hardly. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Hamas and Hezbollah
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and other Palestinian groups, are unlikely to accept a politically negotiated
settlement, which will disarm them and diffuse the various groups as
unnecessary. In fact the opposite may happen, if the world attempts to approach
terrorists with peaceful measures alone,
“ …terrorists tend to ramp up their attacks during peace processes, precluding
concessions. Democracies are widely seen as the preferred host for terrorist
groups…and clearly, withholding concessions does not deter terrorists from
committing the violence” (Abrahams 2011, 592).

It seems that the best way to deal with terrorism is possibly, somewhere
between the different approaches described above. Since terrorism is an
amorphous entity, there are no two identical forms or terrorist groups. Each
group requires a well focused and perfectly tailored, coherent strategy.
Currently, we must seek to tailor the response to al-‐Qaeda, or Hamas and
Hezbollah, not along any ideas of rapprochement; (in spite of al Qaeda’s
notorious suggestion of “truce” (Cole and Shubailat 2009), al Qaeda never
showed any interest is any kind of negotiations or settlement; nor did the U.S.).
Israeli –Palestinian Oslo accords prove that Palestinian Terrorist organizations
would rather continue fighting than renouncing violence and the very
annihilation of Israel. It seems that as mentioned before, the very perpetuation of
the existence of a given terrorist group, could very well be a goal on its own.
Without removing any of the CT tools we have and after defining how we
conceive al Qaeda’s and each other terrorist group’s end – we must choose the
tools to reach this goal. A coherent strategy, (one defining a clear an consistent
path of means for an end) will not abandon the use of force, but whatever final
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means are chosen, they must logically fit the goal of “ending “ al-‐Qaeda or other
terrorist group. While such coherent plan is arguably, easier to create with
respect to local groups, with clearly defined, localized grievances (e.g. Hamas
etc.), the case of the transnational and global aims of al-‐Qaeda, makes the
creation of such coherent plan extremely challenging.
Terrorism is “defeated” every time, that those who were the terrorists, either
renounce the use of violence, and join peaceful political process to pursue their
goals; or whenever they are suppressed hard enough to forever stop significantly
hurting the civilian public, the military and the legal political processes. The
example of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, is an example of such terrible suppression of
terrorism by the government, that it indeed made the LTTE capitulate and lay
down their arms. However, as stated before, suppression has its democracy-‐
defeating, costs. While democracies must retain their high moral standards,
appeasement or any sort of capitulation, to terrorist demands, will not defeat
terrorism; carefully measured and balanced suppression, along with other non-‐
violent counterterrorist measures -‐ eventually might. Although it may sound as a
biased statement, the application of both the offensive and defensive measures,
as a long-‐term tactics, is likely to eventually defeat Palestinian terrorism and less
assuredly -‐ al Qaeda. Suppression in this context is not the military offensive
measure only. It is the result of combining military, intelligence, law enforcement
along with homeland preparedness, which create a resilient public, (strong in the
face of terror and providing strong support to its government). Palestinian
terrorism is very different from the global Islamist terrorism challenge of al-‐
Qaeda. Indeed, one has to be aware that the actual connection between al-‐Qaeda
and Israel is at present time slim. Yet it may prove tragic to accept a notion that
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such connection is altogether nonexistent. In 2011, the world first heard about
the alleged al-‐Qaeda amassing in the Sinai Peninsula. However, despite some
similarities with al-‐Qaeda, at least for now, the terrorists that in July 2011 and in
August 2012 attacked and killed Egyptians from El Arish, and in 2012, Egyptian
border patrol soldiers (and in April 2013 fired rockest from Sinai into Eilat,
Israel and Aqaba, Jordan) -‐ were not al-‐Qaeda, although they identified
themselves as such. (Vick 2011). Israel is diligently monitoring information
regarding al Qaeda’s potential threat to Israel. This writer knows of the GSS al-‐
Qaeda section, and assumes that it is very likely that the Mossad and the IDI
(Israeli Defense Intelligence forces of the IDF) respectively, have analogous al-‐
Qaeda-‐oriented collection and analysis specialized entities.
While radical Islamism and terrorist tactics that currently challenge the
international community have little connection to the Israeli – Palestinian
conflict, it remains hard to contest the fact that the 1979 Iranian Islamist
revolution,(which created the Hezbollah), as well as the establishment of al
Qaeda by bin-‐Laden – drew strength and initiative from the Soviet pullout from
Afghanistan (1989); Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000; the U.S. instant
withdrawal from Lebanon (1983); the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza (2005); and
the Spanish withdrawal from Afghanistan (after Madrid in 2004). Indeed
terrorism and specifically Islamist radical fanaticism, challenges the whole
world, no matter how it is named and whether it is directly or indirectly linked
with al Qaeda, or with its ideology and political goals. In spite of temporary
setbacks, which further empowered Islamist terrorism, it seems acceptable that
in the long run, al least theoretically, democracies can defeat terrorism. They can
do so through a clear threat perception and through moral consistency. Yet
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before one decides on consistency, there are some changes to the current
concept of democracy that seem to be mandatory, if we want to win the war on
terror. In this vein, the free world must assimilate the contention that endurance,
consistency and resilience are our strategic weapons.
In the war on terror, the world as an international community, must unite behind
the banner of targeting: terrorists, their facilities, finances and state sponsors.
Moreover, certain legislative changes are necessary:
“ Democracies need to drastically alter their legislation and

policies, as well as international law, vis-‐a’-‐vis the war on terror.
Until recently, most democratic legislatures considered terror a
crime best dealt with by the judiciary. After 9/11, legislation in
some of these countries changed rapidly, but not
enough…International law, meanwhile, is still based on the
percepts of conventional warfare – and especially the experiences
of WWII…We must find the proper legal balance between the need
to ensure security and the need to ensure basic liberties…Although
passing through security at an airport may seem inconvenient, it is
nonetheless a necessary precaution.“ (Ya’alon 2007, 21).

Finally, nobody is born terrorist; terrorism is being taught and indoctrinated.
What is so hard for Westerns to understand is why the Islamist education system
dehumanizes Americans, Israelis and Jews (and then some) as “ infidels” to be
annihilated; why Islamic schools (madrasas), wherever they are, be it the
Palestinian occupied territories, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Iran, promote a
culture of Jihad and martyrdom, thus the culture of death, instead of life.
Glorification of life -‐ not of death, must be the target of future Islamic education.
This is where our “battle for hearts and minds” must be focused. Until such
change in Islamic education will materialize – we have little chance of truly
defeating Islamist terrorism, and changing the Islamist frame of mind. The
democracies of the world must unite in their attempt to promote a major change
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in the core values of the Middle Eastern countries. Islam is not the source of jihad
and martyrdom – people who prefer a fictional afterlife to happiness and
fulfillment in this life – are. In that respect several steps should be made or
continued:
• Monitoring efforts made by terrorists in every aspect of the battle for the
hearts and minds, research and operational tools, treating it as a
legitimate subject …and as an intelligence task… The media constructed
by the terrorist organizations, encompassing television, radio, the press
and the Internet, has to be studied and monitored…” (Gilboa and Lapid
2012, 174-‐175).
• Sober declassifying intelligence and making it available to individuals and
institutions dealing with the battle for hearts and minds in Israel and
abroad: that includes declassification of information regarding terrorist
activity, terrorist military structure, funding, brainwashing…support from
sponsors …” (Gilboa and Lapid 2012, 175).
• Sober declassification of counterterrorist methods and their
implementation. Recording not only success, but also failures.
It is much better to disclose our CT measures and truthfully argue those
opposing them, by explaining our realistic options and trade-‐offs in case
we cease deploying certain controversial CT options (e.g. targeted
killings). Transparency, within logical limits, may consolidate support to
CT activities through better understanding of the options we have when
facing terrorism.
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Some say that Israel attracts attention like a magnet. Back in the 1980’s there
were said to have been more foreign reporters in Jerusalem than in any other
major capital, with the exception of Washington and Moscow. The reason for that
is not too hard to understand. Israel is probably the most controversial and
condemned state in the International community. The fact that Israel is situated
on the “holy land” of three main religions, one of them being Christianity -‐
focuses the attention of the Christians of the United States and Europe – on
Israel. Islam claims its connection to this land, and especially to Jerusalem, thus
focusing the attention of some 1.3 billion Muslims around the world on Israel.
Being “the people of the Book,” higher moral standards are expected for Israel
and Israelis and serve as yet another reasoning behind the frequent criticism of
Israel. Most critics somehow overlook the multiple nature of moralities, the
complexity of judging the whole country, or the acts of the Israeli government,
and its military, as well as its parliamentary democracy – in the context of their
own biases, or norms -‐ as defined in the behaviors of other countries. Indeed,
comparing Israel and the United states, on just about any issue is very
instructive. Speaking of differences, there are arguably, no other two
democracies that are more different. One is huge and relatively rich, and the
other is tiny, and while not poor, possibly best defined as bordering on
wellbeing. While the U.S. is extremely multicultural, Israel is rather homogenous.
A President governs the American democracy. The American legislature is
completely independent. Both, are separately elected for fixed terms – Israel is a
parliamentary, democratic regime, where the tenure of the government depends
on the continued support from the legislature (Knesset), the Prime Minister is
the leader of the largest party and may lose his/her chair if support wanes; no
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matter how long he/she has been at the state’s helm. There is also a very
significant difference in the location of the current enemies of these two
democracies. The current enemies of the United States are mostly (with some
exceptions of homegrown enemies), located very far from its shores and
homeland, while most Israel’s enemies are no more than a short bus ride from its
centers and some, like in the US, live within its sovereign territory.
Furthermore, both democracies are very engaged in their respective national
security. According to the CIA World Fact Book, Israel allocates some 7.5 percent
of its gross national product to the military, (#6 in the world), while the United
States allocates somewhere near 4 percent of its GNP for the same purpose (# 23
in the world). Interestingly, most democracies typically allocate one or two
percent for this very purpose. (Military Expenditures 2006-‐2012). Israel does
not have a Constitution. There is a codex of basic laws, which were passed by the
Knesset, and they serve as the laws of the land. They are as abiding, and as
strongly observed, as the laws stemming from any constitution; they are, at the
same time, often debated upon. The United States Constitution, conceived by the
Founding Fathers, is upheld with unprecedented rigor, almost as if it were
“sacred.” While it indeed preserves the human rights and civil liberties, it is often
the source of bitter struggle and harsh disputes over the interpretation of its
various articles, and amendments.
While Israel, from its inception promised and preserved civil liberties and
human rights, based on the British and American legal systems, the United
States, is a country that until not too long ago, did not have, de facto, equal rights
neither for women, nor for certain origin and skin color. The United States is
constantly evolving, and progress is constant and clear to see by all. In this
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respect it is important to acknowledge, that although Israel does not have to deal
with the huge cultural diversity of the United States, it would be incorrect to
assume that Israel is free of sectarian discrimination, or that women are always
paid same wages as men in the same position. However, if there is one really
vital difference between the Israelis and the Americans, it is arguably, in the
amount of trust the people are expressing towards one another and the amount
of trust the public has to its respective government, military and the various
authorities and agencies. According to James Madison’s Federalist Papers 10:
“ A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt
by a majority of the whole… and there is nothing to check
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious
individual. Hence it is that such democracies have been spectacles
of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible
with personal security…”

Indeed, Americans observe a great amount of suspicion and mistrust towards
any authority, and they fear of being potentially, in danger of being deprived of
their basic Constitutional rights. This core belief is a guiding light in their
perception of their government.
One may rightly question the source of the Israeli unusual, amount of trust,
which Israelis have towards each other; the “camaraderie,” so often exhibited in
personal relations, as well as towards the government. This work has not
researched this question scientifically; however there are certain factors, which
are anecdotally familiar, from a life-‐long experience within the Israeli
community, that undoubtedly contribute to the unique cohesiveness of the
Israeli society. Among the most vital cohesiveness enhancers are the following
common experiences: 1) the vast majority of Israelis are Jewish and whether
secular or orthodox, the religion equals nationality concept, serves as a social
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glue. 2) The “founding fathers of Israel” came mostly from Poland, Russia and
Europe and shared much of the same culture, as well as a socialist, and a humble
vision of themselves and of the Israeli State; a state created to serve as a refuge
for the Jewish Diaspora. 3) Many of the founders of Israel were survivors of the
Holocaust and these survivors were forever bonded by the memories of near
total annihilation of the Jewish people. 4) The current generations of Israelis are
often descendants of the Holocaust victims and survivors. They thus continue to
uphold much of the same attitudes, towards Jewish and Israeli existential issues.
5) Most Israelis, undergo a mandatory three-‐year service in the IDF, which
serves as a maturing mechanism, as well as additional ”social glue,” and results
in a true “people’s army,” which is a near sacred and very highly trusted,
protector of the Jewish/Israeli people and the Jewish state.
While the American people find protection in the Separation of Powers and the
system of Checks and Balances, so do the Israelis. In spite of the trust Israelis
have in their government, both the Israelis and Americans, respectively, insist on
the separation between the White House and Congress, and the separation of the
government [of Israel] from the Knesset; knowing that it helps to lessen the
madness that can come from any one institution taking over.
XII. Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Threat to Israel
Interestingly, while there is a lot of talk and debate regarding the WMD terrorist
threat to the U.S., there is hardly any such talk regarding Israel. While WMD
threat of annihilation of the Jewish state has been expressed numerous times, by
states like Iran, and Libya, (in the past), there is very little “talk” coming directly
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from terrorist sources. Indeed, as suggested by William Walker, if we assume for
a while, the point of view of Israel’s adversaries, Israel has indeed been
“ …a principal driver of enmity of every kind in the Middle East,
and a principal driver of quests for WMD…Israel’s nuclear
capability and supremacy in conventional weapons have
encouraged and legitimized WMD proliferation within the region.
Where unable to gain access nuclear technology, states have
turned to CBW instead…” (Walker 2004, 66).

Naturally, this truism however right, is oblivious to the fact that Israel developed
its arguable, nuclear capability with French help, in the 1950s and on; but it
never threatened any nation with its nuclear capability, and never even
acknowledged it as existent. Nobody has tried to call Israel’s bluff, thus far.
However the threat from Iran, is realistic enough to create an atmosphere of
alarmism in spite of the fact that even if Iran were to cross the “red line”
portrayed by the Israeli Premier Benyamin Netanyahu on September 27, 2012
(Heller 2012), and continue enriching its uranium – it would take additional
considerable time to create a nuclear weapon, as we can learn from the more
nuclear-‐advanced case of North Korea. (South Korea and U.S. 2013). Moreover,
although due to Israel’s small size and its high population density, it would have
a very hard time to survive even a single nuclear attack, even if it indeed has as it
is suggested, between 80 and 200 nuclear bombs ready; or moreover as claimed:
“ The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s nuclear weapons” U.S.
Army Col. Warner Farr said Israel’s nuclear arsenal has grown
from an estimated 13 nuclear bombs in 1967 to 400 nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons…Israel’s navy could deploy weapons on…
[its] submarines. Israel will then have a second strike
capability…(U.S. Air Force Says Israel…2002).

By merely admitting to such legendary capability -‐ it would arguably, silence
even the hateful “Ahemedinajads” of Iran. However, the fact that no matter how
many bombs Israel might have, if it has no strategic depth and can’t allow for at
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least 1/3 of it population, along with at least 50 percent of its vital infrastructure,
to be annihilated -‐ all these imaginary claims of its suggested deterrence
capability could very well be a nonsense.
Moreover, even more threatening for Israel, is the idea of any country “sharing”
its nuclear or other WMD capability, with Hezbollah or al-‐Qaeda. Although such
scenario seems unrealistic, it may prove real after all. On January 16, 2013
Israel’s Ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor said: “ the prospect of Hezbollah
acquiring chemical weapons – through mishandling or via [Syria]… is
frightening” (Wilner 2013). As widely known, already in August 2012, Syria
acknowledged its chemical weapons warning to the world: “ No chemical
weapons will ever be used [said Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman] …Unless
Syria is exposed to external aggression…The weapons are under supervision of
the Syrian armed forces” (Ghitis 2012).
Much more realistic is the version voiced by the outgoing Israeli Ambassador to
the UN Danny Gillerman, who told the New York Times in February 2008:
“ The real fear is not that the Iranians will be crazy enough or
stupid enough to launch a missile at Israel, but that they will have
no compunction about providing rouge regimes and terror
organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah with weapons of mass
destruction” (Benhorin 2008).

Even the above version is not necessarily realistic. After all, if Hezbollah, (which
is a very capable terrorist organization), obtains CBW from Syria or Iran, and
uses them against Israel, the retaliation might be against the state who’s
“signature” will be on such weapons; thus theoretically, Israel might retaliate
accordingly, and…the world would be at the edge of a nuclear abyss. On February
9, 2013 the Israeli PM Netanyahu urged the EU to join other nations which have
already declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization; a request seconded by John
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Brennan who called on the EU to take “ proactive action to uncover Hezbollah’s
infrastructure and disrupt the group’s financing schemes and operational
networks in order to prevent future attacks.” (Jerusalem Post Editorial 2013).
Such a move would empower the EU to freeze many of Hezbollah’s assets.
David Siegel, the Israeli Consul General to the U.S. spoke to the GOP on February
13, 2013 and added:

“ Global Jihadists and Al Qaeda are coming to fight in Syria on both
sides of the divide…The longer this continues, the more deeply
embedded in Syria these powerful and dangerous organizations
are…They’ll take [these WMD systems] and disappear throughout
the Middle East…We won’t let terrorists, who are the most
dangerous in the world – Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and others – be
equipped with the most dangerous weapons in the world” (Stone
2013).

Yet another related question is whether there is a significant difference between
the WMD terrorist threat to Israel from Hezbollah, and the WMD threat to Israel
from Hamas. On August 10, 2012, the deputy speaker of the Palestinian, newly
elected parliament in Gaza Strip Ahmad Bahr, was heard shouting:
“ Oh Allah, destroy the Jews and their supporters. Oh Allah,
Destroy the Americans and their supporters. Oh Allah, count them
one by one, and kill them all, without leaving a single one.” That
cry was echoed by Yussuf al Sharafi, a Hamas member of the
Palestinian Legislative Council: “ Allah, take the Jews and their
allies, Allah, take the Americans and their allies…annihilate them
completely and do not leave anyone of them (Keyes 2012).

This kind of rhetoric is far from new, in view of the continuous conflict with
Israel. This conflict is currently in “remission” due to the agreement reached in
November 2012. Interestingly, with Khaled Meshaal’s, (the supreme Hamas
leader’s), refusal to back Basir Asad in failing Syria, the safe haven Hamas had
there was terminated, and Hamas operatives had to look for new alliances and
safe havens in Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. However, Hamas emerged from the
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latest confrontation with Israel stronger than before, and with a degree of new
support within its Sunni allies in the Middle East. Moreover, it did not lose its
support from the Shia’ Iran and Hezbollah and in the future, Israel will have to
confront a better-‐armed Hamas. While the chance of reconciliation between the
Fatah and Hamas went amiss (in fact, none of the involved parties was
interested: Fatah was afraid of being overrun by Hamas, Hamas, did not want
anything to do with possible peace negotiations with Israel); and Israel too
would arguably, rather see the division in the Palestinian camp as an ongoing,
reassuring that the Palestinian will not unify as a single entity; harder to deal
with. Furthermore, Hamas, in a way like Hezbollah, is not a monolithic entity.
While it is interested in resistance, it is also interested in politics, (very possibly
more interested in politics than resistance). Indeed, its involvement and
attempted help to the Palestinian civilization (medical, educational etc.) is no
way near the infrastructure developed by the Hezbollah in Lebanon, but it can
not be disregarded. (Shaikh 2012). Back in January 2009, an arms convoy on its
way from Iran to the Gaza Strip was destroyed in Sudan’s eastern Red Sea, by an
“unidentified” aircraft. In April 2011, alleged smugglers of a shipment of Iranian-‐
made mustard and other nerve agent, were killed in Port Sudan by a mysterious
aircraft strike. Israel denied comment (Israeli Strikes Kill WMD-‐related Hamas
2011). All this information, even if true, is at best anecdotal. There are no public
statements by Israeli officials regarding WMD threat from either Hamas or
Hezbollah. Although in truth, Hezbollah posits a grave potential danger to both
the U.S. and Israel, this threat does not, at this time, include WMD. Moreover, in a
relatively recent statement (September 3, 2012) Hassan Nasrallah openly
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declared that the Hezbollah does not have, and does not need WMD to pummel
Israel in a war. (Hezbollah: We Don’t Have Chemical Weapons 2012).
The WMD terrorist danger to Israel may be smaller than the danger to US. While
the imminent threat to the United States is mostly from al Qaeda (and very
currently also from North Korea), the WMD threat to Israel is mostly from Iran,
and it is not very likely that Iran, or any other Middle Eastern country, may
release WMD into the unpredictable hands of terrorists. At the same time, the
great difference between al Qaeda as a non-‐state, transnational actor, and
Hezbollah, which has evolved into a guerrilla type insurgency; deeply involved in
a “legitimate” political system in Lebanon -‐ is that while Hezbollah presents a
grave potential future danger to the U.S., EU and other parts of the world -‐ at this
time, Hezbollah is carefully building its infrastructure in Latin America, EU, the
U.S and other parts of the world. Hezbollah is currently focused on twin activity:
political and social activity within Lebanon, and diversified criminal activity
elsewhere as part of Transnational Organized Crime (Hezbollah in Latin America
2011). Although it is theoretically, like al-‐Qaeda interested in expelling the West
from the Middle East, it is presently unlikely to participate in overt and large
terrorist attacks against the U.S. The future however, may be holding some very
unpleasant surprises from Hezbollah to the West. While some may suggest that
Hezbollah is more likely to get politically assimilated in the Lebanese society,
such development is not very likely, because Hezbollah is manipulated by Iran. If
Iran will become involved in a regional war due to its nuclear ambitions,
Hezbollah might be accordingly, activated to attack not only Israel. It may be
requested also, to stage terrorist attacks in the U.S. and elsewhere. However, it
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should be clear that no matter what terrorist group is threatening the United
States -‐ no terrorist threat to the U.S. is truly existential. The U.S. can survive
much more than a single terrorist attack of any kind. Unfortunately, this is not
necessarily the Israeli situation. Thus, however theoretically small is the WMD
threat to Israel – it cannot be disregarded. This section did not expand on the
theoretical threat to Israel from transnational, al Qaeda type of terrorism. At
present time, the Israeli IC carefully monitors such threat. The GSS has a
dedicated al Qaeda section, and it is probably true that the same can be said
about the rest of the Israeli IC. As it turns out – it is Hamas, of all things, that
blocks any current al Qaeda foothold in the West Bank and Gaza.
Not out of love for Israel though…

XIII. The Israeli Counterterrorism Apparatus
Israel has been affected by terrorism from its very birth as a nation – on every
level. Terrorism affects directly and indirectly most of Israeli government
ministries and institutions. It is arguably true that every Israeli share part of the
daily burden of terrorism. However, the coping framework that Israeli
authorities developed in order to deal with this threat is divided between three
dimensions: intelligence, security and civilian. This part of the paper will focus
mainly on the offensive dimension of the Israeli model and thus the intelligence
and security dimensions.
The Israeli intelligence community is constructed from three separate entities:
Military Intelligence (a.k.a. Israel Defense Intelligence, IDI, know also as AMAN);
the Institute for Special Operations (Mossad); and the Israeli General Security
Service aka Israel Security Agency (GSS aka ISA aka Shabak or Shin Bet). The
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Israeli National Police (INP), as well as the Department of Political Research of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not an official part of the IIC, but the INP is a
de facto participant; and has been known to generate its own CT leads and cases,
through special intelligence and CT units (e.g. YAMAM or TZASMA a.k.a. Tzevet
Samim Mivttzai Artzi, which originally was a national anti-‐drug unit in the 1970s
and 1980s.).
In spite of the fact that all above-‐mentioned entities share the task of fighting and
thwarting terrorism as one of their missions, counterterrorism per se, is the
main mission of the GSS. And the GSS is accepted as the first and foremost
authority with regard to counterterrorism.
“ In principle, the GSS jurisdiction was limited to the State of Israel
and the occupied territories; Aman was responsible for Arab
countries and the Middle East; and Mossad handled special
operations and intelligence in the rest of the world. The problem
with this division is that in order to enhance their reputation,
prove their importance, and secure resources, intelligence
organizations tend to compete with one another. Thus, when they
identify a promising lead, they tend to overlook geographical
boundaries” (Pedahzur 2009, 71).

Moreover, when a promising lead is identified by one of these agencies, there
still is to some degree, an inherent tendency to develop such lead alone, without
sharing; despite specific operational needs (such as SIGINT or VISINT, that can
be best performed by IDI/AMAN). In the very same manner, while the GSS, often
reached out of Israel and the occupied territories, using human assets it obtained
through its cover of various foreign individuals, posted in Israel. Both, the GSS
and the Mossad occasionally developed promising leads linked to the occupied
territories, and even more so, to Israel’s neighbors (e.g. Jordan, Syria or
Lebanon), which arguably, should have been AMAN’s domain, according to the
official IDI mandate.
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“ An examination of the relations among the Israeli intelligence
agencies…shows that often at the root of their disagreements have
nothing to do with intelligence or operational matters at all, but
are the expression of generic problems in public organizations,
which tend to be highly territorial and compete over prestige and
resources. These problems are far from being exclusive to Israel ”
(Pedahzur 2009, 74).

The above description is no longer entirely adequate. Following the 2006, second
Lebanon war, a rethinking prompted by Hezbollah’s relative success, prompted
reorganization within the GSS, which led to a much improved paradigm of
sharing.

“ Shin Bet [aka GSS] began to work closely with special police
counterterrorism units…The IDF and police were brought inside
Shin Bet’s command center to ensure that they had access to all
information. Local commanders could reach out directly to Shin
Bet regional leaders, decentralizing (and thus speeding up)
information sharing…the situation is hardly perfect. There is still
fighting over scarce SIGINT assets, and Shin Bet relies on the IDF
for aerial surveillance and other expensive platforms…Yet by the
standards of U.S. intelligence, where coordination is more
cumbersome, Israel’s sharing of information is impressive”
(Byman 2011, 343).

The changes the GSS has gradually enacted were possibly based not only on
Israeli innovative thinking, but also on lessons learned from the post 9/11
reorganization of the U.S. CT struggle. Israel realized that it should create a
single, central headquarters for the struggle with terrorism, like the CTC, but
with certain specific, Israeli adjustments. These were outlined in Pedahzur’s
description:

“…instead of implementing organizational reforms that will end up
in a new series of struggles between the various agencies…the idea
is to establish a main headquarters for the struggle against
terrorism that will serve as a hub of a network that will send out
its arms to each and every one of the various intelligence and
thwarting forces…it will enable daily coordination…and rapid
deployment of the necessary resources when…a threat is detected
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by one of the intelligence organizations. Representatives of all the
forces in charge of coping with terrorism will be stationed full-‐
time at the headquarters. Their job will be real time
coordination…” (Pedahzur 2009, 146).

The GSS collects, analyzes, assesses the terrorism related intelligence, and
evaluates the threats. It formulates and disseminates concrete warnings
regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks. The intelligence products are also
used in preparation of offensive and defensive activity against terrorist
organizations. While the GSS is sometimes paralleled with the FBI, such
comparison is somewhat flawed. The GSS, is less concerned with law
enforcement and forensic aspects, which are the forte of the FBI. Although the
GSS interrogates its suspects and investigates cases of terrorism or espionage, it
has relatively lower interest in the procedure of indictment and the prosecution
of the suspects; it attempts to produce a constant flow of actionable intelligence,
and thwart terrorism; any other tasks are arguably, secondary. To arrests its
suspects in terrorism, the GSS collaborates with the INP, IDF’s Special Forces and
the Border Patrol. When a terror suspect is ready for indictment, he/she is often
passed to the police to deal with most of the aspects of the arrests and prisoner
transfer. The GSS has its own prosecutors, which often work as a team with
Israel’s Attorney General’s office and the police to reach indictment, prosecution
and eventually -‐ incarceration.
The Israel National Police has the mandate over internal security in Israel, and as
such it has a responsibility to prevent terrorist attacks within Israel. It shares
with the GSS the reasonability for foiling and thwarting terrorist attacks, either
by acting upon intelligence from the GSS or other branches of the IC, or by acting
on its own intelligence and by proactively locating and neutralizing, prospective
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attackers on their way to their targets. The INP is also entrusted with securing of
sensitive facilities, crowded areas, as well as providing emergency management
to attack sites, following an attack. The INP operates a large number of highly
qualified bomb squads, capable of responding to multiple and simultaneous
alerts regarding “suspected objects,” with the objective being -‐ neutralizing IEDs .
The INP also provides all forensic services through its Identification and Forensic
Science Division. (Ganor 2007, 277).
During the 1950’s the INP has established the Border Patrol (BP a.k.a. Mishmar
Hagvul or MAGAV) as an auxiliary arm, which at that time was responsible for
the safety of villages located close to Israel’s “green line “ borders. Currently, the
BP is used to augment the police during large-‐scale public events. It also
augments the IDF by patrolling and helping to preserve the order in the West
Bank, and along the Gaza Strip “border” with Israel. The BP hosts the YAMAM,
which is a highly trained SF unit, tasked with a variety of kinetic missions such as
the interception and arrests of terrorist suspects, and intervention in hostage
situations. The Yamam, which is located in more than a single base, also serves as
an equivalent of S.W.A.T. to augment the INP’s during problematic, criminal
arrests.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are responsible for protecting Israel’s borders,
from foreign invaders. Currently, it focuses on preventing terrorist penetration
to Israel, controlling the West Bank, and preventing Palestinian, terrorist
infiltration of Israel, from Gaza and the West Bank. The IDF is tasked with
conducting offensive kinetic activity against terrorist organizations wherever
they are: in Gaza, West Bank and in Arab states that sponsor terrorism.
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Both the IDF and the INP created a number of units specializing in undercover
and overt operations aimed at the apprehension or the killing of terrorist leaders
and combatants, within their Palestinian strongholds. (e.g. units like Duvdevan,
Shimshon, Yamas, Gideonim etc.). While the main mission of the IDF is to protect
the sovereign borders of Israel from external attack by a hostile nation/s; as part
of the lessons learned from the 1991 Iraq Gulf war, a new reality had to be
recognized: the external borders could not stop missiles and the HAGA
Command (Civil Defense) which was linked to the IDF, was found insufficient, (in
size, capability and authority) in view of the new threats to the homeland. In
1992, the Israeli government decided to create the Homeland Front Command
(HFC), which has been created as an integral part of the IDF; its commander has
a dual sub ordinance: directly to the IDF’s COS (Chief of Staff)– as part of the IDF,
and directly to the Minister of Defense. This unique structure gave the new
command all the independence and the respective responsibilities of an IDF
combatant command. As such it focused on the protection of the civilian
population of Israel in times of war, massive terrorist attacks (e.g. during the
2006 war with the Hezbollah), as well as in case of natural disasters. The HFC
became the first and foremost authority on Civil Defense in Israel. It is assisted
by the voluntary police units of Civil Guard, (also known as MASH’AZ aka
Mishmar Ezrahi), and other voluntary, and semi-‐voluntary organizations (e.g. the
Israeli equivalent of the Red Cross: MDA a.k.a. Magen David Adom etc.). The new
command can arguably, and to a limited degree, be seen as a rough, Israeli
equivalent of the U.S. National Guard. One of the additional objectives of the HFC
is to relieve the IDF regional commanders of their partial responsibility for the
civilian population’s safety in wartime, which they had until 1992. The creation
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of the HFC liberated the regional IDF commanders from much of their internal
obligations; thus allowing the IDF to focus solely on protecting Israel outwards.
(Israelis and Americans 2013).
XIV. The Shaping of Israel’s counterterrorism paradigm.
Counter terrorism experts like Boaz Ganor and Ami Pedahzur correctly claim,
that Israel has never developed a straightforward, coherent, official doctrine for
counterterrorism. Various policy makers and heads of the security apparatuses,
held various opinions regarding the goals and the means to be defined in the
struggle with Palestinian terrorism. Some of the hawkish Israeli leaders believe
that terrorism can be eliminated completely, by adhering to the” war model.”
Others argue that terrorism can be contained, only well enough, not to affect
policymakers. Yet others suggest, that although terrorism could indeed be
eliminated through the war model, such approach is not practical due to the
constraints imposed by the international community (Pedahzur 2009, 3).
The supporters of the war model prevailed over the past sixty-‐five years;
however, it is not to say, that there were no periods of defensive attitude to
counterterrorist struggle. In fact if anything characterizes the Israeli CT model, it
is rather its lack of consistency and its lack of coherence, (and thus the lack of
narrow, focused, definition of the final ends to be achieved and the consistent
application of chosen means, until the goal is reached). In fact as Ganor posits,
“…[during] 1994-‐2000…the Israelis emphasized using all means

necessary to deal with terrorism, cripple the ability of terrorists to
carry out attacks, and reduce terrorism’s influence on the morale
of the Israeli public…[but] When decision makers realized that
fundamentalist Islamic groups were continuing their showcase
attacks on Israel, and the [Palestinian] Authority was not making
use of its capabilities,[to use its own militia to arrest terrorists – as
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agreed], Israel’s policies underwent a change: security apparatuses
would now operate within the [Palestinian] autonomy, although in
a discreet manner. Under cover units and Special Forces
concentrated on eliminating senior terrorist leaders…In October
1994, after a suicide attack… Yitzhak Rabin announced that he had
directed the security forces to eliminate terrorist leaders.” (Ganor
2007, 279).

Moreover, this opinion is strongly seconded by Avraham Shalom and Yuval
Diskin two of the former heads of the Israeli General Secret Service (GSS aka
SHABAK), clearly state in interviews, that when it comes to making a final
decision regarding a CT operation – Israeli politicians (many of whom were
former generals) expect the Shabak, military or else to present them with an
option which is agreed upon by all – so that they don’t have to be the once to
make the final decision, and thus take the responsibility, and often the ultimate
blame for the results. Yet these decisions are always tactical, never strategic (The
Gatekeepers 2013).
However, not long after Israel’s counterterrorism apparatus engaged in frequent
targeted killing of terrorist leaders and specific combatants, it became clear that
the deterrence effect that Israel expected to achieve through the implication of
this method, failed to deter the Hamas and other terrorist factions. In fact the
opposite better exemplifies the result of the application of this paradigm. In fact,
Israel failed to deter suicide terrorism through the application of targeted
killings and other, nonlethal and punitive CT methods (e.g. house demolitions,
enhanced interrogations, deportations, administrative detentions, etc.).
However, this failure does not suggest that ‘suicide terrorism deterrence’ is
outright impossible. It only suggests that Israel has not found the “right formula”
to attain such deterrence, till this very day.
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“…it is reasonable to conclude that Israel’s deterrent policies were
not effective. While offensive and defensive actions achieved
impressive successes in thwarting attacks, the total number of
attempts was not reduced, and indeed it increased. If the objective
of Israeli actions was to deter the organizations, their leaders, and
their operatives from carrying out suicide attacks…the objective
was not fulfilled. In spite of this, it is not possible to conclude… that
it is necessarily impossible to deter terrorists or suicide bombers,
only that the tactics used by Israel did not achieve this objective
and that efforts must be made to tailor new methods to the unique
challenges of suicide bombings” (Ganor 2007, 281).

Existing data suggests, that although the long-‐term objective of deterrence and
ending terrorism in general (and suicide terrorism in particular), was not
obtained, Israel’s immense thwarting efforts were not entirely lost on the
adversaries, nor on the Israeli public. In fact, the Israeli public, consistently, gives
the GSS and IDF a 100 percent, unequalled trust. (Byman 2011, 344).
For one thing, the terrorists understood that Israel’s resolve is undiminished,
and that continued terrorism, (which was unprecedented in scope between 2001
and 2005), is unlikely to break the Israeli resolve and its public resilience.
Moreover, it is definitely unlikely to bring about the collapse of the Israeli society
and state, nor is it advancing in any way, any negotiated solution to the
Palestinian problem.
Secondly, targeted killings offered the Israeli population in general and those
directly affected by acts of terrorism, some sense of “rough justice” being done.
This in turn, also caused the respective prime minister and his cabinet to retain
the political power and popular support. However, targeted killing and other
non-‐lethal CT measures used by Israel were also a widely used reason for
international criticism and political pressure.
Moshe Ya’alon, a former IDF COS (2002-‐2005) contends that terrorism can be
ultimately defeated through the war model, if the application of this model is
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prolonged and continuous. He suggests that capitulation to terrorism only
generates more terror. Indeed, in 1983, when the Hezbollah bombed the Marine
barracks outside Beirut, the U.S. (and the French) immediately pulled out from
Lebanon, where they were applied as a U.N. Peace keeping force. Not Hezbollah,
nor Iran, has ever “ paid” for this horrible act. In another case, in 1989, after
spending ten years attempting to establish firm foothold in Afghanistan, the
Soviet army withdrew. These withdrawals were, and still are used as a proof of
Islam’s victory and they encouraged Islamists to pursue new non-‐Islamic targets,
considered to be a threat to Islam. This later led to the creation of al Qaeda and
eventually, to the horrors of September 11, 2001.
The Israeli pull-‐out from Lebanon in 2000, closely followed by Hezbollah’s
occupation of most of Lebanon; as well as the Israeli pull-‐out of the Gaza Strip in
2005, gave further impetus to terror organizations and eventually led to the
“legalization” of Hamas, as the “true representative” of the Palestinian population
of the Gaza Strip -‐ through the 2006 elections. All these examples show that
giving up to terrorism does not quench terrorism’s blood thirst; on the contrary,
it invigorates it. The issue eventually boils down to the effect such “retreats” or
pullbacks have on the resilience of the civilian public. The respectable
democratic society (i.e. Israeli or American, for example) must be and remain,
psychologically resilient.
”[it]… must be able to absorb terror’s costs economically,

emotionally, and in terms of lives lost – rather than surrender to it.
Democratic societies are uniquely susceptible to terrorism and can
be easily manipulated by terrorists. A perfect example…occurred
in Spain, where the public responded to the 2004 Madrid train
bombings by electing a government that immediately withdrew
Spanish troops from Iraq.” (Yaalon 2007, 10).

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The terrorism expert Ami Pedahzur, contends also that terrorized public, that is
unsatisfied with its government response to terrorism can terminate, or shorten
the political careers of the elected leadership. Thus the leadership feels under
pressure to counter the psychological impact of terrorism on the public.
Furthermore,
“…defensive model” has proven to be successful in offering

physical protection to civilian centers. Yet applying it is usually a
long process, sometimes much longer than the tenure of an elected
policymaker. Hence it does not have the same impact of the war
model….Successful offensive operations, which take place
immediately after a terrorist attack, reassure the terrorized public,
boost morale, and carry political perks that are very appealing for
elected officials” (Pedahzur 2009, 8).

The assumption, that the “war model” does not offer a real solution to the
problem constantly creates constant pressures to “ innovate;” meaning: to come
up with some “new trick,” new CT method, that will prove more efficient in
answering the terrorist challenge. In Israel, this challenge is often exemplified by
the competition among the various branches of the IC and the special CT units.
Innovation is important in order to remain ‘relevant’ and to assure continued
flow of funds to the respective organization or unit. Although such competition
encourages “out of the box” thinking, it may at times be destructive, by way of
creating unwillingness to share knowledge and information. One of the
manifestations of this problem in Israel was the unhealthy competition between
Special Forces units. Such competition often ignored the respective unit’s specific
fortes and caused choosing another unit, despite of it objectively being less
suitable for the task at hand. The war model, in its CT application relies on highly
sophisticated technological minor-‐tactical-‐warfare, which is considered better
for CT operations, than the use of traditionally oriented and equipped army
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units. This claim can be exemplified by the past frequent use of the IDF’s special
forces elite unit, named SAYERET MATKAL, in many complex operations, for
which (in spite of this units near phenomenal versatility and adaptability) – this
unit was not always the best choice. The competition was often vis a’ vis the
INP’s afore mentioned, YAMAM. While SAYERET MATKAL is agreeably a great
unit, it does not specifically, specialize in say, hostages’ release and
counterterrorism related arrests, through its everyday training and missions. It
is a deep-‐enemy-‐territory-‐penetration intelligence unit. SAYERET MATKAL is
very famous and admired (by the Israeli public) unit. Moreover, some Israeli
leaders were its commanders, while in the IDF. (E.g. Binyamin Netanyahu and
Ehud Barak, or Moshe Ya’alon). It is thus attributed almost mythological
capabilities. The INP’s YAMAM was established with its reason d’être being
counterterrorism. It became internationally highly regarded and envied, by the
much more powerful IDF which favored “ its own” SAYERET MATKAL. In many
cases, the YAMAM was the first one to arrive and be ready for action in a CT
situation, but was voted down, and substituted by SAYERET MATKAL. (A classic
case to prove this point is the Nahshon Waxman/Wachsman 1994 abduction and
failed release attempt. (Haberman 1994).
The prolonged Israeli and worldly experience contends that no swift victory is
predictable or possible in the war against terrorism. The public must be aware of
the fact that the struggle will be likely very long and with many casualties, along
the way. It is the role of the leadership to influence the civilian public on the
necessity of confronting terrorism continuously, until its defeat and not be lured
by the false premises of some form of appeasement, capitulation or surrender.
Furthermore, even if public is being readied, the leadership and even more so,
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the military leaders, have to define what constitutes a victory in such struggle.
Surely a “decisive victory” is not one attained by killing a single person; not even
a person like bin Laden.
As Moshe Ya’alon posits,
“ To draw an analogy from boxing, victory over terror is achieved
through winning points rather than knockouts. A “ decisive
victory” is thus gained by winning various tactical engagements,
reducing the overall threat to civilians, and strengthening the
broader society’s resilience in the face of terrorism” (Ya’alon 2007,
11).

The citizens of Western democracies expect accountability from both their
political and military leaders and often blame their politicians because of not-‐
timely thwarted terrorist attacks. Arguably, this may be seen as a “psychological
mechanism that allows average citizens to believe that they retain a degree of
control over their lives…through participation in the democratic process”
(Ya’alon 2007,11)
Moreover, civilians expect absolute safety promised and actually obtained. They
have hard time understanding, that in face of terrorism, such guarantees
available are non-‐existent. Foolproof protection is impossible. In the political
world, the frustration of civilians over inability to foolproof citizenry against
terrorism, can also be used by the political opposition against the political
leadership; claiming that the government, that was in power at the time of given
terrorist attacks was ‘incompetent’ in its ‘war against terror.’ Such, as afore
mentioned, was the case of the Spanish government that fell after the 2004
Madrid train bombings, or the case of Benyamin Netanyahu and the Likud
replacing Shimon Peres as PM of Israel, after the 1996 Hezbollah suicide
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terrorist campaign. This was also the case the 1999 Ehud Barak’s replacement of
Benyamin Netanyahu.
The military and IC leadership as well, is being scrutinized by the public for their
use, or abuse of coercive power. In a democracy, any military/intelligence entity
is limited by the need for a public support for their use of force. This is the
inherent result of the democratic system of checks and balances. In this respect,
the Israeli public is no different from other democratic publics. It has been for
many years, split regarding the attitude to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. The
Israeli public is split over two main issues: the future outcome of the said conflict
and the persuasion of some Israelis, that “we have missed opportunities” to
restore peace, by way of a two state solution.
“ This kind of division hinders the development of a necessary

consensus regarding the legitimacy of the use of force. Terrorists
recognize the importance of legitimacy in democratic states, and
the Palestinians exploited it to manipulate both Israeli and
international opinion, thus causing major problems for Israeli
commanders” (Ya’alon 2007, 14).

No matter how split the Israeli public was in April 2002, it reunited in the face of
the second intifada, and PM Ariel Sharon, defying intelligence, as well as some of
his first line generals, sent the IDF to retake the West Bank despite fears of
failure and massive Israeli casualties. It was the correct choice, as a tactical
decision to stop Yasser Arafat’s empty promises to police his own and stop the
suicide bombers from penetrating Israel.

“ Some of the methods were brutal, but Operation Defensive Shield
suppressed Palestinian terrorism, including Hamas and Fatah’s
deadly suicide bombings. Though its impact was not fully apparent
until three years later, the operation restored normalcy on both
sides of the green line. Even though the second intifada claimed
seven times as many Israeli lives as the Second Lebanon War, most
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Israelis seem to have erased it from their memory” (Issacharoff
and Harel 2012).

Within the Israeli CT activities, it seems reasonable to believe in offensively
pursuing and thwarting terrorist activity, within their immediate surroundings.
Operating in the periphery of “terror land” allows IDF to control the
circumstances of engagement. IDF keeps the initiative, and occasionally achieves
surprise. Ya’alon neatly posits that: “All these lessons emphasize the importance
of relaying first on offense, then the fence, and finally defense “ the fence being the
Israeli Protective Barrier ( Ya’alon 2007, 15).
Thus, the Israeli operational principles of counterterrorism are:
• Keeping timely Intelligence as the heart of the offense.
Defensively/offensively providing real–time information leading to
successful terrorist interdiction and the destruction of their
infrastructure. It also suggests effective collection and dissemination of
early warnings. The offensive kinetics must be precise, and must stress
avoiding collateral damage.
• Intelligence and information First. The IDF and the IC must have the
ability to obtain and convey all-‐source intelligence: VISINT, SIGINT,
HUMINT OSINT and C4I (Command, control, communications, computers,
and information) to the front lines. Only by integrating intelligence units
and wide-‐source information can be effective to find, fix and finish the
low-‐signature targets exemplified by terrorists.
• Creativity and Flexibility within the offensive paradigm.
Terrorists are uniquely effective in avoiding detection or escaping after
detection. Since the different means, forces and platforms used to detect,
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recognize and finish terrorists act on a moment’s notice, this is indeed an
operational problem. Operational units must thus be always ready for a fast
deployment. These units must be well trained and highly adaptable to
changing conditions. Moreover, the surprise element is a must have; without
which the apprehension of terrorists is impossible. Since terrorists prefer to
shield themselves by non-‐combatant civilian population, they notably seek
refuge in the crowded refugee camps, where the population (which often
serves as their lookouts), also aids them. Here the need for creativity, on the
part of Special Forces, is imminent in view of the inherent, suspicious nature,
of terrorists and the fact that they quickly learn new lessons and spread any
innovative methods seen in use by the IDF. Creativity and innovation in the SF
must thus be constantly encouraged on every level. The leading principal is:
“[the one] who dares-‐wins”…success is built on taking risks, and a single
setback should not warrant a return to the defensive mode of operation…”
(Ya’alon 2007, 16). Gaza presents a unique challenge: the decision to work
from the periphery – in, necessitates the use of targeted killings or military
incursions. “ Because no freedom of movement exists (for the IDF), arrest
missions such as conducted in the West Bank are nearly impossible in Gaza.
Any arrest operation inside Gaza, would necessitate massive troops, unlike
the platoon-‐size operations conducted in the West Bank.” (Ya’alon 2007, 16).
• The role of defensive measures in security operations
Defensive measures are complementary to the offensive ones. Such measures
are highly inconvenient to both sides. The roadblocks, curfews, checkpoints
and closures saved many Israeli lives, but at the same time made life very
difficult to the Palestinian civilian population and these control means,
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continuously create deep resentment and a sense of humiliation, in the
Palestinian population; as well as harm the Palestinian economy. The Security
Barrier has proven to be an effective defensive system; however, although it
reduced the number of suicide bomber infiltrations of Israel, this system is
not foolproof. Terrorists, by default, will never stop looking for ways to
circumvent any defensive system, the barrier included. (17).
• Achieving Security, while attempting to also “Win Hearts and Minds.”
As mentioned before, defensive measures, in the form of checkpoints or
closures, as well as outright offensive measures like targeted killings,
undermine the very possibility to win the heart and minds of the Palestinian
population. There is no exact formula for striking the balance, so very
needed between the “carrots and the sticks.” Thus, the fact that Palestinians
for example, get free medical care in Israeli hospitals pales in comparison to
the everyday buildup of hatred and humiliation. Hearts and minds will not be
won in Gaza, anytime in the near future. This however, does not mean that
the battle for hearts & minds should be limited to Palestinians, and to the
current generations only. Israel must continue this battle for the hearts and
minds of the international community, and future Palestinian generations.
This must be done by better understanding of the Palestinian plight; strongly
influencing Israeli peace-‐related perceptions as presented by the various
media outlets; as well as a conscious educational effort, aimed at mitigating
the devastating results of Palestinian hateful, anti-‐Israeli, anti-‐Jew and anti-‐
Zionism “educational” effort, which often results in the creation of new
terrorist cadres.
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• Safeguarding “Arms Purity” at War (TOHAR HANESHEK in Hebrew). The
struggle with terrorism is characterized by its asymmetry. While Israel is
attempting to maintain the highest moral standards possible, terrorists
inherently play by a different set of rules, or arguably, without any rules
whatsoever. Since every war, by its very nature, poses severe challenges to the
morality of the adversaries, in the Israeli-‐Palestinian context, the Israeli and
the worldly public opinion are truly judging only Israeli morality. Israeli
military and IC know, that it is extremely important to display high moral
standards in order to maintain strong resolve as a moral nation and to
eventually, prevail in the long battle for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian
civilian population. In spite of constant criticism by other democracies, as well
as by other, non-‐democratic nations, the IDF and the IIC, attempt to maintain
the highest moral standards, in the face of public scrutiny regarding the use of
force against terrorist organizations acting from within civilian population that
protects them, despite the fact that in reality, terrorists do not care much about
the fate of the public. In the case of Israel, arguably unlike in the case of other
nations facing terrorism, the whole nation is at war. When a whole society is at
war, the use of force by that society is heavily criticized, and such society must
do its very best to preserve this society’s peacetime values, no matter what.
The Bible teaches us refrain from murder and killing, while the Talmud grants
us the option to kill first – in self-‐defense. On the terrorism “battlefield” it is
sometimes difficult to discern right from wrongdoing. Thus, education of the
whole society, and especially, those directly involved in the fighting -‐ is
necessary. The IDF thus stresses the education of the ‘moral rules of
engagement’s on this unique battleground, especially to the commanders of the
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various military units. The military, intelligence and police commanders are the
role models, the behavior of which is copied by their subordinates. High
professional conduct must be maintained at all cost. However, the continuous
situation whereas, Israel is constantly fighting within civilian areas and civilian
population, may bring about a dangerous degree of desensitization. Some claim
that this is the result of the fighters’ survival instinct that makes Israelis
capable of more easily enduring the complexity of this battleground. This
unique battleground also blurs the difference between civilians and combatants
and may prevent Israeli soldiers from making the right distinction between a
terrorist and an innocent civilian. Dehumanization of the enemy; the perception
that the enemy is inhuman, evil, because he/she is himself, or is a supporter-‐of
suicide bombings, -‐ is easy. Suicide terrorism makes no logical ‘sense’ to the
Western mind. Thus Israeli soldiers may be tempted to treat any Palestinian
inhumanely. Some regrettably do.
“ Anyone who tells you that there were no moral offenses during
the [second] intifada is lying. Members of our [Israeli] forces
deliberately vandalized property, looted and stole. We also killed
people by mistake. But we were able to check ourselves and mete
out punishment where necessary, especially when people
committed offenses that were not just judgment errors in the heat
of the battle” (Baram in Issacharoff and Harel 2012).

It is also possible that at times, soldiers assume that all their actions are
inclusively correct, as part of their acting in “self defense.” Thus, any act of self-‐
defense or attempt to survive, may be assumed as moral.
Combat experience is another factor which should be considered; especially,
when considering the behavior of lower ranks and younger soldiers, who are
often inexperienced. Some suggest that youth leads to a tendency to characterize
their view of the world -‐ in terms of “black and white;” with little or no “gray
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areas.” Experiencing the Palestinian adversary in black and white only, may lead
to moral mistakes and is thus, yet another challenge to the commanders.
XV. Israel’s Offensive Counterterrorism Tools: Practical, Moral and Legal
Perspectives
Overview
Over the years of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, decision makers learned that it
was not enough to examine the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism policy in
quantitative terms only. Metrics like the number of Israeli/Palestinian casualties
were not telling enough, when the leadership had to face also international and
national media outlets and public opinion. Boaz Ganor, suggests that when
examining the effectiveness of the CT struggle it is valuable to consider four main
terrorism-‐related factors: counterterrorist operational capability; motivation to
perpetrate new attacks; group’s internal morale; and the morale of the
victimized, targeted population. (Ganor 2005, 105-‐111). Accordingly, several
aspects should be examined, when attempting to evaluate the CT efforts:
• Operational Capability – the degree the CT actions diminish or enhance
terrorist capability to perpetrate attacks.
• Damage to terrorists’ internal image – damage to the group’s image within its
civilian population, which is its source of support, funding and mobilization.
• Damage to its fundraising capabilities -‐ how does the CT operations affect the
group’s capability to continue their financing through donations, money
laundering and through various criminal activity.
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• Disrupting the administrative capabilities of the group (training, arming, etc.
whatever is needed to continue operations).
• To what degree has the CT action contributed to limiting group’s freedom of
movement.
• Actual damage to group’s personnel, resulting from the CT activity.
• Motivation -‐ while the aim of CT actions is to diminish the terrorist’s
motivation, we have to acknowledge that sometimes, it fires back and
increases the motivation to perpetrate new attacks, due to increased
frustration and hatred (towards Israel/Jews).
• Terrorist group’s internal morale: successful CT operations aim to decrease
the group’s morale by triggering fear, loss of confidence in group’s
leadership, leading to increased fear among group supporters and possibly
leading to lesser expectations and some degree of openness to political
compromise. However, CT offensive operations may, just as well, have the
opposite effect: an increased stubbornness, increased daring, increased
mobilization and public support -‐ as a blow back resulting from some
offensive tactics, deemed as “too much” (e.g. targeting Hamas political
figures).
• Morale of those who suffer from the acts of terror. Terrorism causes
psychological and physical damage. The civilian population targeted by
terrorists expect the government to “get justice done” by hitting at the attack
perpetrators in retaliation and vengeance. CT operations are thus also
targeted to boost popular morale and support for the political leadership; as
well as to intensify the national resolve to stick to national goals, norms and
beliefs.
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Targeted Killings
By far, the most controversial counterterrorism tool is the Targeted Killing of
terrorists. This terminology is relatively new, although the intentional killing of
terrorist leaders, proponents and combatants is very old; in truth, it can be
traced, at least, as far back as the Biblical times and the example of King David
ordering the killing of his chief of staff (Uriah Hachette). Throughout history,
assassinations were a clandestine political tool, used by a wide variety of
governments not necessarily to deal with terrorists, but rather with all kinds of
politically ‘unwanted and harmful’ dissidents and political leaders. Professor
Steven R. David, in 2002, defined the difference between an assassination and
targeted killing. Assassination suggests a connotation of “ murder by treacherous
means,” which is arguably, not the case when discussing targeted killing of
bloody-‐handed terrorists. It is also usually accepted that “assassinations relate to
the killing of political adversaries, in order to silence legitimate opposition.
Terrorists, who target and indiscriminately kill innocents, are usually not
considered as “political leaders”, although they are certainly “political players,”
whether we like it or not. (David 2002, 2-‐3). Although we know today about a
number of assassinations and assassination attempts, carried out by secret
services like the Soviet KGB, the Russian FSB, the CIA, the Israeli Mossad, and
many others; such actions were rarely publicly admitted by the sponsoring state.
While in some cases they were conveniently “leaked,” so the gains from their
attribution to the right party could be obtained (e.g. retaliation, deterrence etc.)
this seldom the case. The common denominator of these actions was the fact that
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the targeted individuals caused an unacceptable degree of harm to a nation, or
posed a real political threat to the leadership of the state behind the killing; yet,
they often were living away from the state they were acting against, often on a
constant move or in hiding and the state could not bring them to public trial. In
other cases, the state did not want a public trial, or could not prove their “guilt”
through commonly accepted criminal evidence, that they indeed deserve to die.
Assassinations (and assassination attempts) were at times, carried out also, by
sane or insane individuals, over political, religious or personal issues (e.g. the
assassination of Lincoln, Lenin, the attempt on President Reagan’s life, etc.).
Assassinations deprived the targeted individual from the due process of law, the
fair trial, which all democracies claim to assert their constituents. While Israel
targeted and successfully killed, the Black September terrorists that perpetrated
the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre, this was not yet called “targeted
killing.” This was an act of clandestine retribution-through-execution. In fact, after
a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in 1994, which killed twenty-‐one Israelis and
injured forty-‐three, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin openly announced, that he
directed the security forces to eliminate terrorist leaders that organize the
terrorist attacks. (Ganor 2007. In Art and Richardson 2007, 279) However, it was
in view of the onset of the second intifada, in September 2000 and the spat of
high intensity and magnitude, suicide bombings by Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and
other Palestinian terrorist factions, that Israel has openly declared the targeted
killing of terrorist leaders and combatants as its formal and overt policy. Since
“assassination” is inherently viewed in a negative context, Israel has chosen to
use “ targeted thwarting” or “ interceptions” instead (Shapiro 2001). The
evolution of targeted killings since 1972 until current times has been widely
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elaborated on by many. However, even the highly eloquent explanations offered
by Ganor, does not render the reader with a definitive answer to whether the use
of this method is legal and moral or not. Due to the fact that targeted killings are
conducted against terrorist entity, which is not directly compatible with the
worldly experiences of WWII, the Geneva Conventions, and the deliberations of
the International Red Cross – an obscurity arises from the lack of new tools, new
spectacles, through which targeted killings of terrorists should be viewed. Some
of the main, open issues are: the very definition of terrorists; are they to be
treated according to the laws of war, in spite of the fact that they are “civilian
combatants” of sorts? The Geneva Conventions, the Red Cross and the
International Courts (e.g. ICTY, ICT, ICC, etc.) were meant to deal with armies,
soldiers and civilians, and in some cases -‐ with a third category: insurgents or
guerrillas – but not “terrorists.” Guerrillas are often recognized as political
players, legitimately representing the population of sovereign states. Currently,
the Hezbollah, deemed as a terrorist group by Israel, the U.S. and some of the
West, indeed represents the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon; while
Hamas is arguably, the ‘true representative’ of the Palestinian population of the
Gaza Strip. None of the two populations mentioned, is recognized as a sovereign
people or state. Thus Israel, in its decision to target terrorists that plan, help,
train, equip, send and dispatch those who actually execute terrorist attacks
against Israel, are now viewed by Israeli authorities as anything but “guerrilla
combatants” -‐ and as such, Israel occasionally, kills them after very careful
deliberation, which is backed by Israel Supreme Court rulings (2004) and upon
the careful approval by top political and military leadership. This does not solve
some critical question. Not only the question of the ‘legality’ of targeted killings,
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but also the morality of it; the effectiveness of this method or the fate of the
innocent by-‐standers, commonly referred to as the “collateral damage.”
The policy of targeted killing is consistent with Jewish and current Israeli law,
and is considered legal with most of the current interpretations of the
International Law. David posits’
“ Regarding Jewish law, the “Rodef” [assailant] injunction that appears in the
Bible (Exodus 22:1) makes it abundantly clear that if someone is coming to kill
you, you are obliged to kill them first. This obligation applies not only for one’s
protection, but for the defense of one’s community as well. As such, Jewish law
does not only permit killing a terrorist, before he can act -‐ it requires it (David
2002, 14).
The Israeli law, based on its Basic Law (which is the closest Israeli legislation
ever came to a Constitution), prohibits the violation of life of any person, yet it
states that this provision may be suspended for a “proper purpose, and to extent
no greater than is required…” (Basic Law1992, 150). Prior to the second intifada,
the Prosecutor General (Attorney General) of IDF has issued three conditions,
which were mandatory to rendering a specific targeted killing -‐ legal: the name
of the targeted individual, has been submitted to the Palestinian Authority (PA),
with an arrest request, which was thus ignored by the PA; Israeli authorities
were unable to arrest the said individual themselves; and the killing must be the
only way to prevent an imminent future terrorist attack. An IDF team of lawyers
led by Daniel Reisner further scrutinized these provisions. (Byman 2011, 314-‐
315).
In 2002, Reisner drew a new set of guidelines for targeted killing. In order for a
targeted killing to be legal, the following conditions must be met:
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• The target is a combatant.
• The target is unreachable, and thus cannot be arrested.
• Senior civilian officials approve the operation.
• Efforts are undertaken to avoid/reduce civilian casualties (such efforts
must be consistent with the principle of proportionality of potential
collateral damage, with the damage to be caused by the target, if not
killed).
• The operation takes place in areas that Israel does not effectively control.
• The target must be an individual posing a future threat. Not just
somebody with past-‐time, blood on his/her hands.
For years, Israel attempted to avoid its direct linkage to a certain terrorist killing,
because of international scrutiny and harsh criticism. Indeed, Mossad agents
preserve such anonymity to this day, unless they are uncovered due to mission’s
failure (e.g. the Lilhammer affair in 1973, or the failed assassination attempt of
Khaled Mashal in Jordan, 1997). Moreover, some of the members of the IDF elite
SF units (e.g. Duvdevan. See links under Duvdevan), use undercover methods to
briefly infiltrate Palestinian hostile areas and either carry out a targeted killing
or apprehension and arrest of suspected terrorists. The Duvdevan and Shimshon
units are the descendants of the pre-‐independence, Jewish Mistarvim military
intelligence unit. While Duvdevan/Shimshon are used for intelligence gathering
missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, their main mission is apprehension,
arrest or targeted killings of terrorists. During a typical operation, while
undercover posture is best retained for future activity, it is sometimes blown,
due to operational circumstances. In any case, the IDF and the GSS officially
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acknowledge their operations, and especially targeted killings, as part of IDF’s
and GSS’s transparency paradigm (see: IDF Failed to Investigate 2012).
While Israeli soldiers, intelligence operatives and police officers, act within the
limitations of the Israeli law, these practices are not necessarily accepted as legal
in the eyes of the international community and the International Law. Moreover,
sometimes even the rulings of the Israel Supreme Court are internationally
challenged.
In 2005, in more than 30 cases the targeted killings failed, yet approximately 150
civilians, who were near to the locations of the targeted killing attempts, were
unintentionally killed as well. International and local objections to the killings
argued that since Israel is the formal occupier of the West Bank and Gaza Strip –
these areas should fall under police jurisdiction and thus Israel must deploy only
the law enforcement model there. The Supreme Court however, held a broader
definition of the term “combatant” than the one used with regard to ‘army
combatants,’ because of the Palestinian population’s involvement in supporting
terrorists; acting as “human shields” for the terrorists, and thus actively
participating in terrorism. This ruling of the Israel Supreme Court clearly,
“…exculpated the IDF for killing the relatives, recruiters, planners

and group leaders of a known terrorist when striking the terrorist
himself. The Supreme Court added that the future threat does not
have to be imminent; the target can simply be a member of a
terrorist group and thus presumed to be involved in
attacks…[however] Israel must first try to arrest, but if that is not
feasible, killing is considered legal” (Byman 2011, 318).

However, when the Israeli government asked the Supreme Court to rule on the
recognition of terrorists as “unlawful Combatants” – in order to differentiate
them from “legal combatants” and civilians, (because terrorists indeed, try to
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blend-‐in with the rest of the population; they indeed, do not obey the law and as
such, should not be subject to the Geneva Conventions, Red Cross and other
military war rules) – the court decided to “take no stance” on this question and
left open the issue of “what rights terrorists have.” (Byman 2011, 318-‐319).
In yet another legal opinion by Kristen Eichensehr, published in the Yale Law
Journal, she criticizes the Israeli Supreme Court, asserting that in its first ruling
on the issue of targeted killings, it has weakened the international law’s
protection to all civilians, by extending the meaning of “direct participation” of
terrorists in terrorism:
“ terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus
are lawfully subject to attack only when the directly participate in
hostilities. But the court also expanded the traditional definition of
“direct participation”…By disregarding the “direct participation”
requirements’ important evidentiary function, the court weakened
the protection that international law affords to all civilians, not just
to terrorists” (Eichensehr, 2007).

International Law complicates things because it is by default, applied to
individuals, groups and populations, based on WWI and WWII experiences
mostly. It is not that the asymmetry context, within which terrorism acts is lost
on international lawyers; it is the fact that international law has so far failed to
adapt to current day realities, by passing new and more applicable laws to fit
current terrorism. This failure stems from international diversity of interests,
norms, morals and perceptions’ that International Law represents.
As mentioned before, assassination per se, violates the International
Law. However, if one is lawfully engaged in armed hostility, it is not considered
‘assassination’ to target such individual, because lawful engagement in an armed
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hostility (i.e. insurgency or guerrilla war) deals with individuals who are lawful
combatants, and thus viewed pretty much like “soldiers”. Moreover, terrorists
are widely recognized as “ enemies of human kind “ and as such warrant their
engagement with extreme prejudice. (Li 2010).
Another complex legal issue is the one regarding the ambiguity of the Israeli
engagement with the Palestinian terror groups. Is Israel in a state of war with the
terrorists? And is Israel using ‘treacherous” (and thus forbidden) methods in its
struggle with terrorism. Robert David posits:
“ there are two points of ambiguity in the Israeli case regarding its
adherence to international law. First, is whether Israel is actually
at war with the Palestinians…Israel is not at war since war is
between two armies or two states and the Palestinians are neither.
But since Israel is in armed conflict with Palestinians,…[it is]
allowed to target combatants….The second.. area of ambiguity…is
using “treacherous” means when it kills terrorists…It is true that
Israelis have used deception in some of their killings…Israelis have
disguised themselves as women or Arabs to facilitate getting their
target. [However,] what distinguishes the killings in the second
intifada from the past…is precisely the open and military nature of
the attacks. The use of helicopter gunships of F-‐16 to kill suspected
terrorists…International lawyers may disapprove of the Israeli
actions but few would argue that it violates the ban on
assassination. (David 2002, 15).

Historically, it was Premier Golda Meir, who promised, ordered and authorized
the first official targeted killings of the Black September terrorists involved in the
Munich Olympic Games 1972 massacre:
“ Golda’s dark eyes glazed straight at them [the family members of
the victims]… “I want to share my plans with you. I’ve decided to
pursue each and everyone of them, not one of the people involved
in any way will be walking on this earth for much longer…We will
chase them till the last” (Klein 2005, 100).

Boaz Ganor (2005), elaborates also on the so called “ boomerang effect” which is
applied to the possible result of targeted killings. It has been frequently stated
that targeted killings do not deter terrorists from further attacks; furthermore, it
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has been often posited that it makes them more revengeful, hateful, and thus
potentially provokes murderous retaliatory terrorist attacks, which arguably,
would not have taken place otherwise. Others suggest, that the claims that
targeted killings increase the overall number of terrorist attacks, are hard to
prove. Moreover, the alluded retaliatory terrorist attacks are hard to prove as
such. One of the most prominent examples of the said boomerang effect, was the
Hezbollah attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992; which probably
indeed was correctly linked with the targeted killing of the Hezbollah leader
Abbas al-‐ Musawi. However an attempt to link the rather unique, chain of suicide
bombings to the targeted killing of Yihye Ayash (aka the Engineer), the infamous
Hamas bomb maker, attack planner, recruiter and suicide bombers dispatcher –
is questionable. The capability to execute such attacks was already there; the
killing of Ayash may have rather sped up the process and rate of “ normal”
suicide attacks. As suggested by Ganor:
“ Those who favor offensive action claim that boomerang effect is
merely the invention of terrorist organizations, as part of a
sophisticated and calculated psychological warfare aimed at
ensuring their immunity from military attack. …Those who oppose
offensive action believe that the boomerang effect should be taken
seriously, and that it actually dictates a policy of restraint and
avoiding offensive action against terrorist organizations… Israel’s
offensive actions may increase motivation but certainly do not
increase capability to carry out attacks…. Offensive action against
the organization is liable to increase its activists’ motivation for
vengeance and because the capability is already there, the
organization’s leaders are likely to…perpetrate an attack….”
(Ganor 2005, 133).

The efficacy of targeted killings as a CT tool is frequently contested, not only by
international organizations and international community, but also by segments
of the Israeli society and members of various human and public rights
organizations (Stein 2001). However the most ambiguous question is whether
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or not, targeted killing are a successful CT tactic. In truth, the offensive and
defensive tools available to any society faced with a terrorism problem are very
limited; hence as such, no terrorism-‐afflicted society can just disregard or
dismiss any tool in its CT arsenal. As the Israeli experience exemplifies, all tools
must be used in a careful, legal and balanced way. Variables, like the number of
terrorist attacks, or the number of casualties of such attacks, are not necessarily
good predictors of the efficacy of the CT tools used at a given time, because a
variety of unrelated variants are likely to influence terrorist response to targeted
killings, simultaneously with their emotional wish for revenge. Such
unaccounted-‐for variants may be for example: personal changes within the
terrorist organizations; changes in what terrorists prioritize in a given period;
lull periods in terrorist attacks; peace negotiations, etc. In a similar way, the
above-‐mentioned, unaccounted-‐for changes may be also confused with
successful or unsuccessful application of certain CT measures.
This problem is even more comprehensive due to the fact that in the Israeli
experience, there was no one period of time, during which only one offensive CT
measure was applied. There is no way to gauge the effect of targeted killings
alone, since they were always applied along with road blocks, check points,
administrative detentions, deportations, house demolitions or the erection of the
Security Barrier. Moreover, one should note, that targeted killings’ effect might
be also affected by the way this CT method by itself, is being carried out: are
targeted killings by snipers, or undercover Special Forces less or more deterring
than a strike from a airborne platform of some kind? There is no univocal reply
to this question; The IDF and GSS decide on the best method according to how it
fits the targets behavior, his/her location (e.g. within civilian population, schools
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and children and the prospective collateral damage; the urgency of the case: has
the terrorist has been dispatched and is on his/her way to carry out an attack?
The danger to Israeli troops/snipers – stemming from a high-‐risk incursion to
Palestinian controlled territory, etc.).
The Israeli way of application of targeted terrorist killings has never been as
consistent, systematic and continuous as it was during the second intifada. Some
observe, that the second intifada could be considered as a “laboratory” for
examining this CT method, as never done before. (Kober 2007). During the
second intifada, Israel has successfully targeted and killed more than 253
terrorists, an unprecedented number, in comparison to the previous application
of this method. Interestingly, some claim that the method of decapitation of the
leaders only, seems to have been temporarily “abandoned” -‐ (after the 2002
killing of a PFLP political activist Mustafa Thabet, who was perceived by the
Palestinian population, as a “political figure” only) -‐ in favor of targeting
relatively low ranking terrorist operatives. During the period between 2000 and
2004 some 159 attempted targeted killings, were carried out through a variety of
application methods. These resulted in 317 Palestinian fatalities, out of which
almost 80 percent (253) were indeed combatants. Choosing to target the
leadership not only rightly “fits with the common logic”, it is also allegedly
confirmed by the influence of such choice on the Stock Exchange.
“ As for seniority, an assassination will probably be most effective
if the target is a senior leader with specialized knowledge and
skills. At the same time, successful assassinations would also tend
to increase significantly the motivation…to retaliate. Conversely,
an assassination targeting a low-‐rank terrorist is likely to have
both a relatively small effect in reducing the capability of his
organization and also in increasing motivation for retaliation”
(Zussman and Zussman 2006, A196).

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Interestingly, Zussman and Zussman also deduct, from their Stock Marked
response to targeted killings study, that the killing of high ranking terrorist
military leadership made the stock market rise; however, the stock market
declined, following the killing of terrorist group’s political leaders. (Zussman and
Zusman 2006, A204). Yet, Kobler argues that,
“ …unlike the elimination of military leaders, which proved to be
ineffective, the decapitation of Hamas’s political and spiritual
leaders seemed to have accounted for the organization’s decision
to suspend hostilities against Israel, which essentially meant the
end of the second intifada” (Kobler 2006).

Who is right then? This question is arguably, answered by the comprehensive
approach-‐change, adopted by the IDF: since 2002: “ In a significant shift from the
IDF legal advisor’s emphasis on targeting combatants only, Israel raised the
stakes again when it began a comprehensive campaign against the military,
organizational, and political leadership of its opponents” (Byman 2011, 316).
Indeed, many Israeli proponents argue that the peace process is stalled and
cannot advance, as long as terrorists are unafraid to continue their actions. As
history have shown, cease fire only played into Palestinian extremism hands.
Inherently, the Palestinians used cease-‐fires merely for rearming.
One may correctly argue, that the actual Israeli gains from targeted killings
remain controversial. Despite of the 2002 Israeli shift in their targeting choices
and despite the conclusion that cease-‐fires are used by Hamas only for rearming,
the November 2012 spat of fighting brought about the cessation of the rocketing
attacks on Israel, -‐ the fighting was stopped in favor of a negotiated cease fire,
one more time. It can be safely assumed, that during the next round of fighting,
(which can be arguably accepted as granted,), Israel will face a better-‐prepared
and better-‐armed Hamas.
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In 2005, Jerry Smith evaluates in his thesis, the effectiveness of Israel’s
counterterrorism strategy as a whole.

Diane Leigh Maye contrasts this point of view, in her 2006 thesis, on the same
topic. Leigh Maye evaluates seven Israeli “ actions aimed at countering
“Palestinian resistance.” By addressing Palestinian terrorists as resistance, Leigh
Maye renders Palestinian terrorism certain “legitimacy” as combatants of a
guerrilla war. Maye correctly assesses the poor efficacy of targeted killings as
“root problem solution” for the long run:
“ The assassinations have not thwarted number of attacks…nor do they have
history of ending the terrorist organization’s existence. To the contrary, the
attacks may have provoked an even stronger response…” (Leigh Maye 2006, 39).

However, Smith contends,

“ International law prohibits assassinations…[however] terrorists
are considered to be “common enemies of humankind”…Many
times after a leader is removed there tends to be
internal…struggle…furthermore, group will tend to spend more
time and resources to stay alive…the Israeli policy of targeting
“ticking-‐bomb terrorists does not deserve the kind of
condemnation it is receiving…” (Smith 2005, 35).

Yet another study of the efficacy of targeted killings against Palestinian terrorism
was conducted Hafez and Hatfield who concluded in their 2000-‐2004 differenced
and lagged time-‐series analysis, which targeted killings have no significant
impact on rates of Palestinian violence. Targeted Killings did not increase or
decrease Palestinian attacks whether in the long or short run. While targeted
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assassinations may be a useful political tool, signaling the adversary state’s
determination to punish the perpetrators, or placate angry public at home, there
is but little evidence that they really impact the course of terrorism (Hapez and
Hatefield 2006).
As before, when it comes to concluding who is right and who is wrong in their
conclusions regarding the efficacy of the targeted killings and the other Israeli
offensive and defensive CT tools, it is up to the reader to draw his/her own
conclusions.
The issue of deterrence with regard to the Palestinian terrorism is somewhat
complex. While some, like Ganor, claim that Israeli CT measures however
successful, did not deter the Hamas Hezbollah and others from perpetrating
attacks -‐ it is true that the “hard hand” approach of Israel in thwarting
Palestinian suicide terrorism, may have increased the hatred and demand for
revenge in the Palestinian organizations; but the systematic decapitation of
Hamas, (and other group’s) leaders, as well as mid level combatants, created real
capability losses in the terrorist groups. In 2002 the suicide attacks related
deaths peaked, (188) and in 2003. The average lethality per attack -‐ has peaked
as well (5.5) (Byman 2011, 366-‐368). By decapitating the leaders and the
“engineers,” Israel created a situation, whereas much of the terrorist’s top
echelon, both leadership and bomb-‐making capability -‐ was extinct. It is arguably
wrong to suggest that:“ every dead terrorist is instantly replaced by a new one.”
In the longer run, the quality matters. The loss of leadership and much of the
technical “know how” probably indeed caused the drop in the number of suicide
attacks.
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.”…simply swapping one militant for another does not work. The
number of skilled terrorists is often quite limited. Generators of
terror such as bomb makers, trainers, document forgers,
recruiters, and leaders are scarce in number and require many
months if not years to perfect their skills. If these generators of
terror can be eliminated through arrests or killings, the
organization as a whole is disrupted” (Byman 2011, 365).

The exact success of the targeted killings is hard to gauge also due to the
erection of the Security Barrier, which agreeably, prevented many suicide
attacks.
In an interesting quantitative and qualitative PhD paper, Pia Jansen concludes
that there has been a remarkable decline in the average number of fatalities per
terrorist incident in Israel from 2001-‐2005. She further posits that,
“ Israel have not only been successful in countering the volume of
attacks, but that they may have been able to thwart the
effectiveness of the attacks, which again indicates that they have
succeeded in reducing the terror organization’s overall
capability”(Jansen 2007, 321).

In direct relation to targeted killings Byman summarizes:
“Given all the drawbacks, why does Israel continue with targeted
killings? The reason is simple: targeted killings work. The strikes
have disrupted Hamas, PIJ the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and other
Palestinian terrorist groups; they have depleted the number of
skilled operatives; and they have forced the remaining militants to
spend more time in hiding than in plotting future attacks. Targeted
killings are not the only important tool in Israel’s arsenal, but
when these killings are combined with the security barrier and an
increased ability to arrest suspects, the number of Israeli deaths
from terrorism declines precipitously “ (Byman 2011, 312).

Moreover, Byman also emphasizes Israel’s General Secret Service’s and the IDF’s
uniquely transparent approach and nationwide-‐garnered support towards these
unfortunate, yet sometimes, absolutely necessary kinetic operations. (Byman
2006, 108-‐111).
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If there is any single Palestinian indication of how successful have the Israeli
targeted have been in suppressing Palestinian terrorism, it can be found in the
Palestinian, first and foremost request, during the negotiations for the cease-‐fire
in 2012: “ 1.a. Israel should stop all hostilities in the Gaza Strip land, sea and air
including incursions and targeting of individuals” (Kaphle 2012).
Other Israeli Counterterrorism Measures: Defensive and Punitive
Counterterrorism Measures
Overview
The terminology offensive and defensive, with regard to the Israeli CT model, can
be misleading since both, offensive and defensive measures can be considered
pre-‐emptive or preventive, in certain occasions; thus, even the defensive
measures, often contain offensive elements. In this context administrative
measures like detainment, can be viewed as both defensive and offensive. The
most prominent goal of all these measures is to jointly, or separately, prevent
acts of terrorism against Israel. While some Israeli leaders decidedly, belittle
defensive measures (e.g. closures, checkpoints etc.), for their part in thwarting or
deterring terrorist attacks -‐ it is harder to belittle some major defensive projects,
such as the Israeli Airport Authority security measures, the securing of sensitive
installations, infrastructure and national monuments and symbols, or the
Security Barrier erected since 2003, which is said to have prevented over 75% of
suicide terrorist attacks (Ganor in Art 207, 283). Nonetheless, Israel has very
long borders, comparatively to its small size. Securing borders is not only an
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American problem; even in a state as tiny as Israel, an airtight border security is
virtually impossible. Nor is it possible to have a guard everywhere, at all times.
Moreover, the Israeli public lives within a very short distance from Israel’s
borders, and thus, is in constant and very realistic, danger from Palestinian
terrorists.
Infiltration of Israel by Palestinians is done on a daily basis. Ways to circumvent
the checkpoints are daily tested, and Palestinians continuously create new paths
on their way to their legal or illegal work place in Israel. This practice, may
however be waning down, with the completion of the Security Barrier.
In the same vein, despite the ongoing debate as to the efficiency and the legal
standing of the Security Barrier, the reader is herewith provided with additional
data, to help create an educated opinion on that topic.
The Israeli version of a Security Barrier is not a unique and original invention of
Israel. Likewise protective barriers have been built in quite a few places in the
world: Iraq-‐Kuwait (1991, 120 miles long); Iraq-‐Saudi Arabia (2006, 559 miles
long); Afghanistan-‐Pakistan (2005, 1500 miles long); India –Pakistan (2007, 435
miles long), etc. (Walls of the World 2012). In 2002, following the huge increase
in suicide bombing in Israel, the government decided to build a physical obstacle
in order to improve the operational capability of fighting terrorism and to
prevent terrorist infiltration from the West Bank, into Israel. The ideas behind
the “fence” were to prevent uncontrolled passage of residents of the West Bank
into Israeli territory, as well as to prevent weapons smuggling and the
infiltration of terror cells and individuals, wishing to augment existing terrorist
cells in Israel (Mersel 2006, 80).
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Despite the historical views of the founding fathers of Israel (e.g. Yigal Alon) that
claimed that no modern country could surround itself with a fence or walls, in
2001 and on, the wall became clearly detrimental to Israel’s protection from
Palestinian suicide bombers. Avi Dichter, a former head of the GSS is cited saying
that the barrier was crucial for stopping terrorism, and stopping suicide
bombers from entering Israel. Furthermore, one of the leaders of the terrorist
group Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ramadan Abdallah Shalah is quoted as
saying, in an interview to Al-‐Sharq, in March 2008, that the barrier “limits the
ability of the resistance…to carry out suicide bombing attacks” within Israeli
territory (Byman 2011, 325, 328). Due to the fact that the “route” of the Security
Barrier makes several ‘detours’ resulting in the effective incursion and inclusion
of some of the West Bank as partial enclaves, within the Israeli territory, many
critics accused Israel of a “ land grab” and creating a de facto “new border” with
the future Palestinian state. The original route of the barrier indeed included
some indisputably Palestinian lands. The “land grab” as it was often defined, was
contested as illegal, mostly because it would infringe upon some of the
Palestinian petitioners basic liberties, to access their agricultural lands, their
access to water wells; thus also affecting their shepherding, as well as their
access to fruit and olive plantations and thus undermining the livelihood of some
35,000 Palestinian village residents and their children. These Palestinians also
claimed to have lost their access to schools and medical facilities (Mersel 2006,
80). As in other cases of offensive or defensive CT measures, the case of the
Security Barrier was eventually, overviewed and ruled upon, by the Israeli
Supreme Court (ISC), which ruled the Barrier “somewhat” illegal.
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“the Court [ISC] rationalized in [2004], that even if it can be
assumed that building the fence would achieve and promote
national security, and even if there is no alternative means that is
less restrictive, some of the seizure actions were illegal under
principals of international law and Israeli administrative law
because the damage they caused to the individual was not
proportional to the gain brought about” (Mersel 2006, 81).

The ruling by the International Court declared the Separation Barrier as illegal,
period.
While the ISC did not declare the mere ‘building of the fence’ illegal, it did rule
that the placement/route of the barrier was disproportionately harmful. The
eventual ruling of the ISC effectively decreased the annexed Palestinian land, by
15 percent (Byman 2011, 327).
The impact of the barrier was intense. It did effectively, block almost all terrorist
infiltrations from the Gaza Strip, and much of the infiltration from the West bank.
It is however, not impregnable. Israeli Arabs (some 20 percent of the Israeli
civilian population, or 1.5 million, that did not leave their lands in 1948), which
have an Israeli citizenship, Israeli ID, and do not experience any limitations on
their movement, have on quite a few occasions, linked with the West Bank
Palestinians in the perpetration of terrorist attacks. However, this is not the only
concern regarding the final outcome of the Barrier: currently, even those
Palestinians that are participants in the Israeli economy, as highly valued
workers in Israeli agriculture and construction, are often stopped by the barrier.
The long waiting, slow traffic progress, at the barrier checkpoints, (where they
display their special working passes and are searched for explosives), and the
frequent closures, cause direct damage to the Israeli economy, as well as
exacerbate the anger and the hatred towards Israel.
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Israelis are very open about the human costs of the Barrier. The former COS of
IDF Moshe Yaalon wrote: “ Any defensive measures taken by Israel – including
traffic checkpoints, closures, and curfews-‐ inevitably led to Palestinian suffering
and to violations of their civil rights” (In Byman 2011, 331). And the Israeli
politician Uzi Dayan, a firm believer in the effectiveness of the Barrier contends
that, “ The barrier also poisons communal relations…I don’t think that good
fences make good neighbors…If Frost [See Robert Frost’s Mending Wall] had
terrorists for neighbors rather than irate New Englanders, he would build a
fence.”(In Byman 2011, 331). The Security Barrier is not just a passive, physical
obstacle; it is heavily armed with various types of motion detectors, video
cameras and other sensors, as well as sniper nests and observation points,
affording better security and arguably, a certain degree of deterrence. Indeed, as
Byman (2011) suggests, despite the security wall along the Gaza Strip, Hamas
unsuccessfully attempted to mount many suicide operations. The cost of the
completed Security barrier is said to be around $2Billion. Indeed a large amount
of money. According to US estimates, the construction of the planned “Great Wall
of Mexico” would be $4-‐$8 Billion (U.S.-‐ Mexico Border Fence 2008). However,
from a bit cynical point of view, the cost of a single USAF F/A-‐18 Horne,t is $94
Million, F-‐35 Lightning II is $122 Million, a single F-‐22 Raptor is $350 Million and
a single B-‐2 Spirit is $ 2.4 Billion… (Top 10 Most Expensive Military Planes
2012).
Historically, there is no significant stretch of the Israeli land borders, and its
coastline, that has not been penetrated by terrorists and used to launch an
attack. It is thus hard to disregard the opinion of one of the former “gatekeepers”
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(heads of the GSS) Carmi Gilon, cited by Boaz Ganor (translated from Hebrew)
who says:
“It must be remembered that the number of possible targets for
terrorism is almost infinite…it is impossible to place a guard at
every location in the country. The only solution is pinpoint
intelligence that leads to the terrorist about to carry out the attack,
and your ability to cripple or stop him beforehand…Most of our
resources should not be invested guarding buses but in
operational intelligence, so we can get to the terrorist before he
places the bomb” (In Art 2007, 284).

Although Gilon is indeed correct, his argument is faulty, because his logic implies
that using guards on buses, inside malls and movie theatres for example, is too
costly and inefficient. Gilon implies that if the money invested in passive
defensive measures would have been applied to theoretical creation of better
intelligence products; this would have been more effective. This is not
completely true: Gilon’s argument is theoretical at best; we don’t know how
would a dramatic shift of funds from passive-‐defensive means towards
theoretical intelligence, affect the actual thwarting of terrorist attacks. We know
for fact, that guards of public places did, in fact, stop suicide terrorists, more than
few times; sometime at the cost of their own lives (Bennet 2002), in other cases
guards, along with members of the public stopped suicide terrorists from
mounting a crowded bus, or from entering a crowded restaurant. Although
ideally, Americans, Israelis, and everybody else would love to always have hard,
operational intelligence ready to thwart any terrorist attempt -‐ in reality,
although Israeli CT has excelled in this respect, for as long as Palestinian
terrorism continue, Israel will probably always need ‘additional’ intelligence,
which is often not attainable, no matter how much Israel invest in growing its
intelligence potential. This is the “unquenchable thirst” that characterizes the
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very nature of intelligence work. Israelis have the greatest respect for the work
of the GSS, IDF and the rest of the IIC; but the need to augment intelligence
capabilities by passive-‐defensive measures should be an accepted reality.
Additional measures, such as police patrols, police presence, bus guards, mall
guards etc., will for the foreseeable future, be part of the Israeli life and its
landscape. Life in Israel has created highly vigilant and wary public, which is
made of individuals who in many cases are the ones who locate IEDs and
neutralize suicide bombers, either alone, or together with the police.
However, Palestinian terrorism is not deterred by Israel’s last line of defense, aka
the civilian guards, and the public. Occasional successes in foiling an attack by
ordinary civilians or hired guards did not increase the Israeli deterrence effect.
There is no known effective way to deter suicide bombers. In 2008 Ehud Olmert,
then Israel’s Prime Minister, considered an actual legislation according to which,
the house of the family of the suicide bomber will be demolished and razed, thus
penalizing the family of the dead terrorist for his deeds. Even if that such
legislation have not created a public uproar (which it did), while suicide
terrorists have emotional ties to their families, their perception is that their
sacrifice in becoming a martyr, overrides all other concerns. Moreover, in some
cases, the act of martyrdom is strongly encouraged by the bomber’s family.
(Chehab 2007, 85-‐90). When public vigilance succeeds foiling a terrorist plan,
yet the perpetrators manage to escape arrest -‐ the attack is likely to be only
postponed, and possibly attempted in a different place, on a different occasion.
Suicide bombers are no longer easy to identify. It is next to impossible to define
what makes for a positive identification of a prospective suicide bomber. Suicide
bombers are not always nervous or …smiling; they do not always perspire
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profusely and so on – it is rather, a combination of a ‘wrong person in the wrong
place at the wrong time, ‘ odd behavior and…”vibes” that cannot be explained but
which are somehow “sensed” by everyday Israelis. Statistically, civilian vigilance
plays a major role in the identification of “suspicious objects” and people. This
unique capability of many Israelis, also strengthens the Israeli public
psychologically, and gives it some sense of “control” over their environment.
While many countries look up to their government alone, to take care their
security, Israelis largely share the security burden with their government and are
seen as an active and valuable partner in counterterrorism and other security
measures.
As posited by the 2009 U.S. Homeland Security Institute Report for the DHS:
“The [Israeli] public is treated [by the Israeli government] as a key partner in
counterterrorism.”(McGee et. al. 2009, 3).
Israeli administrative counterterrorist measures
Israeli authorities deploy several administrative measures, which aim at limiting
the liberties of the Palestinian population in order to retain peace and order and
prevent terrorism. The most prominent administrative measure is the closure
(SEGER Heb.). There are four types of most commonly imposed closures: 1).
Closure imposed for a predetermined period of time, during Palestinian
memorial days (e.g. the ” Earth Day” a.k.a. Yum-‐el-‐Ard), or during Jewish
holidays; 2) Protective closures, due to a concrete warning about an imminent
attack – attempting to stop any Palestinians from moving inside a certain area of
the West Bank, and temporarily stopping the movement through the IDF
checkpoints. 3) Closures following a terrorist attack – aimed at allowing for fast
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and effective movement of IDF in their attempt to arrest the perpetrators of the
attack. 4) In the past, closures intended to exert pressure on the Palestinian
Authority, to comply with certain security request from Israeli authorities (e.g.
arresting fugitives etc.). Closures are often confused with punitive measures.
They indeed cause a lot of suffering on the part of Palestinians, yet their purpose,
from the Israeli point of view, is very logical as a security tool, to control the
movements of Palestinians and prevent attacks against Israelis. The IDF has
stated that during 2008 it has removed 140 roadblocks and eight central
checkpoints in an effort to improve freedom of movement for the civilian
Palestinian population in Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley. As of July 2009,
Israeli authorities report that an additional 27 checkpoints and 140 roadblocks
have been removed. 1500 permits have been issued to Palestinian public
officials, allowing them to pass freely through the Israeli crossings into Israel.
According to IDF sources, in the West Bank there are 504 remaining dirt
roadblocks and 14 checkpoints (Behind the Headlines 2009).
Israel’s punitive counterterrorism measures
The aim of CT punitive measures is to remove threatening, dangerous elements
from within the Palestinian society, in order to prevent attacks, promote public
security and also to extract some revenge from Palestinians found responsible
for attacks they were linked to and deter others from following in their footsteps.
All the punitive CT approach is based on the enactment of punitive actions,
without providing the subjecst of these actions, with the full due process prior
the administration of these means. The Israeli authorities’ actions are however,
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based on existing laws and regulations, which clearly define acts considered as
forbidden by state laws and as endangering the safety of the Israeli society.
The main punitive counterterrorism measures in Israel include: demolition or
the sealing (with concrete) of the houses of terrorists, and especially suicide
terrorists; administrative detention of terror suspects; deportation of suspects;
confiscation of funds deemed to be related to terrorist activities and the
imposing of administrative fines.
Administrative deportation has been considered to be the most severe
punishment and actively removed key figures involved in unrest and terrorism.
It is also the most contested punitive measure and one that often cause an
escalation in tensions and unrest; such actions, have had sometimes, a self-‐
defeating results. Deportation of Palestinians from the occupied territories,
should not however, be confused with mass deportation of population from
occupied areas, which is banned by the U.N. international community, based on
the Geneva Conventions. Thus Israeli deportations of Palestinians targeted
individuals only. The act of deportation can be appealed in absentia by
representative of the deported before the Israeli High Court of Justice (It is a
special convening of the ISC). The highest number of deportees in the 1990s was
the deportation of 415 radical Islamist political activists to Lebanon in 1992. Due
to a U.N. Security Council intervention, this deportation was terminated after one
year, during which the deportees, which were hosted and sponsored by
Hezbollah that instructed them in terrorism related actions, such as the
preparation of IEDs, military training, and terrorist attacks related training.
According to the most recently updated statistics, the last deportations were
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conducted in 2004 and included only 3 Palestinians. (Deportations from the
West Bank to the Gaza Strip 2013).
Administrative detentions are one of the more common, as well as more
effective punitive measures. It is based on emergency regulations, dating back to
the British Mandate over Palestine (1920-‐1948). The idea is simple and effective:
removal of the detainee, who is considered to be a violence inciter and his
incarceration for a limited period of time (up to six month a t a time); a period
which can be both, appealed to the ISC (by the detainee), and extended according
to the state’s security needs, after legal review of each case. Detention is mostly
used to deal with individuals which otherwise would have to be publically tried,
forcing the authorities to reveal secret information (e.g. how the evidence
against the said individual was obtained). Meir Dagan, former head of the GSS,
stated in a 1999 interview, cited by Ganor: “ It is impossible to act in the State of
Israel without administrative detention. It is one of the best tools in our
possession to make use of intelligence without exposing it to the other side”
(Ganor 2005, 292). Doubtlessly, detaining an individual for longer than a few
hours is contrasted with the very concept of democracy. However, one should
consider that democracies faced with continuous acts of terrorism, must defend
themselves somehow. Detention is the only tool which allows for the use of
intelligence in the possession of the state, without disclosing it to the terrorist
entities and terrorism supporting population. B’Tselem, the Israeli Human Rights
Organization, suggests that the most recent peak in administrative detentions
has been in February and April of 2012, with over 300 detainees detained for a
period of over two years (Duration of Administrative Detention 2013).
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House demolition and house razing. This punitive measure is legally based on
Emergency Defense Regulations, created closely with the creation of the State of
Israel. The original logic behind this CT method was not punitive at the time it
was created. In its source, the regulation provided a local military commander
with the legal right to use such measure to maintain order and security, within
the area under his command. It was a deterrent. Although house demolitions
were often appealed to the Israeli High Court of Justice, the appeals were mostly
turned down. In principle, the demolition of a Palestinian house is ordered in
cases that the house dweller was a terrorist. The appeals of house demolition
cases were often based on the claim that the other owners of the said house had
no knowledge of the terrorist activities of the individual/s, which were proved to
be suicide (or non suicide) terrorists. In July 2012, upon the order of Israel’s
minister of defense Ehud Barak, an area including 8 small Palestinian villages,
which was for years acclaimed by the IDF as needed for IDF training and as an
IDF fire zone, has been ordered for demolition. However, Barak’s order did not
deprive the inhabitants from using the said land for their farming -‐ when not in
use by the IDF. (Hass 2012).
XVI. Israeli Counterterrorism model: preliminary conclusions.
As the terrorism experts Boaz Ganor and Ami Pedahzur, stated, Israel never
formulated a definitive CT policy or strategy. The Israeli approach to countering
terrorism is thus a compilation of extensive experience, arguably, the most
extensive CT experience today. When attempting to classify or categorize Israeli
counterterrorism model, one can only point out to certain CT tactics, as opposed
to comprehensive strategy. In the Israeli case, lacking a precise, coherent,
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strategy has proven to be occasionally beneficial to Israel, because it was not
forced to stick to an inflexible set of decisions, made at one point in time. Israel
was thus, able to adapt its CT to its most current needs and pressures without
contradicting former decisions. However, such benefit does not come without a
tradeoff: lack of coherent CT strategy often made Israeli authorities more
exposed to outside pressures, whether by its own public, or by international
public opinion as outlined in various forums (e.g. U.N. general assembly, the Red
Cross and other various NGOs and specific countries). These pressures are
possibly, the main reason behind the lack of consistency in Israel’s approach to
terrorism, and the occasional shifting of the emphasis from utterly offensive
measures to more “permissive” and lenient ones – and back. In this respect one
may want to examine the Palestinian behavior. Every time the Israelis have
shown flexibility and a wish to “talk peace” – the Palestinians stepped up their
defiance. This happened clearly in the aftermath of the 1993 Oslo accords, and
again after Israel’s pullout from Lebanon in 2000. Although since the most recent
cease fire in December 2012, by and large, calm was observed; there were
several incident of rockets fired from Gaza and Sinai into Israel.
While Israel may be criticized for not having a written and well-‐defined CT
strategy and policy, it remains a fact that it was able to counter terrorism
successfully for extended periods of time, thus allowing its population to regain
their peace and composure. Unlike what some may think, life in Israel is good, in
almost every respect. Israel has been wise, in setting as a goal, not the total
eradication of the Palestinian terror, but rather its confinement, containment, so
as to minimize terror’s success in ensuing physical damage, carnage and
psychological and political pressure.
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In the offensive field Israel’s biggest achievement its unique intelligence
capability, which evolved along with the threat, while constantly investing in
more comprehensive understanding of their adversaries, and innovating the CT
tools, methods and units – accordingly.
In the defensive field, Israel’s major CT achievement is the creation of the lasting
bond and partnership between its civilian population, its security apparatuses
and the government. Israelis are probably, the worlds most CT oriented people.
They take pride in their ability to stand up to terrorism and in spite of the fear,
horror and trauma, rationalize the fact that the number of injuries and fatalities
from car accidents, is many times the number of terrorism casualties.
Israel is being criticized as being somewhat a “police state.” Although
undeniably, Israeli democratic liberties are infringed upon each time Israelis are
asked to identify themselves or open their bags for a security search; this
infringement is not only accepted as a necessary evil; in fact, sometimes, when a
guard does not perform his/her task with diligence – he/she is reprimanded by
the public. Moreover, largely because the wisdom of involving the judiciary in the
CT process and safeguarding its independence from the executive, Israel was
able to preserve the true spirit of democracy, at least as well and arguably better
than states like the US, France or UK.
What took place in Israel as a gradual application of appropriate legislature and
Jurisprudence happened to the U.K., U.S., in the form of shock treatment. The
September 11, 2001 bombings triggered a cascade of emergency legislature at
least in the US (2001), the U.K. (2001), Italy (2001), Germany (2002), Norway
(2002), to mention a few (Counter Terrorism Legislation 2005). The new laws
triggered understandable concern from large segments of the respective
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populations, which do not share the Israeli level of confidence and trust it has in
its government.
In view of the global expansion of Islamist terrorism, other nations, other
democracies beside Israel, will arguably, have to accept certain infringement of
their democratic liberties in order to more effectively confront transnational
terrorism.
XVII. Can Lessons from Fighting Palestinian Terrorism be Applied to the
Struggle with Al Qaeda?
While lessons from the Israeli struggle with two, very different, types of
terrorism (one carried out by Hamas and other Palestinian factions and the other
carried out by Hezbollah), are likely to benefit the U.S. CT efforts, it is suggested
by some, that Palestinian terrorism, Hezbollah terrorism, and other forms of
terror, be it the LTTE, the FARC, the Chechens, Or the IRA etc, -‐ none apply to the
al Qaeda model and the al Qaeda related counterterrorism. Indeed, al Qaeda is
different from any other terrorist group mentioned in this paper. It is in truth,
the only truly transnational terrorist group. It conducts its activities both in a
hierarchical and horizontal venues. Unlike all other groups, which are focused on
actions directed at a single state and its sovereign territory and its civilian
population – al Qaeda targets the whole world -‐ even if its current efforts are
focused on the U.S. and its allies mainly as “symbols of all evil”. Although the
Hezbollah is widely diffused around the world, it is still no match in popularity to
al Qaeda, which can boast significant and autonomous presence in some 100
states, despite the fact that a poll released in 2008 by Terror Free Tomorrow,
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found that only 24 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin-‐Laden in
2008, as compared to 46 percent a year before. In a similar way, the poll suggests
that al Qaeda’s popularity has dropped from 33 to 18 percent (Bajoria and Bruno
2012). Al Qaeda has an international communications and propaganda systems,
as well as funds collection system/s. Al Qaeda operatives meet and train in
various and ever changing, locations throughout the world; it is also involved in
criminal activities, along with “fund raising” activities in the Middle East, Africa,
Latin America, Asia, and even throughout Europe and the United States and
Canada. Moreover, al Qaeda has evolved beyond being just a terrorist group of
several thousands sworn in members (possibly more – or – less); al-‐Qaeda is
currently an “idea” or as suggested, a “brand name” or a “franchise”. It is unique.
Without negating any part of the “myth” of al Qaeda, it is clear that in spite of al
Qaeda’s “innovations,” it still shares a respectable number of common traits with
other terrorist groups. The lessons to be learned are thus, from each and every
terrorist -‐ combating experience. At this point in time, no country, including the
U.S., can afford to disregard the lessons learned from CT struggles of other
countries. However, the applicability of such lessons is naturally, selective. Al-‐
Qaeda’s and its affiliate’s motivation is a mixture of political (nationalist) and
religious reasoning, much like some of the other terrorist groups. Like others, al-‐
Qaeda and its affiliates, are is still conducting its business in secrecy; it has to
constantly hide from its persecutors, train and mobilize new combatants, show
strong Internet presence, affect the world news and execute terrorist attacks -‐ to
prove its continuous existence, just like other terrorist groups.
“ Under the impact of the loss of its base in Afghanistan and under
relentless pursuit…al Qaeda was forced to reconfigure itself from a
unitary bureaucratic organization into an ideology and a loose
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confederation of groups. It has become a true transnational entity
that has networked…with numerous like-‐minded groups…” (Art
and Richardson 2007, 582).

While the “founding fathers” of al-‐Qaeda came from Egypt, Algeria and Saudi
Arabia, the new generation came also from Muslim “diasporas” in W. Europe and
their descendants. Each of al-‐Qaeda’s affiliates has its own agenda, but they all
share the common set of beliefs regarding the West, Palestine and naturally the
U.S. These beliefs are summarized in the following: “ the West is implacably
hostile to Islam; the only way to address this threat and the only language that
the West understands is the logic of violence; and jihad is the only option”
(Hoffman 2003, 10). Since the United States is the leader of the West, (and
arguably, the rest of the world), it is only natural for it to become al-‐Qaida’s
main target. The Idea of liberal democratic regime does not resonate well with
al-‐Qaeda’s thinking; it rebels not only against Western democracies, but also
against the autocracies of the Middle East: it wishes to replace the present
autocratic systems there with a theocratic, undemocratic and suppressive
regime, based on the Sharia’ law being mandatory and the creation of a new
caliphate, that will engulf the whole Islamic culture. It is clear that al Qaeda and
its affiliates tap onto the existing sea of hatred and resentment towards the
colonializing West and its “puppet,” corrupt, autocratic and “secular” regimes. As
mentioned before, in spite of tactical successes of the U.S. and its allies in
Afghanistan, the dwindling numbers of al-‐Qaida core say little about the actual
situation of the jihadist, worldwide movement. Many claim that unlike the theory
of Moshe Ya’alon with regard to the possibility to defeat Palestinian terrorism, by
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consistent and complete suppression (Ya’alon 2007, 20), suppressing al Qaeda
et.al. is much more challenging and difficult, because it is so widely metastasized.
“ Since 9/11, al Qaeda and jihadist terrorists in general are putting
more emphasis than ever on recruitment from the Muslim
diasporic community, especially those living in the West. Although
the diasporic jihadists may be less capable than those trained in
Afghanistan, as resolute…[resulting from the Iraq War
experience]…the jihadists have become particularly adept in urban
terrorist warfare that can be just as easily applied in the United
States and Europe as in Iraq and the Middle East” (Art and
Richardson 2007, 584).

On the other hand, these 2007 conclusions by Richardson are arguably,
contested by recent statistics: a 2012 Pew Research Center Study conducted in
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey shows that a majority of Muslim
citizens hold unfavorable views of al-‐Qaeda one year after Osama bin-‐Laden’s
death. For the record, in Pakistan, only 13 percent of Muslims have a positive
view of al-‐Qaeda, with 55 percent holding an unfavorable view of it and just over
30 percent have no opinion at all. In Lebanon and in Turkey, the number of al-‐
Qaeda enthusiasts is portrayed by 2% and 6% respectively. It seems that al-‐
Qaeda is most popular in Egypt (possibly due to the fact that Ayman al Zawahiri,
Osama’s successor is originally from Egypt). 21 percent of Egyptians surveyed,
presented a favorable view of al-‐Qaeda (Fox 2012). Furthermore, Richard Wike,
Pew’s Global Attitudes Project’s associate director, is cited saying that al-‐Qaeda’s
popularity has changed little over the past year (2011-‐2012), since bin-‐Laden’s
death; however, throughout the decade plus since 9/11, support for al Qaeda
dropped sharply. Wikes is cited saying, “ Typically when people are exposed to
extremism and extremist violence in their own country, we tend to see people
reacting in a negative way” (in Fox 2012). Indeed, for example in Jordan,
confidence in al-‐Qaeda dropped dramatically from 61 percent in 2005 to 24
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percent in 2006, after al-‐Qaeda carried out several suicide bombings in Amman,
Jordan’s capital. By 2011, only 13 percent of the Jordanians reported confidence
in bin-‐Laden’s leadership (Fox 2012). This however, is unfortunately not the
whole picture.
As mentioned earlier in this work, while al-‐Qaeda core in Afghanistan has been
arguably, effectively dealt with -‐ its off-‐shots in the Maghreb (AQIM) and in the
Middle East, specifically in Libya, Algeria, Mali, Yemen, Sudan and Syria are a
source for serious concern to the U.S. and the rest of the free world. Recent
attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, (September 11, 2012) and the natural gas
complex in Algeria, (January 2013), along with the strengthening of an Al Qaeda
franchised group Jabhat al Nusra in Syria; as well as the recent arrest of al-‐Qaeda
related terrorist network in Canada and the jihadist terror attack in Boston, MA
(although not directly linked to al-‐Qaeda the “idea” is there); are all pointing at a
metastasized al-‐Qaeda capability. Al Nusra is of particular concern to the U.S.
due to its AQI backing and support, as well as due to its already large
membership, estimated at 10,000 fighters including some with Western
nationalities, which may refocus its attention on another target, once the Syrian
civil war is over (Miller and Warrick 2013). Back in April 2012, Bruce Riedel, a
Brookings institution fellow focusing on the Middle East warned, that despite the
decrease in popularity, al-‐Qaeda still poses a significant threat to international
security. In his words, cited in U.S. News, “ Low approval ratings are not really
relevant in terrorism. If 10 percent of Muslims support [al-‐Qaeda] that means
100 followers, a huge pool to recruit a few suicide bombers.” (Fox 2012). Mr.
Riedel could hardly be more correct. As recently stated by unidentified senior
U.S. intelligence source,
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“ one of the most concerning things we’re seeing is cross-‐
fertilization and cross-‐ pollinization of affiliates. The newer groups
have more diverse memberships, abundant access to weapons and
a willingness to collaborate that serves as a multiplier effect”
(Miller and Warrick 2013).

These new developments pose new challenges to the U.S. and counterterrorism
strategy, which was until very recently focused mostly on al-‐Qaeda Afghanistan
and on the Taliban. The shift in al-‐Qaeda’s profile, challenges the future of the
drone related intelligence and targeted killings of al-‐Qaeda members. The U.S. is
not as well prepared for such challenges from the HUMINT respect, as well as
from the angle of using the drones in far away countries, where the U.S. does not
have as many ready “landing strips,” nor necessarily, the consent of the state in
which al-‐Qaeda is present. While in the short term, al-‐Qaeda affiliates provide
new justification for the U.S. to use its drone tactics, it is suggested that these CT
wars may well be expected to continue for another decade or more.
The U.S. has recently disclosed plans to build a drone base in Niger, to make
intelligence collection over Mali possible. While nothing has yet been said about
targeted killings there, this would have been an expected move on the part of the
U.S. However, for now, the U.S. relies on regional allies and on France to deal
with the terrorists in Mali and Niger. The flow of combatants and weapons has
transformed AQIM and made it more resilient. It became a focal point for
’migration’ of combatants ousted from their previous ‘posts,’ where they suffered
setbacks (e.g. Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc.). As correctly stated,
“ In its broader incarnation, the group [AQIM] is one of the most
diverse affiliates, drawing militants from Mali, Mauritania, Libya,
Egypt and Sudan. The organization’s amorphous membership also
illustrates what U.S. officials described as an increasingly fluid
militant network” (Miller and Warrick 2013).

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An increasingly important is also the fact that al-‐Qaeda core is not funding any of
its new, affiliated groups. Moreover, it is currently, not much more that a
“blessing giver” and possibly an adviser. However, the affiliates still look to al-‐
Qaeda core for varying degrees of guidance and affirmation. David Cohen, the
Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism was cited saying:

“ Unable to rely on al Qaeda [central] for help, regional affiliates
such as AQIM have been forced to raise their own funds, mostly
through criminal enterprises…Their money is self-‐generated,
predominantly through kidnapping ventures and other criminal
enterprises” (Miller and Warrick 2013).

With due “respect” granted to al-‐Qaida’s activity in the Maghreb, the Arabian
Peninsula remains an al-‐Qaeda’s franchise stronghold (in Yemen), which is
capable and committed to carrying attacks against the United States. However,
the al-‐Qaeda metastasized threats are evident to all Western democracies and
their worldwide facilities. Indeed, Western governments are warning their
embassies, businesses and tourists of the terrorist hazards and threats. In view
of the French intervention in the Algerian gas pipeline and the Mali hostage
incidents, the French government with population a 10 percent of which, is of
North African descent, is bracing for a possible wave of retaliatory terrorist
attacks in France.
To conclude this section, it seems reasonable, that lessons can and should
be learned constantly, from the experiences of every country, which is
threatened by terrorists and is involved in counterterrorism. There is no way to
directly apply everything learned from the decades of fighting Palestinian
terrorism, to the struggle with al-‐Qaeda. But there are some points to be made.
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• The use of force alone is unlikely to defeat al-‐Qaeda. Even local groups
like Hamas, PIJ and alike, were not defeated and completely destroyed by
Israeli military. Moreover it took Sri Lankan governments 24 years, to
defeat the local LTTE through the application of extreme measures, which
badly undermined the democratic nature of the existing regime. With al-‐
Qaeda being more an idea and a formula for global terrorism, force alone
is insufficient.
• The Israelis have never really tried “to battle” for the hearts and minds of
the Palestinians. The very nature of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict
negates the very concept of positively approaching the Palestinians; this
is, simply put – two people locked in a deadly struggle over the same tiny
piece of land.
Positive Israeli gestures towards Palestinians (e.g. medical care, the Oslo
accords, etc.) have been dwarfed by both, the offensive and the defensive
Israeli measures. Interestingly, although Israeli retaliatory and pre-‐
emptive violence against Palestinians, leads them to support more radical
factions and more radical attitudes towards the conflict, this effect is
temporary, and according to a study, supposedly, vanishes completely
within 90 days (Jaeger et.al. 2008). The lesson for fighting against al-‐
Qaeda is: refrain from occupation. If the US has to fight – it should do so,
as much as possible, by “remote control” to minimize the alienating effect
of occupation on those who host al-‐Qaeda.
• The United States has a much better chance than Israel, of waging a
successful campaign for the hearts and minds of the Muslim population, by
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driving a wedge between the Muslim public at large, and the destructive
path of al-‐ Qaeda.
General Lessons to be Learned from the Worldwide Struggle with
Terrorism
International Cooperation in CT Struggle is a Must
Most of terrorist groups not affiliated with al-‐Qaeda, portray a picture of
localized activity and accordingly, require a mostly localized
counterterrorist struggle. However, is some cases as exemplified by the
Hezbollah, the most daring, complex and lethal attacks, were carried not
in the Hezbollah locale, but in far away lands, e.g. Argentina (the attacks
on the Israeli Embassy in 1992, and the Argentine Jewish Cultural Center
in 1994); the 2002 failed plot to attack U.S. and Israeli naval vessels in
Singapore Straits; the 2009 foiled attempt to attack Israeli and Egyptian
targets in Sinai; and the 2012 Burgas, Bulgaria attack on Israeli tourists.
Although Israel has shown it capability to retaliate against terrorists
overseas, when facing terrorism as well spread as al Qaeda’s affiliates, a
great deal of international cooperation is needed in order to successfully
counter terrorist attempts. It is notable, that while most countries seem to
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cooperate with the U.S. in al-‐Qaeda related terrorism cases (e.g. the Dar el
Salam, and Nairobi 1998 bombings; the 2000 USS Cole: September 11,
2001 attacks: the Bali 2002 attacks in Indonesia; the 2004 Madrid: 2005
London, and Sharem al Sheikh; 2008: and 2011 Mumbai, India etc.) -‐
Michael Chertoff, who led the U.S. DHS, already back in 2005 correctly
suggested that,
“ If we are going to challenge the kind of interdependence that
terrorist networks thrive upon, we have to be able to confront the
network anywhere it operates, and that means we have to be able
to function internationally and do it in partnership with overseas
allies” (Fiorill 2005).

While some of this international cooperation is exemplified in law
enforcement cooperation, the main purpose of international cooperation
regarding counterterrorism is focused on intelligence collaboration. In
the Cold War era, the U.S. had a considerable pool of human intelligence
sources; however, following the demise of the Soviet Union, the interest in
HUMINT waned, in favor of the “magic “ of SIGINT, MASINT and COMINT.
With the new need for infiltration of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
groups, the U.S. have found itself in a dire renewed need of HUMINT to
supplement and complement the digital intelligence. Typically, human
assets take a long time to acquire and to develop; it is thus, that the U.S.
had to lean heavily on foreign collaboration with the international
intelligence community to augment its own, lacking, human sources.
During the first decade of the 21st century, many terrorist plots
succeeded, but an unknown, yet arguably, impressive number of al Qaeda,
and affiliate plots, was foiled mostly due to good human intelligence,
resulting from international cooperation, along with collaboration in
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surveillance and law enforcement; including international pre and post
event investigation. It is interesting to see the far-‐sightedness of C.I.A’s
Paul Pillar, in his writings, Terrorism and American Foreign Policy (2001),
as well as in Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy,(2011); in both Pillar
argues in favor of,
“Close cooperation with foreign intelligence services constitutes

our most important and effective tool, by expanding the
intelligence, police and international security resources directed
against terrorist targets…Imposing financial controls and
limitations plays a secondary role in combating
terrorism…Selective military retaliation deters terrorism,
demonstrates US resolve, encourages other governments to fight
terrorism, and disrupts terrorist operations” (Pillar in Moore
2008).

Pillar does not see an end to the struggle with al Qaeda. Rather than
winning against terrorism – terrorism can at best be managed. And he
sagely contends (in 2001) that the death of Osama bin Laden will not
bring about the complete demise of al Qaeda. Pillar further suggests
several policy recommendations to be implicated by the U.S. (Pillar in
Moore 2008).
• The U.S. should insert a counterterrorism perspective into its foreign
policy strategy.
• U.S. government must pay attention to a maximal range of terrorist
threats, and not to focus solely on Osama, al-‐Qaeda, or on any particular
other group or individual alone. All threats must be considered. (But not
all must be fought).
• All available CT methods must be applied in a carefully balanced way.
• We must tailor different CT measures to meet different terrorist
challenges.
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• The U.S must leverage the power of foreign governments to engage in the
U.S. and other allied countries counterterrorism efforts.
• Special efforts must be made to inform the American public about the
terrorist threat, and the role the American public may (and possibly
should) play in counterterrorism.
Overall, the purpose of counterterrorism related intelligence is the
disruption of as many terrorist cells and plots as possible; this will not
only prevent attacks, but also damage the terrorist network and possibly
disrupt terrorist activity in a longer run. As stated before, some claim that
the killed and the apprehended terrorists are almost instantly replaced,
but as we have seen in the Palestinian Hamas’ case, high ranking fighters
or leaders were hard to replace and the effect of being openly targeted at
all times, caused them to go into hiding and limited the damage they
caused. Furthermore, as we know from the Osama case, he was deeply
affected by the U.S. relentless hunt for him; and he shared his fears and
concerns by warning other al Qaeda operatives of the dangers constituted
by drones and other modern CT tools (McConnell and Todd 2013).
Although the CT capabilities of the U.S. and its allies have improved on the
national and international level, an ongoing international cooperation
with foreign intelligence services is a must, because none of the countries
targeted by al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates, can effectively seal its borders, and
prevent terrorist infiltration. Not even Israel, which arguably, has come
relatively close to such capability. (Levi 2008).
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Intelligence and Counterterrorism: The Unique Nature and Quality
of Intelligence Needed to Disrupt Terrorism: the U.S. and Israeli
Perspectives
Starting on the national level, the U.S. has a troubled history as far as
intelligence sharing is concerned. Good, effective intelligence sharing is
arguably, the foundation for the obtaining of a reliable, finalized and
actionable intelligence product. This problem is magnified many times
over, when the sharing is needed on an international level, whereas the
trust shared with foreign intelligence services is inherently low and tends
to be extremely egocentric.
“ America needs help from other countries, whether it likes it or
not…Working with other services provides US intelligence several
direct benefits, including access to specific information…denied to
large-‐scale US penetration…Foreign services can also provide
direct force to solve a particular problem [arrests etc.]. Finally,
other intelligence services can mask American actions as local
ones…At the same time, foreign services may harm US interests.
They may have conflicting political missions…[and] working with
liaison often open the US to moral hazards. Foreign intelligence
services are not bound by the peculiarities of the American legal
system…” (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 221).

Moreover, foreign help in counterterrorism, is not offered “free of
charge.” There is a “price” for helping the U.S. to fight al-‐Qaeda and its
affiliates. In exchange for services rendered to the US, it may be obliged to
overlook certain moral and humanitarian issues related to the
interrogation style, prisoner abuse, clandestine nuclear deals and human
rights violations. This is a necessary evil, with which the US intelligence
services must often cope, in order to gain the needed support.
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The intelligence failures that allowed 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War to
happen, point out to two U.S. intelligence problems; both, prior to 9/11,
and in the aftermath of 9/11. It is still debated, whether 9/11 could have
been thwarted if better intelligence sharing was experienced within the
US IC. It is also arguable whether better intelligence, based on more
sources – could have prevented the Iraq 2003 war. Yet, there is no
division over the fact that intelligence sharing within the US IC has been
and unfortunately, still is -‐ faulty. The problem of “stove-‐piping” or not
sharing information gathered, even with sister agencies are not a unique
problem of the US IC. It is in fact, an inherent problem of any intelligence
agency; and some say – and large bureaucracy.
“Information sharing has been repeatedly identified as one of the
weakest points of various intelligence communities around the
world….known as “stove-‐piping” or the “silo-‐ effect”… intelligence
agencies are often good at moving information up and down their
own chains of command, but do a poor job of sharing this
information laterally. (Quiggin 2007, 140).

A 2006 GAO report, surveying 26 US government agencies involved in the
collection dissemination and the use of terrorism related intelligence,
points out to the sad fact that between 2001 and 2006 there was still no
government-‐wide policy, or process integrating CT-‐related information
available. (Quiggin 2007, 141). However, in 2007 the US government has
issued a National Strategy for Information Sharing, which declares:
“success in preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to
gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those
who want to attack us… “ (National Strategy for Information Sharing
2007).
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It was the huge bureaucracy and “red tape,” that made the US IC
extremely cumbersome and slow to react – that often was the reason
behind stove piping (i.e. moving information within each agency only,
without sharing). Interestingly, for comparison and contrast, Israel, being
a small country, with a tiny IC (in comparison to the US), also suffered
from stove piping. An extensive review of the GSS in 1996 found that
intelligence integration and sharing was not done properly. There was no
clear hierarchy for decision-‐making,
“ …Different parts of the GSS organized according to region: one
division might advise waiting before protecting a source, while
another would advocate nabbing a suspect and interrogating him
immediately. Each command had autonomy, which resulted in a
mix of methods and philosophies…On top of that there it was not
clear where Shin Bet’s [GGS] responsibility ended and those of the
Mossad and the IDF began” (Byman 2011, 340).

This foreign example of “turf wars” even within a single agency,
demonstrates a problem that is inherent worldwide, and can be seen in its
common example even in the inherent rivalry and turf wars between
different police jurisdictions, sometimes named “collar wars” (Allen 1993,
203). The US government attempted to improve this situation by the 2005
Intelligence Reform Act, and the 2007 actual National Strategy for
Information Sharing. The documents representing a set of visions,
aspirations, rules and regulations, seen in a “strategy’ is not enough;
especially so, when such rules and regulations are not assimilated and
shared by those who have to execute the said strategy. The original 2005
U.S. Intelligence Reform tried to deal with numerous issues:
• The overemphasizing of the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB),
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which created a tendency to focus on superficial intelligence product,
listing mostly attention-‐grabbing, latest clandestine reports, without
deep analysis.
• Changing the disappointing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs),
which instead of being one of the IC’s major products, were often too
late, too long and too detailed, to serve high level policy makers in an
optimal way. The source of this problem was the wish to present a
unified analytic position (of the IC), which not necessarily portrayed
the reality.
• Following the Iraq WMD quagmire, the analysts started to deploy “risk
aversion techniques” whereas the intelligence product focused often
on amalgamating all potential relevant data – forcing the policy
makers to draw their own conclusions. These issues clearly show a
poor capability to balance the intelligence product (Lieberthal 2009).
• The new cadre of analysts hired by the IC lacked the deep immersion
in the background of the country they were specializing in. They
lacked the extensive knowledge of the country’s history, economics
and politics; which are very important to correctly understand the
information collected. Accordingly, it has been recommended that
despite certain security vetting risks – the recruits should be chosen
from those that have and extensive experience relevant to the country
of concern.
• Greater sharing not only of information, but also of competing
opinions over a given topic. By getting more than a single analytic
opinion from a single intelligence agency or discipline, a joint
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leadership in developing an analysis was suggested, along with
encouragement of presenting privately held opinions, even if they were
contrary to the general position on a given subject.
• Accordingly, additional emphasis was placed also on the education of
new IC recruits and assigning analysts systematically to provide
support to senor policy makers, from the assistant secretary and up.
• Another suggestion was to develop a systematic and regular feedback
flow from the policy makers to the analysts, and thus creating a better
understanding between the “supply end” of the intelligence, and the
“demand. “ Analysts need to be better trained and equipped to
understand the subtle effects of power dynamics between analysts
and policymakers; and policymakers need to keep in mind that their
power and positions are intimidating to many analysts who brief
them” (Lieberthal 2009).
• Lieberthal further outlines the obstacles still troubling the U.S. IC,
even after 2007:
“ Ongoing IC cultures of insularity and secrecy… present major

obstacles to realizing the IC’s full potential…some IC managers
continue to deny information to other parts of the community
because they do not utilize identical security
screenings…another example, the need for National Intelligence
University has been understood for some time, but the IC’s
sixteen disparate agencies still resist merging their
educational…programs. This resistance highlights that the IC
still has some distance to go in terms of individual agency
cultures and mindsets…” (Lieberthal 2009).

Moreover, the 2005 creation of the ODNI, without giving it and its head,
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) a real mandate, created not
much more that another layer of ineffective bureaucracy. Although
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talented individuals staff it; the function of these individuals is at best
unclear and at worst destructive.
“Beyond its information –sharing and relationship building

abilities – two areas that the intelligence bureaucracy has
improved apart from the ODNI’s efforts – the office has no added
value in the fight against al Qaeda. The ODNI – has yet to take
center stage in thwarting an attack …despite multiple chances to
do so “ (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 225).

The DNI has a broad job, but little actual power. He is theoretically,
supposed to manage the sixteen IC agencies, which are frequently in
dispute with one another and which often answer to different leaders,
including the President. This makes the DNI the most likely “fall guy” to
take the blame for whatever intelligence mishap or terrorist attack.
However, as Peritz and Rosenbach suggest, the ODNI could become more
valuable, if instead of regurgitating the already processed information
and actual intelligence products of the IC before it reaches the President
and the NSC, it could arguably, become more valuable, if it would become
removed from the daily analysis, and focus on its own signature
intelligence products, produced by a group of analysts made of the US
government’s highest experts in any given NS field – who can focus on the
big picture; way beyond the limited scope of the analysts of each IC
participant and contributor. In reality, most of the time spent by the
various analysts is spent on the so-‐called “ current intelligence”. Such
focus prevents them from conducting long term, strategic analyses.
“ By creating a cadre of first-‐among-‐equals analysts, the ODNI

could capitalize on the creative energies of its working
population…these particulars thinkers would be encouraged to
challenge conventional wisdom” (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012,
227).

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Though domestic information sharing is of grave importance to
the counterterrorism effort, one must not overlook two important
points:
First, beyond the internal squabbles, states rely increasingly on other
states for their security or their CT related training and equipment.
Second, to combat transnational terrorist threats effectively, the
information sharing, must expand to the international realm. After all,
Muhammad Atta’s cell, made up largely from Saudi nationals, trained for
quite a while in Hamburg, Germany, with the intention to carry attacks in
the United States. Terrorists still come from various states, plan
operations in states, and operate in states (Revron 2008, 3).
Most terrorism activities, just like politics – are local, and what makes al-‐
Qaeda such huge challenge to the US, is its transnational nature.
Interestingly, Hamas, another Muslim Sunni group, might be wrongly
considered as “brother-‐in-‐ arms” of al Qaeda. Yet this is not the case. In
fact, Hamas holds a rather low opinion of al-‐Qaeda and has so far
prevented al-‐Qaeda from obtaining a foothold in Gaza. Even the al-‐Qaeda
affiliate, Jund al-‐Islam, (Army of Islam) group, that kidnapped the BBC
reporter Alan Johnston in 2007, was quickly and brutally suppressed by
Hamas. (Meshal: Johnston’s Release 2007). At that time, al-‐Qaeda’s
Zawahiri has softened his criticism of Hamas, attempting to use the
isolation in which Hamas has found itself after the purge of FATAH from
Gaza strip and the 2007 elections. Zawahiri indeed intended for al-‐Qaida
to create presence in Palestinian territories and start its own anti Israel
Jihad. (Baliani 2007).
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In 2012, the Obama administration produced a revamped National
Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (2012). The emphasis
is on the fact that information is treated as a National Asset, and as such
Information Sharing Requires Shared Risk Management. In order to build
and sustain the trust required to share with one another, the various IC
agencies must work together to identify and collectively reduce risk,
rather than avoiding information loss by not sharing at all. Moreover, the
new NSISS declares that the purpose of information sharing is nothing
else than Improved Decisionmaking. The 2012 NSISS thus focuses on
achieving five goals:
A. Emphasis on working together, adopting common processes in order
to build trust, simplifying information sharing agreements, supporting
efforts through training, incentives and performance management.
B. Developing clear policies for making information available to
approved individuals. Secure information discovery and access, must
rely on identity, authentication, and authorization control, wide data
correlation, common information sharing standards and a rigorous
process to certify and validate their use.
C. Optimize mission effectiveness through shared services and
interoperability.
D. Strengthen information safeguarding through structural reform,
policy, and technical solutions.
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E. Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. In order to
maintain public trust, the US IC and government must be consistent in
the way privacy is applied and the way civil rights and civil liberties
are protected. The US must carefully adhere to and comply with the
law by developing information sharing operations.
“ As we execute the Strategy together, we will harness our
collective resolve to treat information as a national asset,
make it discoverable and retrievable by all authorized users,
and arm those charged with preserving the security of the
Nation. Only as we achieve the safety and success our country
rightfully demands and fully deserves” (National Strategy for
Intelligence Sharing and Safeguarding 2012, 2).

When one considers the magnitude of the effort and good will, that will be
required to enact the demands stemming from this National Strategy, it
may be – rather overwhelming. In the much smaller, Israeli intelligence
community, it is easy to detect the basic differences in approach to issues
of sharing and safeguarding of intelligence in the U.S. and Israel.
For one thing, the huge size of the U.S. IC with its 16 sister agencies, (not
including several intelligence oriented agencies such as the Customs, the
DEA, Coast Guard etc. which arguably, should be included in the sharing
process, along with certain elements of law enforcement, even on the
local level) – it is clear that having a dedicated strategy is a must, if only
due to the sheer size of the bureaucratic effort that is involved in sharing
information on the national level; without even getting into the additional
complexity of sharing on the international level.
Israel, by contrast, officially, has only three intelligence agencies, (the GSS,
the Mossad and the IDI); although, one should not omit the intelligence -‐
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oriented, Political Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as well as INP intelligence Division, both are at least de facto, intelligence
agencies. The INP is tasked with several counterterrorism duties and
responsibilities and is by and large, responsible for the actual “arresting,
thwarting ” element of CT efforts and participates in the interrogation of
suspected terrorists. (Israel Police Intelligence Division 2013 website).
Israel (despite its minute size), has experienced a severe sharing problem
not only between its various IC agencies. In fact, the problems were
inherent even inside the GSS alone, not to mention the vicious turf wars,
between the GSS and the other sister agencies and the INP, which was
frequently looked upon as an underdog.
The Israeli society is rather cohesive, even if only just because of the fact
that most of its members are of Jewish origin. The Jewish religion, into
which most Jews are born, is an element that largely diminishes the risk
of disloyalty and treason; however, it does not completely rule out such
possibility, and cases to the contrary are dully noted (Gilboa and Lapid
2012, 250-‐257). Foreign agents, for example, can infiltrate Israel while
posing as being of Jewish origin, and thus gladly accepted as new
immigrants. Israel also attracts religious personnel of all kinds: clerics,
monks and priests etc., who come to Israel under religious pretenses, and
are granted certain diplomatic immunity. Naturally, all IC and police
members are vetted to one degree or another, but only a minority of
police officers, in intelligence related tasks, is vetted with considerable
intensity, equivalent to other members of the Israeli IC and is cleared to
deal highly classified information.
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Since the American society is much less homogenous and cohesive, a
country of massive immigration and tourism (much more than Israel), it
is understandable that the very act of recruiting new IC employees of all
races and religions, is more than theoretically more risky. Moreover, it
may be hard to understand that being an Israeli (not only a Jew) is very
unique, from the security angle, since all Israelis are exposed rather
evenly, to the terrorist threat, which makes for a more homogenous
perception of the terrorist threat and Israel’s anti-‐terrorist stance. In spite
of this interesting sociological and political feature, there are numerous
Israelis that in the last two decades openly adopt an anti – Zionist, anti-‐
Israeli, pro-‐Palestinian stance, which creates an interesting vetting
dilemmas. Moreover, in the past three decades, Israel must also deal with
the problem of the extreme right. Although Israel has arguably
experienced only one anti Israeli extreme-‐right–related, VIP assassination
(the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin November 1995), the problem of
“Jewish Underground” has cast a grim shadow of Israel’s self-‐perceived
unity (Sprinzak 1999, 155-‐161).
The 1996 formerly mentioned GSS review, led to two significant
changes: a somewhat improved central coordination and improved
intelligence sharing. The coordination problem was partially resolved
through the strengthening of the GSS headquarters,
“Over time Shin Bet [GSS] “broke all the walls of
compartmentalization”…Now the information was open to anyone
who might need it. Unlike the presumption of
compartmentalization in most Western intelligence agencies, in
Israel today [2011] the presumption is for sharing. Shin Bet
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officials need approval of the deputy director or the director to
compartmentalize information, rather than the other way around”
(Byman 2011, 340-‐341).

In 2002, the GSS claimed that the shared counterterrorism response has
been able to prevent about 80 percent of terrorist attacks through
preemptive intelligence. This however was not satisfactory, since the
other 20 percent claimed many Israeli lives. Out of 155 attempted suicide
bombings, 112 were stopped, while forty-‐three were actually carried out.
It was not until 2006, that the GSS completed its reorganization in the face
of continuing terrorist challenge:
“ There are three geographic field offices that focus on Palestinian
areas and Israeli Arabs. Another part of the organization works on
al-‐Qaida, Hizballah, and other groups, at times in cooperation with
the Mossad. A fifth division looks at Jewish extremism…. To
coordinate all the information, the desk at headquarters where
analyst sat became Shin Bet’s counterterrorism brain. The desk
operatives see all interrogations reports, SIGINT, and field agent
reports and directs different collectors to complete…and pursue
new leads…[and] coordinate with the IDF, air force and the
police…In the past Shin Bet favored agent runners and
interrogators. Today the desk operatives run the show…” (Byman
2011, 341-‐342).

A lesson to be learned here is that although the new changes in the GSS’
and IDF’s approach to the terrorist challenge did not deter the Hamas and
other Palestinian faction from attempting terrorist attacks, it has
however, transformed overall terrorism from a massive, uncontrolled
problem, into a manageable one, thus allowing the Israelis to conduct
normal life once more.
However, in as much as the CT doctrine improved, it has not become an
actual long-‐term and coherent strategy. While it allows for additional
flexibility in the almost instantaneous application of new or different CT
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measures, it is very open to outside political pressures, manifested in the
multi-‐partisan Israeli democratic system, which is often self-‐destructive,
in its inability to create a broad consent and support for CT measures and
policies.

“ Much of the problem is due to Israel’s unusual system of
democracy…ministers are rarely chosen for their expertise, but
instead to ensure that the prime minister can form a coalition to
stay in government. In contrast to the American system, Cabinet
ministers owe their primary loyalty to their party, and not to the
prime minister …As a result Cabinet turnover is frequent and
political horizons are short term, driven by politics rather than the
greater good” (Byman 2011, 345).

With due respect to the American democratic government system, where
the choice of ministers is not always bipartisan, and the choice of new
Supreme Justices is mostly a Presidential and partisan prerogative,
possibly the final outcome is not necessarily much “better,” but it is open
to Congressional oversight and is certainly more permanent and stable.

XVIII. The United States Counterterrorism Paradigm: The Use of Lethal
Force in U.S. Counterterrorism: Moral, Legal and
Efficacy Issues

As shown in the Israeli case of targeted killings, the debates regarding
their efficacy and their legal limitations are still ongoing and although it is
one of the limited options the world has at its disposal, when combating
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terrorism, the proponents of democracy, civil liberties and human rights
are adamantly opposed to the systematic targeted killing of terrorists.
From the logical point of view, with the limited CT capabilities we have at
our disposal, it might be unwise to completely outlaw and stop using this
ugly and imperfect method. The world have learned that national
terrorism, and more so, transnational terrorism, cannot be fought by large
armies and according to the rules of war applied in WWII.
Daniel Byman expresses his opinion on the topic of targeted killings, for
the Brooking Institute. He posits,
Killing terrorists is difficult, is often ineffective, and can easily
backfire. Yet it is one of United States’ few options for managing
the threat posed by al Qaeda…U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan has
killed dozens of lower –ranking and at least 10-‐mid and high-‐
ranking leaders from al Qaeda and the Taliban”(Byman 2009).

Interestingly, in 2006 Byman wrote an article with an near-‐ identical title,
in which he carefully outlined the risks, as exemplified by the Bush
administration’s abolishing of many, long-‐standing, U.S. limits on punitive
and preventive actions; as well as the need for authorization of special
measures, including secret prisons, domestic surveillance without court
authorization, holding of enemy combatants and their rendition to third
countries for interrogation. All of which caused international outcry and
have caused many Americans to question the legitimacy of their
government’s CT policy. Usually, almost no method used, can remain
secret forever. One way or another, almost everything leaks at some point
or is officially declassified. The US exploits several CT measures, which
are controversial. Targeted killings are only one of these measures. The
White House has sanctioned, upon a certification by the Department of
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Justice, enhanced interrogation techniques, “black sites,” special
electronic surveillance (without a warrant) etc. In the early post 9/11
stages, the American public, as well as most of the IC knew next to nothing
about what has been going on, and what has already, been much more
openly discussed by the Israelis. The eventual “ sharing” of these secrets
with the American public, proved detrimental in the way it has been
conducted. It created a significant mistrust of the Bush administration
and cast a dark shadow over the actions and the legitimacy of the C.I.A
and its operations, which were deemed as contrary to the Constitutional
rights, the American legislature stemming from: the United States
Constitution and the International law.
In 2005 Jerry Smith evaluates in his thesis, the effectiveness of Israel’s
counterterrorism strategy. He posits:

In view of the American continuous criticism of these questionable
methods, (starting with the notable, 2001 condemnation of Israel’s
targeted killings by Martin Indyk, then the US Ambassador to Israel),
One must ask: are the American people oblivious to the limited options of
conducting counterterrorist operations?
Doesn’t the very same logic apply to the Israeli and U.S. use of these
method/s? In fact, while what indeed takes place within the Israeli
decision–making process is rather transparent, (although not in a real
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time); as attested to by several of the commanders of the Shin Bet (The
Gatekeepers, 2013) – Israeli politicians, even at the highest levels, were
often detached from the decision making process on the executive, field
levels.
Israeli political leaders such as Shamir or Rabin wanted to be handed “a
ready decision” for each and every case where Palestinian terrorists were
to be targeted and killed; even more so in cases involving possible
collateral damage. Politicians were always in awe of the final results of
kinetic operations and their international and national repercussions.
According to Avraham Shalom, interviewed in The Gatekeepers (2013),
“ One could not relate to them [the political leadership] seriously; could
not believe them; nobody was giving official backing [to the decisions of
the IDF or Shabak] .” (The Gatekeepers 2013). Thus the Israeli CT
apparatuses learned since the 1980’s not to execute kinetic operations
without the direct consent of the political leadership and their
involvement and approval for each such operation. Yet the Israeli CT
paradigm evolved further with the continuous involvement of the Israeli
Attorney General, and the Israeli Supreme Court, which are currently
always involved in such decisions. While the case of the killing of Osama
bin-‐Laden indicate full involvement of the American political leadership
in a kinetic action, it is so far unclear to what actual extent is the US
President, the US Attorney General and Judicial involved in each kinetic
operation. The media thus, plays an important role in providing a degree
of transparence to the military and intelligence operations.
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In truth, although there are some obvious differences between the Israeli
and American CT paradigms – the continued use of targeted killing is
simply an inevitable must. Even more than in the case of Palestinian
terrorism – the case of al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates the challenge of finding,
fixing and finishing terrorists is currently even harder and more
challenging.
The American public, because of the assumption of not being threatened
by daily terrorist attacks (like in Israel), considers terrorist threat as
remote (the terrorist attack on the Boston Marathon in April 2013, comes
as a sobering reminder). Americans are strongly susceptible to thinking
that, “ it will not happen here, or “it will not happen to me.” Although in
order to cope with the horror of terrorism, Israelis too, use such defense
mechanisms; it seems, that at least statistically, the chances of being
affected by a terrorist incident in the U.S. are much smaller than in Israel.
In fact, even in Israel, the statistics are “calming” and the chances of an
average Israeli (as opposed to say, a settler, living and travelling through
hostile territory on a daily basis) being involved in a lethal car accident, or
dying of heart disease or cancer, are much higher than the chances to be
killed by terrorists. (Chapman 2012). Despite that, most Israelis are
unlikely to arrive at the conclusion that due to the statistically low chance
of being hit by terrorists, there is no need for preparedness, and the
stubborn struggle with Palestinian terrorists. In fact, the Council on
Foreign Relations, has published in its 2012 publication of the 2011 NCTC
report the following statistics:
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“ The number of U.S. citizens who died in terrorism attacks increased by 2
(two) between 2010 and 2011; overall a comparable number of
Americans are Crushed to death by their television or furniture each
year…” (Zenko 2012). It took 9/11 to bring the horrors of terrorism to
strike home, unlike any terrorist attack before. Not even the Oklahoma
City bombing. This is, after all, the rationale behind terrorism: terrifying
the public beyond logic.
The United States faces terrorist challenges overseas, as well as from
within. Home born and bred American terrorists, are yet another good
reason to set the statistics aside and prepare. Some additional traits
characterize the difference in battlegrounds between the U.S. and Israel:
• The U.S. can survive WMD attacks, but some of its allies arguably, cannot.
And even the US may take decades to recover from such event.
• Targeted killings (and specially drone attacks and Special Forces killing
operations) are the only CT tolls that can reach terrorists wherever they
are. “ Counterterrorism requires the use of force, and there is no way
around that. It does not, however, require the indiscriminate use of force”
(Art & Richardson 2007, 590).
• Elimination of al Qaeda’s top echelon, improves the chances of ultimately
defeating it in the long run. While “foot soldiers” are easily replaced,
leaders, technicians, communication and propaganda experts etc., are
hard to find and it takes a long time to train.
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Although Art and Richardson state,
“ Do not count on decapitation to incapacitate the global

jihadist terrorist network. Decapitation worked in the
Peruvian, Turkish and Japanese cases because the
[respective terrorist groups] were highly centralized
around one individual. Bin Laden created a different type of
organization…Al Qaeda has proved resilient in finding new
leaders to replace the original ones taken down” (Art &
Richardson 2007, 590-‐591).

The post–bin-‐Laden reality suggests that bin Laden’s demise did, in fact,
create a significant void in al-‐Qaeda, but failed to defeat the group.
However, continuous decapitation, of top and middle level operatives, is
the correct way to continue for the foreseeable future. Some believe that
in order to defeat terrorism “ You do not have to kill every single terrorist,
you have to kill ‘enough’ to create a critical mass “ that will stop them in
their tracks (Avi Dichter in The Gatekeepers 2013).
• Although the international law prohibits assassinations, terrorist are
considered to be “common enemies of humankind,” (Smith 2005, 35),
shouldn’t people thus conclude, that even if targeted killings are not more
righteous than “assassinations,” the International Law should be changed
to exclude terrorists from International Law’s protective shield?
• There is no doubt that targeted killings can go wrong, and innocents can
be mistakenly hurt or killed, as history shows. If that is the case, how can
today’s Americans or Britons criticize their government, when their
public sat quietly when an American and U.K administrations endorsed
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the indiscriminate killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians
during WWII (in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dresden, Hamburg Tokyo etc.)???
• It is obvious that in order to minimize mistaken killing of innocents,
during the long hunt for terrorists, the hunting tools and hunting
instructions must become as close as possible to mistake-‐free, through
proper oversight (Juristic and top executive).
The United States is a firm, unrelenting, believer in democracy.
Democracies vary, among other things -‐ in the respective perception of their
citizen’s rights as humans and as citizens. The United States also struggles
with its perception of the “human rights of terrorists.” Most of the currently
used counterterrorism measures used by Israel, (e.g. blowing up houses of
terrorists; the security barrier, enhanced interrogation, targeted killings etc.)
are occasionally contested, not only by the terrorists themselves and the Arab
countries; but also by the Israeli legal system, and by Israel’s otherwise
closest allies, including the United States. These deeds, embraced by both
American and Israeli CT apparatuses, are also contested and criticized by the
American and other countries’ publics. Furthermore, Israeli CT practices are
severely scrutinized also by segments of the Israeli population. Naturally,
“targeted killings” of terrorists is probably, the most contested CT method.
Arguably, this method would probably, not be as contested as it is, if the actual
casualties of drone strikes would have been terrorists only. The so-‐called
“collateral damage” is understandably, severely contested. Had the American
people shared Israel’s experience of daily suicide bombings, they too, might
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have decided, that “better red than dead”; meaning, “if the current political
and legal system is incapable of defending me – it’s time to re-‐evaluate and
possibly correct it, using whatever measures needed to assure my survival.”
Alas, the world is not perfect and the U.S. population and other allied
populations, include people that often see targeted killings and especially
targeted killings of Americans-‐turned-‐terrorists and the so called “signature
killings” not only deplorable, questionable, but even outright illegal, under the
5th Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S. and under the International
Law.
The near-‐total opaqueness of the drone strikes conducted by the CIA, does not
help the case for the killing of terrorists without “due process”. Many free
press articles cover the debate over this and other CT issues. David Brooks
writing recently in the New York Times suggested,
“ [Machiavelli] puts too much faith in the self-‐constraint of his leaders.
Machiavelli tells us that men are venal self-‐deceivers, but then he gives his
Prince [aka Obama] permission to do all these monstrous things, trusting him
not to get carried away or turn in a monster himself. Our founders were more
careful. Our founders understood that leaders are as venal and untrustworthy
as anybody else. They abhorred concentrated power, and they set up checks
and balances to disperse it. Our drone policy should take account of our
founders’ superior realism. Drone strikes are easy, hidden and abstract. There
should be some independent judicial panel to review the kill lists. There
should be an independent panel of former military and intelligence officers
issuing reports on the program’s efficacy.”(Brooks, David. 2013).

There is no disputing Brook’s logic and the great foresight of our Funding
Fathers, but one more, where was this democratic, civil and human rights
American thinking during WWII or Vietnam??? Where was the intense need
for transparency and oversight back then?
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The American democracy, as other stable democracies, obviously has some
sanity to it after all. None of the American leaders of the 20th century turned to
be an irreversible, heartless “monsters,” like Hitler or Stalin.
Even during WWII and Vietnam, when grave atrocities were conducted with
the knowledge of the American leadership, “something” has put an eventual
stop to these atrocities – before they got completely out of hand. And horrors
like Nagasaki were not repeated. However, human kind developed an
“elephants skin” as far as human suffering is concerned. The atrocities of
Bosnia, Darfur or Rwanda, can easily dwarf all of al Qaeda’s current
“achievements.” But we are dead-‐stuck in what terrorizes us, and interferes
with our relatively secure lives. We are thus, by and large – hypocrites.
As we know more, about the terrible things humans can do to one another, we
must strive to minimize our violent activities as much as possible. In the case
of the US targeted terrorist killings, the judiciary and the very top of the
government must oversee and approve the “list of terrorist targets”.
Moreover, “signature drone strikes,” must be altogether, reconsidered. The
case regarding the legality and Constitutional Rights regarding targeting of a
terrorist who happens to be an American citizen, is of disproportional
importance. If an American individual chooses to be a terrorist, or is the tragic
case collateral damage, although far from perfect or humanitarian, such
events must be accepted as sometimes, unpreventable. And finally, the CIA
should reconsider its culture of opaqueness, which does little to improve its
success rate, but creates an exhausting distrust of the whole American CT
apparatus.
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It is interesting to recall Francis Fukuyama’s End of History in this context. In
2008 Fukuyama suggested, in an interview to the Daily Beast, an “upgrade” to
his 1992 original thoughts,
”… Democracy is built around institutions that are quite difficult to put into
place, especially the rule of law…I did not imagine back in 1992 [that] the U.S.
could become so controversial and damaging to the prospect of
democracy…there needs to be a re-‐emphasis on the use of American soft
power” (Fukuyama In Philips 2008).
Contrary to the thoughts of Fukuyama is Daniel Byman suggestion in his 2011
article,
“ The aggressive U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has played an important role
in weakening al-‐Qaeda and should be continued. The Drone campaign will not
end al-‐Qaeda presence in Pakistan, but it does keep the organization on the
run and reduces its operational effectiveness.” (Byman 2011).
On this very topic of targeted killings, Richard Murpy and Afsheen John
Radsan, wrote their legal analysis and assessment, of Due Process and
Targeted Killing of Terrorists. There, on page 405 they posit,
“…under Boumediene, [Boumediene vs. Bush] the executive has a due process
obligation to develop fair, rational procedures for its use of targeted killing no
matter whom it might be targeting anywhere in the world. To implement this
duty, the executive should, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Israel
(among others), require an independent, intra-‐executive investigation of any
targeted killing by the CIA. These investigations should be as public as is
reasonably consistent with national security. Even in war on terror, due
process demands at least this level of accountability for the power to kill
suspected terrorists” (Murpy & Radsan 2009, 405).

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In yet another legal opinion by Kristen Eichensehr, published in the Yale Law
Journal, she criticizes the Israeli Supreme Court, asserting that the Israeli
Supreme Court, in its first ruling on the issue of targeted killings, has
weakened the international law’s protection to all civilians, by extending the
meaning of “direct participation” of terrorists in terrorism:
“ terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus are lawfully
subject to attack only when the directly participate in hostilities. But the court
also expanded the traditional definition of “direct participation”…By
disregarding the “direct participation” requirements’ important evidentiary
function, the court weakened the protection that international law affords to
all civilians, not just to terrorists” (Eichensehr, 2007).

To summarize, the morals, humanity and the legal posture, of targeted killing
is highly disputed, as is its efficacy. While the whole array of counterterrorist
current tools is badly flawed, it is arguably, the best we have – in the short
term.
When thinking about more distant future, something that strategists should
and must do, new elements, still in their early stages of development, such as
the application of soft power, smart power, state building, democratic
institutions creation, education etc., should be considered with much more
vigor than has been thus far.
XIX. Other U.S. Counterterrorist measures.
Administrative: The Patriot Act
The Patriot act, (Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) is possibly the
most noteworthy piece of legislation enacted in response to the 9/11 attacks.
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Section 411 of the act expands the definition of the terminology of “ terrorist
activity” to include also whatever is considered as engaging in terrorist activity
and makes an alien who provides “material support”(i.e., food, shelter, transport,
funds etc.) to a terrorist – “removable,” whether or not the alien knew that he
was involved in terrorist activity (Grebinar 2003, 278). Section 412 of the Patriot
Act deals with Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Habeas Corpus. The
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that, “no person shall… be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Due
Process Clause applies to all individuals, not just U.S. citizens. The Supreme Court
held that illegal aliens are indeed granted the protection of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, which grant also the right to due process.
Interestingly, the provisions determining the legal aspects of the detention of
alien terrorists do not mention a trial or a hearing/s required to determine,
beyond a reasonable doubt, if the alien has indeed committed the terrorist acts
he/she is accused of. To this day, many disapprove of the sweeping authority it
grants U.S. officials and question the legislation, which seems to contradict the
very principles on which a democracy is built. (Grebinar 2003, 280).
Torture and Indefinite Detention
Although the issue of torture has not been explored before the U.S. courts and
the Congress, and is not subjected to much contention, it remains problematic.
The U.S. Supreme Court 2011-‐2012 term has ended with “mixed results.” “ The
Court, without comment, let stand rulings upholding torture…”(Kravets 2012).
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The United Nations Convention Against Torture, which both Israel and the
United States have ratified, defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” to
obtain information or a confession.
Israel’s official, “ moderate measure of physical pressure,” was a touch more
honest than the Bush administration’s “enhanced interrogation techniques.” But
the intent was the same. The Israel Supreme Court has eventually terminated
this practice in 1999, and the United States followed this rulings.
“ In both countries, whatever security benefits may have been gained by torture
were far outweighed by the damage done to a nation that betrays its own values.
As Justice Barak wrote in his 1999 decision clarified, “Although a democracy
must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper
hand” (Schmemann 2009).
However, in spite of this democratic ruling, the debates around the alleged
continued use of ill treatment and torture by the GSS, and in the U.S. is still on.
The Israeli human right organization B’tselem had the following 2011,
condemnation of the 1999 ruling of the Israel Supreme Court, convened as the
High Court of Justice.
“ the court avoided declaring the methods torture or ill-‐treatment

because such a finding would have rendered its judgment
incompatible with international law, which requires states to
prosecute and punish perpetrators of torture and ill-‐treatment and
forbids them to cite "exceptional circumstances" as a justification
for such actions. “ (Torture and Ill-‐Treatment 2011).

It is the opinion of this writer, that the American justice system, although,
arguably, politically influenced, is certainly competent and capable of dealing
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with terrorism and related issues of human rights, civil rights and civil liberties,
as well as the international law. It seems that when terrorism is the concern, it is
patriotism that unites all under the same “democratic” banner.
While battling terrorism is constantly carried out, both, on the battlefields and
inside courtrooms, it is in our best interests to conduct as much of this struggle
as possible – in the courtrooms, where justice can not only administered, but
also – seen. Indeed, some cases are very problematic, as evidence needed to
effectively indict and convict terrorists is not always easily accessible; whether
because of the need to preserve the anonymity of the source of the information
or evidence, or because the evidence gathered, may be insufficient to justify a
conviction, or may have been obtained through marginal means (i.e.
psychological and/or physiological duress which can be contested in court).
“Respected conservative Jurists Benjamin Wittes and Jack

Goldsmith argued in March 2010 that…the US should sidestep the
issue of the courts and detain these individuals indefinitely. Don’t
bother trying them at all…the politically draining fight about
civilian vs. military trials is not worth the costs… [However],
detaining people indefinitely rubs most Americans the wrong way
”(Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 233-‐234).

This is a real challenge. During such times, a democracy must protect its nation
while preserving human right and civil liberties, including those of the terrorists.
And yet this writer posits, that indefinite detention in case of some major
terrorist leaders is a “necessary evil,” which can be exercised with grave
limitations and, strict oversight by the Judiciary and the Executive. It may be an
unfortunate truth, that many Americans are concerned that by the emulation of
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Israeli rationales and procedures in counterterrorism, the United States may be
risking the deprivation of individuals from their basic rights.
There are times when ideals and noble principles, may cause harm to the very
democratic structure we are trying to protect. It is essential that people will
continue questioning government’s actions, and its ability to restrict the rights of
others. Without such pressure, a government could easily abuse its powers, as
we have seen in the rise of the Third Reich in Germany. However, we must also
enable the actions of the government to react firmly and consistently to terrorist
threats. Considering the current availability of WMD, we must keep in mind that,
“ Terrorists today are not only willing to die for their cause, but they incorporate
that willingness into the execution of their plans” (Grebinar 2003, 284).
Renditions and Extraordinary Renditions
Rendition is yet another controversial, but efficient tool in the counterterrorist
tool bag. A rendition is the transfer of a captured fugitive or suspect to another
country, without performing the formal, legal and diplomatic procedure of
extradition. The first U.S. rendition took place in 1985. It was the 1985 arrests of
the Palestinian terrorists involved in the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship
Achille Lauro, and the murder of U.S citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The second case
was conducted after President Reagan has signed a secret presidential directive
authorizing the CIA to kidnap terror suspects anywhere in the world, in 1987.
The arrest of Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese implicated in the 1985 Hijacking of TWA
Flight 847 and the murder of US Navy diver onboard, is an example of the style
and methodology of the first terrorism-‐oriented renditions, during the pre 9/11
era. (Naftali 2005). During the Clinton administration formal steps were
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undertaken to prevent any inhumane treating of the rendered individuals. Thus,
the country to which the suspect was rendered must have had a legal case
pending against the rendered person prior to his rendition. (Peritz and
Rosenbach 2012, 64).
Although the original renditions of the 1990s designed by the CIA’s Michael
Scheuer, received the blessings of the US Supreme Court as legal, such was not
the case with the post 9/11 renditions and extraordinary renditions. The
extraordinary renditions are acts of kidnapping of suspects, without the
knowledge and consent of the sovereign state in which the suspect resided at the
time of the kidnapping.
The state of Israel has been a relentless, somewhat legendary, practitioner of
extraordinary renditions starting with the famous case of Adolf Eichmann
(1960). However, by and large, most of Israeli renditions are in fact arrests of
Palestinian terrorists, within the Gaza Strip or the West Bank (a.k.a. ‘occupied
territories’) and thus does not involve the ‘mitos’ of abduction, exchanging flights
allover the-‐globe etc. After 9/11 the CIA was placed under extreme pressure to
effectively neutralize al-‐Qaeda. This called for some marginal methods, that
would place captured, wanted terrorists outside of the reach of judicial systems,
for an undefined period of time:
“ The central effect of the post-‐9/11 rendition program has been to
place captured terrorist suspects outside the reach of any justice
system and keep them there. The absence of human rights
guarantees and the introduction of “enhanced interrogation
techniques” have led, in several cases examined, as we shall see, to
detainees being subjected to torture” (Alleged Secret Detentions
report 2006).

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The Council of Europe (COE) human rights organizations pointed an accusing
finger toward the US and the CIA, as the main culprit behind renditions. In its
2006 report, the COE alleges that some 14 EU countries colluded with the US in
conducting these secret extrajudicial acts, implicating mostly Poland and
Romania. Between 2001 and 2005, there were allegedly, some 100-‐150 cases of
rendition and extraordinary rendition conducted by the CIA over EU. (Savage
2009).
Although the Obama administration opposed renditions in 2009; extraordinary
and ordinary renditions were, in fact, secretly and sparingly continued. In 2011
renditions were again formally adopted and limited only by the mandatory
request that renditions will only take place to countries “ where there is a
diplomatic assurance that they will not be treated inhumanely” (Finn and Tate
2011). However, the US cannot in reality, control the deeds of the authorities of
other states and thus assure “humane treatment” outside the US. It is
additionally claimed by the same source, that the CIA operated a fleet of 26
leased, privately owned, planes to conduct a huge number of renditions in the
period between 2001-‐2006, according to the allegations of the CEO (Finn and
Tate 2011).
Interestingly, according to a recent report, although more than 20 EU countries
offered their support in extraordinary renditions to the CIA, many of the Western
states are conspicuously missing from the new list of the 54 states listed in the
new COE report. (Elgot 2013).
Renditions of both types have certain important, advantages: For one thing
rendition is an effective way of removing terror suspects and thus neutralizing
them. Terrorists in captivity, cannot really harm anybody, although arguably, as
200
was the case of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (Hamas leader), he continued to be an
inspirational figure, despite his incarceration (and later – home imprisonment);
In the case of the notorious Sheikh Yassin, because of his continuous instigation
of violence against Israel – he was eventually killed in a targeted killing by the
IDF. Moreover, such individuals may become a reason for the abduction of allied
civilian or military individuals by terrorists, that declare their release of their
captives conditional upon the release of the rendered terrorist/s. Although
renditions and the investigation of suspects by foreign authorities are very
important for developing future intelligence, much of the information or even
evidence collected during a rendition is inadmissible in US courts, which is
guided by strict evidence admission standards. Rendition can also effectively
disrupt a terrorist plot during its planning phase. Such was in the case of Khalid
Sheikh Muhammad, arrested in Pakistan in 2003 and handed over to the CIA;
thus thwarting the Bojinka plot. Furthermore, in some cases where the rendition
placed the suspect in a nation, which upholds lower evidence-‐admission
standards than the US, such country is likely to end the trial with a steep
sentence, possibly much harsher than if the case were tried in US courts. In such
a case, the world is a bit safer for a longer period.
Renditions have some obvious disadvantages as well. Due to the very
questionable nature of basing an arrest upon partial evidence, mistakes, which
may cause embarrassment to the CIA (or any other arresting agency), as well as
a possible anger from US allies, are common. In spite of efforts to avoid them,
mistaken renditions do happen.
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EPILOGUE
202

XX. Limitations of the Study
Being a qualitative -‐ descriptive study, only scantly supported by statistics
can be an obvious limitation. However, numeral quantification of the
attributes of various CT tactics, as stated in this work, is often, at best
confusing, and at worst misinforming.
Of much greater importance would have been the implications of further
study into two related fields: First, the effect of the nexus between
transnational terrorism and transnational organized crime, which could
prove of great value when assessing the terrorist chances to acquire
further funding, as well as WMD. Second, this paper discussed only
marginally the role of the creation of public resilience in the face of
terrorism. Such section is very instructive, especially with regard to the
American public, which is currently, unprepared to absorb terrorist
attacks survive and rebound back to normal life (McGee et.al. 2009). The
current paper does not consider these fields as secondary, but their scope
would have justified another separate paper.
Some may posit that this work is biased in favor of “extermination” of
terrorists at all costs and arguably, that it upholds the Israeli
counterterrorism methods as more compatible with democratic ideals
and norms – than the CT methods, in reality are. This is not the intended
case. Although the author had a first hand experience with the Israeli IC, a
conscious effort was made to present a balanced view of the issues at
hand, supporting the various claims made throughout the book with solid
203
research. In the end, it is for the reader to decide what is the ultimate way
to deal with terrorism.
Finally, this work should be further extended into the realm of live
interviews with counterintelligence operatives from the United States,
and Israel at least. Unfortunately, the time frame and other obstacles, did
not allow for that. Although much of the cited literature is indeed based,
to some extent, on such interviews, the use of additional, current, live
material could better portray the current situation and the option at hand.
XXI. Conclusions and Recommendations
This work, has taken the reader over vast territory regarding the different
nuances of counterterrorism. It exemplified the nature of the difference
between most terrorist groups – and al-‐Qaeda and its affiliates. In the end
of the day, it seems that with the possible yet arguable, exception of the
Hezbollah, only al-‐Qaeda is transnational in its scope, ideology and vision.
While this paper reiterates that democracy cannot be imposed
prematurely and forcefully; it also suggests that the further
counterterrorist struggle, must be focused through a cohesive strategy on
a narrowly defined enemy, like Hamas or al-‐Qaeda; so far, despite intense
efforts to defeat both (and other) groups, and successfully secure
democracies from terrorist threats failed and they are likely to at best,
bring about the control and containment of terrorism, but not its defeat
and surrender.
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Countries faced with terrorism must prepare for a long, continuous
struggle with terrorist entities. And in order for their societies to survive,
these societies must become, governmental partners to the CT struggle.
Accordingly, these societies must be more educated about the threats
they face, and about the ways to become more resilient when facing
terrorist attacks.
Although it is clear that current and mid-‐term counterterrorism must
involve the use of aggressive, and occasionally lethal, military and law
enforcement measures; and include temporary, and highly over sighted
measures which at times are deemed as less-‐than-‐democratic – the world
must remember that terrorists defy it of any and all democratic
principles, because the destruction of democracy and its substitution by
an Islamist religious regime, is one of the main terrorist aims. And
terrorists are agreeably, defined as the enemies of humanity. This is a war
for the perpetuation of democracy. One must further remember, that
although there is a strong likelihood that the U.S., or one of its allies, will
become the victim of a terrorist WMD attack, it is also probable, that such
attack will be relatively limited, and arguably, survivable by most allied
countries. By no means, should even the terrorist threat of the use of
WMD lead to any appeasement policy. Terrorists have proven, time and
again, that they inherently see any peaceful reconciliation attempts – as a
sign of weakness, and have used any past peaceful attempts – only to
strengthen their terrorist attacks (e.g. Hamas, Hezbollah, LTTE, and al-‐
Qaeda).
205
The struggle with Islamist terrorism has taken us to foreign lands, some
of which have in the past, been erroneously occupied. There is no such
thing as “good occupation” and modern democracies must strive to
refrain from future occupation of lands, during the course of the hunt
after terrorists. Thus, the hunt for terrorists must be limited to pinpointed
strikes, aimed at either decapitation of certain members from airborne
platforms or, whenever intelligence allows – a limited and very
temporary, land incursions and kinetic operations; followed by a swift
withdrawal of the Special Forces involved in the hunt.
Any future capability to strike terrorist organizations and personnel
depends more than anything else – on intelligence. Democracies must not
only develop their intelligence capabilities of all possible types;
furthermore, they must further develop and improve their international
intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation and collaboration with
other CT entities around the world. The world must be led by thoughts
and by the persuasion that terrorism has almost never won a war, but it
did win a few battles. Terrorism must never, be allowed to win this
struggle.
The main hypothesis of this paper was the assumption that the United
States, can and should learn from counterterrorism lessons learned by
other countries faced with terrorism and specifically, the lessons learned
by Israel’s sixty-‐five years of continued struggle with terrorism. Although,
as elaborated on in this paper, the conditions of the battlefield, its size, the
arms involved and the differences in the goals of Palestinian terrorism
and al-‐Qaeda – are outstanding; terrorists are terrorists, and suicide
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terrorists are just that – wherever they are and act. Although the
American technology may be more advanced than the Israeli and the
structure of the American and the Israeli counterterrorism may be
different, it was Israel that was first to use airborne platforms to kill
terrorists through precision strikes, which precluded very large collateral
damage. The U.S. introduction of drone strikes, has so far proven to be
effective, although not in Israel, nor anywhere else, can anybody rightly
claim, that CT measures of any kind, actually deterred terrorists from
continuing their attacks. However, in several cases, massive repression of
a terrorist group, led after decades of bloodshed, to a political solution
(e.g. LTTE, ETA, IRA etc.). Yet another lesson can be learned from the
structure of different CT bureaucracies, and their relative success in
fighting terrorism. Although both, the American and the Israeli IC
suffered, and still suffer from information sharing problems, so far it looks
like the Israelis were able to improve their intelligence capability
regarding CT, more than their American allies. The U.S. IC suffers from
many maladies; one of the major ones being its humongous bureaucratic
size, which hampers its information sharing as well as its ability to make
fast decisions, so often needed in the CT battlefield. Reorganizations, are
extremely difficult to execute, especially so in large organizations. It
remains questionable whether even if it wanted, the U.S. would have
actually, been able to truly reorganize the 16-‐agency structure of its IC.
The creation of the ODNI did little to improve the situation. There must be
a rethinking of the sharing process and procedures, so eloquently
verbalized in the 2012 NSSI. If this strategy is worthy the paper it is
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written on, this may indeed be the key to improvement. Also the Israeli
transparency regarding its CT measures and the extraordinary
willingness of the Israeli GSS to share its information with its partners,
attests to organizational maturity, and effectiveness. This also is a lesson
to look into and consider.
The Israelis use few CT measures that are inapplicable to the U.S.
situation (e.g. house demolitions, closures, and curfews). However,
targeted killings and detentions are tools shared and strongly criticized
by the populations of both countries. It is rather easy to criticize the
democratic behavior of a country, which tries to defend itself from
terrorism. The tools at the disposal of a democracy fighting a terrorist
threat are very limited. It is however, a survivalist struggle, at least for the
Israeli state. Israel’s biggest disadvantage stems from the very occupation
of the disputed lands. While Israel’s withdrawal options are very limited;
this is not the case with the U.S. presence in Afghanistan/Pakistan/ Iraq.
Terminating occupation will most likely create an atmosphere of
diminishing hatred to the U.S. and its allies. While in the short turn a
pullout from occupied lands, may be wrongly perceived as a sign of
weakness; if accompanied by proper re-‐education and possibly, by smart
power approach, including positive propaganda – it may alienate
transnational, and national terrorist groups and remove or dramatically
diminish their popular support and funding sources. Terrorism cannot be
altogether eradicated, but it can be contained and managed to a degree
that it will cause little disturbance to normal life. For that reason, the CT
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efforts must not be limited to the use of force alone, but rather the use of
other, above mentioned measures as well.

XXII. Methodology: Research and Analysis

An attempt to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the U.S. and Israeli CT
model’s efficacy has been done by many. This work focuses more on the Israeli
CT model and its questionable compatibility with the U.S. struggle against al-‐
Qaeda and its affiliates. Such attempts are reflected by using variables like the
number of suicide terrorist attacks, thwarted by American or Israeli authorities,
respectively, in a given period of time (most Israeli data tends to focus on 2000-‐
2005, the years of the second Palestinian upraising). Another variable is the
number of fatalities that resulted from suicide/terrorist attacks. There is
abundance of data regarding the relationship between the number of thwarted
attacks and the number of casualties/fatalities. Yet another interesting analytical
tool can arguably be, the statistical exemplification of al-‐Qaeda’s resonance with
the Muslim public worldwide. In other words – al-‐Qaeda’s decreasing popularity
and the impact of this feature on the future of transnational terrorism. It is highly
arguable to what extent can any of the above variables be used, as a stand-‐alone
predictor of Islamist transnational terrorism. Any such set of figures is
insufficient to be a reliable predictor of the future of terrorism. These figures can
at best, help in understanding the terrorist dynamics in a given period.
Moreover, it is hard to find U.S. military or CIA statistics comparable with those
published by the Israeli authorities. One of the main differences between the
American and the Israeli CT approach is the difference in transparency. The
Israelis announce and “take the blame for” every terrorist killed; they are precise
in stating numbers of casualties on both sides. The US, because of a variety of
reasons (mainly the assumed need for secrecy and the public and legal scrutiny),
plays their hand close to their chest; with certain exceptions made when major
terrorist figures are eliminated.
209
Furthermore, as stated above, the fact remains that despite the figures quoted by
various researchers (from highly accredited scholars to research students),
regarding the Israeli CT success or failure in effectively dealing with terrorism,
there is no agreement among the scholars and the CT professionals, as to the
efficacy of the Israeli CT model. Moreover, it is frustrating that there is no general
agreement even with respect to the efficacy of one single CT tool, which is
currently used by both countries (Israel is in fact, “taking a break” since
November 2012 ceasefire agreement with Hamas) – the targeted killings. This,
after all, is the one variable that is reasonably easy to quantify, as opposed to
evaluating the value of say, the Security Barrier, which is said to have prevented
over 75 percent of suicide terrorist attacks during the 2003-‐2005 period (Ganor
in Art 2007, 283). The only way to obtain such figure would be through accessing
IDF and GSS official databases of intended terrorist attempts and thwarted ones.
(Usually, attempts thwarted without casualties or damage, are not reported).
While this work sparingly uses statistics, it is difficult to decide who is right in
their data interpretation. Furthermore, the scope of this work has encountered
some true dilemmas. For example: targeted killings decimate the number of
terrorists in a certain organization. But some scholars posit that this is a “fata
morgana” (mirage) because there is almost always a new leader, ready and
waiting to fill in the shoes of his predecessor and certainly, a new combatant to
take the place of the dead or captured one. Moreover, some claim that targeted
killing cause a “boomerang effect” – targeted killings are claimed to enrage
terrorists even more, thus enhance volunteering and act as a catalyzing agent for
ever-‐ more-‐murderous attacks. In view of the fact that the escalation in al-‐
Qaeda’s activity since 1993 (Trade Center), through US Embassies in Kenya and
Zimbabwe 1998, the USS Cole in 2000, and finally 9/11 -‐ was not caused by a
significantly more efficient and resolute CT activity by the US -‐ it is difficult to
accept the boomerang effect as given. So, is the terrorism of Hamas, PIJ or
Hezbollah different altogether from al Qaeda’s? Such is not the case, although
very significant differences between al-‐Qaeda and other groups do exist, and are
elaborated on, in this paper. The ideas behind sending a suicide bomber to a
busy market in Iraq, and in Jerusalem, are very close and the indoctrination and
“reasoning” of the suicide bomber are indeed very much alike. However, the
210
arenas, the circumstances, are different and most of the difference stems out of
al-‐ Qaeda’s global reach and global intentions. In a way, Palestinian suicide
bombers are much more ‘nationalist’ and “localized” both in their goals and their
battlefield, than the “foreign legion” of al Qaeda.
The methodology that was decided upon as best suiting for this work, was that of
a predictive and suggestive, analytic thesis, based mostly on qualitative and
descriptive research. The careful examination and analysis of current literature
and related historical facts on the topic, are likely to provide for a product that
will best benefit the academic world and may possibly interest the respective
counterterrorist administrations. This research involves many factors and
exploits on their inter-‐relations. For example, this writer chose to expand on the
actual risks of WMD being obtained and used by al-‐Qaeda against the U.S. and its
allies. However, this part of the research is strongly connected to the overall
threat posed by Islamist terrorism and it examines also similar threats to Israel.
It is imperative to expand this research in the future and to analyze, through
critical inquiry and document analysis (e.g. U.S NSS, NSCT, NSS, terrorist fatwas
etc.), the actual relationship between documents and historical events and
changes in CT measures. The thorough examination of many of the related
scholarly books and much of the related articles and published works, provides a
detailed perspective on both the past and the current situation, as well as allows
for a cautious, exploratory, educated guesswork aimed at the future.

+++++++++++++++++++++++
211
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intelligence community and U.S. public resilience.

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………… … 4

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW………………….............8

IV. LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………………… .11

PART TWO: MODERN TETTORISM CHALLENGE: WHAT TO EXPECT?

PRACTICAL AND ACADEMIC APPROACHES………………………............................. 43

V. FIGHTING TERRORISM EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT GIVING UP ON THE VERY

FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY – A FALLACY OR ACTUAL POSSIBILITY..44

VI. FIGHTING TERRORISM ON A NATIONAL LEVEL……………………………………..52

VII. COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE COLLABORATIVE

IX. TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: ARE TERRORISTS

LIKELY TO OBTAIN AND USE WMD?................................................................. 73

PARADIGMS TESTED………………………………………………………… 90

X. THE COUNTERTERRORISM MODELS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

XI. CAN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI DEMOCRACIES ULTIMATELY DEFEAT

XII. THE WMD TERRORIST THREAT TO ISRAEL……………………………………..103

XIII. THE ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORIST APPARATUS…………………………….109

XIV. THE SHAPING OF ISRAEL’S COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGM……….. 115

XV. ISRAEL’S OFFENSIVE CT TOOLS: MORAL, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL

Targeted Killings……………………………………………………………………………. 130

Other Israeli Counterterrorism Measures: Defensive and Punitive

Counterterrorism Measures………………………………………….......................... 145

Israeli Administrative Counterterrorist Measures……………………………. .152

Israel’s Punitive CT Measures……………………………………………………………153

XVI. THE ISRAELI CT MODEL: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS……………………. ..156

XVII. CAN LESSONS FROM FIGHTING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM BE

APPLIED TO THE STRUGGLE WITH AL QAEDA?......................................... . 159

General Lessons from Worldwide Struggle with Terrorism……………….167

International Cooperation in the CT struggle……………………………………167

Intelligence and Counterterrorism: the Nature & Quality of Intelligence

XVIII. THE UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGM: THE USE OF

LETHAL FORCE IN THE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM: MORAL,

LEGAL AND EFFICACY ISSUES………………………………………………………… 183

XIX. OTHER U.S. CT MEASURES………………………………………………………… .. 194

Torture and Indefinite Detention…………………………………………………… 195

Renditions and Extraordinary Renditions…………………………………………...198

XX. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY………………………………………………………….. ...203

XXI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………….. . 204

XXII. METHODOLOGY: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS……………………………………...209

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

“The worst enemy of any progress is a closed mind”

Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-­‐Qaeda,

IV. LITERATURE REVIEW

police state. This inconsolably contrasts with the American democratic

application of hard-­‐learned lessons, from the Israeli counterterrorism

also inside Israel’s sovereign territory. Accordingly, the intelligence

strategy in order to augment it.

Homeland Security research that,

sufficient reason to wave their respective counterterrorism lessons aside as

Review of literature regarding American and Israeli approaches to

Although the sharing of terrorism-­‐related information within the U.S.

In 2010, Mark Hoseneball, writing for the Daily Beast posited,

on them”(Hoseneball 2010). Moreover, Anthony Quiggin states,

its intelligence sharing and collaboration. Yet, the Israeli intelligence-­‐sharing

involved in the intelligence sharing process.

[The Israelis thought that]“… instead of implementing

terrorist acquisition of WMD.

additional challenges stemming from the possible connection between suicide

additionally observes that there seem to be a strong link between suicide

as in Iranian official declarations. Al-­‐Qaeda, has literally, committed to killing

it adapts new/adjusted set of laws and rules-­‐of–engagement vs. al Qaeda, and

short-­‐term, line of offensive-­‐defense: the Intelligence Community and the

in the options of deterring terrorism, suggests,

Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-‐Qaeda,

application of hard-‐learned lessons, from the Israeli counterterrorism

Although the sharing of terrorism-‐related information within the U.S.

its intelligence sharing and collaboration. Yet, the Israeli intelligence-‐sharing

as in Iranian official declarations. Al-‐Qaeda, has literally, committed to killing

it adapts new/adjusted set of laws and rules-‐of–engagement vs. al Qaeda, and

short-‐term, line of offensive-‐defense: the Intelligence Community and the

and U.S. nuclear arsenals. (Allison 2004, 46-‐49).

“…for financial or political reasons, a nuclear-‐armed rogue state

of al-‐Qaeda -‐ which indeed survived.

approach and nationwide-‐garnered support, towards these unfortunate, yet

sometimes, absolutely necessary kinetic operations. (Byman 2006, 108-‐111).

killings and especially targeted killings of Americans-‐turned-‐terrorists, as

“ …Not even close. It would be a devastating, world-‐changing

convictions/intentions of al-‐Qaeda-‐core’s leadership -‐ and the super-‐