1.

In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

No. L27664. February 18, 1970.

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a
tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also
expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.” . The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time
and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it
was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of
this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust,
and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
YES. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but
Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his
accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to
condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute
to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign
and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references.
Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension
may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he
is again fit to resume the practice of law. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a

trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the ltgal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

2. Wicker v. Arcangel, 22 SCRA 445

G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996.
FACTS:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering
Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and
others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the
defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to co-defendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge
Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel. Wicker's
counsel, Atty.. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent judge from the
consideration of the case. Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and
contemptuous," respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on
November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court. In a
pleading, Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his
views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just
lawyering," for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by
the Court" had advised him to have the case re-raffled, when the opposing counsel Atty.
Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence
was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who "the judge may be and when he would appear".
Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, held them guilty of direct
contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or Atty. Rayos violted Canon 11 of the CPR.

RULING:

Yes. client.—In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he
had been bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a “mouthpiece.”
He was just “lawyering” and “he cannot be gagged,” even if the allegations
 in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since
it was his client who verified the same. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade
responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in
the representation of a cause, and while he owed him wholesouled
devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he
could not overstep. Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty.
Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. client.—Atty. Rayos’ duty to
the courts is not
secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins him to “observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others” and “not [to]
attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality
to the case.”

3. Surigao Mineral Registration Board v. Cloribel, 1 SCRA 1 No. L27072. January 9, 1970.

FACTS
Scattered in Atty. Santiago’s motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the
Supreme Court, which is unfavorable to his client, as false, erroneous, and illegal.
Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Castro, because allegedly, he is the
brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Concepcion because
immediately after the 1968 decision, his son was appointed to a significant position in the
government, implying that their decision was unfair and influenced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which
he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice..—The language of
attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring
to the Supreme Court as a “cviilized, democratic tribunal,” but by innuendo would suggest that it is not;
in
his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court’s decision as “false, erroneous
and illegal” and accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of
the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the Court to
inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners
including the President—constitute disrespectful language to the Court. It
undermines and degrades the administration of justice..
4. Tiongco v. Aguilar G.R. No. 115932. January 25, 1995.

Facts:

1. Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for violating Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He characterized the decision of respondent Judge
as “having been crafted in order to fool the winning party”; as a “hypocritical
judgment in plaintiff’s favour”; one with “perfidious character.”
2. Tiongco described respondent as a liar, perjurer or blasphemer. Atty. Tiongco did
not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his
unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition
in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the
respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he
tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief."
perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest
of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously
frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate
words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to those so
enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten
manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."

ISSUE: WON ATTY TIONGCO VIOLATED CANON 11 OF THE CPR

Ruling:

1. The duty contemplated in Canon 11 is closely entwined with his vow in the
lawyer’s oath “to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts,”
his duty under Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court “to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,” and his
duty under the first canon “to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. In using in the petition in this case
intemperate and scurrilous words and

phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and
entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily
demonstrated by the respondent judge’s decision in favor of Atty. Tiongco
and his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by
the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt
for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter
and, eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of
justice. Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made out a strong case for a serious
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Tiongco was ordered to
pay fine of Php 5,000 plus warning.

5. MONTECILLO v GICA

G.R. No. L-36800. October 21, 1974

ESGUERRA, J.
FACTS:

Montecillo was accused by Gica of slander. Atty. del Mar represented Montecillo and he
successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. The Court of Appeals reversed the same.
Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the
Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust
decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself
to be deceived.

But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices
of the CAthe CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.

Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo
case, but SC denied both. Del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.

Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled
the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Del Mar should be held liable.

HELD: Yes. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As
an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he
owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. icers.—To aged brethren of the bar it may
appear belated to
remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. But We do remind them of said duty
to emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer
of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
6. Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

Facts: 

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro

R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil case for unlawful detainer against
defendant Federico Barrientos (Barrientos). In the motion for
Reconsideration filed by the counsel, it was stated that the resolution
of the court is “an abhorrent nullity. And that there is a legal
monstrosity on the part of the RTC;that the mistakes are very patent
and glaring. Thus, it was Horrible and Terrible.” 

 On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear

before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of
court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,
Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand who
actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the
undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this
case. 

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of

contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine
of P1,000.

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001

order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon
hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan
mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or
it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her
without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years
with whom she entrusted her whole life and future.[17] This pleading
turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but
could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of
law.   An administrative case was filed against the spouses Jacoba. 
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10
October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from the
practice of law for six months.

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner

Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for the length of
suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Atty. Velasco-Jacoba is administratively liable for

the signing of the motion which she did not prepare.

2. Whether or not the  marriage privilege rule in evidence applies in

this case.

Ruling:

1) There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba

appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as
counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the

party or counsel representing him x x x.

By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified

that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for
the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion
with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to
that of a court document. 

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001

motion only because of her husband’s request but she did not know its
contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others
pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses.
According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is [their] trust for each
other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already
lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by
the other.  By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated
Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the
courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary
action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion. 

2) The marital privilege rule does not apply in this case. Despite the
fact that his name in  does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion, his
Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of
his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of
the motion by stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors
which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental. 

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by

failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any
conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July
2001 motion.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba is suspended from the practice of

law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. Likewise, 
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacobais suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) months. 

 
7. Judge Jose Madrid vs Atty. Juan Dealca, AC No. 7474, Sept. 9, 2014

FACTS:
On Feb 7, 2007. Atty. Juan Dealca entered his appearance in a criminal case entitled People of
thePhilippines v Philip William Arsenault, presided by complainant judge Jose Madrid, to
replace Atty. VicenteJudar. Atty. Dealca also moved that said criminal case be re-raffled to
another branch of RTC, consideringthe adverse incidents between Judge Madrid and himself.
Judge Madrid denied the motion on the ground
that a case cannot be removed from the Court due to “personal sentiments of counsel who was not eventhe
original counsel of the litigant”.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty.
Dealca’s
unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding
judge onthe pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. Atty. Dealca asserted in his
comment-complaint
that Judge Madrid’s order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to
counsel,
due process, and to a fair and impartial trial, that he exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion
to liftand set aside the warrant of arrest issued against accused, and that it should be him who
should bedisbarred and dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and
court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
(YES) The Supreme Court ruled that there were no merits in Atty. Dealca’s arguments. Atty. Dealca’s
complaint against Judge Madrid has failed the judicious scrutiny. The Court did not find any trace of
idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for
vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed
out, his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law
Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well
knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor
harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be
reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to
harass them. The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his
Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.