(1) PT & T v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

I G.R. No. 189026 I November 9, 2016 I

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T) and respondent Smart
Communications, Inc. (Smart) entered into an Agreement dated June 23, 1997 for the
interconnection of their telecommunication facilities. The Agreement provided for the
interconnection of Smart's Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS), Local Exchange Carrier
(LEC) and Paging services with PT&T's LEC service.

Starting 1999, however, PT&T had difficulty meeting its financial obligations to Smart.
Thus, on November 28, 2003, the parties amended the Agreement, which extended the
payment period and allowed PT&T to settle its obligations on installment basis. On April 4,
2005, Smart sent a letter informing PT&T that it increased the access charge from P1.00 to
P2.00 starting April 1, 2005 in accordance with the amended Agreement. However, on
September 2, 2005, PT&T sent a letter to Smart claiming that the latter overcharged PT&T on
outbound calls to Smart's CMTS.

PT&T filed a letter-complaint with the NTC raising the issue that the access charges
imposed by Smart were allegedly "discriminatory and not in conformity with those of other
carriers." On January 20, 2006, the NTC ordered Smart and PT&T to attend mediation
conferences in order to thresh out the issues. After the mediation efforts failed, the NTC
directed the parties to file their respective pleadings, after which it would consider the case
submitted for resolution. But before the parties were able to submit the pleadings, Smart filed
a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC) against PT&T on April 7, 2006.
Smart alleged that PT&T was in breach of its contractual obligation when it failed to pay its
outstanding debt and denied its liability to Smart.

In its answer to the complaint, PT&T sought for the dismissal of the civil case on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, non-observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, litis pendentia and res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not the NTC has the primary jurisdiction over the matter.

Whether or not RTC exceeded its jurisdition.

Ruling:

(1) YES. NTC was already in the process of resolving the issue of whether the access
charges stipulated in the Agreement were fair and equitable pursuant to its mandate
under RA 7925 when the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary injunction

Section 18 of RA 7925 authorizes the NTC to determine the equity, reciprocity and
fairness of the access charges stipulated in Smart and PT&T's Agreement. This does not,
however, completely deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Smart. The
Agreement has other stipulations which do not require the NTC's expertise.

(2) YES. RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it restrained the NTC from exercising
its statutory authority over the dispute.

Congress intended NTC, in respect of its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions, to be co-

equal with regional trial courts. Hence, the RTC cannot interfere with the NTC's exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers without breaching the rule of non-interference with tribunals of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.

But insofar as Smart's complaint involved the enforcement of, as well as the collection of
sums based on the rates subject of the NTC proceedings, the RTC cannot proceed with the civil
case until the NTC has finally determined if the access charges are fair and reasonable. Hence,
the more prudent course of action for the RTC would have been to hold the civil action in
abeyance until after a determination of the NTC case.

Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court where the action
is pending may grant the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. Generally, trial courts
have the ancillary jurisdiction to issue writs of preliminary injunction in cases falling within its
jurisdiction, including civil actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation and claims for
sum of money exceeding P400,000.00, among others. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule, such as when Congress, in the exercise of its power to apportion jurisdiction, restricts the
authority of regular courts to issue injunctive reliefs.

(2) RIVERA vs. HON. CATALO

AM RTJ-15-2422 July 20, 2015

[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]

[FACTS]
Rivera filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a TCT.
The case was raffled to Judge Catalo. The complaint alleged that Rivera was an heir of Juan
Gilbuena (whose name is registered on the aforementioned TCT). Judge Catalo granted the
petition on the basis of evidence presented by Rivera, particularly the affidavit of loss and the
certification by the ROD. The decision became final and exec on July 3, 2012.
The RD then informed Rivera that the Affidavit of Loss was being recalled considering that the
said title was already cancelled, and being a cancelled title, it could no longer be the subject of
any transaction. An RD officer had discovered that the TCT had already been cancelled as early
as 1924, and they discovered that several titles had already originated from said cancelled
title. Thus, the affidavit of loss by Rivera was untrue and fabricated.

Judge Catalo then ordered a hearing, to which Rivera did not appear. And so the original
decision was set aside.
Aggrieved, Rivera filed an administrative complaint alleging that Judge Catalo committer gross
misconduct in recalling the decision.
Judge Catalo avers that he has the right to invoke the inherent power of the court to amend
and control its processed and orders to make them conformable with law and justice.

[LOWER COURT’S RULING]

OCA opined that Judge Catalo is liable for gross ignorance of the law by motu proprio recalling
his own decision, which is prohibited as it had already become final and executory.

[ISSUES]
WON the recalling of a final and executor decision is valid

[HELD]
Yes.
A decision that acquires finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect. The exceptions to this are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) void
judgements; (3) whenever the circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Under the second exception, a void judgement for want of jurisdiction is no judgement at all. It
can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. The third exception also
applies, where there are facts which that would render the execution of the decision a nullity.

Also, the OCA erred in saying that Catalo motu proprio recalled his own decision and should
have waited for an action under Rule 47 to assail the final judgement. The Rd can hardly be
expected to file an independent action to annul the judgement. In addition, Rule 47 is not the
only remedy to assail final judgements, as jurisprudence held that the decision may be
attacked collaterally, as when a party files for a motion for its execution (as what the RD
Officer did upon the discovery of the fraud).

(3) PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE

CORPORATION and AUTOCORP vs. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS
| G.R. No. 151242 | June 15, 2005

FACTS
Sometime in 1995, petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit
facilities of herein respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of
its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive Corporation Philippines (Automotive), Asea One
Corporation (Asea) and Autocorp Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the
extent of $2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt
agreements dated June 4, 1996, January 14, 1997, and April 24, 1997.

Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger
motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject
to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its
obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together
with all the accompanying documents of title. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds
of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles.

Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the
payment of the amount of $1,544,984.40 representing Proton's total outstanding obligations.
However, these guarantors refused to pay. Hence, BNP filed on September 7, 1998 before the
Makati RTC, a complaint against petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay (1)
$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon subsequent to
August 15, 1998 until fully paid; and (2) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from
petitioners as attorney's fees.

The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid at P352,116.30.

The petitioners then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that (1) BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees, thus preventing the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case;
and as additional ground, petitioners raised (2) prematurity of the complaint, alleging that
BNP failed to priorly send any demand letter.

Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94, petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the
correct docket fees as the said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest
claimed should be included. There being an underpayment of the docket fees, petitioners
conclude, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Additionally, petitioners point out that the clerk of court, in converting BNP's claims from US
dollars to Philippine pesos, applied the wrong exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00 (the exchange
rate on September 7, 1998 when the complaint was filed) having been pegged at US $1 =
P43.21. Thus, by petitioners' computation, BNP's claim as of August 15, 1998 was
actually P70,096,714.72, not P69,756,045.66. Thus, petitioners submit that pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular No. 7, the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
specify the amount of interest in the prayer.

ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the payment of incorrect
docket fees

HELD: Yes, RTC acquired jurisdiction. However, when the complaint was filed in 1998, as
correctly pointed out by petitioners, Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94 which provides that in the assessment of docket fees, interest
claimed should be included. Thus, the clerk of court should have assessed the filing fee by
taking into consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in
litigation."

Although, the Court also noted that in Manchester Development Corporation vs CA, it
condemned the pratice of the counsel who in filing original complaint omitted from the prayer
any specication of the amount of damages, but such was clearly intended for no other purpose
than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the
assessment of the filing fee.

The court even gave warning in that said case stating that it will take drastic action upon
repitition of such unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity, all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought
in the amended pleading.

4. CAMILO SIBAL vs. PEDRO BUQUEL, SANTIAGO BUQUEL JR., ROSALINDA BUQUEL
| G.R. No. 197825 | January 11, 2016

FACTS
The respondents inherited a parcel of land from their parents Santiago Buquel Sr and Faustina
Buquel, consisting of 81,022 sqm covered by OCT No. 0-725. Sometime on January 1999,
petitioner together with Tobi Mangoba took possession of a portion of the property which
belonged to Santiago Sr. Thereafter the Buquels made several demands against Sibal and
Mongoba for them to vacate and turn over the property, but the latter refused to do so. Hence,
they filed a complaint before Tuguegarao RTC for recovery of possession and damages.

Tuguegarao RTC ruled in favor of the respondents Buquel ordering the restoration of their
peaceful possession of the land in question, specifically on the share of Santiago Jr., and
demanding the petitioners to pay attorney’s fees as well as moral and actual damage.

Thereafter, said decision became final and executory; hence the trial court issued a writ of
execution. However, Sibal filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA,
where he raised lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud as grounds.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Yes. The SC noted upon review of the records that the Real Property Tax Order of
Payment submitted which shows the amount of P51,190.00 is truly the assessed value of the
property, which fact Sibal failed to refute.

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud, and only when other
remedies are wanting. In the present case, Sibal was able to avail of other remedies when he
filed before the RTC a motion to quash the writ of execution and a motion to annul judgment.

Moreover, parties aggrieved by final judgments, orders or resolutions cannot be allowed to

easily and readily abuse a petition for annulment of judgment. Thus, the Court has instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and
by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available without fault on the part of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that
ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

Further, it must be emphasized that not every kind of fraud justies the action of annulment of
judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. According to Cosmic Lumber Corporation vs. CA, fraud is
extrinsic when the unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully exhibiting his case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been
a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair
hearing.

As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse
party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in
court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own
counsel. Thus, the SC ruled that Sibal must bear the unfortunate consequences of his actions.
As a litigant, he should not have entirely left the case in his counsel's hands, for he had the
continuing duty to keep himself abreast of the developments, if only to protect his own interest
in the litigation. He could have discharged said duty by keeping in regular touch with his
counsel, but he failed to do so.

5. SUN INSURANCE V. ASUNCION et.al. | G.R. No. 79937 - 38 | FEBRUARY 13, 1989

[FACTS]
Private respondent Asuncion filed a complaint in RTC Quezon City for the refund of
premiums with damages against petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) and 2
other defendants. Asuncion only paid P210.00 as docket fee which prompted SIOL's counsel to
raise an objection. Said objection was disregarded by Judge Castro who was then presiding
over said case.
Thereafter, Judge Castro was under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees.
SC ordered that the records of this case, together with 22 other cases, be re-raffled to the
other judges in Quezon City. SC made a resolution directing the other judges to reassess the
docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment, with the additional
requirement that all clerks of court would issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees.
This case was re-raffled to a new judge. The judge issued a Supplemental Order
requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her
difficulty in complying with the SC Resolution since the pleadings filed by Asuncion did not
indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
Asuncion filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim
of "not less than P10M as actual compensatory damages”. The same later filed a second
amended complaint that alleged the actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in
the total amount of about P44M.

[ISSUE/S]

WON the lower court acquired jurisdiction over this case on the ground of non-
payment of the correct and proper docket fee.

[HELD]

YES. The lower court has jurisdiction.

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-
assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The
principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. However, a more
liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
Asuncion demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence
on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent
court. It triggered his change for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional
docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court
should determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due, he must require the
private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

VENUE

(1) BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. SPOUSES YUJUICO

I G.R. No. 175796 I July 22, 2015 I

Facts:
City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five
parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita
Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title, were previously
mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a
First Real Estate Mortgage Contract.

Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the five
parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory on
January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment on March 23, 2001. The
petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to
Defendant's Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been "filed out of
time." Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on
the two parcels of land subject of the respondents' loan. After holding the public auction, the
sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.

Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522,155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents

to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint
on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated
no cause of action; and that the plaintiff's claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished.

Issue: Whether or not the CA’s act of recognizing the additional ground of improper venue,
only raised in the motion for reconsideration, is contrary to law and jurisprudence.

Held: We grant the petition for review on certiorari. The determinants of whether an
action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The
real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof.

The petitioner correctly brought the case in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place
where the main office of the petitioner was located. Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and
the observation is correct in our view, that it would be improper to dismiss Civil Case No. 03-
450 on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been improperly laid,
considering that the respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to Dismiss.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals.
2. UNION BANK V. MAUNLAD HOMES | G.R. No. 190071 | AUGUST 15, 2012

[FACTS]

Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan, known as
the Maunlad Shopping Mall.
Aug. 2002, Union Bank (seller), entered into a contract to sell with Maunlad Homes
(buyer). Purchase price: P151 M. Downpayment: 2.4 M. Amortization for 180 month period. In
the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad to take possession of the property and to build or
introduce improvements. Also, agreed that if Maunlad violates any of the provisions of the
contract, all payments made will be applied as rentals for the use and possession of the
property, and all improvements will accrue in favor of Union Bank. In the case of rescission due
to failure to pay or to comply with the terms, Maunlad will be required to immediately vacate
the property and must voluntarily turn over to Union Bank..
Maunlad failed to pay monthly amortization, Union Bank sent a notice of rescission on Feb.
5, 2003, demanding payment of the installments within 30 days. Maunlad failed to comply.
Nov. 19, 2003, Union Bank sent Maunlad a letter demanding payment of rentals due and
requiring that the property be vacated and possession turned over to the bank. Maunlad
continued to refuse.

Thus, Union Bank instituted an ejectment suit (unlawful detainer) before the MeTC of
Makati on Feb 19, 2004.

[ISSUE/S]

WON the unlawful detainer case is correctly filed before the MeTC of Makati
City.
[HELD]

YES. The petition is meritorious. Union Bank correctly filed the unlawful detainer case
before the MeTC of Makati. Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded by the litigant through the
allegations in his complaint.
Maunlad rests their case on Sec.1, Rule 4 of RoC that ejectment actions shall be filed
where the real property involved is situated. However, Sec. 4, Rule 4 provides that rule
shall not apply “where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of
the action on the exclusive venue thereof.” Since the unlawful detainer is connected with
the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with the MeTC of Makati City.

3. DE LEON v. DELA LLANA

I G.R. No. 212277 I February 11, 2015 I

Facts:
This case stemmed from an unlawful detainer complaint (1st ejectment complaint) filed by
respondent Gilbert dela Llana (Gilbert) against petitioner Robert de Leon (Robert) and a certain
Gil de Leon (Gil) on March 7, 2005 before the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-
Mawab, Compostela Valley Province (MCTCNabunturan- Mawab).

In the said complaint, Gilbert averred that sometime in 1999, he, through an undated
contract of lease, leased a portion of a 541 square-meter property situated in Poblacion,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley Province, registered in his name, to Robert, which the latter
intended to use as a lottery outlet. The lease contract had a term of five (5) years and
contained a stipulation that any case arising from the same shall be filed in the courts of
Davao City only. Gilbert claimed that Robert and Gil failed to pay their rental arrears to him
and refused to vacate the subject property, despite repeated demands, thus, the first
ejectment complaint.

In their defense, Robert and Gil posited that the aforementioned lease contract was
simulated and, hence, not binding on the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata applies that is, whether or not the second
ejectment complaint was barred by prior judgment made by the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab.
Held:
Yes.
Res judicata is a fundamental principle of la which precludes parties from re-litigating
issues actually litigated and determined by prior and final judgment. It means that "a final
judgment or decree on the merits by court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies I all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit."
 With the identity of the parties, subject matter, and cause of action between Cthe first and
second ejectment cases, it cannot thus be seriously doubted that the final and executory
judgment in the first case had already barred the resolution of the second.

The Court deems it apt to correct the MCTC-Nabunturan- Mawab's characterization of the
simulated character of the undated lease contract, which, to note, stands as a mere error in
terminology that would not negate the granting of the present petition on the ground of res
judicata. Properly speaking, the contract, as gathered from the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab's
ratiocination, should be considered as an absolutely and not a relatively simulated contract.

With the undated lease contract definitely settled as absolutely simulated, and hence,
void, there can be no invocation of the exclusive venue stipulation on the part of either party;
thus, the general rule on the filing of real actions in the court where the property is situated —
as in the filing of the first ejectment complaint before the MCTCNabunturan- Mawab located in
Compostela Valley same as the subject property of this case — prevails.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

4. BPI V. HONTANOSAS | G.R. No. 157163 | JUNE 25, 2014

[FACTS]

Respondents Borbon, Sps. Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad, and XM Facultad and
Development Corporation commenced a civil case to seek the declaration of the nullity of the
promissory notes, real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they
had executed in favor of petitioner. They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and
applied for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent petitioner from foreclosing on the
mortgages against their properties.
Complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from BPI, and had executed
promissory notes binding themselves, to pay the sum borrowed; that as security for the
payment of the loan, they had constituted real estate mortgages; and that they had been
made to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Pajero.
Respondents’ obligation to petitioner reached P17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to
pay P13 M due to economic turmoil.
Petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under threat of
foreclosing on the mortgages.
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss contending that complaint should be dismissed
because (1) venue is improperly laid; (2) court has not acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim because the legal fees has not been paid; and (3) claim states no cause of
action.

[ISSUE/S]

WON case should be dismissed for (a) improper venue; and (b) non-payment of
the correct amount of docket fee.
WON the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, was in
order.

WON the case was a real or personal action.

[HELD]

The appeal was partly meritorious.

First Issue (a): SC sustained the lower courts’ rulings on the issue that the venue was
properly laid. the declaration of the nullity of a contract of loan and its accompanying
continuing surety agreement, and the real estate and chattel mortgages, was a personal
action; hence, its filing in Cebu City, the place of business of one of the plaintiffs, was correct
under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contended that such was a real action and should be tried in the proper court
having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, was situated.
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been
fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court: A real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions.
Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for
which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
In the case at bar, the respondents seek the nullification of promissory notes,
continuing surety agreement, checks and mortgage agreements for being executed
against their will and vitiated by irregularities, not the recovery of the possession
or title to the properties burdened by the mortgages. Applying the determinants, the
case was unquestionably a personal action. Thus, case was properly brought before the RTC
in Cebu City, where respondent XM Facultad and Development Corporation, a principal
plaintiff, had its address.
First Issue (b): Upon the same consideration, the petitioner's contention that the filing
and docket fees for the complaint should be based on the assessed values of the mortgaged
real properties due to Civil Case No. CEB-26468 being a real action cannot be upheld for lack
of factual and legal bases.

Second issue: No. RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
petitioner from proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and
unwarranted. Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the RoC enumerates the grounds for issuance of preliminary
injunction.

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may

be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or
in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of preliminary injunction is issued upon
the satisfaction of 2 requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
In this case, they had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to
secure the performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully
aware of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan
secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for
the mortgagee to exact payment.

5. SPOUSES SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA vs. WILLIAM FRANCISCO

| G.R. No. 198718 | November 27, 2013

FACTS
The case stems from an amended complaint filed by William Francisco (respondent) against
Fernando Saraza and Spouses Teodoro and Rosario Saraza (petitioners). The respondent
alleged in his complaint that he and Fernando executed an Agreement that provided for the
latter's sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City, which at
that time was still registered in the name of one Emilia Seraco and covered by TCT No. 40376,
for a total consideration of P3.2M. The amount of P1.2M was paid upon the Agreement's
execution, while the balance of P2M was to be paid on installments to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando's parents, with the bank. A final deed
of sale conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB
loan.

It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to transfer the subject
property to the respondent's name, Rosario and Fernando's 136-sq.m. property covered by
TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was to be paid by the
respondent shall be considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza
signified their conformity to the Agreement. The respondent was also allowed to take
immediate possession of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a contract of
lease.

The petitioners likewise furnished PNB with an Authority, allowing the respondent (1) to pay
their obligations to the PNB; (2) to negotiate for a loan restructuring; (3) to receive the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage; and
(4) to perform such other acts as may be necessary in connection with the settlement of the
loan.

When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached P226,582.13, the respondent asked for
the petitioners' issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would authorize him to
receive from PNB the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan.
The petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the
petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the owner's
copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the
loan. Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from the property covered by
TCT No. 156126. These prompted the respondent to institute the civil case for specific
performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.

The petitioners admitted the existence of the Agreement and the Authority which was
addressed to PNB. They, nonetheless, opposed the respondent's complaint on the ground that
the amount of P1.2M which was supposed to be paid by the respondent upon the Agreement's
execution remained unpaid. The respondent allegedly took advantage of the trust that was
reposed upon him by the petitioners, who nonetheless did not formally demand payment from
him but merely waited for him to pay the amount.

ISSUE: WON the complaint was filed in the proper venue

HELD: Yes. The petitioners' argument that the action should have been instituted with the
RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although the end result of
the respondent's claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still
essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando's
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent's action. It
provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff." Considering the respondent's statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION

(1) HINOG V. MELICOR | G.R. NO. 140954| April 12, 2005

[FACTS]
Private respondents Balane owned a 1,399 sq. Mt. Parcel of land in Bohol, a part of
which was allowed to be occupied by Bertuldo Hinog, predecessor of petitioners. After the
expiration of their 10-year agreement, the Balanes demanded the return of the occupied
portion but Hinog refused, showing a Deed of Absolute Sale which he claimed was acquired
with permission from the respondents.
Respondents filed for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction
and Damages but during the pendency of trial, Hinog died. As a result, the counsel for Hinog
withdrew his services and a new lawyer, Atty. Veronico Petalcorin entered his appearance as
new counsel.
Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the respondents’ complaint and nullify all
court proceedings because the respondents failed to specify the amount of damages claimed
in their complaint so as to pay the correct docket fees. He based his argument on Manchester
Dev. Co. vs. CA which stated that non-payment of the correct docket fee is
jurisdictional.
Respondents averred that the motion was filed more than 7 years after the institution
of the case and that according to Rule 3, Section 16 of the ROC, the death of the original
defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to
represent a litigant. His motion to expunge did not mention any party whom he represented.
Furthermore, any insufficiency in the docket fees will only constitute a lien on the judgment.
The RTC ruled that a specified amount should be stated in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction and thus ordered the complaint to be expunged from the records. It noted
that there was no formal substitution of petitioners as mandated by the ROC to which Atty.
Petalcorin complied.
The respondents then paid the deficiency and filed a motion to reinstate the
case which the TC granted.
In response, the petitioners filed a supplemental pleading, attaching the alleged Deed
of Sale which was denied since the DoS was never mention in their original answer prepared
by the original lawyer.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition directly before
the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be
reinstated since the complaint failed to state the specific amount of damages
resulting in insufficient payment of docket fees. The trial court had already
expunged the complaint and that the respondents did not oppose this ruling.

[ISSUE/S]
 1. Whether or not the petitioners are allowed to directly file the petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
2. Whether or not the non-payment of docket fees divested the TC of
jurisdiction over the case.

[HELD]

1. NO. The concurrence of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,

quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not give petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of correct forum.

Rationale:
(a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Court;
(b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay in the adjudication of cases.

The SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts and only under exceptional and compelling
circumstances.
In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced by the petitioners to justify their direct appeal to the
SC. The present petition should have been filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Besides, the writ of certiorari and prohibition does not avail since they never sought
reconsideration of the TC’s order to expunge and only opposed the reinstatement of
the case averring lack of jurisdiction after their supplemental pleading was denied.

2. NO. The petitioners are already in estoppel because they cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court by submitting the supplemental pleading and then
subsequently assail it claiming insufficient payment of docket fees.

The order of the TC reinstating the case was merely interlocutory and not subject to a
reglementary period. The remedy of certiorari against an interlocutory order can only
be availed of when it is issued with grave abuse of discretion and patently erroneous
that an ordinary appeal would not be enough.

The Manchester rule was modified by Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion which
stated that the court may allow the payment of fees within a reasonable when
the filing of a pleading is not accompanied by payment and will not result in
the automatic dismissal of the case.

When a judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, the additional fees to
be paid will constitute a lien on the judgment. Thus the reinstatement of the case was
proper since the cause of action, being a real action prescribes in 30 years.

The respondents were in good faith since they only relied on the Clerk of Court’s
assessment of the docket fees and did not intend to defraud the court.

Also:
 No formal substitution of parties was effected as required by Rule 3, Section 16 of
the ROC.
 The rationale of this rule is to ensure that the deceased would continue to be
properly represented by a duly appointed legal representative and in order for the
trial court to gain jurisdiction over their persons and future claims.
 Before Atty. Petalcorin complied, he had no standing to file his pleadings to
expunge.

2. CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS V. ABEJAR | G.R. No. 170631 | FEBRUARY 10, 2016

[FACTS]

A certain Reyes is the respondent’s paternal niece who was raised by the latter since
the former was 9 years old. Reyes was hit by one of the petitioner’s commercial vans, and by
reason of which, died 2 days later after hospitalization. Respondent then filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC in Paranaque.

The RTC found that the driver of the was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle and
concluded that this gross negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes' death.. It awarded
damages in favor of respondent. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently
denied.
Petitioner argues that respondent has no personality to bring this suit because she is
not a real party in interest and does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority.
Respondent is not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased
nor is she not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased." According to
petitioner, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana.
[ISSUE/S]

WON respondent is a real party in interest who may bring an action for
damages against petitioner on account of Reyes' death.

[HELD]

YES. Respondent is real party in interest.

Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against petitioner stems from her having
exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes, the former suffered actual loss and is, thus,
a real party in interest in this case.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest, to
wit: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.

"To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought
to be enforced."

Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.

1st, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it
stands to reason that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural
parent would have felt upon the loss of one's child. It is for this injury — as authentic and
personal as that of a natural parent — that respondent seeks to be indemnified.

2nd, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would have

been capacitated to do. As ruled in Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. CA , persons
exercising substitute parental authority have the full range of competencies of a child's actual
parents, nothing prevents persons exercising substitute parental authority from similarly
possessing the right to be indemnified for their ward's death.

We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Except for the legal
technicality of Reyes' emancipation from parental authority, her relationship with respondent
remained the same as the latter continued to support and care for the former even after she
turned 18. In any case, the termination of respondent's parental authority is not an
insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint.

3. CHARLES LIMBAUAN vs. FAUSTINO ACOSTA,

G.R. No. 148606 June 30, 2008

[FACTS]
The Government acquired the Tala Estate located in Kalookan, primarily for a leprosarium.
However, the State utilized only one-fifth of the property for the purpose. In the meantime, the
State found it necessary to establish new residential areas within a 20-kilometer radius from
the center of the Metropolitan Manila and/or utilizing inexpensive land in order to serve low-
income families whose housing needs. In the Interim, it was decreed that no transfer of title
shall be made until the enactment of a law allowing the use of the site for purposes other than
that of a leprosarium.

In the meantime, Faustino Acosta (a Brgy. Councilman tsk) took possession of a vacant portion
of the Tala Estate and constructed his house thereon. However, Paulino Calanday took
possession of the said property without the consent of Faustino, constructed an edifice thereon
and used the same as a beerhouse. When Faustino remonstrated, Paulino filed two criminal
complaints against Faustino with the MTC. Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse
to Juanita Roces. About a year thereafter, Juanita suddenly stopped paying to Faustino her
rentals for the property. It turned out that Juanita conveyed the beerhouse to her nephew,
Charles Limbauan. However, in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying rentals to Faustino
claiming that, since the property was government property, Faustino had no right to lease the
same and collect the rentals therefore.

Sometime in February, 1995, Congress approved Republic Act 7999 under which the State
converted a portion of the Estate, with a total area of 120 hectares, for use as a housing site
for residents and employees of the Department of Health.
Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of Legal Aid of the University of the Philippines, sent
a letter to Charles demanding that the latter vacate the property within five days from notice
for his failure to pay the monthly rentals in the amount of P60.00 a month since October, 1987.
Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and refused to vacate the property. Faustino, forthwith,
filed a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer" against Charles with the MTC. Faustino Acosta,
through the Law Interns, sent another letter of demand to Charles Limbauan, demanding that
the latter vacate the property this time within fifteen days from notice.

[ISSUES]
WON the MTC acquired jurisdiction over the case .

[HELD]
Yes.
For the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely: (1) there
must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be
demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2,
particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings. The first requisite
refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to
the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.
As to whether respondent observed this fifteen-day period, an affirmative answer can be
gleaned from the evidence on record. The fact that respondent’s demand letter granted
petitioner five days to pay and to vacate the subject property is of no moment because what is
important and required under Section 2 of Rule 70 is for the lessor to allow a period of fifteen
days to lapse before commencing an action for unlawful detainer. Evidently, respondent
actually complied with this requirement. For this reason, we find no error in the MTC assuming
jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint and in not dismissing the same.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. A complaint for unlawful detainer is deemed sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law.

4. SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN

| G.R. No. 162788 | July 28, 2005
FACTS
The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the
cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the Regional
Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Respondent alleged that he had obtained a
loan from them in the amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after 5 years; that is, on
June 29, 1979. To secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of
Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-111802. The parties also executed another document entitled
"Kasunduan."

Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable
mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was merely an accommodation
to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he failed to exercise.

On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in favor of respondent. The trial court declared
that the parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase. It further held that
respondent had made a valid tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his
right of repurchase. Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his
payment.

ISSUE: WON the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Joaquin;
WON non-compliance with the Rules affect the validity of a promulgated decision.

HELD: No. The SC held that the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as
when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or
belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court's decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due
process.

Rule on Substitution – When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is
specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which reads thus:

"Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a

pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.

"The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

"The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to

appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
 "If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if
the one so named shall fail to appear within the specied period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor
or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs."

The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party's right to due process.
The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through
the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the
successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.

This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary

when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present
evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right
to due process was violated.

In the case at bar, it was evident that the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and
participated in the case. The Court stressed that the appellate court had ordered his legal
representatives to appear and substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been
ordered correctly. In all proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to protect the
interests of the deceased.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have
been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There
being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a
ground to nullify the trial court's Decision.

5. SPOUSES OCO V. LIMBARING | G.R. No. 161298 | January 31, 2006

[FACTS]
Sabas Limbaring subdivided his Lot 2325-D into two lots denominated as Lot Nos. 2325-D-1
and 2325-D-2. He then executed in favor of Jennifer Limbaring a Deed of Sale for Lot 2325-D-2
for P60,000; and, in favor of Sarah Jane Limbaring, another Deed for Lot 2325-D-1 for P14,440.
Accordingly, TCT No. 5268 was cancelled and TCT Nos. T-21921 and T-21920 were issued in
the names of Jennifer and Sarah Jane, respectively. Sensing some irregularities in the
transaction, Percita Oco, the daughter of Sabas Limbaring, left Puerto Princesa City and went
to Ozamis City.7 She then filed a case of perjury and falsification of documents against
respondent, her uncle who was the father of Jennifer and Sarah Jane. During the pre-litigation
conference the parties agreed that the two parcels of land should be reconveyed to Percita,
who was to pay respondent all the expenses that had been and would be incurred to transfer
the titles to her name. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent facilitated the transfer of the
titles to her from the names of his daughters. On April 6, 1999, respondent filed against
Spouses Anthony and Percita Oco a Complaint for the rescission of the sales contracts, with
recovery of possession and ownership of the two parcels of land. Among others, he claimed 1)
that he was the actual buyer of the lots, but the vendees whose names appeared on the Deeds
were his daughters; 2) that he initially refused to reconvey the properties because he had paid
for them with his hard-earned money, which was partly used by Sabas Limbaring for medical
expenses; 3) that Percita had prepared the two Deeds of Sale, which his daughters signed
despite receiving no consideration as stated in the Deeds; 4) that because she refused to pay
the P25,000, the Limbaring clan held a meeting on October 26, 1996, during which it was
agreed that P1,000 per month would be given to respondent from the rentals of Sabas
Limbaring’s house; and 5) that the agreement was not implemented, because Percita had
failed to cooperate.

[ISSUE]
Whether respondent, who was the plaintiff in the trial court, was a real party in interest in the
suit to rescind the Deeds of Reconveyance.

[RULING]
NO. Respondent is not a real party in interest. He was not a party to the contracts and
has not demonstrated any material interest in their fulfillment.
Evidently, the allegations in the Complaint do not show that the properties would be
conveyed to him, even if Percita were to be proven to have committed a breach of the subject
agreements.To show material interest, respondent argues that a trust was created when he
purchased the properties from Sabas Limbaring in favor of his daughters. As trustor, he
allegedly stands to be benefited or injured by any decision in the case. Respondent has
presented only bare assertions that a trust was created. Noting the need to prove the
existence of a trust, this Court has held thus:
"As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and
its elements. While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be
trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest
on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral
evidence can easily be fabricated."
 Under the last sentence of Article 1448, respondent’s alleged acts -- paying the price
of the subject properties and, in the titles, naming his children as owners -- raise the
presumption that a gift was effected in their favor. Respondent failed to rebut this
presumption. Absent any clear proof that a trust was created, he cannot be deemed a real
party in interest.That he should be deemed a trustor on the basis merely of having paid the
purchase price is plainly contradicted by the presumption based on Article 1448 of the Civil
Code "that there is a gift in favor of the child," not a trust in favor of the parent.
Having found that respondent is not a real party in interest, this Court deems it no
longer necessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.

Liberal Construction

1. CANTON V CITY OF CEBU [GR NO. 152898] FEBRUARY 12, 2007

TOPIC: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROC

FACTS:
Employees of Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP) identified the area disputed as
part of the South Cebu Reclamation Project. MCDP with the assistance of the Squatters
Prevention Encroachment Elimination Division (SPEED) of the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu,
removed the barbed wire on the ground that it was an illegal construction for lack of necessary
permit
Petitioners filed a forcible entry case against MCDP and the City of Cebu before the MTC of
Talisay, Cebu. Petitioners alleged that respondents’ agents unlawfully entered their property
and demolished their fence. Petitioner stated that their property is outside the South Cebu
Reclamation Project and showed tax declaration to prove their ownership of the disputed area.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no right of ownership and possession over the
disputed area for it is a foreshore land which was reclaimed and developed by the respondents
as part of the said project. MTC ruled in favour of the petitioners and stated that the removal of
the fence by the respondent is illegal for it did not secure the aid of the court prior to entering
into possession of the disputed property..

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in outrightly dismissing the petition.

SC RULING:
Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure states that petition shall be filed in 7
legible copies with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without imploding the
lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific
material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the RTC, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of appeal;
(d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record
as would support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also summit together with the petition a certification under oath that
he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the SC, the
CA or different divisions thereof or tribunal or agency; if there is such other action, he must
state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action has been
filed or is pending , he undertakes to promptly inform the SC, CA, or different divisions, and
other tribunal or agency within 5 days therefrom. Section 3 of the same rule states that
noncompliance with any of the Sec. 2’s requirement is a ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
In the case at bar, petitioners’ counsel in his motion for reconsideration, instead of
submitting the pleadings required by the CA con tinted to assert that the “complaint or answer
filed with the MTC and parties appeal memoranda filed with the RTC are not indispensable to
support the allegations in view of the clear and concise statement of the matters in dispute by
both court of origin and appellate and the parties’ position paper.” The counsel ignore the CA’s
directive and insist on his own interpretation of the ROC. Petitioners and their counsel must
bear in mind that the right to appeal is not a natural right. The right to appeal is a statutory
privilege and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law.

2. VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., V CHENG [GR NO. 170232-170301] DECEMBER

5, 2006
TOPIC: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROC

FACTS:
Cheng Sui Soan (Sui) filed for specific performance and damages filed against Vette
Industrial Sales Company, Inc., and the other petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
105691. Sui alleged that he executed a Deed of Assignment, where he transferred his 40,000
shares in his company in favour of Kenneth Tan, Vevette Cheng, Felesavette Cheng and Yvette
Tan (Petitioners-Assignees). To implement the deed, Vette Industrial Sales Company
acknowledged in the MOA, that it owed him P6.8 million pesos plus insurance proceeds of
P760,000 and a signing bonus of P300,000. He was issued 48 postdated checks but after the
11th check, the remaining checks were dishonoured by the bank. Sui claimed that the
insurance proceed was not remitted to him therefore petitioners breached their obligation
under the MOA.
Petitioners alleged that Sui sold his shares which they already paid; that the MOA is
unenforceable because it was executed without authorization from the board of directors and
that petitioner Kenneth Tan executed the MOA after Sui issued threats and refused to sign the
waiver and quitclaim.
Sui filed a motion to set pre-trial but petitioners did not attend because there was no
notice from the court. The trial court then reset the pretrial but was postponed and moved to
May 21, 2004. Sui and his Counsel Atty. Ferrer failed to appear. Trial court ordered the
dismissal of the case without prejudice on the part of petitioners to present evidence.
Atty. Ferrer filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, explaining that he just
arrived from South Cotabato where he served as Chief Counsel in the Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Governor Mangudadatu and had to drop by at his office to get the case folder
the reason why he’s late. The trial court required petitioners to file their comment on the
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration and asserted that Sui did not follow the 3 day
notice rule which is mandatory under Sec. 4 Rule 15 of the ROC, trial court did not comply with
Sec. 6 of Rule 15 of the ROC when it acted on the manifestation and motion of Sui, negligence
of the counsel binds the clients when Atty. Ferrer arrived late, that explanation of Atty. Ferrer
is unacceptable because traffic gridlocks are daily events in the metropolis.

ISSUE/S:
WON the CA erred in dismissing without prejudice Civi Case No. 03-105691 and in ruling
that trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted Sui’s motion for
reconsideration to set aside the order of dismissal of the complaint.

SC RULING:
The judge has the discretion whether or not to declare a party non-suited. It is likewise
settled that the determination of whether or not an order of dismissal issued under such
conditions should be maintained or reconsidered rest upon the sound discretion of the trial
judge. SC hold that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue on whether the trial court granted the motion for reconsideration of Sui and
reinstated the complaint without basis in law, under Sec. 4 of Rule 18 of the ROC, the non-
appearance of a party at the pre-trial maybe excused when there is valid cause shown or when
a representative shall appear in his behalf and is fully authorized in writing to enter into an
amicable settlement. Although Sui was absent during the pre-trial, Atty. Ferrer alleged that he
was fully authorized to represent Sui. Moreover, it is not entirely accurate to state the Atty.
Ferrer was absent when he was only late, the reason for which he explained in his
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. This circumstances attendant in the instant case
compel this Court to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice.
The court also noted that Sui’s Motion for Reconsideration was not defective on the
ground that it was not served 3 days before the date of hearing and no proof of service was
given to the court in violation of Sec. 4 and 6 of the Rule 15 since the purpose of a notice of
hearing had been served. When the trial court received Sui’s Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed petitioners to
file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply. These circumstances
justify the departure from the literal application of the rule. Sui also did not fail to attach proof
of service since petitioners admitted that they received a copy of Sui’s Manifestation and
Motion for Reconsideration. In fact they had the opportunity to oppose the same. Under these
circumstances, SC find that the demands of substantial justice and due process were satisfied.

3. CRUZ V COURT OF APPEALS [GR NO. 156894] DECEMBER 2, 2005

TOPIC: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROC

FACTS:
Spouses Salvador and Carmencita Valle 􏰀filed an action for Annulment of A􏰁ffidavit of Self-
adjudication, Cancellation of Tax Declaration and Quieting of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. 17720
against the petitioner. The case was consolidated with Civil Case No. 17785. The latter case was an appeal
by the petitioner from the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in an ejectment case filed by the
respondent spouses against him.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal.

SC RULING:
Petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner explains that he sought the services of a collaborating counsel when, in the middle of July
2002, he discovered that his counsel of record had not yet started the preparation of his brief. He said that
by then, there was only a short time left before the deadline. The lack of time was compounded by the
illness (acute periodontosis) of his collaborating counsel.
Petitioner contends that the failure of an appellant to 􏰀file his brief within the prescribed time does not
result in the automatic dismissal of the appeal since the appellate court has discretion to dismiss it or not. He
suggests that procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice. He invokes the case of Baylon v.
Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau, where the Court suspended the rules. He argues that since there were
compelling reasons for his delay, substantial rights and interests are at stake, and there could neither be any
injury nor prejudice to appellees, the appellate court should have allowed his appeal.
However, SC said Baylon cannot be applied in this case. In Baylon, there was no negligence on the
part of the client. Moreover, here we must stress that negligence of counsel binds the client. This is
especially true where the client has been as negligent as the lawyer. Negligence of petitioner's counsel and
his own failure to enter the appearance of his collaborating counsel are unacceptable reasons for relaxing
the observance of the period set for filing briefs.
Section 7, 9 Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides that it shall be the duty of the appellant to file his
brief within 45 days from receipt of notice. His failure to comply with this mandate is a ground for the
dismissal of his appeal as provided under Section 1(e), Rule 50 10 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner actually
had 135 days to prepare his brief which is a considerable period of time.

4. HUN HYUNG PARK V EUNG WON CHOI [GR NO. 165496] JUNE 29, 2007
TOPIC: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROC

This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 21, 2007.
For the first time, petitioner raises the matter of inadvertence with respect to the improper verification
of his petition. This Court notes that petitioner has softened his previously adamant stance1 as he now
claims to have simply overlooked the failure to include the words "or based on authentic records" in verifying
the petition.
This Court takes cognizance of petitioner’s humble submission and finds his invocation of honest
mistake to be well-taken in explaining the lapse in the verification.
The relaxation of the rule on verification notwithstanding, petitioner’s motion must nonetheless fail. In
asserting that he was not required to attach the MeTC Orders, petitioner tries to impress upon this Court that
he was not questioning the Orders of the MeTC. Such attempt does not persuade. Rule 42 explicitly
mandates that a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of both lower courts’ judgments or
final orders must be attached to the petition, except where, as in the case of Ramos v. Court of Appeals,2
the MeTC Order was rendered in favor of the petitioner in which case only a true or plain copy thereof is
required to be attached. In this case, the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was not submitted to the appellate
court when, in fact, such Order dismissing the entire case was undoubtedly adverse to petitioner. If
petitioner deemed the MeTC Order favorable as he now claims, he should not have appealed to the RTC in
the first place. Clearly, petitioner’s failure to attach the MeTC Order runs counter to the rules.
In insisting on the application of Rule 33 to buttress his claim that respondent waived his right to
present evidence, petitioner underscores the silence of Section 23 of Rule 119 in cases where the demurrer
to evidence
was granted by the MeTC but reversed on appeal by the RTC. Suffice it to state that the granting of a
demurrer in criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and may not be reversed on appeal without violating
the proscription against double jeopardy. Succinctly stated, there is no waiver to speak of in such case since
an accused’s acquittal on demurrer may not be reversed on appeal.
It must be noted that the RTC decided the appeal only insofar as the MeTC dismissed sub silentio
the civil aspect of the case without finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist. Since the parties do not even dispute the existence of the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise, there was absolutely no reason for the dismissal of the civil aspect of the case.
A finding of sufficiency of evidence as to the civil aspect, where a demurrer to evidence is filed with
leave of court, does not authorize the trial court to terminate the proceedings and immediately render a
decision. As this Court ruled, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable
doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence.
It was thus incorrect for the MeTC to dismiss the civil aspect of the case without any basis. And it was
thus premature for the RTC, in its initial decision, to adjudicate the merits of the civil aspect of the case.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

5. LOURDES DELA CRUZ V CA AND MELBA TAN TE [GR NO. 139442] DECEMBER 6, 2006

FACTS:
The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned a lot located at Sampaloc Manila. Petitioner
Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their lessees who regularly paid its rent over a portion of the lot for over 40
years. A fire struck the premises which destroyed the petitioner’s dwelling. After the fire, petitioner returned
to the said lot and rebuilt her house. However, a verbal demand was made to the remaining lessees
including the petitioner to vacate such lot but the latter did not comply. A written demand was served upon
the petitioner but she refused to leave. The Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings against any of the
lessees.
Sometime on November, 1996, such lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan Te by
virtue of Deed of Absolute Sale. Dela Cruz still refused to give up the lot despite the sale. Petitioner was
then served again a written demand but ignored it. Respondent initiated a conciliation proceeding where he
offered financial assistance but petitioner asked for P500,000 for her house where the respondent rejected it
for the counter offer was unconscionable. Hence, the filing of ejectment case by the respondent in the
MeTC. It ruled in favour of the respondent ordering the petitioner and all persons claiming right under her
property to vacate the premises.

ISSUES:
Which court has the jurisdiction over the ejectment case whether it’s the MeTC or the RTC?

SC RULING:
It is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was
admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around 4 decades. Thus, initially
petitioner as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire
destroyed her house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated but petitioner DelaCruz persisted in
returning to the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses
however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to
respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot was transferred to their subrogee, Tan
Te, who for the time being also tolerated the stay of the petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by
sending several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on
September 8, 1997, the action was instituted well within the 1 year period from January 14, 1997. Hence,
the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.
 Assuming arguendo that it is the RTC and not the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the Tan Te
complaint, following the reasoning that neither respondent nor her predecessor-in-interest filed an ejectment
suit within 1 year, when the Reyeses knew of the unlawful entry of petitioner and hence, the complaint is
transformed into action publiciana, the Court deems it fair and just to suspend its rules in order to render
efficient, effective and expeditious justice considering the 9 years pendency of the ejectment suit. Same
goes on the allegation that the ejectment suit was filed more than 9 years ago, dismissing the case basically
on this allegation would be a serious blow to the effective dispensation justice as the parties will start anew
and incur additional legal expenses.
Moreover, Sec. 8, Rule 40 authorizes the RTC- in a case of affirmance of an order of the MTC
dismissing a case without trial on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it if the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case. In the same vein, this Court, in the exercise of its rule making power, can suspend
its rules with respect to this particular case, even if the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the ejectment
suit and decide to assume jurisdiction over it in order to promptly resolve the dispute

Power of the Supreme Court to Suspend its own Rules

1. TANCREDO REDEÑA, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND LEOCADIO

(G. R. NO. 146611. February 6, 2007.)

FACTS:
This was an action for partition filed by petitioner Tancredo against his half- brother, respondent Leocadio
Redena in several estate of their deceased father Maximo Redena in different places in Famy, Laguna. In a
decission by the RTC dated August 20, 1997, ordering Lecadio to partition only property at Maate, famy,
Laguna after Tancredo's reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the defendant in relation of the
said lot. The 2 other lots are owned by Leocadio. Petioner elevated the case to the CA. The CA required
them to pass an appellant’s brief, but eventhough the filling of the brief has been extended by the CA,
Tancredo failed to file. So the case is deemed abandoned and dismissed by the CA. So, on Dec. 28, 1999,
Tancredo filed for petition for relief in the CA, but the CA on a resolution dismissed the petition explaining
that petition for relief is not among the remedies available in the said court. Under the 1964 Rules of Court,
there was only one court where a petition for relief may be filed - the Court of First Instance, now the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petition for Relief is not an available remedy in the CA.

Ruling:
The petition for relief under rule 38 of Rules of Court is equitable character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to
his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel.
Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38

2. Cu-Unjieng vs. Court of Appeal & Union Bank of the Philippines UPB
479 SCRA 594, January 24,2006
Facts:
UBP is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan that is included in its
list of assets available for Sale.
Cu-Unjieng offered to buy the subject property for a lesser amount and tendered
a check as earnest money, to which UBP acknowledged receipt thereof. UBP rejected
his offer due to DAR requirements on the sale of CARPable lands and advised to pick
up the refund of his check.
Cu-Unjieng filed a case in the RTC for Specific Performance and Damages against
UBP.
The RTC, upon a finding that there was no perfected contract of sale, dismissed
Cu-Unjieng’s complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action.
On appeal, CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for nonpayment of the required
docket and other lawful appeal fees which is late for more than four (4) months.

Issue :
Can Cu-Unjieng’s failure to pay the appeal docket fees on time be considered as
a non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in
order to attain substantial justice as a relaxation of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:
NO. The invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
An appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege. A party seeking
to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules under Rule 41, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court. Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal
fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, noncompliance
with which is fatal to an appeal.
 An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be
made within fifteen (15) days from notice, and the payment must be made within this
period.
The CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal that it rightfully dismissed and
the RTC’s decision has become final and executory.

3. CIR v MIRANT PAGBILAO

G.R. No. 159593 October 12, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent, Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC), is a VAT registered entity. It filed an
applicationfor the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and services for the period
1 April 1996to 31 December 1996 (amounting to P39,330,500.85) pursuant to the procedures
prescribed underRevenue Regulations No. 7-95. However, without waiting for an answer from the
BIR commissioner,MPC filed petition for review to CTA in order to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive periodfor claiming a refund under the law. In his Answer, the BIR Commissioner
raised the followingspecial and affirmative defenses:
[MPC]s claim for refund is still pending investigation and consideration before the office
of[the BIR Commissioner]. Accordingly, the present petition is premature;
Well-settled is the doctrine that provisions in tax refund and credit are construed
strictlyagainst the taxpayer as they are in the nature of a tax exemption;
In an action for refund or tax credit, the taxpayer has the burden to show that the taxespaid
were erroneously or illegally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is fatal to theaction for
refund;
It is incumbent upon [MPC] to show that the claim for tax credit has been filed within
theprescriptive period under the tax code;
The taxes allegedly paid by [MPC] are presumed to have been collected and received
inaccordance with law and revenue regulations.Meanwhile, MPC availed the services of an
independent CPA to verify the accuracy of [MPC]ssummary of input taxes. The CPA found that
only the sum of P28,745,502.40 was properlysupported by valid invoices and/or official
receipts.The CTA ruled in favor of MPC, and declared that MPC had overwhelmingly proved,
through the VATinvoices and official receipts it had presented, that its purchases of goods and
services werenecessary in the construction of power plant facilities which it used in its business of
powergeneration and sale. However, the amount granted was reduced to P28,744,626.95.The
Commissioner appealed to CA raising a new argument that MPC being apublic utility is subjectto
franchise tax instead of VAT, therefore, MPC cannot claim input VAT. The CA dismissed the
appealby ruling that the (1) Commissioner cannot validly change his theory of the case on appeal;
(2) TheMPC is not a public utility within the contemplation of law; (3) The sale by MPC of its
generatedpower to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is subject to VAT at zero
percent rate; and(4) The MPC, as a VAT-registered taxpayer, may apply for tax credit.Hence, the
Commissioner elevated the case to SC under Rule 45.
ISSUEs:
1. WON there is sufficient cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or procedural rules in
theinstant case.2. WON the tax credit should be granted to MPC.
HELD:
1. None. The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or to except
acase from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of
justicerequires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the
rules isdiscretionary upon the courts. The general rules of procedure still apply and the BIR
Commissionercannot be allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
 
It is incumbent upon him to presentsufficient cause or justifiable circumstance that would qualify
his case for such a suspension orexception. The BIR Commissioner made no attempt to provide
reasonable explanation for hisfailure to raise before the CTA the issue of MPC being a public
utility subject to franchise tax ratherthan VAT.

4. PILAPIL VS. HEIRS OF MAXIMO BRIONES

GR. No. 150175

FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When
Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate, which
appointed Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate. Subsequently, when Donata died,
Erlinda instituted a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her
husband, Gregorio, were appointed as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate. Thirty-three
(33) years after Maximino’s death, Silverio, a nephew of Maximino, filed for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted. But then, Gregorio
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his and
his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Thereafter, he filed a complaint
against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
ISSUE: Does Silverio, have rightful claim to recover their share from Maximino’s Estate based
on the alleged misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being registered the
disputed estate properties?
HELD: No, Silverio does not have rightful claim to recover their share from Maximino’s estate
based on the alleged misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being registered
the disputed estate properties. This is so because Silverio’s cause of action had already
prescribed. While Silverio’s right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the time of
Maximino’s death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by
prescription of action. Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions must be brought within ten
(10) years from the time the right of action accrues: 1) Upon written contract; 2) Upon an
obligation created by law; and 3) Upon a judgment. Since implied trust is an obligation created by
law, then, Silverio had ten (10) years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their
shares in Maximino’s estate.

5. GLICERIA SARMIENTO v. EMERITA ZARATAN, GR NO. 167471, 2007-02-05

Facts:
Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the METC. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed her notice of appeal.
Respondent's counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3
June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he
filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of
the said Memorandum. He... cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one
week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the
grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. But the motion remained
unacted.
The RTC dismissed the appeal... the required Memorandum was filed by
defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 or six (6) days beyond the expiration of the
aforesaid fifteen... day period.
This Court did not take cognizance of defendant-appellant's "Motion for Extension
of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so, because it did not contain a notice of
hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an... omission
for which it could offer no explanation.
With regard to the "Motion for Immediate Execution," dated June 23, 2003, filed by
plaintiff-appellee, the rule is explicit that the execution of a judgment in an ejectment
case, must be sought with the inferior court which rendered the same.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which
was granted in a decision. The appellate court nullified and set aside the Orders of
the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of... respondent's appeal. Consequently,
respondent's appeal memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC
for further proceedings.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 13 September 2004, followed by a
Motion for Inhibition but were denied.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in granting the
Writ of Certiorari.
Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a worthless
piece of paper.
Ruling:
Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to Section 41 of the Rules of
Court,... the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without
a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite... pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist
the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right
be not affected without an opportunity to be heard.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of rules, (d)... a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does
not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period
to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondent's counsel's
illness, lack of staff to do... the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the
grounding of the computers.

POWER TO AMEND RULES

 PINGA v. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 170354,
Facts:
Eduardo Pinga was one of the defendants in a complaint for injunction filed by the
heirs of Santiago. The complaint alleged that the petitioners had been unlawfully
entering the coco lands of Santiago, cutting woods, bamboos, and harvesting fruits.
Pinga and his other co-defendant disputed Santiago’s ownership of the property
saying that his father, Edmundo Pinga, had been in possession thereof since 1930.
They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had been ordered ejected from
the properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo
Pinga. Respondents failed to present their evidence for an unreasonable period of
time which led to the dismissal of the case. At the same time, the RTC allowed
defendants to “present their evidence ex-parte.” Respondents then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and prayed that the action be dismissed and petitioner be
disallowed from presenting evidence. They claimed that the order of the RTC was not
in accordance to established jurisprudence. They cited cases including City of Manila
V Ruymann and Domingo V Santos which noted the instances we counterclaim could
not remain pending for independent adjudication.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint carries the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim.

Held:
The constitutional faculty of the court to promulgate the rules of practice and
procedure carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on point of remedial law
through the amendment of the rules of court. One of the changes introduced in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to
fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is "without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. In granting this
petition, the Court cognized that the previous rules applied in jurisprudence can no
longer stand in light of Sec 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
such provision, the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff’s fault, does not
necessarily carry with the dismissal of the counterclaim. In fact, such dismissal is
without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute a counterclaim.

Power to Stay Proceedings and control its Process

1. Security Bank v. Judge Victorio (468 SCRA 609) August 31, 2005

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66879, dismissing the petition for prohibition and mandamus of the
Security Bank and Trust Company, later renamed Security Bank Corporation (SBC),
for the nullification of the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 141, dated March 15, 2001, denying the bank's motion for the suspension of
Civil Case No. 99-1581 on the ground of a prejudicial question relating to the issues
raised in Civil Case No. 17563 pending in Branch 141 of the said RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceedings before the trial courts (FIRST CASE) may be
suspended on the ground of a prejudicial question pending the termination
of another criminal case (SECOND CASE).

RULING:
NO. The ruling of the CA that petitioner SBC failed to make out a good case for the
stay or suspension of the proceedings in the court a quo is correct.
The test to determine whether the suspension of the proceedings in the SECOND
CASE is proper is whether the issues raised by the pleadings in the FIRST CASE are so
related with the issues raised in the SECOND CASE involving the Sinking Fund, such
that the resolution of the issues in the FIRST CASE would determine the issues in the
SECOND CASE.
Since the issue of the Sinking Fund was not raised in the FIRST CASE but as the sole
issue raised not to be resolved in the SECOND CASE, the proceedings in the SECOND
CASE should not be suspended, even in the event that the petitioner files a
supplemental answer and a supplemental third-party complaint against MFCI in the
FIRST CASE, after the decision of this Court in this case shall have been final and
executory. Respondent TIDCORP should not be prejudiced by the petitioner's failure
to file a supplemental answer and third-party complaint in the FIRST CASE before the
execution of the Deed of Assignment by the MFCI in favor of TIDCORP, and the filing
by the respondent of its complaint in the SECOND CASE.
Petition denied for lack of merit.

2. VICENTE D. HERCE, JR. v. MUNICIPALITY OF CABUYAO, LAGUNA

FACTS:
Petitioner principally claimed that the entries in the Ordinary Decree Book of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) did not categorically state that the property
covered by Decree No. N-216115 and OCT No. O-2099 was included in Decree No.
4244. As such, the title issued in his favor could not be declared void, because it had
not been shown by competent proof that the lot covered thereby was included in
Decree No. 4244.
Meanwhile, the respondents maintained that Lot 1, Plan II-2719-A, the property
subject of litigation, was included in Decree No. 4244 issued in the name of the
Municipality of Cabuyao.

ISSUE:
WON the property subject of litigation was included in Decree No. 4244 issued in
favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao.

HELD:
The inherent power of a court to amend and control its processes and orders
includes the right to reverse itself if only to make its findings and conclusions
conformable to law and justice. Every court has the power and the corresponding
duty to review, amend or reverse its findings and conclusions whenever its attention
is seasonably called to any error or defect that it may have committed.
It appearing that we have overlooked certain crucial points and arguments and
calling to mind the Court’s duty to rectify its mistakes when warranted by the facts
and the law at hand, we are constrained to partially grant petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. The case should be remanded to the trial court.
It is clear that petitioner must still present evidence to prove his claim over
the subject property. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Order was denied;
hence, he filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals where the sole
issue for resolution was whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
granting respondent municipality’s motion to reopen the decree of registration.
Finding that the latter met all the requirements to reopen the decree of registration,
the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
The foregoing pronouncements of the Court of Appeals do not expressly state
that the property covered by OCT No. 0-2099 and Decree No. N-216115 issued in
favor of petitioner is included and within the scope of Decree No. 4244 earlier issued
in 1911 in favor of respondent municipality.
As we have ruled in the assailed Decision, there is no doubt that Decree No. 4244
issued in favor of the municipality has become indefeasible. However, based on
the records before us, there is insufficient information to conclude that
Decree No. 4244 includes the property covered by OCT No. 0-2099 and
Decree No. N-216115. As such, there is a need to remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
It is elementary that a court must render judgment confirming the title of the
applicant only if it finds that the latter has sufficient title proper for registration. An
application for land registration may include two or more parcels of land, but the
court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or
more of the parcels or order a severance of the application.

PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER ROC ARE NOT LAWS

1. Alvero v. De la Rosa
G.R. No. L-286

Facts:
Margarita sold 2 parcels of land to Victoriano which he immediately
possessed. Due to the war, Victoriano failed to complete payment and had to
evacuate. Forgetting that she previously sold it, Margarita then resold the land
to Alvero. Victoriano filed a case to enforce the first sale and nullify the subsequent
sale to Alvero. Judge Dela Rosa ruled in favor of Victoriano. Alvero filed a notice of
appeal but the judge ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the
notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal
bond was filed too late. The lawyer claims the death of his wife as reason for the late
filing. 

Issue:
 Whether or not failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the
rules of court, will cause the judgment to become final.

Held:
Yes, Rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect
of law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention, of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and
imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the
period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal. In the same
manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the time
prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on
its own motion the court may dismiss the appeal

2. S. SHIOJI, petitioner, vs . Honorable GEO. R. HARVEY, Judge of First Instance of Manila, PACIFIC MAIL
STEAMSHIP CO. and TOYO KISENKAISHA, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-18940. April 27, 1922.]

FACTS:
The case stemmed from a decision rendered on October 31, 1920 by Judge Concepcion. The court
ruled in favor of Shioji. Thereafter, the defendants duly perfected an appeal by way of bill of exceptions to
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. In accordance with Rule 21 of the Supreme Court, the
appellants has thirty days from the receipt of the printed bill of exceptions within which to serve and file
copies of their brief. The bill of exceptions was filed on February 16, 1922 while the parties received the
copy on February 17, 1922. Meanwhile, the period is set to expire on March 19, 1922. However, the
appellants failed to present their brief or even asked for extension. Accordingly, on March 22, they fled a
motion for an additional period but the court denied such, on March 24 because it was filed out of time,
and, pursuant to Rule 24 (a). The motion for reconsideration faced the same faith as well.
The regular fifteen-day period fixed by the order of the court, of March 24, 1992, for the issuance of
judgment and the return of the record to the lower court, having expired on April 12, 1922, the record was
transmitted to the CFI-Manila. The execution was issued to enforce the judgment, but prior to the levy the
defendants filed an action in CFI-Manila. They alleged that the judgment of the Supreme Court is
unconscionable and was rendered without due process of law and Rule 24 is unconstitutional hence, the
judgment rendered is null and void. In which, they prayed for a preliminary injunction which was later on
issued by Judge Harvey.
The respondents’ countermove in the injunction proceedings was to file a complaint in prohibition in the
Supreme Court, to compel the respondent Judge to desist from interfering with the execution of the
judgment of CFI-Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether the Judge of First Instance (Judge Harvey) correct in assuming jurisdiction to interpret and
review judgments and orders of the Supreme Court, and to obstruct the enforcement of the decision of an
appellate court.
RULING:
No, because the only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it,
is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution, and that a lower court is without supervisory
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court, would seem to be superfluous.
Where a cause has been appealed from a Court of the First Instance to the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands, and a judgment rendered by the latter, no interference therewith by the lower court can be
tolerated through any proceedings other than such as are directed by the appellate court.
Inferior courts cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, for any other purpose
than execution; nor give any other or further relief; nor review it, upon any matter decided on appeal for
error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been remanded. (Sibbald vs.
United States [1838], 12 Pet., 488, followed.)
What has been said is in justification of the preliminary injunction heretofore granted ordering Judge of
First Instance Harvey to desist from interfering with the execution of the judgment in the case of S. Shioji
vs. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, et al., and requiring him to revoke the injunction order previously issued. We ought
properly to stop here, because an attack on the validity of the rules of the Supreme Court should not be
initiated by collateral proceedings in a lower court, but, as before explained, we waived this phase of the
case so as to do full justice to the complainant and so as to make a definite ruling on the point which he
raises.

3. Inchausti vs De Leon

Facts:
The defendant appeared and demurred to the complaint.  The demurrer was
overruled, the defendant failed to answer within the time specified by the rules of the
court, and was, on motion, declared in default.  Upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff after the entry of the default, judgment was rendered decreeing a
foreclosure of the mortgage in the event of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the
judgment before the first day of the next succeeding term of the court.  This
judgment is dated March 15, 1911.  On April 6, the defendant appeared by counsel
and excepted to the decision of the court, and moved for a new trial; the motion for a
new trial was denied. 

Issue/s:
W/N: the court below erred in ordering judgment by default (a) because it was
not stated in the order overruling the demurrer that the defendant would be in
default in the event of his failure to answer within the period prescribed by the rules
of the court; and (b) because no notice was given the defendant of plaintiff's motion
for  default judgment.

Ruling:
Rule 9 of the Courts of First Instance, and which is applicable to the question under
consideration, provides:
"When a demurrer to the complaint is overruled the defendant shall answer within
five days after the service on him of written notice of the order, which notice the
plaintiff shall give."
Rules of court promulgated by authority of law and not in conflict with law have the
force and effect of law.  The law requires that summonses must contain the notice as
provided in the above section.  No provision of law, no rule of court, or approved
practice requires such a notice to be inserted in the order overruling a demurrer. 
Such being the case, the appellant's first alleged error is not well taken. As to the
second alleged error, it is sufficient to say that this court has held that a defendant
whose demurrer to the complaint has been overruled and who fails to answer within
the time prescribed by the rules of the court is not entitled to a notice of the motion
to declare him in default.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM REMEDIAL LAW

1. CIPRIANO PRIMICIAS VS. FELICISIMO OCAMPO

GR. NO. L-6120 June 30, 1953

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the CFI with two statutory offenses namely, (1)with
a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, that he knowingly chartered a vessel of
Philippine registry to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines
and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised
Administrative Code, that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the
manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic"
and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the
departure of said vessel
for a foreign port.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court
in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49
of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal
action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be
invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure." This motion
was opposed by the City Fiscal. The court issued an order denying the motion.
Believing that this order is
erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the
respondent Judge.

ISSUE/S:
WON the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessor is an absolute
substantive right and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

RULING:
Yes, a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right.
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law
and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. The
aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, and this
right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where
the aid of assessors had been invoked. The intervention of the assessors is not an
empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the
spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it
is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the
proceedings
The contention of respondents is predicated on the assumption that the
provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly
 repealed. Such is not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic provisions
on the matter partake of the nature of substantive law and as such they were left
intact by the Supreme Court. It is therefore our opinion that the respondent Judge
acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in
the trial of
the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

2. Case Dig: Dominador Bustos vs. Lucero

G.R. No. L-2068, October 20,1948

FACTS:
The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of
Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and
asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the
case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was
denied and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. Petitioner
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground that it
deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision
of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is an adjective
law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and
the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to
criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished Preliminary investigation
is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution

APPLICABILITY TO PENDING ACTIONS, RETROACTIVITY

1. IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG in the latter’s
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN
G.R. No. 150274

FACTS:
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several
others, relative to the anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the govt.
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents guilty. On March 2, 2000, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification and two co-accused guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service
Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed from the decision to the SC. While appeal was still pending,
Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order dismissing the petitioners from service.
Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court. Petitioner contends that in
issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Secretary Datumanong
committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and an unlawful interference with the
proceedings before the Court.
Under A.O. No. 07 dated 10 April 1990 particularly Sec. 7 thereof, except “when the penalty is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari , shall have been filed by
him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”

ISSUE:
W/N Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court

RULING:
NO. The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies
willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules regarding
execution of decisions pending appeal.
The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the
higher court for review and correction. However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support
its dismissal. First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for
dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service .
Second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution of decisions pending appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service thus:
“An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.”
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights
because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom. In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested
interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.

2. PCI v. GoKO

Facts:
Respondents Emily Rose Go Ko and Kiddy Lim Chao :led a complaint against petitioner for
Annulment/Reformation of Chattel Mortgage, Annulment of Restructuring Agreement, Fixing of Correct
Principal, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu at the branch presided by Judge Gako Jr. The trial court, granted respondent's
prayer for preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on the
ground that the lifting of the injunction would have rendered one of the substantive issues of the case
moot and academic. Fifty-nine (59) days after receipt of the Order denying its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, with a claim that public respondent Judge
Gako acted with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the injunction notwithstanding respondents' non-
entitlement thereto, effectively disposing of the main case without trial, and not holding that the
complaint was filed merely to preempt petitioner's filing of a case for replevin. CA dismissed the petition
for having been filed beyond reglementary period. On September 1, 2000, Sec. 4 of Rule 65 was amended
anew emphasizing that in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted for having been filed within the prescribed period.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65
can only be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. Curative statutes, by their very
essence, are retroactive. The filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December 1998 is
deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative
Resolution.

3. Neypes v. CA

[FACTS]
 Essentially, what happened in this case is that petitioner Neypes filed an action for the annulment of
judgement in a land reconveyance and/or reversion case before the Regional Trial Court (Branch 43). The
proceedings went on and on February 12, 1998, the Trial Court dismissed the complaint of the petitioners on
the ground of prescription. They received a copy of the decision on March 3, 1998 and 15 days later, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The MR was denied on July 1, 1998 and notice was served upon the complainants on July 22, 1998.
Five days later, the filed an appeal. The CA denied the appeal on the ground that it was filed too late. The
complainants filed a motion to reconsider the denial but the Court stood its ground. Therefore, the
complainants filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the decision of the CA.
The complainants argue that they had filed the appeal on time. They state in their arguments that the
denial of the motion for reconsideration should be the FINAL ORDER in which the period for appeal of 15
days begins to run. In essence, the argue that there should be a fresh period of 15 days from the moment
they receive notice of the decision denying the MR
Respondent court argues that the period for filing of appeals runs from the date of decision in the case
and
the motion for reconsideration only serves to interrupt the period for filing of an appeal. Hence, given the fact
that they filed the MR fifteen days after notice of the decision, they only had one more day to file an appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration should be the reckoning date for
the running of the period to appeal
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
The Court declared in its decision that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. It is
to be noted that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and period prescribed by law is not only
MANDATORY but JURISDICTIONAL as well. In addition to this, it is within the power of the Supreme Court
to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. It deems it proper to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of
appeal. This rule was also made to apply to all appeals. The Court's rationale in granting this rule is that
although the speedy disposition of justice is sought, it is ideal that the justice delivered is fair.

FIRST AQUA SUGAR TRADERS, INC. vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

FACTS:
On October 16, 2000, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners received a copy of the judgment on October 27, 2000. Hence, they had fifteen days to file a
notice of appeal. Instead, on November 6, 2000, or 10 days after, they opted to file a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in the order dated January 30, 2001.
Petitioners claim they received a copy of the January 30, 2001 order on February 16, 2001 and that they
filed a notice of appeal on the same day.
On February 19, 2001, the trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal on the premise that the
same was filed within the prescribed period.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion to declare the October 16, 2000 judgment final alleging
that petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed out of time. According to respondent, the January 30, 2001
order was sent to the address of petitioners’ counsel and was received there by a certain Lenie Quilatan
on February 9, 2001. Hence, petitioners had only five days left to file the notice of appeal counted from
February 9, 2001, or until February 14, 2001. Thus, the February 16, 2001 filing was out of time.
Petitioners disputed respondent’s allegation and maintained their position that the reckoning point of the
remaining 5-day period should be the date of their actual receipt which was February 16, 2001. They
claimed that Quilatan, who allegedly received the January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001, was not in
any way connected to them or their counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether the notice of appeal was filed on time.
RULING:
Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In the light of this decision, a party litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days
from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration.17 Being procedural in nature, Neypes is deemed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of its effectivity and is thus retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.

WHEN PROCEDURAL RULES DO NOT APPLY TO PENDING ACTIONS

1. TAN VS CA

FACTS:
Tan executed a deed of absolute sale over a parcel of land in question in favor of spouses Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, they entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was
given one year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until
his death. His heirs filed before the RTC a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The
complaint alleged that their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage. The Magdangals were
able to have Tan's title over the lot in question cancelled and to secure in their names a TCT.

RTC rendered judgment stating that the Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of
the parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the
defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision.

ISSUE:
WON the rules should be given a retroactive effect to govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained
in the trial court by the petitioner?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect
in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to
redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when
he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules
of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot.
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the
rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

2. Bantolino vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc

FACTS:

Complainants filed an illegal dismissal case against Respondents with prayer for
reinstatement plus payment of back wages and declaration of their regular status of employment.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Complainants, Affirmed by NLRC, which prompted Respondent to
appeal to CA on the ground that there was no EE-relationship for lack of sufficient evidence for
failure to cross-examine complainants, thus such affidavits made by the latter are inadmissible.
Complainants filed for petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the Rules of Court
should not be strictly applied in labor cases as NLRC has its own rules of procedure.

ISSUE:
WON Affidavits be given evidentiary value despite failure of the affiants to affirm contents
and undergo cross examination

RULING:

Yes, it should be given evidentiary value since Rules of Evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as NLRC where decisions may be reached based
on position papers only. To require appearance of affiants would negate the rationale and
purpose of the summary nature of the proceeding mandated by the Rules

3. MILAGROS PANUNCILLO, petitioner, vs . CAP PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

[G.R. No. 161305. February 9, 2007.]

FACTS:
Petitioner was dismissed by the respondent for violation of company’s Code of
Discipline in which the petitioner admits of such wrong doings. Petitioner contends
that she should not be terminated before her retirement, however, the company
dismissed her anyway. Petitioner filed a complaint before the labor arbiter but found
that the dismissal was for a valid cause. On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of
the Arbiter and held that dismissal was illegal and accordingly ordering the
reinstatement to former position, to pay full backwages, 13 th month pay, damages,
and attorney’s fees. CA reversed the NLRC and held that the dismissal was valid. The
decision of the NLRC became final and executory after 10 calendar days from the
receipt by the parties pursuant to Art. 223 of the Labor Code. Respondent argues
that she is entitled to her full backwages from the date her compensation was
withheld from her pursuant to the decision of the NLRC reinstating her previous
position, full backwages, etc., until the reversal of the NLRC decision by the CA.

SC RULING:
The order of the Arbiter for reinstatement is self-executory, however, NLRC’s
order is not. There is still a need for the issuance of writ of execution. If a Labor
Arbiter does not issue a writ of execution of the NLRC order for the reinstatement of
an employee even if there is no restraining order, he could probably be merely
observing judicial courtesy, which is advisable "if there is a strong probability that the
issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of
the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court."
While under the sixth paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of
the NLRC becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and then to this
Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45. If during the pendency of the review no
order is issued by the courts enjoining the execution of a decision of the Labor Arbiter
or NLRC which is favorable to an employee, the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC must
exercise extreme prudence and observe judicial courtesy when the circumstances so
warrant.

4. Samalio vs. CA
Facts:
Samalio was formerly an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. In
Resolution, the City Prosecutor's office recommended that petitioner Samalio be prosecuted for the
crimes of Robbery and Violation of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan. BID Commissioner
issued Personnel Order commencing an administrative case against petitioner Samalio for dishonesty,
oppression and misconduct. The answer filed by Samalio was found to be unsatisfactory so the case was
set for formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID. The case suffered several postponed hearings
due to the requests and non-availability of the parties but mostly due to the absence of complainant's
witnesses. BID Acting Commissioner found Samalio guilty. It was confirmed by the Justice Secretary. Civil
Service Commission which issued a Resolution affirming the decision.
CSC applied Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former
testimony," in deciding petitioner's administrative case. CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether CA committed a reversible error in applying RRoC in the administrative case.

Ruling:
No, CA was correct in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the ROC.
The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of
procedure of the administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to
every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings before an
administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and valid statutory or
administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudication of
cases before it
The rule was applied because the records of this case reveal that even in the early stages of the
proceedings before the Board of Discipline of the BID, Weng Sai Qin's (witness) departure from the
country and consequent inability to testify in the proceedings had already been disclosed to the parties.
In applying Section 47, Rule 130, the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No.
18679 which was also material and relevant to the administrative case was used.

5. G.R. No. 169277 (February 9, 2007)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by OIC-Secretary Nasser
C. Pangandaman vs. VICENTE K. UY

FACTS:
Dr. Vicente K. Uy is one of the owners of a 349.9996-ha parcel of land. Sometime
in 1993, some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property filed petitions in the
DAR, seeking to be declared as owners-beneficiaries. On December 20, 1994, the
DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP over the property. For his part,
respondent, in behalf of the co-owners, filed an Application for Exclusion. To
substantiate his request to exclude their landholding from CARP coverage under the
Luz Farms ruling, respondent declared that their property had been exclusively used
for livestock-raising for several years prior to June 15, 1988.
On October 7, 1996, the DAR issued an Order partially granting the application
for exclusion, exempting a total of 219.50 ha. The applicants appealed the order to
the OP but the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent and his co-owners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision, but the appeal was denied. The
respondent and his co-owners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision of the OP but it was denied for being a prohibited pleading and for lack of
merit. The CA affirmed the decision of the OP and, consequently, the October 7, 1996
DAR Order. Respondent and his co-owners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. The CA rendered an Amended Decision reversing and setting aside its
previous decision. The DAR, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's amended decision but it was,
however, denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent tolled
the reglementary period to appeal
RULING:
YES. Appeals to the OP are governed by A.O. No. 18, Series of 1987. Section 7
thereof, provides the rule on filing a motion for reconsideration. It is clear then that
only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to be filed from a decision, resolution
or order of the OP. However, the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is not
absolutely prohibited. A second motion for reconsideration is allowed in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
Respondent certainly did not intend to delay the proceedings here; in fact, it
would adversely affect his cause if he were to delay his appeal to the regular courts
because he would certainly lose vast tracts of land which are integral elements of his
trade. In this case, not only was a second motion for reconsideration allowed by the
OP rules, more importantly, the OP decision and the order denying the first motion
for reconsideration failed to provide its basis in law. The ends of justice would have
been served if the OP decision did more than copy the DAR order and turned toward
the important issues presented before it. In any event, even if we considered the
second motion for reconsideration as pro forma or not "exceptionally meritorious,"
the argument of petitioner would still be untenable. It is settled that rules of
procedure are, as a matter of course, construed liberally in proceedings before
administrative bodies. Thus, technical rules of procedure imposed in judicial
proceedings are unavailing in cases before administrative bodies.

COURT OF LAW AND EQUITY

US vs Tamparong
FACTS:
Defendants were caught violating Baguio City Ordinance No. 35 prohibiting the playing of a game of
chance called “monte.” Justice of the peace of Baguio and Court of First Instance both convicted the
defendants with the same charge. The Supreme Court tried the case because the validity of Ordinance No.
35 was put into question. In tackling the question the history of penal laws in the Philippines was looked
into.
Issue:
WON the Supreme Court is required by law to examine evidence to determine guilt or innocence of
the defendants
Held:
No. Although the SC wrote that Act No. 1627 does not explicitly limit their powers from examining
issues of facts, it likewise does not expressly authorize them to do so. The SC, nevertheless, interpreted
that the law was NOT framed to confer them the said power.

APPLICATION OF EQUITY; EQUITY JURISDICTION

1. David vs CA

Facts:
In 1987, the petitioner filed for a preliminary injunction seeking to stop the
respondent from depriving her of access to the highway. She claims that her property
was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the
highway. Her only access was a small opening of 2 feet and 4 inches through the
property of the private respondent.
Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right
of way. Furthermore, she alleged that the prospective servient estate was sold
without her knowledge and thus, her right of pre-emption was vitiated.
Private respondent was about to complete the construction of the concrete fence
and thus, petitioner sought to enjoin this act. Private respondent however, denied the
allegations of the petitioner and it was made apparent that the petitioners never
tenants of the respondents but were actually illegally occupying the lots therefore,
they had no right of pre-emption. Furthermore, it was made known that the petitioner
actually had access to the national highway through another passage but the
PETITIONER HERSELF closed off this road during the pendency of the case.
Petitioner argues that not only is she entitled to the right of way, she should be
granted such in the spirit of "pakikisama" and "pakikipagkapwa-tao".

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to right of way.
2. Whether or not she is entitled to such easement through the recognition of
these Filipino values.

Ruling:
1. The SC ruled against the petitioner. Requisites of an easement of right of way
are as follows: ○ The estate is surrounded by other immovables and without
adequate outlet to public highway ○ Proper indemnity is paid ○ Isolation is not due to
proprietors own acts ○ Right of way is claimed at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate. The court ruled that it is not a trier of facts and the questions of
whether or not the petitioner had adequate outlet, caused her own isolation, or the
tender of indemnity are all questions of facts which it has no authority to rule upon.
Thus, the findings of the CA are binding on it and the CA found the following:
A. The petitioner caused her own isolation. She had adequate outlets to the
highway which she herself closed.
B. Petitioner also failed to prove that she made a valid tender of the proper
indemnity. No evidence of the tender of payment was ever adduced and the
fact that the plaintiff prays that the buyer of the property be made to sell her
the same hardly satisfies the requisite of payment of proper indemnity.

2. The SC ruled that a judgement based on equity is only valid in the absence of,
AND NEVER AGAINST, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. ○ Judgement based
on equity is termed as "justice OUTSIDE of legality". This presupposes that there are
gaps in the law to which equity can be used to fill.

2. Reyes v Lim

Facts:
Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. Harrison Lumber occupied
the Property as lessee. The Contract to Sell provided that in the event, the tenants or occupants of the
premises subject of this sale shall not vacate the premises on, the VENDEE shall withhold the payment of
the balance of and the VENDOR agrees to pay a penalty to the VENDEE until the complete vacation of the
premises by the tenants therein. Petitioner David Reyes (Reyes) filed before the trial court a complaint for
annulment of contract and damages against respondents claiming that Reyes had informed Harrison
Lumber to vacate the Property and further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate
the property.
Keng and Harrison Lumber filed their answer denying that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes
and alleged that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the propert. Lim filed his
Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Reyes offered to
return the down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the
property which was offer was rejected by Lim.
Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation. Lim filed a
complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale
and title plus damages before another trial court which prompted petitioner to file a motion for leave to
file amended complaint which the trial court granted. In his Amended Answer, Lim prayed for the
cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes.
The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Lim requested in open court that
Reyes be ordered to deposit the down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court which was
granted. Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order which was denied.

Issue:
WON the court erred in granting the order of deposit during the pendency of the case when it is not
one of the Provisional Remedies enumerated in the Rules of Court

Held:
No. The provisional remedies enumerated in the Rules of Court are not exclusive. The instant case is
precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result
in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which is a
precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of equity
overruling a positive provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that governs this particular case.
This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil
Code expressly mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws.[21] This calls for the application of equity,[22] which fills the open spaces in the law.