1.

In Re: Edillon

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of
Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Held: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers
are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.
 2. In re: UP Law faculty

Facts: Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares
against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In
said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from
the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World
War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which
is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in
his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a
truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited
the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.

Issue: Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Held: Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.[4] The court
must “insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free
from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.”

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments
except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s
claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.

3. Dizon vs. De Taza.

Amado Dizon alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in a case. The complainant claimed that
sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos from him
to expedite the proceedings before the Court. According to the complainant, unknown to him at that
time was that, a month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a
total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De
Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court.
Handwritten receipts signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant.

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the
Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza's
representations that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she
could no longer be found.

On November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarmentagainst Atty. De Taza. He
also attached several affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza
issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed
an affidavit which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks in her
favor amounting to 481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her
went unheeded.

Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose affidavit was attached to the complaint,
averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check for P50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was
dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.

Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit stating that Atty. De Taza owes her
p29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.

Issue: Whether Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable.

Held: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if
he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-
existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of
the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach" The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of
the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such
irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.

4. Pichon vs. Agleron.

Facts:

Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez was the widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular
accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. On three occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and
received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, or a
total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron
against the Municipality of Caraga.

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the amount of
₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay the filing
fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing,
complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the
signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s
fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that since
the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of ₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while
awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.2

In reply, complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and asserted that the
filing fee at that time amounted only to ₱7,836.60.

Issue: WON Atty Agleron violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the Municipality of
Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-
filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee
and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would
exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted
the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him
about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the
appropriate charges.

5. Brunet vs. Guaren

Complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L.
Guaren before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a
residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the
fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One
Thousand Pesos which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the
titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch
plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty.
Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to
2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling was
in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return
of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan
Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Issue: WON Atty Guaren violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment
of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of
complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

6. Sanchez vs. Aguilos

Facts:

Nenita D. Sanchez has charged Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return
the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having performed
the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of
the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband,
Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus
the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00;
that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told
her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she
had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation,
not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a higher
acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; that she subsequently withdrew the case from him,
and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already
started working on the case; that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had
already performed; that the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered
any appreciable legal services to her; and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her
to bring an administrative complaint against him in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on March 20,
2007.

the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee sought his legal services to bring the
petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more
appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her
husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action
for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt;
that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of
her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to
submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond
to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money that her
fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him
with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially requesting him not to file
the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the annulment of her marriage
instead.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct.

Held: That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal
education program in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the
complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal
separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it
appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law.

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the
foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and
for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer
accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a
petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the
action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.

7. Pacao vs. Limos

Facts:

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop
(BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. Thereafter, the case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible
settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter
represented that she was duly authorized by BHF negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is
demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an
agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to
Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise
agreement, and a joint motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the court. On October
29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an
Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to
meet the terms of their agreement. Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative,
Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not
authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF. This prompted the
complainant to send a demand letter to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial settlement
payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.

Issue: Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty.
Limos from the practice of law?

Held: To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court,
for three months each in two cases, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before
this Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible
amicable settlement with her client BHF. Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn
over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant despite due demand.
Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized
to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement as counsel of BHF had
already ceased. The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. It is not too
farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ
deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not
speak well of a member of the Bar. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of
disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender. Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the
legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to
her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a
member of the bar.

8. Plumptre vs. Rivera

Facts: Plumptre filed a case for disbarment against Atty Socrates, alleging that he called on respondent
and asked for help in his application for a work permit from the bureau of immigration and he paid
respondent the amount of ten thousand pesos as professional fee. The second time they met,
complainant gave respondent another P10,000 together with his passport for the processing of his work
permit. The third time, respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos and asked for another
P10,000 but complainant refused to pay since they only agreed on the amount of P20,000. Respondent
also asked for an additional P10,000 for the other case involving the complaint he was working on.
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money", he never received any updates on the
status of his work permit and pending court case. Further whenever he called respondent to follow up
on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his wife.

Issue: WON Atty Rivera’s act warrants disbarment.

Held: Atty Rivera failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence and diligence. He not only neglected
the attorney client relationship established between them. He also acted in a manner reprehensible
towards complainant. Respondent also demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral soundness.

Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided in complainant’s
favor, respondent’s act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served and the judiciary by giving the
impression that court cases are won by the deepest pockets and not on the merits.

By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling in the amount of 8,000, respondent trampled upon
the integrity of the judiciary, This gross disrespect shows he is wanting in moral fiber and shows lack of
integrity in his character.

II. qualifications in the matter the admission to the bar and oath taking

1. In re: Argosino

Facts:

Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide” from a
hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the
Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As
a proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen
certifications among others from: two senators, five trial court judges, and six members of religious
order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation
in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD: The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good
moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the
Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit
of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or
formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

2. Alauwi vs. Alauya

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso
wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds
was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao
term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself
a lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney.

Held: The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

3. Aguirre vs. Rana

B.M. No. 1036; June 10, 2003

Facts:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day
before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial
of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct
because he alleged that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC)
of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel
for George Bunan.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave misconduct on the part of Edwin L. Rana.

Held:

The court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent was engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan before he took the lawyers oath.
Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well
that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had
no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.

4. In re Dacanay

B.M. No. 1678; December 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is
a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can still practice law in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes, provided the conditions are complied with.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments; and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

5. Llunar vs. Ricafort

A.C. No. 6484; June 16, 2015

Facts:

Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo Ricafort for the recovery of a parcel of land owned
by the Banez family but which was fraudulently regitered to a different name. The lot was the
subject of foreclosure proceedings, hence, Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the partial redemption
fee, as filing fees, and attorney’s fees. Three years later, complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort
did not file any case, hence, she demanded the return of the amount paid. It was also later on
learned that Atty. Ricafort was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be administratively liable.

Held:

Yes.

The respondent committed several infractions. First, he did not exert due diligence in handling
the complainant’s case. Under the given facts, respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection threwith shall render him liable”. Second,
the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant
for handling the latter’s case which is in violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates every lawyer to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession” and “to account for all money and property he holds
for his client”. Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not telling his client that he was
under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Under Canon 15, “a lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients”. Lastly, the
respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on
him.

6. Caronan vs. Caronan

A.C. No. 11316; July 12, 2016

Facts:

Complinant and respondent are siblings. While complainant was able to complete his studies,
graduated at the University of Makati, respondent first enrolled at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila for one year and transferred to the Philippines Military Academy where he was
discharged after a year and was not able to obtain a college degree since then. Respondent
later on enrolled at St. Mary’s Law School and passed the Bar examinations using complainants
college records. Complainant knew about these events but brushed these aside as he did not
anticipate any adverse consequences to him. Thereafter, it was discovered that respondent had
been using his name to perpetrate crimes.

Issue:

Whether or not the Integrated Bar of the Philippines erred in ordering that: (a) The name
“Patrick A. Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name “Richard A.
Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

Held:
No. As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is
Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll
at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar
Examinations.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan,"
be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless
he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
Spanish, history, and economics.

C. Appearance of Non-Lawyers

1. In re Joaquin

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0; February 21, 1995

Facts:

The Supreme Court has decided to issue a decision in relation to the mishaps of Joaquin T.
Borromeo, a Cebuano who’s “come to posses superficial awareness of a few substantive legal
principles and procedural rules”, but is not registered to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and, most importanty, not a lawyer.

For almost 16 years, he has been instituting and and prosecuting legal proceeding in different
courts, and has the balls to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings,
which, expectedly, have been disastrous. He also circulated sccandalous and defamatory
statements against courts, judges, their employees, and his opponents in the legal arena.

He filed different civil and criminal charges against Traders Royal Bank and Security Bank and
Trust Co.. He also pressed charges against clerk of courts, judicial staff, lawyers, and even the
Supreme Court justices.

He also filed petition for certiorari and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to Court of Appeals. The aforementioned petitions should only be filed in Supreme
Court, which has the power to review cases. Furthermore, he spreaded defamatory and libelous
flyers against the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Cebu Chapter and the Regional Trial Court
judges of the province, and to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court justices.

Issue:

Whether or not Joaquin T. Borromeo is liable for contempt.

Held:

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to
courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice. He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without
merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits
and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably
insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more
than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted
the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly
overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees
who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and
motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his
unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to
the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should
contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various
proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court
employees and parties involved.

2. Catimbuhan vs. Cruz

G.R. No. L-51813-14; November 29, 1983

Facts:

Records show that petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against
Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, in
the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus petitioners Malana and
Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners,
and respondent judge sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Respondent Judge
likewise issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not Malana and Lucila may represent Cantimbuhan.

Held:

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in
the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent
appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, a law student was
allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City
Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is
accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing
Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting
his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as
private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal
can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's
participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the
fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court
that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under
his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense
counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason
should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the
trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner
Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his
right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in
said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the
success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

3. Cruz vs. Mina

G.R. No. 154207; April 27, 2007

Facts:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court should take precedence over the
ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner, a lsw student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.

Held:

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
4. PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co.

G.R. No. L-23959; November 29, 1971

Facts:

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et
al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to
30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar
notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services
Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid
& Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not

Held:

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court
on behalf of a party- litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for
such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of

attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship
with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn,
to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act
or an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave
the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also

leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures.

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers)
cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
"agent" and not as an attorney.

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's
fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of
special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.
D. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority

1. Villahermosa vs. Caracol

A.C. No. 7325; January 21, 2015

Facts:

Oct No. 433 was a homestead patent grabted to Micael Babela who had who sons, Fernando
and Efren. When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and titles were
issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot who in turn sold the parcels of land to
complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. The DARAB issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCT’s derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it
was not covered by the agrarian reform law. The decision was appealed to and affirmed by the
DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. Atty. Caracol filed a motion for the execution
with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, praying for the full implementation of the decision.
Atty. Caracol filed a motion for the isuance of a second alias Writ of Execution and Demolition.
Later on, Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file
motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record.
Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have possibly authorized Atty. Caracol to file becaue
Efren had already been dead for more than a year.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Caracol is guilty of deceit, gross misconduct, and violation of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

Yes. Section 21 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for a presumption that a lawyer
appears in behalf of his client. Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as
counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave fo court. Of an attorney appears on a client’ behalf without a retainer
or the requisite authority, neither the litigant whom he purports to repreent nor the adverse
party may be bound by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to
deny his assumed authority.

E.

In re: UP Law faculty

Facts: Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares
against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In
said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from
the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World
War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which
is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in
his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a
truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited
the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.

Issue: Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Held: Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.[4] The court
must “insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free
from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.”

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments
except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s
claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
Dizon vs. De Taza.

Amado Dizon alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in a case. The complainant claimed that
sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos from him
to expedite the proceedings before the Court. According to the complainant, unknown to him at that
time was that, a month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a
total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De
Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court.
Handwritten receipts signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant.

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the
Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza's
representations that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she
could no longer be found.

On November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarmentagainst Atty. De Taza. He
also attached several affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza
issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed
an affidavit which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks in her
favor amounting to 481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her
went unheeded.

Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose affidavit was attached to the complaint,
averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check for P50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was
dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.

Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit stating that Atty. De Taza owes her
p29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.

Issue: Whether Atty. De Taza should be held administratively liable.

Held: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if
he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-
existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of
the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach" The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of
the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such
irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.

Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners question the validity of the CFI ruling that
they will be held in contempt for refusing to vacate the land. The said property, being collateral for a
loan to a Mr. Rivera, was foreclosed due to non-payment of loan amount and its interest within the
prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera later sold the property to Ms. Lopez, who later filed petition that she be
placed in possession of the land. The petitioners question the ruling of the courISSUES:

Whether or not:

(1) The decision of the lower court (CFI) is valid;

(2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid; and,

(3) (Possible Legal Ethics Issue) the term “appearance” would include only presence in courts.

HELD:

YES on first two issues. NO on the third issue. Petition was dismissed. Cost against the petitioners.

RATIO:

Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be sustained for the reason that it is in a
nature of collateral attack to judgment which on its face is valid and regular for a long time. It is a well
known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate
action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717).

The second issue was also not taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of possession in
foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of Section 6 Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, but is merely ministerial and complementary duty of the court.

In the third issue, the word or term “appearance” includes not only arguing a case before any such body
but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as “by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer”.
In Re: David 93 Phil 461

FACTS:

Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of
five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed
on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension,
November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.

On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent.
(For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a
motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino,
defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.

“In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the
Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for
the Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am
Practicing as attorney-at-law.”

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name
under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of
a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and
because he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of
the constitutional restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.”

Peo v. Villanueva, 14, SCRA 109

FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with
crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused
was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the
same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in
this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain
attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule
had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293

In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as a hearing officer of
the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him
to engage in private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.

Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the same is with the
permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer;
that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never
represented himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in
the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in
one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote his name as Atty.
Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were
sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”,

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.

HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by evidence. The allegations
in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed
an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful disobedience of any
lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without
attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private practice of law, more
so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were
close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend
should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against him.

Lingan v. Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014

VIOLATION OF NOTARIAL PRACTICE LAW Victor Lingan VS. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga
A.C. No. 5377, June 15, 2013 Corona, J.

FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and
Jimmy Baliga on November16, 2000. Complainant alleged that respondents both as notaries public
falsified certain public documents, as follows:

1. A complaint for annulment of title with damages filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant with the
RTC of Tuguegarao. Respondent Calubaquib signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping of the complainant as notary public and entered the same as Doc. No. 182, Page No. 38, Book
No. CLXXII, Series of 1996, which according to the National Archives that such document number
actually pertains to an affidavit of one Daniel Malayao, 2. A special power of attorney dated September
10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to “enter
into a compromise agreement under such terms and conditions acceptable to him” which was notarized
by respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996, which
according to respondent Baliga’s notarial register, such document number pertains to an affidavit of loss
of one Pedro Telan, dated August 26, 1996. 3. A petition for reappointment as notary public for and in
Tuguegarao,Cagayan by respondent Baliga, which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered
in his notarial register as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial
Register BookNo. CXXX was for the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was
acancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996. In his answer, respondent Baliga admitted
the incorrectness of the entries and simply attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith of his
secretary to whom he had left the task of entering all his notarial documents. Respondent Calubaquibs
comment, howevever, questioned the complainant's motives. He also stated that complainant had filed
a case for falsification of documents against him with the Ombudsman but it was dismissed. In the end,
however, he (like his co-respondent Baliga) admitted to the mistaken entries and also ascribed the same
to his legal assistants. Similarly, by way of defense, he pointed out that the Notarial Law provides that
only contracts need to have their copies included in thenotarial records. It does not require affidavits,
verifications or subscriptions of petitions which are mere allegations of facts to be entered in the
NotarialRegister, despite widespread practice to the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents violated the Notarial Practice Law .

HELD: Yes. Respondents Calubaquib and Baliga violated the Notarial Practice Law

It is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial
register. Section 245

of the Notarial Law provides that every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial
register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified
copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees
therefore. Section 246 of the same law also provides that the notary public shall enter in such register,
in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him,
the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the
signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him
for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep
a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of
the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in
each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the
page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
In this connection, Section 249(b) provides that the failure of the notary to make the proper entry or
entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission: Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections
by passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our
open condemnation. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as
notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the courts and the
administrative offices in general. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public one and makes it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public
must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties. Wherefore,
in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga are hereby
found guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of their
lawyer’s oath. Hence, both respondents are suspended for one year.

EUSTAQUIO v. NAVALES

Spouses Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants) filed cases against respondent
Atty. Edgar R. Navales (respondent), praying that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary
sanction/s for failing to pay rent and to vacate the apartment he is leasing despite demands.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and, accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.[11] It
was found that respondent displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts, as
highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged on. In this light, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held administratively liable.[12]

On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a
Certification[17] was issued by the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the
present. In connection with this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter[18] dated September 8, 2015 to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the details of respondent's suspension from the
practice of law. In view of the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for appropriate action.
[19]

Despite due notice from the Court,[20] respondent failed to file his comment to the aforementioned
Certification issued by MeTC-Br. 38.

In a Report and Recommendation[21] dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended that respondent
be further suspended from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor
for a period of six (6) months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective
immediately.[22] It found that since respondent received the order of suspension against him on
October 16, 2014 and did not move for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of
15 days therefrom. As such, he should have already served his suspension.
HELD

In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution[26] dated September 15,
2014 suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and
executory fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus,
respondent should have already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent
never heeded the suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant
City Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification[27] issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the
present.

FAJARDO vs. ALVAREZ

Facts:

Complainant Teresita Fajardo was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired Atty.
Nicanor Alvarez (Respondent) to defend her in her criminal case that was pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman.

Atty Alvarez asked for 1.4M in acceptance fee but never entered his appearance nor signed any
pleading.

Fajardo’s case was not dismissed so she demand for the return of the amount that she gave alvarez. The
latter however, did not heed.

Held:
Fajardo violated both his lawyer’s oath and the CPR specificallhy Canon 1, Rules 1,01 and 1. 02, in
relation to Canon 13, when he communicated or at least intimated that he knew people from the Office
of the Ombudsman.

ONG vs. DELO SANTOS

Facts:

Atty. Delos Santos issued a check for a loan that he contracted from Mr. Ong.

The check bounced. Hence, Ong filed cases for estafa, BP22, and disbarment.

Held

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pullute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurth th ewelfard of society
and the public interest.

Case Digest: Presiding Judge Jose L. Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Sorsogon City, Complainant,
v. Atty. Juan S. Dealca, Respondent | A.C. No. 7474, 9

Presiding Judge Jose L. Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Sorsogon City, Complainant, v. Atty. Juan
S. Dealca, Respondent

A.C. No. 7474, 9 September 2014

Facts:

The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty.
Ronando L. Gerona in a pending case docketed at the Court of Appeals wherein the complainant was the
plaintiff-appellant.

The parties agreed upon PhP 15,000.00 as attorney’s fees with the following breakdown: 50% payable
upon acceptance of the case; and the remaining balance upon termination of the case. Complainant
paid the respondent PhP 7,500.00.

Prior to preparing the appellant’s brief, respondent demanded payment of PhP 4,000.00. The
complainant obliged though it was contrary to the original agreement.

Before filing the appellant's brief, respondent demanded payment of the balance amounting to PhP
3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent withdraw his appearance as complaint’s
counsel without informing the complainant.

Thus, the complainant charged the respondent with misconduct and praying the respondent be
“sternly dealt with administratively.”

Issue:

Whether respondent committed misconduct and violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Held:

The Supreme Court find the respondent violated Canon 22 of the CPR for withdrawing from the
complainant’s case without a good cause. Respondent also violated Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the CPR for
demanding full payment before submission of the complainant-appellant’s brief even though they have
an agreement that final payment will be given upon termination of the case.

The Supreme Court reprimanded the respondent.

SALABAO v. VILLARUEL

In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its
resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004
but Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost
and the case became final and executory.

Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162, by bringing
to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When
rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments
other than what he had presented before the Court of Appeals.

Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC
before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon,
there was not stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban,
Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion,
Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an
administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Complainant then
complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant
and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule
12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

HELD

Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of
a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him.[12]
In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005.
Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts
subsequent to the Entry of Judgment:

From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was
to delay the execution of the final judgment.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a lawyer to
exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other actions belie his claim of good
faith. Respondent filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon in what
was clearly a case of forum-shopping. Moreover, respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against the
three judges hearing these cases, and even a motion to cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was
simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision.

It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes,
employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of Ms
duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he is
administratively liable for his actions.
Pichon vs. Agleron.

Facts:

Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez was the widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular
accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. On three occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and
received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, or a
total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron
against the Municipality of Caraga.

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the amount of
₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay the filing
fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing,
complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the
signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s
fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that since
the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of ₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while
awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.2
In reply, complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and asserted that the
filing fee at that time amounted only to ₱7,836.60.

Issue: WON Atty Agleron violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.

In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the Municipality of
Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-
filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee
and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would
exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted
the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him
about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the
appropriate charges.

Brunet vs. Guaren

Complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L.
Guaren before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a
residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the
fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One
Thousand Pesos which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the
titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch
plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty.
Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to
2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling was
in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return
of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan
Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Issue: WON Atty Guaren violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment
of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of
complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

Sanchez vs. Aguilos

Facts:

Nenita D. Sanchez has charged Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return
the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having performed
the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of
the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband,
Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus
the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00;
that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told
her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she
had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation,
not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a higher
acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; that she subsequently withdrew the case from him,
and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already
started working on the case; that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had
already performed; that the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered
any appreciable legal services to her; and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her
to bring an administrative complaint against him in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on March 20,
2007.

the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee sought his legal services to bring the
petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more
appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her
husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action
for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt;
that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of
her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to
submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond
to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money that her
fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him
with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially requesting him not to file
the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the annulment of her marriage
instead.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct.

Held: That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal
education program in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the
complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal
separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it
appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law.

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the
foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and
for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer
accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a
petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the
action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow
afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
Pacao vs. Limos

Facts:

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop
(BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. Thereafter, the case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible
settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter
represented that she was duly authorized by BHF negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is
demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an
agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to
Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise
agreement, and a joint motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the court. On October
29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an
Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to
meet the terms of their agreement. Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative,
Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not
authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF. This prompted the
complainant to send a demand letter to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial settlement
payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.

Issue: Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty.
Limos from the practice of law?

Held: To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court,
for three months each in two cases, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before
this Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible
amicable settlement with her client BHF. Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn
over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant despite due demand.
Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized
to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement as counsel of BHF had
already ceased. The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. It is not too
farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ
deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not
speak well of a member of the Bar. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of
disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender. Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the
legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to
her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a
member of the bar.

Plumptre vs. Rivera

Facts: Plumptre filed a case for disbarment against Atty Socrates, alleging that he called on respondent
and asked for help in his application for a work permit from the bureau of immigration and he paid
respondent the amount of ten thousand pesos as professional fee. The second time they met,
complainant gave respondent another P10,000 together with his passport for the processing of his work
permit. The third time, respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos and asked for another
P10,000 but complainant refused to pay since they only agreed on the amount of P20,000. Respondent
also asked for an additional P10,000 for the other case involving the complaint he was working on.
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money", he never received any updates on the
status of his work permit and pending court case. Further whenever he called respondent to follow up
on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his wife.

Issue: WON Atty Rivera’s act warrants disbarment.

Held: Atty Rivera failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence and diligence. He not only neglected
the attorney client relationship established between them. He also acted in a manner reprehensible
towards complainant. Respondent also demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral soundness.
Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided in complainant’s
favor, respondent’s act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served and the judiciary by giving the
impression that court cases are won by the deepest pockets and not on the merits.

By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling in the amount of 8,000, respondent trampled upon
the integrity of the judiciary, This gross disrespect shows he is wanting in moral fiber and shows lack of
integrity in his character.

In re: Argosino

Facts:

Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide” from a
hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the
Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As
a proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen
certifications among others from: two senators, five trial court judges, and six members of religious
order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation
in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD: The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good
moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the
Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit
of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or
formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

Alauwi vs. Alauya

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso
wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds
was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao
term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself
a lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney.

Held: The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint for

disbarment by reason of dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).

Facts:

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in

his favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the
latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo, complainant
accepted the check without question.It was dishonored due to
insufficient fluids. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the
check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting
complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22... the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor...
issued a Resolution... recommending the filing of the appropriate
information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of
Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC). The RTC affirmed in toto the MTC
ruling became final and executory. Prior to the promulgation of the
RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the
Bar Confidant. respondent denied that he committed dishonesty
against complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed the
latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the
check. he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in
whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally
benefit from the proceeds thereof said friend had died and respondent
had no means by which to pay for the amount of the check. the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)... recommending that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude,
and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed
the said offense. the IBP Board of Governors... adopting and approving
with modification... suspending respondent from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the
CPR as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Issue: The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent should be administratively disciplined for having been
found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of
the offense defined and punished the law is designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is
deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.x x x
xBeing a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage
of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the
law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded
check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him
to support the Constitution and obey the laws.

Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates

a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.

Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, 

Kruysel v. Abion

the high court found Atty. Lorenza A. Abion guilty of gross misconduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
and ordered her name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

Facts:

The case stemmed from the  2003 disbarment complaint filed before the SC
by German national Jutta Krursel who charged Abion with forgery, swindling,
and falsification of a public document. In 2002, Krursel engaged services of
Abion to assist her to file a case before the Monetary Board of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas for Conducting Business in an Unsafe and Unsound
Manner in violation of RA 8791 against Robinsons Savings Bank Ermita
branch and its officers in relation to the bank's alleged illegal
withholding/blocking of her account. However, without the complainant's
knowledge, Abion withdrew her complaint with prejudice through a letter
dated April 15, 2002 to the Monetary Board. She claimed that Abion forged
her and that of a certain William Randell Coleman's signatures and stressed
that she never authorized nor acceded to the complaint's withdrawal. She
later discovered two Special Powers of Attorney (SPA), which appears to
have her and Coleman's signature as principals and Abion as attorney-in-fact.
The high court noted that Abion cannot be located and it (Court) even had to
request NBI assistance to locate respondent but to no avail. It added that
Abion's willful behavior has effectively hindered the court's process service
and unduly prolonged the case.

The SC held that respondent's "evasive attitude is tantamount to a 'wilful

disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,' which alone is a ground
for disbarment or suspension under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court."

While the court agreed that Krursel's signature in the letter of withdrawal
appeared to have been forged, there was no evidence pointing to Abion as
the author of forgery in the SPA.

Issue:

Did atty. Abion violate the lawyer’s oath?

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) disbarred atty. Abion who forged her German client's
signature and "besmirched the entire legal profession" by imputing
corruption. Aside from defrauding her client, respondent recklessly put Atty.
Soriano's career in jeopardy by fabricating such order, and made a mockery
of the judicial system. It cannot be overemphasized that a lawyer is not
merely professional but also an officer of the court….Her conduct degrades
the administration of justice and weakens the people faith in the judicial
system. She inexorably besmirched the entire legal profession,"
III. Duty of the Lawyer to the Society

A. Duty to Uphold the Constitution and Obey the Laws of the Land

Jimenez v. Verano, A.C. 8108

Facts:

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La

Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is
Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent
Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R.
Tecson. Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the “Alabang Boys” were the accused in cases filed by PDEA
for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest Resolution,
the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause. Because of the failure
of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the
evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery
and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own
congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that
respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the
letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then
Secretary Raul Gonzales. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as
founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of
complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly
irregular and unethical act. He had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead
and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar. For his
part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed
disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and
sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a
government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground
that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. DEFENSE: Sheer faith
in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was
overzealous; yet, âif the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything
may be expedited. In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release
order was not signed by the Se

cretary and therefore remained “a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all.”
The Investigating Commissioner noted that both complaints remained
unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not
been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be
highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a
warning not to repeat the same or any similar action

Issue:

Whether or not Verano should be suspended for violating CPR

Held:

Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and
15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately. This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that repetition of
any similar offense shall be dealt with more severel

Foster vs Agtang A.C. 10579, Dec. 10, 2014; 

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board or Governors (BOG). Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (!BP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with
modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang
(respondent)from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety
and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant. From the
records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD),received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful acts as a lawyer.

Facts:

The complainant was reffered to respondent in connection with her legal

problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra
Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant
agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in
court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent
P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter to Tropical Villas

Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then
visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in
sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount
without interest. A promissory note evidenced the loan. In November 2009,
complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation
of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and
thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing
fee. When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high
value of the land and the sheriffs' travel expenses and accommodations in
Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later,
complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No.
14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development
Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records. Also
according to the Registrat of Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the
civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that
he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant's case. Upon
reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court,
complainant noticed that:

1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not
alleged;

2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not
attached thereto;

3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point
of contention in the case; and

4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent,

however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the
hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the

latter extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 "in the moment
of urgency or emergency." Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

Issue:

whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner with respect to respondent's violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the
CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of
Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the
penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." It is well-established that
a lawyer's conduct is "not confined to the performance of his professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful

conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he
clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses
to be incurred by court employees.

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he

received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all
of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented
by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross

misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.
Agot vs. Rivera

Facts:

Complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her bestfriends
wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate
the issuance of her US visa, complainant sought the services of respondent
who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, they entered into a
contract of legal services contract. whereby respondent undertook to
facilitate and secure release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor
prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P350 000 as downpayment and undertook to pay
the balance of of P350 000. After the issuance of the US visa the parties
stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records
of criminal conviction and/or any court issued hold departure order,
respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period.
Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US
Embassy. As demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant
administrative complaint against respondent.

The investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in

deceitful conduct for:

1. misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer

2. failing to deliver the services contracted

3. being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of P350 000

Issue:

whether or not respondent should be held administrative liable for violating

the CPR.

Held:

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." It is well established that
a lawyer’s conduct is "not confined to the performance of his professional
duties.”

n this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful

conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he
clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses
to be incurred by court employees

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross

misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of ₱127,590.00, ₱50,000.00 and
₱2,500.00. Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Con
fidanl, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to ail courts

Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, A.M. 09-6-01-SC

May a Lawyer Perform Notarial Practice Outside the Jurisdiction of His

Notarial Commission?

Lawyers are required to follow certain rules in notarial practice. Lawyers

engaged in notarial practice are not merely signing a piece of document –
they are executing an act that will transform documents into pieces of
evidences that can be used by people against other people. 

In this January 21, 2015 decision by the Supreme Court, Atty. Juan C. Siapno,
Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. “Evelyn”

Facts of the Case Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno 

Atty. Siapno was alleged to be maintaining a notarial office along Alvear St.
East, Lingayen Pangasinan and was performing notarial acts and practices
in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial
commission. Atty. Siapno applied and was commissioned to perform notarial
functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission was never renewed upon expiration.

Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the

pictures of Atty. Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents
to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage
Agreement showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty.
Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of
Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of Birth, dated January
6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.

The Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial
commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20,
2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His
commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued
another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to
have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed
notarial functions without commission and recommended that he be fined in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The Supreme Court
however, was not satisfied with the recommended penalty.

 Decision of the Supreme Court  Re: Atty. Siapno.

Atty. Siapno is guilty of violating  Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice;

Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may

perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day
of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court.

Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which
granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial
functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of
Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform
such act.

The Supreme Court stated the importance of notarization done by lawyers.

The Court said;

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12
It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.

Atty. Siapno also violated Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of professional

Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.

Facts of the Case Re: Atty. Pedro Santos.

The second letter-complaint was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against

Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his
driver’s license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by
Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication
when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos
was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of
Manila.

Facts of the Case Re: Atty “Evelyn”.

The third letter-complaint came from a concerned citizen reporting that a

certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381
Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing
documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.

Court’s Decision Re:Atty Santos and Atty. Evelyn.

The Judge handling the case of Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn was no longer
the Executive Judge of RTC-Manila at the time the orders of the Court were
handed down to him. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on
the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a
certain Atty. Evelyn. Therefore, the Court stated that the incumbent
Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity,
is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his
Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of
this decision.

 The Court ended with the following decision;

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from
being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of
this decision.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain
Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate
administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to
submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Chu v. Guico, A.C. 10573, Jan. 13, 2015;

Facts:

Chu seeked Atty, Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his
company. According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5,
2006, atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amont of money to be
given at the NLRC Commissioner handling his case to insure favorable
decision. At the UCC coffeeshop wherein atty. Guico asked chui to meet him
there, atty. Guico presented a draft decision printed in dorsal portion of used
paper apparently emanating from the office of the NLRC in favor of Chu. On
that occasion, atty. Guico asked Chu to prepare another P300 000 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu can only
produce the amount P280 000 which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office.
On Jan 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to Chu. Chu then
confronted atty. Guico then the latter filed a motion for reconsideration. After
the denial of the motion for consideration, Atty. Guico caused the
preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu
terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009.

Issue:

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?

Held:

The IBP found out that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in
view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to
and contempt for the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel
Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision
in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He
compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of
obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own
personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and
were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer's Oath
not to delay any man for money or malice.
Sosa v. Mendoza, A.C. 8776, Mar. 23, 2015;

FACTS:

Ms. Sosa alleged that she extended a loan of P500 000 to Atty. Mendoza at
an interest of P25 000, They agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten
percent (10%) per month shall accrue in case of default. To ensure the
payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and
issued a postdated check for P500,000.00. Atty. Mendoza failed to comply
with his obligation on due date.  Upon demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa
not to deposit the postdated check.  She acceded and deferred the deposit
of the check based on Atty. Mendoza's promise that he would later pay.  The
check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited
it sometime in October 2006; it was "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds."  Ms.
Sosa then obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera ( Atty.
Cabrera), to legally address Atty. Mendoza's failure to pay. In view of the
repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for
disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Mendoza violated the CPR?

Held:

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: "[a] lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful
in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
Thus therefore his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and
deceitful conduct.  This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty.
Mendoza's act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the
conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
ACA v. Salvado, A.C. No. 10952, Jan. 26, 2016;

Facts:

Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and canon 7 of CPR. Complainant
alleged that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman
engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the lending
business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant
to invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high
interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a
profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients
and investors. Because of these representations, the complainant made an
initial investment in his business. On various dates from 2010 to 2011,
complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest
with promises of high rates of return. As consideration for these investments,
Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon
presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from
insufficient funds or a closed account. After some time, the complainant
made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado who at first
communicated with him, as time went by, Atty. Salvado began to avoid
complainant’s calls and texts messages. Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado
failed to settle his obligations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Salvado violated the CPR?

Held:

Yes. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover
the same constituted willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which
undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. The parties gave
conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been
lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his businesses with the promise of
yielding high interests, which he believed because he was a lawyer who was
expected to protect his public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other
hand, denied having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had
invested by virtue of his own desire to gain profits. He insisted that the
checks that he issued in favor of complainant were in the form of security or
evidence of investment. 

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of

violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.
Canlapan v. Balayo, A.C. 10605, Feb. 17, 2016; 

BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

Facts:

Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before Executive

Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by
complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council
(Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the
complainant while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon
mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you
will not get what you want!")

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's

actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly considering that
respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by Higino M.
Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an
Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission,
including the security guard.

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for
justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer actively
participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case
nor was authorized by the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.

Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition,

Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions
submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao,
Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he asked
respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role

Issue:
WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held:

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and

restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.42
Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation
and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised
restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of
complainant's claims, it was improper for respondent to state that even if
complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not
prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as
this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice,
undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public
respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be
taken back."

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition

precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the
lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard
the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a,
lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is
sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Facturan vs. Barcelona

A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government, he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and air dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper o the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice

Facts:

On June 04, 2004 a complaint was filed against 6 persons, before the
provincial prosecution office and was assigned for preliminary investigation
to Prosecutor Amerkhan, on October 26, 2004 the latter forwarded the
records of the case together with the resolution recommending the
prosecution of the accused and the corresponding information to respondent
for his approval and signature. however, the respondent neither approved nor
signed the resolution, but instead removed the case records from the office
of the Provincial Prosecutor and brought them to his residence. it appears
that the respondent has personally known to the accused as one of them is
his cousin. Aggrieved, the complainant sought the intervention of the
department of Justice. On June 20 2005, the complainant learned that the
case had been turned over to the Office but without Prosecutor Amerkhans
resolution and information. neither did the respondent approve nor act upon
the same prompting the complainant to file this case for disbarment
anchored on gross misconduct in office and dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. In his defense, the respondent claims that the delay
was not because of his alleged malicious action as he had inhibited himself
from the case and so it was assigned to Prosecutor Amerkhan. The IBP held
that the respondent is administratively liable violating Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Hence this petition.

Issue:
whether or not the action of the prosecutor in delaying the progress of the
complaint constitute grave misconduct

Held:

The court concur with the decision of the IBP but ruled that the respondent
has violated Canon 6 rule 6.02 “A lawyer in the government service shall not
use his public position, to promote advance and advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties” and not
Canon 18.

Respondent action and omissions in this case, appear to have been

committed for the benefit and to safeguard private interests. As a lawyer and
who is also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. It bears stressing
that a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government, he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.

The court ruled his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
year and is sternly warned that a repetition of the act will be dealt more
severely.

Nulada v. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint for

disbarment by reason of dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).

Facts:
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in
his favor a check in the amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the
latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao, Province of Iloilo, complainant
accepted the check without question.It was dishonored due to
insufficient fluids. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the
check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting
complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22... the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor...
issued a Resolution... recommending the filing of the appropriate
information against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of
Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC). The RTC affirmed in toto the MTC
ruling became final and executory. Prior to the promulgation of the
RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the
Bar Confidant. respondent denied that he committed dishonesty
against complainant, as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed the
latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the
check. he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in
whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally
benefit from the proceeds thereof said friend had died and respondent
had no means by which to pay for the amount of the check. the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)... recommending that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude violation of BP 22, involved moral turpitude,
and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed
the said offense. the IBP Board of Governors... adopting and approving
with modification... suspending respondent from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the
CPR as well as for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Issue: The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent should be administratively disciplined for having been
found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of
the offense defined and punished the law is designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is
deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.x x x
xBeing a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage
of [BP] 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the
law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded
check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him
to support the Constitution and obey the laws.

Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates

a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.

Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, 

Kruysel v. Abion

the high court found Atty. Lorenza A. Abion guilty of gross misconduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
and ordered her name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

Facts:

The case stemmed from the  2003 disbarment complaint filed before the SC
by German national Jutta Krursel who charged Abion with forgery, swindling,
and falsification of a public document. In 2002, Krursel engaged services of
Abion to assist her to file a case before the Monetary Board of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas for Conducting Business in an Unsafe and Unsound
Manner in violation of RA 8791 against Robinsons Savings Bank Ermita
branch and its officers in relation to the bank's alleged illegal
withholding/blocking of her account. However, without the complainant's
knowledge, Abion withdrew her complaint with prejudice through a letter
dated April 15, 2002 to the Monetary Board. She claimed that Abion forged
her and that of a certain William Randell Coleman's signatures and stressed
that she never authorized nor acceded to the complaint's withdrawal. She
later discovered two Special Powers of Attorney (SPA), which appears to
have her and Coleman's signature as principals and Abion as attorney-in-fact.
The high court noted that Abion cannot be located and it (Court) even had to
request NBI assistance to locate respondent but to no avail. It added that
Abion's willful behavior has effectively hindered the court's process service
and unduly prolonged the case.

The SC held that respondent's "evasive attitude is tantamount to a 'wilful

disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,' which alone is a ground
for disbarment or suspension under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court."

While the court agreed that Krursel's signature in the letter of withdrawal
appeared to have been forged, there was no evidence pointing to Abion as
the author of forgery in the SPA.

Issue:

Did atty. Abion violate the lawyer’s oath?

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) disbarred atty. Abion who forged her German client's
signature and "besmirched the entire legal profession" by imputing
corruption. Aside from defrauding her client, respondent recklessly put Atty.
Soriano's career in jeopardy by fabricating such order, and made a mockery
of the judicial system. It cannot be overemphasized that a lawyer is not
merely professional but also an officer of the court….Her conduct degrades
the administration of justice and weakens the people faith in the judicial
system. She inexorably besmirched the entire legal profession,"

III. Duty of the Lawyer to the Society

A. Duty to Uphold the Constitution and Obey the Laws of the Land

Jimenez v. Verano, A.C. 8108

Facts:

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La

Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is
Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent
Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R.
Tecson. Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the “Alabang Boys” were the accused in cases filed by PDEA
for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest Resolution,
the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause. Because of the failure
of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the
evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery
and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own
congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that
respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the
letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then
Secretary Raul Gonzales. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as
founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of
complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly
irregular and unethical act. He had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead
and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar. For his
part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed
disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and
sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a
government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground
that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. DEFENSE: Sheer faith
in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was
overzealous; yet, âif the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything
may be expedited. In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release
order was not signed by the Se

cretary and therefore remained “a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all.”
The Investigating Commissioner noted that both complaints remained
unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not
been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be
highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a
warning not to repeat the same or any similar action

Issue:

Whether or not Verano should be suspended for violating CPR

Held:
Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and
15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately. This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that repetition of
any similar offense shall be dealt with more severel

Foster vs Agtang A.C. 10579, Dec. 10, 2014; 

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board or Governors (BOG). Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (!BP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with
modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang
(respondent)from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety
and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant. From the
records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD),received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful acts as a lawyer.

Facts:

The complainant was reffered to respondent in connection with her legal

problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra
Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant
agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in
court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent
P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter to Tropical Villas

Subdivision in relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then
visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in
sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount
without interest. A promissory note evidenced the loan. In November 2009,
complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation
of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and
thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing
fee. When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high
value of the land and the sheriffs' travel expenses and accommodations in
Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later,
complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No.
14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development
Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records. Also
according to the Registrat of Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the
civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that
he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant's case. Upon
reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court,
complainant noticed that:

1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not
alleged;

2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not
attached thereto;

3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point
of contention in the case; and

4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent,

however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the
hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the

latter extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 "in the moment
of urgency or emergency." Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

Issue:

whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner with respect to respondent's violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the
CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of
Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the
penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." It is well-established that
a lawyer's conduct is "not confined to the performance of his professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful

conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he
clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses
to be incurred by court employees.

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he

received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all
of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented
by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross

misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.
Agot vs. Rivera
Facts:

Complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her bestfriends
wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate
the issuance of her US visa, complainant sought the services of respondent
who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, they entered into a
contract of legal services contract. whereby respondent undertook to
facilitate and secure release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor
prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P350 000 as downpayment and undertook to pay
the balance of of P350 000. After the issuance of the US visa the parties
stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records
of criminal conviction and/or any court issued hold departure order,
respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period.
Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US
Embassy. As demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant
administrative complaint against respondent.

The investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in

deceitful conduct for:

1. misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer

2. failing to deliver the services contracted

3. being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of P350 000

Issue:

whether or not respondent should be held administrative liable for violating

the CPR.

Held:

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." It is well established that
a lawyer’s conduct is "not confined to the performance of his professional
duties.”

n this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful

conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he
clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses
to be incurred by court employees

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross

misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of ₱127,590.00, ₱50,000.00 and
₱2,500.00. Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Con
fidanl, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to ail courts

Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, A.M. 09-6-01-SC

May a Lawyer Perform Notarial Practice Outside the Jurisdiction of His
Notarial Commission?

Lawyers are required to follow certain rules in notarial practice. Lawyers

engaged in notarial practice are not merely signing a piece of document –
they are executing an act that will transform documents into pieces of
evidences that can be used by people against other people. 

In this January 21, 2015 decision by the Supreme Court, Atty. Juan C. Siapno,
Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. “Evelyn”

Facts of the Case Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno 

Atty. Siapno was alleged to be maintaining a notarial office along Alvear St.
East, Lingayen Pangasinan and was performing notarial acts and practices
in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial
commission. Atty. Siapno applied and was commissioned to perform notarial
functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission was never renewed upon expiration.

Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the

pictures of Atty. Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents
to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage
Agreement showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty.
Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of
Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of Birth, dated January
6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.
The Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial
commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20,
2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His
commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued
another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to
have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed
notarial functions without commission and recommended that he be fined in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The Supreme Court
however, was not satisfied with the recommended penalty.

 Decision of the Supreme Court  Re: Atty. Siapno.

Atty. Siapno is guilty of violating  Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice;

Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may

perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day
of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court.

Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which
granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial
functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of
Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform
such act.

The Supreme Court stated the importance of notarization done by lawyers.

The Court said;

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12
It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.

Atty. Siapno also violated Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of professional

Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.

Facts of the Case Re: Atty. Pedro Santos.

The second letter-complaint was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against

Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his
driver’s license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by
Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication
when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos
was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of
Manila.

Facts of the Case Re: Atty “Evelyn”.

The third letter-complaint came from a concerned citizen reporting that a

certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381
Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing
documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.

Court’s Decision Re:Atty Santos and Atty. Evelyn.

The Judge handling the case of Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn was no longer
the Executive Judge of RTC-Manila at the time the orders of the Court were
handed down to him. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on
the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a
certain Atty. Evelyn. Therefore, the Court stated that the incumbent
Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity,
is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his
Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of
this decision.

 The Court ended with the following decision;

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from
being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of
this decision.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain
Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate
administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to
submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Chu v. Guico, A.C. 10573, Jan. 13, 2015;

Facts:

Chu seeked Atty, Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his
company. According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5,
2006, atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amont of money to be
given at the NLRC Commissioner handling his case to insure favorable
decision. At the UCC coffeeshop wherein atty. Guico asked chui to meet him
there, atty. Guico presented a draft decision printed in dorsal portion of used
paper apparently emanating from the office of the NLRC in favor of Chu. On
that occasion, atty. Guico asked Chu to prepare another P300 000 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu can only
produce the amount P280 000 which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office.

On Jan 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to Chu. Chu then
confronted atty. Guico then the latter filed a motion for reconsideration. After
the denial of the motion for consideration, Atty. Guico caused the
preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu
terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009.

Issue:

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?

Held:

The IBP found out that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in
view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to
and contempt for the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel
Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision
in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He
compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of
obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own
personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and
were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer's Oath
not to delay any man for money or malice.
Sosa v. Mendoza, A.C. 8776, Mar. 23, 2015;

FACTS:

Ms. Sosa alleged that she extended a loan of P500 000 to Atty. Mendoza at
an interest of P25 000, They agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten
percent (10%) per month shall accrue in case of default. To ensure the
payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and
issued a postdated check for P500,000.00. Atty. Mendoza failed to comply
with his obligation on due date.  Upon demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa
not to deposit the postdated check.  She acceded and deferred the deposit
of the check based on Atty. Mendoza's promise that he would later pay.  The
check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited
it sometime in October 2006; it was "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds."  Ms.
Sosa then obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera ( Atty.
Cabrera), to legally address Atty. Mendoza's failure to pay. In view of the
repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for
disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Mendoza violated the CPR?

Held:

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: "[a] lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful
in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
Thus therefore his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and
deceitful conduct.  This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty.
Mendoza's act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the
conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
ACA v. Salvado, A.C. No. 10952, Jan. 26, 2016;

Facts:

Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and canon 7 of CPR. Complainant
alleged that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman
engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the lending
business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant
to invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high
interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a
profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients
and investors. Because of these representations, the complainant made an
initial investment in his business. On various dates from 2010 to 2011,
complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest
with promises of high rates of return. As consideration for these investments,
Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon
presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from
insufficient funds or a closed account. After some time, the complainant
made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado who at first
communicated with him, as time went by, Atty. Salvado began to avoid
complainant’s calls and texts messages. Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado
failed to settle his obligations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Salvado violated the CPR?

Held:

Yes. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover
the same constituted willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which
undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. The parties gave
conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been
lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his businesses with the promise of
yielding high interests, which he believed because he was a lawyer who was
expected to protect his public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other
hand, denied having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had
invested by virtue of his own desire to gain profits. He insisted that the
checks that he issued in favor of complainant were in the form of security or
evidence of investment. 

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of

violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.
Canlapan v. Balayo, A.C. 10605, Feb. 17, 2016; 

BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO, Respondent.

Facts:

Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before Executive

Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed by
complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council
(Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the
complainant while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon
mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you
will not get what you want!")

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's

actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly considering that
respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by Higino M.
Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an
Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission,
including the security guard.

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for
justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer actively
participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case
nor was authorized by the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.

Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition,

Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions
submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao,
Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he asked
respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role

Issue:

WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

Held:

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and

restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.42
Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation
and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised
restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of
complainant's claims, it was improper for respondent to state that even if
complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not
prosper in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as
this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of justice,
undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public
respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be
taken back."

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition

precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the
lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard
the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a,
lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is
sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

Facturan vs. Barcelona

A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government, he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and air dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper o the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice

Facts:

On June 04, 2004 a complaint was filed against 6 persons, before the
provincial prosecution office and was assigned for preliminary investigation
to Prosecutor Amerkhan, on October 26, 2004 the latter forwarded the
records of the case together with the resolution recommending the
prosecution of the accused and the corresponding information to respondent
for his approval and signature. however, the respondent neither approved nor
signed the resolution, but instead removed the case records from the office
of the Provincial Prosecutor and brought them to his residence. it appears
that the respondent has personally known to the accused as one of them is
his cousin. Aggrieved, the complainant sought the intervention of the
department of Justice. On June 20 2005, the complainant learned that the
case had been turned over to the Office but without Prosecutor Amerkhans
resolution and information. neither did the respondent approve nor act upon
the same prompting the complainant to file this case for disbarment
anchored on gross misconduct in office and dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. In his defense, the respondent claims that the delay
was not because of his alleged malicious action as he had inhibited himself
from the case and so it was assigned to Prosecutor Amerkhan. The IBP held
that the respondent is administratively liable violating Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Hence this petition.

Issue:

whether or not the action of the prosecutor in delaying the progress of the
complaint constitute grave misconduct

Held:

The court concur with the decision of the IBP but ruled that the respondent
has violated Canon 6 rule 6.02 “A lawyer in the government service shall not
use his public position, to promote advance and advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties” and not
Canon 18.

Respondent action and omissions in this case, appear to have been

committed for the benefit and to safeguard private interests. As a lawyer and
who is also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. It bears stressing
that a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government, he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.

The court ruled his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
year and is sternly warned that a repetition of the act will be dealt more
severely.
1 III. Duty of the Lawyer to the Society A. Duty to Uphold the Constitution and Obey the Laws of the
Land DR. PEREZ V ATTY CATINDIG AC 5816 MARCH 10, 2015 FACTS: Dr Perez and Atty Catindig had a
relationship while Atty. Catindig’s marriage with Lily Gomez still subsists. Both have been friends during
the mid 1960s, lost contact and after 23 years, they meet again. It was all the while known to Dr. Perez
that Atty. Catindig is still married however, Atty Catindig claims that he only married Gomez because he
got her pregnant and he don’t want her to make any scandal about the pregnancy. Atty. Catindig and
Gomez agreed to have their divorce and it took place at Dominican Republic. Thereafter, after securing
the Divorce Decree and confirming with Dr. Perez that it was lawful, they exchanged their vows in the
US and they begot 1 child. Years passed and Dr. Perez learned that the status of her marriage with Atty
Catindig remains invalid because Philippine Law does not recognize the divorce decree obtained from
Dominican Republic. Atty Catindig made promises with Dr Perez that he will legalize their unions but
eventually there were sudden change of events. Their relationship turned sour and Dr. Perez found out
that Atty Catindig is having an affair with a certain Atty. Baydo who was also employed in his law firm.
Soon after, Atty Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and made promise to Atty Baydo that he will marry her.
Atty Baydo on the other hand, denied their steaming affair. The case was referred to the IBP for
investigation. The IBP investigating commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for
gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR. The IBP-BOG adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner.Atty. Catindig, claiming that the
Investigating Commissioner relied only on Dr. Perez allegations and not substantiated with factual pieces
of evidence. Moreover, he claims that he never concealed his marriage to anyone and he had been
transparent to Gomez and Dr. Perez. The IBP-BOG denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty.
Catindig committed gross immorality that would warrant disbarment? RULING: Yes. The court affirmed
the recommendations of the IBP. The rule provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that at all times a lawyer shall uphold his integrity and
dignity. The act must not only be immoral but it must be gross to warrant disbarment. In the case at bar,
Atty. Catindig’s marriage with Dr. Perez while his marriage with Gomez still subsists manifest a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, which is protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. Therefore, warrants the penalty of disbarment. A.C. No. 10676: September 8,
2015 ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent. PER
CURIAM: 2 Facts: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue
embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant and respondent were best friends and both
graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being
admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit
relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit
relations involved: 1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992,
which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations; 2. BBB, sometime during the period
from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin; 3. CCC, despite
being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD; 4. DDD, sometime
during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically involved with CCC; 5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from
May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC. Issue: Should
Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred? Ruling: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral
conduct. CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to
the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity. In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several
adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007, including 3 complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email
messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to
establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence. In sum, Atty.
Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to
participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him
as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment. In Re: Ozaeta These are 2 petitions
regarding the two law firms mentioned in the title praying that they may retain the names of their
former partners “Sycip” and “Ozaeta” who both passed away. Issue: Whether or not the two law firms
may retain the names of their deceased partners. Ruling: The Court ruled that they should remove the
names of the deceased partners for the following reasons: 1. Previous jurisprudence: The Court already
ruled before in the Deen case that the name C.D. Johnston should be removed. There is also a later
ruling that “Perkins” in Perkins & Ponce-Enrile should be removed. These decisions ride on the fact that
Perkins and Johnston are dead. 2. Art 1815 of the Civil Code which states Art. 1815. Every partnership
shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall
be subject to the liability, of a partner. which implies that the partner must be living for his/her name to
be included. Heirs of the deceased cannot also be held liable or get a percentage (esp. if non-lawyers)
because the “partner” being dead doesn’t give service anymore. 3. Practical obligations: A lawyer can
just ride on the reputation of the old firm. 4. Law is a profession, not a business. A professional
partnership rides on the individual skill of the members. Profession - a group of men pursuing a learned
art as a common calling in the spirit of public service (def. by Dean Pound) CHARACTERISTICS THAT
DISTINGUISH LEGAL PROFESSION FROM BUSINESS 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is
a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money. 2. A
relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity,
and reliability. 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. 4 4. A relation to colleagues at the
bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 5. In the
Philippines, no local custom prevents or allows use of names of deceased in partnerships. Holding:
Petitions denied and petitioners are advised to drop the names but can be included in the listing of
individuals who have become partners in the firms indicating years served. Concur: Fernando Dissent:
Aquino – can be granted if indicated in letterhead that they are dead and the period served. E. Duty to
Keep Abreast with the Legal Profession Bumactao v. Atty Fano Sirs/Mesdames : Please take notice that
the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated April 7, 2014, which reads as follows: "A.C. No.
10286 (Atty. Rodrigo B. Bumactao vs. Atty. Restito F. Fano). — This involves a disciplinary complaint
directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant Atty. Rodrigo B. Bumactao
against respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano. In his complaint, 1 Atty. Bumactao charged Atty. Fano with
gross misconduct for having supposedly made a false representation in a pleading and a motion that the
latter filed with the Department of Labor and Employment. Atty. Fano was the counsel for Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa sa JJPNB Transport Services-Kapisanan sa Kapakanan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAKAMPI), a petitioner in proceedings relating to the "Petition for Certification Election of the Rank and
File Workers of JJPNB Transport Service" (petition for certification election) docketed as Case No. NCR-
QC-CE-02-20-5-11 and Case No. QC-CE-02- 17-6-11. 2 Atty. Bumactao alleged that Atty. Fano indicated
"MCLE Compliance No. III0018308" in two submissions to the Department of Labor and Employment:
first, KAKAMPI's "Reply to Respondent's Comment/Opposition" 3 dated August 17, 2011; second,
KAKAMPI's "Motion for Deferment of Certification Election," 4 also dated August 17, 2011. Supported by
a certification issued by the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Office 5 and dated
September 6, 2011, Atty. Bumactao asserted that Arty. Fano indicated an MCLE compliance number
despite 5 his failure to comply with the third MCLE compliance period. 6 Thus, as Atty. Fano supposedly
engaged in deceptive acts which are tantamount to gross misconduct, Atty. Bumactao prayed that
"appropriate disciplinary action . . . be imposed against respondent . . . ." 7 In his answer, 8 Atty. Fano
admitted to having indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" on both the reply and the motion.
Moreover, he admitted that it "is actually MCLE Compliance No. II-0018308," 9 albeit attributing the
error to his secretary/liaison officer. 10 Atty. Fano explained the error as having been made on account
of his reliance on the representation of the MCLE providers whose MCLE seminars he had attended (i.e.,
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila [PLM] Law Center and the IBP Quezon City Chapter), and since he
attended four (4) full MCLE seminars, he already completed the requisite number of MCLE units. He
asserted that he was belatedly informed that he had yet to complete two (2) units of Legal Ethics and
two (2) units of Trial Procedure. He emphasized that despite his protestations that it was the MCLE
providers which were in error, he still attended subsequent MCLE seminars so as to complete the
requisite number of MCLE units. 11 A mandatory conference was scheduled on March 28, 2012, but only
Atty. Fano appeared. The mandatory conference was terminated so as not to delay the disposition of
the case. The parties were then directed to submit their position papers. 12 On September 20, 2012, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera issued a report and recommendation 13 finding
that Atty. Fano should not be penalized as he acted in good faith, relying on the representations of the
MCLE providers. He held that, at most, Atty. Fano committed excusable negligence but not misconduct
which is so gross as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Thus, he recommended that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-443 dated April 16, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera's report and recommendation.
After a careful examination of the records, this court disagrees with the conclusions of Commissioner
Antiquiera and the IBP Board of Governors. His assertions of good faith notwithstanding, Atty. Fano
acted negligently and admittedly made false representations in the reply and the motion. In so doing, 6
he has vexed the Department of Labor and Employment as well as the parties and counsels adverse to
his clients' case in the proceedings relating to the petition for certification election by submitting a
deficient pleading and motion. Worse, he has jeopardized his clients' own case by seeking relief through
submissions which could have been expunged from the records and, therefore, rendered inutile. Thus,
we reverse Resolution No. XX-2013-443 and suspend Atty. Fano from the practice of law for one (1)
month. The legal profession requires lawyers to adhere to the "highest standards of truthfulness." 14 As
this court has stated in Ducat v. Villalon: 15 The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to
act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 16 This court has emphasized that
lawyers are "guardians of truth": By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice — a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from
the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated
by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high toned morality is more imperative than that of law. 17 Apart from these
exhortations on the exacting standards enjoined upon lawyers, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is clear in requiring lawyers to "observe the rules of procedure and . . . not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice." Here, it is established that Atty. Restito F. Fano falsely indicated "MCLE
Compliance No. III-0018308" in two submissions to the Department of Labor and Employment, i.e., in a
reply and in a motion. The admitted falsity 7 notwithstanding, Atty. Fano endeavored to douse his
culpability by shifting the blame to the MCLE providers, namely, PLM Law Center and the IBP Quezon
City Chapter, and insisting that he acted in good faith. He likewise attributed the indication of "MCLE
Compliance No. III-0018308" to his secretary/liaison officer as an "honest mistake . . . because of the
pressure of his many duties." 18 We are not impressed. Bar Matter No. 1922 dated June 3, 2008
requires "practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-
judicial bodies; the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable . . . ." It further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records." At the very least, Atty. Fano was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE compliance. This
is a sort of negligence that is hardly excusable. As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Fano ought to
have known that non-compliance would have resulted in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may
file before any tribunal. The grave consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding, Atty. Fano (by his
own account) admitted to having complacently relied on the statements of MCLE providers. His
negligence, therefore, risked harm not only upon himself — with him now burdened with the present
complaint as a direct consequence — but worse, upon his clients whose reliefs they seek through their
pleadings being possibly rendered inoperative. Atty. Fano's claim that the indication of "MCLE
Compliance No. III-0018308" was made by his secretary/liaison officer affords him no relief. As this court
has stated in Gutierrez v. Zulueta: 19 The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that
the failure is attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is
expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the pleadings to be filed in court and he
should not delegate this responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise,
irresponsible members of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply
disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the office secretary. Such
situation will not be countenanced by this Court. 20 In sum, Atty. Fano has not only fallen short of the
standard of accuracy and truth that is required of members of the bar. He has also heaped upon the
Department of Labor and Employment the vexation of having to tend to a deficient pleading 8 and
motion. In so doing, he has fallen short of the injunction for him to diligently adhere to rules of
procedure. He has heaped upon adverse parties and counsels the same vexation. In fact, had attention
to his error not been called through this present complaint, Atty. Fano could have very well been free to
foist his error on even more litigants, fellow lawyers, and tribunals. Worst, he has endangered his own
clients' entitlement to lawful relief. He has effectively compelled them to bear the burden of summarily
perfunctorily losing remedies through a formally deficient pleading and motion. Not being merely
negligent but having engendered damage upon a tribunal, adverse litigants and counsels, and even his
own clients, Atty. Fano is suspended by this court from the practice of law. WHEREFORE, Resolution No.
XX-2013-443 of the IBP Board of Governors is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Restito F.
Fano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and STERNLY WARNED that any similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this resolution be entered in the record of
respondent and served on the IBP as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED." Very truly yours, (SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA
SORIANO Division Clerk of Court UY v. MAGHARI September 01, 2015 This resolves a Complaint1 for
disbarment directly filed before this court by complainant Wilson Uy, the designated administrator of
the estate of Jose Uy. This Complaint charges respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari) with
engaging in deceitful conduct and violating the Lawyer's Oath. Specifically, Maghari is charged with the
use of information that is false and/or appropriated from other lawyers in signing certain pleadings.2 9
On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the Bacolod City Regional Trial
Court praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the
deceased Jose Uy. Hofileña was initially designated administratrix.4 However, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose
Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children.5 In its Order dated June 9, 1998, the
Regional Trial Court designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate. Subsequently, Hofileña's
claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution8
dated September 14, 2007. In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the
conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El
(Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these proceedings (i.e., in the Comment dated May
27, 2009 filed before the Court of Appeals9), There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy
and the other heirs of Jose Uy.11 In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad
testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the treasurer of several
businesses owned by Jose Uy.12 In its Order13dated April 20, 2010, the Regional Trial Court granted
Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy. Thereafter,
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy.14 In signing this Motion, Maghari
indicated the following details: PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III Counsel for Magdalena Uy 590 Ylac St.,
Villamonte Bacolod City IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C. PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C. ROLL NO.
20865 MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied) On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his
Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.16 Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to
Wilson Uy's Opposition. This Reply was dated 10 December 8, 2010. In signing this Reply, Maghari
indicated the following details: PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III Counsel for Magdalena Uy 590 Ylac St.,
Villamonte Bacolod City IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C. PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C. ROLL NO.
20865 MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied) The Regional Trial Court subsequently
denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.19 Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for
Reconsideration20 dated July 15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III Counsel for Magdalena Uy 590 Ylac St., Villamonte Bacolod City IBP O.R. No.
815530 1/4/11 B.C. PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C. ROLL NO. 20865 MCLE Compl. IH-0000762
1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied) As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied,22 Maghari filed for
Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum23 dated March 8, 2012. In signing this
Motion, Maghari indicated the following details: PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte Bacolod City IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C. PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869 MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied) At this point, Wilson Uy's
counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to
have only recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted 11 Wilson Uy to check the records of
Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional
details of Atty. Natu-El.25 Wilson Uy then filed a Motion26 to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect
contempt (as by then she had still not complied with the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require
Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the professional details of another lawyer. In its Order27
dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as no
verified petition asking that she be so cited had been filed. 28 On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before
this court the present Complaint for disbarment.29 Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing
and using another lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's
Oath and acted in a deceitful manner. In the Resolution30 dated November 12, 2014, this court directed
Maghari to file his Comment on Wilson Uy's Complaint. This court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, received Maghari's Comment31 on March 2, 2015. For resolution are the issues of whether
respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty may
be meted on him. I Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by
complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries
were mere overlooked errors: For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or pleading had
been printed and ready for signature, all what [sic] he did after cursorily going over it was to affix his
signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name, without giving any special or particular attention
to details as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers", considering that these are matters of record and are
easily verifiable, thus he gains nothing by "the usurpation of professional details of another lawyer" and
has no sinister motive or ill-purpose in so doing[.]32 He attempts to diminish the significance of the
dubious entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He faults complainant for "nitpicking"33
and calls him a "sore loser"34 and a 12 "disgruntled litigant"35 who is merely "making a mountain out of
a molehill"36 and is predisposed to "fault-finding." He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant,"37
he has provided what are supposedly his correct professional details: 2009 IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22,
2008 - Bacolod City PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009
and III-0000762-Jan. 14, 200 2010 IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City PTR No. 3793872 -
Jan. 4, 2010 -Bacolod City MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009 2011
IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City MCLE Compl.
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009 2012 IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City PTR No. 4631737 - Jan.
2, 2012 -Bacolod City MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009 II Respondent's avowals, protestations,
and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress. The duplicitous entries speak for themselves.
The errors are manifest and respondent admits their existence. This court would perhaps be well
counseled to absolve respondent of liability or let him get away with a proverbial slap on the wrist if all
that was involved were a typographical 13 error, or otherwise, an error or a handful of errors made in an
isolated instance or a few isolated instances. So too, if the error pertained to only one of the several
pieces of information that lawyers are required to indicate when signing pleadings. None of these can be
said of this case. Respondent did not merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from it. First,
respondent violated clear legal requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way
he did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he did so repeatedly. Before our eyes is a
pattern of deceit. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been appropriated from another
lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another
lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly changing information from one pleading to another
demonstrates the intent to mock and ridicule courts and legal processes. Respondent toyed with the
standards of legal practice. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for
disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws and legal orders,
doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best of one's capacity, and acting with
fidelity to both court and client: No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on
complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent and mocking violation of
statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to courts. His swiping of
another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the legal profession. The unnecessary risks
that he foiled on his client as a possible result of deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his
client. Thus, respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he took to be
admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is woefully
unworthy of an officer of the court. He was not even a good citizen. As respondent has fallen short of
the ethical standards apropos to members of the legal profession, we find it proper to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years. III The requirement of a counsel's signature in
pleadings, the significance of this requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance are spelled out
in Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court: Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a
post office box. 14 The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay. A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality
nor even a mere means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a
positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the pleading, that
there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her
competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that
this court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he
has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters. Responsibility provides: Rule 9.01 — A lawyer
shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer
amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)
As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities. The inclusion of a counsel's Roll
of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt
(or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice.
They seek to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to
engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a
lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar.45 With the professional tax receipt number,
they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she
principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the same
person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of information, in the words of Galicto v.
Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus lawyers."46 Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that
proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily
devolved to 15 local government units. The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or
exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is
reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with
law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the
practice of law."47 Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to facilitate
the dispensation of justice. These pieces of information aid in the service of court processes, enhance
compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better representation of a client's cause. In
Juane v. Garcia,48this court took occasion to expound on the significance of putting on record a
counsel's address: The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind the members of the Bar that
it is their inescapable duty to make of record their correct address in all cases in which they are counsel
for a suitor. For, instances there have been in the past when, because of failure to inform the court of
the change of address, litigations were delayed. And this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the
other parties and the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such
negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a setback in a legal
battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's failure to receive notice because the
latter has changed the place of his law office without giving the proper notice therefor. It is unsettling
that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of the very same badges—his place in
the Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional,
his continuing training and competence—that are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he
manifested such contempt for these badges, we find that there is every reason for preventing him, at
least temporarily, from engaging in the profession these badges signify. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution. 16 EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001] MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION R E S O L U T I O N
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP,
endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court
Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the
following Revised Rules for proper implementation: Rule 1. PURPOSE SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE.
Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics
of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval
of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall
commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in
accordance with these Rules. SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not
exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal
education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours: (a) At least six (6) hours shall be
devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units. (b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to
trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units. (c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to
alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units. (d) At least nine (9) hours shall be
devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit
units. (e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4)
credit units. (f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions
equivalent to two (2) credit units. 17 (g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as
may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units. Rule 3. COMPLIANCE
PERIOD SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later than
three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members
admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for
thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period. SEC. 2.
Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into
three (3) compliance groups, namely: (a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region
(NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1. (b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in
Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2. (c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas
and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3. Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal
education activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE
requirement. SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be
assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of
admission or readmission. The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on
the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group. (a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial
compliance period after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with the
program requirement for the initial compliance. (b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the
initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a
number of hours of approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months
remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall
be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of
months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole
number. Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU) SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE
EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under
the Rules, based on the 18 category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following are
the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor:
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS,
CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND
TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES 1.1
PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS 1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE
OR SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS CERTIFICATION 1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR
THE CERTIFICATION COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ORGANIZATION FACILITATOR 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW 2.1
LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD 2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY
WITH PROOF AS EDITOR 2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/
SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/ CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED 19 TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER 2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE LEAST TEN (10) PAGES
SUBJECT PER COMPLIANCE PERIOD 2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED LAW JOURNAL
EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL 2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF BAR
REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are
either participatory or non-participatory. SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory
credit units may be claimed for: (a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences,
conventions, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities. (c) Teaching in a law school or
lecturing in a bar review class. SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit
units may be claimed per compliance period for: (a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written
materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book
review which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in the
ordinary course of the members practice or employment. (b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal
newsletter. Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH) SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. --
Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest
one-quarter hour reported in decimals. 20 Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the
MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement: (a) The President
and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive
Departments; (b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; (c) The Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent
members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial
Academy program of continuing judicial education; (d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor
and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice; (e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant
Solicitors General; (f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel; (g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions; (h) The Ombudsman, the
Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman; (i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions; (j) Incumbent deans,
bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in
accredited law schools; (k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and (l) Governors and Mayors. SEC. 2. Other
parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt: (a) Those who
are not in law practice, private or public. (b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval
of the IBP Board of Governors. SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A
member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability,
illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification
of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a
procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee. 21 SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance
period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections
1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group. SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the
MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents. Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the
implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education
program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an
accreditedprovider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the
provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education. SEC. 2. Standards for all
education activities. All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards: (a) The
activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content. (b) The activity shall constitute an
organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross
profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to
practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy. (c) The activity shall be conducted by
a provider with adequate professional experience. (d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in
length, substantive written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be
distributed at or before the time the activity is offered. (e) In-house education activities must be
scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other
distractions. Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. --
Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee. SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation
of providers. Any person or group may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which
may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities,
including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee; (b) Contain all information requested in
the form; (c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee. 22 SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers.
-- All approved accredited providers shall agree to the following: (a) An official record verifying the
attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of attendance only if the
members signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of
attendance shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the
time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE. (b) The provider shall certify that: (1) This activity has been approved
BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal
ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity; (2) The activity conforms to the standards for
approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by
the MCLE COMMITTEE. (c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying
the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity. (d) The provider shall allow in-person
observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of
the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes of
monitoring compliance with these Rules. (e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the
nature of the activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall
make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity
Evaluation Form. (f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a
period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE. (g) Any
person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious
certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions. SEC. 4. Renewal of
provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be
denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide
satisfactory education activities for the preceding period. SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. --
the accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE
Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause. Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND
ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education
activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the
Schedule of MCLE Fees. Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES 23 SECTION 1. Compliance card.
-- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the
education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance
Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members
compliance period. SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain
sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required
to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient
record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be
maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5. Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE
PROCEDURES SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-
compliance: (a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period; (b) Failure
to provide attestation of compliance or exemption; (c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of
compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period; (d) Failure to satisfy the
education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of
non-compliance notice; (e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; (f) Any other
act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with
the MCLE requirements. SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance.
-Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will
be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or
otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language
near the beginning of the notice in capital letters: IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU
SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE. Members
given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the adequate
number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE 24 SECTION 1. Non-
compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee. SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member
who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired,
shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee.
The investigation of a member for noncompliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee. SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. --
Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she
is listed as a delinquent member. Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing
as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the
MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary
credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is
on inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed
to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process.
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by
the MCLE Committee. Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SECTION
1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice
of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or
law professors. The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be
appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as
may be determined by the Court. SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and
adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It
shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court. SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the
Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the
record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions. SEC. 4. Submission of
annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget
[for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program. 25 This resolution shall take effect
on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines. Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Kapunan, J., on official leave. Samuel B.
Arnado vs. Atty. Homobono A. Adaza Facts: In March 15, 2013, Arnado called the attention of the SC to
the practice of Adaza of indicating “MCLE application for exemption under process” in his pleadings filed
in 2009-2012, and “MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a pleading filed in 2012.
Arnado informed the SC that he inquired from the MCLE Office of the status of Adaza’s compliance and
received a Certification from the MCLE Executive Director that Adaza did not comply with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850 for the periods: First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 – April 14,
2004); Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 – April 14, 2007); and Third Compliance Period (April
15, 2007 – April 14, 2010). Also, his application for exemption from MCLE requirement on 2009 was
denied by the MCLE Governors on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of
expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. In his Comment, Adaza stated that he
was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. Adaza then enumerated his
achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years. He stated: 1.
that he was the first outsider of the SC whom president Cory offered a seat as Justice of the SC but
refused the intended appointment because he hid not like some of the Cory crowd; 2. That he almost
single-handedly handled the case of Cory in canvassing of the results in the 1986 snap elections,
discussing constitutional and legal issues which finally resulted to EDSA I revolution; 3. That he was one
of the two lead counsels of Senator MDS in the national canvassing for President, the other counsel
being the former Justice Serafin Cuevas; 4. The he handled the 1987 and 1989, as well as the 2003 Coup
cases; 5. That he filed a case in the SC contesting the constitutionality of 2010 national elections; 6. That
he filed a case together with another lawyer in the SC on the constitutionality of the Corona
impeachment; 7. That he have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as
Governor of Misamis Oriental, Commission of Immigration and senior member of the Opposition in the
regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments; 8. That he
was the leading Opposition member Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law; 9. That he was
the leading member of the Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate in the complaint for
impeachment against President Marcos; 10. That he has been engaged as lawyer for a number of
lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE. He also further claimed that he had written five books.
The OBC recommended that Adaza be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of
noncompliance with the MCLE requirements. It further recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for six months. Issue: Is Adaza administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements? Ruling: Yes. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education “to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, 26
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law”. Arnado’s letter
covered Adaza’s pleadings filed in 2009 – 2012, which means he also failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period (April 15, 2010 – April 14, 2013). According to the MCLE
Governing Board, Adaza’s application for exemption covered First and Second Compliance Periods, but
did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The application for exemption was denied
on January 2009, however, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption
of Adaza, and only informed him in its letter dated October 1, 2012 when it received inquiries from
complainants. Clearly, Adaza had been remised in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar
Matter No. 850. But the MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on Adaza’s
application for exemption on January 14, 2009, it took the office three years to inform Adaza of the
denial of his application. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated “MCLE application for
exemption under process” in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board
on his application for exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application
for exemption, it still took Adaza one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, Adaza still took, and still taking, his time to satisfy the requirements of
MCLE. In addition, when Adaza indicated “MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a
pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office. Adaza’s failure to
comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his
declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: § 1976: General Bank &
Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in
the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover. § 1977: Genbank was
declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbank’s assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the
bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of
Genbank. § 1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his
family and cronies. § 1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami
sila). In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired
by the respondents by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos.
Sandiganbayan heard the case. § Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos)
represented the respondents. § 1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his
participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that
PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. § Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s motion. According to the Sandiganbayan,
Mendoza did not take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986. Issue: § W/N
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza Held: § No, it does not
apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed. 27 § The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of
Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of
Genbank. This is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
§ The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter involved in the
PCGG case against the Lucio Tan group. § The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be
substantial and important. The role of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered
insubstantial. § SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to
disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyle’s interpretation:
PCGG getting desperate § Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will
make it harder for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because of the
prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to one’s work as a government counsel.
WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008 Facts. Petitioner
initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a
building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where Respondent was the
punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive
at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent
on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay,
he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an
elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA6713. Consequently, for the violation of the
latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Respondent was then recommended for
suspension from the practice of law. Issue. Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Ruling. Yes. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not
require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law
only with the written 28 permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Notwithstanding all of these, respondent still
should have procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required
by civil service regulations. For this failure, responded violated his oath as a lawyer, that is, to obey the
laws, Rule 1.01, CPR and, for not complying with the ethical standards of the legal profession, Canon 7,
CPR. Respondent was found GUILTY of professional misconduct, SUSPENDED from the practice of law
and was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. MA. CECILIA
CLARISSA C v. ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA FACTS: This administrative case stemmed from the
complaint for disbarment dated June 16, 2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C.
Advincula (Dr. Advincula). In her complaint,[1] Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed
unlawful and immoral acts;[2] that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital
sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga);[3] that the extra-marital relations bore a
child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula (Alexandria);[4] that Atty. Advincula failed to
give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose
Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources.that siring a child with a woman other than his
lawful wife was conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer;[8] that
contracting a subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an unlawful
conduct;[9] that making a false declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct punishable
under the Revised Penal Code;[10] and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to
his children showed his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer.[11] Dr.
Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred. In his answer,[13] Atty. Advincula denied the
accusations. He asserted that during the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the
birth of their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they could not
agree on various matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that Dr.
Advincula abandoned the rented family home with the two children to live with her parents; that
despite their separation, he 29 regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their children; that
during their separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a
second marriage with Ms. Gonzaga. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF EXTRA MARITAL
RELATIONSHIP OF ATTY. ADVINCULA TANTAMOUNT TO GROSS IMMORAL ACT THAT WARRANTS THE
PENALTY OF DISBARMENT HELD: Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD shows that the conduct
in issue of Atty. Advincula is immoral but not grossly immoral that would warrant the penalty of
disbarment. It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to Respondent Leo
Palma's case earlier decided of this Court on the same issue of immorality of members of the Bar. But
the ruling of the court is that on different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for
immorality based on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Yet, we cannot sanction Atty.
Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate
wife constituted immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The
degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already
a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the
circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law
for three months to be condign and appropriate. Heck v. Gamotin Facts: In September 2000,
complainant Heinz Heck filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Casiano A.
Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City. According to Heck, he was a victim of the "faulty, highly improper,
suspicious anomalous and unlawful practice" by the respondent, who had obstructed justice by delaying
cases and disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty. Ce(s)ilo A. Adaza, his
business partners and friends. 30 On September 15, 2000, Heck, his wife, child, and counsel went to the
respondent's office for another meeting. Atty. Adaza arrived and went straight inside the respondent's
office and then called Heck and his group in as if the office was his own. On that occasion, Heck was told
that if he agreed, all cases would be settled and withdrawn. Heck then asked why the respondent was
still entertaining Atty. Adaza despite his having been already suspended from the practice of law by the
Supreme Court. The respondent raised his voice asking how Heck had learned about the suspension, and
whether it was a final decision of the Supreme Court.[5] Moreover, Heck recalled: That the City
Prosecutor x x x now was screaming at me, as no one has ever screamed at me in my sixty (60) years of
live [sic]. That he x x x "never received such information and that this Supreme Court decision is not
final", he was now repeating himself again and again. Here Adaza came in and remarked (when Gamotin
Jr. was catching his breath) that he, Adaza had appealed against this decision[)] Gamotin, Jr. continued
screaming at me, (")that he, (Gamotin) is the ["]Authority and the Law.”[6] Heck stated that he tried to
explain his situation calmly to the respondent, but the respondent continued screaming at him, saying:
You foreigner, go home here we the law of the Filipinos, I am the Authority.[7] Heck then left the office
of the respondent upon the prodding of his counsel. He claimed that his wife and child became very
scared. In his response to the charge of Heck, the respondent averred that: (1) he had no personal
knowledge of Atty. Adaza's suspension, because such information had not been properly disseminated
to the public offices; (2) there were no irregularities in the filing and resolution of the motion for
reconsideration of Atty. Adaza; (3) the September 11, 2000 meeting had not been arranged by him, but
by Heck's counsel in order to discuss the possibility of settlement; hence, he did not take part in the
meeting; (4) he did not display any act of violence, particularly the kicking of the chair and slamming of
the door, aside from such acts being improbable because of his age and build; (5) the September 14,
2000 meeting was between the parties' counsels to discuss ways to settle their cases, and Heck was the
one who did not agree to the suggestion of withdrawing the cases; (6) it was Heck who acted arrogantly
when he challenged the respondent's authority in allowing Atty. Adaza to appear in court despite his
suspension; and (7) he admitted that when Heck uttered the words: I will not believe the authorities of
the Philippines, he slightly raised his voice to respond: If you will not believe the authorities of the
Philippines, you have no place in this country, you can go home. Plaintiff filed a disbarment case against
the respondent. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCED ADDUCED AGAINST City Prosecutor Casiano
A. Gamotin IS ENOUGH TO WARRANT THE ULTIMATE PENALTY OF DISBARMENT HELD: No. Like the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), we consider that the evidence adduced by the complainant
insufficient to warrant the disbarment of the respondent. Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the Integrated Bar. As such, the power to disbar
is always exercised with great caution only for the most imperative 31 reasons and in cases of clear
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. we cannot sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Heck's unexpected
tirade in his presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person, but to Heck's
disrespectful remark against Philippine authorities in general. Any self-respecting government official
like the respondent should feel justly affronted by any expression or show of disrespect in his presence,
including harsh words like those uttered by Heck. Whether or not Heck was justified in making the
utterance is of no relevance to us. Lawyers may be expected to maintain their composure and decorum
at all times, but they are still human, and their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in
unexpected situations that can crack their veneer of selfcontrol. That is how we now view the actuation
of the respondent in reacting to Heck's utterance. The Court will not permit the respondent's good
record to be tarnished by his having promptly reacted to Heck's remark. Case dismissed and consider
this administrative matter closed and terminated.

Noble vs. Ailes

A.C. No. 10628; July 1, 2015

Facts:

Maximino alleged that Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. Maximino
claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint. Orlando’s IBP O.R. number should have
already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa
against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through
text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "
x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost
in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from
[you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol." Records show that Orlando even prepared a
Notice to Terminate Services of CounseI in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximina "x x
x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of
which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent
as well as the award of damages.

In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his
dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration which was however denied in a Resolution with
modification deleting the warning.

Issue:
Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Ailes.

Held:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with
them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls
short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements
were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been
more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness
as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned
Maximino to his client.

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure
to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for
the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.

Malabed vs. De La Pena

A.C. No. 7594; February 9, 2016

Facts:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed against Atty. Meljohn B. De
la Peña for dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for “deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood”
that “misled the Court”; second, that respondent did not furnih her counsel with a copy of the free
patent but forwarded a copy to the CA; third, that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest; last, that
respondent connived with Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Held:

Yes.

For using foul language in pleadings

Aside from the language used being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While
respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong, we stated:

x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Non- submission of the certificate to file action

Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which
act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.

Conflict of Interest

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings which
were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to
present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and
Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed
against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a
government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not
object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.
Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon
him by the Court.

Gross Misconduct

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Binay-an vs. Addog

A.C. No. 10449; July 28, 2014

Facts:

According to the complainants, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of Barot
Binay-an, called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. Paul Palos and Bienvenido Palos, who are also
heirs of Barot Binay-an and their co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07, and the respondent were
present in the meeting. During the meeting, Damaso and the respondent managed to convince Paul and
Bienvenido to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance, which were later notarized by the respondent.
The respondent subsequently submitted the Affidavits ofDesistance to the NCIP, which the NCIP Hearing
Officer denied. The NCIP Hearing Officer also cautioned the respondent on the ethical consideration in
having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his representation for the defendants.
Thus, the complaint for misconduct against the respondent, which was filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct.

Held:

It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07
to execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo. In this regard,
the respondent should have been mindful of the canon dictating that:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as
to the law.

In Likong v. Lim, the Court disciplined and imposed a penalty of one ( 1) year from the practice of law on
a lawyer who prepared a compromise agreement between the parties in an action for injunction with
damages, without informing the opposing counsel of the agreement. The Court conc:uded,
"[u]ndoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of thE legal profession."

Similarly in this case, the respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal profession and
must, therefore, be disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise
prevent justice from being attained."

Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Noble vs. Ailes

A.C. No. 10628; July 1, 2015

Facts:

Maximino alleged that Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. Maximino
claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint. Orlando’s IBP O.R. number should have
already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.
Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa
against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through
text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "
x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost
in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from
[you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol." Records show that Orlando even prepared a
Notice to Terminate Services of CounseI in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximina "x x
x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of
which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent
as well as the award of damages.

In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his
dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration which was however denied in a Resolution with
modification deleting the warning.

Issue:

Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Ailes.

Held:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with
them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls
short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements
were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been
more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness
as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned
Maximino to his client.

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure
to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for
the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.

Malabed vs. De La Pena

A.C. No. 7594; February 9, 2016

Facts:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed against Atty. Meljohn B. De
la Peña for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for “deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood”
that “misled the Court”; second, that respondent did not furnih her counsel with a copy of the free
patent but forwarded a copy to the CA; third, that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest; last, that
respondent connived with Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Held:

Yes.

For using foul language in pleadings

Aside from the language used being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While
respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong, we stated:

x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Non- submission of the certificate to file action

Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which
act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.

Conflict of Interest

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings which
were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to
present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and
Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed
against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a
government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not
object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.
Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon
him by the Court.

Gross Misconduct

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Binay-an vs. Addog

A.C. No. 10449; July 28, 2014

Facts:
According to the complainants, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of Barot
Binay-an, called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. Paul Palos and Bienvenido Palos, who are also
heirs of Barot Binay-an and their co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07, and the respondent were
present in the meeting. During the meeting, Damaso and the respondent managed to convince Paul and
Bienvenido to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance, which were later notarized by the respondent.
The respondent subsequently submitted the Affidavits ofDesistance to the NCIP, which the NCIP Hearing
Officer denied. The NCIP Hearing Officer also cautioned the respondent on the ethical consideration in
having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his representation for the defendants.
Thus, the complaint for misconduct against the respondent, which was filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct.

Held:

It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07
to execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo. In this regard,
the respondent should have been mindful of the canon dictating that:

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as
to the law.

In Likong v. Lim, the Court disciplined and imposed a penalty of one ( 1) year from the practice of law on
a lawyer who prepared a compromise agreement between the parties in an action for injunction with
damages, without informing the opposing counsel of the agreement. The Court conc:uded,
"[u]ndoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of thE legal profession."
Similarly in this case, the respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal profession and
must, therefore, be disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise
prevent justice from being attained."

Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Tapay vs. Bancolo

A.C. No. 9604; March 20, 2013

Facts:

Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged
signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo
for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents
engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.

Issue:

Whether or not Bancolo is administratively liable.

Held:

Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Angeles vs. Baggay

A.C. No. 8103; December 3, 2014

Facts:

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by
Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M.
Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato
C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the
country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had
information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer
and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the
documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign
the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of
the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a
certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008.

Issue:

Whether or not the notarization documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.

Held:

Yes.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim
that it was his secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary
which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his
notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these
items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced
by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a
conscious act of what his secretary did.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only
damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires
lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to
practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he
was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that
their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the
notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the
persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Umaguing vs. De Vera

A.C. No. 10451; February 4, 2015

Facts:

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the
year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants lodged
an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. Complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera
to pay his acceptance fee of ₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses
in the amount of ₱30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time
to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary
documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of
material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica and Angela Almera, which was personally prepared by Atty.
De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip and
Hendricson Fielding to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign
over the names. The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin and
Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
Donato Manguiat. Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the
signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize
Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosill, who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error it was observed
that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the
affidavits at hand were falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear
before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not
offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give
him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De
Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering
that he only appeared twice for the case.

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be administratively liable.

Held:

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected
to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as
a bona fide member of the Law Profession.

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release Waiver &
Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes
of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court
its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott that:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stem disciplinary sanctions.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 75209; September 30, 1987

Facts:

The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987
outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building.

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the
Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause why
he should not be administratively dealt with.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an
assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the
picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of
about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas should be administratively
dealt with.
Held:

Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of
justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.” The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the
citizenry at large to have their causes tried fairly.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an abuse
thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being non- lawyers, the
duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to
properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.

The contempt changes were dismissed.

Enriquez vs. Lavadia

Disbarment filed against Atty. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance
of his duties as a lawyer.

Facts:

On march 18, 2000: Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and affidavits within 30
days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be submitted for decision.
However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being declared
default. The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal
with sufficient bond but was dismissed based on section 7(b) rule 40 of ROC. Atty. Lavadia failed to
file the appeal of memorandum after more than 71 days. He moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied by the RTC in its order pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension
and still no memorandum was filed. Hence the disbarment case against Atty, Lavadia in failing to
file the necessary pleadings before the court, he caused them great damage and prejudice. This
constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance as his duty as a lawyer. The court
required that Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment but failed to do so saying that its due to his
heavy case load and family problems. The court gave him extensions but failed to show cause. The
court referred the case to IBP. The IBP recommended that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred. They found
that not only Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as counsel
in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his client’s interest, he also displayed a willful,
defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the resolution of the court.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Lavadia violated the CPR?

Held:

Atty. Lavadia was disbarred for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.

The court has granted every opportunity to file his reply to the complaint. The court has issued no
less than 8 resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: 2 which ordered him to pay fines of
P1000 and P2000 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the
court’s resolutions. The court has granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his reply to the
complaint. This reflects his willful disregard for court orders putting in question his suitability to
discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer.
Crisostomo vs. Nazareno

Facts:

In 2001, the complainants in the disbarment case filed against Atty. Philip Nazareno bought housing
units in Patricia South Subdivision, from Rudex International Development Corporation (rudex).
They then filed, in two batches, complaints for rescission of contracts against Rudex. In all of these
cases, Rudex was representerd by Atty. Nazareno. In the first batch of cases, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) rendered judgements in default against Rudex, hence the latter filed
petitions for review before the HLURB assailing them. In the certifications against forum shopping,
Atty. Nazareno as counsel of rudex and ruben, the president of rudex stated that they have they
have not commenced or has knowledge of any action involving the same issues pending before the
NLRC, this despite Rudex filed ejectment cases against the complainants therein. Rudex again filed a
complaint for rescission of contract with the HLURB against Melinda Sioting. Again, the certification
against no forum shopping signed by Norilyn stated that no pending action involving the same
issues were pending, which certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno. On april 2004, Rudex
again filed 6 complaints for rescission of contracr against the other complainants, with the same
manifestation in the certification against forum shopping.

The Complainants then filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Nazareno, alleging that he made
false declaration in the certifications against them. Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno did not submit his
comment during the proceedings. In the meantime, the HLURB dismissed the complaints filed by
Rudex due to the erroneous certification against forum shopping. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner recommended the suspension from the practice of law for 6 months of Atty.
Nazareno. The IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the investigating commissioner
but modified it to one month suspension from the practice of law.
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable?

Held:

The Court affirm the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed. Separate from the
proscription against forum shopping is the violation of the certification requirement against forum
shopping, which was distinguished in the case of sps. Ong vs. CA as follows:

The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement
should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the
certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of
forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms
of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient
cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon
motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct
contempt. The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification
requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with
the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the
act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with
the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in
terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof
and for direct contempt.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false declarations
in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary
public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby
REVOKED.

De los Santos vs. Barbosa

Facts:

A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis)
against her father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco (Canaco).
Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate of live birth of her son,
Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's certificate of live birth that she was
married to De Los Santos, Sr. on September 1, 1974 in San Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such
marriage took place.

On April 24, 2002, an Information was filed against Canaco for violation of Sections 1 and 2 in
relation with Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 651. Particularly, Canaco was charged of
"willfully, unlawfully and knowingly making false statements in the Certificate of Live Birth form for
her son Victor P. Delos Santos who was born on June 30, 1982 by falsely stating that she was
married to the father of her son, RICARDO P. DELOS SANTOS on September 1, 1974."

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 111152 and assigned to the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 43 of Quezon City.

At the preliminary conference held on May 24, 2004, the respondent, as counsel de parte of Canaco,
objected to the Prosecution's offer in evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of Victor Canaco
Delos Santos. As a result, the MeTC issued an order resetting the preliminary conference to October
19, 2004 in order to give the prosecution time to file a certified true copy of the birth certificate.

On May 25, 2004, the respondent sent letters[5] dated May 24, 2004 to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital. 

There is being distributed by unauthorized person/s a purported copy of Certificate of Live Birth
above indicated which refers to one certain VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS. In this connection,
please be guided by provisions of our existing laws regarding possible violation of the secrecy and
confidentiality of records.

Assuming without admitting that such facts of birth records exists, please be guided that my client,
VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS, has never authorized anybody to secure a copy, Xerox or
otherwise, and only upon his written authority and with undersigned counsel's signature and
verification may a copy be officially reproduced, if any exist.

Canaco, through the respondent, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated October 19,
2004 directing the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum. In its order dated July 8,
2005, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Victor D. De Los Santos II [herein complainant (brother of Rodis and son of Delos
Santos, Sr.)] filed a complaint with the prosecutor charging the respondent for obstruction of
justice.

In defense, the respondent argued, among others, that the name of his client Canaco's son is VICTOR
C. DE LOS SANTOS and not VICTOR P. DE LOS SANTOS as stated in the Information charging Canaco
with violation of Presidential Decree No. 651. Thus, the respondent vehemently denied that he
intentionally intended to delay and obstruct the proceedings in the MeTC.

The prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:

WON Atty. Barbosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:

After a careful study of the records, the Court approves the findings of the IBP Commission and the
IBP Board of Governors, but resolves to modify the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law to a period of one (1) year

Unduly Delaying the Proceedings

Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise states that "[a] lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes."

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. A lawyer
should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or
improper practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient
administration of justice

Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client

Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers owe candor, fairness, and good
faith to the court. Particularly, Rule 10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice."
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer's first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice

Tapay vs. Bancolo

A.C. No. 9604; March 20, 2013

Facts:

Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged
signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo
for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents
engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.

Issue:

Whether or not Bancolo is administratively liable.

Held:

Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Angeles vs. Baggay

A.C. No. 8103; December 3, 2014

Facts:

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by
Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M.
Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato
C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the
country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had
information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer
and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the
documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign
the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of
the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a
certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008.

Issue:

Whether or not the notarization documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.

Held:

Yes.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim
that it was his secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary
which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his
notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these
items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced
by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a
conscious act of what his secretary did.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only
damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires
lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to
practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he
was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that
their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the
notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the
persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Umaguing vs. De Vera

A.C. No. 10451; February 4, 2015

Facts:

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the
year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants lodged
an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. Complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera
to pay his acceptance fee of ₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses
in the amount of ₱30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time
to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary
documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of
material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica and Angela Almera, which was personally prepared by Atty.
De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip and
Hendricson Fielding to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign
over the names. The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin and
Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
Donato Manguiat. Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the
signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize
Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosill, who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error it was observed
that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the
affidavits at hand were falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear
before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not
offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give
him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De
Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering
that he only appeared twice for the case.

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be administratively liable.

Held:

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected
to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as
a bona fide member of the Law Profession.

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release Waiver &
Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes
of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court
its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott that:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stem disciplinary sanctions.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 75209; September 30, 1987

Facts:

The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987
outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building.

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the
Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause why
he should not be administratively dealt with.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an
assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the
picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of
about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas should be administratively
dealt with.
Held:

Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of
justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.” The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the
citizenry at large to have their causes tried fairly.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an abuse
thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being non- lawyers, the
duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to
properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.

The contempt changes were dismissed.

Noble vs. Ailes

A.C. No. 10628; July 1, 2015

Facts:
Maximino alleged that Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. Maximino
claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint. Orlando’s IBP O.R. number should have
already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa
against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through
text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "
x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost
in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from
[you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol." Records show that Orlando even prepared a
Notice to Terminate Services of CounseI in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximina "x x
x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of
which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent
as well as the award of damages.

In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his
dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration which was however denied in a Resolution with
modification deleting the warning.

Issue:

Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Ailes.

Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with
them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls
short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements
were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been
more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness
as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned
Maximino to his client.

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure
to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for
the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.

Malabed vs. De La Pena

A.C. No. 7594; February 9, 2016

Facts:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed against Atty. Meljohn B. De
la Peña for dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for “deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood”
that “misled the Court”; second, that respondent did not furnih her counsel with a copy of the free
patent but forwarded a copy to the CA; third, that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest; last, that
respondent connived with Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Held:

Yes.

For using foul language in pleadings

Aside from the language used being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While
respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong, we stated:

x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Non- submission of the certificate to file action

Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which
act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.

Conflict of Interest

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings which
were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to
present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and
Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed
against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a
government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not
object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.
Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon
him by the Court.

Gross Misconduct

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Binay-an vs. Addog

A.C. No. 10449; July 28, 2014

Facts:

According to the complainants, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of Barot
Binay-an, called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. Paul Palos and Bienvenido Palos, who are also
heirs of Barot Binay-an and their co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07, and the respondent were
present in the meeting. During the meeting, Damaso and the respondent managed to convince Paul and
Bienvenido to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance, which were later notarized by the respondent.
The respondent subsequently submitted the Affidavits ofDesistance to the NCIP, which the NCIP Hearing
Officer denied. The NCIP Hearing Officer also cautioned the respondent on the ethical consideration in
having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his representation for the defendants.
Thus, the complaint for misconduct against the respondent, which was filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct.

Held:

It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07
to execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo. In this regard,
the respondent should have been mindful of the canon dictating that:

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as
to the law.
In Likong v. Lim, the Court disciplined and imposed a penalty of one ( 1) year from the practice of law on
a lawyer who prepared a compromise agreement between the parties in an action for injunction with
damages, without informing the opposing counsel of the agreement. The Court conc:uded,
"[u]ndoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of thE legal profession."

Similarly in this case, the respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal profession and
must, therefore, be disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise
prevent justice from being attained."

Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Tapay vs. Bancolo

A.C. No. 9604; March 20, 2013

Facts:

Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged
signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo
for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents
engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.
Issue:

Whether or not Bancolo is administratively liable.

Held:

Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9

A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Angeles vs. Baggay

A.C. No. 8103; December 3, 2014

Facts:

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by
Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M.
Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato
C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the
country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had
information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer
and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the
documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign
the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of
the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a
certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008.

Issue:

Whether or not the notarization documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.

Held:
Yes.

Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim
that it was his secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary
which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his
notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these
items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced
by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a
conscious act of what his secretary did.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only
damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires
lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to
practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he
was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that
their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the
notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the
persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Umaguing vs. De Vera

A.C. No. 10451; February 4, 2015

Facts:

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the
year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants lodged
an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. Complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera
to pay his acceptance fee of ₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses
in the amount of ₱30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time
to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary
documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of
material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica and Angela Almera, which was personally prepared by Atty.
De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip and
Hendricson Fielding to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign
over the names. The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin and
Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
Donato Manguiat. Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the
signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize
Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosill, who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error it was observed
that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the
affidavits at hand were falsified.

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear
before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not
offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give
him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De
Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering
that he only appeared twice for the case.

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be administratively liable.

Held:

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected
to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as
a bona fide member of the Law Profession.

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release Waiver &
Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes
of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court
its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott that:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stem disciplinary sanctions.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 75209; September 30, 1987

Facts:

The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987
outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building.

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the
Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause why
he should not be administratively dealt with.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an
assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the
picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of
about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas should be administratively
dealt with.

Held:

Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of
justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.” The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the
citizenry at large to have their causes tried fairly.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an abuse
thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being non- lawyers, the
duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to
properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.

The contempt changes were dismissed.

NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN, Complainants, vs. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Atty. Ediza's liability stemmed from a Complaint filed by the spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran
(complainants). The subject of the complaint was a parcel of unregistered land located in San Martin,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal, a relative, who
gave the property to complainants.
Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a
portion of their land to him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received
half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled complainants into thinking that
he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. These actions, which
deprived complainants of their property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as unbecoming a member of the
legal profession.

The Court, in a Decision then, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six months; (2)
directed him to return to complainants the two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga Epal
into signing; and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay complainants the amount he deceived them into paying
him. The Court further warned Atty. Ediza that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Thereafter, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court for lack of
substantial merit. More than four years since the· Court promulgated its Decision, Atty. Ediza has yet to
comply with the Court's directives.

The Court issued numerous Resolutions, however, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and blatantly disregarded and
obstinately defied these orders from the Court. Instead, Atty. Ediza responded by (1) claiming ignorance
over the documents stated in the Decision, and worse, adjudged that the documents were fictional; (2)
alleging newly discovered evidence; (3) demanding to stay the execution of the Decision; and (4)
reporting that he has complied with the order of suspension without submitting any required
certifications from the IBP and the Office of the Executive Judge.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. EDIZA SHOULD BE DISBARRED

HELD: YES

The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to the Court
which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed upon him,
despite the earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his administrative liability. The
failure of Atty. Ediza to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect
for the Court's lawful orders and directives.

As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes of this
Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:

CANON 12

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12. 04  - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes.

In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite the suspension, Atty.
Ediza is once again demonstrating that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal profession for failing to
protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has
administrative supervision over him. The Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints. It
bears stressing that a disregard of Court directives constitutes grave or serious misconduct  and gross or
willful insubordination which warrant disciplinary sanction by this Court.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Ediza, the Court was aware that the power to disbar is
one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. However,
Atty. Ediza's stubborn attitude and unwillingness to comply with the Court's directives, which we deem
to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary
sanction from this Court.

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY
FACTS: 

Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme
Court”.  He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas
for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.”  His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s
“unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant.  The trial court rendered judgment against his client.  Atty. Almacen receive a copy of the
decision.  Twenty days later, he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion.  Meanwhile, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment.  For
lack of proof of service, the trial court denied both motions.  To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed a second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who earlier, had already perfected the appeal.  Motion for reconsideration was denied
by Court of Appeals.

This earned the ire of Atty. Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then
filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that
it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are
calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute
resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became
“one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” The Supreme Court did not immediately act
on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate. He,
however, did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate as he now argues that he chose not to. Atty. Almacen
then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the
Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.”

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE UTTERANCES AND ACTUATIONS OF ATTY. ALMACEN ARE OBJECT OF
DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

HELD: YES

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. Courts thus treat with forbearance
and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a
lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that an attorney does not
surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as
a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of
the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen."

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As
such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leaves
the Court no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, the court was
impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite.
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE No. 7006

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR 

FACTS:

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 30. In an Order, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring
that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide
and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable
with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail. Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of
bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P.
Tan. Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of
the bond at P40,000. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, which motion was
denied for lack of merit. Respondent appealed from the Orders to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article
regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The
article, was entitled “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out”.

The RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and Mark Francisco, the writer of the article of
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court to explain why they should not be cited for indirect
contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge
with its lies and misrepresentation.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference,
stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the
press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he
shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of
court.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in
Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the
proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144. The RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain
and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his
media interviews, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however,
stated that right after the hearing, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the
Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt
of court. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right
of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY?

HELD: YES

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice. The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the
practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for any of the causes mentioned in Sec.
27 of the same Rule. 

The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which
maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the
trial courts Order, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144,
constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. 

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states
that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to
be released on bail also when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the
article which appeared in the  issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents statements in the
article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02
of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

In regard to the radio interviews, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances
against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when
he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law and that he was a liar.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. 

[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000]

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA

MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT,
SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.
Facts:

Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following
reversible errors:

IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS
WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW
WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL
PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE;[12]

Held:

Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for
review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of
the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the
researcher."[60]Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without
reference to the record"[61] that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any
partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show that
there was no proper study of the case by the researcher."[62]

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart
from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or
personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for
counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded
of the elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper
language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his
petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the
courts.[63]

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 174759

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

September 7, 2011

the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the motion for
reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for
indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
And insofar as the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be considered as the final
decision on the matter.

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for
the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of
this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect
for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the
basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; they vow
solemnly to conduct themselves with all good fidelityto the courts. As a matter of fact, the first canon of
legal ethics enjoins them to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its superior importance.
Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution why he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.[15]

The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,[16] in which they appeared to apologize
but nonetheless justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts
attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.[17]

In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in sincerity
and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts
honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion,
to wit:

In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and
Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance
and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts
honor and integrity. We quote:

a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the
gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the
simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which the Decision was based (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket, p. 349);

b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to
perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court
concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned
counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the
Honorable Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable
Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels
perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored
Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction (par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);[18]

Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for
failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to
suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal
sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division; and that the
statements described by the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful should be viewed within the context of the general tone and language of their motion for
reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered, restrained and respectful and should not be
construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of
the court to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate the sincerity
of their apology; and that they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and the
character of the words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no
humility, nor were they expressive of a contrite heart; and that their submissions instead reflected
arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to again deride the public respondent on
the manner of how it wrote the decision.[23]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing derogatory,
offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending
constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding the
petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[24]

Held
We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion,
least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:

Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges
provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.

IN RE KAPUNAN

The court required Atty. Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview before a nationwide
television audience, she made unwarranted remarks which tended to erode public trust and confidence
in the judiciary. She made unfounded insinuations that some members of the judiciary can easily be
bribed at the expense of justice.

Atty. Kapunan explains that she made no personal accusation against any court or judge. She adds that
when imparting information on corruption and bribe money based on hearsay and/or general
knowledge within the legal circles, she, in the interest of candor and transparency, would use the
appropriate caveats -"known to receive," "I am told' and "hindi ko po alam."

HELD
In sum, Atty. Kapunan admits to have made remarks with reference to corruption in the judiciary, but
denies to have uttered the same to degrade the court and bring it to disrepute. In invoking her
constitutional guarantee to freedom of speech, she explains though that she js not unaware of the
corresponding obligation to exercise said right responsibly. True, well-recognized is the right of a
lawyer,both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize the courts or any of its officers. This
right, however, is not without limitations. Atty. Kapunan should be reminded that comments made
against the courts must not go beyond the bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the
people's trust in the judicial system.

Moreover, it is well to remind Atty. Kapunan that, as a member of the Bar, she is under the obligation to
maintain at all times a respectful attitude toward the courts. This responsibility of a lawyer in relation to
the court is imposed under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, Canon 10 and 11
provide: CANON 10 -A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. CANON 11
-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.03 -A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

While it appears that, at the

moment, there is no solid basis to proceed against her, the Court is not disposed to shelve the matter in
the meantime.

Justice Brion is of the view that the matter should be dealt with appropriately given the extent and
gravity of the substance of her disclosure on the alleged corruption in the judiciary and the public
perception her statements represent. In his Reflections, he said, that the Court should "proactively react
to the smoke that Atty. Kapunan has raised" as a fire must have existed somewhere behind her
statements which, according to him, should not be left unattended to.