CAPILI vs.
PEOPLE ISSUE:
(G.R. No. 183805, July 13, 2013)
PERALTA, J
FACTS:
In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in December
1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage between Capili and
Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was granted and
Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina
and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage never took place and that therefore,
there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.
HELD:
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was already
consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was
subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the
determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is void, he
cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially declared as
void. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.
TENEBRO vs. CA
(G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
FACTS:
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously
and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for
bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact
there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been
declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
MONTAÑEZ vs. CIPRIANO
(G.R. No. 181089, October 2, 2012)
PERALTA, J
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy
against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already declared void ab initio
in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the ground
that both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her.
HELD:
NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration
of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.
REPUBLIC vs. SAREÑOGON, JR.
(G.R. No. February 10, 2016)
DEL CASTILLO, J
FACTS:
Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie.  He
testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left
to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts.  While still abroad, he
tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed.  He returned home after his contract expired,  then  marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
inquired  from  Netchie’s  relatives  and  friends  about  her whereabouts.  They also did not know where
she was.  Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead.   He filed the
Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.  spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt.     These two witnesses
testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their
leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information
regarding Netchie’s location.  The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years,
reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of
evidence.  The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse
in elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with
HELD:
No.  To  comply  with  this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result
of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required “well-founded belief”
standard.
Sarenogon’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence.  For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness
stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest
for the allegedly missing Netchie.  Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media.  Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined
and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming
the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and
identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
DOMINGO vs. CA
(G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993)
ROMERO. J
FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia,
for support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some
of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and
separation of property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
HELD:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
Article 40  as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however,
one is required by law to show proof  that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy,  there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE
(G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
LEONEN, J
FACTS:
On 1994, Alice Eduardo married petitioner. After some time, Eduardo discovered that petitioner was
married to a Gina Gaerlan on July 1987, before the Family Code became effective. She then filed for
bigamy.
The RTC held in favor of Eduardo and the CA affirmed that decision. In his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner argues that there is no bigamy as there was no proof of existence of an essential requisite of
marriage in the first marriage which was the marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether the essential requisites of marriage was present in the first marriage.
HELD:
YES.
The SC held that petitioner was indeed guilty of bigamy. The SC stated that “petitioner was still legally
married to Gina when he married Alice.”
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders
the marriage void from the beginning:
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
“The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license represents the state’s
“involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.”

“To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”
“Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar” but the SC held that the
Certification “does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license.
It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.”
“Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife. The first marriage contract is a positive piece of evidence as to the
existence of petitioner’s first marriage.”
“A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.”
“In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on
December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the
bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.”
“Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license,
petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was
his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.”
“As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, that parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.”
“The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
CARIÑO vs. CARIÑO
(G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage,
SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total
of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was  solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but
the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage
license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.  Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.  For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.  These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him
or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if
their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there
were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation,
their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes
salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA
(G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997)
PANGANIBAN, J
FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son.  After a
year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he
preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them.  The RTC
granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute psychological incapacity?
HELD:
There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity.  It appears to be more
of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity.  It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other.  There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological –
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven be evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
MARCOS vs. MARCOS
(G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000)
PANGANIBAN, J
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
ISSUE:
1) Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity
2) Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.
HELD:
No. Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined
by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to
said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing
that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this
Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her
failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
CHI MING TSOI vs. CA
(G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997)
FACTS:
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their
marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the
Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went
to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse
between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage)
until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results
were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to
this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said
she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She
also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her
very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID
the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner
in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA, et al.
(G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005)
AZCUNA, J
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he
and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and
violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
HELD:
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article
50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule
applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the
CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution.
NGO TE vs. YU-TE
(G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009)
NACHURA, J
FACTS:
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped
in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on
January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void
on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that
petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not
personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed
before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to
personally examine respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void?
HELD:
The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and
the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA
(G.R. No. 141528, October 6, 2003)
AZCUNA, J
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?

HELD:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior  judgment” or “estoppels by
verdict,” which is the effect of ajudgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its
concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed
the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.
The Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage licenseis barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.