MANU/DE/0276/1983

Equivalent Citation: AIR1985Delhi83, 26(1984)DLT377

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Regular First Appeal No. 71 of 1980
Decided On: 04.10.1983
Appellants: Ishwar Dass Malhotra
Vs.
Respondent: Dhanwant Singh and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
D.K. Kapur and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.
Counsels:
B.I. Singh, H.L. Sabarwal, S.M. Grover and C.B. Thanai, Advs

JUDGMENT
D.P. Wadhwa, J.
(1) The appellant, Ishwar Das Malhotra, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 17.500.00
based on the mortgage of two properties. Dhanwant Singh, defendant No. 1
(respondent No. 1 herein) was the person stated to have taken loans from the
plaintiff-appellant on the basis of these mortgages while defendants-respondents
Nos. 2 to 5 were the persons who had allegedly purchased the mortgaged properties
subsequently. The suit of Malhotra was decreed but only against defendant No. I,
Dhanwant Singh, and his suit as against defendants Nos. 2 to 5 was dismissed with
costs. It was held that Dhanwant Singh was not competent to mortgage one property
and as regards the other property no mortgage was enforceable. Malhotra was also
awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum and not at 7% per annum as claimed
by him. Aggrieved, Malhotra has appealed to (his court.
(2) The two mortgaged properties are .'(1) house No. J-6/87 Rajouri Garden, New
Delhi, and (2) house No. j-7/24, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. At the relevant time
property No. J-6/87 was a plot of land and was owned by Dhanwant Singh who, by a
sale deed dated 11-3-1966, sold the same to Smt. Indrawati, respondent-defendant
No. 2. The sale deed was registered on 17-3-1966. Smt. Indrawati constructed a
single storeyed house thereon and sold the same to respondents-defendants Nos. 3
and 4, namely, Smt. Basant Kaur and Smt. Harbans Kaur, respectively by a sale deed
dated 10-10-1966. Incidentally, it may be noted, during the pendency of the present
appeal Smt. Basant Kaur died and her legal heirs were brought on record. Reference
to Smt. Basant Kaur would Therefore, mean reference to her legal representatives.
(3) Property No. J-7/24, at that time was a single store) ed house and " was owned
by Smt. Indrawati. She sold this house along with the plot to Dhanwant Singh on 11-
3-1966, and the sale deed was also registered on the same date. Dhanwant Singh, in
turn, sold this property to Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, respondent-defendant No. 5 by a
sale deed dated 5-6-1975.
(4) The case of Malhotra is that on 18-5-1966 Dhanwant Singh took a loan of Rs.
8500.00 with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from him and executed a pronote

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and also deposited title deeds of the aforesaid two properties with him 'as security
for repayment of the amount'. Later on the same date, Dhanwant Singh also gave a
memorandum in writing regarding deposit of the title deeds to Malhotra. This
memorandum is Ex. P-2 and is the subject matter of considerable controversy
between the parties. Dhanwant Singh took a further loan of Rs. 4500.00 from
Malhotra on 20-5-1967 and executed a pronote for Rs. 13,000.00 which include the
loan of Rs. 8500.00 which had been advanced to him by Malhotra earlier. The title
deeds were agreed to be kept as security for this loan of Rs. 4500.00 as well Again
on 4-5-1971 Dhanwant Singh took yet another loan of Rs. 3000.00 from Malhotra
and executed a consolidated pronote of Rs. 16.000.00 and allowed the title deeds to
be kept with the plaintiff as security for this loan as well. It was stated by Malhotra
that Dhanwant Singh had paid him interest up to 3-5-1971 and he also received a
further sum of Rs. 3900.00 from Dhanwant Singh as interest on different occasions.
A sum of Rs. 1500.00 towards interest remained due to Malhotra from defendant
Dhanwant Singh on the date of the institution of the suit apart from the principal
amount of Rs. 16000.00 .
(5) A perusal, of the facts narrated above would show that property No. J-6/87, had
already been sold by Dhanwant Singh to Smt. Indrawati when Dhanwant Singh is
stated to have deposited the title deeds of this property with the plaintiff Malhotra.
Since Dhanwant Singh was not having any legal title to this property, he could not
create any mortgage by means of deposit of title deeds of this property or otherwise.
Malhotra has alleged that there was a collusion between Dhanwant Singh and Smt.
Indrawati. Otherwise, he claimed, there was no occasion for Smt. Indrawati to hand
over the title deeds of this property to Dhanwant Singh for the purpose of creating
the mortgage. In support of this submission Malhotra refers to the fact that the sale
deeds in respect of both the properties were executed on the same date, i.e. 11-3-
1966, by which Smt. Indrawati sold her property (No. J-7/24) to Dhanwant Singh
and Dhanwant Singh sold his property (No. J-6/87) to Smt. Indrawati Smt. however,
denied any such collusion. Apart from making a bald averment in the plaint no
evidence has been led to prove the alleged collusion between Dhanwant Singh and
Smt. Indrawati. The collusion having not been proved, the question of there being
any mortgage by deposit of title deeds in respect of property No. J-6/87 does not
arise. Smt. Indrawati cannot, Therefore, be held liable for the loan raised by
Dhanwant Singh from Malhotra and property No. J-6/87 could not be the subject
matter of any mortgage. Similarly, defendants Smt. Basant Kaur and Smt. Harbans
Kaur, who subsequently purchased property No. J-6/87 from Smt. Indrawati, also
cannot be made liable. In fact, Mr. Bharat Inder Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant, was himself not very enthusiastic about the mortgage being enforced in
respect of property No. J-6/87, and we did not think it necessary to call upon counsel
for defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to address any argument on this point.
(6) That "takes us to the determination of the contest between the plaintiff Malhotra
and Dhanwant Singh and Harjeet Singh Dhanjal in respect of property No. J-7/24.
Dhanwant Singh admits the raising of loan but denies that he ever executed any
mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Harjeet Singh Dhanjal who is the subsequent
purchaser of this property states that he is bona fide purchaser for value of this
property from Dhanwant Singh and that when he bought it he was not having any
notice of any mortgage and, on the other hand, assurance were given to him by
Dhanwant Singh that the property was free from all encumbrances and that the
(Harjeet Singh Dhanjal) also made independent inquiries to find out if the property
was encumbered According to Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, there was no equitable
mortgage in respect of this property and that it was only Dhanwant Singh who could
be personally liable.

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(7) At the time when Dhanwant Singh took the loan of Rs. 8500.00 from Malhotra a
memorandum (Ex. P-2) evidencing deposit of title deeds was written by him to
Malhotra. It will be appropriate to reproduce the said memorandum:
"SHRI Ishwar Dass Malhotra, 3918, Near Jagat Cinema, Delhi. I have already
created an equitable mortgage to you for Rs. 8500.00 (Eight thousand five
hundred only) together with interest @7ø/o P.A. from 18-5-1966 till
payment in full in respect of property- Single storey house built on plot No.
J-7/24 area 146 square yards and plot No. 87 Block-1-6, 1 0 yards free hold
plot in Abadi of Rajouri Gardens area of village Tatarpur, Delhi State and
deposited the deeds as follows :- (A) Sale deed for Rs. 22000.00 dated 11-
3-1966 by Smt. Indrawati in my favor registered vide No. 1591 Bahi No. 1
Volume 464 pages 131 to 133 on 17-3-1966. (B) .Sale deed for Rs.
IOOGO.00 dated 12-4-1965 by Supreme Enterprise; (P) Ltd. Gokhale Market,
Delhi in favor of Shrimati Indrawati registered vide No. 1429 Addl. Book No.
1 Volume 377 page; 111 to 113 on 19-4-1965. (C) (Illegible) sanctioned by
Mc Delhi vide orders dated 26-7-1965. (D) Gift deed dated 12-2-1965 for Rs.
3600.00 of 1/2 Plot No. 87 Block-J-6 (J6/87) by S. Tripat Singh in my favor.
(E) Sale deed dated 9-2-1958 for Rs. 1257.62 by Dlf in favor of myself and
S. Tripat Singh. Dhanwant Singh 18-5-1966 "
(8) At the time when the loan of Rs. 4500.00 was taken on 20-5-1967' Dhanwant
Singh wrote receipt Ex. P-6 which is as under :-
"RECEIVED the sum of Rs. 13000.00 (Rs. Thirteen thousand only) on a/c of
pronote dated today as following :- Cheque No. 0441803 dated 18-5-1966
on the Bank of India Ltd. New Delhi vide pronote dated 18-5-1966 (for) Rs.
Eight thousand and five hundred only (Rs. 8500.00 ). Cheque No. C041821
dated 20-5-1967 on the Bank of India Ltd. New Delhi (Ajmer Gate Extension
Branch) turn (Rs. Four thousand and five hundred only) Rs. 4500.CO. Delhi.
Dhanwant Singh Dated 20-5-1967. 20-5-1967 "
(9) Again, at the time when loan of Rs.3000.00 was taken on 4-5-1971 Dhanwant
Singh executed receipt Ex. P-8 which is as follows :
" RECEIVED the sum of Rs. sixteen thousand only (16000.00) on account of
pronote dated today as following :- Rs. 13000.00 (Thirteen thousand) on a/c
of Dhanwant Singh's equitable mortgage dated 20-5-1967. Rs. 3000.00
(Three thousand) cash received today. Total Rs. 16000.00- Delhi, Dhanwant
Singh Dated 4-5-1971. 4-5-1971 "
(10) Reference may also be made to another document being letter dated 16-5-1970
which was written by Dhanwant Singh to Malhotra, the plaintiff. It is Ex. P-12. The
relevant portion of this letter reads :-
"WITH reference to your letter, telegram and notice I hereby inform you that
I have made the following payments towards interest of equitable mortgage
deed of 20-5-1967 for Rs. 13000.00 in your favor and request you to wait for
another three months for full payment. Interest will be paid regularly"-..."
(11) Various issues were framed by the trial court. The trial court held that there was
an 'equitable mortgage' in respect of property No. J-7/24. It, however; held that the
transfer of this property in favor of Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, defendant No. 5, was not
subject to equitable mortgage in as much as he was a bona fide purchaser for value
and had taken all reasonable care and had acted in good faith. The trial court
negatived the contention of Dhanwant Singh that he had paid back the full amount of

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loan and interest to Malhotra. Accordingly, it passed a decree with costs for Rs.
17500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum in favor of the plaintiff and
against Dhanwant Singh defendant No. 1 only.
(12) The expression 'equitable mortgage' does not find mention in the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. S. 58(f) of the Act describes mortgage by deposit of title deeds.
It is as good as any other mode of creating a legal mortgage where under there will
be transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgages. The expression
'equitable mortgage' which is known in the English law is loosely used to mean a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Rather it can be said that in India a mortgage by
deposit of title deeds is commonly known as an equitable mortgage but its incidents
are not the same as that of an equitable mortgage under the English law. In K.J.
Nathan v S.V. Maruthi Rao and others MANU/SC/0235/1964 : [1964]6SCR727 ,
distinction between an equitable mortgage, as understood in the English law, and the
mortgage, by deposit of title deeds has been brought out by the Supreme Court.
Subha Rao J., (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the court, observed as under:-
"UNDER this definition (referring to S. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act)
the essential requisites of mortgage by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt,
(ii) deposit of title deeds, and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be
security for the debt. Though such a mortgage is often described as an
equitable mortgage, there is an essential distinction between an equitable
mortgage as understood in English law and the mortgage by deposit of title
deeds recognised under the Transfer of Property Act in India. In England an
equitable mortgage can be created either, (l)by actual deposit of title-deeds,
in which case parol evidence is admissible to show the meaning of the
deposit and the extent of the security created, or (2) if there be no deposit of
title-deeds, then by a memorandum in writing, purporting to create a security
for money advanced : see White and Tudor's Leading Case in Equity, 9th
Edition, Vol. 2 at p. 77. In either case it does not operate as an actual
conveyance though it is enforceable in equity ; whereas under the Transfer of
Property Act a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the modes of
creating a legal mortgage where under there will be transfer of interest in the
property mortgaged to the mortgagee. This distinction will have to be borne
in mind in appreciating the scope of the English decisions cited at the Bar.
This distinction is also the basis for the view that for the purpose of priority
it stood on the same footing as a mortgage by deed."
(13) It will thus be seen that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is like any other
mortgage and there is a transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the
mortgagee. The question, Therefore, of the subsequent purchaser having bought the
property subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds bona fide, with or without
notice, is of no relevance. The subsequent purchaser cannot avoid the mortgage by
leading evidence to show that he made all reasonable inquiries to find out if the
property was subject to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or not. S. 48 of the
Transfer of Property Act does not admit of any such exception. According to this
section, when a person purports to created, by transfer at different times, rights in or
over the same immovable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised
to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special
contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights
previously created. Further, proviso to S. 48 of the Registration Act enacts that a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds shall take effect as against any mortgage deed
subsequently executed and registered relating to the same property. Thus, a -
subsequent sale cannot have priority over a mortgage by deposit of title Seeds
created before the sale. In my view, Therefore, the trial court fell in an error in

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holding that Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, the subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged
property, was not liable on the ground that he took all reasonable care and acted in
good faith.
(14) Before us the argument proceeded on a different line. It was argued by Mr. C.B.
Thanai, learned counsel for Harjeet Singh Dhanjal, that the memorandum (Ex. P-2)
was compulsorily registrable under S. 17 of the Registration Act and as the same was
not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence and any oral evidence was barred
under S. 91 of the Evidence Act. At the time when Ex. P-2 was put in evidence it was
objected to on the ground of admissibility. The trial court has not touched this point
in its judgment. It is a legal point, and a vexed one. The law relating to registration
of a document, like in the instant case, is to be found in S. 59 of the Transfer of
Property Act and Ss. 17(b), 48 and 49 of the Registration Act.
(15) There have been quite a number of cases in the High Courts all over the country,
some of which reached the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, in which a
mortgage, alleged to have been effected by deposit of title deeds, has been
accompanied by a written document, and in which a question has arisen as to
whether that document was of such a character as to require registration. The
decision in each case has turned upon the nature of the document in question. It is,
Therefore, unnecessary to multiply the authorities, and it would be sufficient if
reference is made to some of the cases decided by the Privy Council and the Supreme
Court and also to one decision of this court.
(16) In M. Subramannian and another v. M.L.R.M. Lutchman and others
MANU/PR/0062/1922 : AIR 1923 Pc 50, it was held that if the memorandum was of
such a nature that it could be treated as the contract for the mortgage which the
parties considered to be the only repository and appropriate evidence of their
agreement, it would be the instrument by which equitable mortgage was creased and
would come within Section 17 of the Registration Act. Lord Carson, speaking for the
Board, observed :
"TURNING to the document itself, one is led to the same conclusion. "We
hand you herewith title deeds, etc......This please hold as security, etc.- .-
Please also hold this as further security." Their Lordships have no doubt
Therefore that the memorandum in question was the bargain between the
parties, and that without its production in evidence the plaintiff could
establish no claim, and as it was unregistered it ought to have been
rejected."
In Rachpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka and others MANU/SC/0046/1950 :
[1950]1SCR548 , the Supreme Court dealt with the question of registration of the
memorandum given along with the title deeds. Patanjali Sastri, J., (as his Lordship
then was) who spoke for the court, stated the law as under :
" WHEN the debtor deposits with the creditor the title deeds of his property
with intent to create a security, the law implies a contract between the
parties to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is required under
section 59 as in other forms of mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce
the contract to writing, the implication is excluded by their express bargain,
and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the
deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are
essential ingredients in the creating of the mortgage. As the deposit alone is
not intended to create the charge and the document, which constitutes the
bargain regarding the security, is also necessary and operates to create the

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 charge in conjunction with the deposit, it requires registration under section
17, Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an
interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one
hundred rupees and upwards. The time factor is not decisive. The document
may be handed over to the creditor along with the title deeds and yet may
not be registrable, .........".
In Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ayyar MANU/PR/0138/1931, dealing with a
memorandum which consisted of a list of the title deeds and contained a recital that
'As agreed upon in person, I have delivered to you the undermentioned documents as
security', the Privy Council held that it recorded particulars of documents which, it
stated, had been delivered as security in pursuance of an agreement reached in
person. It did not state what were the terms of the agreement nor did it indicate the
nature of the matter for which the deeds were deposited as security. Since the
memorandum in question did not embody the terms of the agreement between the
parties, it was held, that it did not require registration. In Hari Shankar v. Kedar Nath
MANU/PR/0022/1939, the Board was of the opinion that :
" WHERE, as here, the parties professing to create a mortgage by deposit of
title deeds contemporaneously eater into a contractual agreement, in writing,
which is made an integral part of the transaction and is itself an operative
instrument and not merely evidential, such a document must under the
statute be registered,"
In United Bank of India v. Lakharam S. & Co. AIR 1965 Sc 159 the Supreme Court
examined the question as to whether the memorandum required registration. It held
that:
"APPLYING the principle to the present case, we consider that the letter at Ex.
7(a) was not meant to be an integral part of the transaction between the
parties. The letter does not mention what was the principal amount borrowed
or to be borrowed. Neither does it refer to rate of interest for the loan. It is
important to notice that the letter does not mention details of title deeds
which are to be deposited with the plaintiff-bank. We are, Therefore, of the
opinion that the view of the High Court with regard to the construction of Ex.
7(a) is erroneous and the document was not intended to be an integral part
of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the
immovable property. It follows, Therefore, that the document-Ex. 7(a)-did
not require registration under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act."
In V.G. Rao v. Andhra Bank MANU/SC/0602/1971 : AIR1971SC1613 , Hegde, J.,
while dealing with the law relating to the nature of a memorandum given along with
the deposit of title deeds or one filed thereafter, held as under :
" THEREFORE, the crucial question is : Did the parties intend to reduce their
bargain regarding the deposit of the title deeds to the from of a document ?
If so, the document requires registration. If on the other hand, its proper
construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that
the parties did not intend to do so, then, there being no express bargain, the
contract to create the mortgage arises by implication of the law from the
deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document being merely
evidential does not require registration."
In Parkash Dev v. New Bank of India MANU/DE/0056/1968 : AIR1968Delhi244 a
Division Bench of this court held that where the memorandum itself constitutes the
bargain, registration is necessary.

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(17) The question which falls for determination is whether the memorandum (Ex. P-
2), having regard to its true construction and the circumstances in which it came into
existence and passed into the hands of Malhotra, is an instrument which purports or
operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in
future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, in respect of the
property sought to be mortgaged. The memorandum has been reproduced above. It
is of the same date on which the loan was raised and a pronote (Ex. P-l) was written
by Dhanwant Singh in favor of the plaintiff Malhotra. Though this memorandum
refers to the creation of an equitable mortgage it gives the particulars of the bargain
contract between the parties. Also, though it refers to a past transaction, if a
reference is made to the statement of Malhotra, it shows that he admits that the
pronote (Ex. P-1) and the memorandum (Ex. P-2) 'were written at one and the same
time at my house'. The document was contemporaneously written and cannot be said
to record a past transaction. Applying the principles enumerated in the decisions
mentioned above, the memorandum (Ex. P-2) contains the terms of the contract
between the parties. It mentions the amount of loan. rate of interest and details of
the property in respect of which equitable mortgage' is stated to have been already
created. In my view, the answer would be in the affirmative, and this documents
required registration and is, Therefore, in admissible in evidence. This, however,
does not conclude the matter.
(18) It is nobody's case that the documents, receipt Ex. P-6, receipt Ex- P-8 and
letter Ex. P-12 required registration.
(19) The fact remains that the title deeds were with Malhotra. He has stated that
when further loans were raised the same were done on the security of these
documents of title Admittedly, it is not necessary that a memorandum in writing
should pass while creating a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Three things are
requisite for such a mortgage :(1) debt, (2) deposit of title deeds, and (3) an
intention that deeds shall be security for the debt. In K.J. Nathan's case (Supra), the
Supreme Court has held that physical delivery of document by the debtor to the
creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may be a constructive deposit. The
court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there is delivery of title
deeds by the debtor to the creditor If the credit or was already in possession of the
title deeds, it would be hypertechnical to insist upon the formality of the creditor
delivering the title deeds to the debtor, and the debtor delivering them back to the
creditor. When the loan of Rs. 4500.00 was taken by Dhanwant Singh on 20-5-1967
a consolidated pronote of the previous loan of Rs. 8500.00 and the present loan of
Rs. 4500.00 was executed. Similarly, when further loan of Rs. 3000 was taken on 4-
5-1971, another consolidated pronote of Rs. 16000.00 was written by Dhanwant
Singh in favor of Malhotra. The receipt dated 4-5-1971 refers to a sum of Rs.
13000.00 on account of 'equitable mortgage' created on 20-5-1967 for Rs. 3000.00 .
This receipt is for a total amount of Rs. 16000.00 . The letter dated 16-5-1970 also
refers to the 'equitable mortgage' of 20-5-1967 for Rs. 13000.00 .Malhotra has said
in his statement that the subsequent amounts were advanced on the security of the
title deeds already lying with him, and since he has not been cross examined on this
point, his statement has to be believed, and it has to be held that there was a
mortgage by deposit of title deeds for a sum of Rs. 7500.00 (comprising the two
subsequent loans of Rs. 4500.00 and Rs. 3000.00 ) in respect of property No. J-7/24,
Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. It follows, Therefore, also that Malhotra is entitled to
interest at the rate of 7"% per annum on this amount of Rs. 7500.00 as was agreed
to between him and Dhanwant Singh. This rate of interest is permissible under S. 5
of the Punjab Relief and Indebtedness Act, 1934, as extended to Delhi. The first loan
of Rs. 8500.00 was advanced on 18-5-1966 when document Ex. P-2 was stated to
have been executed. In the documents, Exs. P-6, P-8 and P-12, there is no reference

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to any 'equitable mortgage' of 18-5-1966. Since document Ex. P-2 has been held to
be inadmissible in evidence the judgment of the trial court decreasing the suit of
Malhotra to the extent of Rs. 8500.00 with interest against Dhanwant Singh has to be
affirmed, though on a different ground. Now, since the principal amount of Rs.
16000.00 has been held to consist of two distinct transactions of Rs. 8500.00 (Ex. P-
l) and Rs. 7509.00 (Ex. P-6 and P-8), it appear, fair that the claim of interest of Rs.
1500.00 in the suit is split up into two respective amount of Rs. 800.00 and Rs.
700.00 . Thus, for the amount of Rs. 9300.00 (Rs. 8500.00 plus Rs. 800.00 ), there
is no mortgage, and only the amount of Rs. 8200.00 (Rs. 7500.00 plus Rs. 700.00 )
is secured by mortgage of property stated above.
(20) It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that while
drawing up the decree the trial court has taken into consideration the certificates of
fee filed by counsel for the defendants which fee certificates, according to the
counsel, were submitted after the commencement of the argument, and ought not to
have been allowed. This argument overlooks the relevant clauses 16 and 17 of
Chapter 168 of Vol. I of the High Court Rules and Orders. According to clause 16, the
fee certificate has to be filed before the final hearing. The import of the words 'before
the commencement of the arguments' is Therefore not correct. Even otherwise, the
court can always extend the time.
(21) For the reasons recorded above, it is held as under :-
(1)The appeal against defendants-respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 is dismissed
with costs. (2) The judgment of the trial court decreasing the suit of the
plaintiff to the extent of Rs. 9300.00 with costs against defendant respondent
No. 1 only and also awarding interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the
principal amount of Rs. 8500.00 from the date of the institution of the suit
till realisation is affirmed. (3) The appeal against defendants-respondents
Nos. 1 and 5 for the amount of Rs. 8200.00 is, however, allowed with costs,
granting a mortgage decree for the amount of Rs. 8200.00 together with
interest at the rate of 7% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 7500.00
from the date of the institution of the suit till recovery. The plaintiff appellant
is accordingly granted the usual mortgage decree under Order 34, Rule 4, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and it should be stated in the decree that if the
defendants-respondents Nos. I and 5 do not pay the amount within a period
of six months from today, the mortgaged property No. J-7/24, Rajouri
Garden, New Delhi, as described in the plaint, would be sold for the
satisfaction of the amount due to the plaintiff-appellant.
(22) The appeal is partly allowed.

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