People of The Philippines, Appellee, EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant

G.R. No.
168168 September 14, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant. Object 1
DECISION
Object 7
2
3
4
5
6
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of
rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the
timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in
the morning of September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her
room and laid down beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his
penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to herself as her
father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on her
side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina which caused tremendous pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to
herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen sink, he
raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and
inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant immediately asked her
to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant down
on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on.
Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon learning
of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a
complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found
her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on
December 25, 1976 and begot three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged
that he worked in several companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in September
1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant because he was always in the
office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas.12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996
because there were other people in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant, then she would
not have accompanied him to the Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply
for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque, where they
applied for membership at the Video City Club.13 He also maintained that the fact that his daughter
was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it because it is also
possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the
obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless she
herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against
appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she
testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is
sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is imposed the
supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor maximum. He is ordered to
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also
ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as
moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of
qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of
attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years
of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases
(A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for
review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT
OF DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE
FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported them to
the authorities when she accompanied him to Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San
Antonio or to their relatives when she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial
court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it
would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly
their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the appellate
court's highest respect.19
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and
credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to
tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the
complainant who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person as
follows:
For rape committed in September 1993:
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
A: September 1993.
COURT:
No specific date?
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
A: 10 years old, Maam.
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything
happened?
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?
RECORD: The witness is crying.
A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.
Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?
A: No, Maam.
Q: Why not?
A: Because I was afraid of my father.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father?
A: Because he might hurt me.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred?
A: There is, Maam.
Q: When was it?
A: After a few days after the first incident.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
A: He removed his clothes.
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?
A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his side.
Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any?
A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21
For rape committed on December 29, 1995:
Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was, Maam.
Q: What is that incident?
A: I was raped by my father on that day.
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?
A: I was then sitting at our dining set.
Q: What about your father, what he doing?
A: He was cooking.
Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?
A: He told me to approach him.
Q: After you approached him, what happened next?
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
Q: What happened after you embraced him?
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?
A: He held my breast.
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: He kept kissing my breast.
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?
A: Many times.
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?
A: He put my shorts down.
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?
A: He also put down my panty.
Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
A: He held my organ.
ATTY. MALLARES:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When you say organ', what do you mean?
A: Pekpek.
COURT: Proceed.
ANSWER:
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?
A: We were in our sala on the sofa.
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?
A: Me and my father.
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened?
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.
Q: What were you wearing at that time?
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
A: He raised them.
Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?
A: Shorts and T-shirt.
Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of me.
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23
The trial court believed the complainant and held that:
The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is
spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and
convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the
troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she
has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not
ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.24
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to report
the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting
the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions brought about by
fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what should otherwise
be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered justified the filing
of complaints for rape months, even years, after the commission of the offense.25
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were fabricated
for complainant's reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack
of struggle and the studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear
posed by her own father against her.
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey of
our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when
executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is
quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested by the
police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in
detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.26
Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted
her when she affixed her signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the
cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion
whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that the compromise agreement and the
affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to
prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege
to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must
therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never retracted her
allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise
doubts about the rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the
complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to consent to annul his marriage;
allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his children to his
wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant raped her
on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without
consent.1âwphi1 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial
not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is
presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12
years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be
employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father,
would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into
submission to his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his
moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995.
However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure
to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the
timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed.35 What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific
acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the
complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the
rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when committed
against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-
150 which was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus
applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during
trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they were also
supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a photocopy
of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public
record in the custody of a public officer. The admission of this secondary evidence is one of the
exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil
registrar who is a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to note that appellant did not dispute their
contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and
timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity
and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by
separately awarding the sums of P50,000.0040 and P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of
rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory
upon a conviction for rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission
of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.44
Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and
96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-
125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is
however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the
complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions constituting the offense.
SO ORDERED.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

C E R T I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above per curiam Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court. The majority opinion, and the concurring or separate opinions supporting the
imposition of the death sentence, as well as the dissenting opinions are set out in full, or otherwise
adverted to, but without indicating the names of the Justices who penned the same. The decision is
signed by all the Members of the Court who actually participated in the deliberation in the case and
voted therein but does not indicate the vote cast by any Member, whether concurring in or dissenting
from the judgment, or both.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
G.R. No. 88282 May 6, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN PASCUAL y FLORES, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon M. Miranda for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information filed on 2 August l988 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, accused
Edwin Pascual was charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. The said information alleges:
That on or about the 28th day of May, 1988, in the Municipality of Pateros, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 3.80 grams of
marijuana fruiting tops placed in a transparent plastic bag, which are prohibited drug
(sic), in violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law. 1
The case was docketed as Spl. Criminal Case No. 717-D.
Upon arraignment on 22 August 1982, 2 accused pleaded not guilty. Trail was set for 26 September
1988. On that date, however, accused signified his intention to plead guilty to the lesser offense defined
in Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. To afford him time to secure "the necessary
approvals (sic) from the authorities concerned regarding" that intention, the hearing was reset for 7
October 1988. 3 Since nothing positive developed thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the trial, the
prosecution presented as witnesses the arresting officers, Pat. Armando de Villa, Pat. Domingo Casiño
and Pat. Romeo de Castro of the Pateros Police Station, and P/Lt. Tita
B. Advincula of the PC Crime Laboratory Services at Camp Crame, Quezon City. 4 The prosecution's
theory of the case, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
. . . Prior to May 28, 1988, P/Major Ernesto I. Josef, the Station Commander of the
Pateros Police Station, received telephone calls from residents of Pateros informing him
of rampant drug selling along said area. Acting on said information, he tasked Pat.
Romeo de Castro to compose (sic) a team to conduct surveillance in the area in order to
identify the suspected pusher and to apprehend him through the so-called "buy-bust"
operation. Chosen as members of the team were Pat. Armando de Villa, Pat. Domingo
Casiño and Pat. Eduardo Reyes of the Pateros Police Station.
At the height of a week-long surveillance, the group was able to ascertain the identity of
the suspected pusher as a certain alias "Tabo." On May 28, 1988 at around 7:10 o'clock
in the evening, they conducted the "buy-bust" operation at T. Sulit St., Barangay Aguho,
Pateros, Metro Manila where the suspected pusher allegedly indulged in the illicit trade
of marijuana. Pat. Romeo de Castro briefed each member of the team on how to go
about the operation. He assigned Pat. Armando de Villa as poseur-buyer and the rest as
back-up. He then gave Pat. de Villa three (3) previously xeroxed ten-peso bills with
Serial Nos. FK920246, EK440768 and FH627260 (Exhibits "A", "A-1" and "A-2",
respectively) which would be used in purchasing marijuana from the suspect.
In (sic) just a while, Pat. de Villa spotted the suspect in a dimly lit vacant lot talking to a
person and when he came near them, the suspect asked him: "Iiskor ka ba". Since he
answered yes, worth P30.00 of marijuana, the suspect told him to wait for a while as he
would come back. A few moments later, the suspect appeared and handed to Pat. de Villa
three (3) tea bags of marijuana in exchange of (sic) the amount of P30.00 which Pat. de
Villa paid to the suspect. At this point in time, Pat. de Villa executed a pre-arranged hand
signal to his teammates who immediately closed in and assisted him in apprehending the
suspect. The latter was frisked and recovered from his possession were the three (3) ten-
peso bills found at his right back pocket. He was subsequently brought to the Pateros
Police Station where he was investigated by Pat. Domingo Casiño. The suspect pointed
to one alias John-John Pilay of Barangay Martinez de 96 as the source of marijuana.
Through a letter-request for technical assistance signed by Pat. Domingo Casiño on May
23, 1988 (Exhibit "D"), the marijuana specimens confiscated from the suspect were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory Services at Camp Crame, Quezon City for chemical
analysis. After conducting three (3) tests on the subject specimens, namely: microscopic,
chemical and thin layer chromatographic tests, Forensic Chemist, P/Lt. Tita B.
Advincula, declared in her Chemistry Report No. D-492-88 (Exhibit "C") and Certificate
Laboratory Result (Exhibit "F") and which she affirmed in her testimony that the subject
specimens gave positive result for marijuana, a prohibited drug. 5
Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused, who denied committing the crime, the
accused's neighbors, Ernesto Nicdao and Conrado Asuncion, who corroborated his testimony, and the
accused's sister, Jocelyn Tolentino. Their testimonies were condensed by the trial court as follows:
Accused, in his defense, claimed that he did not commit the crime as charged. He
alleged that on May 28, 1988 at around 5:10 o'clock in the afternoon, he arrived home
from work at T. Sulit St., Barangay Aguho, Pateros, Metro Manila and took a short rest.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, three (3) persons whom he later identified as police
officers approached him while he was just resting near their house and invited him to go
with them to the Pateros Municipal Hall because somebody allegedly bought three (3)
bags of marijuana from him. He vehemently denied said accusation but the police
officers nevertheless handcuffed him, searched him and brought him to the Municipal
Hall Pateros without a warrant. At the Pateros Police Station, he was shown the tea bags
of marijuana which allegedly came from him. He disowned them but the police officers
would not believe him. He was later detained and the corresponding charge was filed
against him.
Accused's testimony was supported by the testimonies of his neighbors Ernesto Nicdao
and Conrado Asuncion who at that time were near the place of the arrest. They were
united in saying that accused was handcuffed and frisked by three (3) unidentified male
persons but nothing except a plastic bag of rice was found in his possession. Later
accused was asked to board a tricycle going to the municipal hall.
For her part, accused's sister, Jocelyn Tolentino, told the Court that after receiving the
information that his brother was arrested she immediately went to the Pateros Municipal
Hall. There she saw her brother at the investigation room being frisked by a policeman
and was being forced to admit that he was selling marijuana. Then she saw her brother
being brought to the detention cell. 6
After evaluating the evidence of both parties, the trial court promulgated a decision on 8 May 1989, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN PASCUAL y FLORES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment. 7
On 9 May 1989, accused filed his notice of appeal.
In his four-page Brief, 8 accused contends that:
I
The trial court erred in finding that the testimony (sic) of the three (3) policemen who
allegedly conducted a "buy-bust" operation against the appellant is more credible that
(sic) the testimony of the three (3) witnesses for the defense and the appellant.
II
The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty of the capital offense charged based on
the testimony (sic) of said policeman.
III
The trial court erred in finding no violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant
against arrest without warrant and against unreasonable search.
In support of these assertions, he presents the following bare arguments and nothing more:
The testimony (sic) of said policemen is not more credible that (sic) the testimony of the
appellant and his three (3) witnesses.
The evidence for the prosecution does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant committed said capital offense.
The reasons are:
Nicdao and Asuncion, the neighbors of the appellant, categorically testified that they
witnessed the arrest of the appellant and the search of his body by said policemen.
Nicdao and Asuncion categorically testified that they did not see the transfer from the
appellant to Pat. de Villa of three (3) tea bags of marijuana.
Nicdao and Asuncion categorically testified that they did not see the transfer of xerox
copies of three (3) ten-peso bills from Pat. de Villa to the appellant.
The testimony of said policemen that they used xerox copies of three (3) ten-peso bills in
the "buy-bust" operation is hard to believe.
Hence, the incredible testimony (sic) of said policemen cannot be considered as
constituting proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed said capital
offense.
Violations of the constitutional rights of the appellant against arrest without warrant and
against unreasonable search were committed by said policemen.
The testimony (sic) of the appellant and his witnesses proves (sic) that the appellant was
not committing said capital offense at the time that he was arrested and his body was
searched by said policemen.
Hence, the constitutional rights of the appellant against arrest (sic) without warrant and
against unreasonable search were violated by said policemen when they arrested the
appellant and searched his body without a warrant of arrest and without a search
warrant. 9
These arguments do not deserve the scantest consideration as they are nothing but mere conclusions
which betray either the hopelessness of the accused's cause or his counsel's lack of zeal and seriousness
in defending his client. If the latter was due to counsel's firm conviction of the futility of the appeal, he
should have, instead of pursuing the appeal only to file a pro-forma brief therein, given the accused a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the case. 10
Nevertheless, if only to satisfy accused's plea for justice, this Court is inclined to consider the assigned
errors:
1. Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 11 This present case
cannot qualify as an exception to the rule and the accused miserably failed to point out any reason why
it should be considered as such. Two important considerations enhance the correctness of the findings
of the trial court. Firstly, the testimonies of the arresting officers are positive in character while that of
the accused is negative. Thus, the former testimonies necessarily prevail over the latter. Secondly, no
improper motive had been imputed to the arresting officers. They are, therefore, presumed to have
regularly performed their official duty in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 12 That the
accused sold three (3) tea bags of marijuana and received consideration therefor in a buy-bust operation
was duly proved by the testimony of Pat. Armando de Villa, thus:
Q Who was your suspect according to the result of your surveillance?
A A certain Tabo, Edwin Pascual alias Tabo.
Q Please tell the Court the result of your operation against Tabo on the night of May 28,
1988?
A At about 7:15 in the evening the group led by Lt. De Castro and I and I (sic) was
assigned as poseur buyer of the suspect and when I reached the vacant lot when (sic)
Tabo was there and approached me and asked if I would score and I said, Yes and I gave
him the three-ten peso bills and then he go (sic) to the alley and when he come (sic) back
he was bringing with him three tea bags of marijuana.
Q Were you able to get the three bags of marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else did you and your group do after you were handing the three bags of
marijuana?
A I gave my signal. When I raised my right hand that is the time, sir.
Q Did you raise your hand for the signal?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A My companion came near me and apprehended the suspect and brought him to the
station, sir. 13
Upon cross-examination, Pat. de Villa narrated more specifically how the buy-bust operation was
conducted:
Q In that point of operation when for the first time did you see the accused?
A Around 7:10, sir.
Q Where was the accused at that time when you first saw him?
A At the vacant lot, sir,
Q Could you give us the specific location of that vacant lot?
A Corner of T. Sulit and Quiogue St., sir.
Q Were you alone when you first saw the accused at that vacant lot?
A Yes, sir.
Q What action did you take when you saw the accused at the vacant lot?
A I went at (sic) the vacant lot and the suspect arrived and asked me if I would buy
marijuana.
Q What were the exact words of the accused when he approached you about your
intention to buy marijuana?
A He asked me and I quote, "Pare, i-iscore ka ba at ilan?" I said worth P30.00.
Q How did the accused came (sic) to know that you are (sic) buying marijuana?
A Because during the surveillance that is what we got from the residents in the area.
Q What were (sic) your reply when the accused offered to buy marijuana?
A We said Yes.
Q And then what happened?
A When I said Yes and he left the place and when he came back, the suspect, marijuana
(sic) was already with him.
Q And after that, were you able to buy marijuana?
A Yes, sir. 14
The abovequoted testimony of Pat. de Villa was corroborated by his companions during the buy-bust
operation, Pats. Casiño and De Castro. Moreover, P/Lt. Tita Advincula, the forensic chemist who
examined the contents of the three (3) tea bags obtained from the accused, testified that after she
conducted a microscopic examination, a chemical test and a tin layer examination thereon, she reached
the conclusion that the same were positive for marijuana. 15
The contention of the accused that the policemen used xerox copies of the ten-peso bills in the buy-bust
operation is completely misleading. Actual and genuine ten-peso bills were used; only the machine
copies thereof were offered in evidence. Thus, in his direct testimony, Pat. de Villa said: 16
Q You said you paid three-ten peso bills. Do you have that?
A In (sic) our investigator, sir.
COURT: Who is that?
A Pat. Domingo Casiño, sir.
FISCAL: Do you remember if those three-ten peso bills were marked?
A Yes, sir.
Q What are the markings?
A The serial number (sic) of the three-ten peso bills, sir.
Q Do you remember?
A I have my note, sir. One is FK920246, Two is EK440768 and Three is H627267, sir.
Q If you are shown a photocopy of that (sic) three-ten peso bills, Will you be able to tell
the Court whether those are the three-ten peso bills you used in the buy-bust operation?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you the machine copy of the three-ten peso bills. Will you go over it
and tell the Court whether that is the faithful reproduction of the three-ten peso bills you
used in that buy-bust operation?
A Yes, sir. That is the same. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, it is settled that the presentation in evidence of the "buy-bust" money is not
indispensable for the conviction of an accused provided that the sale of marijuana is adequately
proven by the prosecution. 17
2. The last issue raised by accused is the alleged violation of his constitutional rights against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizure. He claims that when he was arrested and
searched on 28 May 1988, he was not committing any offense; hence, the same is illegal and violates
his constitutional rights.
This contention is likewise unmeritorious. Accused was arrested while in the act of selling marijuana to
Pat. de Villa; he was caught in flagrante delicto. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides
that:
Sec. 5 Arrest without a warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x
Moreover, Section 12, Rule 126 provides:
Sec. 12 Search incidental to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest,
as well as unreasonable searches and seizure, was not violated.
We therefore affirm the finding of the trial court that accused is guilty of the crime charged. However,
as to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, the same is improper as this is not the
penalty providedfor the offense charged. Section 4, Article II of Republic Act. No. 6425, as amended,
provides the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua, a penalty provided for in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal
Code and which carries accessory penalties, is completely different from life imprisonment. 18
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification above indicated changing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186141 : April 11, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JESUSA FIGUEROA Y

CORONADO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 02348 dated
October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in Criminal Case No.
04-2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.cralaw
There were originally two Informations filed against accused-appellant:
That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her
possession, direct custody and control a total weight of nine point fourty [sic] two (9.42)
grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above-cited law.[2]
That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to sell, give away, distribute and deliver four point sixty (4.60) grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, by then and there
agreeing to sell and deliver the said dangerous drug to the proposed buyer PO3 JOSEFINO
CALLORA, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
but which nevertheless failed to consummate the said sale by reason of causes other than
her own spontaneous desistance, that is she got frightened by the presence of police officers
at the scene of the crime.[3]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 64 of Makati City proceeded with the trial of the aforementioned charges. The versions
of the prosecution and the defense of what transpired on July 2, 2004, as concisely summarized by the
Court of Appeals, were as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
In the evening of June 20, 2004, an informant came to the office of P/Supt. Nelson T. Yabut
(P/SUPT. YABUT), Chief of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force (PNP AIDSOTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City and
informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain “Baby,” later identified as accused-
appellant FIGUEROA. P/SUPT. YABUT instructed PS/Insp. Pepito Garcia (PS/INSP.
GARCIA), PO3 Josefino Callora (PO3 CALLORA) and PO2 Rogie Pinili (PO2 PINILI) to
conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information.
On June 23, 2004, at about 8:00 p.m., PO3 CALLORA, together with the informant, met
with accused-appellant FIGUEROA at the parking area of SM Bicutan in Taguig, Metro
Manila. The informant introduced PO3 CALLORA to accused-appellant FIGUEROA as
the one who was willing to regularly buy shabu from her should her sample be of good
quality. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA, however, told them that she had no stock of shabu
at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 CALLORA through the informant once she
already has supply of good quality shabu.
In the morning of the following day, the Special Operation Unit 1 of the PNP AIDSOTF
requested the PNP Crime Laboratory to dust with ultra-violet powder the two (2) pieces of
P500.00 bills with serial numbers FG403794 and MY883243 to be used in the planned buy-
bust operation against accused-appellant FIGUEROA.
On July 2, 2004, at about 12:00 noon, the informant called the Desk Officer of the Special
Operation Unit 1 of PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that accused-
appellant FIGUEROA had informed him that she already had a stock of good quality shabu
and asked how much shabu would be bought by PO3 CALLORA. P/SUPT YABUT
instructed the informant to tell accused-appellant FIGUEROA that P10,000.00 worth of
shabu would be bought from her. Later on the same day, the informant made another
telephone call and relayed the information that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had agreed
to deliver the shabu worth [P10,000.00] in front of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at the
corner of M. Almeda and M. Conception Avenues, San Joaquin, Pasig City at about 4:00
p.m. of that day.
A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3
CALLORA, was then formed to conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA
designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money was prepared. The genuine two (2)
pieces of P500.00 bills were placed on top of boodle money to make them appear as
P10,000.00.
At about 4:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, the team proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3
CALLORA arrived in the vicinity of 7-Eleven on board a car driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA
and met with the informant. PO3 CALLORA and the informant waited for accused-
appellant FIGUEROA, who after a few minutes, arrived driving a Toyota Revo with Plate
No. XPN 433. Seeing the two, accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove
towards them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant FIGUEROA rolled down the
window of her car and asked where the money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA
asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accused-appellant FIGUEROA opened a Chowking
plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3
CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA,
the latter sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she sped away towards the
direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road. The other occupants of the car were Susan
Samson y Figueroa, sister-in-law of the accused, Margie Sampayan y Garbo, Fe Salceda y
Resma and Christian Salceda y Resma, a nine[-]year[-]old boy.
PO3 CALLORA immediately boarded the car being driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA and gave
chase. PO2 PINILI, who was driving another vehicle, joined the chase.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA’s vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the
intersection of C-5 road. At that time, PS/INSP. GARCIA saw Christian Salceda y Resma
alighted from the backdoor of the Toyota Revo and threw the Chowking plastic bag to the
pavement, which was about two steps from the backdoor. PS/INSP. GARCIA picked it up
and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
inside. PO3 CALLORA and PO2 PINILI introduced themselves as police officers. The
Toyota Revo was checked by PS/INSP. GARCIA and PO2 PINILI, which was witnessed by
PO1 Alvarado and PO3 Basa of the Makati Police PCP No. 7, MMDA Traffic Enforcers
Gonzales and Salvador and a reporter/press photographer of Manila Star named Eduardo
Rosales. Retrieved under the floor matting of the Toyota Revo were two heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets of undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA was informed of her violation and was apprised of her
constitutional rights. She was brought to the office of Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP
AIDSOTF for investigation. The items recovered from the crime scene were brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were tested positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA denied that she met and transacted with PO3 CALLORA
regarding the sale of shabu. She likewise denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu
that were recovered under the floor matting of the car she was driving as well as the plastic
sachet of shabu inside a Chowking plastic bag found on the pavement of Kalayaan Avenue
corner C-5 road.
She alleged that between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, she was driving a Toyota Revo
with Plate No. XPN 433 on her way to the house of her elder brother at Eco Center,
Barangay Calsada, Taguig City to get their mother’s allowance. Their mother stays with
her at her residence at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City. With her as passengers
were Susan Samson y Figueroa, Fe Salceda y Resma, and the latter’s nine[-]year[-]old son,
Christian Salceda y Resma, and Margie Sampayan y Garbo, accused-appellant
FIGUEROA’s laundrywoman. They stayed at her brother’s house for about twenty (20)
minutes.
From her brother’s house, she proceeded to Tejeron, Sta. Ana, Manila to bring Susan
Samson y Figueroa to the latter’s house. The other passengers remained in the car.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA then continued driving, taking the C-5-Kalayaan Avenue
route. When she was about to proceed after the traffic light turned green at the junction of
Kalayaan Avenue, a navy blue car blocked her path. P/SUPT YABUT alighted from said
car and was shouting that he was a police officer while approaching accused-appellant
FIGUEROA. He ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to roll down her car window.
Accused then asked, “Bakit po mister?” P/SUPT YABUT reiterated that he was a police
officer and ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to get down from her car as they would
be searching the same.
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were made to stay at the sidewalk for
about thirty (30) minutes. They were asked to turn their backs and were told not to do
anything while the search was going on. P/SUPT. YABUT later said, “Aantayin muna natin
sila.” For another thirty minutes, they stayed at the sidewalk until other persons referred to
by P/SUPT. YABUT arrived at the scene.
After the search, accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were ordered to board
the same Toyota Revo, which was driven to Camp Crame by one of the persons who
arrived at the scene.[4]
On May 18, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision[5] acquitting accused-appellant in Criminal Case No.
04-2432, but convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-2433. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing[,] judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 04-2432[,] the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado is

ACQUITTED of the charge for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II RA No. 9165 for lack of
evidence. The two plastic sachets of containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu with a combined weight of 9.42 grams are forfeited in favor of the Government. Let
the custody thereof be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
its appropriate disposition.
2. In Criminal Case No. 04-2433, the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado alias “Baby” is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA
9165 and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00).
Let the one plastic bag labeled Chowking containing one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet with
4.60 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for its
appropriate disposition.
The period during which the accused is detained at the City Jail of Makati shall be
considered in her favor pursuant to existing rules.[6]
Alleging that the foregoing decision was contrary to law and unsupported by the evidentiary records,
accused-appellant sought a review of the same with this Court through a Notice of Appeal, which the
RTC gave due course. However, in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[7] we remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
On October 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of
accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision, dated May 18, 2006, in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2432 and 04-2433, of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October
15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.[8]
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court anew. Accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief,

[9] wherein she highlighted the fact that the Court of Appeals did not discuss the first error assigned in
her Brief with said appellate court. In the aforementioned Brief[10] with the Court of Appeals,
accused-appellant submitted the following assignment of errors:
First
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE SPECIAL OPERATION UNIT 1 OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE ANTI-ILLEGAL DRUGS SPECIAL OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE WAS IRREGULAR BECAUSE OF LACK OF PRIOR COORDINATION
WITH THE PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA).
Second
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A PRIOR
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND ACCUSED REGARDING
THE ALLEGED SALE OF SHABU.
Third
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF PO3 JOSEFINO
CALLORA AND P/INSP. PEPITO GARCIA THAT HAVE DIRECT BEARING ON THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
Fourth
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE

OFFENSE OF ATTEMPT TO SELL SHABU AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 26,
ART. II OF R.A. 9165.[11]
Lack of Prior Coordination with the PDEA
In both the Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals and accused-appellant’s Supplemental Brief
before this Court, the main defense proffered by accused-appellant was the alleged violation of Section
86[12] of Republic Act No. 9165, requiring that the Philippine National Police (PNP) maintain close
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters.
Accused-appellant’s contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
does not invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers’ failure to maintain close
coordination with the PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero,[13] the Court noted that Section 86, as
well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of
the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-
bust operation. This Court consequently held that “this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative
intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such
an arrest inadmissible.”[14] The same conclusion was reached by this Court in People v. Roa,
[15] People v. Mantalaba[16] and People v. Sabadlab.[17]
Alleged lack of prior agreement between accused-appellant and PO3 Callora.
Accused-appellant argues that the alleged sale transaction borne out by the evidence of the prosecution
was not between Police Officer 3 (PO3) Josefino Callora and accused-appellant Figueroa, but was
instead between the latter and the unnamed informant. Accused-appellant concludes that the testimony
of PO3 Callora regarding the alleged sale transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and
without probative value, as it was the informant which is competent to testify on the alleged agreement
to sell drugs.[18]
We disagree. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay
rule does not apply where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or
falsity thereof is immaterial.[19] In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the
conversations between the informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that
said information led the police officers to prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The
conversation between the informant and the accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the
attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell was already clear from accused-appellant’s actuations
on July 2, 2004, which were all within the personal knowledge of PO3 Callora and testified to by him,
to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the informant and PO3 Callora
and approached them while driving her Toyota Revo;[20] (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the
informant, accused-appellant asked PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for
the shabu;[21] (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet
of white crystalline substance;[22] (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the money, accused-
appellant sensed that there were police officers around the area, and drove away;[23] (5) PO3 Callora
and the informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner Kalayaan
Avenue.[24]
Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[25] This
definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of Republic Act No.
9165. Thus in People v. Laylo,[26] we affirmed the conviction of the appellant therein and held that the
attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant therein of showing the substance to the
poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and
placed appellant under arrest.
The identity of the white crystalline substance was furthermore established by the testimony of
PS/Insp. Garcia, who likewise testified as to the following matters based on his own personal
knowledge: (1) after the chase, PS/Insp. Garcia saw a boy (later identified as Christian Salceda) alight
from the vehicle and threw a Chowking plastic bag two to three meters from the vehicle;[27] (2)
PS/Insp. Garcia picked up the Chowking plastic bag from the sidewalk ad found a sachet
of shabu inside the same;[28] (3) PS/Insp. Garcia later proceeded with the other police officers to their
office, where they requested for a laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance;
[29] PS/Insp. Garcia identified the Chowking plastic bag and the sachet containing white crystalline
substance in court. He identified the mark “PEG-1” on the sachet as his initial and testified that he was
the one who marked the same.[30]
The prosecution presented as its Exhibit “B” an Initial Laboratory Report. The report states that the
heat-sealed transparent plastic bag with the marking “PEG-1” inside a Chowking plastic bag was found
to contain 4.60 grams of white crystalline substance. The latter specimen was found positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[31]
In light of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, which were found credible by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, the crime of attempt to sell a dangerous drug under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 9165 was sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As for the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we agree with the
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that discrepancies “referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair [the witnesses’] credibility”[32] nor
do they overcome the presumption that the arresting officers have regularly performed their official
duties.[33]
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts in the instant
case.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02348 dated October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in
Criminal Case No. 04-2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
* Per Raffle dated April 11, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices
Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
[2] Records, p. 3.
[3] Id. at 4.
[4] Rollo, pp. 6-10.
[5] Records, pp. 183-197.
[6] Id. at 33-34.
[7] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[8] Rollo, p. 17.
[9] Id. at 30-35.
[10] CA rollo, p. 44.
[11] Id. at 48-49.
[12] Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. — The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the
Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby
abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service
with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the
Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is
sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall
have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by
the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in
the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other
emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother
agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in
this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years
to finally decide to join the PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the
PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided,
however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-
drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA
shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer
the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs
shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.
(Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 174198 January 19, 2010

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which
affirmed in toto the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Parañaque City4 in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida5 Kamad y Ambing (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA
9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession of
shabu, the accused-appellant was charged under an Information6 that reads:
The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous
drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer for P300.00 pesos one (1) small heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance (shabu) weighing 0.20 gram, which when
examined were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution’s version of events is summarized below.
On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern
Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an asset that a certain
"Zaida" was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV, Silverio Compound in Parañaque City.
The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Antonio Parillas,7 PO3 Christopher
Maulit8 (PO3 Maulit), PO1 Manfoste,9 SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez10 (SPO2
Sanchez), as members. SPO2 Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso
bills for use as marked money.
After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00 p.m. of
October 16, 2002 to the target area where they immediately saw the accused-appellant and Leo. The
asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the rest of the buy-bust team watched from a
distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of shabu and the accused-appellant asked him
how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for ₱300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked
money; the accused-appellant thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected
to be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to
approach. SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the ₱300.00 marked
money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also
suspected to contain shabu.
The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their office
for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as "ES-1-161009" and "ES-2-161002," were
then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests yielded positive results
for methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.
The accused-appellant12 denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At around
2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leo’s cousin’s house. Since
Leo’s cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing
civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers.
The accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police
officers asked the accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling
shabu. Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked
and asked the same question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the
accused-appellant for about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutor’s Office for inquest without
showing them any shabu.
The RTC Ruling
After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
this Court hereby sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for
Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 …
xxxx
SO ORDERED.13
The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTC’s reliance on the
presumption of regularity that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation by
the police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could arise considering that the police violated
NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit the deputation of private persons as PNP
civilian agents.14 The accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2
Sanchez regarding the time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of
PO3 Maulit on the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted mistake of PO3
Maulit that only the recovered plastic sachet was marked "ES" (standing for the initials of SPO2
Sanchez), while the marked money was marked "MF" (standing for the initials of P/Insp. Mariano F.
Fegarido as commanding officer); and (d) the contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit who testified that
it was Leo who sold the shabu and that of SPO2 Sanchez who testified that it was the accused-appellant
who sold him the shabu.
The CA Ruling
The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled that the
prosecution satisfactorily established the accused-appellant’s guilt based on the positive testimony of
SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation; his testimony bore badges of truth.
Accordingly, the CA found the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight.
The CA brushed aside as a minor inconsistency the uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on
the time the buy-bust operation took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the
NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that the accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal
sale of shabu committed in the presence of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers.
Moreover, the CA held that the use of assets to aid police officers in buy-bust operations has been
judicially recognized. The CA found that while the asset brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role
in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search and seizure of the shabu from the
accused-appellant.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.
The Court’s Ruling
We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the appeal throws
the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.15 We find the present appeal
meritorious on the basis of such review.
As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not
apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the
case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.16 After due consideration of the records of
this case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation
from the general rule is warranted.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence.17 Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not
only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined
are the same drugs presented in court. This is a condition sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are
the main subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be
proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of prohibited drugs
necessitate their strict identification by the prosecution.18
Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the testimony of
SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took place, we find that
both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities in the prosecution’s case: (1) the
serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-bust team in handling the seized shabu;
and (2) the failure of the police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu,
resulting in the prosecution’s failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu
seized from the accused-appellant on October 16, 2002.
Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
In People v. Garcia,19 we emphasized the prosecution’s duty to adduce evidence proving compliance
by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165. This provision reads:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. [emphasis supplied]
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further details
on how RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no strict compliance
with the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug’s unique
characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution either by accident or otherwise.20 Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed during
and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to
their presentation in court.
In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu. The records
show that his testimony and the identification he made in court constitute the totality of the
prosecution’s evidence on how the police handled and preserved the integrity of the seized shabu.
Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:
Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the poseur buyer,
gave the money to Zaida?
A: We brought them to our office.
xxxx
Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance?
A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.21
Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the evidence
shows that the shabu was marked as "ES-1-161009" before it was sent to a forensic laboratory. His
testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu was done immediately after its seizure
(as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation. His testimony likewise failed to
disclose if a physical inventory and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had,
whether these were undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and of an elective official.
In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the item seized
had been preserved; no explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-
compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedures. In fact, the records clearly
reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the procedural lapses committed by the
buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu.
The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution under the rule
that penal laws, such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of
the accused.22 One consequence is to produce doubts on the origins of the illegal drug presented in
court,23 thus leading to the prosecution’s failure to establish the corpus delicti.24 Unless excused by
the saving mechanism, the acquittal of the accused must follow.
The non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule
Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an
unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in
establishing the necessary links in the handling of the seized prohibited drug from the time of its
seizure until its presentation in court.
In Mallillin v. People,25 we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient
compliance with this rule:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witnesses' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. [emphasis supplied]26
We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,27 People v. Gum-Oyen,28 People v. Denoman29 and People
v. Coreche30 where we recognized the following links that must be established in the chain of custody
in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission
of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
(a) The first link in the chain of custody
We observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled
immediately after the accused-appellant’s arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez
testified that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-appellant, he never disclosed
the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the shabu after its seizure, nor that he
retained possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they reached the police station.
SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who made
the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the accused-
appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.
(b) The second link in the chain of custody
We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez’ testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed to
provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The records only identify
the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit
executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002.31 Thus, a big gap exists on who had
custody and possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and
how the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt
by the forensic laboratory.
(c) The third link in the chain of custody
The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 200232 of Police Superintendent Mariano
F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug Enforcement Group and the Physical Science
Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic chemist.33
These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings "ES-1-
161002" and "ES-2-161002" were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown
envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime Laboratory received this
letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were then subjected to qualitative
examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the seized shabu to
the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who received the shabu at the
forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated October 17, 2002, and who exercised custody
and possession of the shabu after it was examined and before it was presented in court. Neither was
there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded
pending its presentation in court.
(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody
The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecution’s evidence in this case.
Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered testimony related to a
shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of October 16, 2002. Specifically, his
testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October 12, 2002. This is borne by the following
exchanges:
FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the one who
cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this case containing with white
crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with
markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I reduced findings after the examination conducted.
xxxx
Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a letter
request relevant to this case specifically a drug test request, dated October 12, 2002 from
PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter request with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12, 2002 for
purposes of identification, respectfully request that it be marked in evidence as Exhibit A. In
this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the evidence submitted specifically a small
brown stapled wire envelope with signature containing with white crystalline substance inside
and with markings EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-1 12/10/02. After you received this specimen what
action did you take or do?
A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after which, I stamped
and marked the letter request and then record it on the logbook and after recording it on the
logbook, I performed the test for determination of the presence of dangerous drug on the
specimen.
xxxx
Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?
A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as shabu, a
dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown envelope
with markings D-1487-02, and the signature and the date 12 October 02, now Mr. Witness tell
us who placed these markings on this brown envelope?
A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.
Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio and the
signature and the date 12 October 2002. Do you know who placed who placed those markings?
A I have no idea.
Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown envelope. May I
respectfully request that this brown envelope be marked in evidence as Exhibit B. And inside
this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic sachets inside which are white crystalline
substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and EPC-1 12 October 02. May I respectfully
request that these plastic sachets with white substance inside be marked in evidence as Exhibit
B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic sachets with white crystalline inside is a masking tape with
the signature and letters are RAM, do you know who placed those letters?
A I am the one who placed that markings sir.
Q And what RAM stands for?
A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.
Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official finding
with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science report no. D-
1487-2 for purposes of identification respectfully request that this specimen be marked in
evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a signature above the typewritten name
Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you whose signature is this Mr. Witness? 34 [Emphasis
supplied]
A That is my signature sir.
Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in evidence as
Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that you cause the weight of the white crystalline substance in
this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white crystalline substance?
A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.
Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report now mark
in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I have no further questions to the witness your Honor.
xxxx
Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in court as
evidence through the testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics distinct from the shabu
from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:
First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu recovered on
October 12, 2002. As testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was marked, "EBC 12 October
02," while the other plastic sachet of shabu was marked, "EBC-1 12 October 02";35
Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name and signature
of one "PO1 Edwin Plopino" and the date "12 October 2002" were written; 36
Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made pursuant to a
different letter-request for examination dated October 12, 2002 written by one P/Insp. Wilfredo
Calderon;37 and
Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was contained in a
different forensic laboratory report known as Physical Science Report No. D-1487-2.38
We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence the
prosecution formally offered39 consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 200240 and the
Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02.41 The testimonies of SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well
as the submitted documentary evidence referred to the plastic sachets of shabu through their markings
of "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002."42
From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution, however, left the discrepancies fully unexplained. To reiterate,
the forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before the buy-
bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence documents relating to the specimen of October 16,
2002. Strangely, even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of
evidence, the defense simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that "the forensic chemical
officer only conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined and not the quantitative
examination."43 Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances with markings "ES-1 16/10/02" and "ES-2 16/10/02," and the
Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02,44 the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted
to the prosecution’s offer of evidence.
But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for the
prosecution and the offered evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the glaring flaws in
the prosecution’s evidence. Apparently, because the parties did not point out these discrepancies while
the appellate court did not closely review the records of the proceedings, the discrepancies were not
taken into account in the decision now under review.
These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Court’s ruling on the kind
and extent of review that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the appeal opens the whole
case for review, with the appellate court charged with the duty to cite and appreciate the errors it may
find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are assigned or unassigned. This is one such
instance where we are duty bound to rectify errors that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by
the parties, are clearly reflected in the records of the case.
The Conclusion
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in
the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the
record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by
law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.45 In light of the
flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty.
We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and
examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the
origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody
immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.1avvphi1
From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution’s failure to establish with moral certainty all
the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn
the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When
this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the
case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March 28, 2006
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision of conviction
dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Parañaque City in Criminal Case Nos.
02-1236-7 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-
appellant ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING is hereby declared ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 218578
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ENRICO BRIONES BADILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated March 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06354 affirming the Decision2 dated September 9, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case No. C-84868, finding herein appellant Enrico Briones
Badilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11,Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.
No.) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.3
In an Information4 dated September 9, 2010, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September 2010 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control One (1) small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 7.75 grams, which when subjected for laboratory examination
gave POSITIVE result to the test of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in gross
violation of the above-cited law.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty5 to the offense charged. After pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence consists of the testimonies of (1) PO2 Borban Paras, the one who arrested
appellant and seized the illegal drug from him; (2) PO2 Rafael Espadero, the one who received the
marked specimen from PO2 Paras; (3) PO2 Eduardo Ronquillo, one of PO2 Paras' companions during
the arrest of accused; and (4) P/Sr. Insp. Margarita Mamotos-Libres, the forensic chemist who
examined the specimen seized from the appellant. The testimonies of PO2 Espadero, PO2 Ronquillo
and P/Sr. Insp. Libres were abbreviated due to the stipulations entered into by the prosecution and the
defense. 6 The evidence of the prosecution may be summed up as follows: On September 6, 2010,
around 10:15 p.m., PO2 Paras received a phone call from a concerned citizen infonning him that
someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA Compound, 4th Avenue, Caloocan City. PO2
Paras and his companions, PO2 Ronquillo, PO3 Baldomero and PO2 Woo, responded to the call and
reached the target area around 10:25 p.m. 7 There they saw a male person, later identified as appellant
Enrico Briones Badilla, standing along the alley. Appellant was suspiciously in the act of pulling or
drawing something from his pocket; thus, as a precautionary measure, and thinking that a concealed
weapon was inside his pocket, PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as a police officer, held
appellant's arm, and asked the latter to bring out his hand from his pocket. 8 It turned out that appellant
was holding a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet
from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. Appellant and the
confiscated plastic sachet were brought to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group
(SAID-SOTG) Office where PO2 Paras marked the plastic sachet with "BP/EBB 07 Sept 2010."9
Thereafter, PO2 Paras turned-over appellant and the seized item to PO2 Espadero who placed the
seized item in a much bigger plastic sachet which the latter marked with "SAID-SOTG EVIDENCE 07-
Sept 2010. "10 PO2 Espadero then prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination 11 of the seized
item, dated September 7, 2010, and another request for drug test on the urine sample taken from
appellant. These requests were both signed by P/Chief Insp. Bartolome Tarnate. PO2 Espadero
transmitted the requests and the specimen to the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
where duty desk officer PO1 Pataweg received and recorded the same in his logbook. PO1 Pataweg, in
the presence of PO2 Espadero, turned-over the requests and the specimen to P/Sr. Insp. Libres for
laboratory examination. 12
The white crystalline substance was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug, per Physical Science Report No. D-246-10, 13 while the urine sample taken from appellant was
found positive for methylamphetamine, per Physical Evidence Report No. DT-250-10. Upon
completion of the laboratory examination on the seized item, P/Sr. Insp. Libres marked the plastic
sachet with "A" MML, countersigned it, and placed it in a brown envelope where she also wrote her
initials "MML" and placed the markings "D-246-10," 14then she deposited the envelope containing the
seized item to the evidence custodian of their office and later retrieved the same tor presentation in
court.
The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as its sole witness and offered a different version of
what transpired on the day of the arrest. Appellant narrated that on September 6, 2010, around 10:30 in
the evening, he was walking along 4th Avenue, Caloocan City when a male person called him.
Recognizing the man as a police officer who frequented their place, he approached the man. When he
got near the man, the latter's companion poked a gun at him. By instinct, he shoved the gun away and it
fell on the ground. 15
According to appellant, the police officer then arrested him, shoved him aboard the police vehicle, and
brought him to 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City. When the police officers failed to see their target person at
the said place, they left and went to the police station where he was told that he would be charged with
a non-bailable offense. He only saw the plastic sachet containing shabu in court. He denied the
accusations against him and stated that he was arrested because the police officers thought he would
fight back when he shoved the police officer's gun. The police officers asked ₱20,000.00 from him
allegedly because they knew that his father had a junk shop business, but he refused to give them
money. He questioned the positive result of the drug test because allegedly no examination was
conducted on his person. 16
In its Decision dated September 9, 2013, the RTC held appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused Enrico
Briones Padilla beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of Twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00) in accordance with Section 11 sub-section 2 of Art. II, R.A. 9165, otherwise known as
the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".
The drugs subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to
be dealt with in accordance with law. 17
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.
On March 27, 2015, the CA affirmed the appellant's conviction but with modification as to the penalty
imposed.1âwphi1The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision elated September 9, 2013 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION of the prison term which is hereby fixed at 20 years and 1 day. 18
Still unsatisfied, appellant elevated the aforesaid Decision of the CA to this Court via a Notice of
Appeal.
In a Resolution 19 dated July 22, 2015, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire, but both parties manifested that they are no longer
filing a supplemental brief.
In his Brief, 20 appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE EXISTING DOUBT AND
PATENT ILLEGALITY WHICH ATTENDED HIS ARREST.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE NOTHWITHSTANDING ITS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED SHABU.
III

APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On the first error, appellant argues that there was no basis for his apprehension because there was no
prior knowledge that he was the suspect in the alleged indiscriminate firing incident and that there was
no mention that he executed an overt act reflecting any intention to commit a crime. Also, there was no
testimony that he had just committed an offense, such that, it cannot be said that PO2 Paras had any
immediate justification for subjecting him to any search. Thus, the shabu may not be utilized as
evidence to sustain his conviction.
On the second error, appellant submits that the failure to mark the seized item right away is a violation
of the chain of custody rule as mandated by Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 9165. There was no immediate conduct of a physical inventory and the seized item was not
photographed in the presence of appellant or counsel, or of a representative from the media, and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign copies of the
inventory. Appellant avers that there is no absolute certainty that it was the same drug item that was
allegedly recovered from him, and there was also no justifiable ground warranting the exception to the
chain of custody rule.
On the third error, appellant contends that failure to comply with the chain of custody rule negates the
presumption that official duties had been regularly performed by the police officers.
We dismiss the appeal.
First Issue: Legality of Arrest
We stress, at the outset, that appellant failed to question the legality of his arrest before he entered his
plea. The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if
he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.21 Thus, appellant is deemed to have waived any objection thereto since he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he entered a plea of not guilty during the
arraignment, and thereafter actively participated in the trial. He even entered into a stipulation, during
the pre-trial of the case, admitting the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person.22
In any event, appellant was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require
a warrant in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 23 Such arrest is commonly known as in flagrante delicto. For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. 24
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police officers to the place where appellant was
when he was arrested was triggered by a phone call from a concerned citizen that someone was
indiscriminately firing a gun in the said place. Under the circumstances, the police officers did not have
enough time to secure a warrant considering the "time element" involved in the process. To obtain a
warrant would be impossible to contain the crime. In view of the urgency of the matter, the police
officers proceeded to the place. There, PO2 Paras saw appellant, alone in an alley which used to be a
busy place, 25 suspiciously in the act of pulling something from his pocket. Appellant's act of pulling
something from his pocket constituted an overt manifestation in the mind of PO2 Paras that appellant
has just committed or is attempting to commit a crime. There was, therefore, sufficient probable cause
for PO2 Paras to believe that appellant was, then and there, about to draw a gun from his pocket
considering the report he received about an indiscriminate firing in the said place. Probable cause
means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or about to
be committed. 26
Thus, thinking there was a concealed weapon inside appellant's pocket and as precautionary measure,
PO2 Paras (who was three or four meters away from appellant)27 immediately introduced himself as a
police officer, held appellant's arm, and asked the latter to pull his hand out. Incidentally, appellant was
holding a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras then confiscated the plastic
sachet from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. When an accused is
caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized, but are duty-bound, to arrest him
even without a warrant. 28 And considering that appellant's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful.29
Therefore, We agree with the CA when it adopted the People's disquisition:
The police officers are completely justified for being at the BMBA compound when appellant was
arrested, since they were merely performing their regular duty of responding to a reported crime.
When appellant was found alone, acting suspiciously in the reported area, PO2 Paras instinctively
thought that appellant was about to pull out a gun or a weapon from his pocket due to a previous
report of indiscriminate firing, that he approached him as a precautionary measure.
xxxx
In the course of the performance of their official duties, the police officers inadvertently
recovered from appellant a plastic sachet of shabu which was voluntarily given by
appellant himself. Clearly, the item recovered from appellant was not a product of illegal
search and seizure, because appellant voluntarily surrendered the drugs in his possession. In
short, appellant was not forced or coerced to bring out the contents of his pocket, thus, the
recovery of evidence was appellant's own volition.
Accordingly, appellant was arrested because he was caught in flagrante delicto of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, given that mere possession of a prohibited
drug already constitutes a criminal offense.
Appellant's arrest, therefore, was completely justified pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that a person may be arrested
without a warrant when in a presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.30
Second Issue: Compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule

We likewise find untenable the contention of appellant that since the provision of Section 21, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the prosecution failed to prove the identity
and integrity of the seized prohibited drug.
Section 21, paragraph 1, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
Section 21. Custody and disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, controlled precursors and Essentials Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall
immediately, after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Further, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
similarly provides that:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
xxx Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises
from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt
or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant;
otherwise, the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails. 31 In
this regard, the aforesaid provisions outline the procedure to be observed by the apprehending officers
in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.
Under the same proviso, however, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable
grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.32 While nowhere in the prosecution's evidence would show the "justifiable ground" which
may excuse the police operatives involved from making the physical inventory and taking of
photograph of the drug confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not render appellant's arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground"
will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of appellant to specifically challenge the
custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drug before the trial
court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question the police officers' alleged non-compliance
with Section 21 for the first time on appeal. 33
Moreover, the rule on chain of custody under the foregoing enactments expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs from the time they are seized from the accused until the time
they are presented in court. 34 The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary
doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to
the time it was offered in evidence. 35
Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No.
9165, defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.
In the case at bench, after PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
from appellant, the same remained in PO2 Paras' possession until appellant and the seized item were
brought to the SAID-SOTG office. Upon reaching the office, PO2 Paras marked the plastic sachet with
his initials "BP/EBB 07 Sept 2010" and turned it over to police investigator PO2 Espadero who, in turn,
placed it in a much bigger plastic sachet and marked the bigger plastic sachet with "SAID-SOTG
EVIDENCE 07 Sept 2010 ". Then, PO2 Espadero prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination
dated September 7, 2010.36 Later, PO2 Espadero brought the plastic sachet and the request to the PNP
Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office where PO1 Pataweg, the duty desk officer, received
the same. Thereafter, PO1 Pataweg, in the presence of PO2 Espadero, turned over the requests and
specimen for laboratory examination to P/Sr. Insp. Libres, a forensic chemist. Per Physical Science
Report No. D-246-10, the white crystalline substance was found positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, while, per Physical Evidence Report No. DT-250-10, the urine
sample taken from appellant was found positive for methylamphetamine. Upon completion of the
laboratory examination on the seized item, P/Sr. Insp. Libres marked the plastic sachet with "A"
MML, countersigned it, and placed it in a brown envelope where she also wrote her initials "MML" and
marked the envelope with "D-246-10". She then deposited the envelope containing the seized item to
the evidence custodian of their office. She later retrieved the same from the evidence custodian for
presentation in court. The Chemistry Report and the subject specimen were presented in court as
evidence, and were properly identified by prosecution witnesses.
Hence, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drug had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized item from the time it was first discovered until it was brought to the court for
examination. 37 The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court.38
In this case, the facts persuasively proved that the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same item
seized from appellant.1âwphi1 The integrity and evidentiary value thereof were duly preserved. The
marking and the handling of the specimen were testified to by PO2 Paras and PO2 Espadero.39 During
the trial, the prosecution and the defense entered into a stipulation that witnesses PO2 Espadero and
P/Sr. Insp. Libres (the forensic chemist) could identify the subject specimen as well as the documents
they prepared. 40 The aforesaid witnesses testified about every link in the chain, from the moment the
seized item was picked up to the time it was offered into evidence in court.
To reiterate, We discussed in the case of Mallillin v. People 41 how the chain of custody of seized items
should be established, thus:
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 42
However, while the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.43 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section
21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item.44
In a number of cases, 45 We held that with the implied judicial recognition of the difficulty of complete
compliance with the chain of custody requirement, substantial compliance is sufficient as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
We ruled that the marking and inventory of the seized items at the police station immediately after the
arrival thereat of the police officers, as in this case, were in accordance with the law, its implementing
rules and regulations, and relevant jurisprudence. Also, the failure to photograph and conduct physical
inventory of the seized items is not fatal to the case against the accused and does not ipso facto render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized. What is important is that the seized item marked at the police
station is identified as the same item produced in court.46
Therefore, in this case, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drug nor mark the same immediately after seizure, these will not render
appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by
the police officers as to the required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated item. The
succession of events established by evidence and the overall handling of the seized item by the
prosecution witnesses all show that the item seized was the same evidence subsequently identified and
testified to in open court.47
Specifically, in People v. Padua,48We stated that the purpose of the procedure outlined in the
implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items. We also reiterated in People v. Hernandez, et al. 49 that non-compliance with Section 21 would
not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Third Issue: Defense of Alibi
For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proved: (a)
the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and,
(c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. 50 All
these elements were adequately proven by the prosecution. Appellant was found to have in his
possession 7.75 grams of shabu, a dangerous drug. He could not present any proof or justification that
he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The mere possession of a prohibited drug
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi (intent to possess) sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.51
Appellant's mere denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification and declarations
of the police officers. The defense of denial, frame-up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably
viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.52 As evidence that is both negative
and self-serving, this defense of alibi cannot attain more credibility than the testimony of the
prosecution witness who testified clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the crime
committed. 53 One such positive evidence, in this case, is the result of the laboratory examination
conducted on the drug recovered from the appellant which revealed that the confiscated plastic sachet
tested positive for the presence of "shabu". 54
Furthermore, the defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed can only be overcome
through clear and convincing evidence showing either of two things: (1) that they were not properly
performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive. 55 In the present case,
appellant failed to overcome such presumption. The bare denial of the appellant cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses for failing to present any corroborative evidence. 56 As
correctly ruled by the trial court, when accused testified that he came from a drugstore in Monumento
in the evening of his arrest and allegedly bought medicine, accused should have presented to the police
officers the item he bought, or any receipt, to prove that he was not at the place when the alleged
indiscriminate firing occurred. 57
Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusions of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed because
it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment and manner of
testifying. 58 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the
CA as in this case. 59 Hence, We find no compelling reason to deviate from the CA's:findings that,
indeed, the appellant's guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Turning now to the imposable penalty, We sustain the penalty imposed by the CA. Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the penalty for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in
the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows:
xxxx
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or
more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shahu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy",
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana. 60
The aforesaid provision clearly states that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of any dangerous
drug, like shabu, with a quantity of five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams, is
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from
₱400,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
Thus, for the illegal possession of shabu in the amount of 7.75 grams, as in this case, the CA correctly
imposed the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day and a fine of Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in this case
because the penalty of imprisonment provided for illegal possession of five (5) grams or more but less
than ten (10) grams of shabu is indivisible. 61
All told, We find no reason to modify or set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27,
2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06354 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 196966 October 23, 2013

vs.
MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA and PHANS BANDALI y SIMPAL, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated September 6, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03505, which affirmed in toto the Decision2 dated June 11, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court RTC),
Branch 82, Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-127731-32, finding accused-appellants Michael
Y. Maongco Maongco) and Phans S. Bandali Bandali) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Accused-appellants were separately charged for illegally dispensing, delivering, transporting,
distributing, or acting as brokers of dangerous drugs under the following amended Informations:
[Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731]
The undersigned accuses MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA for Violation of Section 5, Article II,
R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and
there willfully and unlawfully dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, four point fifty (4.50) grams of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3
[Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732]
The undersigned accuses PHANS BANDALI y SIMPAL for Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and
there willfully and unlawfully dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, four point forty-five (4.45) grams of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.4
When arraigned on September 13, 2004, both accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.5
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 1 Dominador Arugay
(Arugay)6 and PO2 Vener Ong (Ong),7 who arrested accused-appellants. The testimonies of Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Erickson Calabocal (Calabocal),8 the forensic chemist, and Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 1 Adonis Sugui (Sugui),9 the post investigating officer, were dispensed with after the defense
agreed to a stipulation of the substance of the two witnesses’ testimonies, but with the qualification that
said witnesses had no personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding accused-appellants’ arrest
and the source of the plastic sachets of shabu.
The object and documentary evidence of the prosecution, all admitted by the RTC,10 consisted of the
Request for Laboratory Examination;11 an Improvised Envelope containing the plastic sachets of
suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu;12 P/Insp. Calabocal’s
Chemistry Report No. D-360-04;13 P/Insp. Calabocal’s Certification14 stating that the contents of the
plastic sachets tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride; PO1 Arugay’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay;15 PO2 Ong’s Sinumpaang Salaysay;16and the Referral of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office
of Quezon City.17
The prosecution’s evidence presented the following version of the events leading to accused-appellants’
arrests.
Based on a tip from a confidential informant, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs of the Navotas City Police
conducted a special operation on June 18, 2004, which resulted in the arrest of a certain Alvin Carpio
(Carpio) for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and seizure from Carpio’s possession of 15 heat-
sealed plastic sachets containing shabu . When questioned by the police, Carpio admitted that the shabu
came from accused-appellant Maongco. Consequently, the police planned an operation to apprehend
accused-appellant Maongco and formed a team for this purpose, composed of PO1 Arugay, PO2 Ong,
PO2 Geoffrey Huertas (Huertas), and PO1 Jesus del Fierro (Del Fierro).
On June 19, 2004, after coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the police
team was briefed about the operation. The police team allowed Carpio to talk to accused-appellant
Maongco on the cellphone to arrange for a sale transaction of shabu. At around 10:30 in the morning,
the police team, accompanied and guided by Carpio, proceeded to the vicinity of Quezon corner Roces
Avenues in Quezon City frequented by accused-appellant Maongco. PO1 Arugay, PO2 Ong, and
Carpio rode a taxi, while PO1 Del Fierro and PO2 Huertas followed in an owner-type jeep. Carpio
spotted accused-appellant Maongco at a waiting shed and pointed out the latter to the police. PO2
Arugay alighted from the taxi and approached accused-appellant Maongco. PO2 Arugay introduced
himself to accused-appellant Maongco as Carpio’s cousin, and claimed that Carpio was sick and could
not be there personally. PO2 Arugay then asked from accused-appellant Maongco for Carpio’s order of
" dalawang bulto." Accused-appellant Maongco drew out from his pocket a sachet of shabu and showed
it to PO2 Arugay. When PO2 Arugay got hold of the sachet of shabu , he immediately revealed that he
was a police officer, arrested accused-appellant Maongco, and apprised the latter of his constitutional
rights.
When the police team questioned accused-appellant Maongco as to the other " bulto " of shabu Carpio
had ordered, accussed-appellant disclosed that the same was in the possession of accused-appellant
Bandali, who was then at Jollibee Pantranco branch along Quezon Avenue. The police team, with
Carpio and accused-appellant Maongco, went to the said restaurant where accused-appellant Maongco
identified accused-appellant Bandali to the police team as the one wearing a blue shirt. PO2 Ong
approached accused-appellant Bandali and demanded from the latter the other half of the drugs
ordered. Accused-appellant Bandali voluntarily handed over a sachet of shabu to PO2 Ong. Thereafter,
PO2 Ong apprised accused-appellant Bandali of his constitutional rights and arrested him.
The police team first brought accused-appellants to the East Avenue Medical Center for medical
examination to prove that accused-appellants sustained no physical injuries during their apprehension.
Afterwards, the police team brought accused-appellants to the police station in Navotas City. At the
police station, PO1 Arugay marked the sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Maongco with the
initials "MMY," while PO2 Ong marked the sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Bandali with the
initials "PBS." PO1 Arugay and PO2 Ong turned over the two sachets of shabu to the custody of PO1
Del Fierro and SPO1 Sugui. The sachets of shabu were then inventoried, photographed in the presence
of accused-appellants, and submitted for laboratory examination.
P/Insp. Calabocal received the sachets of shabu for chemical analysis. P/Insp. Calabocal’s examination
revealed that the contents of the sachets marked "MMY" and "PBS" weighed 4.50 grams and 4.45
grams, respectively, and both tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
When the defense’s turn to present evidence came, the accused-appellants took the witness
stand.18 Accused-appellants asserted that they did not know each other prior to their arrests and they
were illegally arrested, extorted for money, physically beaten, and framed-up by the police.
On June 11, 2008, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegally selling shabu, penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused MICHAEL
MAONGCO y YUMONDA, accused in Ciminal Case No. Q-04-127731 and PHANS BANDALI y
SIMPAL, accused in Ciminal Case No. Q-04-127732, both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violations of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
(₱500,000.00) Pesos.19
Accused-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. In their Brief,20 accused-appellants imputed the
following errors on the part of the RTC:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SHABU ALLEGEDLY SEIZED.
II

APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE "OBJECTIVE
TEST" IN BUY-BUST OPERATIONS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION OF

REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY BY THE POLICE
OFFICERS DESPITE THE PATENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE BUY-BUST
OPERATION.
IV

APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21
Plaintiff-appellee countered in its Brief22 that:

I.
THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY ADMITTED THE SHABU IN EVIDENCE.
II.
THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE "BUY-BUST" OPERATION IN THE CASE AT BAR

WHICH RESULTED IN THE LAWFUL ARREST, PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION
OF APPELLANTS.
III.
THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.23
In its Decision dated September 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals found no palpable error in the judgment
of conviction rendered by the RTC against accused-appellants and rejected accused-appellants’
argument that the prosecution failed to establish the factual details constituting the essential elements of
an illegal sale of dangerous drugs. According to the appellate court, Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165 penalizes not only those who sell dangerous drugs, but also those who "trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,"
without being authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove with moral certainty
that accused-appellants were caught in the act of illegally delivering, giving away to another, or
distributing sachets of shabu. In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82 dated June 11, 2008 convicting appellants for violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.24
Hence, this appeal.
Since accused-appellants had opted not to file any supplemental briefs, the Court considers the same
issues and arguments raised by accused-appellants before the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellants stress that for a judgment of conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
identities of the buyer and seller, the delivery of the drugs, and the payment in consideration thereof,
must all be duly proven. However, accused-appellants lament that in their case, the prosecution failed
to establish by evidence these essential elements of the alleged sale of shabu. Accused-appellants add
that the prosecution was also unable to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu
had been preserved in accordance with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
9165. Accused-appellants point out that PO1 Arugay did not mention the time and place of the marking
of the sachet of shabu purportedly sold to him by accused-appellant Maongco; while PO2 Ong
admitted that he marked the sachet of shabu he received from accused-appellant Bandali only at the
police station. Both PO1 Arugay and PO2 Ong merely provided an obscure account of the marking of
the sachets of shabu, falling short of the statutory requirement that the marking of the seized drugs be
made immediately after seizure and confiscation.
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In the case of accused-appellant Maongco, the Court finds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals both
erred in convicting him in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 for the illegal sale of shabu under Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The evidence on record does not support accused-appellant
Maongco’s conviction for said crime, especially considering the following answers of prosecution
witness PO1 Arugay during the latter’s cross-examination, practically admitting the lack of
consideration/payment for the sachet of shabu:
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.
Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order of shabu.
Q. In your affidavit, you testified that you asked one "bulto" of shabu?
A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.
Q. Did the accused ask any in exchange of that shabu?
A. No, sir.
Q. Immediately, you arrested him already?
A. After I got my order from him, I introduced myself as policeman, sir.
COURT:
Who gave you that one "bulto" of shabu?
A. I have the money but he did not ask it from me, your Honor.
Q. Was there any arrangement between you and Maongco as to how much this one "bulto" cost? A.
Alvin and Maongco were the ones who talked.
xxxx
Q. Meaning to say, it was Maongco and Alvin who talked in Quezon Avenue?
A. They talked over the cellphone.
xxxx
Q. But you did not hear the conversation?
A. No, sir.25 (Emphases supplied.)
Inarguably, consideration/payment is one of the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
without which, accused-appellant Maongco’s conviction for said crime cannot stand. Nonetheless,
accused-appellant Maongco is still not absolved of criminal liability.
A review of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 readily reveals that accused-appellant
Maongco was not actually charged with illegal sale of shabu. Said Information specifically alleged that
accused-appellant Maongco "willfully and unlawfully dispensed, delivered, transported, distributed or
acted as broker" in the transaction involving 4.50 grams of shabu. These acts are likewise punishable
under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos ( ₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Several of the acts enumerated in the foregoing provision have been explicitly defined under Article I,
Section 3 of the same statute, viz:
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person, with or
without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of committing any act
of indispensable assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself unless
administered by a duly licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.
xxxx
(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and
by any means, with or without consideration.
xxxx
(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug with or
without the use of prescription.
xxxx
(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other consideration.
(jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-
mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a
broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other consideration in violation of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that (1) the accused passed on
possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such
delivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is
that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant Maongco, who was working as a taxi driver at the time of his
arrest,26had no authority under the law to deliver any dangerous drug. The existence of the two other
elements was established by PO1 Arugay’s testimony that provided the following details:
FISCAL ANTERO:
Q. Why did you arrest this certain Alvin?
A. For violation of R.A. 9165, sir.
Q. What happened when you arrested this alias Alvin?
A. We investigated on where the shabu he was selling came from.
Q. What was the result of your inquiry as to the source of the shabu?
A. We learned that the source came from a certain Michael, sir.
Q. When you found out that the source came from a certain Michael, what did you do, Mr. Witness?
A. We formed a team and we made a Pre-Operation Report, sir.
Q. Aside from mentioning about the source as Michael, what are the other details?
A. No more, sir. On June 19, 2004 at about 10:30 a.m., our group was dispatched in Quezon Avenue
corner Roces Avenue.
xxxx
Q. What happened when you arrived in that area?
A. We went to the place where Michael is always staying and when he arrived he was pointed by Alvin,
sir.
Q. What did you do when Alvin pointed to Michael?
A. I pretended to be the cousin of Alvin who was going to get the order.
Q. What happened when you approached this Michael?
A. I asked from him my order of "dalawang bulto" and he asked me who am I and I told him that I am
the cousin of Alvin and that Alvin cannot come because he was sick, sir.
Q. What happened after you said that?
A. I asked from him my order and then he took something out from his pocket and he showed it to me.
It was a shabu, sir.
Q. What happened next?
A. After I got the order we arrested Michael, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Q. What was Maongco doing at that time?
A. He was staying in a waiting shed along Quezon Avenue, sir.
Q. What was he doing there?
A. He was waiting for somebody, sir.
Q. Immediately you approached Maongco?
A. He was pointed by Alvin, sir. I alighted from the taxi.
Q. What was his reaction when you approached him?
A. He was a bit surprised, sir.
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.
Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order my shabu.
Q. In your Affidavit, you testified that you asked one "bulto" of shabu?
A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.27 (Emphases supplied.)
There was a prior arrangement between Carpio and accused-appellant Maongco. When PO1 Arugay
appeared for his purportedly indisposed cousin, Carpio, and asked for his order of shabu, accused-
appellant Maongco immediately understood what PO1 Arugay meant. Accused-appellant Maongco
took out a sachet of shabu from his pocket and handed over possession of said sachet to PO1 Arugay.
Based on the charges against accused-appellant Maongco and the evidence presented by the
prosecution, accused-appellant Maongco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu
under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
For the same reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, the RTC and the Court of Appeals also erred in
convicting accused-appellant Bandali for the crime of illegal sale of shabu in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
127732.
The Information against accused-appellant Bandali, same as that against accused-appellant Maongco,
charged him with "willfully and unlawfully dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing or acting
as broker" in the transaction involving 4.45 grams of shabu . However, unlike accused-appellant
Maongco, accused-appellant Bandali cannot be convicted for illegal delivery of shabu under Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, given that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the latter
were radically different from those of the former.
PO2 Ong testified:
Q. How did this Arugay arrest this Michael?
A. I was only a back-up of Arugay, sir.
Q. What did you see, if any?
A. I saw that he recovered one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, sir.
Q. He recovered it from whom?
A. From Michael Maongco, sir.
xxxx
Q. What happened when this man was arrested by Arugay?
A. We looked for the other "bulto" because according to Michael there were two and it was in the
possession of Phans, sir.
THE COURT:
Q. Where did you look for him?
A. At Jollibee, Pantranco, your Honor.
xxxx
Q. Did you find him in Jollibee?
A. Yes, your Honor, because according to Michael Maongco he was wearing blue T-shirt.
Q. What did you do when you found him at Jollibee?
A. I went near him and asked him to put out the other shabu in his possession, your Honor.
Q. You yourself?
A. My companions were just there, your Honor.
Q. You yourself approached him?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. When you demanded the production of what?
A. One (1) bulto of shabu, your Honor.
PROS. ANTERO:
Q. Why do you know that he was Bandali?
A. Because Michael Maongco was pointing to him that he was Phans Bandali, sir.
Q. Was Michael with you when you went to that Jollibee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened when you demanded from Bandali this shabu?
A. He voluntarily put out the shabu, sir.
Q. What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A. I told him of his violation and his rights, sir.28 PO2 Ong further confirmed during his cross-
examination:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while ago that you arrested Phans Bandali inside Jollibee,
Pantranco.1avvphi1 Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you did not buy from him a shabu, Mr. Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. You just demanded from him a plastic sachet?
A. Yes, sir.29 (Emphases supplied.)
In accused-appellant Bandali’s case, it cannot be said that he knowingly passed on the sachet of shabu
in his possession to PO2 Ong. PO2 Ong approached accused-appellant Bandali as a police officer,
absent any pretense, and demanded that the latter bring out the other sachet of shabu. Accused-
appellant Bandali’s voluntary production of the sachet of shabu in his possession was in subservience
to PO2 Ong’s authority. PO2 Ong then acquired the sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Bandali by
seizure, not by delivery. Even if there may be doubt as to whether or not accused-appellant Bandali was
actually aware at that moment that PO2 Ong was a police officer, the ambiguity would still be resolved
in accused-appellant Bandali’s favor.
This does not mean though that accused-appellant Bandali goes scot-free. The evidence for the
prosecution did establish that accused-appellant Bandali committed illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.
For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following essential
elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possess the said drug.30Accused-appellant Maongco informed the police officers that the
other sachet of shabu was in the possession of accused-appellant Bandali. Accused-appellant Bandali
herein was in possession of the sachet of shabu as he was sitting at Jollibee Pantranco branch and was
approached by PO2 Ong. Hence, accused-appellant Bandali was able to immediately produce and
surrender the said sachet upon demand by PO2 Ong. Accused-appellant Bandali, admittedly jobless at
the time of his arrest,31 did not have any authority to possess shabu. And as to the last element, the rule
is settled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of
such possession.32
But can accused-appellant Bandali be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article
II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 when he was charged with illegal dispensation, delivery,
transportation, distribution or acting as broker of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 5 of the
same statute? The Court answers in the affirmative.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court governs situations where there is a variance between the
crime charged and the crime proved, to wit:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.33 The same ruling may also be applied to the other acts
penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 because for the accused to be able to
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any
dangerous drug, he must necessarily be in possession of said drugs.
At the outset of the trial, both parties had admitted the laboratory results showing that the contents of
the two sachets tested positive for shabu, although accused-appellants contest the identity and integrity
of the sachets and contents actually tested since the chain of custody of the same was not satisfactorily
established in accordance with Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules.
The Court disagrees with accused-appellants as the police officers had substantially complied with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Court had previously held that in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a
physical inventory, to photograph, and to mark the seized drugs at the place of arrest do not render said
drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the
same.34 The Court had further clarified, in relation to the requirement of marking the drugs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation," that the marking may be undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused and that what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of its integrity and evidentiary value.35
The Court finds no fault on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in giving more weight
and credence to the testimonies of the police officers vis-à-vis those of the accused-appellants.
Questions as to the credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court
because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the reviewing
tribunal.36
Moreover, accused-appellants’ uncorroborated defenses of denial and claims of frame-up cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti. The testimonies of police officers who caught the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto
are usually credited with more weight and credence, in the absence of evidence that they have been
inspired by an improper or ill motive, than the defenses of denial and frame-up of an accused which
have been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence,37 which
accused-appellants failed to present in this case.
Lastly, the Court determines the proper penalties to be imposed upon accused-appellants.1âwphi1
Under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalties for the illegal delivery of dangerous
drugs, regardless of the quantity thereof, shall be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). Hence, accused-
appellant Maongco, for his illegal delivery of shabu in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, is sentenced to
life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 prescribes the penalty, for possession of less than five
grams of dangerous drugs, of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
plus a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱400,000.00). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term as prescribed by
the same law. Resultantly, accused-appellant Bandali, for his illegal possession of 4.45 grams of shabu
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, is sentenced to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day,
as the minimum term, to twenty (20) years, as the maximum term, and ordered to pay a fine of Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision Is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, accused-appellant MICHAEL YUMONDA MAONGCO
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu penalized under Article
II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
ordered to pay a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, accused-appellant PHANS SIMP AL BAND ALI is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu with a net weight of
4.45 grams, penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as the minimum
term, to twenty (20) years, as the maximum term, and ordered to pay a FINE of Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > June 2016 Decisions > G.R. No. 204441, June
08, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y
ANDALES, Respondent.:
G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL KURT
JOHN BULAWAN Y ANDALES, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y
ANDALES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision 1 dated 25 October 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00798-MIN, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 dated 24 August 2010
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2008-714,
effectively finding (accused-appellant) Michael Kurt John Bulawan y Andales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as follows:
That on November 10, 2008, at more or less 10:55 in the evening at Gusa National
Highway, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell
and/or offer to sell and give away to the arresting officer 101 Rodolfo S. de la Cerna, Jr.,
acting as poseur buyer, one (1) pack of dried marijuana fruiting tops with stalks wrapped in
a magazine paper weighing 13.98 grams, which upon qualitative examinations conducted
thereon, give positive result to the test for the presence of aforesaid dangerous
drug.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4 Trial
on the merits followed.
The prosecution relied on the testimony of 101 Rodolfo S. De La Cerna, Jr. (101 de la Cerna) of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), who testified as follows:
That he executed an Affidavit in connection with this case [Exh. "F"]. On November 10,
2008, at about 10:55 in the evening, he was along Gusa [NJational Highway, particularly in
front of "Starwood" acting as a poseur buyer for marijuana. That the said operation was
headed by I01 Neil Pimentel and they were backed up by P03 Benjamin Jay Reycilez and
I01 Gerald Pica. He was with their confidential informant who informed him that there was
already a transaction negotiated earlier for the purchase of [P]1,000.00 worth of marijuana.
They waited for the subject of the buy-bust for about five minutes. The accused arrived and
he was introduced to him by their CI. After he was introduced, the accused handed to him
the marijuana wrapped in a magazine paper. After the accused gave him the marijuana, he
inspected it if to verify if it was indeed marijuana and after confirming it, he made a "miss-
call" signal to their team leader who was inside the vehicle which was parked about 10 to
15 meters away from them. He then immediately announced that he is a PDEA agent and
he informed the accused of the latter's violation.On questioning of the Court, he testified
that there were only three of them, two [2] from the PDEA [he and Pimentel] and one [1]
from the CAIDTF [Reycitez]. He ordered them to "appraise the rights " of the accused
when the latter was already arrested. When asked by the Court why he was the only person
who executed the Affidavit, he answered that he was the poseur buyer and that he was
responsible for the arrest of the accused, and it was already dark, it was already 11:00
o'clock in the evening. He however testified that it is not a normal procedure in the office
that only one officer will execute an affidavit. He further testified that he did not prepare
the buy bust money in the amount of [P]1,000.00 and that when he met the accused, he had
no [P]1,000.00 with him and that he arrested the accused when the latter showed him the
marijuana. He then informed the accused of his rights and when the other members arrived,
he conducted an inventory [Exhibit "G"] right at the place, and then proceeded to the Office
where he made the markings "RDC". He prepared a laboratory request for examination
[Exh. A]and he delivered the request including the specimen [Exhibit B] as well as the
accused to the crime laboratory for examination. The result was positive [Exhibit "C" and
Exhibit "D"]. He also took photographs of the accused [Exhibit "H"]. Finally, he identified
the accused who answered with the name Michael Kurt John
5
Bulawan. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On cross examination, the witness testified that:

Before he arrived at Gusam the CI had already contacted the accused and that he did not
give any money to the accused. He did not also bring any money for the buy-bust operation
and that the accused delivered the marijuana even without first receiving the money; that
there was no pre-payment prior to the agreed time of delivery and that he did not promise
the accused that he will pay after the delivery. Fie brought cellphone during the operation
while the rest of the team brought with them their firearms and some documents. The
mediamen arrived at the office, not at the place where the operation
tookplace.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The defense, on the other hand, hinged their case on the testimony of accused-appellant, to wit:
That on November 10, 2008 at about 10:00 o 'clock in the evening, he was at his house
preparing to sleep when he received a text message from his friend Joey Maalyao of
Camella requesting him to go out from his house and inviting him to attend the birthday
party of the classmate of his wife, a nursing student. He told Joey that he will not go out
because he was tired as he had just took (sic) an exam. However, Joey insisted so he went
out of his house and saw the service vehicle of Joey, a Tamaraw FX parked at about 500
meters away. His house is in the interior part. He then approached the vehicle and he
became aware that there were companions inside the tinted vehicle and he asked Joey who
were these persons and Joey answered that they were his cousins. There were about four of
them inside the vehicle, one was the driver, one was at the passenger side and there were
two at the back. Joey was seated at the front seat. When he was informed by Joey that they
were his cousins, he went inside the vehicle. When the engine started, and was in the
vicinity of Lapasan the men inside started to search him bodily and they got his went inside
the vehicle. When the engine started, and was in the vicinity of Lapasan the men inside
started to search him bodily and they got his cellphone, wallet, and coins. They held his
neck and hands and told him it was an arrest. He then asked Joey was (sic) offense had him
(sic) committed against him and why his companions were searching him and Joey told him
to be considerate since he was just pressured by those men. One of the men beside him
handed marijuana to him and to use it inside the vehicle. Then he was brought to the office
and they took his picture in front of the vehicle of his friend. The man who took the picture,
he identified later as 101 De la Cerna. That de la Cerna took out something from the vehicle
owned by Joey and forced him to point them out. He was then handcuffed by de la Cerna
and was forced again to point out to the items which were wrapped with a newspaper, then
he was brought back to the office and was detained thereat. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn he
was brought to the PNP Crime laboratory at Patag, and Joey was with them, then he was
brought back to their office. He stayed in the office for three days. They parted ways with
Joey when he was already committed at the BJMP in Lumbia. He was later informed that
the PDEA agents did it to him in exchange for Joey because Joey was arrested in Carmen.
He learned of this information from his friend who is a neighbor of Joey in Camella and
who visited him at Lumbia.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
After weighing the evidence, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC found that although the identity of the
alleged buyer, seller, and object were established, two elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were
still missing - the consideration and the payment. As testified to by 101 de la Cerna himself, he did not
bring any buy-bust money and that there was no payment of the alleged marijuana he received from
accused-appellant.8
Nevertheless, the RTC found accused-appellant liable for possession of dangerous drugs, which crime
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The RTC then disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused MICHAEL KURT JOHN
BULAWAN Y ANDALES GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, the offense proved which
is included in the offense charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for twelve [12] years and one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to
pay the Fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00], without subsidiary penalty
in case of insolvency.
The accused shall be entitled to be credited in full of his preventive detention and the period
of his actual incarceration shall be deducted from the number of years with which the
accused is to serve his sentence.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant went before the Court of Appeals. After a review of the records, the appellate court
found accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
Citing People v. Conception,10 the Court of Appeals held that Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
covers not only the sale of dangerous drugs but also the mere act of delivery after the offer to buy by
the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller.11
The Court of Appeals further held that, in convicting accused-appellant of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, accused-appellant's right against double jeopardy was not violated. Citing US v.
Abijan,12 the appellate court held that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render judgment as the law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether they are assigned as errors or not.13
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro in Criminal Case No. 2008-714 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN y ANDALES is found guilty of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment,
without eligibility of parole, and to pay the fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
([P]500,000.00).
SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant is now before the Court, raising the following issues:15
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A BUY-BUST OPERATION

WAS ACTUALLY CONDUCTED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF

THE CORPUS DELICTI WAS ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENTLY.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION OF

REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES OF TFIE ARRESTING
OFFICERS.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

OF A CRIME NOT CFIARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
In sum, accused-appellant argues that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, and that
he cannot be convicted of delivery or possession of dangerous drugs when such was not charged in the
Information.16
After a thorough review of the records, we acquit accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant is charged, particularly, with unlawfully selling and/or offering to sell or give away
marijuana.17
For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165; the following elements must be present: (1) the identities of the buyer and
seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What is
material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti.18
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less
its receipt by accused-appellant, were not established. As testified on by 101 de la Cerna:
Pros.
Borja:
To witness, proceeding.
Q You mentioned earlier that there was a negotiation for the purchase of
P1,000.00 peso worth of marijuana, did you prepare money for that operation?
A No, sir.
Q You mean when you met the accused, there was no P1,000.00 with you?
A No, sir.
Q And you arrested him after he showed to you the marijuana?
A After he gave to me the marijuana sir.19
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Q Did you bring the money at that time?
A No, Ma'am.
Q You mean you are supposed to conduct a buybust operation, you did not bring
any money to be given to the accused?
A It is agreed upon to conduct delivery.
Q What you are trying to tell this Court therefore, is that the accused delivered
drugs without receiving first the money?
A Yes, sir.20
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
To witness.
Q There was no pre-payment prior to the agreed time of delivery?
A No Your Honor.
Q You did not also promise him that you will pay it only after the delivery?
A No, Your Honor.21
In People v. Dasigan,22 where the marked money was shown to therein accused-appellant but was not
actually given to her as she was immediately arrested when the shabu was handed over to the poseur-
buyer, the Court acquitted said accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Citing People v. Hong Yen E,23 the Court held therein that it is material in illegal sale of dangerous
drugs that the sale actually took place, and what consummates the buy-bust transaction is the delivery
of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the seller's receipt of the marked money. While the parties
may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of payment was intended, these do not
prove consummated sale. Receipt of the marked money, whether done before delivery of the drugs or
after, is required.
In the case at bar, there is more reason to acquit accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as the prosecution was not able to prove that there was even a consideration for the
supposed transaction.
The prosecution claimed that that there was prior negotiation between the confidential informant and
accused-appellant. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce any evidence of such prior negotiation.
In fact, nothing can be gained from the records and from the testimonies of the witnesses as to how the
supposed confidential informant conducted the alleged negotiation with accused-appellant.
Repeatedly, this Court has reminded the prosecution of its duty to present a complete picture of the
buy-bust operation - "from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale."24
In the present case, no information was presented by the prosecution on the prior negotiation between
the confidential informant and accused-appellant. Moreover, the testimony of I01 de la Cerna failed to
show any kind of confirmation of the alleged prior negotiation. Thus, there is no proof of the offer to
purchase dangerous drugs, as well as the promise of the consideration.
Also, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti of the offense charged.
In People v. Torres,25 we held that the identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral
certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or
seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard,
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R. A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards
for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.26
However, this Court has also said that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it
is not "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.27cralawred
In the case at bar, the chain of custody of the seized alleged marijuana was not sufficiently established,
thereby casting doubt on the identity and integrity of the supposed evidence.28
The foregoing is I01 dela Cerna's testimony on the handling of the seized alleged marijuana:
Q And you mentioned about marijuana, if that marijuana be shown to you, will you be
able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which I am showing to you this marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine paper, is
this the one you said delivered to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why do you say that this is the one?
A I put marking on it.
Q Where did you place the marking?
A At the left portion sir.
Q Where did you make the marking?
A At the office sir.
That is all that was said as regards the handling of the seized item. The prosecution failed to prove that
the identity and integrity of the seized item was preserved - whether it was kept by I01 dela Cerna from
the time accused-appellant allegedly handed it to him until the time he marked it in the office, whether
I01 dela Cerna turned it over to his superior as is the usual procedure, whether it was returned to I01
dela Cerna for it to be brought to the crime laboratory, whether the specimen was intact when the crime
laboratory received it, whether the crime laboratory officers marked and sealed the seized item after it
was tested, and whether the proper officers observed the mandated precautions in preserving the
identity and integrity of the seized item until it was presented in open court.
On the contrary, what we can deduce from I01 dela Cerna's testimony is the fact that the seized item
was not placed in a plastic container and sealed upon confiscation. As sworn to by PSI Erma Condino
Salvacion, the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory test on the seized item, what she tested
were "suspected Marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine paper with markings 'RDC-D'."29 Also, when
the said item was presented in open court for identification, it was still wrapped in magazine paper.30
In People v. Habana,31 as reiterated in People v. Martinez, et al.,32 we ruled that:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over a supervising
officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it
is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is
imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking
on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be
removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then
identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until it
reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the
same.In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition
it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the
nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container
and seal it again with a new seal since the police officer's seal has been broken. At the trial,
the technician can then describe the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was
handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to
present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the
entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one's possession has been. Each of them has
to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted
while in his care. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, as the seized substance was not sealed, the prosecution should have presented all the
officers who handled said evidence from the time it left the person of the accused to the time it was
presented in open court. The prosecution did not.
Time and again, this Court has held that "the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the
integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is
enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused, x x x A conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug."33
On a final note, in People v. Maongco34 we clarified that possession is necessarily included in the sale
of dangerous drugs. Thus:
Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily
includes the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The same ruling may also be
applied to the other acts penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
because for the accused to be able to trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any dangerous drug, he must necessarily
be in possession of said drugs.35
In the present case, however, as the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of
the subject dangerous drugs, thus compromising its identity and integrity, accused-appellant cannot be
held liable for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the appeal. The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant
Michael Kurt John Bulawan y Andales and ORDERS his immediate release from detention, unless he
is detained for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlib
G.R. No. 210454
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 10 July 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 05055 affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch
93 of appellant Ronaldo Casacop y Amil for violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Appellant was charged with the crime following a "buy-bust" operation. The accusatory portion of the
Information against appellant reads:
Criminal Case No. 5485-SPL
On July 21, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court the said above-named accused not being authorized/permitted by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dangerous
drugs paraphernalia such as one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip and one (1) improvised "tooter," both
positive of traces 'shabu' .2
On July 21, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court above-named accused without the authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of zero point nineteen (0.19) gram.3
On July 21, 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused without any legal authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously in consideration of three (3) pieces one-hundred peso bill, sell,
pass and deliver to a police poseur-buyer one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE weighing zero point zero six (0.06) gram.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Acting on a tip from an informant that a. certain Edong was selling shabu in Quezon Street, Barangay
San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, the Chief of Police of San Pedro Police Station, Police
Superintendent Sergio Dimandal formed a team to conduct surveillance on appellant. Upon receiving a
positive result, Senior Police Officer 4 Melchor Dela Peña (SP04 Dela Pefia) prepared a pre-operation
report which was sent to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).5
SP04 Dela Peña then formed a buy-bust team composed of Police Officer I Jifford Signap (POI Signap)
as the poseur-buyer, SPO2 Diosdado Fernandez, SPOI Jorge Jacob and POI Rommel Bautista, as police
backup. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. POI Signap and the informant
approached appellant's house. POI Signap was introduced to appellant by the informant as the buyer
of shabu. He handed the marked money, consisting of three (3) Pl00.00 bills, to appellant, who took a
plastic sachet from his left pocket and gave it to him. PO1 Signap made the prearranged signal of
calling SP04 Dela Peña. The backup team rushed towards appellant's house and arrested him. PO1
Signap frisked appellant and recovered an improvised glass tooter, aluminum foil strip, cigarette lighter
two (2) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, and the marked money. POI Signap conducted a
physical inventory of the seized items and correspondingly marked them in appellant's house.6
Thereafter, appellant was brought to the police station. Thereat, SPO4 Dela Peña prepared a certificate
of inventory.7 A request letter8 was sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime lab.oratory for
the examination of the seized items. Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas issued Chemistry Report
No. D-808-059 which confirmed the seized items as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
Appellant, for his part, denied the charges of possession of shabu and its paraphernalia and sale
of shabu. Appellant testified that he was urinating at the back of his house on 21 July 2005 at around
12:00 pm when five (5) police officers barged into his house. After confirming that he is Edong,
appellant was handcuffed and brought to the police station. Appellant claimed that the police only
planted evidence against him because they were not able to pin him down in a robbery case.
On 7 January 2011, the R TC rendered a Decision10 finding appellant guilty of all the charges against
him. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1) Finding accused Ronaldo Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5485-SPL, hereby sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years as minimum to four (4) years as maximum, to
pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.
2) Finding accused Ronalda Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5486-SPL, hereby
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15)
years as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.
3) Finding accused Ronalda Casacop y Amil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation 'Of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 5487-SPL, and hereby sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the costs.
The drugs paraphernalia such as one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip and one (1) improvised "tooter", the
0.19 and 0.06 grams (sic) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" which constitutes the
instrument in the commission of the crime is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government. The
Branch Clerk qf Court of this Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit the drugs paraphernalia
such as one (1) rolled aluminum strip and one (1) improvised "tooter", the 0.19 and 0.06 grams (sic) of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "shabu" to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.11
Appellant seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2013, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC.
Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, adopting the same arguments in his Brief12 before
the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1
Appellant asserts that the chain of custody of the object evidence was never established. Moreover,
appellant claims that Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 was
not complied with.
For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.13 On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.14
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO1 Signap, the poseur-
buyer, positively identified appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline substance in one
plastic sachet which was later proven to be positive for shabu. In exchange for this plastic sachet; PO1
Signap handed the marked money as payment. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.15
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and paraphernalia were
likewise established. Found in appellant's pocket after he was caught in flagrante were two (2) more
plastic sachets containing shabu, an improvised glass tooter containing shabu residue and the rolled
aluminum foil with shabu residue. Under Rule 126, Section 13, a person lawfully arrested may be
s,earched for anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a warrant. There was no showing that appellant had legal authority to possess the shabu and its
paraphernalia. Moreover, the fact that these contraband were found in his physical possession shows
that he freely and consciously possessed them.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
in sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved. 16
Records show that PO1 Signap recovered from appellant three (3) plastic sachets of shabu, a glass
tooter and aluminum foil. These items were marked and inventoried in the house of appellant and in his
presence. Thereafter, these seized items were brought to the police station where a request for
qualitative examination was made. SPO4 Dela Peña signed the request and it was sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory. Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas conducted the
examination. Thus, the chain of custody was clearly accounted for.
As the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to establish the corpus
delicti were proven, substantial compliance with Section 21, paragraph I, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
will suffice.
The Court of Appeals successfully rebutted appellant's argument that the police officers failed to
comply with procedure in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs, thus:
Appellant contends that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of paragraph I, Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. This
cotention is untenable. It appears from the testimony of PO1 Signap during direct and cross-
examination, as appreciated and contained in the decision of the court a quo, that after PO1 Signap
showed the three (3) marked one hundred peso (Pl00.00) bills, appellant brought out a plastic Sachet
containing white crystalline substance which was later found out to contain "shabu," a dangerous drug.
Two (2) more plastic sachets containing "shabu" and other drug paraphernalia were recovered from
appellant after he was bodily searched. Thereafter, the apprehending team, before proceeding to the
Police Station, had the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia inventoried and marked at appellant's house
in his presence. At the said station, SPO4 Dela Pena prepared a Certification of Inventory as to the
items seized from appellant. The said certification was signed by one representative from the media by
the name of Edward Pelayo. A Booking Sheet/ Arrest Report was issued to appellant and a letter
request was sent to the PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Crime Laboratory Office for
examination of the seized plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.17
All told, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold and
possessed shabu and shabu paraphernalia. Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to Pl0,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species
of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved. For the crime of illegal sale
of shabu, appellant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
Appellant was also caught in possession of 0.19 gram of shabu. The crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11, paragraph 2(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
provides an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00),
if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who unless authorized by law,
shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
We sustain the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the crime of
illegal possession of shabu.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 July 2013 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of
appellant Ronaldo Casacop y Amil by the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, for
violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185460 July 25, 2012

EDWIN FAJARDO and REYNALDO CORALDE, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration is the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Edwin Fajardo (Fajardo)
and Reynaldo Coralde (Coralde) from the Decision1 dated 15 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 30451, affirming the 25 September 2006 Joint Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103, which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of shabu.
On 26 December 2002, petitioners were charged with violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in two (2) separate
Informations, which read as follow:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses EDWIN FAJARDO Y DADULA of Violation of Section 11, Art. II, R.A.
9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 2002 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in her/his/their possession and control, one (1) disposable lighter and four (4)
transparent plastic sachet containing traces of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, the
content of which does not exceed one gram.3
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO CORALDE Y FERNANDEZ of Violation of Section 11, Art.
II, R.A. 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 2002 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in her/his/their possession and control, zero point zero two (0.02) grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu; one (1) rolled aluminum foil and one (1)
improvised tooter a dangerous drug.4
Petitioners pleaded not guilty on the charges. A joint trial then proceeded.
The facts, as narrated by two prosecution witnesses, follow.
Acting on a tip from a barangay official of an ongoing pot session, a certain SPO4 Cilieto immediately
dispatched six (6) police officers including PO1 Joel Tuscano (PO1 Tuscano) and PO1 Pedro Bernardo
(PO1 Bernardo) to a house in 26 Mabilis Street, Barangay Piñahan, Quezon City at around 3 to 4
o’clock in the afternoon of 21 December 2002. The house is reportedly owned by Coralde.5
Upon arriving at the house, the door was slightly open. From the small opening, PO1 Tuscano saw one
male person, whom he called as Gerald or Gerry Malabanan, lighting up an aluminum foil. When asked
by the court to identify Malabanan, PO1 Tuscano mistakenly pointed to Fajardo. PO1 Tuscano then
identified Malabanan as the other male person he saw inside the house.6 PO1 Bernardo saw through
the partial opening Malabanan with a lighter, while Coralde was holding a lighter and a tooter, and
Fajardo, an aluminum foil.7 PO1 Tuscano then explained that he and the other police officers
introduced themselves and confiscated the drug paraphernalia consisting of one lighter, scissor,
aluminum foil and empty plastic sachet. PO1 Tuscano confiscated the aluminum foil from Fajardo.
These items were brought to the police station, turned over to the investigator, PO2 Merlito Tugo (PO2
Tugo), who in turn, brought them to the crime laboratory.8
The three accused and two other witnesses testified for the defense. Fajardo said that he went to the
house of Coralde to retrieve his cellphone which he pawned to Coralde’s wife.9 Malabanan, on the
other hand, alleged that the wife of Coralde had asked him to go to her house to take her to the hospital.
Malabanan and Coralde’s two (2) sons were also inside the house.
They were asked to wait for Coralde’s wife, who was then taking a bath. While waiting, the three
accused watched the television. Malabanan said he heard someone called out to a Paring
Coring.10 Fajardo heard someone knocking at the door and looking for a Pareng Buboy11 while
Coralde heard a voice from outside calling a certain Pareng Boyong.12 Before anyone could open the
door, a group of men barged into the house. Coralde and Fajardo scampered to a connecting bathroom
which leads to another room owned by Remia Ruanto (Ruanto). Coralde explained that he ran towards
the other house when some strangers came barging into his house because he was caught by
surprise.13 Fajardo followed Coralde because he got scared.14
They were eventually caught inside Ruanto’s room. Meanwhile, Malabanan stayed seated. He got
shocked by the events that transpired and he immediately introduced himself as an employee of East
Avenue Medical Center. The police officers took the identification card and P400.00 cash from his
wallet.
The three accused were handcuffed, boarded to a car, and brought to the police station. They were
brought to Caloocan City for inquest. They all denied that they were having a pot session. Fajardo
claims that he saw the confiscated drug paraphernalia for the first time during their inquest.15
Chemistry Report No. D-1498-02 shows the qualitative examination that was conducted on the
following specimens and with the following results:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
1. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, marked A (JT-A 12-21-02) containing 0.02
gram of white crystalline substance.
2. One (1) strip of aluminum foil, marked B (JT-B 12-21-02) with traces of white crystalline
substance.
3. Four (4) unsealed transparent plastic sachets, each with markings JT-D 12-21-02 containing
traces of white crystalline substance and collectively marked as "C."
4. One (1) piece glass pipe, marked D (JT-F 12-21-02).
5. Three (3) disposable lighters, marked E (JT-E1 12-21-02) F(JT-E2 12-21-02) and G (JT-E3
12-21-02) respectively.
6. One (1) pair of scissor, marked H (JT-6 12-21-02).
7. One (1) rolled aluminum foil, marked I (JT-C 12-21-02).
x x x x.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen A through D gave the following results:
Specimens A and C – POSITIVE to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
Specimens B and D – NEGATIVE to the tests for the presence of any dangerous drugs.16
Noticeably, Specimens E to I were not examined.
Finding the testimonies of the 2 police officers credible, the trial court rendered a decision finding
petitioners guilty as charged. Malabanan was acquitted. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused EDWIN FAJARDO y Dadula in
Criminal Case No. Q-02-114130 and REYNALDO CORALDE y Fernandez in Criminal Case No. Q-
02-114131 GUILTY each of the offense of Section 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165 violation and each accused is
hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day as Minimum to Twelve (12)
Years and Six (6) Months as Maximum and each to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
As for GERRY MALABANAN y Nitural, he is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. Q-02-
114132 of the offense of Section 12, Art. II, R.A. 9165 as it was not established by the arresting
policemen that indeed drugs or paraphernalia were recovered from his possession, and moreover, he
appears to be a mere visitor there to help Mrs. Coralde in her scheduling of operation at EAMC where
he works.
The drugs involved in these cases are hereby ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition upon finality of this judgment. The PDEA is requested to take good
care in the storage of these shabus within its premises.17
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, affirmed the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the
conviction of petitioners. It found the prosecution’s version more credible and relied on the
presumption of regularity on the part of the police officers and on the absence of any ill-motive on their
part. The Court of Appeals justified the validity of the warrantless arrest under the "plain view"
doctrine. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court.
The instant petition raises the lone issue of whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners. Petitioners primarily assail the identity of the shabu as
evidence of the corpus delicti in light of non-compliance with the chain of custody rule. Petitioners
argue that they were not in possession of the plastic sachets apparently containing shabu. The
prosecution merely sought to establish that petitioners were caught in possession of a lighter, tooter and
aluminum foil, all of which were neither examined by the forensic chemist nor found to be positive for
traces of shabu.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General relied on the straightforward and positive
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that petitioners were caught in possession of shabu.
In view of the interrelated issues presented, a joint discussion is in order.
In order for prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof that
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug,
(2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug.
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense and its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus
delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.18 The rule seeks to settle definitively whether the
object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court is the same object allegedly
seized from appellant.19
In Malillin v. People, the Court elucidated on the chain of custody rule, thus:
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.20 [Emphasis Supplied]
The prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody. The prosecution witnesses,
both arresting officers, testified on how the plastic sachets containing traces of shabu were seized from
petitioners. PO1 Tuscano, who even made a mistake in identifying Fajardo as Malabanan, gave a rather
vague account, thus:
A: When we arrived at the house we saw the door opened [sic] and we entered.
Q: After entering the house, what did you see?
A: We saw one male person with a lighter and gumagamit ng shabu.
Q: Who was that person?
A: Gerard, sir.
Q: And how was he using shabu?
A: He was lighting up an aluminum foil.
Q: And what else did you see?
A: The other one was waiting.
Q: And who was the other one waiting?
A: I could not remember who was that person but there were 3 of them.
Q: Would you be able to indentify Gerry if he is inside the courtroom?
A: That man, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who identified himself as EDWIN FAJARDO.
COURT
The person pointed to by the witness as Gerry Malabanan is Edwin Fajardo.
FISCAL JURADO
Q: How about the other person if inside the courtroom?
A: I could not remember.
Q: How many persons did you see inside?
A: Three (3) sir.
Q: Do you know the identity of the 3rd person?
A: I could not remember. I can recognize them by face.
Q: If he is inside the courtroom, the 2nd person?
COURT
Q: Tap his shoulder.
WITNESS
A: That man.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who identified themselves as Gerry Malabanan and
Edwin Fajardo.
FISCAL JURADO
Q: And after that, what did you do to the 3 of them?
WITNESS
A: We introduced ourselves as police officers and we confiscated the paraphernalia.
Q: What were the paraphernalia confiscated?
A: One lighter, scissor, aluminum foil, empty plastic sachet.
Q: What else?
A: Only those.
Q: And after you confiscated it, what happened next?
A: We brought them to the police station.
Q: What happened next?
A: We turned them over to the investigator.
Q: How about the item you confiscated?
A: We brought it to the crime lab.
Q: Who brought that to the crime lab.
A: Our investigator.
Q: What is his name?
A: PO2 Merlito Tugo.
Q: What is the result of that?
A: Positive, sir.
Q: What were the items positive?
A: Aluminum foil.
Q: What else?
A: I could not remember.21 (Emphasis supplied).
On cross-examination, the defense lawyer inquired about the plastic sachet:
Q: Those empty plastic sachets that you mentioned, those were scattered when you entered the house?
A: Yes, but they were just beside them.
Q: How about the aluminum foil, where did you get that?
A: The person was holding it.
COURT
Q: You pointed 2 persons here, who was the one holding it.
ATTY. MOSING
May we state from the record that the witness said "parang si ano."
COURT
The witness tapped the shoulder of Edwin Fajardo.22
First, PO1 Tuscano stated that he saw one of the accused using shabu. Unfortunately, he was not able to
identify which one, from Malabanan and Fajardo, was committing the crime. Second, PO1 Tuscano
stated that an empty plastic sachet was confiscated. But he did not identify from whom it was seized.
Third, the other plastic sachets only cropped up during the cross-examination where PO1 Tuscano
declared that he "found those beside them," apparently referring to all of the accused. Gauging from
PO1 Tuscano’s statement, he did not pinpoint from whom he specifically seized the empty plastic
sachets. He did not explain, nor was it asked of him, how many sachets were seized. Fourth and more
importantly, the Chemistry Report yielded negative results upon examination of Specimens B and D
which were the glass pipe or tooter and the aluminum foil, respectively.23 This finding readily
engenders doubt on whether Fajardo was actually sniffing shabu through a tooter at that time he was
caught by the police officers.
PO1 Bernardo identified the drug paraphernalia held by the accused when they were allegedly caught:
Q: When you and PO3 Tuscano arrived on that place, what happened, what did you do, if any?
A: We joined the team that was already there.
Q: And then what happened?
A: We saw the door was half opened.
Q: When your group saw that the door was half opened at the time, what happened next?
A: I saw two persons holding lighter and paraphernalia.
Q: Can you tell this court who were the two persons you saw inside that house?
A: Gerry Malabanan and Reynaldo Coralde.
Q: If those persons are inside the courtroom, can you identify these persons?
A: Yes, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who identified himself as Gerry Malabanan
A: Turalde [sic] is not around.
FISCAL ARAULA
Q: You said that you saw two persons holding a lighter and drug paraphernalia, can you tell this
Honorable Court who was holding a lighter at the time?
WITNESS
A: Gerry Malabanan, sir.
Q: How about the drug paraphernalia?
A: Reynaldo was holding a tooter.
Q: When you said that Coralde was holding a drug paraphernalia, what was that?
A: Lighter, sir.
Q: When you said that Coralde was holding drug paraphernalia, what do you mean by that, what are
those drug paraphernalia?
A: lighter, tooter24
x x x x.
Q: After you confiscated these items as you mentioned the drug paraphernalia and the lighter from
accused Malabanan and Coralde, how about Fajardo, what was he doing?
A: Holding an aluminum foil.
Q: Can you describe that aluminum foil, how big was that?
A: About 5 inches.
Q: If you‘re shown that item, can you identify that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the lighter?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the tooter as you mentioned?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What can you say on those items in front of you?
A: These are the drug paraphernalia.
Q: Paraphernalia as what?
A: Drugs paraphernalia.
COURT
Q: What is the connection of that drug paraphernalia to this case?
WITNESS
A: Yes, there is.
FISCAL ARAULA
Q: What is the connection of the item shown to you in this case.
WITNESS
A: This lighter came from Malabanan.
Q: How about the two lighters?
A: These particular lighters are not included.
COURT
According to the witness these two lighters colored pink and green are not included.
FISCAL ARAULA
Q: How about the aluminum foil, what can you say to this aluminum foil?
WITNESS
A: This is the aluminum foil.
Q: Who used that aluminum foil?
A: The three, sir.
Q: Who was holding this aluminum foil?
A: Fajardo, sir.
Q: How about these two plastic sachet, do you know where it came from?
A: These were also part of paraphernalia taken from them.
Q: How about the scissor?
A: Also the scissor and the aluminum foil, tooter.25
PO1 Bernardo had apparently seen Coralde in the act of sniffing from the tooter, Fajardo holding an
aluminum foil and Malabanan holding the lighter. Again, the aluminum foil and the tooter were found
negative for traces of shabu. Noticeably, PO1 Bernardo did not initially mention the plastic sachets
until he was asked. It was the public prosecutor who brought up the question where the plastic sachets
came from, to which PO1 Bernardo replied indistinctly: "These were also part of paraphernalia taken
from them."
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses merely established the possession of drug paraphernalia,
i.e., aluminum foil, lighter, and tooter by petitioners. Petitioners were however charged for violation of
Article II, Section 11, Republic Act No. 9165 or for possession of illegal drugs which reads:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma
hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section
93, Article XI of this Act.
None of the dangerous drugs enumerated above and more specifically, shabu, were convincingly
proven to have been in possession of petitioners. On the other hand, possession of drug paraphernalia is
dealt with in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, which reads:
Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs. -The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in
the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry such equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
Notably, a case for possession of drug paraphernalia was filed but only against Malabanan, who was
later on acquitted by the trial court.
Another phase of the first link to the chain of custody is the marking of seized items. The rule requires
that it should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence.26 Evidently, the marking was not done at the scene of the crime. In fact, PO1 Bernardo
testified that it was an investigator of the crime laboratory, whose name he cannot recall, who made the
markings. Indeed, PO1 Bernardo could not explain the actual markings.27
The prosecution miserably failed to establish the crucial first link in the chain of custody.1âwphi1 The
plastic sachets, while tested positive for shabu, could not be considered as the primary proof of the
corpus delicti because the persons from whom they were seized were not positively and categorically
identified by prosecution witnesses. The prosecution likewise failed to show how the integrity and
evidentiary value of the item seized had been preserved when it was not explained who made the
markings, how and where they were made.
The second link in the chain of custody constitutes custody and possession of the shabu prior, during
and immediately after the police investigation and how the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and
recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by the crime laboratory.28 PO1 Tuscano merely
identified PO2 Tugo as the one who brought the confiscated items to the crime laboratory. But it was
not clear whether it was PO2 Tugo who received the seized items from the police officers who arrived
at the police station. In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the police officers stated "that all the recovered
evidence were confiscated and properly handled and transported to this Station for
safekeeping"29 without stating the particulars. Moreover, no details were given as to who was in
custody of the seized items while in transit. Thus, the reliability, nay existence of the second link, had
clearly been compromised.
The third link in the chain should detail who brought the seized shabu to the crime laboratory, who
received the shabu at the crime laboratory and, who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after
it was examined and before it was presented in court.30 Once again, these crucial details were nowhere
to be found in the records. PO2 Tugo allegedly brought them to the crime laboratory but he was not
presented to affirm and corroborate PO1 Tuscano’s statement, nor was any document shown to
evidence the turnover of the seized items. The Request for Laboratory Examination was signed by a
certain Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Tababan. But his participation in the custody and handling of
the seized items were never mentioned by the prosecution witnesses.
Considering these huge discrepancies in the chain of custody, the claim of regularity in the conduct of
police operation will certainly not hold water. It bears stressing that the presumption of regularity only
arises in the absence of contradicting details that would raise doubts on the regularity in the
performance of official duties. Where the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedure
prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption.31
Given that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of the corpus delicti, there is no
necessity to discuss the alleged procedural infirmities that may have attended the arrest of petitioners.
This Court is thus constrained to acquit petitioners on reasonable doubt.
WHERFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 15 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Edwin Fajardo and Reynaldo Coralde are
ACQUITED based on reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which
provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of
the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and
custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing
0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the
motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or
Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter
into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A.
No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118,
the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining.
It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law,
R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only
possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by
case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No.
191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve
an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for
the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional
because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this
judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26,
2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS

IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E.

LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23
of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a
petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover,
the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona
lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy;
and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless,
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make
exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive
ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a
petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial
and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on
illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its
disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes,
and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have
equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as
urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly
accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and
its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort
to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should
not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends
for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural
rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilladiscussed
the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's
rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to
be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.
In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme
Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953
which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any
attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is
the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of
Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary
by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing
scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions
by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the
Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and
more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers
debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was
an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the
said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present
lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected
an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have
rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an

administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The

Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule
14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon.
Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section

14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when
the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal,
may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule
118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the
provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the
trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section
2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2,
Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will
promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test
for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive.
In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that
what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however,
an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For
example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as
a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the
right of the State to prosecute the accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing
the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the
Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to
due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by
the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due
to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor,
especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the
State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may
have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes
proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another
crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more
difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a
criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public
obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may
fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus
eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely
provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused
to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable
cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to
avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the
simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively
attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial
resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or
in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who
are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time
between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty
when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he
gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and
scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There
is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both
the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered,
plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and
finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a
right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's
case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and
accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a
"serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the
witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is
that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best
to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the
litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the
decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense
than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for
the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion"
is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could
be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted
a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea
to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must
disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of
the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and
irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper
to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
G.R. No. 223528

vs.
JEFFREY HIRANG y RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated March 9, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05129, which affirmed the conviction of defendant-appellant Jeffrey Hirang y Rodriguez
(Hirang) for violation of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
The Facts
Hirang, also known as Jojit and Jojie, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons, as defined and penalized under Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9208, via an Amended
Information2 that reads:
That on or about June 27, 2007, at Taguig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruited, transported
and provided in a large scale minors [AAA],3 17 years old, [BBB], 17 years old, [CCC], 14 years
old and [DDD], 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution by taking advantage of their
vulnerability as young girls through promise of a good time or "gimik" in a disco and good food if they
would simply accompany him in meeting and entertaining his Korean friends and to induce their full
consent further promise them Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) to Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00) each afterwards when in truth and in fact peddled them for sexual favors and pleasure
in consideration of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) each and engaged' their services in
prostitution as in fact he already received Seven Thousand Pesos down payment from the Korean
national who engaged their services.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Emphasis and underlining in the original)
Upon arraignment, Hirang entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 5
Version of the Prosecution
The private complainants are minor victims of Hirang in his prostitution activities. The following
persons testified for the prosecution: victims DDD, AAA, CCC and BBB, International Justice Mission
(UM) Investigators Alvin Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and Jeffrey Villagracia (Villagracia), National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator (SI) Menandro Cariaga (Cariaga), SI Anson L. Chumacera
and forensic chemist Loren J. Briones. 6
AAA was born on November 25, 1989. She was only 16 years old when Hirang recruited her in August
of 2006 as a sex worker, for which she was paid ₱1,000.00 per day, less Hirang's commission of
₱200.00. She was later prodded to work as a sexy dancer and prostitute at the Catwalk Club along
Quezon Avenue. She joined her customers in their tables at the club, and gave sexual services in hotels.
She left the club after two nights, upon her live-in partner's order. Still, Hirang sourced several other
prostitution jobs for AAA. He convinced AAA to work in a cybersex den in Muñoz, Quezon City. She
received ₱700.00 a month, less ₱200.00 commission received by Hirang. In September 2006, Hirang
made AAA work again as a sexy dancer at Philippine Village bar in Puerto Galera. AAA had to quit her
job when she got pregnant, but resumed work for Hirang after she gave birth.7
CCC was born on December 19, 1992. She was 14 years old when she was recruited by Hirang for his
illicit activities. She met Hirang at the house of Ka Lolet, her best friend's mother. She knew Hirang to
be scouting young girls who could be traded for sex. Sometime in June 2007, Hirang asked CCC to go
with him and meet some Koreans. 8
DDD, who was born on February 11, 1991, was 16 years old when she ran away from home in 2007
and stayed at a friend's house in Sta. Ana, Taguig City. As she was then in need of money, she accepted
an offer from one Ate Lolet, a pimp, that she be introduced to a male customer, with whom she had
sexual intercourse for ₱2,500.00. It was Ate Lolet who later introduced DDD to Hirang.9
BBB was born on March 28, 1990. CCC is her younger sister. She was 17 years old when on June 27,
2007, she visited CCC at Ka Lolet's house. There she saw Hirang, who invited her to come with him in
meeting some Koreans that evening. Later in the evening, at around 8:00 p.m., BBB went back to the
house of Ka Lo let to meet Hirang. It was then on June 27, 2007 that Hirang sold BBB, along with
AAA, CCC and DDD, to his Korean customers for sexual activities. Hirang told his victims that they
would receive ₱5,000.00 after a "gimik" 10 with them. At around 10:00 p.m., their group proceeded to
meet with the Koreans at Chowking restaurant, C-5 in Taguig City. Hirang instructed the girls to tell the
Koreans that they were 16 years of age, as this was their customers' preference. 11
When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then introduced the girls to him.
The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the latter was counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene
and announced a raid. NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and
brought them to the NBI for their statements. 12
The raid was conducted following a prior investigation conducted by IJM, a non-profit organization
that renders legal services and is based in Washington, D.C. IJM's investigators Sarmiento and
Villagracia gathered data on human trafficking in Metro Manila, after information that Hirang was
selling minors for prostitution. Hirang was introduced by a confidential informant to Villagracia, who
posed as a travel agency employee having Korean friends. Villagracia claimed to have Korean friends
as they knew Hirang to be transacting only with foreign customers. 13
Hirang and Villagracia first agreed to meet on June 20, 2007 at Chowking restaurant along C-5 Road in
Taguig City. Villagracia introduced Hirang to Sarmiento, who introduced himself as Korean national
studying English in Manila. Hirang informed Sarmiento that he had with him AAA, who was good in
bed, only 15 years old and could perform any sexual position, for a fee of ₱20,000.00. Sarmiento,
however, told Hirang that he and his other Korean friends had other plans for the night. Hirang
demanded a cancellation fee of ₱1,500.00 and scheduled another meeting with Sarmiento and the other
Koreans on June 26, 2007. 14
Thereafter, IJM submitted a report to the NBI-Field Office Division, and asked for the agency's
investigative assistance and operation against Hirang. On June 26, 2007, IJM and NBI operatives
agreed during a conference that they would conduct an entrapment operation on June 27, 2007.
Sarmiento reset his meeting with Hirang to June 27, 2007. Hirang initially got mad, but was appeased
after Sarmiento promised to give a bonus of ₱20,0000.00. Cariaga prepared the marked money to be
used during the entrapment, and was tasked to be the driver of poseur-customer Sarmiento. Several
other NBI and IJM agents served as back-up during the operation, in case any untoward incident should
happen. 15
On June 27, 2007, the entrapment was conducted with proper coordination with local authorities. A
social worker from the Deartment of Social Welfare and Development and members of the media for
the segment XXX of ABS-CBN Channel 2 joined the operation. Villagracia secretly recorded his
conversation with Hirang. 16
Hirang introduced AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD to Sarmiento, who feigned his desire to pursue the
transaction. Hirang specified the sexual services that the girls could offer, and assured Sarmiento that
the girls could fulfill their customers' sexual fantasies. 17 Sarmiento then handed to Hirang a fictitious
check amounting to ₱20,000.00, while Cariaga handed the ₱7,000.00 marked money. As Hirang was
counting the cash, he complained that the amount was not enough as he charged ₱20,000.00 per girl,
plus bonus. At this point, Cariaga performed the pre-arranged signal with NBI operatives, who declared
the entrapment operation and arrested Hirang. An ultraviolet dust examination later performed upon
Hirang rendered positive result for fluorescent powder specks. 18
Version of the Defense
Hirang and his mother Myrna Hirang (Myrna) testified for the defense.
Hirang claimed to be self-employed, selling longganisa and other wares for a living. He denied dealing
with sexual trade. It was upon the instigation of Villagracia, who was introduced to him by his friend
Jun Valentin (Valentin), that he agreed to bring the girls for the supposed Korean clients. Hirang
described Villagracia as a drug addict who frequently visited Valentin's house for pot sessions.
Villagracia told Hirang that he knew of Koreans looking for girls and were willing to pay ₱20,000.00 to
₱25,000.00 for each girl who must be 13 to 14 years old. 19
On June 20, 2007, Hirang, Valentin and two girls went to meet up with Villagracia at Chowking in C-5
Road, but the Koreans cancelled the transaction. Villagracia was disappointed that the girls brought by
Hirang were already 23 years old. They agreed to meet again, but Villagracia reminded Hirang to bring
young girls next time. Hirang promised to do so, and then received ₱500.00 from Villagracia.20
When they later talked again over the telephone, Villagracia advised Hirang to convince the Koreans to
hire the girls so that Hirang and Valentin could receive the ₱5,000.00 commission per girl. Another
Korean promised to give a bonus of ₱10,000.00 if Hirang could provide young girls. Since Hirang
claimed to have no girls for the service, he went to the house of Ka Lolet with whom he had previously
transacted whenever he needed girls for sexual services. Ka Lolet provided BBB, CCC and DDD,
while Hirang personally talked to AAA. Hirang and Ka Lolet agreed to give each girl ₱5,000.00, while
a ₱5,000.00 commission for each girl would be divided among him, Ka Lolet, Villagracia and
Valentin.21
Hirang and Villagracia met again on June 26, 2007 at Valentin's house. Villagracia reminded Hirang
that the girls should be young. He also gave instructions on the dresses that the girls should wear during
their meeting. On the evening of June 27, 2007, Hirang went to Ka Lolet's house and from there,
brought the girls to Chowking in C-5 Road on board a van provided by Ka Lolet. One Korean national
gave Hirang money for their food. As their order was being served at the restaurant, NBI operatives
approached Hirang and arrested him. 22
In her testimony, defense witness Myrna claimed knowing Villagracia, as the latter frequently talked to
Hirang over the cellphone. There were times that she answered Villagracia's calls, and the latter
introduced himself as a friend of Hirang with whom he had an arrangement. 23
Ruling of the RTC
On June 25, 2011, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station rendered its
Decision24 convicting Hirang of the crime of human trafficking. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, [HIRANG] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 6 of [R.A.] No. 9208 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.25
Feeling aggrieved, Hirang appealed26 to the CA based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING [HIRANG'S] DEFENSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING
AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [HIRANG'S] RIGHTS
UNDER [R.A.] NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.27
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the appeal via a Decision28 dated March 9, 2015, with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2011 of the [RTC] of Pasig City,
Branch 163, Taguig City Station in Criminal Case No. 135682 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.29
Hence, this appeal. 30

The Present Appeal
On June 13, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that they could file their
respective supplemental briefs.31 However, both Hirang and the Office of the Solicitor General, as
counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, manifested that they would no longer file
supplemental briefs, as their respective briefs filed with the CA sufficiently addressed their particular
arguments. 32
Based on the parties' contentions as raised before the CA, the Court is called upon to resolve the
following issues: (1) whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
Hirang for the crime charged; and (2) whether Hirang should be acquitted in view of the failure of the
arresting officers to observe R.A. No. 7438.
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms Hirang's conviction.
Hirang was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a), in relation to
Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9208, which read:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to
commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring,

or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at
a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve
any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen
(18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a
person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money,
profit or any other consideration.
In People v. Casio,33 the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from the
aforequoted Section 3(a), to wit:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders";
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another"; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs."34 (Citation omitted and italics in the original)
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the
minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was
committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during
the trial.1âwphi1The young victims themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were
lured by Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become
victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed
and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes.
Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's unlawful activity, as they conducted the entrapment
operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with the supposed customers and received payment
therefor.
Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were conflicting
and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained to the supposed participation of Ka Lolet in the
recruitment of the victims, how the IJM agents came to personally know of Hirang, and other incidents
that involved prior surveillance and the entrapment operation itself. It is evident, however, that the
supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any case, could
not negate Hirang's unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled
time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be
given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by
the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 35
Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even such defense deserves
scant consideration.1âwphi1 It has been established by the prosecution that Hirang has been engaged in
the illegal activities leading young women to prostitution, and the police officers merely employed
means for his capture. Trafficking of women was his habitual trade; he was merely entrapped by
authorities.36 Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a wrongdoer. In People v. Bartolome,37the
Court distinguished between entrapment and instigation, as it explained:
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for
the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their
agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would
otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the
accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the
accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been
said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary
criminal."38
In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and deploying young girls
for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel approached him for girls precisely because of his
illicit activities. Also, Hirang was not first approached for prostitutes by police or government
authorities, but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-governmental organization. IJM
only sought coordination with the police officers after Hirang, Sarmiento and Villagracia had
determined to meet on June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported Korean customers. Clearly,
there could be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to speak of.
Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to inform Hirang of
the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to acquit him. The CA
correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of
entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.39 In People v. Vasquez,40the
Court held:
[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated
in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before
the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information
against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of
their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
x x x. 41 (Citations omitted)
Given the foregoing, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse Hirang's conviction for qualified
trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and CA correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment
and fine of ₱2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for
the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos (5,000,000.00)[.]
Damages in favor of the victims should, however, also be awarded. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,42 each victim is entitled to ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. This is supported by Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in A1iicle 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
xxxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thereby justifying the award of
moral damages. When the crime is aggravated, the award of exemplary damages is also justified.43
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 9, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05129 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that victims AAA,
BBB, CCC and DDD are each entitled to ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 195419 October 12, 2011

vs.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH, RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION, and NESTOR
RELAMPAGOS (at large),Accused.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No. 21908).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29 November 2005 (RTC
Decision),1found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, and sentenced each of the accused to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA Decision),2 affirmed in
toto the RTC Decision. The accused-appellants appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal3 in
accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as follows:
In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old, single, was in Tumaga,
Zamboanga City on her way to the house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion Aringoy and
Rachel Aringoy Cañete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, it’s good you are here" ("oy, maayo kay dia ka").
Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to work in Malaysia. x x x Lolita was interested so she gave her
cellphone number to Ronnie. After their conversation, Lolita proceeded to her grandfather’s house.
xxx
On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Lolita received a text message from Ronnie
Aringoy inviting her to go to the latter’s house. At 7:30 in the morning, they met at Tumaga on the road
near the place where they had a conversation the night before. Ronnie brought Lolita to the house of his
sister in Tumaga. Lolita inquired what job is available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will work
as a restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a passport. She will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits
which is equivalent to ₱7,000.00 pesos in Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not
have a passport. Ronnie said that they will look for a passport so she could leave immediately. Lolita
informed him that her younger sister, Marife Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided her for not telling
him immediately. He told Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on June 6, 2005 and they will go to
Hadja Jarma Lalli who will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter
replied that she was not in her house. She was at the city proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Cañete
arrived on board a tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house where Lolita was staying at Southcom
Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a passport. Lolita said that she will borrow her sister’s
passport. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to Buenavista where Lolita’s other sister, Gina Plando was
staying. Her sister Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let her use Marife’s
passport. Marife refused but Lolita got the passport. Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded
to Tumaga. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house of Hadja Jarma Lalli just two hundred meters
away from the house of Ronnie in Tumaga. Ronnie introduced Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying "Ji, she is
also interested in going to Malaysia." Lolita handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs
to her sister Marife Plando. Hadja Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have a connection
with the DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs) and Marife’s picture in the passport will be substituted
with Lolita’s picture. Nestor Relampagos arrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma introduced
Nestor to Lolita as their financier who will accompany them to Malaysia. x x x Lolita noticed three
other women in Hadja Jarma’s house. They were Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and
another woman who is about 28 years old. The women said that they are from Ipil, Sibugay Province.
Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many companions going to Malaysia to work. They will leave the
next day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in the afternoon.
On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon bringing a bag
containing her make-up and powder. She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey
and Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket for the vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan,
Malaysia; a passport in the name of Marife Plando but with Lolita’s picture on it, and ₱1,000.00 in
cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded the boat M/V Mary Joy
bound for Sandakan. Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board the boat. x x x After the
boat sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos approached Lolita and her companions. Nestor
told them that they will have a good job in Malaysia as restaurant entertainers. They will serve food to
customers. They will not be harmed.
M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 o’clock in the morning of June 7,
2005. After passing through the immigration office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relampagos, Lolita,
Honey, Michele and two other women boarded a van for Kota Kinabalu. x x x At the hotel, Nestor
Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their employer.
After looking at the women, "Boss" brought Lolita, Honey, Diane and Lorraine to a restaurant near the
hotel. Diane and Lorraine were also on baord M/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for
Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already at the restaurant, a Filipina woman working there
said that the place is a prostitution den and the women there are used as prostitutes. Lolita and her
companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and Nestor that they do not like to work as
prostitutes. x x x After about five minutes, another person called "boss" arrived. x x x [T]hey were
fetched by a van at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening and brought to Pipen Club owned by "Boss Awa",
a Malaysian. At the club, they were told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the
amount given by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the said
amount by entertaining customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for short time services of which
50 ringgits will go to the entertainer, and 500 ringgits for over night service of which 100 ringgits will
be given to the entertainer. Pipen Club is a big club in a two-storey building. There were about 100
women working in the club, many of them were Filipina women.
Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started working at 8:30 in the
evening of June 14, 2005. She was given the number 60 which was pinned on her. That night, she had
her first customer who selected her among the other women at the club. He was a very big man, about
32 years old, a Chinese-Malay who looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short time service at the
counter. Lolita was given by the cashier a small pink paper. She was instructed to keep it. A small
yellow paper is given to the entertainer for overnight services. The customer brought Lolita to a hotel.
She did not like to go with him but a "boss" at the club told her that she could not do anything. At the
hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and instructed her to undress. She refused. The man boxed her on
the side of her body. She could not bear the pain. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse
with her. He had sexual intercourse with her every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour. When the
customer went inside the comfort room, Lolita put on her clothes and left. The customer followed her
and wanted to bring her back to the hotel but Lolita refused. At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of
June 15, 2005, Lolita was chosen by another customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The
customer paid for an overnight service at the counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel which is far
from Pipen Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to undress. When she refused, the man brought her
to the comfort room and bumped her head on the wall. Lolita felt dizzy. The man opened the shower
and said that both of them will take a bath. Lolita’s clothes got wet. She was crying. The man undressed
her and had sexual intercourse with her. They stayed at the hotel until 11:00 o’clock in the morning of
June 15, 2005. The customer used Lolita many times. He had sexual intercourse with her every hour.
Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She had at
least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had around five customers a night. They all had
sexual intercourse with her. On July 9, 2005, Lolita was able to contact by cellphone at about 10:00
o’clock in the morning her sister Janet Plando who is staying at Sipangkot Felda x x x. Janet is married
to Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a driver in the factory. x x x Lolita told
Janet that she is in Labuan, Malaysia and beg Janet to save her because she was sold as a prostitute.
Janet told Lolita to wait because her husband will go to Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00 o’clock that
evening of that day. x x x She told Janet to instruct her husband to ask for No. 60 at Pipen Club. x x x
At 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Lolita was told by Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a
customer requested for No. 60. The man was seated at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and
said, "good evening." The man asked her is she is the sister of Janet Plando. Lolita replied that she is,
and asked the man if he is the husband of her sister. He said, "yes." The man had already paid at the
counter. He stood up and left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. x x x Lolita told her
sister about her ordeal. She stayed at her sister’s house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005 at 7:00
o’clock in the evening, a policeman went to her sisters house and asked if there is a woman staying in
the house without a passport. Her sister told the policeman that she will send Lolita home on July 22.
At dawn on July 22, Lolita and her brother-in-law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas
where Lolita will board a speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi. x x x
Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the house of her eldest sister
Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta. Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her things at her sister’s house
and immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga. Ronnie was not there. She asked
Russel, niece of Ronnie, to call for the latter. Ronnie arrived and said to her, "so you are here, you
arrived already." He said he is not involved in what happened to her. Lolita asked Ronnie to accompany
her to the house of Nestor Relampagos because she has something to get from him. Ronnie refused. He
told Lolita not to let them know that she had already arrived from Malaysia.
Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia. On August 2,
2005, at past 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim
Avenue to file her complaint. x x x
In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"; "1-A"-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met Lolita Plando
on June 6, 2005 on board M/V Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan,
Malaysia. The meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos
and Lolita Plando boarded the same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted ways.
They did not see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what happened to
them. She went to Kota Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited Lolita Plando for
employment abroad (Exh. "1"; "1-A"). x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally

knows Lolita Plando since she was a teenager and he knows for a fact that her name is
Cristine and not Marife "as she purports it to appear." Sometime in the first week of June
2005, Lolita borrowed ₱1,000.00 from Ronnie because she wanted to go to Malaysia to
work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie lent her ₱1,000.00. He told her that he
knows "a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who frequents to Malaysia and with
whom she can ask pertinent information on job opportunities." The entries in Philippine
Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on January 29, 2004 (Exh. "2"; "2-A"
to "2-Q") showed that she traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times within the period
from March 2004 to June 2005.
xxx
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary
Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3,
testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not
only for herself but also for other women passengers.
xxx
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Cañete (Exh. "2") and the
Joint Affidavits of witnesses Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete
declared that Lolita Plando whom she knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest
relation officer) and massage attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that Lolita
Plando has four children sired by different men; and that she knows for a fact that Lolita
Plando has been going to and from Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in court,
Rachel did not present other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar and
Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is known to them as
Marife Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO (guest relation officer)
at Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the names Gina Plando and
Cristine Plando. She worked in the said establishment for nine months from February to
October 2002. She has four children from four different men. No other evidence was
submitted in court to prove their assertions.4
The Decision of the Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005, with its dispositive portion
declaring:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY y
MASION GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 21908 of the Crime of Trafficking
in Persons defined in Section 3(a) and penalized under Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and
6(c) of Republic Act No. 9208 known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and in Criminal
Case No. 21930 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment defined in Section 6 and penalized under Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995"
and SENTENCES each of said accused:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of ₱2,000,000.00 pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00 pesos;
3. To pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-appellants over the candid, positive and
convincing testimony of complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused, likewise, tried to prove that
Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the Philippines with four children fathered by four
different men. However, the trial court found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to the criminal
prosecution. These circumstances, even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of
the accused. The trial court found that the accused, without a POEA license, conspired in recruiting
Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a syndicate.6 The trial court
did not pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos) because
jurisdiction was not acquired over his person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and found accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in
Persons.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming in
toto the RTC Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons from ₱50,000
to ₱500,000 for moral damages and ₱50,000 to ₱100,000 for exemplary damages.
Grounds for Appeal
In his Appeal Brief,7 Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma
Lalli (Lalli), Aringoy’s neighbor who frequents Malaysia and from whom Lolita could ask pertinent
information on job opportunities.8 Aringoy claims that he learned later that Lolita left for
Malaysia.9 He denies knowing Relampagos to whom Lolita paid ₱28,000 as placement fee for finding
her work in Malaysia.10
Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece Rachel Aringoy Cañete (Rachel), Mercedita Salazar
(Mercedita), and Estrella Galgan (Estrella). In her testimony, Rachel declared that: (1) Lolita is a GRO
and Massage Attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor; (2) Lolita has four children sired by
different men; and (3) Lolita has been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella, on
the other hand, declared in their testimonies that Lolita was their co-worker as Massage Attendant and
GRO in Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002.11
Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolita’s testimony because of inconsistencies with regard to: (1)
Lolita’s grandfather’s status and name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and Rachel) who approached Lolita to
talk about the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3) certain statements in Lolita’s testimony that were not
alleged in her Sworn Statement; (4) payment of placement fee of ₱ 28,000; and (5) names of the other
female recruits who were with Lolita in the boat going to Sandakan and Kota Kinabalu.12 Aringoy
likewise claims that he was never included in the initial complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolita’s
statements about her meetings with him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4, 5 and 6 June 2005 were not
corroborated by any witness.13
On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,14 Lalli claims that she simply met Lolita on 6 June 2005 on
board the ship M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia.15 Lalli denies having met Lolita prior to
their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy.16 Lalli claims she was going to Malaysia to visit her daughter
and son-in-law who was a Malaysian national.17 Lalli further claims that she only spoke to Lolita
aboard the ship for idle conversation to pass away the time.18 In this conversation, she learned that
Lolita was with a party of girls accompanied by Relampagos, and the latter was bringing them to
Malaysia to work as sales ladies.19 Lalli admits that Lolita, Relampagos and the other girls rode in
Lalli’s van in Sandakan, driven by a friend of Lalli’s son-in-law.20 They all rode together because
Relampagos talked to the van driver, requesting if he and his party of girls could board the van and pay
their fare when they reach the city proper of Kota Kinabalu.21 Lalli boarded the van with Lolita,
Relampagos and their companions.22 Upon reaching her destination, Lalli got off the van, leaving
Lolita, Relampagos and their other companions to continue their journey towards the city proper of
Kota Kinabalu.23 After spending several days in Malaysia with her daughter and son-in-law, Lalli went
to Brunei to visit a cousin on 12 June 2005, and headed back to Malaysia on 14 June 2005.24
Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her testimony with regard to: (1) Lolita
not being in Southcom Village on 5 June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she claimed, but in Buenavista Village;
and (2) Lolita’s claim that Lalli and Relampagos on 12 June 2005 brought the girls to Labuan, when in
fact, Lalli was already in Brunei on 12 June 2005, as evidenced by the stamp in her passport.25
Credibility of Testimonies
Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the testimony of Lolita due to its
alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts, such as the status of Lolita’s grandfather, the name of the
village she was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and the like. In a long line of cases,
the Court has ruled that inconsistencies pointed out by the accused in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses relating to minor details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses.26 On the contrary, they
indicate that the witnesses were telling the truth and not previously rehearsed.27
The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the testimonies of accused Aringoy and
Lalli. Aringoy admitted that he referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, his neighbor who
frequents Malaysia and with whom Lolita could ask pertinent information on job opportunities.28 Lalli,
on the other hand, denies having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6 June
2005,29 and claims that her meeting with Lolita was purely coincidental.30 Lalli admits that, even if
she met Relampagos, Lolita and their companions only on that day on board M/V Mary Joy, she
allowed these people to ride with her in Malaysia using the van driven by the friend of Lalli’s son-in-
law.31 Lastly, Lalli claims that she often goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-
law.32 However, this does not explain why Lalli purchased boat tickets, not only for herself, but for the
other women passengers going to Malaysia.33 From March 2004 to June 2005, Lalli traveled to
Malaysia no less than nine (9) times.34 Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines,
owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V
Kristel Jane 3, testified in open court that "Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to
Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers."35 Clearly, it is not Lolita’s
testimony that is materially inconsistent, but the testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy.
Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to impeach the credibility of Lolita by
alleging that Lolita was a Massage Attendant and GRO in a massage parlor and videoke bar. His
witness Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the young age of 23 years, already had four children
sired by four different men, and had been previously travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These bare
allegations were not supported by any other evidence. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lolita
previously worked in a Karaoke Bar and Massage Parlor and that she had four children from different
men, such facts cannot constitute exempting or mitigating circumstances to relieve the accused from
their criminal liabilities. It does not change the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to work in
Malaysia without the requisite POEA license, thus constituting the crime of illegal recruitment. Worse,
the accused deceived her by saying that her work in Malaysia would be as restaurant entertainer, when
in fact, Lolita would be working as a prostitute, thus, constituting the crime of trafficking.
The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, are, as a general rule,
conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion.36 The Court,
however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or controversies under specific circumstances, such
as:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and
(10 when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
) absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.37
In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are applicable. The
Court gives weight and respect to the trial court’s findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.38 For this reason, the Court adopts the findings of
fact of the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower courts.
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
xxx
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, defines "authority" as follows:
"Authority" means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or association
to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate (which
constitutes economic sabotage), as follows:
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not, is
engaged in illegal recruitment.39 The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an
agency under DOLE created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under the Labor Code. The
commission of illegal recruitment by three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another is deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage,40 for which the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱ 500,000 but not more than ₱ 1,000,000 shall
be imposed.41
The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than ₱ 2,000,000 but not more than ₱ 5,000,000.
However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply the penalties in the old law, RA 8042.
In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal recruitment, to wit:
1. the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
2. he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and
3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another.43
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee,
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of referring
someone for placement abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of referral, in connivance with
someone without the requisite authority or POEA license, constitutes illegal recruitment. In its simplest
terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give
the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.44
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to
have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia,
without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case, in
particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of
recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and
(3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos), conspiring
and confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to Malaysia. Such
act of referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone without a POEA license, is
already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement in the
Labor Code.
Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and placement of Lolita
to Malaysia, and claims she only met Lolita for the first time by coincidence on board the ship M/V
Mary Joy. Lalli’s denial does not deserve credence because it completely conflicts with the testimony
of Aringoy who claims he referred Lolita to Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in
Malaysia.
The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give doubt to the truth and veracity
of their stories, and strengthens the credibility of the testimony of Lolita, despite allegations of
irrelevant inconsistencies.
No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would falsely testify against the
accused. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive entitles Lolita’s testimony to full faith and
credit.45
Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even knowing
Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli denies any involvement in the illegal recruitment, and
claims that she only met Relampagos through Lolita on board the ship M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005,
and learned that Relampagos was bringing Lolita and their other girl companions to Malaysia to work
as sales ladies.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:
The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the
agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided
upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the
parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission
of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also
be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. 47
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted efforts of
Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor
of Lolita’s grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly admitted by Aringoy.
Second, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolita’s boat
ticket to Malaysia. This fact can be deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing
clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to
Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora testified in open court that "Hadja Jarma
Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women
passengers." Lalli’s claim that she only goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law does not
explain the fact why she bought the boat tickets of the other women passengers going to Malaysia. In
fact, it appears strange that Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span of one year and three months
(March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and son-in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos
who introduced Lolita and her companions to a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their first employer.
When Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel to tell Relampagos and Lalli that they did not
want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought Lolita and the girls on board a van to Sangawan
China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one night. The next day, they were picked up by a van
and brought to Pipen Club, where Lolita and her companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused
Relampagos is at large and has not been brought under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in
order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.48 The
unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence
having a tendency to establish his guilt.49 Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who
is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and
deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos
could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated – each of the accused played a
pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring accused
Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of ₱ 500,000 imposed on each of the accused.
Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows:
Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of which is:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those
done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a syndicate, as provided in Section
6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by
a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.
Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
million pesos (₱5,000,000.00).
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May 2003, designed to criminalize the
act of trafficking in persons for prostitution, sexual exploitation, foced labor and slavery, among others.
In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of Trafficking in Persons because
he was not part of the group that transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship
M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as witness to testify that Lolita had been
travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the
recruitment and trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the first time on board M/V
Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
The testimony of Aringoy’s niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars
cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her
sister’s passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she
could have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover,
even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in
Persons can exist even with the victim’s consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of
victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the
three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to
illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA
9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different offenses, a
prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other.50 The constitutional right against
double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same offense, or for an act punished
by a law and an ordinance.51 The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of
acts constituting different offenses.
DAMAGES
Lolita claimed actual damages of ₱ 28,000, which she allegedly paid to the accused as placement fee
for the work of restaurant entertainer in Malaysia. The trial court did not award this amount to Lolita.
We agree and affirm the trial court’s non-award due to Lolita’s inconsistent statements on the payment
of placement fee. In her sworn statement, Lolita alleged that she paid ₱ 28,000 as placement fee to
Lalli.52 On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she never paid ₱ 28,000 to the accused.53
We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons from
₱ 50,000 to ₱ 500,000 as moral damages and ₱ 50,000 to ₱ 100,000 as exemplary damages.
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission.1avvphi1
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral damages, by
way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
The payment of ₱ 500,000 as moral damages and ₱ 100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of
Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article, in the order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute
without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is
horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation
when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February 2010, affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City dated 29 November 2005, finding accused
Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking
in Persons committed by a syndicate, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱ 2,000,000;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LIFEIMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱ 500,000;
3. Each of the accused is ordered to pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly
and severally, the sum of ₱ 500,000 as moral damages, and ₱ 100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons; and to pay the costs.
The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos as jurisdiction over
his person has not been acquired.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.

CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, Petitioners, v. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY
CALVENTO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated
February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG

LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo’t higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA’T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala
A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng
lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito
sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo’t higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine

National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng
illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng." 3
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent
Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1)
a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined
from implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April
21, 1997, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff’s counsel and the comment
thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by
the respondent trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING

KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE

PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE
IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND
APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED
SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It
is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government’s police power under the General Welfare
Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 6 They also
maintain that respondent’s lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the
local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections
2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. 7cralaw : red
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations around the country. 8 As for the allegation that no prior consultations and
approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends
this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-
executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991. 9 He also states that his operation of the
lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted
a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of
Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national
government. 11 He argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene
statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This being
the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for
Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the
PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of
authority, the province’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by
preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid; and
(2) whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto
system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor’s permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private Respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision
on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance,
however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement
on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much
when they stated in their petition that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a
policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection
to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of
Laguna. 12
As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and
providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national
character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One
thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such
frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be
promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government
deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local
government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated
otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may
not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel v. Virac, 13 ordinances
should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. 14chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state,
and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing
Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different
conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution),
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still
the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 15
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted
to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio." 16chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of
Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto
in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit
concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the
national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the
setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These provisions state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people’s organizations,
and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented by

government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied
with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas
where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless, appropriate relocation sites have
been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the
national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. 17 Section 26
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It
shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing
or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution,
climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover,
and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or
program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable
resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain
animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of
Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought
on their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for
his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or
implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That
resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding
legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent
mayor’s refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate
business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 18-20.
2. Id. at 21.
3. Records, pp. 8-8-A.
4. Rollo, p. 20.
5. Id. at 21.
6. Id. at 13.
7. Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — . . .

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental
and people’s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented

by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained;
Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be
evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against
herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019),
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired
with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense
in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public
Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to
have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent,
who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not
be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing
that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public
official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is
hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT
THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE

DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section
3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which
is a case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private
person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer,
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3
(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two
or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in
contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of
one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus,
this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent)
conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the
other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent
to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and
the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy
known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a
crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not
perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged
and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in
U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime
unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to
commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other
evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the
conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the
crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of
one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-
doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it
is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly
explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability
of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of
them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x.
The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission
of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation
of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was
remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if
it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved
or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy
is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of
the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary
Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves
evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated
before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late
Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another
agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution
dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB.
This Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this
Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private
respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction
over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest
or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise
the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail,
demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If
the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the
SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order
requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered
into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal
court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed
by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the
death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not
follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer
be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged
offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to
the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means,
promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No.
28090.
G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of
the Resolution 1 of the Sandiganbayan (4th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023, as well
as its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon)
and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) carried out an
extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and the alleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its Report dated December 23,
1998, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, among others, the anomalies in the acquisition of
lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and described the
modus operandi of the perpetrators as follows:
The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions with two deeds of sale.
One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed). Another deed of sale
would be signed by the seller or seller and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed).
The devious gimmicking was uncovered by your Committee which also found out that the buying
prices stated in the unilateral deeds did not match those stated in the bilateral deeds. To borrow a word
from lawyers, the "consideration" (i.e., prices) in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of
sale did not tally even if they covered the same transaction.
Without exception, the deed(s) signed by the seller(s) only (unilateral deeds) were the one registered
with the registrar (sic) of deeds. These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by
the System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation was obviously to
evade payment of the correct taxes to the government and save money for the seller(s), broker(s) and
who knows, probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the buyer.
xxxx
The bilateral deeds were kept in the dark files [of] the System over the years. They were uncovered
only recently as a result of your Committee’s investigation. Your Committee submits that the reason
why the bilateral deeds were kept in the vaults of the System was to justify the huge lot payments made
by the System just in case any soldier-member of RSBS would be bold or curious enough to inquire
about the matter directly with the System. The curious soldier would then be shown the bilateral deed
to impress upon him/her that indeed the System has spent huge amounts for the purchase of the lots in
question.
Until the investigation uncovered the anomaly, the matter of the two sets of documents covering the
purchases of the same parcels of land made by the System were, like the Clinton-Lewinsky trysts, kept
from the prying eyes officials of the System but so unfair because the public continues to shoulder, in
behalf of the RSBS, the payments for the pension and retirement benefits of the soldiers." (Emphasis
supplied)
The Initial Report of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was cited by the Feliciano
Commission in its Report to the President of the Philippines, included the following discussion:
Essentially, the Blue Ribbon Committee found that the real estate purchases by RSBS were uniformly
documented, by two (2) sets of instruments: Firstly, a unilateral covering the same piece of land,
executed both by the seller and by RSBS as buyer. The price stated in the second bilateral instrument
was invariably much higher than the price reflected in the unilateral deed of sale. The discrepancies
between the purchase price booked by RSBS and the purchase price reflected in the unilateral deed of
sale actually registered in the relevant Registry of Deeds, totaled about seven hundred three million
pesos (P703 Million). The two sets of purchase price figures obviously could not both be correct at the
same time. Either the purchase price booked and paid out by RSBS was the true purchase price of the
land involved, in which case RSBS had obviously assisted or abetted the seller in grossly understating
the capital gains realized by him and in defrauding the National treasury; or the purchase price in the
unilateral deed of sale was the consideration actually received by the seller from RSBS, in which case,
the buyer-RSBS had grossly overpaid, with the differential, in the belief of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, going into the pockets of RSBS officials. A third possibility was that the differential
between the purchase price booked and paid by the buyer-RSBS and the selling price admitted by the
seller of the land, had been shared by the buyer and seller in some undisclosed ratio. 2
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecute and/or cause the
prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land," Ombudsman
Investigators Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio Alejandrino of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint, 3 stating that based on their findings, the following may be charged with
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019: petitioner B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-RSBS president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello,
Head of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department in charge of Land Acquisition; Capt. Perfecto Enrique
Quilicot, AFP-RSBS Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land Acquisition; and Notaries Public
Alfredo Nasser and Manuel Satuito.
The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued on March 30,
2001 a Joint Resolution 4 finding probable cause to file the corresponding Informations for 148 counts
of violation of Article 315, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty. Manuel Satuito. However, it was
likewise recommended that the complaint against petitioner be dismissed, without prejudice to a
thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability in light of this Court’s ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan. 5
The Ombudsman did not act on this recommendation. Instead, another panel of prosecutors was
directed to review the Joint Resolution and conduct a thorough investigation of the case. After
conducting clarificatory hearings, the investigating panel issued a Memorandum 6 dated June 15, 2004,
recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be charged with 148 counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents, and one count violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioner’s allegation that he merely relied on the legal staff of the AFP-RSBS when he signed the
unregistered bilateral deeds of sale was considered untenable. The panel declared that the deeds were
used purposely to facilitate the payment of amounts in excess of that paid to the landowners. Moreover,
petitioner, as AFP-RSBS president, could not claim that he was merely involved in top- level policy
implementation.
The Memorandum also stated that the AFP-RSBS had an Investment Committee tasked to screen
project proposals, which was headed by petitioner, Oscar Martinez and other AFP-RSBS officers; these
potential investments were then elevated for further screening and approval to the Executive
Committee, of which petitioner and Martinez were also members. The panel found that petitioner knew
of the unilateral deeds of sale, considering that they were duly registered with the Register of Deeds
and titles were issued on the basis thereof. The investigating panel clarified that the ruling of this Court
in Arias does not apply because petitioner’s
participation consisted of signing and approving documents prepared by his subordinates relative to the
transactions, from the time of conceptualization until payment by AFP-RSBS.
The panel further found that the culpability of petitioner, Quilicot, Bello and Satuito is evidenced by
the fact that they signed documents in manifest bad faith, with full knowledge of the anomalous
transactions. The bilateral deeds of absolute sale were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS
where Bello and Satuito were assigned, later enabling them to amass enormous profits. The
investigating panel "confirmed" the observations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee as follows:
We have also noted that in all the 148 transactions of lot acquisition, the Bilateral Deeds of Sale never
bore the marks/annotations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Register of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas, as would always appear, if they were used as basis for transfer of title. These Bilateral Deeds
of Sale were attached to the payment vouchers to justify the payment of the much higher price
considerations of the acquired lots, yet, no one of the respondents and the concerned AFP-RSBS
officials and employees questioned the fact that the Bilateral Deeds of Sale never bore the marks and
annotations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue indicative that the proper taxes have been paid nor that
of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas particularly the assigned Entry Number and the date of
said entry as reflected in its Primary Entry Book.
From the concerted silence and inaction of the respondents on the glaring irregularities attendant to the
transaction, we can draw the conclusion that these officers of the AFP-RSBS who passed upon the
Disbursement Voucher and the Status Transaction Forms were aware of the forgeries and the result
thereof. All the respondents were acting under a common design and purpose to give a semblance of
regularity to the acquisition of the subject one hundred forty eight (148) lots at a price very much
higher than what was actually paid to the individual lot owners. The element of conspiracy was
therefore present. 7
The panel opined that the AFP-RSBS funds used to purchase the parcels of land were trust funds and
for administration purposes. 8 Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, the charter of the AFP-
RSBS, intended to create a trust fund for the specific purpose of benefiting the members of the armed
forces, hence contributions thereto were compulsory. Since soldiers and military personnel rely on the
administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits, petitioner and his
co-officers occupy positions of trust, with obligations and responsibilities akin to those imposed on
directors and officers of a corporation; and considering that the responsible officers are not mere
directors but trustees, there is all the more reason to apply the fiduciary relationship principle in this
case.
The Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors without prejudice to the
liability of the landowners involved in the transactions.
Petitioner and his co-accused filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the investigating
panel’s June 15, 2004 Memorandum. Petitioner alleged the following:
1. RESPONDENT RAMISCAL’S PARTICIPATION IN THE SUBJECT SALE TRANSACTIONS,
WHICH WERE DULY APPROVED BY THE RSBS BOARD, WAS PURELY MINISTERIAL AS
PART OF HIS LIMITED FUNCTIONS AS PRESIDENT OF RSBS.
2. THE CONSPIRACY THEORY LINKING RESPONDENT RAMISCAL TO THE CHARGES IS
DEVOID OF FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASIS. IN FACT, THE MEMORANDUM FAILED TO
SHOW, AS THERE IS NONE (SIC) ANY OVERT ACT OF CONSPIRACY COMMITTED BY
RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
3. IN ANY EVENT, THE CHARGES OF FALSIFICATION BASED ON THE BILATERAL DEEDS
HAVE NO LEGAL LEG TO STAND ON AS AGAINST RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
4. MORE THAN THAT, THE CHARGES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) R.A.
3019 HAVE NO FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASES INASMUCH AS THE AMOUNTS PAID BY
AFP-RSBS TO THE VENDORS ARE THOSE THAT WERE INDICATED IN THE BILATERAL
DEEDS OF SALE, HENCE, NO UNWARRANTED BENEFITS WERE AFFORDED THE SELLERS
NOR DID THE [AFP-RSBS] AND THE GOVERNMENT SUFFER UNDUE INJURY INCIDENT
THERETO. 9
On September 27, 2004, the Panel of Prosecutors issued a Memorandum 10 to the Ombudsman
recommending that the motion be denied, which the latter duly approved.
Thereafter, the panel of Prosecutors and the Special Prosecutors had a series of meetings with the
Ombudsman, where it was agreed upon that only five Informations for estafa through falsification of
public documents and five Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 would be
initially filed with the Sandiganbayan instead of the 148 counts previously recommended by the
Ombudsman. This was due to the lack of prosecutors who would handle the voluminous cases. 11
Of the Informations filed, two were raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, one of which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28022 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas and
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
public officers, namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., a high-ranking public official,
being then the President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement, Separation and Benefit
System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se
Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and
certain John and John Does, also of the AFP-RSBS, a government entity, being a government owned or
controlled corporation, while in the performance of their official functions and committing the offense
in relation to their office, acting with evident bad faith, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with private individuals John Does and Jane Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally cause undue injury to AFP-RSBS and its members by purchasing a parcel of land
covering an area of seven thousand five hundred eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less,
situated at Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra
Maunahan and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT 65973 of the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas,
under a bilateral Deed of Absoute Sale dated April 23, 1997, making it appear therein that the afore-
described real property was sold by the said owners and purchased by the AFP-RSBS, represented by
accused BGen. Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00), Philippine
Currency, paid under AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated May 28, 1997 with corresponding
Philippine National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, when in truth and in fact, accused
knew fully well that the true and real consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-
SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine Currency, as
correctly indicated in a unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said
owners, thereby resulting to an overprice of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00) to the damage and prejudice of AFP-RSBS and its
members.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
The other, for estafa thru falsification of public documents, was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023.
The accusatory portion reads:
That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas and
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
public officers, namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., a high ranking public official,
being then the President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement Separation and Benefit
System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se
Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and
certain John and Jane Does, also of the AFP-RSBS, a government entity, being a government owned or
controlled corporation, while in the performance of their official functions and committing the offense
in relation to their office, acting with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with private individuals John Does and Jane Does, and with intent to
defraud the AFP-RSBS and its members, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
or cause to be falsified a bilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 23, 1997 covering seven thousand
five hundred eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less, of real property situated at
Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra Maunahan
and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT 65973 of the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, by making
it appear therein that the aforedescribed real property was sold by the said owners and purchased by the
AFP-RSBS, represented by accused BGen. Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the overpriced amount of
ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR
PESOS (P1,531,564.00), Philippine Currency, from its funds held by the accused AFP-RSBS officials
in trust and for administration, when in truth and in fact, accused knew fully well that the true and real
consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine Currency, as correctly indicated in a unilateral Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said owners, and thereafter, to facilitate the
payment of the said overpriced amount by the AFP-RSBS, the accused used the said falsified bilateral
Deed of Absolute Sale as supporting document, among others, to the AFP-RSBS General Voucher No.
61789 dated May 28, 1997, and relying on said fraudulent acts, AFP-RSBS released the amount of
ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR
PESOS (P1,531,564.00) by way of Philippine National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997,
which amount included the overprice of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00) and which the accused subsequently
misappropriated and converted to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
AFP-RSBS and its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 13
Raffled to the First Division of the anti-graft court were two other cases docketed as Criminal Case No.
28026 14for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, and Criminal Case No. 28027 15 for estafa through falsification of public documents.
Criminal Case No. 28028 16 for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Criminal Case No.
28029 17 for estafa through falsification of public documents were raffled to the Second Division,
while Criminal Case No. 28021 18 for estafa through falsification of public documents was raffled to
the Third Division. Criminal Case No. 28024 19 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
Criminal Case No. 28025 20 for estafa through falsification of public documents were raffled to the
Fifth Division.
Petitioner filed in the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court (in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023)
an "Urgent Motion for Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and Consolidate All Cases in One
Information with Prayer to Defer Issuance of An Arrest Warrant Pending Resolution Hereof." 21 The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion on January 17, 2005, holding that the judicial determination of
probable cause is not an adversarial proceeding but summary in nature. While it ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the accused, it resolved to hold in abeyance the resolution on the matter of
consolidation of all the cases until after it had acquired jurisdiction over their persons. 22 After
petitioner posted bail for his provisional release, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for the
consolidation of the cases, considering that the other cases filed were pending in its other divisions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution and sought to have the cases dismissed
for lack of probable cause. 23 He alleged that, in finding probable cause, the Sandiganbayan merely
relied on the findings of the Ombudsman and did not take into account the other affidavits on record.
The Sandiganbayan again denied the motion on February 22, 2005. 24
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 25 in Criminal Cases Nos. 28022 and 28023 on the
following grounds:
I. This Court has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged in both Informations;
II. In Criminal Case No. 28023 (estafa through falsification), the facts charged being an essential part
of the continuing crime of Estafa separately charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 28021, 28025, 28027 and
28029, pending in the 3rd, 1st, 5th and 2nd divisions, respectively, only one Information must be filed
for all these cases including those covered by the OSP memorandum dated June 15, 2004; and,
III. In Criminal Case No. 20822 (violation of RA No. 3019), the said case is abated by Criminal Case
No. 20823 (Estafa through falsification) because the very facts alleged in the former are also the very
facts alleged in the latter. 26
On June 2, 2005, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the motion, holding that contrary to petitioner’s
claim, it had jurisdiction over the crimes charged. 27 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied on August 17, 2005. 28 Petitioner then posted bail for his provisional liberty.
When arraigned on September 1, 2005, petitioner refused to enter a plea, prompting the anti-graft court
to enter a plea of not guilty in both cases. 29
On October 7, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the
said Resolution be nullified on the following grounds:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE OMBUDSMAN’S
FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE COMMISSION OF ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT
(148) COUNTS OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND ANOTHER
ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (148) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019
AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATIONS.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATIONS
AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28023 (ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION), NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED THEREIN WERE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ONE CONTINUING
CRIME OF ESTAFA SEPARATELY CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 28021, 28025, 28027
AND 28029, PENDING IN THE THIRD, FIRST, FIFTH AND SECOND DIVISIONS OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPECTIVELY, CONSIDERING THAT BASED ON THE DOCUMENTS
ADDUCED BY THE PEOPLE AND FOR OBVIOUS WANT OF RELIABLE EVIDENCE, ONLY
ONE INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED FOR ALL THESE CASES
INCLUDING THE REMAINING ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE (143) COUNTS COVERED BY
THE OSP MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 15, 2004, ANNEX T;
IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 20822 (VIOLATION OF RA NO. 3019) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
SAID CASE WAS ABATED BY CRIMINAL CASE NO. 20823 (ESTAFA THROUGH
FALSIFICATION) BECAUSE THE VERY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE FORMER WERE ALSO THE
VERY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE LATTER, THUS VIOLATING THE RULE ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. 30
Petitioner insists that, in finding probable cause against him for estafa through falsification of public
document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, as it relied solely on the Memorandum of the investigation
panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors. He posits that it behooved the anti-graft court to review the
Ombudsman’s findings and scrutinize the evidence, the affidavits on record, including the transcript of
stenographic notes. As gleaned from the Joint Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the initial finding of
the Ombudsman Prosecutors was that there was no probable cause to charge him for the acts
complained of, in the light of the Court’s ruling in the Arias case. He asserts that there was no evidence
of bad faith on his part relative to the deeds of sale subject of the Informations filed against him. He
insists that based on the Joint Resolution, and even the report of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, he
had no part whatsoever in the commission of the crimes charged. The disparity of the prices of the
properties in the bilateral deeds of sale, vis-à-vis the unilateral deeds of sale, do not support the finding
of probable cause against him made by the investigating panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors. Petitioner
asserts that there is no evidence on record that he conspired with the other accused in the commission
of the crimes charged.
Petitioner further posits that the Sandiganbayan likewise committed grave abuse of its discretion when
it found probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him instead of setting the case for
hearing. He insists that the anti-graft court failed to consider the other evidence on record and erred in
relying solely on the evaluation and resolution of the investigating panel of Prosecutors; the fact that he
posted bail bonds for his provisional liberty does not estop him from raising the issue in his Motion to
Quash.
Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged as provided in
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. He insists that the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation and that he does not fall under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of the law,
inasmuch as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989. Petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Inding v. Sandiganbayan 31 to
support his claim.
Petitioner asserts that the charges filed against him constitute only one crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, in the nature of delito continuado, or a series of repetition of the same
acts arising from one and the same criminal intent. He maintains that while there are 148 bilateral deeds
of sale signed by him and 145 unilateral deeds of sale signed by the sellers, it cannot thereby be
concluded that he is criminally liable for each deed executed. The number of transactions purportedly
entered into is not a gauge in ascertaining criminal intent for the several transactions. The best test
should be the presence of clear, convincing and positive evidence showing distinct criminal intent for
each sales transaction, which in any event, is wanting in this case. Petitioner further alleges that for
multiple transactions to be considered as separate and distinct crimes, there must be a series of acts
with individual sellers such as (a) negotiations; (b) discussion of the terms of the sale; (c) finalizing the
terms thereof; and (d) instruction to prepare payment and (e) actual payment. He points out that there is
no
evidence that he and the other accused involved ever met with any of the sellers. While he admits the
possibility that he could have signed the bilateral deeds of sale in one sitting, he insists that these
documents were
notarized separately; there is even no evidence on record that the sellers of the property transacted
separately with him. He points out that the corporate officers of AFP-RSBS, especially its President, do
not personally deal with any of the sellers. The bare fact that he executed the bilateral deeds of sale and
that the project was approved by the higher level of the management, cannot lead to the conclusion that
he took part in the implementation of the transactions.
Petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or excess of jurisdiction in filing the charges against him. He insists that the delictual acts contained in
the two Informations, Criminal Case No. 28022 (for violation of R.A. 3019) and Criminal Case No.
28023 (for estafa through falsification of public document), are one and the same; to charge him under
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 despite his indictment for estafa is to duplicate the very same charge under
another name, which under the principle of double jeopardy, is proscribed. He further argues that while
it is true that, in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the charge against him for said crime is "in addition" to his
criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, the phrase connotes cumulativeness and simultaneity
of liability.
Petitioner points out that the panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors recommended the filing of only one
count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, but the Ombudsman filed five (5) counts thereof.
The issues are the following: (1) whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioner for estafa
through falsification of public document and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; (2)
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
finding probable cause against petitioner for the issuance of warrants for petitioner’s arrest without first
conducting a hearing; (3) whether petitioner may be charged and prosecuted for five (5) counts of
estafa thru falsification of public documents; and (4) whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both
estafa through falsification of a public document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
without violating his right against double jeopardy.
The petition has no merit.
On the first issue, the rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter,
is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to
determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person
believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. Whether or not the Ombudsman has correctly
discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct assessment of the evidence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable
cause, 32 except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. 33 Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the
determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion. 34 As we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v.
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 35 a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied. 36
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to charge him with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for estafa through falsification of a public document.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s claim that there is no probable cause on record for the filing of the
Information against him. It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. 37 The
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against petitioner is buttressed by his encompassing and
comprehensive resolution, independent of the findings of the Senate Committees, as well as the
documents appended to the Informations. Petitioner’s bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail over
such positive findings of the Ombudsman. In fine, the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause prevails over petitioner’s bare allegations of grave abuse of discretion; that he was not
involved in the step-by-step consummation of the anomalous transaction; and that as President he was
involved only in the top level policy formulation and implementation.
It is true that in the Joint Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the Panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors found
no sufficient evidence that petitioner acted in bad faith and that he merely relied on the
recommendations of his subordinates. However, after a thorough investigation, another panel of
Ombudsman Prosecutors found that, indeed, petitioner not merely relied on the recommendations of his
subordinates but likewise perpetrated overt acts, which, along with those of the other accused, resulted
in the consummation of the crimes charged. Thus, as maintained by the respondents in their Comment
on the petition, petitioner signed documents, indicating his evident bad faith on the highly anomalous
transactions; petitioner was aware of the forgeries and anomalies in the buying of the parcels of land,
yet gave his conformity thereto, causing grave injury to its members and to the public in general. Thus,
it was also found that petitioner, together with his cohorts, conspired to perpetuate clear fraud on the
government and the AFP-RSBS members by giving a semblance of regularity to real estate acquisitions
at bloated prices.
The fact alone that petitioner was aware, in each transaction, that the two (2) deeds of sale contain
contradictory costs for every acquisition, and that he failed to rectify the same eloquently speak of his
participation in the criminal malevolence. He was a member of the Investment Committee of the AFP-
RSBS, which screened potential investments, that were thereafter subjected to further screening and
approval by the Executive Committee of which he was also a member; hence, petitioner had full
knowledge of the transactions, from the time they were conceptualized until the properties were paid
for. The records show that the Tanauan, Batangas properties alone were overpriced by about 600%.
Thus, petitioner consented to the crimes charged by the following overt acts:
(1) Petitioner and his co-accused prepared or caused to be prepared two (2) deeds of sale covering the
same transactions: a deed of sale with the seller or sellers as the sole signatory or signatories therein
(unilateral deeds); and a deed of sale with the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS, represented by
petitioner (bilateral deeds);
(2) The considerations in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of sale did not tally,
notwithstanding the fact that they covered the same subject matter and transaction, with the bilateral
deeds of sale bearing a bloated price; and,
(3) Of these two deeds, the unilateral deeds of sale bore the correct value given to the seller(s) as
evinced, among others, by the fact that the same were the ones registered with the Registry of Deeds.
The bilateral deeds of sale could not possibly be the basis of the transfer of the properties because the
supporting bilateral deeds carried dates much later than the date of issue of the titles, which were
likewise not filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas. The Court cannot supplant the findings of the Ombudsman that the unilateral deeds of sale
were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, in as much as both the unilateral and bilateral
deeds of sale have exactly the same print and form. The residence certificate number of petitioner
which is indicated in the bilateral deeds of sale is likewise printed in the unilateral deeds. Petitioner’s
fraudulent intent is further proven by the fact that the Status of Transaction Form (STF), where the
subject lots were endorsed for payment, bore his signature. The unilateral deeds of sale resulted in the
issuance of the titles, which were also the supporting documents enumerated in the STF. In many
instances, the bilateral deeds of sale carry dates much later than the dates their corresponding titles
were issued.
Petitioner was likewise unable to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. His bare claim that the
Sandiganbayan merely relied on the Memoranda of the Panel of Prosecutors to the Ombudsman and
did not scrutinize the evidence appended thereto is not supported by the records. In the first place, the
Sandiganbayan is presumed to have performed its duty as provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which can likewise be gleaned from its February 22, 2005 Resolution:
[1] While accused Ramiscal is correct in stating that this Court, in determining the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused, had evaluated the
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and its supporting documents, he is, however, wrong in
presuming that such process failed to consider the evidence the accused adduced during preliminary
investigation. It should be noted that the supporting documents submitted by the Office of the
Ombudsman to this Court included, among others, the counter-affidavits submitted by the accused at
the preliminary investigation. Parenthetically, there is no need, and the rules do not require this Court,
to enumerate in detail what were the supporting documents it considered in determining the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest because the same are matters of record that
the parties can easily verify. 38
We agree with the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require
cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
accused before any warrant may be issued. Section 6, Rule 112 mandates the judge to personally
evaluate the resolution of the Prosecutor (in this case, the Ombudsman) and its supporting evidence,
and if he/she finds probable cause, a warrant of arrest or commitment order may be issued within 10
days from the filing of the complaint or Information; in case the Judge doubts the existence of probable
cause, the prosecutor may be ordered to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice.
The provision reads in full:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or
a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation
or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint of information. 39
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge
must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s
determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge
should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for
determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
We hold that petitioner likewise failed to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of authority in denying his motion to quash the Information.
First. The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
In People v. Sandiganbayan 40 and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 41 this Court ruled that the AFP-
RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public
funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or
managers of government owned or controlled corporations. 42 Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes. 43
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge
against petitioner is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance of his duties and
in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Second. On petitioner’s claim that he should be charged with only one count of estafa through
falsification of public document instead of five (5) charges, respondents counter that the criminal acts
petitioner and his co-accused are not continuous crimes. Respondents argue that a continuous crime
may exist only if there is only a single criminal intent and the commission of diverse acts is merely a
partial execution of said single criminal resolution. In the instant cases, the requirement of singularity
of criminal intent does not exist because there are as many criminal intents as there are anomalous
transactions, causing grave damage to the government at each instance. There was no need for the
accused to perform another or other delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents maintain that
petitioner was motivated by separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in
character; hence, it is but proper that corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and
every act of falsification committed.
The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the contention of respondents and ruled that the
determination of (a) the charge/s and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the
sound discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes committed by
petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution. Thus:
In the first place, the question of the number of criminal charges that must be instituted against a
criminal respondent (whether one count or multiple counts of the same offense) is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the prosecution service. It is enough, as this Court has already ruled, that the
informations filed in these cases are based on facts establishing probable cause for the offenses
charged. This Court will not compel the Office of the Ombudsman to file only one information for
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents when its preliminary investigation established the
commission of several counts thereof as such action on the part of this Court would constitute undue
interference with the Office of the Ombudsman’s control over the prosecution of these cases.
In the second place, this Court is not persuaded that what is involved in these cases is a continuous
crime, that is to say, a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division, with each act in that series being merely the partial
execution of a single delict. On the contrary, the Court is of the view that what is involved herein are
several completed and distinct purported criminal acts which should be prosecuted as multiple counts
of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by the prosecution, there are as many alleged
offenses as there are alleged anomalous transactions involved in these cases. 44
When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his co- accused for a consolidation of the
charges filed against them before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting
that there were as many crimes committed by the accused as there were sales contracts forged by them.
Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the
discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and
his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito
continuado or classified as concurso de
delitos; or involve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual
issues. 45 Such factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The
Court is being tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his
co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force
however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination of the
trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan. 46
Thus, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is hardly the
appropriate remedy and forum for petitioner to ventilate the issues he has raised, as only jurisdictional
issues can be resolved therein. As eloquently expressed by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, speaking for
this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals: 47
If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of
multiple prosecutions for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this is
neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that possibility. For, squarely
imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a grossly defective presentation of
that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and at this time. 48
It must be stressed that our disposition of the matters in the present recourse will not foreclose
petitioner’s right to ventilate the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan:
However, this observation would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the
evidence presented and the developments therein suffice to establish the supervening fact that indeed
there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule 117, they can
still hereafter raise that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases
therefor and refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was earlier said on the nature and
the non-identity of the several crimes of Estafa involved which, to repeat, we pronounced purely on the
bases of existing records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact since none has been adduced. 49
On the last issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that the crimes committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do
not exclude prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and vice
versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.–In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear then that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 175750-51 April 2, 2014

SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
EMERLINA MOLETA,Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Honorable Sandiganbayan dated 12 December 2006,
finding Silverina E. Consigna (petitioner) guilty for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Estafa, as defined and
penalized under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On or about 14 June 1994, petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte,
together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta (Moleta), the
sum of ₱320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the
municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As
payment, petitioner issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime
Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna: (1) Check No.
11281104 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; (2) Check No. 9660500 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14 June
1994; and (3) Check No. 9660439 for ₱60,000.00 dated 11 July 1994.
Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions, Moleta
demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.
Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in Metrobank-
Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the
checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks. This time, however, she
deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon presentation for payment, the checks were again
returned for the reason, "Signature Not on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the
municipality’s account was already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines, and
that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against petitioner, in the
latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General
Luna, Surigao del Norte, to wit:
(1) Criminal Case No. 24182 - Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act:
That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna, Surigao del
Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Municipal Treasurer
Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and Municipal Mayor Jaime Rusillon (with
Salary Grace 27) did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith, in
cooperation with each other, and taking advantage of their official positions and in the discharge
for the functions as such, borrow the amount of ₱320,000.00 from one Emerlina Moleta to
whom they misrepresented to be for the municipality of General Luna, when in fact the same is
not; and fail to pay back said amount thereby causing undue injury to said Emerlina Moleta in
the amount of ₱320,000.00.2
(2) Criminal Case No. 24183 – Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as Estafa:
That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna, Surigao del
Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Municipal Treasurer
Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and Municipal Mayor Jaime Rusillon (with
Salary Grade 27), did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith, in
cooperation with each other, representing themselves to be transacting in behalf of the
[M]unicipality of Gen. Luna, in truth and in fact they are not, contract a loan from one Emerlina
Moleta in the amount of ₱320,000.00 for which they issued three (3) checks: LBP Check No.
11281104 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of ₱130,000.00, LBP Check No. 9660500 dated 14
June 1994 in the amount of ₱130,000.00, and LBP Check no. 9660439 dated 11 July 1994 in the
amount of ₱60,000.00, all in favor of said Emerlina Moleta, knowing fully well that the account
belongs to the Municipality of the (sic) Gen. Luna, and that they have no personal funds [of] the
same account such that upon presentation of the said checks to the bank, the same were
dishonored and refused payment, to the damage and prejudice of said Emerlina Moleta in the
amount of ₱320,000.00.3
As defense, petitioner argued that the court a quo has no jurisdiction because (1) the crime as charged
did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of Estafa; and (2) Sec. 3(e)
of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo because the offense as charged can
stand independently of public office and public office is not an element of the crime.4
The court a quo admitted that the Information for violation of Estafa did not specify the provision of
law allegedly violated.5 However, based on the allegations of deceit and misrepresentation, the court a
quo allowed the prosecution to indict petitioner and Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
On the charge of graft and corruption, petitioner argued that, "[w]hen allegations in the information do
not show that the official position of the [petitioner] was connected with the offense charged, the
accused is not charged with an offense in relation to her official functions".6 Petitioner, citing Lacson v.
The Executive Secretary,7 further argued:
x x x [M]ere allegation in the information "that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is a mere conclusion of law not a factual
averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
accused’s official duties."8
Petitioner also contends that there was no fraud or misrepresentation. By demanding payment from
Rusillon, Moleta attested that there exists no fraud or misrepresentation. In petitioner’s words, "… why
will she [Moleta] insist payment from [Rusillon] if she has no knowledge that the money loaned have
reached him?"9
On the other hand, Rusillon maintained that he had no participation in the acts committed by petitioner.
Based on his testimony, he signed the three (3) checks to pay the following: (1) payroll of the following
day; (2) daily expenses of the municipal building; (3) construction of the municipal gymnasium; and
(4) health office’s medical supplies.10 As found by the court a quo, "the only link of Rusillon to
[petitioner] with respect to the loan transaction is his signature on the three (3) checks which
[petitioner] used as security to Moleta."11
After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 12 December 2006, found petitioner guilty, but exonerated Rusillon.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:12
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 24182, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of the Republic Act No. 3019, and is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month
to eight (8) years.
Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
with moral certainty.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 24183, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as MINIMUM, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM.
Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED as his guilt was not proven with moral certainty.
(3) Accused SILVERIA E. CONSIGNA is ordered to pay private complainant Emerlina F.
Moleta the amount of Ph₱368,739.20 by way of actual damages; Ph ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs of suit; and
(4) The hold departure order against accused JAIME RUSILLON in connection with these
cases is hereby LIFTED.
Hence, this Petition.
Noticeably, the petitioner formulated its arguments, thus:
a. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in making its finding of facts which amounts to
lack of jurisdiction.
xxxx
b. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it convicted the accused on "false
pretense, fraudulent act or means" made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
fraud.
xxxx
c. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it made a conclusion that the petitioner
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence to justify its conclusion that
all the elements of violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are present."13
Preliminarily, We here note a common disorder in petitions that mingle the concepts involved in a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 and in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, as a
prevalent practice of litigants to cure a lapsed appeal.
We shall discuss the distinction.
With regard to the period to file a petition, in Rule 45, the period within which to file is fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from.14 In contrast to Rule 65,
the petition should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution.15
Regarding the subject matter, a review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited to the review of
legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly raised by the parties
during the appeal and in the petition.16 A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the
determination of the propriety of the trial court’s jurisdiction — whether it has jurisdiction over the
case and if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 Otherwise stated, errors of judgment are the
proper subjects of a Rule 45 petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.18 So when appeal, or a petition for
review is available, certiorari cannot be resorted to; certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost
appeal.19 A Rule 65 certiorari petition cannot be a substitute for a Rule 45 petition so as to excuse the
belatedness in filing the correct petition. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even
if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.20
Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.21
Petitioner was correct when she filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45. However, instead of raising
errors of judgment as a proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45, the petition formulated
jurisdictional errors purportedly committed by the court a quo, i.e., whether or not the court a quo
committed grave abuse of discretion,22 which is the proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. Noticeably, the petition does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith by the court a quo in its
proceedings;23 and the petition does not raise a denial of due process in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.24
Importantly, however, the petition followed the period specified in Rule 45. It was timely filed. For that
reason, we excuse the repeated referral to the supposed grave abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan
and treat the petition as, nonetheless, one for review of the questioned decision. We thus recast the
arguments as:
I. Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of
estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly
violated.
II. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
III. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Petition must fail.
1. On the first issue, petitioner insists that even if the court a quo already admitted that the Information
failed to specifically identify the mode or manner by which estafa was committed by petitioner, it
nonetheless went on to convict her by relying on the allegation in the Information of deceit and
misrepresentation and applying par. (2)(a), Art. 315 of the RPC.
Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts
in the complaint or information.25As held in People v. Dimaano:26
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. (Emphasis
supplied)
As early in United States v. Lim San,27 this Court has determined that:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in
the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter
of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute.
The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the
body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not
know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner
stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the
province of the court alone to say what the name of the crime is or what it is named. x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the two (2) sets of Information
against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the
crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare
their respective defenses.
2. Contrary to the submission of petitioner, false pretense and fraudulent acts attended her transaction
with Moleta. The law explicitly provides that in the prosecution for Estafa under par. (2)(a), Art. 315 of
the RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent
representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only
motive which induced the offended party to part with his money. Paragraph 2(a), Art. 315 of the RPC
provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are
the following: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (b) such false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.28
As borne by the records, petitioner’s representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated
for the sole purpose of inducing Moleta to hand to her the amount of ₱320,000.00 purportedly for the
Municipality of General Luna. Being the Municipal Treasurer, there was reason for Moleta to rely on
petitioner’s representations that money is needed for the payment of the employees’ salary as well as
for the construction of the gymnasium. There was also a ring of truth to the deception that the share of
the municipality from the IRA is forthcoming. Added to this, petitioner’s representations were even
supported by the issuance of three (3) LBP checks to guarantee payment taken from the account of the
municipality and signed by no less than the municipal mayor, giving the impression that the loaned
amount would indeed be utilized for public purposes.
As the court a quo correctly observed:
It is undisputed that Consigna obtained a loan from Moleta for the reason that the municipality lacked
funds for the June 15, 1994 payroll of the employees and materials of the gymnasium. However,
several circumstances point to the fact that Consigna’s representation has no basis.
She contradicted her own testimony that at the time she borrowed from Moleta on June 14, 1994, the
municipality suffered a shortage of funds, with her admission that when she was relieved as a
municipal treasurer, the Municipality had more than 1 million in Land Bank from the IRA of
₱600,000.00 a month for the past three months x x x. This means that when she left her post before the
second week of July x x x, the municipality had money from the April to June 1994 IRA, enough to
meet the need of ₱320,000.00. x x x29
The circumstances and the reason behind the issuance of the three (3) checks given to Moleta by
petitioner was testified to by Rusillon:
He was the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, in 1994. In the
morning of June 14, 1994, he received the amount of ₱268,800.00 from accused Consigna, as
evidenced by a voucher (Exh. 1) signed by him on the same day. The money was to be used for the
purchase of materials for the gymnasium of the municipality which construction started in 1992. After
signing the voucher, he ordered Consigna to prepare a check for ₱130,000.00 (Exh. 2) for the June 15,
1994 payroll of the municipality’s employees. After the check was prepared, he again ordered Consigna
to make another two checks, one for ₱130,000.00 (Exh. 3) dated June 14, 1994 intended for the
expenses of the municipal building and for the daily transactions of the municipality in the following
days, and the other check was for ₱60,000.00 (Exh. 4) dated July 11, 1994 for the purchase of
medicines for the municipality’s health office. The latter check was postdated to July because it would
be charged against the IRA in the 3rd quarter of 1994 since they bought medicines at that time on a
quarterly basis as the budget allowed only ₱240,000.00 per year for such expenditure."30
3. Anent the issue on the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction committed
by the court a quo when it took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 24182, charging petitioner for "taking
advantage of her official position and the discharge of the functions as such," petitioner averred that the
charge was erroneous because borrowing of money is not a function of a Municipal Treasurer under the
Local Government Code. Petitioner asserts that the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot cover
her.
We find such reasoning misplaced.
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.31
There is no doubt that petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer discharging official
functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a loan from Moleta, who was misled
into the belief that petitioner, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla v. Hilario,32 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion,
direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in
the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which
event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating
circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the
criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with certainty during trial that
the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime necessarily relates to her official function as a
municipal treasurer. Petitioner’s official function created in her favor an impression of authority to
transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct
relation between the commission of the crime and petitioner’s office – the latter being the very reason
or consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta, for which the latter
suffered damages in the amount of ₱320,000.00. It was just fortunate that Rusillon instructed the bank
to stop payment of the checks issued by petitioner, lest, the victim could have been the Municipality of
General Luna.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan33 that there are
two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged
under either mode or under both.34 This was reiterated in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,35 where the Court
held that the use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the alternative mode
of "causing undue injury" to Moleta committed with evident bad faith, for which she was correctly
found guilty. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes,36 which manifested in
petitioner’s actuations and representation.
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official function to commit the crimes
charged. Without her position, petitioner would not have induced Moleta to part with her money. In the
same vein, petitioner could not have orchestrated a scheme of issuing postdated checks meddling with
the municipality’s coffers and defiling the mayor’s signature. As correctly found by the court a quo:
x x x Likewise worthy of stress is [petitioner’s] failure to establish that the amount she disbursed to
Rusillon came from the money she loaned from Moleta. If indeed the ₱268,800.00 advanced to
Rusillon was charged against the loan, then, this should have been reflected in the municipality’s books
of accounts. The same is true with the ₱320,000.00 and the ₱32,000.00 given to Moleta if the proceeds
of the loan really went to the municipality’s treasury. It is a standard accounting procedure that every
transaction must be properly entered in the books of accounts of the municipality. A cash that comes in
is a debit to the asset account and every loan incurred is a credit to the liability account.37
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue raised by petitioner
that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or other concessions. Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the last sentence
of the said provision is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of its
coverage. This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,38 where we
categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie
regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions." Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from Mejorada:39
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic)
declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it
specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the
last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public
officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,40 where the Court affirmed the
Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous interpretation of the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft Law.
All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar.1âwphi1 All told, this Court
finds no justification to depart from the findings of the lower court. Petitioner failed to present any
cogent reason that would warrant a reversal of the Decision assailed in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24182-83 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989
AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989
CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Paredes Law Office for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and
for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to
be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is
of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court
feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable
doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the
irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had
also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the
bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have
ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere
in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the
defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or
affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of
land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had
been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a
square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land
in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a
square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by
the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square
meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan
property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must
have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and
reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It
was, therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price
had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left to the
discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the
essence of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller
and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price
(Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the
reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location,
potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises into
consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and
fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter
only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the
prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig,
admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham
property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn, August 19,1983, p.
20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from
P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from
Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near
Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is surrounded by
factories, commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that
the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham property appearing on the
tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the
uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and
did not take into account the existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area
(Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from and always lower
than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial
law decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a
landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors
must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal
employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms
the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would
be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent
court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it
says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners of
causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is
grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during
orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest
or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But
were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue
in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a
department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the
restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon,
inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the
reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why
he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies
or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document
, letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or
departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a
conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started
in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June
8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-
audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias
points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence
transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none
approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of
the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already
worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner
alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was done
before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila.
Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is only
until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the
Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on firmer
foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias
explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents
and under no circumstanceto relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of
Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of
custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as
auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming
that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of
the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been
consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had been
issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The auditors
have no more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase
price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the
government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of the
papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the
government without paying the price Did you not consider that rather odd
or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition
that no payments will be made unless the corresponding title in the
payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the
government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is
an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As of the price
it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property
to be bought by the government; the sale was consummated; the title was
issued in favor of the government without the price being paid first to the
seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the
government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).
Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also
that function you are also called upon by going over the papers . . . (TSN,
page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine whether
there is any irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the
tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A
They are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23,
April 27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of
the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount involved is beyond his
counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16,
Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as
the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee,
headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao
Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members,
specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents,
conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and
prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the
acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined
the authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis
thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the
deed of sale together with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on
the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on
their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level,
merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof
was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the
signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of
Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public
Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a
review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by
the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which
petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her
during the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-
24, 31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and
convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There
was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged
existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in
the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence
on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was there any specific
allusion to some or even one instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to
their co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported
fraud and falsifications alleged in the information That petitioners Data and Arias
happened to be officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed the deed of
sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively,
does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to
defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as
aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated
purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00
per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase
price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove
conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the
estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land
Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase
price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale were simple
corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in
the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because
the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite to the
approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by
the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been
cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating therein the technical
description as approved by the Land Registration Commission, as what obtained in the
instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence
on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data
are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having
violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private
lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio
Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the
Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged with the acquisition of
lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the
Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works
who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Claudio H.
Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office,
Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to
private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro
Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of
lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public
and official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused
Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose
and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data,
Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the
discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving
the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in
the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General
Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was
purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of
Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P.
Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by the
accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting
papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that
19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact,
the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00
per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered
in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the
Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the
foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and
actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was
acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused
officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of
P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount,
the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual
value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs,
uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being
unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the
northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An
announcement was published in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District
headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising
Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for
acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the
impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by
order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a
memorandum was sent to Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin,
directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig
registered in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on
May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez,
parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided
into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for
the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was
declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15
per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169
square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed
value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by
Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped
to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and
value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on
the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to the Municipal Assessor's office
by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's
Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December
15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as
"residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter
(instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of
P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the
technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and
Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo
Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused
Claudio Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of
Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz
who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as
attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of
the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer
of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth
certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil
Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for
payment by the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October
24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5),
for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-
meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross
overpricing of Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo
Prudencio, Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig
(Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the
certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to
1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian,
Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both
Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such certifications
are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax
Declaration No. 47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein,
Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the
supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as one of the
supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following tell-tale
signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax
declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the
correct date February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification
in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised
value of only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on
October 18, 1978 in the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-
meters' residential property with a declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado
Arias, who approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the
amount of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed
by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor
checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S),
numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter
(Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was
P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and
Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be
"residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978)
was superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying
that he had examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20,
1978 was not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved
technical description and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham
(Exhs. C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated
October 1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The
Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be identical to accused
Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in
favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65,
Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he
had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District,
he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been
filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16,
1987, whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,
Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C.
Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and severally, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay
their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his
contention that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly
negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of
Prescillo Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government
paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of
the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury
to the Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be
proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No.
71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been
vigilant to protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland,
accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the
million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions they
looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the
same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to
act in that manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and
defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property
transferred to the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do
but approve the voucher for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three
aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and
resources of the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code
of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other
documents; review procedures, and question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of
accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by
Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was
submitted to him for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez.
Arias did not question any person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the
documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for
the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had
passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere
rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence
because he allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham
property, throwing the blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion,
Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of
properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect would hide under the skirt of
the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that was assigned to his
office to identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify documents,
make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the
committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the
committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee,
he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those members of the
committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false
certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of
Agleham's property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works.
It should not be overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an
attestation that the transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of
implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced
because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the
petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having
given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further
argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be used as a standard in
determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory in
expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no
allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven
(11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations
(Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and
fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of the deed of sale.
Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on
the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the
land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not
clarify that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of
the implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to
rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the
riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable
value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed
their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by
the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010,
with costs against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having
violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan
Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private
lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio
Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the
Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged with the acquisition of
lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the
Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works
who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Claudio H.
Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office,
Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to
private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro
Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of
lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public
and official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused
Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose
and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data,
Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the
discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving
the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in
the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General
Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was
purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of
Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P.
Agleham, and an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by the
accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting
papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that
19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact,
the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00
per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered
in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the
Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila; that the
foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and
actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was
acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused
officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of
P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount,
the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual
value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs,
uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being
unknown (p. 48, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the
northern and southern portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An
announcement was published in leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their
applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District
headed by the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising
Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for
acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the
impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by
order of the President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a
memorandum was sent to Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin,
directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan
Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig
registered in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on
May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez,
parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided
into three (3) lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for
the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was
declared for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15
per square meter (p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169
square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed
value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by
Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped
to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and
value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on
the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to the Municipal Assessor's office
by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's
Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney
allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December
15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as
"residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter
(instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of
P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the
technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and
Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo
Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused
Claudio Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of
Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz
who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as
attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of
the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer
of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth
certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil
Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting
Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for
payment by the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October
24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5),
for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-
meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross
overpricing of Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo
Prudencio, Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig
(Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the
certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to
1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian,
Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both
Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such certifications
are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax
Declaration No. 47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein,
Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the
supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as one of the
supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following tell-tale
signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax
declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the
correct date February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification
in the genuine document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised
value of only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
(Exhs. K and K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on
October 18, 1978 in the names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-
meters' residential property with a declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado
Arias, who approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the
amount of the purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed
by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor
checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S),
numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter
(Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was
P100 per square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and
Fernando, certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be
"residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978)
was superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying
that he had examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20,
1978 was not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic
Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved
technical description and the technical description of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham
(Exhs. C, C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p.
91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated
October 1, 1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The
Sandiganbayan observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be Identical to accused
Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in
favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65,
Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he
had been replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District,
he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been
filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16,
1987, whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,
Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C.
Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and severally, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay
their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his
contention that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly
negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of
Prescillo Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government
paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of
the petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury
to the Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be
proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No.
71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been
vigilant to protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland,
accepted as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the
million-peso purchase which, by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions they
looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the
same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to
act in that manner to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and
defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property
transferred to the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do
but approve the voucher for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three
aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and
resources of the agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code
of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other
documents; review procedures, and question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of
accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by
Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was
submitted to him for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez.
Arias did not question any person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the
documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for
the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had
passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere
rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence
because he allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham
property, throwing the blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion,
Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of
properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect would hide under the skirt of
the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that was assigned to his
office to Identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify documents,
make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the
committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the
committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee,
he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those members of the
committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false
certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of
Agleham's property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works.
It should not be overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an
attestation that the transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of
implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced
because the price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the
petitioners are not guilty of having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having
given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further
argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be used as a standard in
determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory in
expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no
allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven
(11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations
(Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and
fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of the deed of sale.
Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on
the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the
land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not
clarify that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of
the implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to
rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the
riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable
value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed
their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by
the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010,
with costs against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano,
G.R. No. 116938 September 20, 2001
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner,
vs.
REMEDIOS A. AMOR,* RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR.,
FRANCISCO A. VILLA, ** all of the Office of the Ombudsman, and LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA,
Assistant City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for certiorari1 to annul and set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing
the complaint for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e], against respondent assistant city prosecutor
Leoncia R. Dimagiba, for lack of evidence showing that complainant suffered undue injury through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith of the respondent public officials.2
The Facts
On 19 November 1991, petitioner's husband, Engr. Florencio V. Rueda, Jr., 32 years old, underwent an
operation at the Santo Tomas University Hospital, Sampaloc, Manila for the removal of a stone
blocking his ureter. Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr., urological surgeon, performed the operation with Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes as anaesthesiologist. The surgery started at 8:30 a. m. and it was over at 9:50 a.
m. The patient was given spinal/regional anaesthesia (Pontocaine) and inhalational or gaseous
anaesthesia (Forane or Isuflorane).3
A few minutes after the surgery, while the patient was wheeled to the recovery room, he manifested
facial twitches, muscle rigidity, and tonic and clonic seizures. His body temperature rose to 42 degrees
Centigrade and blood pressure was 210 (systolic mm Hg) over 110 (diastolic mm Hg) per clinical
records.4
Doctors Antonio and Balatbat-Reyes immediately administered appropriate emergency treatment for
epileptic seizures in consultation with specialists on neurology, cardiology and anaesthesia. However,
the general condition of the patient deteriorated, and he later developed asystole at 3:15 p. m. The
doctors initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation procedure. Nevertheless, it was unsuccessful, and at
3:45 p. m., the patient died.5
Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. signed the death certificate indicating the immediate cause of death as status
epilepticus, antecedent cause unknown. Other significant condition contributing to death-
ureterolithotomy (lower third, right) under spinal anaesthesia.6
In the evening of the same day, relatives of the victim requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an autopsy on his cadaver. According to the NBI Medico-Legal findings, the victim
died of malignant hyperthermia, secondary to anesthesia clinical7 and recommended the filing of
criminal charges against Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes, for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.8
On 7 July 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Dimagiba to whom the case was reassigned (after several
other prosecutors inhibited themselves) conducted another preliminary investigation9
On 24 August, 1993, respondent assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against Dr. Reyes and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide against Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr.10
On 25 August 1993, respondent assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, an information against Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.11
On 23 November 1993, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against assistant
city prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e3, and for grave misconduct.12
On 1 March 1994, Graft Investigation Officer II (GIO) Remedios A. Amor submitted to the
Ombudsman a draft resolution recommending dismissal of the charges against assistant city prosecutor
Dimagiba for lack of evidence.13
On 4 March 1994, respondent Raul R. Arnau, head, evaluation and preliminary investigation bureau,
Office of the Ombudsman, recommended approval of the resolution.14 On 8 March 1994, respondent
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. assistant Ombudsman (EIO), reviewed the resolution, and on 9 March
1994, respondent Francisco A. Villa, Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the resolution.15
On 7 April, 1994, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a motion for
reconsideration,16 however, on 29 July 1994, respondent officials of the Office of the Ombudsman
denied the motion.17
Hence, this petition.18
The Issue
The issue raised is whether respondent officials of the office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their
discretion in finding that there was no evidence sufficient to warrant the prosecution of respondent
assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e].19
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner posits that in dismissing the case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes despite overwhelming evidence pointing to the criminal liability of the latter,
assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba violated the Anti-Graft Act, R A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e].
In his comment,20 the Solicitor General submitted the view that "the Office of the Ombudsman is not
the proper forum for the review of what might be reversible errors in the appreciation of the evidence in
cases before quasi judicial or judicial bodies."21
We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman may not pass upon errors of the prosecutor's
office intrinsic to the resolution itself of the case as that function pertains to the power of review of the
Secretary of Justice.22
In fact, in this case, the petitioner appealed the resolution of assistant city prosecutor Dimagiba to the
Secretary of Justice. On 27 September 1994, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition for
review.23 On 23 January 1995, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.24
On March 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari25 questioning the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice, which we referred to the Court of Appeals.26 On 13 June 1996, the
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision setting aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice and
directing the City Prosecutor of Manila to give due course to the information against respondent Dr.
Reyes.27
The essential elements of violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 [e] are as follows:
"(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
"(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions
"(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
"(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and
"(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.28
In dismissing petitioner's charges against Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes, respondent prosecutor Dimagiba
did not cause any undue injury to petitioner. Respondent prosecutor as a quasi judicial official exercises
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists sufficient to sustain the charge against Dr.
Reyes.29 In the performance of the duties of her office as prosecutor, respondent assistant city
prosecutor Dimagiba may err. 30 Such error may not necessarily cause undue injury to any party. To
constitute this element of the offense, the act of respondent must cause specific quantified injury to any
party by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party with the public officer
acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.31
In the absence of evidence showing that the act of respondent assistant city prosecutor in dismissing the
charge against Dr. Reyes was done in evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue
injury to petitioner, the charge of violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3[e], would not prosper.32
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
No costs.
Davide, Jr., C. J., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official Leave
G.R. No. 84571 October 2, 1989

REYNALDO A. JACINTO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
On June 23, 1984, Dr. Reynaldo Jacinto was assigned as the Officer-In-Charge of the Eulogio
Rodriguez Sr. Memorial Hospital (ERMH). He was instructed by the Minister of Health to clean it up
and get rid of its bad image. Correctly indeed, he found out that most of the medical staff were
rendering services outside of the hospital at government time and collecting full government pay. He
gathered the so-called moonlighting doctors including Dr. Veneracion Pacis-Munar and asked them to
make their choice between government service and private practice. He tried to dissuade Dr. Munar
from this practice as she was drawing full pay as a full-time member of the medical staff while teaching
in several medical schools but she remarked that she had been doing this since 1972 while working at
the San Lazaro Hospital and that she had the authority to teach.
After some time, Dr. Munar protested the promotion of Dr. Tica to the position of Medical Specialist II
which she believed should have been given to her. This caused a misunderstanding between her and Dr.
Jacinto who recommended said promotion.
On May 13,1985, after the medical staff meeting at the hospital, Dr. Munar submitted to a medical
examination by Dr. Evelyn Padre of the same hospital as she was allegedly suffering from intermittent
diarrhea. Dr. Padre issued a medical certificate that she was sick of gastro enteritis and amoebic
colic.1 She then filed an emergency sick leave application attaching the medical certificate.2 Dr.
Jacinto did not believe the findings of Dr. Padre and disapproved the application. He instructed Dr.
Munar to file an application for vacation leave. She left her vacation leave papers in the office of the
hospital's personnel officer without retaining a copy. The period covered by her vacation leave was
from May 13 to 19, 1985.
A few days later, Dr. Munar received a telegram dated May 17,1985 3 from Dr. Jacinto asking her to
report for duty on May 20,1985. She went to the hospital on said day and learned that it was the
birthday of Dr. Jacinto. He asked her to report for work and he tried to persuade her to withdraw her
protest against the promotion of Dr. Tica as a birthday gift. Dr. Munar did not agree. Apparently, Dr.
Jacinto resented this as he told her she would never be promoted. Thereafter, Dr. Munar received a
letter from Dr. Jacinto reiterating the disapproval of her application for sick leave for the period from
May 13 to 19, 1985 as she was not sick.
On May 30,1985 Dr. Munar reported for duty at the hospital. She could not get her salary as her name
was deleted from the hospital payroll. She again went on leave on June 4 to 20,1985 upon the advise of
another physician.
On July 5, 1985, she was detailed at the Quirino Memorial Hospital upon order of the Minister of
Health,4 a copy of which was furnished Dr. Jacinto. Although detailed at another hospital, Dr. Munar
was to continue to receive her salary from the ERMH.
While still working at the ERMH, she presented her daily time record for the month of May to Dr.
Jacinto but the latter refused to sign the same. She then approached Dr. Flores, the Chief of Clinic, but
he remarked that Dr. Jacinto instructed him not to sign.
At the Quirino Memorial Hospital, Dr. Munar had her daily time record signed by her superior officer
thereat which she submitted to her former place of assignment for the purpose of collecting her salary.
Nonetheless, she still could not get her salary from the ERMH so she sought the assistance of Director
Ibañez of the Regional Health Office in Quezon City who sent a letter ordering Dr. Jacinto to pay her
salary. She got a similar directive from the Minister of Health.5 Dr. Jacinto released her salary.
Meanwhile, Dr. Munar's name was not included in the proposed plantilla of the ERMH. Upon learning
about this, she wrote the Placement Committee of Region IV, Ministry of Health, about the deletion of
her name and she received a reply that her name was reincluded in the final plantilla.
During the period covered by this incident, Dr. Munar had a part time teaching job at the Philippine-
Muslim Medical School and at the Ocampo Memorial School. She taught in the former from 7:00 to
12:00 noon only during Saturdays while in the latter institution her class schedule was variable but the
same did not prejudice her office hours in the hospital. She also handled summer classes in Micro-
Biology at the Ocampo Memorial School. She claims she was authorized to teach by way of a teaching
permit issued by the Minister of Health but said permit prohibited her from teaching earlier than 6:00 in
the evening. 6 However, she was able to hold classes after 1:00 P.M. allegedly upon verbal permission
of Dr. Jacinto provided she should render service either on Saturdays or Sundays to compensate for the
lost hours in the hospital. The latter denies this.
It is on the basis of the foregoing set of facts that in due course an information was filed in the
Sandiganbayan against Dr. Jacinto by the special prosecutor of the Tanodbayan charging him with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about May 17,1985, in Marikina, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the duly
appointed officer-in-charge of the Eulogio Rodriguez Sr. Memorial Hospital, acting
with evident bad faith, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully order the indefinite
withholding of the salary of his subordinate, Dr. Veneracion Pacis-Munar and removal of
her name in the plantilla, thereby causing undue injury to the latter.
After arraignment wherein the accused entered a plea of not guilty and a trial on the merits a decision
was rendered on May 12, 1988 finding him guilty of the offense charged with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentencing him to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month, to suffer perpetual disqualification and to pay the costs.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by the accused based on the following assigned errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTS
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION DID NOT REALLY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3,
PARAGRAPH (E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, AND,
THEREFORE, ACCUSED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ARRAIGNED NOR TRIED
UNDER SUCH INFORMATION.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
ASSUMING AD ARGUENDUM THAT THE INFORMATION CHALLENGED
COULD BE THE VALID BASIS FOR ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL, THE
DECISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF SIX YEARS AND ONE (1) MONTH IMPRISONMENT,
TO SUFFER PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION, AND TO PAY THE COSTS' FOR
THE MERE ACTS OF ALLEGEDLY WITHHOLDING SALARY AND REMOVAL
OF NAME FROM THE PLANTILLA (WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT SHE
RECEIVED HER PAY IN FULL AND HER NAME WAS IN THE FINAL
PLANTILLA) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND, THEREFORE, VOID (ART. III, SEC.
19-(l), 1987 CONSTITUTION) PROVIDING THAT;
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. ...
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
REGARDLESS OF THE ABOVE ERRORS, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
UPON WHICH IT RENDERED A SENTENCE OF CONVICTION WERE NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND, HENCE ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
The petition is impressed with merit. Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes any public officer as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.-In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The elements of this offense are:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions.
In this case, it is not denied that the salary of the complainant, Dr. Munar, was withheld for sometime
upon instruction of petitioner. But his explanation therewith is that complainant failed to submit her
daily time records duly approved. Indeed her daily time records for May, June, July and August, 1985
were submitted by her only on September 24,1985. It is a well-known fact that in the government
service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before he can
collect his salary.
Furthermore, petitioner asserted that he withheld the salary of the complainant from May 13 to May
19,1985, which was the period when she applied for sick leave because he disapproved her application
for sick leave. He found out she was not sick from Dr. Padre who confided to him that she was merely
persuaded by the complainant to issue said medical certificate.
At any rate, while there was indeed some inconvenience in the failure of complainant to immediately
get her salary for the aforesaid period, upon receiving the handwritten note of the Minister of Health,
the petitioner nevertheless authorized the payment of the salary of the complainant.
The petitioner also admits that he caused the removal of the name of the complainant from the plantilla
but obviously his action was the net result of his dissatisfaction with the services of complainant. The
complainant was undeniably moonlighting even during her office hours in the ERMH. She also refused
to yield to the advice of petitioner not to further protest the promotion of Dr. Tica. When her salary was
withheld, instead of appealing to petitioner who was her immediate superior, she went directly to
higher authorities for assistance. When her name was omitted in the plantilla, she again by-passed
petitioner.
Nevertheless, no real or actual damage was suffered by her. She got her withheld salary released. Her
name was restored in the plantilla. Thus, the complainant did not suffer undue injury as an element
required by the law. Such an injury must be more than necessary, excessive, improper or illegal.7 The
injury suffered by complainant in this instance, if at all, is negligible.
By the same token, the essential ingredient of manifest partiality and evident bad faith required for the
commission of the offense has not been successfully established in this case. As above discussed, the
actions taken by petitioner aforestated were not entirely without rhyme or reason. They were measures
taken by a superior against an erring employee who studiously ignored if not defied his authority.
Moreover, assuming the aforesaid actions which were taken by petitioner are erroneous or excessive,
they are certainly not criminal in nature. If at all ,the liability of petitioner may be civil if not
administrative. Indeed, because of this prosecution, the petitioner was purged from the government
service after the EDSA revolution. The nominal injury to the complainant had been more than
adequately vindicated. A conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is certainly out of
the question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 1988 is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING the
petitioner, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan,C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED
BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and interfere
with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable for
indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges and the
Judiciary.
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q.
Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of
the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along Epifanio
Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the project’s
location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the notice.
Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a
temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence to deny access
to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an
easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included
an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s prayer
for the WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed use
(to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition for corporate rehabilitation was
approved.4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its
prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The denial of the
prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an application
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil
Case No. 65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or
Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file its Comment.
AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion for partial reconsideration of
the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to
Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division,
which included Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting the
petition of WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had conspired
with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-
Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had been
rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave
injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were
guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its
lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary must be
supported by at least substantial evidence.10 But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such
that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of
culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
especially because the charge is penal in character.11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised
Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision" is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an
unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a
controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly means "sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate
intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made
with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives
or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering
an unjust decision.14 In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other
similar motive in issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure
of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable.17
But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly
rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and declaration be made in administrative
investigations and proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor? The answers
to these queries are obvious – only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or
supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may be usurping a basic
judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by law elsewhere in the appellate
court.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through an
administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled
litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting judges instead of
exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of
Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport
Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S.
Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,18 we emphatically held that the filing of administrative
complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to
wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take respondent
Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would
thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such
actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and
prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular performance of the
judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.
Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of
resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in its
cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1 The complaint herein is actually the second
one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation to the performance of their judicial
duty in the same case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against
Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals,19 AMALI accused respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in
violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the propriety
of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court
appropriately observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’ respective allegations disclosed that the acts
complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before the respondent CA Justices and the
propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the exercise of their judicial
functions. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against justices
do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or
judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the questioned
order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a
decision on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices in
this administrative proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions
thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of
the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or
corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality
established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly
shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than
AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s counsel
in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct,"
no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA
Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has
regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed to the
evaluation of the Court in the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues
involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts
must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate
their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the complaint herein
containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were intended to intimidate
or to disparage respondent Justices in the performance of their judicial functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an
outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges
against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI
or its representative personally responsible for the unfounded charges brought against respondent
Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of
respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives
have thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and
they have not stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of
AMALI and its representatives would be to reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously
wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer for
performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public duty and
responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer justice area function of sovereignty, and
should not be simply taken for granted. As a recognized commentator on public offices and public
officers has written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be
sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been injured by
the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the officer is called
upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be
performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear
either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is
said of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have a controversy
before him, is not the end and object which were in view when his court was created, and he was
selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as
between suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and that rights may
be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public; the individual
advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a
duty for which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing
justice between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be called to
account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the
duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not
admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior
Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized
Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect
contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only
once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting
judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by
the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring
the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines:22
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In
its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a
variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by
statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists
for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the
power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution;
without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for
its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA
Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita
to bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show cause in writing
within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices, and for interfering with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

People of The Philippines, Appellee, EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant

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People of The Philippines, Appellee, EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant

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G.R. No.

168168 September 14, 2005

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

[G.R. No. 186141 : April 11, 2012]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JESUSA FIGUEROA Y

There were originally two Informations filed against accused-appellant:

Criminal Case No. 04-2432

Criminal Case No. 04-2433

Version of the Defense

1. In Criminal Case No. 04-2432[,] the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado is

Accused-appellant appealed to this Court anew. Accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief,

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE

Lack of Prior Coordination with the PDEA

Alleged lack of prior agreement between accused-appellant and PO3 Callora.

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

* Per Raffle dated April 11, 2012.

[4] Rollo, pp. 6-10.

[5] Records, pp. 183-197.

[7] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

G.R. No. 174198 January 19, 2010

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

Second Issue: Compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule

G.R. No. 196966 October 23, 2013

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION OF

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

Plaintiff-appellee countered in its Brief22 that:

THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY ADMITTED THE SHABU IN EVIDENCE.

THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE "BUY-BUST" OPERATION IN THE CASE AT BAR

THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

On cross examination, the witness testified that:

Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:

Accused-appellant is now before the Court, raising the following issues:15

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A BUY-BUST OPERATION

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

After a thorough review of the records, we acquit accused-appellant.

In People v. Habana,31 as reiterated in People v. Martinez, et al.,32 we ruled that:

G.R. No. 185460 July 25, 2012

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E.

We grant the petition.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and