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THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Art. 3, sec. 1: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process
of law.”

The “due process of law” means: (U.S. v. Ling Su Fan)

1. there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the government
2. that the law is reasonable in its operation
3. that the law shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed
4. that the law shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class

Due process questions seek for the invalidity of the whole proceedings.

Due process concerns depend upon the nature of the proceedings and the person.
1. Criminal – proof beyond reasonable doubt (moral certainty)
2. Civil – preponderance of evidence (weighting of evidence)
3. Administrative – substantial evidence (a reasonable person might conclude that the
conclusion was supported by evidence)

1. jurisdiction
2. due process – an opportunity, not a right, to be heard
3. impartial judge
4. decision on the merits

PROCEDURE

Procedural Requirements
 Notice
 Hearing
o the right of the party interested to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof (evidentiary hearing)
The requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present:
1. there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it
2. jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding
3. the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
4. judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing (Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca)

Citizen vis-à-vis the State

 The due process clause is a limitation on governmental power. The purpose of the
clause is to make the government’s taking of life, liberty and property consistent with
civilized methods. Notice and hearing are required to afford the citizen the right to be heard
before action by the state. (Serrano v. NLRC)
 The requirements of procedural due process apply only to deprivation of interests
within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. (Board of
Regents v. Roth)
o To have a property interest in a benefit, one must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.
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 In welfare cases, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing accords recipients of

state aid with due process. (Goldberg v. Kelly where due process was applied to a privilege
as opposed to a right)
o This is because the termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient the very means by which to live while he
waits.
o Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for qualified persons and
procedural due process is applicable to their termination.

Employee vis-à-vis Employer

 The due process clause is a limitation on governmental power. It does not apply to the
exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment. Thus, failure to
observe a procedure for the termination of employment makes the termination only
ineffectual and not void. (Serrano v. NLRC, overruled by Agabon v. NLRC)
o When the dismissal of an employee is for a just and valid cause but he is not
accorded his right to due process, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer
must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the due process requirement by
payment of full backwages. (constitutional due process v. statutory due process)
 In dismissal cases, due process requires the employer to give notice of termination and
an opportunity for the employee to be heard and defend himself. (twin requirements of
notice and hearing)
o Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal or ineffectual. However, the employee
should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. (Agabon v.
NLRC; Whenphil Doctrine or Belated Due Process reinstated but with stiffer
sanctions)
 Rights and procedure in an evidentiary hearing (Ang Tibay v. CIR)
o The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by the parties involved.
o The evidence to support a finding must be substantial.
o The decision must be rendered on evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in record ad disclosed to the parties affected

SUSBTANCE

On Life, Liberty and Property

Police Power
 The exercise of police power is justified state interference on life, liberty and property.
Where public interests demand it, the state through its police power may enact necessary
measures for the protection of such interests. (U.S v. Toribio)
 The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters
relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, as long as it does not
contravene any organic law. (People v. Pomar)
 Police power is based on the maxim “salus populi est supreme lex” – the welfare of the
people is the first law. (U.S. v. Salaveria)
 To be valid, police power regulations must
(1) have a compelling reason for its exercise
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(2) must bear a reasonable relation to the legitimate end it seeks to accomplish
(Lochner v. New York)
 To justify state interference in behalf of the public, it must appear
o That the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference
o That the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
o And the means must not be duly oppressive upon individuals (US v. Toribio)
 It is through police power that the legislature can create classifications in the promotion of
general welfare and public interest (Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad)

On Protected Liberties
 Liberty guaranteed by the due process clause includes not only freedom from bodily
constraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, and to generally enjoy
privileges recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. (Meyer v. Nebraska)

On Economic Liberties

Liberty as including the right to contract

 The right to purchase or sell labor (Lochner v. New York on work hours)
 The right to employ and be employed by another on one’s terms (Adair v. U.S. on labor
union membership)
 The right to quit the service of an employer for whatever reason; the right to dispense the
services of an employee for whatever reason (Coppage v. State of Kansas on labor union
membership)
 The right to make contracts of personal employment and for the acquisition of property; the
equal right of both employer and employee to obtain from each other the best terms they
can by private bargaining (Adkins v. Children’s Hospital on minimum wage law, People v.
Pomar on pregnancy leave)
Philosophy:
 Laissez faire
 equality between the employer and the employee (People v. Pomar)

On Personal Liberties
 freedom of action, freedom of locomotion (Villavicencio v. Lukban)
 liberty of abode; no one may be compelled to change domiciles (Villavicencio v. Lukban)
 right to teach, the right of parents to control the education of their children (Meyer v.
Nebraska)
 the right to direct the upbringing and the education of children; the state cannot standardize
education through compulsory public school attendance (Pierce v. Society of Sisters)

On the Protection of Public Interest

The exercise of police power was permitted in the following cases:
 regulation and control of money (U.S. v. Ling Su Fan)
 slaughtering of carabaos for food (U.S. v. Toribio)
 regulation and restriction of billboards on private property inasmuch as they were unsightly
to public view (Churchill v. Rafferty)
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 the regulation of panguingue to improve morals and the industry of the people (U.S. v.
Salaveria)
 the confinement of the Manguianes to a reservation for their “welfare and advancement”
(Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro)

THE 1935 CONSTITUTION & THE GREAT DEPRESSION

1. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan

Valid Delegation – doctrinal tool to check the federal power
 For a delegation to be valid, Congress should declare a policy, establish a standard, and lay
down a rule.
 If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive
officer, due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is within the authority
of the officer; and if that authority depends on determinations of fact, those determinations
must be shown.

2. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton

 The imposition of liability to pay again for services long since rendered and fully
compensated is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
 Due process of law is denied by taking the property of one and bestowing it to another.

3. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.

 Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to the President or to trade or industrial
associations to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws they deem wise for
trade or industry.
 The code-making authority given to prescribe conduct is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power.

4. U.S. v. Butler
 The regulation of the farmer’s activities under the statute, though in form subject to his own
will, is in fact coercion through economic pressure.
 The state cannot justify its interference on the right to produce agricultural products by
farmers. It is an invasion of the right to property without due process.

5. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.

 One person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of another. A
statute which confers such power undertakes an unconstitutional interference with
personal liberty and property guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.

6. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish

Reversed Adkins; rejection of laissez-faire; adoption of general welfare
 Deprivation of liberty to contract is forbidden by the Constitution if without due process of
law; but restraint or regulation of this liberty, if reasonable in relation to its subject and
if adopted for the protection of the community against evils menacing health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people, is due process.
 Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint and not immunity from reasonable
restraints imposed in the interests of the community.
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 The decision in Adkins is reversed. The contention that adult employees should be deemed
competent to make their own contracts is defeated by the fact of unequal footing between
parties, especially in employer-employee relations.

7. NLRB v. Jones
 The right of employer to conduct their own business is not arbitrarily restrained by
regulations that merely protect the correlative rights of their employees to organize.

8. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis

 The enjoyment of common rights, such as the right to employ labor, may constitutionally be
taxed.

9. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma

Put a final blow to laissez-faire
 The day is gone when courts uses the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.
 The law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction that might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way of correcting it.

10. Calalang v. Williams

Police power in the Phils
 The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances.
 A valid delegation of legislative power should not be the determination of what the law shall
be but merely the ascertainment of facts upon which the application of the law is to be
predicated.

11. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Ass’n, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila
 A prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary if there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction.
 The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power.

12. Whitelight Corp. v. City of Manila

 For an ordinance to be valid, it must be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and it must pass the procedural requirements of law.
 It must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive
3. must not be partial or discriminatory
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. must be general and consistent with public policy
6. must not be unreasonable
 The interference with private rights and the means employed must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and must not be unduly oppressive of
private rights. The relation between means and ends must not be weak and overboard.
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13. ACCFA v. CUGCO

 The classification of government functions into constituent and ministrant is
rejected
o Constituent functions – those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature (e.g. keeping of order)
o Ministrant functions – undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional (e.g. public works)
 The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification
obsolete. The tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces.
 There is again full adherence to the extensive power lodged in the government to
cope with socio-economic problems.
 The laissez-faire principle has never found full acceptance in the country. The
Constitution embodies a policy of general welfare through state action.

14. US v. Carolene Products Co.

 Regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is entitled to the
presumption of constitutionality. It should be upheld if supported by rational basis.
 Footnote 4 outlines the standards of review.
o Standards of review depends on WON a right is fundamental.
 If fundamental – strict scrutiny
 If not fundamental – minimal scrutiny or rational basis standard
o Strict scrutiny
 applies to laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process
 applies to laws that discriminate against a discrete or insular minority or
infringe a fundamental right
 “Strict in theory but fatal in fact”
o Rational basis standard
 applies to economic legislation
 applies to laws that does not deal with fundamental rights
 “rational in theory but no scrutiny in fact” – in almost all cases, statutes are
upheld

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

1. Griswold v. Connecticut
Right of privacy as penumbra of liberty
 The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from government
intrusion. Without the penumbral rights, the specific rights would be less secure.
 The right to marry is part of the fundamental right to privacy implicit in the Due
Process Clause.
 A statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy which is
within the penumbra of specific guarantees in the Bill of rights.

2. Eisenstadt v. Baird
Right of privacy as the right of the individual
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 Whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be
the same for the unmarried and married alike.
 If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.

3. Loving v. Virginia
(right of privacy)
 Freedom of choice to marry may not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination. To
deny freedom to marry on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classification is to deprive
the citizens of liberty without dues process of law.
 Freedom to marry is one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness of the individual. Denying that right is deprives citizens of due process of law.
(equal protection clause)
Strict scrutiny for racial classifications
 The fact of equal application (i.e. penalizing both the white and the colored spouse) does
not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.
 The Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications be subjected to the
most rigid scrutiny and, if they are to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination.

4. Boddie v. Connecticut
 Due process prohibits the State from denying solely, because of inability to pay, access
to courts to individuals who seek divorce.
 A State may not pre-empt the right to dissolve marriage without affording all citizens access
to the means it has prescribed for doing so.
 Persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must
be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

5. Zablocki v. Redhail
 The right to marry is part of the fundamental right of privacy implicit in the due process
clause.
 The means chosen for achieving the interests must not unnecessarily impinge on the right to
marry.

6. Turney v. Safley
 Prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to marry. Although such marriage is
subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration, sufficient important
attributes of marriage remain to form a constitutionally protected relationship.
Reasonable relationship test for prison regulations:
 When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

7. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health

 Limiting the benefits of a civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic
principles of individual liberty and equality under the law.
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 Central to personal freedom is the assurance that the law will apply equally to persons in
similar situations. The liberty interest in choosing whether or whom to marry would be
hollow if state regulation could prevent an individual from freely choosing whom to
marry.

8. Duncan Association of Detailmen-PTGWO v. Glaxo-Wellcome Philippines, Inc.

 The Equal Protection Clause is addressed only to the state or those acting under the color
of its authority; it erects no shield against a merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state has become involved
in the wrongful private conduct.
 An employee’s personal decision to marry anyone of his/her own choosing does not
detract the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure its economic
interests.
 The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon the employee is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. The
employer possesses the right to protect its economic interests.

9. Roe v. Wade
Right to choose to terminate pregnancy
 The right of privacy is broad enough to encompass termination of pregnancy. However,
the privacy right involved is not absolute. The right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision but this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation (i.e. interest in health of mother and in potentiality
of human life).
 The State’s interest, the compelling point, is at approx the end of the 1st trimester. Hence:
o For the stage prior to approx the end of the 1st trimester, the abortion decision must
be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant women’s physician
o For the stage subsequent to approx the end of the 1st trimester, the State may choose
to regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health
o For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion except for the preservation of the life of the mother

10. Planned Parenthood v. Casey

 Roe v. Wade establishes not only the woman’s liberty but also the State’s important and
legitimate interest in potential life. Though a woman has a right to choose to terminate
or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not follow that the State is prohibited
from taking steps to ensure that her choice is informed.
Trimester framework rejected
 The trimester framework is rejected because it undervalues the State’s interest in potential
life.
Undue Burden Standard
 An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose and effect
is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking abortion before fetal
viability
 To promote the State’s interest in potential life, the State throughout the pregnancy
may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures
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designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.
 State regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will have a far greater
impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s.

11. Lawrence v. Texas

 Liberty gives substantial protection to consenting adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
 Individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, even though
not intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.
 The State cannot demean homosexuals’ existence or control their destiny by making their
consensual private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without government intervention.

12. Silverio v. Republic

 A person’s first name and sex cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. There
is no law on such matter.
 Sex is determined at birth.
 Granting the petition will substantially reconfigure the laws on marriage and family
relations.
 Prof. Hilbay’s criticism – The decision makes Silverio constitutionally invisible .

13. Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services

 There is no fundamental right to adopt. Adoption is not a right but a statutory privilege.
 Foster parents have no liberty interest in “family integrity.” Foster care is designed to be
short-term.
Private Sexual Intimacy
 Lawrence v. Texas did not recognize a “fundamental” right to private sexual intimacy.
o There, the court merely established a greater respect for the right of consenting
adults to engage in private sexual intimacy.
o Nowhere, however, did the court characterize this right as “fundamental.”

14. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

Right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition
 Any competent person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition.
o The same guarantee, however, does not necessarily extend to the incompetent as he
is unable to make an informed consent to exercise that right.
Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
 The due process clause does not require the state to accept the substituted judgment of
close family members in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that their views
reflect the patient’s.

15. Washington v. Glucksberg

 The asserted “right” to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The constitution also requires, however, that
the assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests.
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 The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and
profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment (Cruzan) but it has never
enjoyed similar protection. Not all intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.

16. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director General, NEDA

 The right of privacy does not bar the adoption of a reasonable ID system by government
entities.
 EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, stored and shown, and provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality
of the data collected.
 Prof Hilbay’s point – KMU and Ople not really about constitutionality but lack of trust.

17. Ople v. Torres

 The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of the Government to show that AO308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
 AO308 violates the right to privacy:
o It does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular
biometrics technology shall be used.
o It falls short of assuring that personal information will only be used for identification
or other unequivocally specific purposes.
o There are no safeguards against leakage of information.
o Use of biometrics and computer does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.
 It is so widely drawn that a minimum standard of reasonable expectation of
privacy cannot be inferred.