.R. No.
167707              October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF
KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,  Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y.
SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of
all those similarly situated, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------
-----x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED
NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS
PETITION, petitioners,  of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER,
KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No.
167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved
forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its
powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped
island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or
claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September
3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation
respondents-claimants 
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad,
and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on
PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141
and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated
on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently
in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other
natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more
or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty
(50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land
they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution
was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any
legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the
case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in
Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502
(RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These
lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire
title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable
laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their
lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and
5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced
by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of
the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando
Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. 30 They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested
rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first
class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. 32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-
claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest,
the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act
in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of
the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on
the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS
THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD
705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR
VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22,
2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA
6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR
TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
35
 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in
their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended
and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and
(c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws
and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest
and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided
by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 43 Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 47Thus, all lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege,
not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their
exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced
in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended
the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It
established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the
Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information
title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty
(20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual,
public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after
the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. 58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime
could only be founded on royal concessions which took various
forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado  or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the
Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine
Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions,
to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion
of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission
passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The
Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under
the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This
new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For
judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894,
was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No.
141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day,
CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately
owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act
No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for
possession and occupation of the land applied for since June
12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by
PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was
enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 81 In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay
Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit
that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old
cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands
(1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in
these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa
is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting
the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public domain.
Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the
President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was
the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna,
viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need
not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can
be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases
of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and
Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act
No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7,
1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the
Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance
of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act
No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron  that "the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption
in Ankron and De Aldecoa  to an argument that all lands of the
public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable
and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did
the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would
be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to
land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No.
926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation
of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No.
926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on
proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-
agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court
stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular
land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry
and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and
"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land
the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there
exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified
as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals,
lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof
in that particular case, having regard for its present or future
value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the
land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the
courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself
what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land,
unless private interests have intervened before such reservation
is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral
land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the
classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those
that have already became private lands.96 Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of
CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-
a
 Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who
were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable
case for determination by the land registration court of the
property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification.
Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707
mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which
was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government,102  and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a
totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was
whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien
could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from
acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926
does not create a presumption that the land is alienable.  Private
claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court
in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate
opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance
of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the government’s title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.  The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is
an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of
the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest
land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-
million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks ,"
do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands
of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest
cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as
basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No.
1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert
the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing
in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private
lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only
to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are
declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public
lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the
Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141.
In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the
positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a
tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA
– to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private
sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment.
Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address
the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only
Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa
and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan
de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other
areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared
part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify
lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of
the President. Courts have no authority to do so. 122 Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land.
The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone
on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing
invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657
barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They
claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural
land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest
or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after
the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD
No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into
agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea
Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are
public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact
that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the
opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition
in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has
been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for purposes of
determining which are needed for forest purposes and which
are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other
forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning
of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL
against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands
without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain,
does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain,
denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry
Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified,
as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they
have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay
Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for
is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to
those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private
claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the
requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note
that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private
claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the
period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12,
1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,
having been in possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of
private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right
in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to
the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for
the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the
local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes
that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the
island their home. While the Court commiserates with private
claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at
ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not
be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.
Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith
as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look into other
modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them
from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives.
Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the
step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This
gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve
as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees,
however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining
forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress
and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival.
Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for
politicians and activists. These are needs that become more
urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado
Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence
to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken,
and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by
now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands
produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and
lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways
– not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari  in G.R. No. 167707
is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 167707              October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF
KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners, 
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y.
SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of
all those similarly situated, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------
-----x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED
NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS
PETITION, petitioners, 
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER,
KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No.
167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved
forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its
powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped
island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey
of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or
claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September
3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants 
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad,
and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on
PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141
and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated
on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently
in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other
natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more
or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty
(50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land
they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution
was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any
legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the
case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in
Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502
(RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These
lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire
title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable
laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their
lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and
5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced
by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of
the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando
Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. 30 They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested
rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first
class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. 32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-
claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest,
the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act
in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of
the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on
the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS
THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD
705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR
VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22,
2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA
6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR
TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
35
 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in
their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended
and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and
(c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws
and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest
and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided
by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 43 Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 47Thus, all lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege,
not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their
exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced
in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended
the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It
established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the
Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information
title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty
(20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual,
public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after
the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. 58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime
could only be founded on royal concessions which took various
forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado  or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the
Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine
Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions,
to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion
of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission
passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The
Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under
the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This
new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For
judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894,
was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No.
141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day,
CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately
owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act
No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for
possession and occupation of the land applied for since June
12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by
PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was
enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 81 In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay
Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit
that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old
cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands
(1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in
these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa
is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting
the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public domain.
Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the
President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was
the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna,
viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need
not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can
be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases
of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and
Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act
No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7,
1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the
Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance
of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act
No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron  that "the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption
in Ankron and De Aldecoa  to an argument that all lands of the
public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable
and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did
the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would
be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to
land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No.
926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation
of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No.
926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on
proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-
agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court
stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular
land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry
and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and
"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land
the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there
exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified
as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals,
lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof
in that particular case, having regard for its present or future
value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the
land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the
courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself
what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land,
unless private interests have intervened before such reservation
is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral
land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the
classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those
that have already became private lands.96 Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of
CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-
a
 Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who
were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable
case for determination by the land registration court of the
property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification.
Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707
mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which
was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government,102  and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a
totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was
whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien
could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from
acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926
does not create a presumption that the land is alienable.  Private
claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court
in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate
opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance
of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the government’s title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.  The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is
an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of
the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest
land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-
million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks ,"
do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands
of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest
cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as
basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No.
1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert
the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing
in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private
lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only
to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are
declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public
lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the
Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141.
In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the
positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a
tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA
– to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private
sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment.
Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address
the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only
Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa
and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan
de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other
areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared
part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify
lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of
the President. Courts have no authority to do so. 122 Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land.
The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone
on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing
invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657
barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They
claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural
land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest
or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after
the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD
No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into
agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea
Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are
public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact
that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the
opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition
in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has
been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for purposes of
determining which are needed for forest purposes and which
are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other
forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning
of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL
against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands
without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain,
does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain,
denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry
Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified,
as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they
have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay
Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for
is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to
those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private
claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the
requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note
that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private
claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the
period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12,
1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,
having been in possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of
private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right
in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to
the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for
the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the
local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes
that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the
island their home. While the Court commiserates with private
claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at
ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not
be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.
Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith
as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look into other
modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival.
Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for
politicians and activists. These are needs that become more
urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado
Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence
to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken,
and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by
now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands
produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and
lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways
– not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari  in G.R. No. 167707
is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private

claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them
from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is
one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives.
Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the

step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This
gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve
as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees,
however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining
forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress
and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.

.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v.
ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE,
EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI
and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND;
CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN
OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES
ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY.
— A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT
ACQUIRED. — This Court ruled in the leading case of Director
of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and
title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest
zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It
bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed
to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES;
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. — In
confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his
application.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the
decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed
property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the
Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be
registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades
Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs
of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At
the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No.
885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz,
also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar
as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters
was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed
and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre
sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885
to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming
that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated
117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the
land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry
filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private
litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot
885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than
117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the
rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose
Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be
considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private
litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in
view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; .
..
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the
application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must
have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a
classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even
Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the
Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it
was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the
property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after
1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application;
but only after there had been a previous warning by the District
Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as
a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering
that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in
1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the
lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a
registerable title he must have shown.
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years, preceding the filing of the application;’
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not
one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the
required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act
1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the
entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application,
he had been in
"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain’,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim
all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before
and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit
recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these
applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled
notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting
positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of
them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this
Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the
Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as
complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final
judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is
hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions
with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is
hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore
in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be
the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of
a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the
Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the
deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor
of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the
basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is
part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative
rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision
after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain
classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised
by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No.
885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the
names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot
be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but
is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove
swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are
found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in
actual possession of private persons for many years, and
therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted
and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any
patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-
grounded in the instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the
Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not
divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less
as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in
1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by
Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as
late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as
testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even
Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be
done because it was classified as "public
forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he
is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his
application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the
presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to
be classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does
not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always
been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period
thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes,
68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot
No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest
land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues paten and the title specifically mandate that the land shall
raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as not be alienated nor encumbered within five years from
such issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual the date of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and
lawlibrary 124 of CA No. 141, as amended).

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City,
L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the acting upon reports that respondent Morato had
petitioners. encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the
patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was
SO ORDERED. established that the subject land is a portion of the
Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water
G.R. No. 100709 November 14, 1997 during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not
suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on October 24, 1974, a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,  to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for
vs. P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of Exhibits). The spouses
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion
NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February
OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents. 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was
constructed.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended
complaint against respondents Morato, spouses Nenita Co
Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired
and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of
through free patent constitute sufficient ground for the
Quezon for the cancellation of title and reversion of a
nullification of such land grant? Should such property revert to
parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent
the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes
in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that the
foreshore land?
land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased
within the five-year prohibitory period (p. 46, Records).
The Case
After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983,
These are the two questions raised in the petition before us rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. In
assailing the Court of Appeals' 1 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that
02667 promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said there was no violation of the 5-year period ban against
questions in the negative. 2 Respondent Court's alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was
dismissed 3 petitioner's appeal and affirmed in toto the decision merely leased and not alienated. It also found that the
of the Regional Trial Court4 of Calauag, Quezon, dated mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only
December 28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-608. In turn, the the improvement and not the land itself.
Regional Trial Court's decision dismissed petitioner's complaint
for cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title of Respondent
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land subject thereof of
court. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
the public domain.
present petition. 6
The Facts
The Issues
The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of
Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by
the Philippines, recites the following facts: 5
Respondent Court: 7
Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a
I
Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-B on a parcel of
land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at
Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, Respondent court erred in holding that the patent granted
the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of and certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato cannot
Quezon at Lucena City issued on February 4, 1974 be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title
Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. Both the free
 becomes indefeasible after one year from the issuance of
the title.
II
Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land
is part of a disposable public land and not a foreshore land.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title
In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court
held: 8
. . . As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose
Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. ". . . The rule is well-settled that an
original certificate of title issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of
title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land
disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public
domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of
promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the
issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil.
1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498
(1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972,
45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one registered under
the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a
Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558
(1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran
v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144 (1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R.
No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203).
Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271,
citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija,
Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et
al. v. Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA 676 (1971) held that once a
homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public
Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496,
the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the
force and effect of a Torrens Title issued under the Land
Registration Act.
Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State,
thru the Solicitor General, from filing an action for reversion,
as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose
Aliwalas, (supra), as follows:
But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of
Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas' title to the property having become
incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked.
If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in
obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the
Solicitor General would be the proper remedy (Sec. 101,
C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-
14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra).
(p. 204).
Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and
the subsequent issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-
17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the
conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It
alleges that on October 24, 1974, or nine (9) months and eight
(8) days after the grant of the patent, mortgaged a portion of the
land" to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter constructed a
house thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and "within the
five-year prohibitory period," Respondent Morato "leased a
portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent of
P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of
concrete materials on the subject land."9 Further, petitioner
argues that the defense of indefeasibility of title is "inaccurate."
The original certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato
"contains the seeds of its own cancellation": such certificate
specifically states on its face that "it is subject to the provisions
of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as
amended." 10
Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a "portion
of the land was previously leased," it resulted "from the fact that
Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in the subject land without
[her] prior consent." The mortgage executed over the
improvement "cannot be considered a violation of the said grant
since it can never affect the ownership." 11 She states further:
. . . . the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not
because of the principle of indefeasibility of title but
mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove
the alleged violations of respondent Morato. The records
of this case will readily show that although petitioner was
able to establish that Morato committed some acts
during the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal
thereof will also show that what petitioner was able to
prove never constituted a violation of the grant. 12
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the
mortgage contract they entered into with Respondent Morato
"can never be considered as [an] 'alienation' inasmuch as the
ownership over the property remains with the
owner." 13 Besides, it is the director of lands and not the
Republic of the Philippines who is the real party in interest in this
case, contrary to the provision of the Public Land Act which
states that actions for reversion should be instituted by the
solicitor general in the name of Republic of the Philippines. 14
We find for petitioner.
Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance
or alienation from the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable
to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead
after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance
of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not
be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (As
amended by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or
charitable purposes or for a right of way, no corporation,
association, or partnership may acquire or have any right,
title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land
granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale
provisions of this Act or to any permanent improvement on
such land. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved
May 5, 1941)
Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under
the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement
on such land, shall be encumbered, alienation or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, association, or
partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines
authorized therefore by their charters.
Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any
portion thereof originally acquired under the free patent,
homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred
or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any
permanent improvement thereon be leased to such
individual, when the area of said land, added to that of this
own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any
transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereto shall
be null and void. (As amended by Com Act No. 615, Id.).
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer,
or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three
of this Actshall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or presumatively, and
cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to
the State. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or
homestead within five years from the grant of such patent.
Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of
the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain.
Encumbrance has been defined as "[a]nything that impairs the
use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden
on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien
upon property." It may be a "legal claim on an estate for the
discharge of which the estate is liable; and embarrassment of
the estate or property so that it cannot be disposed of without
being subject to it; an estate, interest, or right in lands,
diminishing their value to the general owner; a liability resting
upon an estate." 15 Do the contracts of lease and mortgage
executed within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent
constitute an "encumbrance" and violate the terms and
conditions of such patent? Respondent Court answered in the
negative: 16
From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been
proved that the area of the portion of the land, subject
matter of the lease contract (Exh. "B") executed by and
between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina L. Morato is only
10 x 12 square meters, where the total area of the land
granted to Morato is 1,265 square meters. It is clear from
this that the portion of the land leased by Advincula does not
significantly affect Morato's ownership and possession.
Above all, the circumstances under which the lease was
executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to
violate the conditions provided for in the patent issued in her
favor. On the contrary, Morato was compelled to enter into
that contract of lease
out of sympathy and the goodness of her heart to
accommodate a fellow man. . . .
It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully
use or enjoy the land during the duration of the lease contract.
This restriction on the enjoyment of her property sufficiently
meets the definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of
the Public Land Act, because such contract "impairs the use of
the property" by the grantee. In a contract of lease which is
consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner
temporarily grants the use of his or her property to another who
undertakes to pay rent therefor. 17 During the term of the lease,
the grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the beneficial use of the
land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not
permit a grantee of a free patent from encumbering any portion
of such land. Such encumbrance is a ground for the nullification
of the award.
Morato's resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed
allegedly out of the goodness of her heart without any intention
of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been
aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments
based on equity contra legem. 18
Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage
should not be considered an encumbrance. Indeed, we do not
find any support for such contention. The questioned mortgage
falls squarely within the term "encumbrance" proscribed by
Section 118 of the Public Land Act. 19 Verily, a mortgage
constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of
such mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the
property. 20
Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated
within the prohibited period of five years from the issuance of
the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion
of the whole estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a
free patent to an applicant, the law requires that the land should
not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from the
issuance of
the patent. The sale or the alienation of part of the homestead
violates that condition. 21
The prohibition against the encumbrance — lease and mortgage
included — of a homestead which, by analogy applies to a free
patent, is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.: 22
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to
such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
incumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five
years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period
the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in
line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader
and his family the statute provides that such alienation or
conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of
repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within
five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of
section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had
gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping
with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right
to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader
makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his
widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from
the terms of the statute.
By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141
and in conformity with the policy of the law, any transfer or
alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from
the issuance of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies
said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the
property to the State.
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the
land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application. 23 Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law,
Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the property;
such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore,
not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely, when
a "homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions
which entitled him to a patent for [a] particular tract of public
land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be
regarded an equitable owner thereof." 24 However, for
Respondent Morato's title of ownership over the patented land
to be perfected, she should have complied with the
requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property
for herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5)
years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements of the law,
Respondent Morato's title over the property was incomplete.
Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State
as the grantor could petition for the annulment of the patent and
the cancellation of the title.
Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility
of her Torrens title to bar the state from questioning its transfer
or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly
stipulated that its award was "subject to the conditions provided
for in Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth
Act (CA) No. 141." Because she violated Section 118, the
reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily
follows, pursuant to Section 124.
Second Issue: Foreshore Land
Revert to the Public Domain
There is yet another reason for granting this petition.
Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was
foreshore land, it nevertheless sustained the award thereof to
Respondent Morato: 25
First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is
really part of the foreshore lands. The Supreme Court defines
foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA
455, 464, as follows:
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the
"extraordinary" action of nature, rainful, for instance, the portions
inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of
the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be
foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land
capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as
follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high
and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides . . . .
(Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August 31, 1984,
131 SCRA 532; Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil
423)
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539).
The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of
the parcel of land in question reads:
Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically
changed sometime in 1937 up to 1955 due to a strong
earthquake followed by frequent storms eventually eroding the
land. From 1955 to 1968, however, gradual reclamation was
undertaken by the lumber company owned by the Moratos.
Having thus restored the land thru mostly human hands
employed by the lumber company, the area continued to be
utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his death in
1965. On or about March 17, 1973, there again was a strong
earthquake unfortunately causing destruction to hundreds of
residential houses fronting the Calauag Bay including the
Santiago Building, a cinema house constructed of concrete
materials. The catastrophe totally caused the sinking of a
concrete bridge at Sumulong river also in the municipality of
Calauag, Quezon.
On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named "Unding"
wrought havoc as it lashed the main land of Calauag, Quezon
causing again great erosion this time than that which the area
suffered in 1937. The Court noted with the significance of the
newspaper clipping entitled "Baryo ng Mangingisda Kinain ng
Dagat" (Exh. "11").
x x x           x x x          x x x
Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about
December 5, 1972 defendant Josefina L. Morato filed with the
Bureau of Lands her free patent application. The defendant
Josefina Morato having taken possession of the land after the
demise of Don Tomas Morato, she introduced improvement and
continued developing the area, planted it to coconut tree.
Having applied for a free patent, defendant had the land area
surveyed and an approved plan (Exh. "9") based on the
cadastral survey as early as 1927 (Exh. "10") was secured. The
area was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
defendant Josefina Morato denominated as Tax Declaration No.
4115 (Exh. "8") and the corresponding realty taxes religiously
paid as shown by Exh. "8-A"). (pp. 12-14, DECISION).
Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the
appellant to show cause which would warrant disturbance, the
aforecited findings of the lower court, must be respected.
Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent
Morato cannot own foreshore land:
Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the
tide, a portion of the subject land was invaded by the waves and
sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5
square meters) is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet
deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended up
to a portion of the questioned land.
While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent
Morato, the land was not reached by the water, however, due to
gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea
advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As
disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the court-
appointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was
under water during high tide in the month of August 1978. The
water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the
water is about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in
1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was covered with
vegetation, but it disappeared in 1978 when the land was
reached by the tides (Exh. "E-1", "E-14"). In fact, in its decision
dated December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the
erosion of the land was caused by natural calamities that struck
the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18). 26
Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is "unfair
and unjust if Josefina Morato will be deprived of the whole
property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water
for reasons not her own doing." 27
As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon this Court, unless such factual
findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or
unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 28 The application for a free patent was made in 1972.
From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it
can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land
Act. Government of the Philippine Islands In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
vs. Cabañgis  29 explained the rationale for this proscription:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads: dominion:

Art. 339. Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1, case 3, of the law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
provides as follows:
Art. 1. The following are part of the national domain open to
public use.
xxx xxx xxx
3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space
covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its
interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest
equinoctal tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the
shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea
during ordinary storms or tempests.
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223),
with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code just quoted,
this Court said:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it,
the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the
realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government
vs. Cabangis 30 annulled the registration of land subject of
cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became
foreshore land. 31 In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had
no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or
entity. 32 The subject land in this case, being foreshore land,
should therefore be returned to the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the assailed Decision of
Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free
Patent No. (IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato and the
subsequent Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. The
subject land therefore REVERTS to the State. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that

in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb
and flow of the tide, private property may not become
"property of public ownership." as defined in article 339 of
the code, where it appear that the owner has to all intents
and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally
destroyed, so as to become a part of the "playa" (shore of
the sea), "rada" (roadstead), or the like. . . .

In the Enciclopedia Juridica Española, volume XII, page

558, we read the following:

With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs;

that is, the sea advances and private properties are
permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they
become part of the shore or breach. The then pass to the
public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not
retain any right to the natural products resulting from their
new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not
subject to indemnity.

G. R. No. 133250 - May 6, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution of the Court are the following motions: (1) Motion
to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation filed by respondent Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation ("Amari" for brevity) on
September 13, 2002; (2) Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Oral
Argument filed by Amari on August 20, 2002; (3) Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Amari on July 26, 2002 and August 20, 2002,
respectively; (4) Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Public Estates
Authority ("PEA" for brevity) on July 26, 2002 and August 8,
2002, respectively; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on July
25, 2002. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez filed on November 13,
2002 his Consolidated Opposition to the main and supplemental
motions for reconsideration.
To recall, the Courts decision of July 9, 2002 ("Decision" for
brevity) on the instant case states in its summary:
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition
and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI
ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to
law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Amari seeks the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ponente
of the Decision, on the ground that Justice Carpio, before his
appointment to the Court, wrote in his Manila Times column of
July 1, 1997, "I have always maintained that the law requires the
public bidding of reclamation projects." Justice Carpio, then a
private law practitioner, also stated in the same column, "The
Amari-PEA reclamation contract is legally flawed because it was
not bid out by the PEA." Amari claims that because of these
statements Justice Carpio should inhibit himself "on the grounds
of bias and prejudgment" and that the instant case should be
"re-deliberated" after being assigned to a new ponente.
The motion to inhibit Justice Carpio must be denied for three
reasons. First, the motion to inhibit came after Justice Carpio
had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case. The
rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a
member of the Court had already given an opinion on the merits
of the case,1 the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court xxx (only to)
raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been
rendered." Second, as can be readily gleaned from the
summary of the Decision quoted above, the absence of public
bidding is not one of the ratio decidendi of the Decision which is
anchored on violation of specific provisions of the Constitution.
The absence of public bidding was not raised as an issue by the
parties. The absence of public bidding was mentioned in the
Decision only to complete the discussion on the law affecting
reclamation contracts for the guidance of public officials. At any
rate, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Motion for
Reconsideration concedes that the absence of public bidding in
the disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered the Amended
JVA null and void.2 Third, judges and justices are not
disqualified from participating in a case just because they have
written legal articles on the law involved in the case. As stated
by the Court in Republic v. Cocofed,3 -
The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has
written on the coconut levy will not disqualify him, in the same
manner that jurists will not be disqualified just because they may
have given their opinions as textbook writers on the question
involved in a case.
Besides, the subject and title of the column in question was "The
CCP reclamation project" and the column referred to the Amari-
PEA contract only in passing in one sentence.
Amaris motion to set the case for oral argument must also be
denied since the pleadings of the parties have discussed
exhaustively the issues involved in the case.
The motions for reconsideration reiterate mainly the arguments
already discussed in the Decision. We shall consider in this
Resolution only the new arguments raised by respondents.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, Amari argues
that the Decision should be made to apply prospectively, not
retroactively to cover the Amended JVA. Amari argues that the
existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB,4 thus:
x x x. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of
nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have
been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,
it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was
in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to
reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may
have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, - with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in
Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v.
Flores. x x x.
xxx
x x x That before the decision they were not constitutionally
infirm was admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then
to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence
of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is
an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.
Amari now claims that "assuming arguendo that Presidential
Decree Nos. 1084 and 1085, and Executive Order Nos. 525 and
654 are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution, the limitation
imposed by the Decision on these decrees and executive orders
should only be applied prospectively from the finality of the
Decision."
Amari likewise asserts that a new doctrine of the Court cannot
operate retroactively if it impairs vested rights. Amari maintains
that the new doctrine embodied in the Decision cannot apply
retroactively on those who relied on the old doctrine in good
faith, citing Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, 5 thus:
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119
of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and
Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent
Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form
part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of
the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit,
the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional
(Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus,
we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] "x x x
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof.
There may be special cases where weighty considerations of
equity and social justice will warrant a retroactive application of
doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it applies to
poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present
petitions, however, we find no such equitable considerations.
Not only did the private respondent apply for free agricultural
land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of
applying it to the noble purposes behind the law, he would now
repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property purchased by the
petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which,
because of improvements and the appreciating value of land
must be worth more than that amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our
rulings in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the property
from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings
in these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot
given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982. He failed to
exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on
the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the
subject lot had already become vested as of that time and
cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisario
ruling.
Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is
misplaced. These cases would apply if the prevailing law or
doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA was that
a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the public
domain, and the Decision annulled the law or reversed this
doctrine. Obviously, this is not the case here.
Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed
to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. But since the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private corporations were
banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this
constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law before, during and
after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the
public domain. The Decision has not annulled or in any way
changed the law on this matter. The Decision, whether made
retroactive or not, does not change the law since the Decision
merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which refers to a law
that is invalidated by a decision of the Court, has no application
to the instant case.
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan is inapplicable because it refers to
a doctrine of the Court that is overruled by a subsequent
decision which adopts a new doctrine. In the instant case, there
is no previous doctrine that is overruled by the Decision. Since
the case of Manila Electric Company v. Judge Castro-
Bartolome,6 decided on June 29, 1982, the Court has applied
consistently the constitutional provision that private corporations
cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public
domain. The Court reiterated this in numerous cases, and the
only dispute in the application of this constitutional provision is
whether the land in question had already become private
property before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 7 If the
land was already private land before the 1973 Constitution
because the corporation had possessed it openly, continuously,
exclusively and adversely for at least thirty years since June 12,
1945 or earlier, then the corporation could apply for judicial
confirmation of its imperfect title. But if the land remained public
land upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, then the
corporation could never hold, except by lease, such public land.
Indisputably, the Decision does not overrule any previous
doctrine of the Court.
The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of
the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold,
except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is
one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the
Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas
of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond
the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable
since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly, the Decision
merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial
doctrine.
Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by
the government, the Decision does not overrule existing law or
doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this
jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been
part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No.
1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands
reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations.
The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the
ban to include any alienable land of the public domain.
There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while
recognizing a violation of the law or Constitution, hold that the
sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated
because of "weighty considerations of equity and social
justice."8 The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be
superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional ban
has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to Amari.
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino
citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino,
the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent
sale to a citizen.9 Similarly, where the alien who buys the land
subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is
validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land
ownership to Filipinos has been achieved.10 In short, the law
disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold
land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party,
or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant
case, however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom Islands,
or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact, Amari admits
that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA. 11
The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of
the land may no longer be questioned under the principle of res
judicata, provided the requisites for res judicata are
present.12 Under this principle, the courts and the parties are
bound by a prior final decision, otherwise there will be no end to
litigation. As the Court declared in Toledo-Banaga v. Court of
Appeals,13 "once a judgement has become final and executory,
it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may
be." In the instant case, there is no prior final decision
adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.
There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify
Amari from invoking equity principles. Amari cannot claim good
faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on
March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on
April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to
acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this
petition, two Senate Committees14 had already approved on
September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560. This
Report concluded, after a well-publicized investigation into PEAs
sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom Islands
are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed
the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks,
including the annulment of the Amended JVA.
Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost
incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Amari
states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.0015 out of
the P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon in
the Amended JVA. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have
even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have
started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the
Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have
introduced any physical improvement or development on the
reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA. And
yet Amari claims that it had already spent a
"whopping P9,876,108,638.00" as its total development cost as
of June 30, 2002.16 Amari does not explain how it spent the rest
of the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost after paying
PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari cannot claim to be an
innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, PEA claims
that it is "similarly situated" as the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is
tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and
other military reservations. PEAs comparison is incorrect. The
Decision states as follows:
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed
lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are
not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it
disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private
lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands
become private lands. In the hands of the government agency
tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not
private lands.
PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. PEA took the place of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for
brevity) as the government agency charged with leasing or
selling all reclaimed lands of the public domain. In the hands of
PEA, which took over the leasing and selling functions of DENR,
reclaimed foreshore lands are public lands in the same manner
that these same lands would have been public lands in the
hands of DENR. BCDA is an entirely different government entity.
BCDA is authorized by law to sell specific government lands that
have long been declared by presidential proclamations as
military reservations for use by the different services of the
armed forces under the Department of National Defense.
BCDAs mandate is specific and limited in area, while PEAs
mandate is general and national. BCDA holds government lands
that have been granted to end-user government entities the
military services of the armed forces. In contrast, under
Executive Order No. 525, PEA holds the reclaimed public lands,
not as an end-user entity, but as the government agency
"primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government."
In Laurel v. Garcia,17 cited in the Decision, the Court ruled that
land devoted to public use by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
when no longer needed for public use, may be declared
patrimonial property for sale to private parties provided there is
a law authorizing such act. Well-settled is the doctrine that
public land granted to an end-user government agency for a
specific public use may subsequently be withdrawn by Congress
from public use and declared patrimonial property to be sold to
private parties. R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that
declares specific military reservations no longer needed for
defense or military purposes and reclassifies such lands as reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the
patrimonial property for sale to private parties. explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to
acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private
can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public
qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They
acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the
property18which even private corporations can acquire by land thus acquired becomes private land.
purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not precluded
for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the from recovering from PEA in the proper proceedings, on a
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may have incurred in
patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or implementing the Amended JVA prior to its declaration of nullity.
municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens
or qualified private corporations. WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for Reconsideration to be
without merit, the same are hereby DENIED with FINALITY. The
We reiterate what we stated in the Decision is the rationale for Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and the Motion to Set
treating PEA in the same manner as DENR with respect to Case for Hearing on Oral Argument are likewise DENIED.
reclaimed foreshore lands, thus:
SO ORDERED.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to
be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA
will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of
these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single
private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will
effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably
the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.

This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable

agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire x
x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds, if not
thousands, of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private
lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the
very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent.
This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional
development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed
private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of
public lands. The 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the
1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.

Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that
the cost of reclaiming deeply submerged areas is "enormous"
and "it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish such project
without the participation of private corporations."19 The Decision
does not bar private corporations from participating in
reclamation projects and being paid for their services in

G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC
REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents, CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Here,
the Court is confronted with a case commenced before the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in
Pasay City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back, that has
spanned six administrations of the Republic and outlasted the
tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as
petitioner, assails the Decision, dated January 29, 1992 and
Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of
Appeals1 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) in
Civil Case No. 2229-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs.
Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation".
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on
June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by
chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899,
the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the
reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands
in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter
into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions
therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by
Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City
under certain terms and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an
Agreement 2 for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay
City.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines
("Republic") filed a Complaint 3 for Recovery of Possession and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive injunction and
Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before
the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay
City).
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an
Amended Complaint 4 questioning subject Agreement between
Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the
subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of
man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and
that the said Agreement was executed without any public
bidding.
The Answers 5 of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and
March 14, 1962, respectively, averred that the subject-matter of
said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase
"foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a
broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the
Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New
International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the
reclamation involved were approved by the authorities
concerned.
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City)
issued an Order6 the dispositive portion of which was to the
following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their
agents, and all persons claiming under them, to refrain from
"further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or
dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila
Bay Beach Resort", until further orders of the court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction 7 which enjoined the defendants, RREC
and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under
them "from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession."
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene8, dated June 27, 1962, was
filed by Jose L. Bautista, Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio,
Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales, Norma Martiner, Emilia E.
Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa,
Pablo S. Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc.,
Industrial and Commercial Factors, Inc., Metropolitan
Distributors of the Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc.
stating inter alia  that they were buyers of lots in the Manila Bay
area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would be affected
by whatever decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion
was granted by the trial court and the Answer attached thereto
admitted.9
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to
dismiss 10 the Complaint of the Republic, placing reliance on
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
x x x           x x x          x x x
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway
from the south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to
the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north,
including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged
areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall be
given to any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to
undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the
President of the Philippines may, after competitive didding,
award contracts for the construction of such project, with the
winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid
in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not
exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and
shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions
of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of reclaimed and
foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided,
finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws,
executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city
or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and
submerged lands shall be respected. . . . . (emphasis ours).
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be
respected, movants contended that the issues raised by the
pleadings have become "moot, academic and of no further
validity or effect."
Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.
("PLCU") moved to intervene 11, alleging as legal interest in the
matter in litigation the avowed purpose of the organization for
the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its Order of
June 10, 1969, the lower court of origin allowed the said
intervention 12.
On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a
Decision, disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original
complaint, (2) the first Amended Complaint, (3) the Answer of
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the first
Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to
the first Amended Complaint, (5) the Second Amended
Complaint, (6) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation to the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer
of Defendant Pasay City to the Second Amended Complaint, (8)
the Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction of
Plaintiff, (9) the Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to
the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction of Defendant Pasay City
and Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the
Answer in Intervention of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (11)
Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene, (12) the Reply to
Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista,  et. al.,
(13) the Stipulation of Facts by all the parties, (14) the Motion for
Leave to Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc., (15) the Opposition to Motion For Leave to
Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (16) the Reply of
Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (17) the
Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant
Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (18) the
Complain in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the Answer of Defendant Republic
Real Estate Corporation, (20) the Answer of Intervenor Jose L.
Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in Intervention, (21) the Motion to
Dismiss of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, and
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to
said Motion to Dismiss, (23) the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay
Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (24) the Memorandum of the
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (25) the
Memorandum for the Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc., (26) the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General, and all the documentary evidence by
the parties to wit: (a) Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to "YYY- 4", (b)
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation's Exhibits "1-
RREC" to "40-a" and (c) Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc's., Exhibits "A-PLACU" to "C-PLACU", the Court
hereby:
(1) Denies the "Motion to Dismiss" filed on January 10, 1968, by
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., as it is the finding of this Court that Republic Act
No. 5187 was not passed by Congress to cure any defect in the
ordinance and agreement in question and that the passage of
said Republic Act No. 5187 did not make the legal issues raised
in the pleadings "moot, academic and of no further validity or
effect;" and
(2) Renders judgment:
(a) dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint;
(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay
Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,
(c) Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and
Defendant Pasay City to have all the plans and specifications in
the reclamation approved by the Director of Public Works and to
have all the contracts and sub-contracts for said reclamation
awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and
(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April
26, 1962, as soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the
corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public
Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon
as the corresponding public bidding for the award to the
contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation
project shall have been effected.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (See  Court of Appeals' Decision dated January
28, 1992; pp. 6-8)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed
therefrom to the Court of Appeals. However, on January 11,
1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree
No. 3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3, thus:
Sec. 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated
September 26, 1972, is hereby amended by the addition of the
following paragraphs:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland,
shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be
forfeited to the State without need of judicial action.
Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity
has been accepted by the National Government shall be taken
over by the National Government on the basis of quantum
meruit, for proper prosecution of the project involved by
administration.
On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP") signed a
Contract13 for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I
and II) which contract included the reclamation and
development of areas covered by the Agreement between
Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 which transferred to the Public Estate
Authority ("PEA") the rights and obligations of the Republic of
the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and
CDCP.
Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives
of the Republic, on the one hand, and those of Pasay City and
RREC, on the other, did not work out. The parties involved failed
to hammer out a compromise.
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a
Decision 14 dismissing the appeal of the Republic and holding,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and
submission of RREC's plans specification to the Department
Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue
the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being
moot and academic;
2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the
ownership and possession over all vacant spaces in the twenty-
one hectare area already reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC at
the time it took over the same. Areas thereat over which
permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall, including
the structures, remain in the possession of the present
possessor, subject to any negotiation between Pasay City and
the said present possessor, as regards the continued
possession and ownership of the latter area.
3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%)
percent of the Twenty-One (21) hectares of land already
reclaimed by it, to be exercised within one (1) year from the
finality of this decision, at the same terms and condition
embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and
enjoining appellee Pasay City to respect RREC's option.
SO ORDERED.
On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a
Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision of the Court of
Appeals, contending, among others, that RREC had actually
reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21)
hectares, and the respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
awarding damages to them, movants.
On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the
said Motion for Reconsideration, by amending the dispositive
portion of its judgment of January 28, 1992, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated
January 28, 1992 is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the
submission of the RREC's plans and specification to the
Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC
may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic.
2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the
ownership and possession of the above enumerated lots (1 to
9).
3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%)
percent of the land referred to in No. 2 of this dispositive portion,
to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality of this
Decision, at the same terms and condition embodied in the
Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay
City to respect RREC's irrevocable option.
SO ORDERED.
From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals aforementioned, the Republic of the Philippines, as well
as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this Court to seek relief,
albeit with different prayers.
On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former
thirteenth Division of Court of Appeals to hear and receive
evidence on the controversy. The corresponding
Commissioner's Report, dated November 25, 1997, was
submitted and now forms part of the records.
On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines
("CCP") filed a Petition in Intervention, theorizing that it has a
direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine (9)
lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of
Appeals ordered to be turned over to Pasay City. The CCP, as
such intervenor, was allowed to present its evidence, as it did,
before the Court of Appeals, which evidence has been
considered in the formulation of this disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes,
by way of assignment of errors, that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY ORDINANCE NO. 158 DATED
APRIL 21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PASAY CITY AND RREC;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC
HAD RECLAIMED 55 HECTARES AND IN ORDERING THE
TURN-OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND
POSSESSION OF NINE (9) LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF
CCP.
In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC,
contend, that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City
Ordinance No. 158 dated April 21, 1959 and the Agreement
dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in
the negative.
Sec. 1 of RA 1899, reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines,
that there are no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay
City 15; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore
areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper
subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC
in question as the area affected is within the National Park,
known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under
Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No.
3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous
and peaceful possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what
may be considered "foreshore land" through the following
disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to
a request for an opinion from the then Secretary of Public Works
and Communications as to whether the term, "foreshore areas"
as used in Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is that
defined in Webster's Dictionary and the Law of Waters so as to
make any dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal,
opined:
According to the basic letter of the Director of Public Works, the
law of Waters speaks of "shore" and defines it thus: "that space
movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit in the line
reached by highest equinoctial tides."
Webster's definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and low-water marks
usually fixed at the line to which the ordinary means tide flows:
also, by extension, the beach, the shore near the water's edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or foreshore
lands should be confined to but a portion of the shore, in itself a
very limited area. (p. 6, Intervenors-appellees' brief).
Bearing in mind the (Webster's and Law of Waters) definitions of
"shore" and of foreshore lands, one is struck with the apparent
inconsistency between the areas thus described and the
purpose to which that area, when reclaimed under the provision
of Republic Act No. 1899, shall be devoted. Section I (of said
Law) authorizes the construction thereat of "adequate docking
and harbor facilities". This purpose is repeated in Sections 3 and
4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally
extend only from 10 to 20 meters along the coast. Not very
much more if at all. In fact certain parts in Manila bordering on
Manila Bay, has no foreshore to speak of since the sea washes
the sea wall.
It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind.
Webster's limited concept of foreshore when it enacted Republic
Act No. 1899, unless it intends that the wharves, piers,
docks, etc. should be constructed parallel to the shore, which is
impractical.
Since it is to be presumed that Congress could not have
intended to enact an ineffectual measure not one that would
lead to absurd consequences, it would seem that it used
"foreshore" in a sense wider in scope that defined by
Webster. . . .
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-
appellant could not offer any refutation or contrary opinion.
Neither can we. In fact, the above construction is consistent with
the "rule on context" in statutory construction which provides
that in construing a statute, the same must be construed as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole (see Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are
two reasons for this. Firstly, the force and significance of
particular expressions will largely depend upon the connection
in which they are found and their relation to the general subject-
matter of the law. The legislature must be understood to have
expressed its whole mind on the special object to which the
legislative act is directed but the vehicle for the expressions of
that meaning is the statute, considered as one entire and
continuous act, and not as an agglomeration of unrelated
clauses. Each clause or provision will be illuminated by those
which are cognate to it and by the general tenor of the whole
statute and thus obscurities end ambiguities may often be
cleared up by the most direct and natural means. Secondly
effect must be given, if it is possible, to every word and clause of
the statute, so that nothing shall be left devoid of meaning or
destitute of force. To this end, each provision of the statute
should be read in the light of the whole. For the general
meaning of the legislature, as gathered from the entire act, may
often prevail over the construction which would appear to be the
most natural and obvious on the face of a particular clause. If is
by this means that contradiction and repugnance between the
different parts of the statute may be avoided. ( See  Black,
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).
Resorting to extrinsic aids, the "Explanatory Note" to House Bill
No. 3830, which was subsequently enacted as Republic Act No.
1899, reads:
In order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the
Philippines, it is necessary that harbor facilities be
correspondingly improved and, where necessary, expanded and
developed. The national government is not in a financial position
to handle all this work. On the other hand, with a greater
autonomy many chartered cities and provinces are financially
able to have credit position which will allow them to undertake
these projects. Some cities, such as the City of Bacolod under
R.A. 161, has been authorized to reclaim foreshore lands
bordering it.
Other cities end provinces have continuously been requesting
for authority to reclaim foreshore lands on the basis of the
Bacolod City pattern, and to undertake work to establish,
construct on the reclaimed area and maintain such port facilities
as may be necessary. In order not to unduly delay the
undertaking of these projects, and inorder to obviate the
passage of individual pieces of legislation for every chartered
city and province, it is hereby recommended that the
accompanying bill be approved. It covers Authority for All
chartered cities and provinces to undertake this work. . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and
construing the provisions of R.A. 1899, then Secretary of Justice
Mabanag opined:
It is clear that the "Bacolod City pattern" was the basis of the
enactment of the aforementioned bill of general application. This
so-called "Bacolod City pattern" appears to be composed of 3
parts, namely: Republic Ad No. 161, which grants authority to
Bacolod City to undertake or carry out . . . the reclamation . . . of
any [sic] carry out the reclamation project conformably with
Republic Act No. 161; and Republic Act No. 1132 authorizing
Bacolod City to contract indebtedness or to issue bonds in the
amount not exceeding six million pesos to finance the
reclamation of land in said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise space
therein referred to as "foreshore" lands, but it provided that
docking and harbor facilities should be erected on the reclaimed
portions thereof, while not conclusive would indicate that
Congress used the word "foreshore" in its broadest sense.
Significantly, the plan of reclamation of foreshore drawn up by
the Bureau of Public Works maps out an area of approximately
1,600,000 square meters, the boundaries of which clearly
extend way beyond Webster's limited concept of the term
"foreshore". As a contemporaneous construction by that branch
of the Government empowered to oversee at least, the conduct
of the work, such an interpretation deserves great weight.
Finally, Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 1132
(supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and approved the
Bureau's interpretation of the term 'foreshore' when instead of
taking the occasion to correct the Bureau of over extending its
plan, it authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full estimated
cost of reclaiming the total area covered by the plan. The
explanatory note to House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic
Act No. 1132 states among the things:
The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a plan for the
reclamation of about 1,600,000 square meters of land at an
estimated costs of about P6,000,000.00. The project is self-
supporting because the proceeds from the sales or leases of
lands so reclaimed will be more than sufficient to cover the cost
of the project.
Consequently, when Congress passed Republic Act No. 1899 in
order to facilitate the reclamation by local governments of
foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern and in
order to obviate the passage of individual pieces of legislation
for every chartered city and provinces requesting authority to
undertake such projects, the lawmaking body could not have
had in mind the limited area described by Webster as
"foreshore" lands. . . . .
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the
strict literal meaning of "foreshore" lands which may be
reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress
would have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu,
Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as
suggested by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the bill
considering that these cities do not have 'foreshore' lands in the
strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not approve the
proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore,
that Congress intended not to limit the area that may be
reclaimed to the strict definition of "foreshore" lands.
The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was
at that time the chief law officer and legal adviser of the
government and whose office is required by law to issue
opinions for the guidance of the various departments of the
government, there being then no judicial interpretation to the
contrary, is entitled to respect (see  Bengzon vs. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).
We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 3, 1965 inPonce vs. Gomez  (L-21870) and Ponce vs.
City of Cebu  (L-2266), by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices
(the other five (5) members deemed it unnecessary to express
their view because in their opinion the questions raised were not
properly brought before the court), which in essence applied the
strict dictionary meaning of "foreshore lands" as used in RA
1899 in the case of the city of Cebu. But this was promulgated
long after the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the
above opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC has
started the subject reclamation project.
Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the
Supreme Court issued the aforementioned Resolution, enacted
RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law, Congress appropriated
money "for the construction of the seawall and limited access
highway from the South boundary of the city of Manila to Cavite
City, to the South, and from the North boundary of the city of
Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to
the North (including the reclamation of foreshore and
submerged areas . . .  provided . . . that . . . existing projects
and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be
respected . . ." This is a clear manifestation that Congress in
enacting RA 1899, did not intend to limit the interpretation of the
term "foreshore land" to its dictionary meaning.
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had
in mind the judicial construction given to a former statute on the
subject, and that the statute on the subject, and that the statute
was enacted having in mind the judicial construction that the
prior enactment had received, or in the light of such existing
judicial decisions as have direct bearing upon it ( see  50 Am.
Jur., Sec. 321, pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said
interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the Ponce
cases, Congress enacted a law covering the same areas
previously embraced in a RA 1899 (as mentioned earlier, cities
without foreshore lands which were sought to be excluded from
the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that
respect be given the reclamation of not only foreshore lands but
also of submerged lands signifying its non-conformity to the
judicial construction given to RA 1899. If Congress was in
accord with the interpretation and construction made by the
Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned
reclamation of "foreshore lands" only in RA 5187, but Congress
included "submerged lands" in order to clarify the intention on
the grant of authority to cities and municipalities in the
reclamation of lands bordering them as provided in RA 1899. It
is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually the intention of
Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the authority granted to cities
and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict
dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include
submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of
respondent court that under RA 1899, the term "foreshore lands"
includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its
disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent
court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of
"foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against
the recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well
entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application. 16 So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of
the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of
the law being plain and unambiguous. 17 Then, too, opinions of
the Secretary of Justice are unavailing to supplant or rectify any
mistake or omission in the law. 18 To repeat, the term "foreshore
lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream);
the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In
so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have  provided expressly. That
Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands".
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of
this Court dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce v. Gomez  (L-21870)
and Ponce v. City of Cebu  (L-22669) despite the enactment of
Republic Act No. 5187 ("RA 5187"), the relevant portion of
which, reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
x x x           x x x          x x x
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway
from the south boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to
the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north,
including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged
areas:Provided, That priority in the construction of such
seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shell be
given to any corporation and/or corporations that may offer to
undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the
President of the Philippines may, after competitive bidding,
award contracts for the construction of such projects, with the
winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid
in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not
exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and
shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions
of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of reclaimed and
foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding:Provided, finally,
that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive
orders, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or municipal
governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
lands shall be respected. . . . .
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which
can be interpreted to broaden the scope of "foreshore lands."
The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an
Appropriations Act, entitled — "AN ACT APPROPRIATING
FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME
WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS."
All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was
said in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of
Cebu  (L-22669) that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of
the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left
dry by the ordinary flow of the tides." As opined by this Court in
said cases:
WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon and Jose P.
Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and contracts are  ultra
vires and hence, null and void, insofar as the remaining 60% of
the area aforementioned, because the term "foreshore lands" as
used in Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in the
sense attached thereto by common parlance; (emphasis ours)
The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice
Claudio Teehankee, in his opinion dated December 22, 1966, in
a case with analogous facts as the present one, to wit:
December 22, 1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
x x x           x x x          x x x
I. Facts —
1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1899, the Municipality of Navotas enacted Ordinance
No. 1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a
reclamation contract with Mr. Chuanico.
2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded
between the Municipality of Navotas, represented by the
Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in accordance with the
above ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the
attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in prosecuting the
reclamation project and shall advance the money needed
therefor; that the actual expenses incurred shall be deemed a
loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall have the
irrevocable option to buy 70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00
per square meter; that he shall have the full and irrevocable
powers to do any and all things necessary and proper in and
about the premises," including the power to hire necessary
personnel for the prosecution of the work, purchase materials
and supplies, and purchase or lease construction machineries
and equipment, but any and all contracts to be concluded by
him in behalf of the Municipality shall be submitted to public
bidding.
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed
Resolution No. 22 approving and ratifying the contract.
x x x           x x x          x x x
III. Comments —
1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis
of Navotas Ordinance No. 1 which, in turn, had been enacted
avowedly pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the
contract, in order to be valid, must conform to the provisions of
the said law.
By authorizing local governments "to execute by
administration any reclamation work," (Republic Act No. 1899
impliedly forbids the execution of said project bycontract. Thus,
in the case or Ponce et al. vs. Gomez  (February 3, 1966), five
justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the contract
between Cebu Development Corporation and Cebu City for the
reclamation of foreshore lands because "the provisions of
said . . . contract are not . . . in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1899," as against one Justice who opined that
the contract substantially complied with the provisions of the
said law. (Five Justices expressed no opinion on this point.)
Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially
similar to the Cebu reclamation contract, it is believed that the
former is likewise fatally defective.
2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction
of a channel along the Manila Bay periphery of that town and
the reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land from said
channel to a seaward distance of one kilometer. In the basic
letter it is stated that "practically, all the 650 hectares of lands
proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement" do not
constitute foreshore lands and that "the greater portion of the
area . . . is in fact navigable and presently being used as a
fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing operators as well as a fishing
ground of sustenance fisherman. Assuming the correctness of
these averments, the Navotas reclamation contract evidently
transcends the authority granted under Republic Act No. 1899,
which empowers the local governments to reclaim nothing more
than "foreshore lands, i.e., "that part of the land adjacent to the
see which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow
of the tides." (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited
case Ponce case, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-0 with five
Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual
stipulation for the reclamation of submerged lands off Cebu City,
and permanently enjoined its execution under Republic Act No.
1899.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the
view that the Navotas reclamation contract is not binding and
should be disregarded for non-compliance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE
Secretary of Justice
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became
Associate Justice, and later Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in
our considered view, supersede the earlier opinion of former
justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the cases, in
connection with which subject opinions were sought, were with
similar facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords with RA
1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City
Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore  ultra vires and
null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring
absence of a public bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that
RREC had really reclaimed 55 hectares. The letter of Minister
Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at all that
RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring
to a tentative schedule of work to be done by RREC, even as it
required RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its
supposed accomplishment, to secure approval by the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways to the reclamation plan, and to
submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for
subject reclamation project but RREC never complied with such
requirements and conditions sine qua non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs,
and/or specifications of the reclamation project were presented
to reflect any accomplishment. Not even any statement or
itemization of works accomplished by contractors or
subcontractors or vouchers and other relevant papers were
introduced to describe the extent of RREC's accomplishment.
Neither was the requisite certification from the City Engineer
concerned that "portions of the reclamation project not less than
50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or
completed" obtained and presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation
work done by RREC, and extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962.
Not a single contractor, sub-contractor, engineer, surveyor, or
any other witness involved in the alleged reclamation work of
RREC testified on the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by
RREC. What work was done, who did the work, where was it
commenced, and when was it completed, was never brought to
light by any witness before the court. Certainly, onus
probandi  was on RREC and Pasay City to show and point out
the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But
this burden of proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to
discharge.
So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance
dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, the lifting of the writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would become effective only
"as soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and
Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the corresponding
plans and specifications to the Director of Public Work, and shall
have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding
public bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor
that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been
effected." (Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No. 103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and
Pasay City never complied with such prerequisites for the lifting
of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Consequently, RREC had
no authority to resume its reclamation work which was stopped
by said writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26,
1960, marked Exhibit "21-A" for RREC before the lower court,
and Exhibit "EE" for CCP before the Court of Appeals, it can be
deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC contract
out the dredging work to C and A Construction Company, Inc.,
for the reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to be
reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position
paper filed with this Court on July 15, 1997, with reference to
CDCP's reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation team
would take one year before a reclamation work could actually
begin. Therefore, the reclamation work undertaker by RREC
could not have started before November 26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from
proceeding any further with its reclamation work, it had barely
five (5) months, from November, 1961 to April, 1962, to work on
subject reclamation project. It was thus physically impossible for
RREC to reclaim 55 hectares, with the stipulated specifications
and elevation, in such a brief span of time. In the report of
RREC (Exhibit "DD" for CCP), it was conceded that due to the
writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962, C and A
Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its dredging operation
since May, 1962.
The "graphical report" on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of
April 30, 1962, attached to the Progress Report marked Exhibit
"DD", is a schematic representation of the work accomplishment
referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the various
elevations of the land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00
meters to the highest elevation of 2.5 meters above MLLW.
Such portrayal of work accomplished is crucial in our
determination of whether or not RREC had actually "reclaimed"
any land as under its Contract for Dredging Work with C and A
Construction Company (Exhibit "EE", the required final elevation
for a completely reclaimed land was 3.5 meters above MLLW,
as explicitly provided in said Contract for Dredging Work. So,
the irresistible conclusion is — when the work on subject RREC-
Pasay City reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in
compliance with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court of origin, no portion of the reclamation project worked
on by RREC had reached the stipulated elevation of 3.5 meters
above MLLW. The entire area it worked on was only at sea level
or 0.00 meter above MLLW. In short, RREC had not yet
reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in April 1962.
On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio,
Architect and Managing partner of Leandro V. Locsin and
partners, Architect and City Planner Manuel T. Mañoza, Jr. of
Planning Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D. Cruz,
Executive Assistant, Office of the President, from 1966 to 1970,
and Dr. Lucrecia Kasilag, National Artist and member of CCP
Advisory Committee, come to the fore. These credible, impartial
and knowledgeable witnesses recounted on the witness stand
that when the construction of the Main Building of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface
land available was the site for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29,
1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be seen in front of and
behind it was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997 pages 127-128).
When the CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1968
to 1969, the land above sea level thereat was only where the
CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of the surroundings
were all under water, particularly the back portion fronting the
bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr.
Lucrecia R. Kasilag stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the
ground breaking for the CCP Main Building, it was water all
around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp. 320, 324, 325).
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of
Appeals to order and declare that "the requirement by the trial
court on public bidding and the submission of RREC's plans and
specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways
in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the
reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic." Said
requirement has never become moot and academic. It has
remained indispensable, as ever, and non-compliance therewith
restrained RREC from lawfully resuming the reclamation work
under controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the
decision in its favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had
not reclaimed any area with the prescribed elevation of 3.5
meters above MLLW, so much so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted
to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for
compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly
done before the CDCP started working on the reclamation of the
CCP grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor
General to settle its subject claim for compensation at the same
amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981, guided by the
cost data, work volume accomplished and other relevant
information gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways,
the Solicitor General informed RREC that the value of what it
had accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was only
P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for mobilization of equipment
amounted to P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid evaluation made by
the government, through the then Minister of Public Highways,
is factual and realistic, so much so that on June 25, 1981,
RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of
P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost data, etc., as
compensation based on quantum meruit. The least we would
consider is the amount of P10,926,071.29 plus interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We feel
that 6% is very much less than the accepted rate of inflation that
has supervened since 1962 to the present, and even less than
the present legal rate of 12% per annum. 19
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was compensation for
what it had done, and for the dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic
meters it used, on subject reclamation project.
Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to
Pasay City of the following titled lots, to wit:
LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT
42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the Restaurant name of
GSIS
3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the name of CCP
12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 hec. TCT 18627 in the and PICC
parking name of CCP space
22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the sculpture
of Asean name of CCP Artists-site of Boom na Boom
23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the of Philcite
name of CCP
24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the Star City,
CCP, name of CCP Philcite
25 open space 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the occupied by Star
name of CCP City
28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the beside PICC
name of CCP
29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the leased by El
name of CCP Shaddai
We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor.
In the first place, in their answer to the Complaint and Amended
Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City never prayed for the
transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which had long
become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP
and GSIS, respectively.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens  on the certificates of
title covering the said lots is of no moment. It did not vest in
Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the absolute
ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of
the action did not really warrant the issuance of a notice of  lis
pendens.
Sec. 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title
or the right of possession of real properly, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and
the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of
filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens  herein above mentioned may be
cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of  lis
pendens  is necessary when the action is for recovery of
possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the present
litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main
case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the
titled lots aforementioned.
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The
issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or
not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul
it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA
174, Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA
611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane
provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can
never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in
accordance with law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their
undertaking to reclaim any area within subject reclamation
project, it appearing that something compensable was
accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law
and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even
the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the
expense of another 20, we believe; and so hold, that Pasay City
and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and
dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as verified by the
former Ministry of Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC
itself in its aforequoted letter dated June 25, 1981.
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this
valley of tears, the court, for its herein historic disposition, will be
exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the
preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our
cultural heritage. As writer Channing rightly puts it: "Whatever
expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our
sympathies — Whatever makes us feel our relation to the
universe and all that it inherits in time and in eternity, and to the
great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine
our nature, and elevate us in the scale of being ."
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision,
dated January 28, 1992, and Amended Decision, dated April 28,
1992, of the Court of Appeals, are both SET ASIDE; and Pasay
City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and Ordinance No.
158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation
Agreements entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real
Estate Corporation (RREC) as authorized by said city
ordinances, are declared NULL and VOID for being  ultra vires,
and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the
trial court a quo in Civil Case No. 2229-P is made permanent
and the notice of lis pendens  issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered CANCELLED. The Register of
Deeds of Pasay City is directed to take note of and annotate on
the certificates of title involved, the cancellation of subject notice
of lis pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to
pay Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation the sum
of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND
SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTY-NINE CENTAVOS
(P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%)
percent per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which
amount shall be divided by Pasay City and RREC, share and
share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160145 November 11, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEDRO O. ENCISO, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 26, 2003, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Iba,
Zambales, Branch 71, promulgated on July 31, 2001 in LRC
Case No. RTC-N-75-I. The CA and the trial court adjudicated
Lot No. 2278-A, Cad. 652-D, Masinloc Cadastre in favor of
respondent Pedro O. Enciso, pursuant to Section 29 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, show that on
April 24, 2000, the respondent, alleging to be the owner in fee
simple of a parcel of residential land located in Barangay South
Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, filed a petition for land
registration before the RTC of Iba, Zambales. The lot is
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 2278-A of the subdivision plan Csd-03-
012562-D being a portion of Lot 2278, Cad. 652-D L.R.C. Rec.
No.), situated in the Barrio of South Poblacion, Municipality of
Masinloc, Province of Zambales. Bounded on the NW., along
line 1-2 by Sta. Lucia Street; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Capt.
Albright Street; on the SE. & SW. along line 3-4-1 by Lot 2278-B
of the subd. plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being
N. 39 deg. 35’E., 12.05 m. from BLLM.1,
Cad. 652-D.
thence N. 16 deg. 13’E., 32.48 m. to point. 2;
thence S. 75 deg. 05’E., 44.83 m. to point. 3;
thence S. 16 deg. 19’W., 33.36 m. to point. 4;
thence N. 73 deg. 57’W., 44.76 m. to point. of;
beginning; containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE (1,475) square meters. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 40 cms. Bearings; true;
date of original survey; Sept. 1927-July 1928 and that of the
subdivision survey; July 22, 1999 and was approved on Jan. 20,
2000.3
The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the
said lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and
quitclaim on March 15, 1999; the said property is not tenanted
or occupied by any person other than the respondent and his
family who are in actual physical possession of the same; and
the respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous, peaceful, open, notorious, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for
not less than 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.4
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the
following grounds: (a) neither the respondent nor his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the
respondent failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax
declaration with the application to prove bona fideacquisition of
the land applied for or its open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax
declaration adverted to in the application does not appear to be
genuine and the tax declarations indicate such possession to be
of recent vintage; (d) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
respondent considering that he failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within the period of six months from
February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892; and (e) the
subject land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private
appropriation.5
After ascertaining that the jurisdictional requirements for the
application were done in accordance with the law during the
initial hearing6 on November 9, 2000, the trial court issued an
Order of Default7 on January 3, 2001 against all persons with
the exception of the government.
The respondent presented tax receipts to show that the property
was declared for taxation purposes in his name. He also
testified that he acquired the property by inheritance from his
deceased father, Vicente Enciso, who died on May 18, 1991. He
then immediately took possession of the property and
constructed a house thereon in 1991. On March 15, 1999, he
and his siblings executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate
where the land was adjudicated in his favor.
The respondent further narrated that the property was originally
owned by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. On October
5, 1968, the municipality passed Resolution No.
71,8 undertaking to construct a road along the shoreline of
the poblacion, but requiring landowners adjoining the roads to
share in the expenses for an inner wall adjacent to their lots. In
view of this, the same resolution provided that:
WHEREAS, where the above landowners share in the
construction of the roads, the same may be given the priority to
acquire such additional available areas by purchase, if such
additional areas are not needed by the government for public
use, the advances of the landowners as a result of his [ sic]
construction (inner wall) be considered as price of the land,
provided that the cost and value of the inner wall exceeds the
assessed value of the land, and if the cost of the inner wall is
less than the assessed value of the land, the landowners will
have to pay the corresponding balance to the government; … 9
On March 8, 1969, the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales
passed supplementary Resolution No. 102,10 which stated that
in consideration of the financial assistance extended by the
abutting property owners, and because the government no
longer needed the additional areas for public use, the
municipality was authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into
and sign deeds of purchase between the municipality and the
landowners concerned. Consequently, the Municipal Council of
Masinloc, Zambales unanimously approved Resolution No. 102-
A11 dated March 15, 1969, authorizing its mayor to execute a
deed of sale in favor of Honorato Edaño, covering a portion of
the reclaimed lots no longer needed for public use. Honorato
was thus entitled to buy the lot for his help in carrying out the
project envisioned in Resolution No. 71, and after the
submission of an itemized statement of the cost of the
construction of the inner wall along Sta. Lucia Street.
Immediately thereafter, the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales,
represented by its Mayor, P.A. Edaño, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale12 covering a piece of reclaimed land containing
more or less 2,790 square meters in favor of Honorato Edaño.
The deed stated that the vendee constructed the inner wall
needed to facilitate the fabrication of a portion of Sta. Lucia
Street, which was opposite his lot, and the extensions of
Magsaysay and Capt. Albright Streets at a total expense of
₱1,683.80. Considering that the assessed value of the lot was
₱2,092.50, or ₱408.70
more than the vendee spent for the construction of the inner
wall, the vendee paid ₱408.70 to the vendor.
The respondent admitted that Honorato was his uncle, being his
father’s half-brother.13 He further narrated that on December 9,
1980, the spouses Honorato and Esperanza Edaño sold the lot
to Vicente B. Enciso for ₱2,092.50 viaa Deed of Absolute
Sale.14 On January 17, 1981, Vicente Enciso, Natividad Edaño
Asuncion and Thelma A. Edaño entered into a Deed of
Partition15 involving the same parcel of land. Vicente was
awarded one-half of the total area of the property, 1,398 square
meters, more or less; Natividad and Thelma got one-fourth
each, or approximately 697.5 square meters individually.
No cross-examination was conducted and no evidence was
adduced by the government to controvert the application for
registration.
On May 8, 2001, Director Felino M. Cortez of the Department on
Registration submitted the Report16 of the Land Registration
Authority, informing the trial court that it was not in a position to
verify whether the parcel of land subject of registration was
already covered by a land patent and previously approved
isolated survey. Acting on this report, the trial court directed the
Lands Management Bureau, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office of Iba, Zambales, and the  The petitioner dispensed with the filing of a motion for
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Regional
Executive Director for Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, to
submit a report on the status of the parcel of land. 17
Without waiting for the final report, the trial court granted the
application for registration on July 31, 2001, the dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court, after confirming the Order of General
Default entered into the record of this case on January 3, 2001
hereby adjudicates Lot No. 2278-A, Cad. 652-D, Masinloc
Cadastre, containing an area of 1,475 square meters, situated
at Brgy. South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, Philippines, as
appearing on the approved Plan No. Csd-03-012562-D (Exhibit
"M") and also in the Technical Description of said lot (Exhibit
"K") in favor of the applicant whose address is at Brgy. South
Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, Philippines, in accordance with
Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication
however is subject to the various easements/reservations
provided for under pertinent laws, Presidential Decree and/or
Presidential Letters of Instruction, which should be
annotated/projected in the title to be issued.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree
and title be issued.
SO ORDERED.18
The trial court ruled that the respondent satisfactorily proved his
ownership in fee simple, as well as the identity of the land
sought to be titled. Likewise, the trial court found that the
respondent, as well as his predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, peaceful, continuous, public, adverse, and under a bona
fide claim of ownership. According to the trial court, there was
no evidence that the subject parcel of land was within any
government reservation, or that the applicant was disqualified
from owning real property under the Constitution.19
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the case before the
CA, contending that the trial court erred in granting the
application despite his failure to prove registrable title over Lot
No. 2278-A.
The CA disposed of the appeal on September 26, 2003 and
affirmed the decision of the trial court. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
dated July 31, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales in
LRC Case No. RTC-N-75-1 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
reconsideration and forthwith filed the instant petition.
The OSG assigned the following error to the appellate court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
IN GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR
REGISTRATION SANS ANY SHOWING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.21
The petitioner contends that the first and primordial element in
order to warrant the registration of title is to show that the land
must be an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
On this note, the petitioner believes that the respondent failed to
adduce any evidence to show that the subject land was already
previously declared part of such alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. Furthermore, the petitioner adds that
under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and those not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to it.
In his comment to the petition, the respondent asserts that the
CA was correct in affirming the decision of the land registration
court. The respondent cites the following justification of the CA
in supporting his claim over Lot No. 2278-A:
Records reveal that subject land is a residential land owned by
the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. The Municipality of
Masinloc, through Resolutions 71, 102 and 102-A-29 sold the
subject land to Honorato Edaño as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 31, 1969 executed by the Municipal
Mayor.
Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and patrimonial property."
Properties of political subdivision[s] which are patrimonial in
character may be alienated. By analogy, when a municipality’s
properties for public use are no longer intended for such use,
the same become patrimonial and may be the subject of a
contract. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and
between the Municipal Mayor of Masinloc and Honorato Edaño
was a valid contract. Subject land was likewise sold by Honorato
Edaño to petitioner-appellee’s father, Vicente Enciso, by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale. From then, subject land changed
hand until it was acquired by petitioner-appellee when his
siblings executed an Extrajudicial Partition assigning said land
to him. It was declared for taxation purposes in his name under
Tax Declaration No. 007-0700R. …
… Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the
Subject land was reclassified as residential. It was already
segregated from the public domain and assumed the character
of private ownership. It was reclaimed by the Municipality of
Masinloc and eventually adjudicated to Honorato Edaño. The
Municipality of Masinloc must have been in possession of the
subject land even before 1969 considering that it was originally
surveyed way back in 1927-1928. In the exercise of its
proprietary right, the Municipality of Masinloc validly conveyed
the subject land to petitioner-appellee’s predecessors-in-
interest. Petitioner-appellee’s possession and occupation of the
subject land is continuous, public, adverse and uninterrupted
and in the concept an owner and no other person claimed
possession and ownership of the same. Article 1137 of the Civil
Code provides:
"Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribed (sic) through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of titles or of good faith."
Parenthetically, petitioner-appellee’s possession tacked with
that of his predecessors-in-interest already complied with the
thirty (30)-year requirement of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession required under the law.
Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner-appellee sufficiently
and satisfactorily proved his real and absolute ownership in fee
simple; that he has a registrable title over the subject land and
that he complied with the requirements under the law to warrant
registration of title over the subject land.22
The petition is meritorious.
While it is the rule that findings of fact of appellate courts are
conclusive upon this Court, among the recognized exceptions is
where the findings of fact are not supported by the record or are
conspicuously erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion.23 This is the situation in this case.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fideclaim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under
a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial, or
since June 12, 1945. It is not disputed that the land sought to be
registered was originally part of the reclamation project
undertaken by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. The
prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public
domain may only be leased and not sold to private parties.
These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain which the government
could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a
law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service.24 The
ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters
of the public domain belong to the State.25On November 7,
1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No.
141, also known as the Public Land Act, compiling all the
existing laws on lands of the public domain. This remains to this
day the existing and applicable general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The
State policy prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain to
private individuals continued under the 1935 Constitution.
Indeed, there is nothing to support the respondent’s claim that
the property "was reclassified as residential … already
segregated from the public domain and assumed the character
of private ownership." At the
moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities
classified the subject as alienable and disposable. It must be
stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.26
According to the CA, "the Municipality of Masinloc must have
been in possession of the subject land even before 1969
considering that it was originally surveyed way back in 1927-
1928." This is not the kind of possession and occupation
contemplated under the law. While the subject property was still
in the hands of the municipality, it was undeniably part of the
public domain. The municipality cannot then be considered a
predecessor-in-interest of the applicant from whom the period of
possession and occupation required by law may be reckoned
with. Any other interpretation would be dangerously detrimental
to our national patrimony.
Even assuming that Honorato Edaño, the respondent’s earliest
predecessor-in-interest, possessed the property as early as
1969, the respondent’s claim must still fail, as he was unable to
prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership. As the Court ruled in Republic v.
Alconaba:27
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect
of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant
to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
The respondent’s possession and that of his "predecessors-in-
interest" will not suffice for purposes of judicial confirmation of
title. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence on record shows that a house was constructed on
the subject property only in 1991. Certain discrepancies likewise
surround the application for registration: Honorato Edaño sold a
parcel of land consisting of 2,790 square meters on December
9, 1980 to Vicente Enciso alone; on January 17, 1981, Vicente
Enciso, Natividad Edaño Asuncion and Thelma Edaño executed
a deed of partition covering the same lot. Why was there a need
to partition the property if the entire land had already been sold
to Vicente? The Court also notes that in the said deed of
partition, one-half of the total area of the land, which was 1,398
square meters, was adjudicated in favor of Vicente; however, in
the respondent’s application for registration, the land sought to
be registered consists of 1,475 square meters.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land
registration cases rests on the applicant who must show clear,
positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession
and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.
Bare allegations, without more, do not amount to preponderant
evidence that would shift the burden to the oppositor. 28
Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1) Lot No. 2278-A
was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the
public domain; and (2) he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of owners since time
immemorial, or from June 12, 1945.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 26, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
72859 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Pedro O.
Enciso’s application for registration and issuance of title to Lot
No. 2278-A, Cad. 652-D, Masinloc Cadastre, is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.