Criminal Law 2 Case Digest (For Prosecutor Garcia's Class)

Book 2: The Revised Penal Code and Related Special Penal Laws
A CASE DIGEST OF THE SIGNIFICANT JURISPRUDENCE

IN CRIMINAL LAW 2
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A Case Digest
Submitted to
Prof. Victoria C. Garcia, LLB.
Faculty of Civil Law
University of Santo Tomas
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In Partial Fulfillment
Of the requirements for the degree,
Juris Doctor
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By
JHAYRONE A. DE ROXAS
1A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Galvante v. Casimiro .................................................................................................................... 1
Geroche v. People .......................................................................................................................... 2
Gonzales v. Abaya ......................................................................................................................... 3
People v. Estonilo .......................................................................................................................... 5
Sydeco v. People ............................................................................................................................ 7
Desmoparan v. People .................................................................................................................. 9
Ursua v. Court of Appeals .......................................................................................................... 11
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.......................................................................................................... 12
People v. Kusain Amin ............................................................................................................... 13
People v. Andaya ......................................................................................................................... 14
People v. Enumerable ................................................................................................................. 15
People v. Gonzales....................................................................................................................... 17
People v. Hilario .......................................................................................................................... 19
People v. dela Cruz ..................................................................................................................... 21
People v. Morilla ......................................................................................................................... 23
People v. Laylo ............................................................................................................................ 25
Araullo v. Ombudsman .............................................................................................................. 27
Acejas III v. People ..................................................................................................................... 30
Torres v. People ........................................................................................................................... 32
Cantos v. People .......................................................................................................................... 33
Ysidoro v. People......................................................................................................................... 35
Lumauig v. People ....................................................................................................................... 36
Go v. Sandiganbayan .................................................................................................................. 37
People v. Go ................................................................................................................................ 39
Javier v. Sandiganbayan ............................................................................................................ 41
Ambil Jr. v. Sandiganbayan ....................................................................................................... 42
Nava v. Palattao .......................................................................................................................... 44
Caunan v. People ......................................................................................................................... 46
Organo v. Sandiganbayan .......................................................................................................... 48
“Jinggoy” Estrada v. Sandiganbayan ....................................................................................... 50
People v. Dalag ............................................................................................................................ 52
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
FELICIANO GALVANTE, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA,
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE
DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT, Respondents.
Galvante v. Casimiro
FACTS: Crimes AgainsttheFundamentalLawsoftheState
Petitioner Galvante is a retired police officer. Petitioner recalled that he was at his friend’s house,
retired officer Percival Plaza to talk about his retirement benefits and how the procedure for the
claim could be conducted. Petitioner alleged that respondents blocked his way and ordered him
and his companions to raise their hands at gunpoint so they could frisk the former for any firearms
in possession. Respondents then went to the petitioner’s owner jeep and conducted a search on the
said vehicle, finding a .38 caliber pistol under the mat. The respondents also asked for the
Memorandum Receipt (MR) as proof of the proper ownership of the said pistol; petitioner, claims
that he gave it right away because he was at gunpoint.
Petitioner went to the Trent Police Station to report the incident and he was detained with an armed
civilian. The Prosecutor’s Office recommended that the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearms
against the petitioner be dismissed on the grounds of what the police officers did against him, being
against his own right to security and privacy.
Petitioner was charged with Illegal Possession as violation of a COMELEC issued election gun
ban. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation and concluded that petitioner failed
to establish the facts of the complaints in the affidavit. The Prosecution Officer then concluded
that the incident is tantamount to a valid warrantless arrest.
Ombudsman Ruling: Dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the criminal case for Illegal Search and Grave Threats against Respondents
prosper.
HELD:
NO. The charge of Illegal Search is not a crime punishable by the Revised Penal Code or even by
any Special Law. The RPC only punishes two (2) crimes for Warrantless Searches which are: (1)
Search Warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of such legally obtained warrants,
and (2) Searching the domicile without a witness.
The Information failed to allege any of violations of Arts. 129 or 130. Petitioner merely accused-
appellant the respondents of illegal search. The case of Arbitrary Detention was also dismissed for
wanting of the second element. The elements of Arbitrary Detention are: (1) offender is a public
officer, (2) he detains the person, and (3) such detention is without legal grounds. In the case at
bar, the one who detained Galvante was not the same person, not the respondents. The Court
recommends that the proper venue to seek judicial remedy for Illegal Search is to file a civil case
for damage because Illegal Search is a violation of the Civil Code and not any penal statute.
1
JHAYRONE A. DE ROXAS UST Faculty of Civil Law Criminal Law 2 – 1A
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias

"TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Geroche v. People
FACTS:
Prosecution claims that on the night of 14 May 1989 at around 10PM, the Barangay Captain,
Edigardo Geroche, along with his companions from the CAFGU unit, broke into and searched the
newly purchased house of Baleriano (formerly owned by one Roberto Mallo) in Brgy. Greenhills,
Cotabato without the former’s consent. Baleriano testified that he was sleeping that night and was
suddenly awakened by the petitioners. The latter then subdued him and searched the house, finding
an airgun which they took.
The petitioners countered the crime charged with the defense of denial and alibi, stating that they
were at home with their respective families during the alleged incident and only went outside the
night before the incident to patrol for reports of cattle rustling.
RTC Ruling: The RTC acquitted petitioners for failure of the Prosecution to prove that the
offenders were public officers contemplated in the Revised Penal Code. RTC convicted them of
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
CA Ruling: CA reversed the decision stating that the mere judicial admissions of them being
barangay captain and CAFGU members respectively are sufficient to prove them being public
officers. CA convicted petitioners of guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion by violating their right against
double jeopardy.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held that perfecting an appeal in a criminal case reopens it for new sets
of evidence and review of questions not previously raised by the parties. As such, an appeal waives
the double jeopardy clause because appealing for the previously rendered decision is an estoppel
for the party which invoked it.
SC affirmed the CA Decision with modification to penalty.
Petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of domicile.
2
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents
Gonzales v. Abaya
FACTS: Crimes Against Public Order
On 27 July 2003, petitioner Trillanes along, with 300 enlisted junior officers of the AFP mostly
from the elite units Army Scout Rangers and Navy Special Welfare Group, entered the Oakwood
Premiere Luxury Apartments, Ayala Avenue, Makati and instigated an armed protest against then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Equipped with high-powered artillery and cladin the red
armbands representing the Magdalo Faction, they disarmed the guards and planted explosive
devices in the vicinity. They aired their grievances for the latter’s rampant graft and corruption,
illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the “enemies”, and the alleged intentional bombing of
Davao to gain the support of the US Army. They also demanded her resignation as the President,
presumably also as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, and also the resignation of her Cabinet
and top brass members of the AFP.
President Arroyo then declared a State of Rebellion and ordered the AFP and PNP to take all
measures to suppress it. After negotiations, the faction then laid down their arms, defused the
bomb, and surrendered.
The DOJ the filed a case of coup d’ etat against the 321 who surrendered in an Information at the
RTC of Makati; consequently, AFP Chief-of-Staff Narciso Abaya ordered the arrest of the 321 for
violations of the Articles of War (Article 70). 243 of the 321 filed a motion to suspend proceedings
with JAGO until the proper jurisdiction has been assumed. Out of the 321, the DOJ saw probable
cause for 31 of its members and proceeded to submit an amended information to the RTC.
Following the findings of the pre-trial investigation, PTIP recommended that utilizing the Doctrine
of Absorption is the best recourse seeing as the crime was not service-related but in furtherance of
the coup d’ etat.
RTC Ruling: No crime was charged in the RTC because petitioners were granted the writ of
prohibition they petitioned for.
ISSUE: WON the granting of the writ of prohibition meritorious.

HELD:
NO. The petitioners are not entitled to the prohibition.
RA 7055 distinguished the court jurisdiction between the kind of offender following: (1) if the
coup d’ etat was committed by civilians, they must be tried before civilian courts, and (2) if the
3
offender is a member of the military, the military courts have jurisdiction. However, the law also
stated an exception to which the civilian courts may assume jurisdiction if it determines that the
crime was not service-related. Another exception to the exception is that if the President directs
before arraignment the jurisdiction to the civil courts.
The Supreme Court held that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service
connected. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation
of their solemn oath as officers to “defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities”.
Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same
dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. The penalty is purely disciplinary
in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the
stringent standard of military discipline. The SC found the decision of the RTC in determining the
nature of the crime as a “not service-related offense” is tantamount to judicial amendment of the
law.
4
G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO,
EDELBRANDO ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO,"
ITCOBANES "NONONG NONOY ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large, TITING GALI
BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO large, TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a.
"NEGRO MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA
CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE
LB RANDO ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a.
"NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA
CRUZ," Accused-Appellants.
People v. Estonilo
FACTS:
Deceased Floro Casas was the District Supervisor of public schools in the Municipality of Placer
in Masbate. On 5 April 2005, he was shot dead by six armed assailants while outside the vicinity
of Celera Elementary School. The medical autopsy records show that Floro sustained gunshot
wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the sizes of the slugs recovered and that some
of them were fired at close range.
The prosecution presented eyewitnesses to testify on the facts of the incident, one Serapion and
Antipolo. Both of which the defense tried to discredit with the question on their pending criminal
charges and are just out on bail. Prepondering on the weight of the said witnesses’ testimonies, the
RTC took credence to them and were fully admitted by the Court.
Based on the testimonies given, alias Nonoy and Negro were found to be the principals by direct
participation while four other accused-appellants were regarded as accomplices.
Deceased’s son Felix Casas testified that on the day prior his father’s shooting, he was summoned
by accused-appellant Mayor Estonilo to talk about the election matters wherein he claims that the
mayor threatened his father due to the latter’s support for another candidate. When pieced together
saw a common design on the conspiracy and declared Mayor Carlos Estonilo Sr. as principal by
inducement, along with his son Rey.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with
Murder qualified by evident premeditation.
CA Ruling: Affirmed with modification to penalty.
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant were guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
YES. They are guilty. There are two modes of committing Direct Assault.
5
Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that (1) there
must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or
his agent; (2) the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and (3) the accused-appellant knew that the victim is a person in
authority or his agent, that is, that the accused-appellant must have the intention to offend, injure
or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
In this case at bar, deceased was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, thereby
a person in authority. The RPC also stated that in case the person in authority dies proximately
with the commission of the direct assault, a higher penalty is imposed as it will be a complex crime.
6
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,

vs.
Sydeco v. People
FACTS:
On 11 June 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar together with other police officers were manning a
checkpoint, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick-up. The police officers flagged the
vehicle down and asked petitioner to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police
station situated nearby, before he resumes driving. Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was
smelling of liquor, denied being drunk, he yelled at the officers and insisted he could manage to
drive. Aguilar proceeded to arrest petitioner who put up resistance and brought him to the hospital
where he was examined and found to be positive of alcohol breath. On the other hand, Sydeco
averred that he was signaled to stop by the police officers and asked him to open the vehicle’s door
and to alight from the vehicle for a body and vehicle search, a directive he refused. By this remark,
the policemen told him that he was drunk.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed to be a victim in the incident, adding in this regard that he
has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against
P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit averred that, in the
early morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and
waitress, respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay, were on the way
home from on board his pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately
referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the
policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle
search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened
the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this
remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turned out, then told the petitioner that he was
drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s
explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was
ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his
head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang
sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the
police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife.
MTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of driving under influence and
resisting arrest.
RTC Ruling: Affirmed MTC Ruling.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty as charged.

HELD:
7
NO. The lower courts, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on 12 June
2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but
on the testimony of SPO4 Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers were
acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of
liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult
to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec.
56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation
has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act
of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term
defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol
concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of
intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under
Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight
not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher
shall be conclusive proof that said driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from
the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone
conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under
the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall be
given retroactive insofar as they are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly
modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec.
3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the charges against him.
8
G.R. No. 233598 March 27, 2019
JUVY DESMOPARAN A.K.A. "MASYADOR," Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Desmoparan v. People
FACTS: Crimes Against Public Interest
On 27 February 2012 Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of ₱ 105,000.00 from
Cebu CFI Community Cooperative – Dumaguete Branch. He presented himself to be an employee
of the City Engineer’s Office, by using the name “Rodulfo M. Cordura” to the loan clerk. To
support his application for loan petitioner submitted the following documents: (1) application of
membership form of CFI; (2) special power of attorney coupled with interest; (3) deed of
assignment (4) certification from the City Human resources office; (5) certificate of employment
from the City Human resources office; (6) service record signed by Henrietta N. Zerna; (7)
promissory note dated 27 February 2012. All said documents were reflected under the name
“Rodulfo M. Cordura” as the loan applicant and debtor.
To get the initial cash advance Desmoparan also presented his employee’s ID bearing the name
“Rodulfo M. Cordura” to the cashier of CFI Menerva Perocho. Because of misrepresentation,
Perocha released ₱ 20,000 then ₱ 10,000 after and the last check was also ₱ 10,000.; all of which
were signed under the name “Rodulfo M. Cordura”
However, the real Rodulfo M. Cordura, went to CFI to verify the information. He identified
himself as the real Cordura a retired government employee previously connected with the City
Engineer’s office. He found out by receiving a bill for the loan through their payroll maker. On
the same day the manager of CFI caught, Efrain Mercado using the name and credentials of a
certain Aldrin John Z Catan to apply for loan. During the investigation Mercado revealed that it
was petitioner Desmoparan who recruited him to submit bogus loan application with CFI.
Desmoparan then was apprehended and arrested.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of complex crime of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification in penalty.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

HELD:
YES. In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment
of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so
that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
In the instant case, Desmoparan used the falsified documents bearing the name and qualifications
of Cordura in fraudulently applying for a salary loan, which resulted in the eventual release and
9
withdrawing of the cash advance amounting to a total of P40,000.00 from CFI. Clearly,
Desmoparan employed deceit by falsifying loan documents in order to take hold of the money and,
thereafter, convert it to his own personal use and benefit, resulting in the damage and prejudice of
CFI and Cordura.
It must be emphasized anew that when the offender commits on a public, official, or commercial
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 17128 of the Revised Penal Code
as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex crime.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex
crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an
offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People, we have held that falsification of a commercial document may be a means
of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated; damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other
words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official
or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission
of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
In this case, Desmoparan could not have succeeded in getting hold of the money without falsifying
the loan documents bearing the name and qualifications of Cordura, and make it appear that he is
actually the real Cordura. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa,
and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to
defraud CFI.
10
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner Ursua was a community environmental and natural resources officer assigned to
Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato, filed a
complaint on the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation into the complaint for
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and unjustified benefits by Ursua and other officials of the
DENR
On 1 August 1989 Atty. The petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Palmones, wrote to the Ombudsman's office
in Davao to furnish a copy of the complaint against the petitioner. Due to the firm’s messenger by
the name of Oscar Perez being out due to some personal affair, Atty. Palmones then asked his
client Ursua to submit the letter himself and just sign “Oscar Perez” on the log book to conceal
his identity, due to the latter’s worries of the office recognizing him as one of the accused-
appellant.
While at the People's Advocate's Office in Davao, the security officer asked to record in the
logbook. Instead of writing his name, the petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez, after which he
was told to go to the Administrative Department. for the copy of the complaint. Claiming the said
the document, he again signed Oscar Perez as consignee. Before the petitioner could leave the
premises, he was met by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office.
They talked for a while, then he left. When Loida found out that the person who appeared as Oscar
Perez was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a client of Josefa Amparo in his gas station, Loida
reported the incident and petitioner was charged accordingly with a violation of the Anti-Alias
Law.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violating the Anti-Alias Law
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC Decision with modification to penalty.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of violating the Anti-Alias Law.

HELD:
NO. The SC held that there are two (2) essential elements in the said crime which must concur:
(1) the use of the alias publicly, and (2) its habitual use. CA 142 defined alias as a name the person
intends to use publicly and habitually in business transaction aside from that which is (1) registered
at birth, at the (2) Immigration Office, or (3) that which has been granted use by a competent Court.
The SC held that the use of such name was on an isolated case, neither used publicly nor habitually.
11
G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In addition to the case of plunder filed against respondent, a separate charge of violation of the
Anti-Alias Law (CA 142) was also filed. The charge alleged that the use of a name other than his
real name was for the purpose of concealing his ill-gotten wealth and identity as President.
Respondent made the use of the alias “Jose Velarde” on multiple occasions: (1) On 4 February
2000, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) where respondent opened an account;
(2) A certain Baby Ortaliza transacted several times at the PCIB-Greenhills Branch where deposits
were made on the account of “Jose Velarde”.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Dismissed due to the prosecution’s failure to prove the use of the name
(1) habitually and (2) publicly.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of violating CA 142.

HELD:
NO. In Ursua v. Court of Appeals, it was held that in order for the use of illegal alias to be
committed, it must be used (1) habitually and (2) publicly. In the case at bar, there was no proof
that respondent Estrada intended to make use of said alias to be known in the general public and
that the transactions were isolated transactions.
12
G.R. No. 215942
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
KUSAIN AMIN y AMPUAN, a.k.a. "Cocoy,", Accused-Appellant.
People v. Kusain Amin
FACTS: Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
At around 5:40 PM of 2 January 2004, at Landless, Colrai, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro, the
accused-appellant Amin was caught by the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation
as the seller of the shabu presented in the case with approx. weight of 0.09g valued to more or less
₱ 100 and sold it to a poseur-buyer of PNP-CDO for a consideration of ₱ 100.00 marked money
one (1) piece one hundred pesos bill with serial number FA246643, well knowing it to be a
dangerous drug.
The accused contended that there was no valid buy-bust operation, because the arresting team had
not coordinated the matter with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), that the
prosecution's failure to present the poseur-buyer weakened the arresting team's testimonies.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Decision.
ISSUE: WON the non-presentation of the witness is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that prior coordination with the PDEA is not necessary to make a
buy-bust operation valid, the court is constrained to reverse the findings of the CA because the
non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the cause of the prosecution. In People v. Andaya,
the importance of presenting the poseur-buyer's testimony before the trial court was underscored
by the Court in this wise:
The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is
arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing,
or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private
person. The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the
State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond
reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the
presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.
Accused-appellant is therefore acquitted on reasonable doubt.
13
G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014

vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.
People v. Andaya
FACTS:
On 16 December 2002, an entrapment operation was conducted on the house of accused-appellant
Andaya. The buy-bust operation was readied and two (2) ₱ 100 were marked as X and was given
to the poseur-buyer asset. The poseur-buyer knocked on the door of the accused and the transaction
was consummated. The pre-determined signal was given and the police officers approached and
arrested Andaya.
SPO2 Lopez received the marked money and the specimen; which was transferred to SPO2
Mercado who recorded it to the police blotter; and from Mercado, the specimen confiscated was
sent to the Regional Crime Lab and was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu).
In his defense, accused claimed that he was with his family when the operation happened and the
police searched the house. Finding no gun or drugs, he was arrested and was later released. He
received a subpoena from the public prosecutor’s office three days after.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling in toto.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.

HELD:
NO. Andaya is acquitted due to reasonable doubt.
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs
Act of 2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that
the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti. Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. Burden of proof is on the State.
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the
pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of
the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and
Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the
trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would
have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being
positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed
transaction.
14
G.R. No. 207993 January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GERARDO ENUMERABLE y DE VILLA, Appellant.
People v. Enumerable
FACTS:
On 27 May 2004 at 11:30 AM, an entrapment operation was prepared by the Batangas Police
Station at a Petron Gas Station in Lipa. Two (2) pieces of ₱ 500 were marked along with false
money to make the appearance of that amounting to ₱ 24,000. PO3 Villas was the poseur-buyer
under the guise of alias “Gerry”. Villas approached the seller and the transaction went through and
the marked money was exchanged for three (3) sachets weighing 9.88g; they proceeded to arrest
accused-appellant Enumerable afterwards.
The confiscated contraband labeled EMV 1-3 were taken into custody by PO3 Villas at around
5:30 PM the same day; however, it was only transferred to the regional crime laboratory at 2:30
PM of 4 June 2004, an eight (8) day interval. The laboratory results yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant can be convicted of Illegal Sale if the unbroken chain of
custody could not be established.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that the chain of custody is not indispensable provided that there is a valid
reason for failing to do such. Under the original provision of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, after
seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team is required to immediately conduct a
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) a
representative from the media and (3) from the DOJ; and (4) any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is assumed that the
presence of these persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up," i.e., they are
"necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity." Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel; (2) an elected public official; and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service
or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It must be
emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain
requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: (1) media
representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the
media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done
in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available
representative of the National
15
Prosecution Service; (3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency
of the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the
requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
A perusal of the records of this case shows that during the inventory, there was no indication that
it was witnessed by a representative from the media and the National Prosecution Service, as well
as that of any barangay official. Although PO1 Flores, during his testimony, claimed that a
barangay official was present during the inventory, he did not offer any explanation as to why the
said barangay official did not sign the inventory receipt nor was there any explanation as to the
absence of a media representative and a representative from the National Prosecution Service,
The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses was not
obtained for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the
place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for
and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts
sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of
being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. (Citation
omitted)
Incidentally, in this case, no explanation, whatsoever, was provided as to the absence of the
required witnesses to the inventory. Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show
valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that, during the
proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived
deviations from the requirements of the law.37 Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must
be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence.
The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but
also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they
took to preserve the integrity of the seized item.38 A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required
where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting,
tampering, or alteration.
16
G.R. No. 229352, April 10, 2019
vs.
LEMUEL GONZALES Y BANARES, Accused-Appellant
People v. Gonzales
FACTS:
At around 6:00 PM on 8 August 2007, a male person appeared at Police Station 11, Quezon City,
informing the officers of an alleged illegal sale of dangerous drugs by one alias "Memel" at
Jollibee, Araneta Ave., cor. Quezon Ave., Quezon City. As such, P/Insp. Gatus formed a team
composed of PO1 Flores, SPO4 Abong, PO1 Bautista, PO3 Carranza, and a certain PO1 Ignacio.
Gatus instructed Bautista to prepare the request for coordination with the PDEA and also instructed
PO1 Flores to act as the poseur-buyer.
On the same day, at around 8:00 PM, the team proceeded to the designated place. After Flores and
the informant alighted from the vehicle, the latter pointed towards the appellant who was standing
outside Jollibee, Araneta Avenue. The two approached appellant. The informant and appellant
talked; and then, the latter approached Flores and asked the latter how much he would get. Flores
replied, "dalawang piso" which meant ₱200 worth of shabu. As Flores handed appellant the
marked ₱200 bill, the latter, in turn, opened the compartment of his motorcycle and gave Flores a
sachet containing white crystalline substance. Flores then lit a cigarette, a signal to the buy-bust
team that the sale had been consummated. Immediately thereafter, the rest of the team approached
appellant. Abong held appellant and told him to empty his pockets. Abong was able to recover the
marked money; he arrested the appellant and apprised him of his constitutional rights. Flores then
searched appellant's motorcycle and found another sachet containing what appeared to be shabu,
and then properly marked the sachets that were confiscated.
Afterwards, the buy-bust team brought appellant to Police Station 11 where an inventory was
made, and the requests for drug test and laboratory examination were prepared. Flores turned over
the seized sachets to the investigator, Bautista, who prepared the requests. Flores brought the
seized sachets and the requests to the Crime Laboratory. Police Insp. Villaraza received the seized
items and conducted a qualitative examination of the contents of the sachets and found them
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty as charged.

HELD:
NO. Petitioner is acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be
convicted of the said violation, the following must concur:
(1) [T]he identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
17
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and
that the procured object "is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same
drugs seized from the accused."
Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following must be proven before an accused can be convicted:
[1] [T]he accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized
by law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous
drugs.
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the
accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges. In People v. Gatlabayan, the Court held that it
is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the
buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the
illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the
very same substance recovered from the suspect. Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose
"as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
18
G.R. No. 210610

vs.
MARILOU HILARIO y DIANA and LALINE GUADAYO y ROYO, Accused-appellant
People v. Hilario
FACTS:
Lone witness for the prosecution was PO1 de Sagun of the PNP - Lemery, Batangas. PO1 de Sagun
testified that on 22 January 2008, at around 11:00 PM, he was with P02 Magpantay and PO1
Cabungcal in Sitio Bagong Barrio, Brgy. Maguihan, Lemery, Batangas, to conduct surveillance
and a buy-bust operation. PO1 de Sagun, in civilian clothes, acted as poseur-buyer and was able
to buy shabu for ₱500.00 from Hilario. Upon consummation of the sale, POI de Sagun personally
arrested Hilario and marked the ₱500.00-bill he paid Hilario as "NBS-1" and the shabu Hilario
sold to him as "NBS-2." After the arrest, POI de Sagun brought Hilario to the Lemery police station
and turned over custody of Hilario to the investigator-onduty, but PO1 de Sagun could not recall
the name of said investigator. PO1 de Sagun also claimed that he prepared an inventory of the
seized items in the presence of "Ma'm Orlina" and Sims Garcia, representatives from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively. PO1 de Sagun then brought the seized
items to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination, and according to him,
the submitted specimen tested positive for shabu.
PO1 de Sagun further recounted that during the buy-bust operation, Guadayo ran away, so PO2
Magpantay had to chase after her. When P02 Magpantay subsequently caught up with Guadayo,
he recovered and confiscated from her another sachet of shabu. PO1 de Sagun, though, admitted
that he was not personally present when PO2 Magpantay seized the sachet of shabu from Guadayo.
During PO1 de Sagun's direct examination, a brown sealed envelope was presented, and when
opened, it contained two heat-sealed transparent sachets of shabu. When questioned as to why
there were two sachets of shabu, PO1 De Sagun maintained that he confiscated only one sachet
from Hilario, and suggested that the other sachet was the one seized by PO2 Magpantay from
Guadayo. Between the two sachets of shabu, PO1 de Sagun identified the sachet marked "NBS-1"
as the one which he confiscated from Hilario.
For the defense, Hilario and Guadayo claimed that on 22 January 2008, at about 10:00 in the
evening, they were both at Hilario's house. Hilario was tending to her sick 12-year-old daughter,
and Guadayo was there to help Hilario with the laundry. A neighbor, Feliciano Anuran, had just
arrived to borrow a DVD, when three police officers entered Hilario's house. Among the police
officers, Hilario already knew PO1 de Sagun at that time because the latter frequented their place.
The police officers demanded that Hilario show them the money and shabu. Hilario replied that
she did not have any money and shabu. Without presenting any warrant, the police officers,
particularly, PO1 de Sagun, then searched Hilario's house, but found nothing. At this point, Anuran
ran out of the house and was chased by the police officers. When the police officers returned, they
invited Hilario and Guadayo to the police station to answer some of the police officers' questions.
When Hilario further inquired as to the reason for the invitation, the police officers told her to just
go with them. The police officers brought Hilario, Guadayo, and even Hilario's sick daughter to
the police station, and after only a short stay at an office in the police station, and without actually
19
being asked any questions, all three were put in jail. On January 23, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo
were subjected to a drug test, and on 24 January 2008, they were brought to Batangas City for
inquest proceedings.
RTC Ruling: Petitioner Hilarion is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal

Sale (Sec. 5) and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (Sec. 22). Guadayo is GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling on petitioner’s conviction for Illegal Sale; but acquitted both
accused on charges of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Illegal Sale.

HELD:
NO. Petitioner is acquitted due to reasonable doubt.
The SC based the acquittal on the inconsistencies of the testimony of PO1 de Sagun.
Clearly, from the circumstances and discrepancies of de Sagun’s testimonies, the identity and
integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de Sagun from Hilario were not preserved,
despite PO1 de Sagun's assertion that he had been in possession of the said sachet from its seizure
from Hilario until its turnover to the crime laboratory. The prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral certainty.
When there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined and
established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of
a prohibited drug. The prosecution's failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from
Hilario was the same one presented in court is fatal to its case.
It is fundamental in the Constitution and basic in the Rules of Court that the accused in a criminal
case enjoys the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Likewise, it is well-established in
jurisprudence that the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the
prosecution fails to discharge this burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal. On the
other hand, if the existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is established by the prosecution,
the accused gets a guilty verdict. In order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense.
The evidence for the prosecution were insufficient in material details and fraught with
discrepancies and contradictions. PO1 de Sagun himself, who claimed to have seized, marked, and
kept custody of the sachet of shabu seized from Hilario, could not positively identify which
between the two sachets of shabu he was presented with at the trial, marked as "NBS-I" and "NBS-
2," was the one he actually seized from Hilario. Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court
cannot merely rely on the presumption that PO1 de Sagun regularly performed his official duties.
20
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
People v. dela Cruz
FACTS:
On 8:00 AM of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the National Bureau of
Investigation - Central Visayas (NBI-CEVRO) received a Complaint from Corazon Absin) and
Charito Escobido claiming that at 1:00 AM of that same day, Ariel Escobido, the live-in partner
of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be
police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and
when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police
Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu. In the said police office, they met alias "James" who
demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate
the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even
received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took
place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu. The
officers were able to nab PO2 Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked ₱ 500 bill dusted with
fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by
Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic
examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit
his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as
indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs)/
Defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. Dela Cruz denied the charges and testified that
while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents.
When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he
refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his
lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violation of Sec. 15, Art. II of
RA 9165 (Illegal Use of Dangerous Drugs).
ISSUE: WON mandatory drug tests may be conducted to those crimes not under RA 9165.
HELD:
NO. Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to
21
the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second
time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person
tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for
under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act,
but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with
R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others,
the "importation," "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; being
"employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal
chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; "manufacture or delivery"
or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during
parties, social gatherings or meetings"; "unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals." To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
Petitioner is therefore acquitted.
22
G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
People v. Morilla
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Mitra and Morilla were the municipal mayor and ambulance driver of
Panukulan, Quezon respectively. On 13 October 2001, in Brgy. Kiloloran, Real, Quezon Province.
While in the middle of transport by means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing
plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance
of Panukulan, Quezon Province were apprehended by police officers on checkpoint. At first, the
Starex van was able to pass through but upon stopping the ambulance, the police saw white crystal
particles falling from sacks. The officers were able to identify the substance as positive
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with an approximate weight of five hundred three point
sixty-eight (503.68) kilos, without authority to possess such.
Mayor Mitra denied involvement saying that he was merely asked to transport such to Manila by
a certain Ben Tan without such knowledge of the illegal drugs. The prosecution claimed that there
was a conspiracy based from the mere acts of the two (2) accused.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Transport of Dangerous
Drugs
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to the existence of a conspiracy which would make
Mayor Mitra liable.
HELD:
YES. The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it
is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire
to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were
on convoy from Quezon to Manila.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the
dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act
means "to carry or convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial that
Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex
van going to Manila.
23
24
G.R. No. 192235 July 6, 2011

vs.
ROLANDO LAYLO y CEPRES, Appellant.
People v. Laylo
FACTS:
On 17 December 2005, while conducting anti-drug surveillance operations in civilian clothes,
police officers Reyes and Pastor were able to apprehend and arrest accused-appellant Laylo while
he and his live-in partner, Ritwal, offered PO1 Reyes shabu. When accused brought out two (2)
packets of shabu, the police officers immediately introduced themselves as police officers and
arrested the two. Upon frisking Ritwal, they were able to find another sachet of shabu in a SIM
card case.
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from Laylo and
Ritwal and forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing.
Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the laboratory examination on the
specimens submitted and found the recovered items positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Accused-appellants claimed that they were set up and the sachets were planted by the said police
officers when they were at a sari-sari store. Their son and three (3) neighbors corroborated their
version of the story, but to no avail.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Attempted Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellants are guilty of Attempted Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
HELD:
YES. Section 3(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration.
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who were presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner. The RTC stated that Reyes and Pastor were
straightforward and candid in their testimonies and unshaken by cross-examination. Their
testimonies were unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their material points. The RTC
added that the denial of appellant Laylo is weak and self-serving and his allegation of planting of
evidence or frame-up can be easily concocted. Thus, Laylo’s defense cannot be given credence
over the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. From the testimonies given,
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively
identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to
be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution
witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of ₱200.00 for each sachet had been
made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police
officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner
25
Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged
with attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful
acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided
under this Act:
xxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.
26
G.R. No. 194157 July 30, 2014
ROMEO R. ARAULLO, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, HON.
GERARDO C. NOGRALES, HON. ROMEO L. GO, HON. PERLITA B. VELASCO,
HON. ARDEN S. ANNI, ATTY. FILOMEMO B. BALBIN, ATTY. ERNESTO P. TABAO
and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Respondents.
Araullo v. Ombudsman
FACTS: Crimes Committed by Public Officers
Petitioner Araullo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Club Filipino. His labor complaint
was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter Fedriel Panganiban, whose ruling was affirmed by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Upon appeal, however, both the Court of Appeals
and this Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed from employment. Club Filipino was then
ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages and other monetary benefits. His
labor complaint was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter Fedriel Panganiban (LA Panganiban),
whose ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Upon appeal, however, both the Court of Appeals and this Court ruled that Araullo was illegally
dismissed from employment. Club Filipino was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him
his full backwages and other monetary benefits. Following the finality of the decision in his favor,
Araullo filed with Panganiban a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. Panganiban, however,
inhibited from further hearing the action, resulting in a re-raffle and assignment of the case to
Labor Arbiter Anni. Araullo’s motion for execution was approved by Anni, who issued a writ of
execution ordering the sheriff’s collection of the amount of ₱ 2,338,152.25, as determined by the
Computation and Examination Unit. The issuance of the writ was questioned by Club Filipino on
the ground that it had filed a Motion to Recompute the judgment award, which remained
unresolved by the Labor Arbiter.
Club Filipino then filed its Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. Before the motion to quash
could be heard, LA Anni issued an Order quashing the writ and lifting the notice of garnishment
upon Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands. Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ,
Araullo filed a petition to set aside LA Anni’s order. When Araullo’s motion for reconsideration
was denied by the NLRC, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint
against respondent LA Anni and other labor officials charging them of violating Article 206 of the
RPC and RA No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Araullo alleged that Anni is guilty of issuing an unjust interlocutory order for granting the motion
to quash filed by Club Filipino despite the fact that his counsel was not furnished with a copy of
the said motion. Anni ordered the quashal of the writ of execution without conducting any hearing
which was tantamount to a denial of Araullo’s right to due process.
Ombudsman Ruling: Dismissed. The Office of the Ombudsman reasoned that the deferral in the
execution of the judgment in favor of Araullo could not be attributed to the respondents in the
criminal complaint. The presumption that the respondents regularly performed their official duty
was not overcome by sufficient evidence. The LA’s and NLRC’s rulings were rendered pursuant
to the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. This finding then barred a prosecution for violation of
27
Article 206 of the RPC. For the claim of violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Office of the Ombudsman
also found no probable cause given Araullo’s failure to establish that the respondents to his
complaint gave undue advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal case filed by Araullo.
HELD:
NO. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Office of Ombudsman did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s case on the ground that the lack of probable
cause was rightly invoked by said Office.
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. "[It]
can only find support in facts and circumstances that would leada reasonable mind to believe that
the person being charged warrants a prosecution." To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the
complainant, then should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed.
In addition, there should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the
respondents, to at least support a ruling that would call for their further prosecution. Specifically
for the charge of violation of Article 206 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of unjust
interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the orders issued by the respondents to
his complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the Office of the Ombudsman
correctly held that LA Anni’s order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC’s
resolution affirming it, were not unjust. Contrary to Araullo’s claim, the rulings of the labor
officials were in accordance with law and the rules of the NLRC, specifically since Rule XI,
Section 4 of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure provided that:
Sec. 4. Computation during execution. – Where further computation of the award in the decision,
resolution or order is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no writ of
execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order
issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter.
Similarly, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the complaint for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. A violation under this provision entails the following:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
(3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.28
The second and third elements are wanting in this case.1âwphi1 With the Court’s finding on the
correctness of the LA’s and NLRC’s rulings, there could have been no undue injury suffered by
Araullo notwithstanding the mentioning that notwithstanding the labor officials’ rulings, Araullo
was not even left without any remedy to enforce the final judgment in his favor. The NLRC’s
endorsement of his case to the arbitration branch of origin was merely for the resolution of pending
28
incidents in the case. It was necessary to hear these matters first in order to ensure that all the
parties to the case were afforded due process.Time and again, the Court has emphasized that
"[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except
only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed."
There was also no showing that the labor officials’ actions were performed with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence.
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment
but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. x x x [It] contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want
of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected.
29
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

vs.
x--------------------------------x
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
Acejas III v. People
FACTS:
On 17 December 1993, Vladimir Hernandez went to the house of Takao Aoyagi and his wife
Bethel, presenting himself as the representative of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on
official business to inform the latter of his charges against him in Japan and their allegations that
the latter is a Yakuza Boss. Hernandez claims that Takao has connections with the drug trade and
is overstaying as an alien in the country.
Takao then presented his passport and signed the undertaking Hernandez was asking for as the
latter would subject himself to the Bureau’s investigation. His passport was also taken as an
assurance that he would not be evading the proceedings by leaving. The BID Chief of Operations
and Intelligence Division ordered that Takao be put under custodial investigation.
Appellant Acejas then met with Takao in order to present himself as his counsel on their pending
case. Takao negotiated for the return of the passport and decided to report. Acejas was involved in
an extortion scheme with Fernandez.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Acejas, Conanan, Hernandez, and Perlas are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Direct Bribery. Victoriano acquitted for reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting accused-appellant for Direct Bribery.
HELD:
NO. The Sandiganbayan was right to convict them of Direct Bribery. The accused-appellant are
gulty of the second punishable act of Direct Bribery. The elements of second act are (1) Offender
is a public officer as provided in Art. 203, (2) he accepts an offer or promise or receives gifts or
presents by himself or through another, (3b) he agrees to perform an act which does not constitute
a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, present, (4) the act is executed with the
performance of his duties.
In the case at hand, Hernandez, a public officer, took Takao’s passport and refuses to return it
without payment. Petitioner Acejas failed to disprove why he also received sum payment for
passport as witnesses claim he did so willingly.
30
The SC ruled that there was a conspiracy because of the common design of the act regardless if
the petitioners failed to prove executing the same acts. Therefore, Acejas and Hernandez are liable
as principles while the others are taken as accomplices.
31
G.R. No. 175074 August 31, 2011
JESUS TORRES, Petitioner

vs.
Torres v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner Torres was the principal of Viga Rural Development High School (VRDHS). He ordered
the school bursar, Lazado, to prepare the checks containing the salaries of their teachers and other
employees for the months of January to March. Heeding to his superior’s order, Lazado issued
three (3) checks amounting to ₱ 196,654.54 under the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Petitioner
then took the checks and proceeded to encash them and did not return thereafter. Petitioner claimed
that his failure to come back was because he flew directly to Manila to have a check up for a
medical condition concerning chest pains he has been experiencing. And soon after was mugged
by armed men who took the bag containing the cash. He supported his claim by presenting his
police blotter dated 29 April 1994.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Malversation of Public Funds

CA Ruling: Appeal was outrightly dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of the RTC
whether in the exercise of their original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the Court erred in convicting him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds (dolo)
HELD:
NO. Malversation of Public Funds may be committed through (1) intentional (dolo), through a
positive act, and (2) negligence (culpa), through passive acts. The Court also held that the two
ways of committing Malversation of Public Funds are mere modalities and does not prejudice the
case. They are mere terms which are punished with the same penalty.
The elements of Malversation of Public Funds are: (1) offender is a public officer, (2) he had
custody or control of funds or property by reason of his office, (3) such funds or property were
public funds and property of which he is accountable, and (4) he appropriated, took,
misappropriated, or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to
take them.
In the case at bar, petitioner is a (1) public school principal (2 and 3) he is liable as an accountable
officer as contemplated in Art. 127 because his position involves receiving public funds and
accounting for the said funds, which he failed to do, (4) he committed any of the four punishable
acts.
32
G.R. No. 184908 July 3, 2013
MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS, Petitioner,

vs.
Cantos v. People
FACTS:
Major Joel G. Cantos is a Commanding Officer of the 22nd Finance Service Center in the
Presidential Security Group, Malacañang. On 21 December 2000, called Major Balao, the
disbursing officer of the 22nd division. at around 12 noon to his office and notified him about the
missing Special Duty Allowance for December and other Maintenance Operating Expenses under
his supervision all amounting to P3 Million pesos. When he asked Major Cantos where he kept it
and asked why he did not keep the money in a safety vault, there was no response from Cantos.
Balao further narrated that he was instructed by Major Cantos to get a screwdriver to unscrew the
safety vault and make it appear that the money was stolen from the vault. Instructions on getting
the combination number of the vault from a certain Major Mendoza in Taguig were also given to
Balao but he was not able to find Mendoza. When Balao went back to the office, Col. Espinelli
tried to make him disclose that he took the money.
Petitioner’s defense was that he was informed by Major Mendoza that the safety vault where he
wished to keep the money was defective and so he kept the money in a duffel bag in a steel cabinet.
At that time, he had the keys to the steel cabinet. The next day, he narrated that the duffel bag with
the money was gone. At first, they wanted to make it appear that the money was stolen by
unscrewing the vault. But, Cantos later informed Gen. Diaz about the lost money and was advised
to relay the incident to Col. Espinelli to which Espinelli made an investigation.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of malversation of public funds.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds.

HELD:
YES. The elements of malversation of public funds were present: (1) that he is a public officer
who, (2) by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property; (3) he
shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property,Despite the failure of the prosecution to prove that there was intent to gain on the
petitioner’s end, petitioner Cantos failed to explain satisfactorily the missing money amounting to
₱ 3 Million and restitute the amount upon demand. The reasons he gave – the funds being stolen
and forcibly taken -- were not well-supported by evidence. There was no trace of the steel cabinet
where he placed the money being opened by force and it was only Cantos who had the keys to the
said steel cabinet. His explanation was insufficient and did not overcome the presumption that he
had put the missing funds to personal use. Even if no direct evidence of misappropriation exists, it
33
was mentioned that the only required element is that there is shortage in the officer’s account which
has not been able to be explained adequately.
34
G.R. No. 192330 November 14, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner

vs.
Ysidoro v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner was the mayor of Leyte when the violation was committed. The Municipal Social
Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance
Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials for the indigent calamity victims with which
to rebuild their homes. Lolita Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-Charge sought the help pf Cristina
Polinio, an officer in charge of the Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) which rationed food to
malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines
in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what
remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries. Petitioner approved the release and signed the
withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 from the savings
of the SFP to CSAP.
On 27 August 2001, Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed a complaint
against Ysidoro for committing technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP
goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for
the poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the
Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP
beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of technical
malversation.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of technical malversation.

HELD:
YES. The elements of technical malversation are: (1) that the offender is an accountable public
officer; (2) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use;
and (3) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
Good faith is not a valid defense for technical malversation. Petitioner insists that he acted in good
faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him,
but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods
could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be
convicted of the crime. But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law
punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public
purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act
is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.
35
G.R. No.166680 July 7, 2014
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, Petitioner

vs.
Lumauig v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner was the former mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During petitioner’s incumbency, he
obtained the cash advance of P101, 736.00 which was intended for the payment of freight and
insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of
Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He
claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles
were already turned over to the municipality. In January 1998, COA Auditor Paguirigan examined
the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista. During the course of her
examination of the records and related documents of the municipality, she came across a
disbursement voucher for the said amount and further records revealed that no payment intended
for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August 1994. She likewise
claimed that she prepared two letters to inform the petitioner of his unliquidated cash advance but
the same were not sent to him because she could not get his exact address despite efforts exerted.
She averred that on June 4, 2001, petitioner paid the subject cash advance before the treasurer of
the municipality.
Petitioner alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand from COA to
liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay when he
came to know that he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not to prolong the issue, he
paid the amount of P101, 736.00 to the municipal treasurer on 4 June 2001.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Acquitted of graft and corruption but GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of failure of accountable officer to render accounts.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of failure of accountable officer to render accounts.

HELD:
YES. Prior demand to liquidate is not a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the RPC.
Article 218 consists of the following elements: (1) that the offender is a public officer, whether in
the service or separated therefrom; that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (2) that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on
Audit, or to a provincial auditor; (3) and that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such
accounts should be rendered. Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand
before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime.
The Court appreciated the act of restituting the said funds as akin to that of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
36
G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
Go v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The case arose out of the nullification of the Concession and Development contracts between the
Government through the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of
Trade (DOTC) with PAIRCARGO CONSORTIUM (which was succeeded by PIATCO
(Philippine International Air Terminals Co.)) for the reason that PIATCO’s predecessor was not
qualified for it did not meet the financial capability requirement under the Build Operate and
Transfer Law.
Consequently, the Corporate Secretary Pesayco of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation (which
was the rival of PIATCO’s predecessor) filed a complaint against Sec. Rivera of the DOTC and
Henry Go as President of PIATCO, before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Sec. 3(g)
of RA3019- entering into contracts grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Go questions via a Motion to Quash the information against him arguing lack of probable cause,
but more importantly that he cannot be held liable under the said provision by reason that he was
not a public official.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Denied Motion to Quash.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash claiming that
he is not a public officer.
HELD:
NO. Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public officer
does not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Go’s
simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as
embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the
principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court had
ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private
persons: x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the
nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character
or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this
construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019
37
was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and private
persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to both
public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less
than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
38
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
People v. Go
FACTS:
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On 16 September 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case.

HELD:
YES. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary
Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should
have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a
public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.
39
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement
is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This
means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance
of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes
no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death
of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator
is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta as to the nature of and
the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to
wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement
to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty
of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
40
G.R. Nos. 147026-27 September 11, 2009
CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Javier v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
RA 8047, also known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act” was enacted into law
in 1995. The primary goal of the said law is to promote the continuing development of the book
publishing industry, through the active participation of the private sector, so that adequate supply
of affordable and high-quality books are ensured for the domestic and export market. A Governing
Board (National Book Development Board) was created to achieve the purpose of the law. NBDB
works under the administration and supervision of the Office of the President.
Petitioner Javier was appointed to the Board as the private sector representative. Part of her
functions is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies.
On 29 September 1997, the Office of the President issued Petitioner Javier an authority to travel
to Madrid, Spain to attend a book fair. She was given ₱139, 199. Unfortunately, Petitioner Javier
was not able to attend the book fair. She was asked to return the money, but she failed to do so.
Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds.
Petitioner claimed that she is not liable because she is neither a public officer or an employee with
salary grade 27.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of malversation of
public funds.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is subject to Ombudsman’s sanctions even though she is from a private
sector representing NBDB.
HELD:
YES. Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.
The Governing Board is the government agency mandated to develop and support Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency (i.e. an agency created by law). It partakes
public functions, thus whoever is appointed to be part of it is considered a public officer.
Even if the petitioner was a private sector representative, she was nevertheless given “sovereign
function” of the government to achieve the goal of RA 8047 (“Book Publishing Industry
Development Act”), which is to ensure full development of the book publishing industry of the
State.
41
G.R. No. 175457 July 06, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 175482
vs.
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
Ambil Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Petitioners Ambil Jr. and Apealdo Sr. were the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar and
Provincial warden, respectively. Petitioner Ambil Jr., ordered the release of then criminally
charged and detained Mayor Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the
governor’s residence. They allowed said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambils residence for a
period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order.
Petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information; they argued however, that Adalim’s
transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by
his detention at the provincial jail.
The Governor claimed that since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted
benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to
Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor
pursuant to his duty as a Provincial Jailer under the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering
this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of duty. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy
between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely
following the orders of a superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes
immunity from criminal liability.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violating Section 3e
of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for violating Section 3e of RA 3019.

HELD:
YES. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1)
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2)
he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers. The acused shall be
in the jurisdiction of Sandigan bayan because Governor’s salary grade is more than 27 and Apelado
42
is a co-accused even though he has only a salary grade of 22. As to the second element, SC find
that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of
Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention
that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the Provincial
Jailer of Eastern Samar. As to the third element it is also present. In the case at hand, the
Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to
Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and
detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the
applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not
applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses,
permits or other concessions and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the
purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer.
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.'s willful cooperation in
executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court
order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the
law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is
elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law
expressed reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners
Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally responsible as
conspirators.
43
G.R. No. 160211 August 28, 2006
VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner,

vs.
The Honorable Justices RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, GREGORY S. ONG, and MA.
CRISTINA G. CORTEZ-ESTRADA as Members of the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division,
and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Nava v. Palattao
FACTS:
In the Audit Report prepared by COA Regional Office, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to
have been released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the newly
nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the initiative of petitioner Nava, a
meeting was called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to
use the money or allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In
other words, instead of referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the
nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities, petitioner succeeded in
persuading his seven (7) schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of
science education facilities for the calendar year 1990.
In the purchase of SLTD's, the provision on the conduct of a public bidding was not followed.
Instead the purchase was done through negotiation. The items were purchased from two stores in
Metro Manila. As disclosed by the audit report, the prices of the SLTDs as purchased from the
above-named sellers exceeded the prevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on
the mathematical computation done by the COA audit team. The report concluded that the
government lost P380,013.60.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violation of Section
3g of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Co-accused were acquitted due to lack of conspiracy.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3g of RA 3019.

HELD:
YES. To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly
proven that (1) the accused is a public officer; (2) the public officer entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence
presented warranted a verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the
transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The
discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased
by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
44
It must be emphasized however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an
administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3(g); namely, that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and
gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was
not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption.
Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are
strictly construed against the government.
45
G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04 September 2, 2009
OFELIA C. CAUNAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 182020-24
JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Caunan v. People
FACTS:
Petitioners Caunan and Marquez were the City Budget officer and City Mayor of Parañaque,
respectively. Along with four (4) other local government officials of Parañaque City and Antonio
Razo, they were charged of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
They entered into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass,
with ZARO Trading for the purchase oof "walis ting-ting" on several occasions at without
complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements
on procurement and Public Bidding.
To ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998, the audit team made
a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of Parañaque City. The Audit
team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the name suppliers of Parañaque City but when
the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, they were occupied by other business
establishments. Thereafter, the audit team purchased from a supplier that sold walis tingting in Las
Piñas City.
Both petitioners insist that the fact of overpricing, upon which the charge against them of graft and
corruption is based, had not been established by the quantum of evidence required in criminal
cases, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners maintain that the evidence of overpricing,
consisting of the report of the Special Audit Team and the testimony thereon of Bermudez,
constitutes hearsay and, as such, is inadmissible against them. In addition, petitioner Marquez
points out that the finding of overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as required
by COA Memorandum No. 97012 dated March 31, 1997.16 In all, petitioners asseverate that, as
the overpricing was not sufficiently established, necessarily, the last criminal element of Section
3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 — a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government — was not proven
Sandiganbayan Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violation of Section
3g of RA 3019.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 3g of RA 3019.

46
HELD:
NO. They must be acquitted due to reasonable doubt. Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the
accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question
we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
injurious or disadvantageous to the government. We agree with petitioners that the fact of
overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given
the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the
gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the
conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant
the petitions.
In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA’s finding of
overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit team’s report. The audit team’s
conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following
documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by
the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers;
(3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price
listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases
of Las Piñas City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by
petitioners and the other accused relative to Parañaque City’s walis tingting transactions. Evidence
of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of
Parañaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the
other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Parañaque City street
sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence
presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have
been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that
the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make
a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
47
G.R. No. 133535 September 9, 1999
LILIA B. ORGANO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Organo v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
At around November 1996 to February 1997, petitioner Organo, along with three (3) other co-
accused, acquired funds belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank
account with the Landbank of the Philippines, West Triangle Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, for
and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposited therein money belonging to the
government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments, then withdrew therefrom the
total sum of One Hundred Ninety Three Million Five Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Seventy Nine
& 64/100 (₱193,565,079.64) without proper authority, through checks made payable to themselves
and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the accused.
On 15 August 1997, Special Prosecution Officer Jose T. de Jesus, Jr., filed with the Sandiganbayan
an Information against petitioner, together with others, for the crime of "plunder" or violation of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case despite the latter being
neither public officer or an employee with salary grade 27 and above.
HELD:
NO. Republic Act No. 7080, Section 3 provides:
Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This law was enacted on September 23, 1991, and was effective on October 7, 1991.
On February 5, 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was approved, further defining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Sec. 4 of the law provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in sub-section a of this section in relation to their office.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27"
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
48
This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is a special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan of "small fry" cases. In an unusual manner,
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the
penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary
grade of accused government officials and employees.
However, the crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until otherwise
provided by law." Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special law that
provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed in Republic
Act No. 7080.
Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade "27" or
higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
in relation to their office.
49
G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
“Jinggoy” Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against the former President
of the Philippines Joseph Ejercito Estrada, five (5) criminal complaints against the former
President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On 4 April 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the
filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal charges against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the charges was for the plunder under Republic Act No. 7080
and among the respondents was the former’s president’s son the petitioner in this case Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On 24 April 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on
the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional for vagueness
and that it charged more than one offense.
On 25 April 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused.
On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law. On 30 April 2001,
petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put
him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in
illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A.
No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's "Motion to Quash and
Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." Petitioner's alternative prayer to post bail was set
for hearing after arraignment of all the accused. Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act
alleged in subparagraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of "receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for
illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit…”
ISSUE: WON petitioner may be tried for plunder.

HELD:
YES. The constitutionality of plunder has been settled in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan and beyond
question. With respect to the second issue, while it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) through their individual acts conspired with the former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
₱4,097,804,173.17, as the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
50
accused persons named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former
President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in subparagraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money
in the aggregate amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit…”
However, if the allegation should be proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It. will be
no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the
other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, viz.:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million
pesos (₱50,000,000.00) (now ₱75,000,000.00 under RA 7080, as amended) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."
The Court added that it cannot fault the Ombudsman for including the predicate offenses alleged
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended information in one and not four separate Informations.
The court explained the history of the Anti-Plunder Law, thus:
A pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz.:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic
treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts
done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so
many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts
and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public
funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in
Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the
possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar
inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.”
51
G.R. No. 129895. April 30, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee

vs.
PO3 ARMANDO DALAG y CUSTODIO, Appellant
People v. Dalag
FACTS: Crimes Against Persons
Accused-appellant PO3 Dalag is a PNP officer assigned in Bacolod City. He is married to deceased
Leah Nolido to whom he had three (3) children with. The marriage was not a peaceful one because
it often leads to arguments and violent altercations wherein deceased often end up with severe
contusions and bruises all over her body.
At the night of 15 August 1996, the children, while watching the television, heard a commotion
outside the yard caused by a quarreling Armando and Leah. The cause of the quarrel was because
the deceased admonished the accused-appellant of his alcoholism. Accused-appellant went to a
point when he could no longer manage his temper, he beat down the deceased; in the process, he
managed to puncture his foot on a nail lying on the floor. Leah, despite beaten, advised Armando
to stay put as she will look for some medicine for the wound. Leah ran to the house of their
neighbor Tia Fely and accused-appellant chased her and pushed her. The children saw their mother
unconscious and was ordered by their father to pour some water on her face so she could regain
consciousness; but to no avail. Accused-appellant tried to perform a mouth to mouth resuscitation,
but again to no avail.
Leah remained unconscious even the following day to which they decided to take her to the
hospital. She never again regained consciousness until she died on 22 August 1996. The medico-
legal examinations found that the cause of death was severe intracranial hemorrhaging caused by
a blunt force on the head.
The station commander, upon learning of Leah’s death ordered PO3 Dalag to not leave the station;
however, Armando left without permission and hid. Five days later, he voluntarily surrendered
himself to the station. Accused-appellant’s defense was mainly couched on denial, claiming that
she hit her head by accident. However, the Court dismissed such defense due to the weight of the
autopsy findings.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The Court took cognizance of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty as charged with the MCs of Voluntary Surrender and
Passion and Obfuscation.
HELD:
YES. He is guilty of parricide. The elements are: (1) a person is killed, (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused-appellant, and (3) deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused-
appellant. The Court however did not appreciate the Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and
Obfuscation because it believes that the victim cannot be faulted for trying to escape being
assaulted.
52
G.R. No. 182551 July 27, 2011

vs.
ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Accused-Appellant.
People v. Rebucan
FACTS:
On November 2002, in Carigara, Leyte, accused-appellant Rebucan assaulted 65-year old Felipe
Lagera and his one-year old grandson Ranil Lagera-Tagpis Jr. with a bolo that the accused-
appellant had provided himself for the purpose of committing the crime. Felipe sustained three
hacking wounds where he suffered hypovolemic shock and massive blood loss due to the multiple
hackings which was the proximate cause of his death. Ranil sustained a hacking wound at the
fronto-temporal area with a skull fracture which led to his instantaneous death.
Renerio Arminal, a human rights officer and the Punong Barangay, testified that on November 6,
2002, the accused-appellant surrendered to him. The latter came to him alone and told him that he
fought with Felipe Lagera. Accused-appellant was apparently avenging his wife’s sexual
molestation by Felipe and his son.
The testimonies of the grandchildren of the deceased were admitted as the primary evidence in
convicting accused-appellant.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder qualified
by evident premeditation and alevosia.
CA Ruling: Affirmed decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty as charged and entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of vindication of grave offense and intoxication.
HELD:
YES. He is guilty for double murder.The elements of the crime of murder are: (1)The evidence of
the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery,
thus qualifying the same to murder. According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed
with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not
fall within the provisions of Article 246. Furthermore, the killing of a child is characterized by
treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown; for the weakness of the victim due to his
tender years result in the absence of any danger to the accused-appellant.
With regard o the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same
cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code requires that the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. In the case at bar, a period of four days
was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have regained his
composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of
the accused-appellant.
53
G.R. No. 197807 April 16, 2012

vs.
CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING, Accused-Appellant
People v. Lagman
FACTS:
One afternoon, Maniego was seated inside the sidecar of a motorcycle with her mother, Sicor.
Without warning, the accused-appellant approached her and punched her face several times. The
accused-appellant turned on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks.
Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that
the barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse,
deceased Jondel Santiago, at the house of his mother. On her way there, she saw the accused-
appellant stabbed Santiago four (4) times while the latter was about to light a cigarette. The
distance between where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine
(9) meters. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to the hospital but
he later succumbed to his wounds and died.
Accused-appellant was arrested and brought to police station where she was charged with one
count of the crime of murder for killing Santiago.
On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused-appellant for almost ten
years and had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused-appellant got angry with
her when she eloped with Santiago. Lagman relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery.
CA Ruling: Affirmed decision of the RTC in its totality.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty as charged of the crime of murder.

HELD:
YES. Lagman is guilty of murder. The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused-appellant killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was accused-
appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiago’s killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The SC held that in order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present:
(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused-
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning,
done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
54
chance to resist or escape. These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago.
We quote with approval the appellate court’s finding on the presence of treachery:
In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without warning, stabbed him
four times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend
himself from appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellant’s act of suddenly
stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery.
55
G.R. No. 198954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.

RODRIGO MACASPAC y ISIP, Accused-Appellant
People v. Macaspac
FACTS:
On 7 July 1988, at 8:00 PM, accused-appellant Macaspac, along with four (4) others, including
deceased Jebulan, were on a drinking session. Accused-appellant and Jebulan then came to an
argument where the former was so agitated that he threatened them by saying, “Hintayin niyo ako
d’yan, wawalisin ko kayo”, and left. He later returned wielding a knife and suddenly stabbed
Jebulan after the latter tried to calm him down. Jebulan was dead on arrival in the hospital.
Accused-appellant tried to invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense claiming that they
both scuffled for the possession of the knife and stabbed him immediately after getting possession
of the knife. He later recanted and said Jebulan fell on the knife while trying to pacify a fight
between one Barcomo and Danny.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of murder qualified by treachery.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC decision but modified damages.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of murder.

HELD:
NO. The Court disagreed that the killing may be attendant of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely:
one, (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which
·give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, (2) said means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the
killing and raises it to the category of murder.
The Court believed that the act of announcing a threat rendered the act of killing to be expected.
The Court also dismissed accused-appellant’s claim that the killing was self-defense because
unlawful aggression was wanting from the deceased.
Accused-appellant was thereby acquitted of murder and convicted with homicide instead.
56
G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 213886
JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,
vs.
Wacoy & Quibac v. People
FACTS:
On 11 April 2004, at 3:00 PM, deceased Elner Aro was engaged on a fight with accused-appellants
Wacoy and Quibac. Prosecution witness Edward Benito testified that he saw Wacoy kicked his
cousin twice on the stomach while the latter was already on the ground. Wacoy was also supposed
to throw a rock at the deceased but was stopped. Accused-appellant Quibac also punched deceased
on the stomach causing the latter to collapse in pain. Deceased was taken to the hospital wherein
the deceased suffered a cardiac arrest during the operation and was put to a comatose state. Due to
financial constraints, he was pulled out of the hospital against the advice of the doctors. He died
the following day. The death certificate indicated “cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a
perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling” as the cause of death. The result
of the autopsy also revealed that the direct cause of death was a rupture of the aorta secondary to
blunt trauma on his body.
Defendants denied the accusations claiming that his death was due to self-defense because
deceased Aro was unruly due to his drunkenness.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of death caused in a tumultuous
affray because the prosecution failed to establish a criminal conspiracy and the extent of injuries
suffered causing deceased’s death.
CA Ruling: Modified conviction to homicide with the mitigating circumstance of aberatio ictus.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellants are guilty of homicide.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision to modify conviction from death caused in
a tumultuous affray to homicide.
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who
shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
57
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several
persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. Based on
case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
On the other hand, homicide is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246, shall kill another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion
temporal. The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder,
or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.
In the case at hand, there was no tumultuous affray because there were only two (2) assailants who
attacked a defenseless individual, and since Wacoy and Quibac were readily identifiable, it cannot
be said that the deceased died in such circumstance.
58
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, Accused-appellant
People v. Abarca
FACTS:
On the afternoon of 15 July 1984, accused-appellant Abarca failed to come home to Tacloban after
the 2:00PM trip had an engine problem. So, he decided to just go to his father’s home to wait for
the next trip. At around 6:00PM, accused-appellant arrived home and found his wife, Jenny, and
deceased Khingsley Paul Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. Koh and Jenny began an illicit affair
while the latter’s husband, accused-appellant was in Manila for his review. When the wife and
Koh noticed the accused-appellant, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The
accused-appellant who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran
away.
The accused-appellant went to look for a firearm at Tacloban. He got an M-16 rifle from a certain
“Talbo” and went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded
to the hangout of Kingsley Koh. The accused-appellant found Koh playing mahjong and fired at
him three times with his rifle. Koh was hit and died in the instant. Arnold and Lina Amparado who
were occupying the adjacent room were also hit by the shots fired by the accused-appellant. Arnold
and Lina Amparado were rushed to the hospital and were rendered timely medical assistance that
prevented their deaths.
The Solicitor General upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court due to the death penalty imposed,
claims that accused-appellant should be entitled to the privilege of Art. 247 or Death or Physical
Injuries under Exceptional Circumstances because he killed Koh for immediate vindication.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with two counts
of frustrated murder.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court agrees with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that Art. 247 be
applied.
Art. 247 provides that, “Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall
be exempt from punishment” xxx
In the case at bar, the SC ruled that the term “immediately after” should not be construed strictly
with the accused-appellant Abarca since the proximate cause of the killing was the infidel act itself.
59
As to the double frustrated murder charge for the Amparados, the Supreme Court held that death
under exceptional circumstance is not murder; therefore following such, the crimes committed
against the Amparados is not tantamount to frustrated murder but only less serious physical injuries
because there was no intent to kill, as justified under Art. 247.
Accused-appellant is therefore acquitted of the crimes charged and modified the conviction to
death under exceptional circumstance and less serious physical injuries. The penalty being arresto
mayor, which is higher than destierro.
60
G.R. No. 212161 March 29, 2017

vs
JUANITO ENTRAMPAS, Accused-Appellant
People v. Entrampas
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Entrampas and BBB are common law spouses co-habiting with each other for
eight years (8), along with AAA who is the latter’s daughter from a previous relationship. They
have been living together as a family in Brgy. Bawod, San Isidro, Leyte.
At around 5:00PM sometime in February 2003, accused-appellant ordered 11-year old AAA to go
upstairs while the latter was preparing dinner for the family. AAA followed and in the room she
was forced to the floor by accused-appellant and was threatened should she shout for help he or
told anyone about the act, he would kill them. Accused-appellant then took off AAA’s panty and
inserted his penis. AAA cried for him to stop as it was hurting her and her vagina was bleeding.
The raping happened for so many times over a couple of months following the first act and AAA
remained silent because of the threat on her and her mother’s lives. On July 2003, BBB, noticed
her daughter’s belly growing bigger so she went to CCC, his brother to ask for help. They
conducted a pregnancy test which yielded positive. AAA concealed the identity of the child’s
father due to the threat on her life.
They managed to secure a confession from Entrampas on September 2003 and sent him to the
police.
Accused-appellant’s defense was mainly couched on alibi and denial stating that he could not have
raped her because he was working at the rice fields during the incidents. Defense also questions
the credibility of the testimony of AAA due to her silence.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape (qualified rape).
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant was guilty of two counts of statutory rape.

HELD:
YES. Art. 226-A of the Revised Penal Code, Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under
twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present. In addition, minor inconsistence and the victim’s silence does not
destroy her credibility; especially that he is a minor who is not at all expected to forego the threats
against her life and report such incident like an adult would. In this case, it falls under element (3).
61
G.R. No. 213390
PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES, Plaintijf-Appellee

vs
JESSIE GABRIELy GAJARDO, Accused-Appellant
People v. Gabriel
FACTS:
AAA was a 17-year old freshman nursing student from Colegio de Dagupan and was residing at
accused-appellant’s boarding house in Dagupan.
On 17 February 2010, while at her room with her cousin BBB, accused-appellant entered their
room accusing them of stealing some merchandise from his store. AAA and BBB both denied the
accusation and accused-appellant did not believe them. Accused-appellant ordered them to go to
his room so they could talk about the matter. While in the room, he forced AAA to sit on his lap,
but the latter felt uncomfortable and stood up and now accused-appellant unhooked the strap of
her bra and forced her to the bed where he inserted his penis. The violating stopped when accused-
appellant’s child began knocking on the door. He ordered AAA to dress and get out. AAA then
cleaned herself and went back to her room and cried. BBB asked why she was crying but she could
not divulge the act of being violated by accused-appellant Gabriel.
BBB then texted CCC and DDD, AAA’s aunt and uncle respectively, along with EEE, BBB’s
mother, because the former would not stop crying. Thinking it was about the accused-appellant’s
accusation of stealing, they decided to confront him about it. Then and there, AAA told them of
the raping incident, and they contacted the police.
The accused-appellant’s defense was mainly couched on denial and was meant to destroy her
testimony’s credibility. He claims that AAA concocted a story to humiliate him as revenge for the
latter’s accusations of her stealing. The defense was negated by the corroboration of the medical
examination conducted on AAA.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty as charged.

HELD:
YES. The SC held that due to the stigma caused by rape among women, especially minors, it would
be improbable that they would concoct a story that would show their disgrace for the mere purpose
of humiliating the accused-appellant. The trial court saw the testimony as straightforward and
consistent; therefore, should be taken with full credence.
226-A of the Revised Penal Code, Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of
age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs
shall be present.
62
G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014

vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN LENNON", Accused-
appellant
People v. Gutierez
FACTS:
AAA was a 10-year old Grade 2 student from Camp 7 Elementary School. Accused-appellant
Gutierez was the common-law spouse of AAA’s sister.
On 29 November 2005, she went to accused-appellant’s house where they were to engage in sexual
intercourse in exchange for ₱10 or ₱5 which AAA would add to her “baon”. AAA would recall
how she would stay on top of him for a long time until he withdraws his penis with seminal fluid
flowing.
AAA left the house and went back to school when she was apprehended by her teacher who asked
why she was late. At first, she didn’t want to disclose what she did; but soon, she told her teacher
that she went to “Uncle Rod” to ask for money. The teacher, worried, took her to Ms. Ambaken,
her former teacher, and they all went to the principal. They inspected her vagina and saw that it
was swelling; thus, they concluded that she was “touched” by said accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant denied raping AAA and claimed he was already already at work during the
time. However, the medical certificate corroborated the act. It was later revealed that a similar case
has been filed against him by AAA’s mother when he was just eight (8) years old but dismissed
after barangay conciliation was settled. It was also revealed that the act has happened on multiple
occasions already for the past years.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape (qualified rape).
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Decision.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape.

HELD:
YES. Statutory rape is committed when the third (3rd) element of rape is concurrent: (3) offended
party is under twelve (12) years of age, regardless if the first and second elements are not present:
(1) the presence of carnal knowledge and (2) that it was committed with force, threat, or
intimidation, or deprived of reason or consciousness.
63
G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014

vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, Accused-Appellant.
People v. Crisostomo
FACTS:
On 8 April 1999, victim AAA was playing with her friends whereupon she wandered by the house
of accused-appellant which was just below their house. Accused-appellant was an employee at the
vulcanizing shop of AAA’s father. At the house of the accused-appellant, AAA recalled that
accused-appellant forced himself on top of her and inserted his penis, consummating his illicit
carnal knowledge with her. AAA also recalled being scorched on the buttocks and vagina with
lighted cigarette by the accused-appellant.
After learning of the incident, the mother of AAA and CCC, aunt of AAA, brought her to the Pasig
General Hospital and to Camp Crame where a doctor also examined AAA and confirmed that the
latter was indeed a victim of rape.
AAA’s family initiated the complaint at the Women's Desk to file a case of rape against accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant denied the allegation of rape against him and presented his brother-
in-law, Rogelio Oletin, who testified that he was tending the store located at the house of accused-
appellant when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 a.m. and slept until 5:00 PM of
the same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused-appellant as the latter
worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victim's
father. In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of AAA's body, the defense
presented a supposed playmate of AAA in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary, she
was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates together with AAA and Joel "Liit" (son of
accused-appellant) were burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood. This Joel "Liit"
supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of "AAA's" body. Mary's
exact words were to the effect that "napatakan ang puwit ni AAA."
RTC Ruling: Guilty of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of statutory rape and two counts of rape
by sexual assault.
HELD:
YES. The SC held that when the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is
"termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry
is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the
victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years. The prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape. Art. 226-A of the Revised Penal Code,
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or
64
otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither
of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The defense of alibi and denial of the accused-appellant was defeated by the positive identification
by the victim. The Court found the testimony of Oletin to be inadmissible because he was laughing
while testifying as if he was making a mockery of the proceedings. Lastly, the minor
inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim does not discredit the truthfulness of the facts behinf
the crime committed against her.
65
G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.s.
AURELIO JASTIVA, Accused–Appellant

People v. Jastiva
FACTS:
Victim AAA is a 67-year-old married woman residing in a small sitio in Zamboanga del Norte
with her husband BBB. On 3 August 2004, was drying corn in their small barn on their farm, when
her husband, BBB, left her alone to attend to their sick daughter. At about 11:00 PM, AAA was
fast asleep when accused-appellant Jastiva threatened her with a knife and warned her not to shout
because he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA was able to grab Jastiva’s hand but then,
she felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, Jastiva removed AAA’s underwear but he cannot
proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet erected. Jastiva, therefore, toyed with
AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. Jastiva then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue.
After that, Jastiva held his penis and inserted it to AAA’s vagina. Since it was dark, it was only
after the consummation of the crime that AAA recognized who her assailant is.
The following day, AAA told her husband and their neighbor about the violation of her person.
BBB took her to the hospital to be medically examined where it was revealed that her labia major
and labia minora was swollen and reddish.
Accused-appellant defense was couched in denial and alibi, presenting three witnesses to vouch
for his whereabouts during the incident. Accused-appellant also questioned the physical
impossibility of identifying the assailant because it was dark.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC decision with modification to damages.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of rape.

HELD:
YES. The elements of rape (under paragraph 1, subparagraph a of Article 266-A) are as follows:
(1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that
such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation. The Supreme Court ruled that a
conviction of rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s accurate and credible testimony.
No decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of public
contempt, unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a
relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their
relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the
rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case, AAA was already
67 years of age when she was raped in the dark by Jastiva who was armed with a knife. A woman
of such age could only recoil in fear. Moreover, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine
whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused-appellant. The law does not
66
impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused-appellant in having sexual
intercourse with the victim – which it did in the case at bar.
Jastiva was not able to show that the RTC and CA overlooked any fact or material of consequence
that could have altered the outcome had they taken it into consideration, the court will not disturb
on appeal the RTC’s findings of facts but must fully accept these. The three guiding principles in
rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation of rape is easy to make and difficult to prove but is even more
difficult to disprove. (2) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care
and caution (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
67
G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents
People & AAA v. Carampatana
FACTS:
Victim AAA was a 16-year high school graduate. On 25 March 2004, after attending a graduation
dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to Alson’s Palace for a drinking session to
celebrate their graduation. During such session, they shared their problems with each other. AAA
became emotional and started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of Emperador Brandy.
After consuming more or less five glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy, so she laid her head down on
Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This
angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. The group just
laughed at her and still made her drink more. She fell asleep but was woken up so that she could
drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank.
Again, AAA fell asleep.
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House.
She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep
and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of
her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA
woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. Alquizola then joined
and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
The following morning, she woke up alone in the same room at Alquizola and went home. She
told her parents she was raped and they all went to Lala Police Station to report the incident.
RTC Ruling: Carampatana and Oporto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape as principals.
Alquizola guilty of the crime as an accomplice. Dela Cruz, Rudina, Roda, Batoctoy and Villame
acquitted due to reasonable doubt.
CA Ruling: Reversed RTC decision and acquitted accused-appellants due to reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON an acquittal and final and executory and an appeal thereafter is a violation of the
rights against double jeopardy.
HELD:
NO. It is not final and executory in this case for it is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed.
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
68
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused-appellant may appeal, but only
with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused-appellant, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due
process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. It
is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution
of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused-appellant.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein
it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party
or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines.
If therefore, it is proven that the Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction; it deems the decision null and void; thus, there is no double jeopardy.
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents. It appears that in reaching
its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if
not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused-appellant, especially that of Oporto,
Carampatana, and Alquizola. It presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support
its ruling of acquittal.
69
G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011

vs.
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN, Accused-Appellant
People v. Laog
FACTS:
On 6 June 2000 in San Rafael, Bulacan, appellant Laoag committed with lewd designs the crimes
of rape and murder.
According to the testimony of AAA, she and her friend were walking on their way to apply for a
job when suddenly, appellant Conrado Laoag, holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them
and forcibly took them to a grassy area. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with
the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for
help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant
stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass.
Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and
stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her
jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her,
sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered
her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. When AAA regained consciousness, it was
nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her uncle’s farm at daybreak. When she
saw his uncle, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to
Hospital. She later learned that Jennifer had died.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at
home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children,
Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven o’clock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him
to the police after he “went wild” that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw
talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was
being charged with murder and rape.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Murder.
CA Ruling: Affirmed with modifications to damages.
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
NO. It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the
victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination
of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible,
is sufficient to convict. Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as
the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element
70
for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the
incident is clear, unequivocal and credible.
In People v. Larrañaga, this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide,
(2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder
or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary
if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659
amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: “When the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;” and that this provision gives rise to
a special complex crime. Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing
of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above
provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or
calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not
witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer’s body, so that
it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows
he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and
appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with
homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term “homicide” is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion
of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant
is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance
of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe
then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had
brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to
render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that
71
appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to
his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and
the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or
repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was
completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the
employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately
employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, accused-appellant clearly took advantage
of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The
accused-appellant’s sudden attack caught the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.
72
G.R. No. 184926 April 11, 2012

vs.
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, Accused-Appellant
People v. Villaflores
FACTS:
Edmundo Villaflores who was also known as “Batman” in their neighborhood and was known to
be a drug-addict. The victim is a four-year old girl named Marita. On July 2, 1999, Marita was last
seen by her mother Julia to be playing at the rear of their residence, when her mother noticed that
she was missing, she called her husband who rushed home to find their daughter. In her
desperation, Julia sought out a manghuhula in another barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita
might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction, they
found Maritas lifeless body inside the comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures
away from their own house. Julia had been tortured and strangled till death. At 6:00AM of July 3,
1999, they found Marita’s lifeless body covered with blue and yellow sack five houses away from
their home. The result of the postmortem examination showed that the child was raped and the
cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.
Upon police investigation, two (2) witnesses who were Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Stadium pointed
Villaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at about 10:00AM on July 2, 1999, they
saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a while, but the
witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house. It was only on 3:00PM that they
heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Batman carrying a yellow sack which
appears heavy, the same sack that he saw when they are still inside the house of Batman. The wife
of the accused-appellant also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw
his husband place some sacks under their house and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow
inside the sack, when she confronted his husband who was on drugs, Villaflores said it was
nothing. Based from these circumstances.. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction.
The accused-appellant appealed and argued that both RTC and CA erred in convicting him of a
composite crime of Rape with homicide through circumstantial evidence.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond Reasonable doubt of rape with homicide

CA Ruling: Affirmed ruling
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant can be convicted of the crime charged with circumstantial
evidence
HELD:
YES. In order to convict Villaflores for the composite crime of rape with homicide, the State must
thus prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (1) carnal knowledge towards victim;
(2) consummated carnal knowledge without the consent; and (3) that he killed victim by reason of
the rape.
73
Under the RPC as amended, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of
a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of
that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Victim is only four years
and eight months at the time of the commission of the crime on 2 July 1999. As such, carnal
knowledge of her by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape. The crime becomes a composite
crime of rape with homicide when it was made on the occasion of the rape, which refers to a killing
that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or
consummated rape, for as long as the killing is lined to rape.
Although the best evidence to prove rape is the testimony of the victim herself, the rule held that
the Rules of Court allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well
as the identity of the culprit when the rape victim is herself killed; provided however, that such
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction.
A circumstantial evidence is sufficient when (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts
from which the inferences derived are proven and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With the circumstances provided by the
testimonies of different witnesses, the RTC and the CA appreciated the circumstances together
and were seen as strands which create a pattern and formed an unbroken chain that led to the
reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with
homicide.
74
G.R. No. 211027 June 29, 2015

vs.
JOSE BRONIOLA "ASOT", Accused-Appellant
People v. Broniola
FACTS:
AAA, a Grade VI pupil, left her house for school in the morning of February 28, 2000. She did not
return home that day. Her lifeless body was found on February 29, 2000 in a grassy lot near an
uninhabited farm hut at Sitio Kabanatian, Barangay Tumanding, Arakan, Cotabato.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar D. Bayog charged appellant with the crime of rape with
homicide:
On February 28, 2000, in Arakan, Cotabato, the said accused, armed with a bolo by means of force
and intimidation, have a carnal knowledge with AAA, minor, 13 years old, against her will.
Thereafter, with intent to kill, hacked the victim, thus inflicting upon her hack wounds on the
different parts of her body, which is the direct and proximate cause of her death.
Alfredo Abag testified that he crossed paths with appellant while he was on his way to sell his
“Taiwan” fish noticing the latter having scratches on the face and carrying a bloodied bolo. The
following day victim’s father along with some barangay officials searched for AAA, finding her
lying dead in a grassy lot near a farm hut owned by a Mrs. Darantinao.
Appellant denied the allegations and claimed that he worked in the farm and the fishpond in the
morning and after lunch respectively making him tired so he went home and stayed inside their
house together with his mother, wife and children. He denied meeting Abag in Sitio Kabanatian.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to penalty
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant can be convicted of the crime charged with circumstantial
evidence
HELD:
YES. Appeal is without merit.
In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge
of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat
or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.
Lack of witness to the actual rape and killing of AAA is not a ground for acquittal for appellant
may still be proven as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence
of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden (People v. Pascual).
75
Considering all the circumstances mentioned and in light of previous rulings, we are satisfied that
the evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one fair and
reasonable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. It is doctrinal that the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of
proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This was
adequately established in the case at bar.
As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death
(amended by RA 9346).
76
G.R. No. 189822 September 2, 2013

vs.
JOJIE SUANSING, Accused-Appellant

People v. Suansing
FACTS:
Victim AAA is a 15-year old from Tangub City, Misamis Occidental. She gave birth in 29
September 1990 to a baby boy. Nobody took responsibility for her pregnancy. Due to the lack of
guidance, AAA transferred to the residence of EEE who raised her as a daughter.
In 2001, GGG, accused’s sister, requested FFF, AAA’s friend, to get from accused’s boarding
house an electric fan. FFF, along with her brother and AAA, went to the boarding house of accused
Suansing. After giving the requested items, Suansing ordered FFF and her brother to leave AAA
behind. After the two left, Suansing forced AAA down the floor and without her consent, engaged
in carnal knowledge with AAA. AAA, feeling ashamed, told FFF not to tell anyone of her rape.
EEE learned about the rape and confronted AAA. EEE then reported the incident to police
authorities. The genital examination of AAA revealed old hymenal lacerations. Her psychiatric
evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9
to 12-year old child. Although with impaired adaptive skills, the RTC found AAA qualified to
testify. The psychological examination of AAA established her mental retardation to be in a mild
form and her intelligence quotient (IQ) of 53 though below the average IQ score of 71 was within
the defective level of a Normal Intelligence Scale.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. RTC held that the mental retardation was
not alleged in the Information; therefore, cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to damages.
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty as charged of the crime of rape.

HELD:
NO. He is guilty of Qualified Rape. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of AAA.
Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives.
He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding
house was also a few minutes away from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that AAA was
known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily noticeable
to the RTC from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the course of her
testimony. We also stress that from the filing of this case until its appeal, appellant did not assail
AAA’s mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy. Art. 226-A.
Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed – 1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or
intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious, c) By
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under
77
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented." From these
requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment the offender has sexual
intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who
is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that
natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual
intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent
to the carnal act already constitutes rape, without requiring proof that the accused used force and
intimidation in committing the act." Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the
victim and the latter’s mental retardation need to be proved.
In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the
sexual congress between appellant and AAA and the latter’s mental retardation. AAA positively
identified appellant as her rapist.
78
G.R. No. 196315 October 22, 2014

vs.
LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO, Accused-Appellant.
People v. Cataytay
FACTS:
AAA is a 19-year old girl who due to a case of mental retardation, had a mental age of a 5-year
old. On 7 September 2003, at around 6:30 PM, BBB left AAA in their house to look for her
youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near Block 37, her neighbor,
Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost.
AAA and the accused-appellant were already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost
that she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, “Mommy, ni-rape
po ako.” BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused Cataytay. During
the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by accused, which
ended when a certain “Mimi” knocked at the door. When accused answered the knock, Mimi told
the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and
sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangay
officials at the outpost. Morante recalled thatshe was inside her house at around 7:00 PM of 7
September 2003, during which time she heard AAA shouting that she was raped. She asked AAA
who raped her. AAA replied “Pilay,” apparently referring to their neighbor who was called “Jun
Pilay”, herein accused Cataytay. Alicia saw Cataytay run from AAA’s house towards a dark area.
Other than alibi and denial, accused presented the testimony of Alicia, a neighbor of AAA and
accused, to prove that another person raped AAA. However, the record is clear that AAA
positively identified accused as the culprit both at the barangay outpost minutes after the incident,
and in open court. It is furthermore axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of
the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is
in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of
witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth. The trial court, which was able to
carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was not adequately convinced by her allegations.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in convicting accused of qualified rape.

HELD:
NO. Despite accused’s contention that victim’s testimony is inadmissible for being hearsay and
inconsistent, the Court disagrees. It has been a long-held doctrine that when a woman says she was
raped, all that is necessary is to prove it to get a conviction. Acccused’s defense of denial and alibi
were easily defeated by the positive identification by the victim.
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
79
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death
(amended by RA 9346).
80
G.R. No. 200940 July 22, 2015

vs.
MARTIN NERIO, JR., Accused-Appellant
People v. Nerio
FACTS:
AAA was a child with special needs adopted spouses Kathleen and Rick. On 26 February 2003,
Kathleen, who was working at the canteen of the same school where victim was studying, noticed
the latter to be missing but dismissed the thought thinking she was just at her cousin’s house.
Kathleen worried more when AAA did not come home and so she went to the police to report her
missing daughter.
They found out that AAA boarded a minibus bound for Matanao, Davao del Sur. They proceeded
to Matanao and arrived at 1:00 AM. They knocked at the house of the Nerios after learning that
AAA is with them and accused’s mother answered the door. Kathleen went upstairs and found
AAA sleeping naked beside accused Nerio.
AAA was subjected to a medical examination and a psychological evaluation where it was found
that she had fresh hymenal lacerations and a mental ability of a child aged four to seven (4-7)
respectively.
The defense dwelled on denial and alibi stating that accused could not have raped AAA because
they were all sleeping at the ground floor along with accused’s mother. This was dismissed by the
Court due to the circumstances attendant.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling in toto.
ISSUE: WON accused may be convicted of rape without the testimony of the victim.
HELD:
YES. The SC ruled that mental retardation has been defined as a chronic condition that exists at
birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by
standardized tests. Intellectual or mental disability is a term synonymous with and is now preferred
over the older term, mental retardation. It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is
essential. However, when the victim is a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one,
and thus cannot effectively testify as to the details of the offense, and there are no other
eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable. Circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, indirectly proves a fact in issue through
an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. It is not a weaker form of
evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. Resort to it is imperative when the lack of direct testimony
would result in setting an outlaw free. The Court reiterates that direct evidence of the commission
of a crime is not the only basis on which a court may draw its finding of guilt. In fact, circumstantial
evidence, when demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may even be the sole basis of a
81
criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed alibis. Established facts
that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction. Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section
5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The following are the requisites for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one
who committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.
In the case at bar, victim’s mother witnessed her child naked beside accused and the medical
examination conducted on her showed that there were signs of copulation as corroborated by the
lacerations on her hymen which in the view of the Court could not have been caused by another
person.
82
G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014

vs.
JERRY OBOGNE, Accused–Appellant
People v. Obogne
FACTS:
On 29 July 2002, accused Obogne consummated carnal knowledge with 12-year old mentally
retarded AAA. AAA was approached by said accused while the former was playing telling her that
he would give her sugarcane if she came with him. AAA came along and was taken to the house
of the accused. He committed carnal knowledge with victim AAA with the threat of a knife.
Thereafter, he gave AAA sugarcane as promised and the latter went home. AAA’s parents found
out and reported Obogne.
Obogne denied raping AAA and argued the physical impossibility of him raping her because he
was at the time in Brgy, Ananong which is four (4) km. away from where the incident occurred.
The Court dismissed such defense stating that it was possible to travel that distance in an hour or
less. Accused also prayed that AAA’s testimony be struck down due to her mental disability, the
Court disagreed.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape.

HELD:
YES. The Court found AAA as a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to
defense counsel’s objection that AAA was not capable of intelligently making known her
perception to others, AAA managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the
accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court and
the appellate court should have considered his alibi must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must
not only be shown that appellant was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime
but that it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime scene. In the case at bar, the
Court successfully disproved the physical possibility of the rape occurring.
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and
properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266–B, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that AAA’s mental disability could not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant
knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime.
83
G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015
vs.
MICHAEL JOSON Y ROGANDO, Defendant-Appellant.
People v. Joson
FACTS:
AAA is a 14-year old girl living with her older biological brother and the latter’s common law
wife. The prosecution’s evidence was based on the sole testimony of the victim. On 1:00 AM of
14 May 2009, and while accused’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing
her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her,
appellant kissed and mounted her. Accused was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt
pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00
or 7:00 AM, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her not
to tell on his wife. He claimed that he was only drunk. The afternoon thereafter, AAA told
accused’s wife and her father of the raping incident.
Accused’s defense was based on his alibi of staying at Alfonso and not the family house the time
of the incident. He also stressed that AAA was merely making up a story because he was strict to
his sister.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling with modification.
ISSUE: WON victim’s testimony proved all the elements of rape.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the victim’s testimony has established all the elements of rape
required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, (1) appellant had carnal knowledge
of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise
unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, (2) appellant
employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. The Supreme Court has, time and again,
ruled that the force or violence that is required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not
be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough.
The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence
of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the
victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age.
In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years
old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused who was in the
prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form
of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force.
84
G.R. No. 189293 July 10, 2013

vs.
VICENTE CANDELLADA, Accused-Appellant
People v. Candellada
FACTS:
AAA was a 14-year old girl from Davao. Victim was also the second-born biological child of
accused with the latter’s deceased wife. Accused’s continuous raping bore fruit, and AAA was
impregnated. Accused then took AAA to Lanao del Sur under false pretense of her being his wife
to a certain Gemina’s old house with the promise that he would pay for the electricity bills.
At Gemina’s old house, accused had sexual intercourse with AAA many times, but AAA could
only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10,
2004; August 13, 2004; November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When
asked to explain what "intercourse" meant, AAA stated that accused inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA further testified that she consistently resisted accused’s bestial acts but he threatened
to stab her with a knife. On 24 September 2004, AAA gave birth to a baby boy with Gemina’s
help but the child died after only four (4) days.
On 8 December 2004, accused again attempted to rape AAA and so he hit her with a piece of wood
on her head which knocked her unconscious. Gemina witnessed the incident and reported it to the
police; thereafter, accused was apprehended and arrested.
Accused-appellant’s defense was merely his testimony about AAA. He claimed that he was not
the father of the child for he was allegedly impregnated by her classmate.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eight (8) counts of qualified rape. Acquitted for
the charge of attempted rape due to reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in convicting accused-appellant despite reasonable doubt.
HELD:
NO. For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order
to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship,
were admitted by accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference.
85
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case
by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has
repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman
to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag
the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined
to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal
prosecutions for rape.
86
G.R. No. 191362 October 09, 2013

vs.
MARCIANO CIAL Y LORENA, Accused-Appellant
People v. Cial
FACTS:
AAA was a 13-year old daughter of BBB, accused-appellant’s common law wife and a Grade 1
student. All of them are residing in Quezon Province along with her five (5) siblings from CCC,
BBB’s former husband, and her two (2) half siblings.
Sometime in September 2002, accused-appellant raped AAA; the latter was not able to fight back
because Cial had a bolo at the time. After consummating his lewd desires, he threatened to kill
AAA and her family should she tell anyone what happened.
She confided the harrowing experience with her mother, who did not believe her. She ran away to
her uncle’s house and told them about it. They believed and was angered however they still let
accused-appellant fetch her from the house. Out of fear of being raped again, AAA ran away to
her aunt’s house; thereafter the former helped her file a case against Cial.
Defense was based on accused-appellant’s denial of the crime and the latter insisting he could not
have done for AAA was like her own daughter. He also claimed that AAA’s aunt only fabricated
the charge to get back at him for calling her a thief.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape (qualified by relationship and
minority).
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of qualified rape.

HELD:
YES. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that if he indeed raped AAA inside their house,
then AAA’s maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled jurisprudence that
rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. As held by the CA, “lust is no
respecter of time and place.” Thus, the presence of AAA’s grandmother would not negate the
commission of the rape; neither would it prove appellant’s innocence.
There is also no merit to appellant’s contention that it was irrational for “AAA’s” uncle to allow
her to return home even after learning about the rape incident. The considerations or reasons which
impelled “AAA’s” uncle to allow her to return home are immaterial to the rape charge. Such have
no bearing on appellant’s guilt.
87
The Supreme Court held that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and
credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party
is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed
if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story.
88
G.R. No. 190632 February 26, 2014

vs.
MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS “MACHETE,” Accused–Appellant
People v. Lucena
FACTS:
AAA is a 17-year old minor residing in San Dionisio, Parañaque. At around 11:30 PM of 28 April
2003, while chatting with her friends, were apprehended by two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom
is the accused-appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for violating
a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to
escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. She was forced into the vehicle. Fearing being
imprisoned for the night, she argued she did not commit any offense and was simply chatting with
her friends.
One of the tanods, herein accused-appellant told the other tanod he will escort AAA back to her
house. Accused-appellant threatened AAA with a gun and alighted on a grassy area and
successfully raped AAA three (3) times. Thereafter, he escorted AAA in front of a school in
Parañaque and he threatened to kill her should she tell anyone. The following day, AAA took
courage and with the help of their barangay kagawad, launched a complaint against Lucena.
Accused-appellant’s defense was merely denial and alibi as he claimed that he was on duty as a
radio operator at the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents
of the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of
assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod.
He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of three (3) counts of rape.

HELD:
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it
should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission
of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the
unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the
victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.
89
The Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who, in
a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her
chastity.
The SC affirmed the Court’s ruling that accused-appellant should be convicted of three (3) counts
of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into
the private part of AAA. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of
five (5) minutes wherein the appellant would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after
he has regained his strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the
foregoing that when the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual
assault upon AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent.
Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
90
G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017

vs.
JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC Y MARQUEZ, Accused-Appellant
People v. Tionloc
FACTS:
At around 9:30 PM of 29 September 2008, AAA was having a drinking session with appellant and
Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy, so she took a nap. At around
11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his
penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they
used to cut hotdog and now lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted.
Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached
her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and
raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. AAA then left accused-
appellant's house and immediately returned to the house she shared with her live--in partner.
The following day, AAA reported the incident to the police. She also underwent a medical
examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen. Defense denied the claiming
testifying that AAA was having sex with Meneses when he arrived after buying food. The said
testimony was corroborated by Meneses.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape by carnal knowledge.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant was guilty of rape through carnal knowledge.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held that force as an element of rape must be sufficient to consummate
the purposes which accused had in mind. Three things are thus clear from the testimony of AAA:
first, appellant never employed the slightest force, threat or intimidation against her; second, AAA
never gave the slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked her to have sex with him; and, third,
appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when AAA felt the slightest pain and tried
to move during their sexual congress. AAA could have resisted right from the start. But she did
not. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress when AAA tried to move which can hardly
be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's sexual
advances.
In People v. Amogis, the Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere
attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor
and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, AAA should have done it earlier or the moment
appellant's evil design became manifest.
91
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant
People v. Jumawan
FACTS:
Accused-appellant and KKK were husband and wife residing in Gusa, Cagayan de Oro with their
children. On 16 October 1998, accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about
their nightly routine. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him
to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. Once in the bedroom,
KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the
accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. He initially ordered her to
sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order
not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When
she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
transformed into a stubborn demand. KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly
pulled them down causing it to tear apart. She was not feeling well so she begged him to stop. He
flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. MMM, one of the children, saw her mother crying
and she told the former about what happened.
The following night, after the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom, KKK decided to sleep
in the children's bedroom. The accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing
to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom,
the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant
further enraged him. He ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to
force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK
begged that her body is aching and that she cannot withstand sex. The accused-appellant removed
his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her.
Accused-appellant relied on the defense of alibi claiming that during those times he was at
Bukidnon and could not have raped her.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of two (2) counts of rape.

HELD:
92
Art. 2a of RA 9262 states that: Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not
be limited to, the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women,
non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation.
It has been acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her,
and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines
and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with
a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to
violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate
conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their relevance in a
progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and
not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion. Further, the delicate and reverent
nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual
intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious
urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose,
vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved
by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally
seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest
herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully
opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus.
93
G.R. No. 225642-43 January 17, 2018

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant
People v. Amarela & Racho
FACTS:
AAA is a housekeeper living in Davao. On 10 February 2009, while watching a beauty pageant
held in the basketball court, she was assaulted and forcibly pulled under the stage of the daycare
center as she was on her to the comfort room by accused-appellant Amarela who were both waiting
for her. Amarela was able to go on top of her and engaged in carnal knowledge with her until his
malicious act was halted by three (3) men who heard AAA’s cries, Amarela and Juvy ran away.
The three men took AAA to a hut; however, they also had malicious intentions against her, so
seeing a chance to flee, she ran to the neighboring house.
AAA was brought to the Racho residence, accused-appellant’s mother instead told Racho to bring
her to his aunt’s house. Thereafter, accused-appellant Racho was able to rape the victim. Racho
left after raping her. The following morning, AAA told her mother about her horrifying experience
and got Amarela and Racho arrested.
Amarela denied raping AAA and claimed that he was so drunk he couldn’t even remember what
happened after. Racho on the other hand claimed that he already left AAA when she insisted of
going to the house of the Venturas instead of Racho’s aunt’s house.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RT Ruling in toto.
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellants are guilty of rape.

HELD:
NO. The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case
of People v. Tana, 12 the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns
raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo
Labrador, said: “It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that
they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct
to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that
intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.”
The SC believes that we cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved
Filipino woman. And should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's
dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently
intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.
In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or
cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.14
94
Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the
version of events narrated by the victim.
The Supreme Court held that reasonable doubt lingers as the Court was not fully convinced that
AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the
credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint
differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela
because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacks
material details on how she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical
findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the
female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is
alleged and shown to be without her consent. Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is
not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving
consent. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to
penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,
prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.
Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we
have dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not,
uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but
he said he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho's mother corroborated
this part of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have
easily raised these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have
likewise covered up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night.
If indeed Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he
thought he did not have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself to
go home. To our mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the
truth.
In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported
by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty. Acccused-
appellants are therefore acquitted due to reasonable doubt.
95
G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner

vs.
Ricalde v. People
FACTS:
XXX is a 10-year old minor boy living in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. On 30 January 2002, XXX asked his
mother to pick-up 31-year old petitioner Ricalde, a distant relative and a textmate of the former, at
McDonald’s in Bel-Air. The mother of XXX then told accused-appellant to stay for the night
wherein the latter slept at the sofa while XXX slept of the living room floor.
XXX woke up in the middle of the night feeling pain on his anus and his stomach as something
was inserted on his anus. He saw Ricalde “fondl[ing] his penis” on the anus of the victim and
returned to the sofa. XXX ran to his mother who told Ricalde to leave. They went together to the
police station to report the incident and where redirected to the health center for medical
examination. The medical report revealed no trauma on the anal orifice, negative for spermatozoa.
Petitioner argues that he did not sexually assaulted XXX and the medical reports corroborated his
denial. Also, he claimed that XXX did not categorically testified that petitioner inserted his penis.
Petitioner also contends that the Variance Doctrine be applied for not being able to prove the
elements of rape and a lower charged should be applied which is Acts of Lasciviousness.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through Sexual Assault.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of rape through sexual assault.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the victim need not categorically assert that a penis was inserted
into his anal orifice; further, the Court held that making the victim identify the object would be
contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. The essence of sexual assault is assault and
violation of human dignity. Therefore, the object and the degree of penetration is immaterial.
The SC also ruled out on the argument that the Variance Doctrine should be applied.
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
96
G.R. No. 193854 September 24, 2012

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.
People v. Dulay
FACTS:
AAA was a 12-year old minor girl. On June 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused during the
wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. On 3 July 2005, the accused convinced AAA to accompany
her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paranaque City. However, before they went to the wake, they
went to look for the boyfriend of the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port where they found
the boyfriend of the accused. They proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the Bulungan
Fish Port. Upon arrival, the accused suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known only
as alias “Speed” was waiting, along with two (2) other male companions. AAA saw “Speed” give
the accused some money, then the latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife and tied AAA’s hands to the
papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when she saw the latter peeping into the
room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, “Speed” and appellant
told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.
AAA, horrified, went to San Pedro, Laguna to tell her sister. AAA, accompanied by her sister and
mother filed a complaint for Rape at the police station.
RTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of rape as co-principal
by indispensable cooperation.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling. Further held that, to cooperate means to desire or wish in
common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous
understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each case. The
cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without which the commission of the crime would not
have been accomplished.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
HELD:
NO. The SC held that to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in
the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
The Supreme Court held that the accused did not participate in the criminal resolution of the crime
of Rape but merely delivered AAA to “Speed.” Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission
of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to
go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's
services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have
offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped.
Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be
97
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and
offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."
In this light, while the Court did not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a
principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610,
or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which
states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The decision of the CA is modified as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610
98
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner

vs.
Bongalon v. People
FACTS:
On 11 May 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz, 12 years of age and Roldan, his older brother, both minors,
joined the evening procession for the Sto. Nino at Oro Site in Legazpi City. When the procession
passed in front of the house of the petitioner, the petitioner’s daughter, Mary Anne Rose, also a
minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him sissy. The petitioner confronted the two brothers and
called them “strangers” and “animals” and struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped his
face. He also went to the house of the two brothers and challenged their father, Rolando to a fight,
but Rolando refused to engage to a fight with the petitioner. Rolando brought Jayson to the Legazpi
City Police Station and reported the incident. Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol
Regional Training and Teaching Hospital and the doctors who examined him testified that he
suffered contusions.
Accused-appellant Bongalon on the other hand, denied that he physically abused and maltreated
Jayson and explained that he only confronted them after Mary Anne Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor
daughters had told him about Jayson and Roldan throwing stones at them and about Jayson burning
Cherrylyn’s hair. Mary Anne Rose corroborated his father’s testimony by testifying that her father
did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi"
and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and
calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during
the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of child abuse.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to penalty.
ISSUE: WON petitioner may be convicted of child abuse for defending his children.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court held that he is not liable of child abuse but for slight physical injuries.
records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that Bongalon’s laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to demean, debase, and degrade the latters intrinsic worth and dignity as a child. It
was shown through the records that the petitioner’s laying of hands was out of outburst of anger,
indicative of fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own two minor daughters who had just
suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of self-control, he lacked specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. Thus, the Supreme
Court enters new judgment finding the petitioner George Bongalon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of slight physical injuries under Paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code.
99
G.R. No. 195224 June 15, 2016
VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON, Petitioner,

vs.
Jabalde v. People
FACTS:
On 13 December 2000, victim Lin Bitoon, a Grade 1 student from Cawitan Elementary School,
was assaulted by petitioner by slapping him on the neck and choking him in a dilapidated building
near the incident with the latter’s daughter. Victim Lin recalls that while playing langit lupa with
friends, he touched the shoulder of petitioner’s daughter which led to her falling down and
sustaining a wound on her head. Lin was able to break free and ran towards their home and told
his mother. Lin was brought to the hospital and took a medical examination wherein it concluded
that he sustained abrasions. Ray Ann, a friend of Lin, testified that petitioner was shouting, “Better
that you are able to free yourself, because if not I should have killed you!”
Jabalde denied the accusation and attributed the filing of the instant petition due to a grudge
because of family inheritance.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of violation of RA 7610.
ISSUE: WON the acts complained about were part of RA 7610.

HELD:
NO. The acts committed were not covered by RA 7610.
The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10(a),
Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610, which states:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as follows: SEC. 3.
Definition of terms. – x x x x (b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3)
Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure
to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In the recent case of Bongalon v. People,35 the Court expounded the definition of "child abuse"
being referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case, therein petitioner was similarly charged, tried, and
100
convicted by the lower courts with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The
Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended
by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being should it be punished as child abuse, otherwise, it is punished under the RPC.
The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the
elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state o In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262
to 266 of the [RPC], the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As
an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from
the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries
under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong
against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim
of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of
freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself,
make a man guilty unless his intentions are mind accompanying a forbidden act.
The lower courts’ decision were set aside and petitioner is liable for slight physical injuries.
101
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner

vs.
Rosaldes v. People
FACTS:
On 13 February 1996, victim Michael Ryan Gonzales, a Grade 1 student from Pughanan
Elementary School, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee
of his teacher, petitioner Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Petitioner asked
Michael to apologize, the latter, however, proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner then pinched
Michael on his thigh, held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor causing him to hit a
desk and, consequently, losing his consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his ears
and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
During lunch break, victim, along with two (2) of his classmates went home to tell his mother and
aunt what happened. They were advised by the barangay captain to have Michael examined.
Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael to
maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity and avers
that her maltreatment is only an act of discipline that she as a schoolteacher could reasonably do
towards the development of the child.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of child abuse (RA 7610).
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of child abuse.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610. Although the petitioner, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical
injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse:
(b) “Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such
as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
102
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by
deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being. The act need not be habitual. The physical pain experienced by the victim had
been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of
fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to
adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Michael Ryan as a human being.
Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse punished under RA 7610.
103
G.R. No. 214497 April 18, 2017
EDUARDO QUIMVEL y BRAGA, Petitioner

vs.
Quimvel v. People
FACTS:
AAA, a 7-year old, was the first-born child of XXX and YYY who were working as a housekeeper
and a barangay tanod who sells vegetables, respectively. Petitioner Quimvel was a caretaker of the
ducks of AAA’s grandparents.
On 18 July 2007, at around 8:00 PM, the power went out so YYY went out to buy kerosene.
Petitioner brought a vegetable viand from XXX’s grandfather so AAA requested for him to stay
because they were alone in the house. While the kids were sleeping, Quimvel inserted his right
hand on AAA’s panty; AAA was awoken. YYY arrived and asked what he was doing in the house,
petitioner said he was just accompanying them.
When XXX came home on 29 July, BBB told him what happened with AAA. They launched a
case against Quimvel.
Quimvel denied the accusation saying that he never went to their house during the incident.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness.

HELD:
YES. Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. -Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness
upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned on the preceding
article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Conviction thereunder requires that the prosecution establish the following elements: (1) That the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done under any of the
following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconsc10us; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
104
G.R. No. 206627 January 18, 2017
VAN CLIFFORD TORRES y SALERA, Petitioner

vs.
Torres v. People
FACTS:
Victim AAA, a 14-year old minor boy, was the nephew of CCC. On 3 November 2003, AAA and
CCC were at a barangay conciliation proceeding with petitioner Torres. Torres vehemently denied
damaging CCC's multicab. 14 In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected
that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Petitioner
admonished AAA for meddling the affairs of grown men but AAA kept on insisting otherwise.
Out of rage, petitioner whipped AAA with a wet t-shirt for three (3) times and the latter fell down
the stairs. CCC came to AAA’s defense and engaged in a fistfight with petitioner, only to be
separated by the barangay captain.
Petitioner claimed that he did not hit AAA. He claimed that he was just warning him when CCC
suddenly punched him. He also asserted that the complainants only filed a case to preempt the
proceedings between the spouses CCC and his wife.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of violating RA 7610.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC decision with modification to penalty.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of child abuse.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the act of whipping AAA, a minor, three (3) times is tantamount
to child abuse. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse: (b) “Child abuse” refers
to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation
of his basic needs for survival, such
as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or
death.
Although the laying of hands does not always constitute intention to debase, degrade, or demean,
it is by common sense that hitting a sensitive part such as the neck would case extreme pain.
105
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem
FACTS:
Petitioner Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on 25 September 1990. The marriage consummated a son named Roderigo Norjo, who at
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
On 19 July 1995, their marriage bond was ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the Court
of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner along
with her son came home to the Philippines. Petitioner claims that respondent made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which
is equivalent to ₱17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Brgy. Tajao, Pinamungahan, Cebu. To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
On 28 August 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter and claimed that under Dutch Law,
he is not obligated to give support as petitioner assails claim on the perspective of Philippine Laws.
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued
in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner. On the other hand, respondent contends that
there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are
entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is
not obligated for any petition for financial support.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed due to the facts alleged in the Information not constituting an offense
vis-à-vis a respondent foreigner.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a foreigner is obligated to support a minor child under Philippine Laws
2. WON he is liable for violating the Violence Against Women and Children Act (RA 9262)
HELD:
1. YES. He is obligated to give support.
106
The Supreme Court stressed that Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality which renders the petitioner’s claim under the Family Code invalid. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The SC ruled that obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a Dutch citizen, such rights and duties cannot be made to apply to
him. However, it does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
2. YES. He is liable.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i)
of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
The SC ruled out the respondent’s claim that the criminal liability has been extinguished on the
ground of prescription. The SC further stated that the act of denying support to a child under
Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still
ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
107
G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015
RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,

vs.
Dinamling v. People
FACTS:
AAA and petitioner were live in partners for five (5) years, with two (2) common children together.
On 14 March 2007, petitioner, along with a friend, went to the boarding house of AAA after a
drinking session. As AAA was putting the children to bed, petitioner, drunk, started to evict the
former and the children. Petitioner told AAA that he was going to use the place as a whore house.
AAA refused but was successfully evicted when petitioner threw a feeding bottle outside, causing
it to break.
AAA went to the house of BBB and requested the latter to fetch her children. Upon reaching the
house, petitioner was already gone, taking with him the older child (aged four). Similar violent
incidents have occurred in the past. Whenever AAA reported it to the police, they merely dismiss
it as a family problem. Petitioner was still then a policeman himself.
On 20 March 2007, petitioner went to the house of CCC and assaulted AAA, calling her “good for
nothing”. AAA then proceeded to the barangay captain’s house; but petitioner caught up to her
and kicked her. She bled and went to the hospital where she found out that she had an unintentional
abortion with a nineteen (19) weeks pregnancy, unbeknownst to her.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of two (2) counts of violations of Section 5i of
RA 9262.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC decision with modification as to penalty.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of two counts of violations of Sec. 5i of RA 9262.

HELD:
YES. He is guilty.
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of
the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a
common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
108
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children
or similar such acts or omissions.
In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward,
unequivocal and positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling
as the perpetrator is not an issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew each other very well as,
in fact, they were at that time carrying on a five-year relationship which had borne two common
children.
Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only
was heat some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission.
Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his alleged location at the
time of commission, that is, the Police Station where he was on duty, in the same municipality as
the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this police station is just
"two to three minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused admits that he was
in the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be said that it was
physically impossible for him to have committed the crime, and his defense of alibi cannot prosper.
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances
which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent
evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.
It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the
crime's elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact
of miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating
circumstance for the crime, and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is
proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in
the course of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete
abortion secondary to the mauling."
Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete
abortion or miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present
contradictory evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof of
pregnancy. The pregnancy was never put in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same
in question in this petition. Therefore, it may be safely concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy
has been established and it may be taken account of and considered as a circumstance that
aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.
109
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G.
MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., AND
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 174786

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S.

VELASCO, AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents
People v. Bayabos
FACTS:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to
successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from
2 May to 1 June 2001. On Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before
the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary
investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and
indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge the following as principals to the
crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez, Leotharius C. Montez, Rudence G. Reyes, and Jed Nicholas S.
Simpas – collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the
RTC–Zambales.
Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan, via a resolution, quashed the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure
to include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed due to a resolution from the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: Quashed the Information and dismissing the case due to lack of
principals in the case.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case of the principals may be a ground for the dismissal of the
case of the accomplices.
110
HELD:
NO. The Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case outright due to the failure of the prosecution
to present a principal to the crime.
The Supreme Court held that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the
latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the
act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established
by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
(3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge
thereof.
First, the Court rejected the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is
not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the
AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a
government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law.
However, the Court, seeing that the Information did not include all the material facts constituting
the crime of accomplice to hazing. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the
successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
111
G.R. No. 226836 December 05, 2018
v.s.
BONG CHAN AND ELMO CHAN, Accused-Appellants
People v. Chan
FACTS: Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
On the night of 27 September 2004, victim went to Ernesto's house to visit his son, who was living
with Ernesto and his wife. The victim stayed at Ernesto's house for about two hours where he told
Ernesto that, earlier that evening, the victim had a quarrel with Melrose Libadia and her husband,
Ronnie, because Melrose refused to sell the victim liquor from her store. Melrose's father, accused-
appellant Elmo, threatened to kill the victim. Because of the threat, Ernesto told the victim that it
would be better for the latter to stay the night; however, the victim refused because his wife might
look for him.
At around 11:00 PM, the victim left Ernesto's house; that Ernesto followed the victim only until
the latter was nearing the house of a certain Helen Pamo. The victim was about 10-20 m. ahead of
Ernesto; and when the victim reached Melrose's house, Ernesto saw the accused-appellants come
out of the yard. Upon seeing the accused-appellants, Ernesto hid and there he saw appellants hit
the victim with bamboo sticks on the neck and kept on hitting him even after he was unconscious
and fell to the ground face down. Ernesto testified that he saw the accused-appellants went inside
the yard and came back carrying a sack where they placed the victim, who was then unconscious.
The following day, he drove his jeepney plying the route of Alaminos-Lingayen. When he arrived
at his house at around 5:30 p.m., he met Rey, the brother of the victim; and that Ernesto told Rey
that appellants killed the victim and that Rey should not tell anyone about it because they might
kill him as well.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
HELD:
YES. Under Article 267 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention are, as follows: "(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another
or in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a)
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer."
All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case.
First, appellants are both private individuals. Second, the fact that they kidnapped the victim was
clearly established by the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Ernesto. Third, appellants' act
112
of kidnapping was illegal. Lastly, the victim has been detained for more than three days. In fact,
until now, the victim has not returned, nor his body been found.
Appellants, however, insist that the element of restraint was not clearly established as the
prosecution allegedly failed to establish actual confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim.
113
G.R. No. 232361 September 26, 2018
vs.
FRANCISCO DAMAYO Y JAIME, Accused-Appellant
People v. Damayo
FACTS:
On 7 August 2008, at 12:00 PM, Jerome Rosario, eleven (11) year-old victim, was outside his
school at Sucat Elementary School, Brgy. Sucat, Muntinlupa when accused-appellant, known to
him as “Kuya Frank”, approached and told him that he was there to fetch him. Since Jerome was
familiar with accused-appellant, he went with him and both boarded a jeep bound for Pasay. Upon
reaching Pasay, they boarded a bus, still victim did not know where they were going.
Victim’s parents Edna and Jerry started looking for Jerome. When they chanced upon Daryll, a
classmate of Jerome, and asked him on his whereabouts, Daryll informed them that an unknown
man had taken Jerome during dismissal time. Edna and Jerry then reported the incident to the
barangay, where it was blottered.
The next day, Edna received a call on her daughter's cellphone from a person who introduced
himself as Jerome's classmate. The man, whom Edna recognized to be accused-appellant, stated
that Jerome was with him and will let him go, provided that he will be given ₱150,000.00 and
Edna will be unaccompanied when they meet. He directed her to meet him at a terminal in Dau,
Pampanga.
The following day, Edna and Jerry went to the Muntinlupa City Police Station to report the matter.
An operation was planned to retrieve Jerome, where it was agreed that upon meeting appellant at
the designated meet-up point, Edna would touch appellant's arm, signaling to the police his
identity. At 2:00 P.M. of the same date, Edna, Jerry, and the police officers, namely, SP04 Nero,
P03 Delmendo, P03 Lanting and P02 Sulaiman, proceeded to the Dau terminal in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Upon seeing appellant, Edna touched his arm which prompted the police to arrest him.
After handcuffing him, informing him of his arrest and reading him his constitutional rights, the
police asked appellant where Jerome was being kept. Appellant told them that Jerome was at his
house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga. They proceeded to the area and were able
to safely recover Jerome.
Defense claimed that the charge was merely a ploy to conceal his alleged affair with the victim’s
mother. He claimed that there was a plan to elope; however, Edna backed out and had him arrested
for false charges of kidnapping with ransom.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
the first (the private complainant is a minor) and second (for the purpose of extorting ransom)
paragraphs of Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to penalty. The CA ruled that the prosecution
witnesses unerringly established the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
Damayo's culpability thereof. The CA, likewise, brushed aside Damayo' s defense of denial for
being self-serving and unsupported by any plausible proof.
114
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and
Extortion with Ransom.
HELD:
YES. In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; ( c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and ( d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the curtailment of the victim's
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the latter's person and it is not necessary that
the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. The crime of serious illegal
detention is committed by detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Its
essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent
of the accused to effect such deprivation.
The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been sufficiently proven in
the case at bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he took Jerome
from his school at Sucat Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on August 7, 2008
at 12:00 noon, brought said victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and kept him there until he was safely recovered by his parents and the police officers on August
9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain Jerome is undeniable.
Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was locked up, he
was nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the place where Damayo brought
him as the latter remained outside and kept watch of him.
115
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
vs.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK, Accused-appellants
People v. Mamantak & Taurak
FACTS:
On 13 December 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s
outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a
vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat,
Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Teresa barely lose sight of Christopher when she
realized that he had disappeared. They searched for Christopher, but to no avail; so they reported
him missing to the nearest police detachment. The following day, Teresa went to several TV and
radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information.
Despite the publicity, however, still to no avail.
On 25 February 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller
claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy. On 27
March 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo
of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised
the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at
Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team
was formed and PO Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the PAOCTF
team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and
proceeded to the designated meeting place. Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day,
Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go
with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia.
Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher. Upon seeing her son,
Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor
understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy
gave a Muslim name with "Taurak" as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that
her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. The transaction was consummated and the PAOCTF
arrested the accused-appellant.
The Defense claimed that they found the victim in Divisoria and merely kept him after all attempts
of finding his parents were futile. They were going to return the victim when they were suddenly
accused of kidnapping and arrested.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Kidnapping for Ransom.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom.
116
HELD:
YES. In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; ( c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and ( d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the curtailment of the victim's
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the latter's person and it is not necessary that
the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. The crime of serious illegal
detention is committed by detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Its
essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent
of the accused to effect such deprivation.
The Supreme Court held that Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was
incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was
that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other
end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development’s social workers in her barangay or in the city
hall at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her
phone conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to each other?
117
G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO HERMANO ALIAS "BOBBY
REYES," ROLANDO DEQUILLO, ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH FERRAER,
appellants.
People v. Muit
FACTS:
On 11 November 1997, Ferraer was introduced by his relative, Julaton, to Pancho, Sr., Pancho, Jr.,
Dequillo, and four (4) other men. All the men arrived at Ferraer’s house in Batangas expressing
their intent to use his house as a safehouse for their “visitor.” Ferraer was hesitant at first but he
was told not to worry because they are not killers and their line of work is kidnap for ransom.
Ferraer was also assured that the money they would get would be divided equally among them.
Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men came. One of them was
Muit.
Romeo served as the group’s informant. One day, Romeo informed them of the presence of the
victim in the construction site. Seraspe, the victim’s driver, drove the latter in a Pajero to the
construction site together with one engineer. The victim and the engineers alighted the Pajero. In
the construction site, the engineers and Seraspe were threatened with a gun to lie prostate on the
ground. Seraspe witnessed as the victim was taken away in the Pajero. Seraspe immediately
reported the incident to the police. The police then barricaded several roads leading to Lipa
whereupon they caught the Pajero. An exchange of gunshots took place, the victim was one of the
casualties, while Muit escaped but was subsequently apprehended.
On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their
agreed meeting place but did not find Hermano’s group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway
in front of the construction site. He thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the
group, so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraer’s house, he told Ferraer what happened to
their operation. Worried that something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went
back and looked for the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
Accused-appellants vehemently denied the charges against them and provided alibis for each.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Kidnapping and Carnapping with homicide. The
RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations
of the prosecution’s witnesses. It found the prosecution’s witnesses more credible than appellants,
whose self-serving statements were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal
liability. The RTC did not give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial
confessions were procured through torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare
and appellants’ medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration and after the
execution of their statements. And the RTC noted that even without appellants’ extra judicial
confessions, there was still sufficient evidence on record to hold them guilty.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA held that the prosecution was able to prove through
Ferraer that appellants conspired with one another in the planning and execution of their plan to
118
kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their
counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping. As for Muit, other than his extra judicial
confession, he was also positively identified during the kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe and
Chavez.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping and carnapping with homicide.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a)
the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The
essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. The totality of the prosecution’s
evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, defines
"carnapping" as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. The crime was committed in this case when the victim’s Pajero was forcibly taken away
from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct
testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and
convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned
the crime in Ferraer’s house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim
would be at the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997
informing them that the victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry
out their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other
members of the group pointed their guns at the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie
prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim
to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim
to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission
testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in which
the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out,
but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the
group did not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the
news that the group engaged the police in a shootout and most of them were killed, and that Muit
was arrested by the police.
119
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO
GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants
People v. Dionaldo
FACTS:
At around 8 AM of 16 May 2003, Roderick dropped his brother, victim Edwin, off at the Health
Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another
brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. Three (3) men, later identified as Armando,
Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed
him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194. Upon receiving the message,
Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of
the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if
he should report the matter to the police.
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the
payment of ransom money in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such
money, as he only had ₱50,000.00. On 19 May 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the
kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of ₱110,000.00. Roderick was
then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call. At around 7:30 PM, as
Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers called and
instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light
when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him
to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was
told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with
plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw
one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their
car and drove away.
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3
Caballero and PO3 Acebuche of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response
(PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth
Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was
the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona on the condition
that he will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts
of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on 12 June 2003. In the early morning of the following day
PACER found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention.
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the
victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported
by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment.
120
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court modified the ruling to a conviction of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which
was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this
case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should
nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as
in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct
errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The
essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. The totality of the prosecution’s
evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The
penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies
as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.
121
G.R. No. 179570 February 4, 2010
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM, Petitioner,
vs.
People v. Madsali
FACTS:
On 1 July 1994, around 3:30 PM, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching
water in a cave in Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards
them and carrying a bolo. They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of
AAA and threatened to kill her should she not come with him. Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue,
but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA
was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun and pointed it at Inon Dama
threatened to shoot her if she won’t leave. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to
AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a
gun and told AAA to come with them.
When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a
piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only
her bra on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron
told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared. She was sexually abused
three (3) times on the ground, where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. Maron stood
guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00 AM the following day and brought
AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard
AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.
On 2 July 1994, AAA’s mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill her
daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out offear, she did not report. Egap asked
AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign a document,
which she was not able to read.
On 11 July 1994, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was
solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA
and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law.
AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her
house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill
her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice
every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied
by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She
got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's
abduction to the proper authorities. AAA was detained at the house of Egap from 2 July 1994 until
December 15, 1994. On December 16, 1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron claimed that
he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their elopement. During the period of their
122
engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and
out of her own free will. The sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The
defense further claimed that AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he did not
pay the dowry (dower) in the amount of ₱10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did
not pay the dowry because he had already rendered services to AAA's family for about three years
prior to his marriage with AAA.
RTC Ruling: Accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of abduction with rape.
Egap and accused-appellant Sajiron Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Serious Illegal Detention.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
rape.
HELD:
YES. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps
or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her
life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault. Clearly, conspiracy
between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible abduction and the subsequent
rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a
felony and decide to commit itDelay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not
affect the credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is
rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. BBB explained that she
did not immediately report the abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to the authorities,
because Egap threatened to kill AAA, who was then in his custody.
Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal
knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed
relationship by substantial evidence. The "sweetheart theory" hardly deserves any attention when
an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show
that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts. In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present
any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense
and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed
against them.
123
G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
vs.
FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
People v. Mirandilla
FACTS:
On 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Brgy. San Francisco, Legazpi. AAA went out of the
dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back through the crowd, a
man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knife’s point thrust at her right side.
He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others
stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked
farther. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International
Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others
alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove
the tricycle. Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside the house. At
gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants and proceeded to rape her, threatening her with the
gun.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting
until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came. At around midnight, Mirandilla
arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he forced her to do a fellatio. After
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the road’s
side, he raped the tied down AAA. He transferred her to a nipa hut and again raped her.
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered
the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place
to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked
up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to
Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly
raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a
river staying out of people’s sight for two nights. She was able to reach the house of Evelyn
Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell,
starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the
police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man as accused-
appellant Mirandilla Jr.
The defense claimed that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual relationship was
consensual and that he even impregnated her but she induced an abortion.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of kidnapping, four (4) counts of rape, and one
(1) count of rape through sexual assault.
124
CA Ruling: Modified the conviction to kidnapping with rape, four (4) counts of rape, and one (1)
count of rape through sexual assault.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping four (4) counts of rape, and one count
of rape through sexual assault.
HELD:
The SC convicted accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps
or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less,
which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused
her while holding a gun and/or a knife.
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. The sweetheart theory
as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively,
it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of
rape. Love, is not a license for lust.
125
G.R. No. 212191 September 05, 2018
v.
RICHARD DILLATAN, SR. Y PAT AND DONATO GARCIA Y DUAZO, Accused-
Appellants.
People v. Dillatan
FACTS: Crimes Against Property
Spouses Henry and Violeta Acob, were owners of a stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa, Aurora,
Isabela. Around 6 PM of 7 February 2010, they closed their stall and proceeded to go home by
riding together on their motorcycle. Homer, the son, was the driver, Violeta sat at the middle, while
Henry sat behind her. They were approaching the entrance to their barangay around 6:30 PM when
they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as herein accused-appellants, near a
motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode the motorcycle and tailed them.
Accused- appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to
stop and immediately declared a “holdup”. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her
belt bag which contained ₱70,000 cash. Thereafter, Dillatan ordered Garcia to fire at the victims
hitting the left hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced
Homer's chest causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the other
hand, was able to get off the motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby
hitting his right knee. Accused-appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people
then came to the aid of the victims and brought them to the hospital where Homer later expired by
reason of his gunshot wound. Violeta and Henry were treated for their wounds. Accused-appellants
were apprehended by police authorities later at night where they were subsequently identified by
Violeta at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt bag and shot them.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of robbery with homicide. The RTC held that all
the elements of the crime of robbery are present in the instant case; robbery was the main purpose
of accused appellants; the killing of Homer and the infliction of injuries upon Violeta and Henry
are only committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery; hence, these crimes are merged
into a special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 294
of the RPC.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the prosecution was able to establish the presence
of all the elements of robbery with homicide by proving that Dillatan declared a holdup and
grabbed Violeta's belt bag, while Garcia fired at the private complainants in order to facilitate the
taking of the bag and their escape from the crime scene. The CA sustained the RTC in giving
credence to the testimony of Violeta who positively identified the accused-appellants in court, as
well as in the police station, on the same night that the crime took place.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide.
HELD:
YES. Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
126
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi
or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide,
as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the
central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery.
Under the given facts, the Court finds no error in the findings of both the RTC and the CA that
the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) accused-appellants forced Homer, Henry and
Violeta to stop their motorcycle; (2) Dillatan declared the holdup and grabbed the belt bag in
Violeta's possession; and (3) thereafter, Garcia fired at the victims in order to preserve their
possession of the stolen item and to facilitate their escape.
127
G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015
vs.
ARNEL BALUTE y VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant
People v. Villanueva
FACTS:
On 22 March 2002 at around 8:00 PM, while on a stop position at a lighted area along Radial Road
10, Tondo, Manila, two persons approached SPO1 Manaois, who was then onboard his owner-
type jeep with his wife Cristina and daughter Blesilda. One man poked a gun at the side of SPOI
Manaois, took his cellular phone and shot him at the left side of his torso. He was unable to fire
his firearm as fell to the ground and died while being operated on at the Mary Johnston Hospital.
The two men were later identified as accused Arnel Balute, the man who shot SPOI Manaois, and
a certain “Leo Blaster”.
Accused-appellant, denied liability. He claims tha on the day in question, he said, he was at the
shop of a certain Leticia Nicol where he worked as pedicab welder and left it at 10:00 in the
evening; he did not notice anything untoward as he was busy working the entire time.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of robbery with homicide with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling with modification to the circumstance removing the aggravating
circumstance of treachery due to the failure of the prosecution to allege it in the Information.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that a special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place
when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a
conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that
the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery." Homicide is said to have been committed by reason
or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the
crime
128
G.R. No. 209227 March 25, 2005
vs.
CHARLIE OROSCO, Accused-Appellant
People v. Orosco
FACTS:
On 16 May 2006, Arca went to the store of victim Lourdes Yap at Purok 4, Brgy. Rawis, Legazpi
City. He was buying ice but it was not yet frozen, so he went home. He again went to buy ice at
the same store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two
(2) male customers. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient change and insisting
they gave a ₱500 bill and not ₱100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store.
From outside the store and through its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left
arm around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was
at her back restraining her hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as
accused-appellant Orosco, while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less
hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released
her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the altar
of the store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with two (2)
other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and
went home afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts.
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later,
at NBI Legazpi Office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who
stabbed Yap. From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to him, Arca positively
identified Abner Astor as one of the two men sitting beside the store as lookouts. Only accused-
appellant was arrested as Astor and two other men went into hiding.
Defense provided an alibi stating that he was at his house taking care of his three-year-old child
and he denies knowing Astor.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of robbery with homicide.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide.
HELD:
YES. Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied
by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another;
129
(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion
thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery
or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the
crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery.
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. The evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.
Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal altercation until she
allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe wrapping
his arm around her neck while appellant held her hands at the back. With the victim pressed
between the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she
fell down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar inside the store and fled together
with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of
conspiracy between appellant and his co- accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the
victim. It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate
the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck.
His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John Doe
stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co- accused, appellant is
equally liable for the killing of Yap.
130
G.R. No. 173479 July 12, 2007
vs.
JUAN CABBAB, JR., Accused-Appellant
People v. Cabbab Jr.
FACTS:
On 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal and Winner, together with Quindasan, Abad and PO
Belmes, went to Brgy. Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to attend a "fiesta”. Upon arrival in the area,
they found out that the fiesta celebration was already over, thus, they decided to go home in
Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime, the group took their lunch at Sitio Turod,
located in the same area of Brgy. Kimmalasag. After taking their lunch and on their way home,
they were met by accused-appellant Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a
local version of the game of "Russian poker."
Only Winner Agbulos and Quindasan played "pepito" with the group of accused-appellant. Winner
Agbulos played the dealer/banker in the game while accused-appellant and Calpito acted as players
therein. Around 3:00 PM PO William Belmes told Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan that they
should be going home after three (3) more deals. About 3:30 PM., Winner Agbulos won the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused
Calpito and a companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos
and Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of
accused-appellant. PO Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Abad, who were walking behind
the group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by
accused-appellant and Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead
body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The three
sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime where
they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Cabbab, Jr. and
Calpito who ambused them and took the money, estimated at ₱12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos
which he won in the card game. Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died
the following day.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of robbery with homicide (for both Cabbab Jr.
and Calpito) and attempted murder (for Cabbab Jr.); the RTC also appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to special complex crime of robbery with
homicide and attempted murder.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty as charged.
131
HELD:
YES. To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened
to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on
the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident,
or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are
killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
132
G.R. NO. 170191, August 16, 2006
v.s.
RODOLFO SUYU, RUDY, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS CAINGLET AND ROMMEL
MACARUBBO, ROMMEL BARIUAN, Appellants
People v. Suyu
FACTS:
At around 7:15 PM on 13 January 1996, couple Angeles and Ferrer eating snacks inside a pick-up
truck parked in a vacant lot near COA and DECS offices in Tuguegarao. They noticed shadows
near the truck, and when William opened his window to check, accused-appellant Macarubbo
stood in front of the truck and pointed a gun at them, telling them that this was a hold-up and if
they tried to start the car, they will be shot. Willy Suyu lifted the lock on the side of William, and
told the couple to surrender what they had so that they would not be harmed, which included: (1)
pair of gold earrings valued at- ₱1,500; (2) A gold ring valued at- ₱1,000 (3) Cash money in the
amount of- ₱10 (4) A wallet containing money- ₱150.
Accused-appellant Suyu clubbed Ferer and dragged him out. Ferrer was able to escape and run to
the police. Willy Suyu lifted the lock of Angeles’ side and Macarubbo opened the door; the acused-
appellants dragged her to a hilly place, where she was held by her arms and a fan knife was pointed
at her. Angeles was then brought to a house near a muddy place, where they all agreed to take
turns and rape Angeles, starting with Suyu and Cainglet. The police started to arrive, so they
brought her to the top of the hill near the Capitol, she attempted to shout but they held a knife to
her. She was forced to lie down on her back, and while Cainglet pinned down her hands, and Suyu
removed her pants and undergarments; even if she bit down on his tongue, he inserted two fingers
into her, and then his penis. Cainglet went next, and was able to insert half an inch of his penis
into her vagina She pled for mercy and was allowed by the culprits to leave when the vehicles
arriving were about 10 m away from the pick-up truck; she ran into a house, where the owners
summoned the barangay tanod.
She was examined by the nurses at CVRH, checked only her bruises; she said that there was merely
an attempt to rape, because she was embarrassed to say she had been raped in front of her
boyfriend. The examining physician noted a complete hymen, no erosions or lacerations.
Macarubbo was released on recognizance of his minority, and volunteered to testify for her case.
RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape. The RTC gave credence
and probative weight to Clarissa's testimony and rejected the defenses of denial and alibi of the
accused. The court ruled that the latter's testimonies were full of inconsistencies and were not in
accord with human experience.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to Macarubbo’s penalty.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide.
HELD:
YES. To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened
to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed
133
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on
the occasion thereof, rape is committed.
The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob
and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission
of the robbery. We note that aside from raping the victim, appellant Suyu inserted his finger in her
sexual organ. Appellant Suyu, thus, committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. Also, aside from Suyu and Cainglet raped the
victim. Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any
crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a
single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape.
The common defense of alibi used by the appellants cannot, moreover, prevail over Clarissa's clear
and convincing narration of the events that transpired and her positive identification of her
assailants. It is a time-honored rule that alibi is a weak defense when unsubstantiated by credible
and plausible testimonies. To merit approbation, clear and convincing evidence must be adduced
that the accused was in a place other than the situs of the crime at the time the crime was committed,
such that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime.
134
G.R. No. 198020 July 10, 2013
vs.
JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-Appellant
People v. Barra
FACTS:
On 9 October 2003, accused-appellant Barra, armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into the
residence of the victim in Brgy. Tigaon, Camarines Sur, stole money from victim Lagdaan and on
the same occasion of the robbery killed Lagdaanby shooting him; thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound which was the proximate cause of his death.
The Prosecution’s witness, De la Peña, narrated the incident that took place in the victim’s house.
He stated that when the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant shot him.
He went home and reported the incident the following morning. Asor also testified that on the
night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s house to collect his daily wage when
he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s house. He inquired from accused-appellant if the victim
was around. Appellant responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while
Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that
the victim died. Asor then reported the incident,
The defense invoked denial and alibi saying that he was at Batangas with his family when it
occurred.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
CA Ruling: Modified RTC ruling convicting the accused-appellant of the crime attempted robbery
with homicide (with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling). The CA held that the only
evidence introduced by the government to establish robbery is the statement of De la Peña that
when accused-appellant reached the victim’s place, the latter barged into the said residence, poked
a gun at the victim’s forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to accede to his
demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Accused-appellant had intent to gain however it was not
consummated.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide.
HELD:
YES. Article 297.
The elements of Attempted Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to
give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for
this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery
with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code.
135
G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017
RAMON AMPARO Y IBAÑEZ, Petitioner,
v.s.
Amparo v. People
FACTS:
26 April 2007, Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo, and accused-appellant Amparo armed with bladed
weapons and as a band, boarded a passenger jeepney with Plate No. DGM-407 at the comer of
C.M. Recto Avenue and T. Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and mugged victim Ignacio. The
victim testified that he was ordered to take his necklace off and hand over his mobile phone.
Ignacio then heard a gunshot, causing the robbers to be rattled and drop their knives on the jeepney
bench. A police officer arrived and ordered the robbers to alight from the jeepney. Four ( 4) men,
later identified as Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo, and Amparo, were handcuffed and taken to the police
station. Ignacio identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one
who announced the hold-up. He also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the
front seat beside the driver. He admitted that he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were
doing at the time of the incident. However, he testified that he saw them place their knives on the
jeepney bench when the police fired the warning shot.
P03 Perez testified that on the day of the incident, he was about to report for work when he noticed
a commotion inside a passenger jeepney. He then saw Alcubar embracing Ignacio, while pointing
a "stainless one foot long double bladed fan knife" at him. He followed the jeepney and fired a
warning shot. Later, he arrested Alcubar. SP03 Perez ordered the other three (3) men to alight from
the jeepney when the other passengers pointed them out as Alcubar's companions. Another police
officer arrived and helped him make the arrest. Upon frisking the men, he recovered a balisong
from Guarino, an improvised kitchen knife from Salmeo, and a fan knife from Amparo. The other
passengers also testified.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of robbery in a band.
CA Ruling: Dismissed the appeal.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of robbery in a band.
HELD:
YES. Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by
use of force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294 (5) in relation to Article 295, and Article
296 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors
take part in the robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the
band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime.
Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the
crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage. under Presidential
Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily
organized themselves for the purpose of committing that crime.
136
G.R. No. 197562 April 20, 2015
AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, Petitioner
v.s.
Fransdilla v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner Fransdilla, posing as a representative from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) went to the house of victim Lalaine Yreverre. Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the
telephone, which the latter acceded to. Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After
Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora,
suddenly came inside the house. Later, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort room,
which the latter again permitted. When Aurora came back, she sat down again but in crossed-legs
as she said she was having a menstrual period. Afterwards, one of the men poked a gun at Lalaine’s
neck and announced that it was a hold-up. Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's
neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair and dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's
room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked around the room and when he spotted
upon the vault he dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his companions to come along.
Accused Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and brought it
downstairs. But before they went downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to
just stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door and followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal
then brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her towards her bed and she fell.
Cacal told her to just stay, and then he searched the room. Lalaine managed to stand up but Cacal
slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came and tied her arms at her back. While she was
being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room. It was also at the time that accused
Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the jewelries and things they sawThey
were able to get a vault, jewelries and other things they saw before they left the house.
Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her. Lalaine then called
her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident to the police authorities.
Not too long thereafter, the police investigated the incident. Investigations ensued in order to look
for the accused. Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged and convicted with
robbery.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of robbery.

ISSUES: WON the penalty imposed should be the lighter one in case two crimes be committed.
HELD:
NO. The Court held that when the elements of both crimes are present, the crime is a complex one,
calling for the imposition of the graver offense on its maximum. In the case at bar, the information
137
fully alleged the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, RPC, and
robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294, RPC by averring that "the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and
intimidation upon person rob the residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently
proved the commission of the complex crime by showing during the trial that the accused, after
entering the residential house of the complainants took away valuables, including the vault
containing Cynthia’s US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against
and intimidation of persons during the robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her
up, and herding the other members of the household inside the bodega of the house.
Therefore, all the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the RPC, and robbery with intimidation or
violence under Article 294 of the same Code. Thus, the penalty for the complex crime under Article
48 of the RPC was that for the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. The
Supreme Court held that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to be validly held
to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her overt acts must evince her
active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt acts of each of the
conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator
cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such conspirator is
the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive co-
conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by representing herself
as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it is not always required to establish that two or more
persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the
details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out. Conspiracy can also be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from
the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest. Once conspiracy is established, the act of each conspirator is the act of
all. Hence, in establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial
evidence.
138
G.R. No. 217722 September 26, 2018
JOMAR ABLAZA y CAPARAS, Petitioner
vs.
Ablaza v. People
FACTS:
On 8:30 AM of 29 June 2010, victim Snyder was using her cellphone while walking along Jolo
St., Brgy. Barreto, Olongapo when a motorcycle with two (2) men on board stopped beside her.
The backrider then suddenly grabbed her three necklaces: (1) a big necklace worth ₱43,800.00 and
(2) two other necklaces each with pendants worth ₱13,500.00 and ₱12,800.00, respectively.
Snyder further recounted that after grabbing her necklaces, the two men moved a short distance
and then looked back at her to check if all her necklaces were taken. Recovering from shock,
Snyder managed to shout and ask for help. A tricycle passed by and so the male persons on board
the motorcycle immediately sped away. Snyder asked the tricycle driver to run after the snatchers
but he unfortunately missed them. Thus, Snyder went to the Police Station to report the incident.
While at the police station, Snyder was shown some pictures from which she identified petitioner
Ablaza as the driver of the motorcycle. Snyder was certain about the identity of petitioner since
she had a good look at the robbers' faces when they looked back at her before speeding away and
also because petitioner was not wearing any helmet at that time. On the same day, a policeman
accompanied Snyder to the house of petitioner who, when asked, denied any involvement in the
snatching incident and claimed that he was asleep at that time. After a while, Snyder and the
policeman discovered that Lauzon, whom Snyder earlier learned to be the backrider, was also in
petitioner's house hiding under the kitchen sink. Unfortunately, Snyder was not able to recover her
necklaces.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt Of Robbery.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling With Modification To Penalty.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of robbery.

HELD:
NO. RPC defines robbery as a crime committed by 'any person who, with intent to gain, shall take
any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything.
The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in
snatching Acarnpado' s shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched
her shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion
used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion's
snatching of Acampado's shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.
139
G.R. No. 182648 June 17, 2015
HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner

vs.
Medina v. People
FACTS:
Henry Lim, a resident of Calao West, Santiago, Isabela, is the registered owner of a Sangyong
Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207. which was involved in an accident that caused damage to
its roof and door. On 27 April 2002, he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic and
maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to
Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and serviceable because the under chassis was not
affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.
Months passed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, on 4 September 2002, Purita, Lim’s
sister, instructed Beltran to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would
instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since
its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00, and
₱10,000.00, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and
installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the
shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep, but without
the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing the jeep
therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in good
running condition.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of theft.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA held that Medina failed to prove that the pick-up was
completely repaired and was placed in good running condition; and that he failed to prove that the
pick-up is owned by Lim. The CA also held that the positive testimony of Beltran deserves merit
in contrast with the self-serving testimony of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to Medina’s
assertion that the missing auto parts were turned over to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an
employee of Lim. For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled that such claim was unsubstantiated
in view of Medina’s failure to formally offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of theft.

HELD:
YES. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter’s consent. As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of
personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain;
(4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished without
the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things. Intent to gain or
animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the
thing subject of asportation. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the
140
evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from
all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As to the concept of "taking" –
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that
it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying
away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not
require asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised
Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed through
the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device.
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter,
battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the
pick-up owned by Lim. With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove
that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic
notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind
the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the
pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-
up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza
witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither
did Medina adduce any justifying or exempting circumstance to avoid criminal liability.
141
G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015

vs.
MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO NIELLES, MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES, Accused-
Appellant.
People v. Nielles
FACTS:
Victim Flores was engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks for
Shoemart and Landmark and selling or transferring them for consideration. Accused-appellant
Nielles worked as Flores' house helper but was eventually hired to work at Flores' office
performing clerical jobs. When Flores' business grew, appellant was assigned to bill and collect
from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks.
On 15 July 2004, Nielles collected ₱640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, she did not
remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in Flores account. Instead, she issued 15 personal checks
totaling ₱640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores' account. All the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to "account closed."
Defense contends that since Flores she could not have personally known whether she indeed
collected the amounts. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she
received or collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies
belonging to Flores.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Qualified Theft.

ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of Qualified Theft.

HELD:
YES. The SC concurs with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: (1) taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the said taking was done
with intent to gain; (4) that it was done without the owner’s consent; (5) that it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and (6) that
it was done with grave abuse of confidence.
The taking of the amount collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain
as she failed to remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of
unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of
the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be
entrusted with the collection of payments.
142
G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner,

vs.
Zapanta v. People
FACTS:
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga
building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. It assigned the petitioner as project manager
with general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building
construction materials.
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr.
Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to ANMAR’s warehouse on
October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook. Engr. Marigondon
contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported return
took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of
the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange
steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures
of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters
and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later
and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The stolen steel beams amounted to
₱2,269,731.69.
Testimonies from fellow engineers in the project as well as documentary evidence consisting of a
security logbook entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits were presented
to prove petitioner’s malicious betrayal of trust.
On two (2) occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck
driver, and about 10 ANMAR welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces
of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos
Highway. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo and several
welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long
wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street in Baguio City.
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS,
not ANMAR, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr. Marigondon’s
motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Qualified Theft. The RTC gave full credence
to the testimonies as well as the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The Court of Appeals held that it is ANMAR and not AMCGS
who put petitioner to such position he is holding as corroborated by the salary receipts presented.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of Qualified Theft.
143
HELD:
YES. The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and
309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's
consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of
the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide flange
steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos
Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed
on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site,
without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.
144
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
People v. Cahilig
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with
handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the
funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in
order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its
other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her
capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer
the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made
into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said
amount from her capital contribution
There was a consolidation of the thirty (30) cases against her. During the pre-trial conference, it
was agreed upon that the first three (3) cases will be used as a face test. It was held that the three
(3) cases provided a modus operandi for the rest of the twenty-seven (27) left.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft. The RTC
held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers
ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records
of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds
which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were
present.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilt of Qualified Theft.
HELD:
YES. Art. 310. Provides the crime of Qualified Theft.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
(1) Taking of personal property; (2) That the said property belongs to another; (3) That the said
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) That it be done without the owner’s consent; (5) That it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
(6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.First, there was taking ofpersonal property,
when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier
of the association which are supposed to be redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second,
145
the property belongs to another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the
taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant
created a ruse showing that the funds were credited to another account but were actually withdrawn
from her own personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with intentto gain, as accused-
appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby means of a modus operandi that made it appear
through the entries inthe ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course
of business and with the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished without
violence or intimidation against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were
committed with grave abuse of confidence considering that her position as cashier permeates trust
and confidence.
However, the SC held that three of the charges have incorrect penalties. The SC affirms the CA
decision with modification to penalties.
146
G.R. No. 212815 March 1, 2017

v.s.
ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN, Accused-Appellant
People v. Donio
FACTS:
On 26 November 2003, six (6) police officers of the Concepcion Police Station, Tarlac, headed by
SP04 Taberdo, conducted a checkpoint along the junction of McArthur Highway in relation to the
campaign of the Philippine National Police against hijacking, camapping, and kidnapping, hailing
cargo trucks and closed vans, and issuing cards to southbound vehicles. At 2:30 AM, a speeding
tricycle abruptly stopped a few meters from the checkpoint and caught the attention of the police
officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others approached the vehicle. The driver, later identified as
Donio, was noticeably agitated while repeatedly kicking the starter of the tricycle. When asked for
his identity, he introduced himself as “Raul Layug” and then handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary
license bearing the said name. The police officers asked the driver and his companions, co-accused
Paulino and Ryan, to bring the vehicle, a Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817, to the
checkpoint when they failed to produce its certificate of registration and the official receipt.
Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They
seized the tricycle and the bolo, and then brought the three to the police station. At 9 AM, Donio
asked permission to leave in order to get the registration papers. The officers allowed him,
however, he did not return. Meanwhile, around 6:30 AM, Rodrigo Layug was searching for his
brother Raul, the victim, who has not returned home since last night. Raul was the driver of
Rodrigo's Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817. Raul’s remains was found in Brgy.
Madapdap.
Defense's sole witness, accused-appellant Donio, denied the accusations. As a sugarcane plantation
worker, he has a long palang for harvesting and cutting. It was not similar to the sharp and pointed
mini jungle bolo. As a stay-in plantation worker, he does not leave the workplace for six months.
His wife visits him instead. On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac.
However, from the evening the following day, he was at home after his wife fetched him to tend
to their sick child
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of carnapping with homicide.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA found his averment that he was taken from his house,
tortured and made to sign a blank sheet of paper as highly implausible. His sworn affidavit was
replete with details which were unlikely the product of creative imagination of the police. There
was no proof that the police singled him out, or was impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. The
said affidavit was voluntarily and freely executed with the assistance of counsel.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of carnapping with homicide.
147
HELD:
YES.
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as amended are the
following: (1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) That the vehicle belongs to a person
other than the offender himself; (3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or
that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things; and (4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof " In other words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there
must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
"Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
It is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same.
The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the person
robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the
robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either
unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent
evidence inconsistent thereto. The said principle may be applied in this case as the concept of
unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. Here, Donio failed to produce
the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the police officers when
his identity was asked, and left under the guise of getting the said documents. It was also
established that he and the others were strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession,
coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the presumption that he was
one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's death.
148
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner

vs.
Ong v. People
FACTS:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires valuing a total of
₱223,401.81 Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside
the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., cor. Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat,
Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse,
was in charge of the tires.
Accused-appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained
inside the warehouse. On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from Cabal that all
thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse. Private complainant, together with
caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
On 24 February1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in
Paco, Manila. Private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based
on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked accussed-appellant
if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private
complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Southern Police District. On 27 February
1995, a buy-bust operation was conducted.
Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves
across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck
tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought
for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which
was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant
entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from
him, based on their serial numbers. After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal,
the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his
own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 PM when appellant, together with the tires, was
brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able
to confiscate thirteen (13) tires.
Accused-appellant denied knowledge of the stolen merchandise saying that it was merely sold to
him by a certain Ramon Go.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law. The RTC
found the 13 tires to be the prima facie evidence which defeats the defense of denial.
149
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of violating PD 1612.
HELD:
YES. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose
of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property.
150
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012
MEL DIMAT, Petitioner,

vs.
Dimat v. People
FACTS:
On 7 March 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number.
After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually
TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan
Safari on their list of stolen vehicles.
They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from
its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari
that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on 25 May 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area.
He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
Defense claimed that accused-appellant Dimat did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997
Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that
gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later
sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado
and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of a violation of PD 1612.

HELD:
YES. The elements of "fencing" are (1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on 25 May 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan
Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions.
The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136
and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
151
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped
on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.
Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special
law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal
intent.4 Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that
the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that
he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
152
G.R. No. 182424 September 22, 2014
NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner

vs.
Carganillo v. People
FACTS:
On 23 September 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the
amount of ₱132,000 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged to be an
"ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay
Buying Station on or before 28 November 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the
petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a
commission of twenty centavos (₱0.20). But if no palay is purchased and delivered on November
28 , the petitioner must return the ₱132,000 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week thereafter,
respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the
₱132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored.
Accused-appellant denied that she entered into a "principal-agent" agreement with, and received
the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owed Teresita a balance of ₱13,704.32 for
the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, and that, in November
1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date and amount. She
likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of estafa.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with modification to penalty. The CA ruled as immaterial the
petitioner’s defense that she did not personally receive a written letter of demand from Teresita.
The CA held that even a verbal query as to the whereabouts of the money suspected to be
misappropriated is already tantamount to a demand, and that the petitioner failed to refute
Teresita’s claim that she went to the petitioner’s house to ask for the palay and/or the return of the
₱132,000.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of estafa.

HELD:
YES. that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust
the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and misappropriated it
when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in
evidence by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the
terms of agreement between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner
received in trust the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with
153
the corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or
before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November
28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the
parties’ rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention.Thus,
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
154
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner

vs.
Corpuz v. People
FACTS:
Private complainant Tangcoy was engaged in the business of lending money to casino players.
Tangcoy, and petitioner Corpuz, met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo in 1990. Upon
learning that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on 2 May 1991
at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Tangcoy agreed, and turned over to petitioner the following items: (1) an 18K diamond ring for
men; (2) a woman's bracelet; (3) one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a
period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of estafa.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of estafa without a valid demand.

HELD:
YES. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial
is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential
element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does
not render the Information ipso facto defective. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.
The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the
person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.
155
G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008
BELEN REAL, Petitioner,

vs.
Real v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner Real was an agent of private complainant Uy in his jewelry business. On several
occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter
to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period
of time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house at Nueva Villa
Subdivision, Brgy. Alangilan, Batangas and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as
she had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is his "kumadre," since Uy was one of the sponsors
in the wedding of petitioner’s daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy
agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them.
Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items selected by
petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the name
Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her signature at the lower portion including
her address.
Ten (10) days after, Uy went to petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and asked about
their transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the
payment was in the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated January
31, 1989 and requested the latter to collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on
January 31, 1989, petitioner again requested him to return the following day as she had not encash
the checks yet. Uy again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day, petitioner
called him "makulit" and "could not sleep for that matter." Petitioner further remarked that the
more she would not pay Uy.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of estafa. The RTC held that there was
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused is very evident in this
case. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale of said jewelry items
nor had she returned the same jewelry items when demanded to do so by the private complainant
shows that accused had misappropriated or converted to her personal use the amount of
₱371,500.00. In fact, she even required the private complainant to return to her house for several
times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him. However, accused did not comply
with her obligation.
HELD:
YES. The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
156
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another.
157
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014
VILMA M. SULIMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
Suliman v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner Suliman and her co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the
capacity to deploy people for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The
misrepresentation was made prior to private complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the
misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that induced the
private complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false pretenses and
misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware of
the recruitment activities done by her co-accused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused
received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal
capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three
(3) counts of estafa.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of
estafa.
HELD:
YES. As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud
another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits. The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following,
viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes
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referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f)
of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines. Provided, that such nonlicense or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule
of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance; (b) To furnish or
publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment; (c)
To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code; (d) To
induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer
him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and
conditions of employment; (e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to
employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency; (f) To engage in the
recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of
the Republic of the Philippines; (g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative; (h) To fail to submit reports
on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings,
separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment; (i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from
the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of
the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment; (j) For an officer or
agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any
corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly orindirectly in the management of
a travel agency; (k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure
for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations; (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as
determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses
incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault.
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense
involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
159
G.R. Nos. 209655-60 January 14, 2015

vs.
PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO Z. PUERTO, Accused-Appellants
People v. Tibayan
FACTS:
Tibayan Group Investment Company,Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered
with the SEC on 21 September 2001. In 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and
its subsidiaries and discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a registration
statement in violation of RA 8799. Further, TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit
before the SEC. On 21 October 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for being
fraudulently procured. The foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for Syndicated
Estafa against the incorporators and directors of TGICI; hwever, only accused-appellants were
arrested, while the others remained at large.
According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita
P. Gacayan, Irma T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon,
Leonida D. Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina Dela Peña, and Rodney E. Villareal (private
complainants) were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the
assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private
complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of
the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings, respectively. Upon encashment, the
checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting private complainants to
bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI
employees took the said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and
reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office
closed down without private complainants having been paid.
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators
to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of
Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of
TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI’s Articles of
Incorporation was a forgery,as she was neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of thirteen (13) and eleven (11) counts of estafa
for Tibayan and Puerto respectively. RTC did not lend credence to accused appellants’ denials in
light of the positive testimonies of the private complainants that they invested their money in
TGICI because of the assurances from accused-appellants and the other directors/incorporators of
TGICI that their investments would yield very profitable returns. In this relation, the RTC found
that accused-appellants conspired with the other directors/incorporators of TGICI in
misrepresenting the company as a legitimate corporation duly registered to operate as a mutual
fund to the detriment of the private complainants. RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple
Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that accused-appellants and the
other directors/ incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public, or it
160
failed to adduce documentary evidence substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants
committed Syndicated Estafa.
CA Ruling: Modified conviction to Syndicated Estafa. It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were
engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors – and
is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish. Inevitably, TGICI could no longer hoodwink new
investors that led to its collapse. Thus, the CA concluded that as incorporators/directors of TGICI,
accused-appellants and their cohorts conspired in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation of
fraud against the unsuspecting public. As such, they cannot hide behind the corporate veil and
must be personally and criminally liable for their acts. The CA then concluded that since the TGICI
incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5) persons, accused-appellants’ criminal
liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their respective penalties increased
accordingly.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellants are guilty of Syndicated Estafa.
HELD:
YES. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’
associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang
nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.
A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to
existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new
investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little
or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are
profiting from a legitimate business. All the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a
Ponzi scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses
and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a
supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b)
the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the
private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
161
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Hao v. People
FACTS:
Private Complainant Dy was a long-time client of AsiaTrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo
was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his
money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to
petitioner Ma. Gracia Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and
an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the recommended
company that can give Dy his higher investment return.
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate
amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000). This initial investment earned the promised interests,
leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to almost One Hundred Million
Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in the
name of State Resources. In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his
earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen
Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(₱114,286,086.14). All these checks were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from
AsiaTrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the
dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and
realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny. Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never
returned Dy’s money.
RTC Ruling: Denied petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, a judge is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence.The CA noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his
personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with
the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him. In its
decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dy’s affidavits
only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa, not syndicated estafa.
ISSUES: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their twin petitions.
HELD:
NO. In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the
executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary
162
investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level,
undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause.
In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed
as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions,
the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties for
each are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC
defines how this particular crime is perpetrated:
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by
the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him to
part withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.
163
G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015
v.s.
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant
People v. Villanueva
FACTS:
In August 1994, private complainant Madarang met accused-appellant Villanueva through a
townmate. Accused-appellant was interested in buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the business
of selling jewelry, Madarang went to Villanueva’s residence at Galeria de Magallanes, and was
able to sell to Villanueva five (5) sets of jewelry worth ₱1,010,000. Villanueva made out nine
checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated.
Madarang receive the checks because of Villanueva’s assurance that they would all be honored
upon presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB Check
No. 131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of “Account Closed”
or “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence
to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by security guards from reaching
Villanueva. Madarang resorted to sending demand letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva
proved futile
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of estafa.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA held that if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty
two thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional ten thousand (₱ 10,000.00) pesos but the total penalty shall not exceed
thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is
not the prescribed penalty for the offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on
account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (₱ 22,000.00)
pesos. “Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal
Code, such as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.”
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of estafa.

HELD:
YES. Swindling (estafa) – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means: (2) By
means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
164
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender has
postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or
issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has
been defrauded. The deceit here should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either
be prior to, or simultaneously with, the act of the fraud.
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who
confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had
purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of
Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not have
parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew
unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise established
because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because
the account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang
suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of ₱ 995,000.
165
G.R. No. 171672 February 02, 2015
MARIETA DE CASTRO, Petitioner
v.s.
De Castro v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner is a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) - Malibay, Pasay Branch.
Private Complainants Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with the
petitioner within the space of a week in October – November 1993. Matuguina, in particular,
withdrew the sum of ₱ 500 on 29 October and left her passbook with the petitioner upon the latter’s
instruction. She had to return two more times before the branch manager Zialcita sensed that
something wrong was going on. Learning of Matuguina’s problem, Zialcita told the accused to
return the passbook to her on November 8. Petitioner came up with the convenient excuse that she
had already returned the passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and found
three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically
different from the specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a total of ₱ 65,000. It was
apparent that the accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her
initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita instructed her assistant manager to pay a visit to Matuguina,
a move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the
signatures in the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When she went
back to the bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she met with the
accused in the presence of the bank manager. She insisted that the signatures in the slips were not
her, forcing the accused to admit that the passbook was still with her and kept in her house.
Zialcita also summoned Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4 withdrawal.
When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the accused as
the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused’s initials on it attesting to having
verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine. She posted
and released the money to the accused. Suspecting that Cornejo was also victimized, the assistant
manager also paid a visit to her; and their suspicions were confirmed as petitioner also made use
of the same modus operandi.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of four (4) counts of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA dismissed the claim of the petitioner that her
extrajudicial confessions which were used as evidence against her was a violation of her right
against self-incrimination. CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel
guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. In
her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents.
Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings
Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence
against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when depositors
Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes.
166
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of the crime of four (4) counts of estafa through falsification
of a commercial document.
HELD:
YES. The guilt of the petitioner for four (4) counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the
bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her
instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and
misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course.
Her misrepresentation to her coemployees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the
withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family
Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and
Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and
Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the
respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex
crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated
without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.
167
G.R. No. 211917 February 27, 2017
NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners
vs.
Gamaro v. People
FACTS: Crimes Against Chastity
Sometime in 2002, private complainant Fineza engaged in a business venture with petitioner
Gamaro and her daughters, petitioners Umali and accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza would buy any
foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who was
then the manager of the said pawnshop located at Basa St., San Pablo, Laguna. The pieces of
jewelry would then be sold for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at SSS in San Pablo
City. The proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following manner: fifty
percent (50%) would go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be divided among
Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were
placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue
several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised
amount of the pieces of jewelry.
Fineza discovered that Gamaro and her children were also engaged in a similar business with other
suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. The agreement was that the
Gamaros would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when
private complainant Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to her by Rowena
Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the account of the Gamaros had been closed. Fineza
then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed
that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks. Fineza also learned that
the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what
they had agreed upon. Petitioner Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such that,
the latter was compelled to redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the
pawnshop tickets that it was the nephew of Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who pledged the
pieces of jewelry.
To settle the matter, Fineza asked Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her
possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for the
pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer. A demand letter was then sent by
Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated 16 February 2004, asking for the
return of the amount of ₱2,292,519. as payment for all the pieces of jewelry which were not
returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand
letter was left unanswered.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of estafa. Josephine Umali was exonerated.
ISSUES: WON petitioners are guilty of estafa.
168
HELD:
YES. They committed estafa (b) by misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods,
or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which
petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) instead of paragraph 2(a).
What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted
of a crime charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A
reading of the Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges
estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with
the pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,5l9. on the condition that the same will be sold for
profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to
Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to
M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds
thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.
Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by
a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This, at least, is very
clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information,
169
G.R. No. 207711 July 2, 2018
MARIA C. OSORIO, Petitioner
vs.
Osorio v. People
FACTS:
Private complainant Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in
December 2000, petitioner Osorio visited Gabriel's store and introduced herself as an agent of the
Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life). As proof, Osorio
presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio offered insurance
coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel told Osorio to come back at a later date as she needed more time to
think about the offer. When Osorio returned, Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and
Excelife Gold Package. Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to
November 2001.
On 19 November 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund
Management. The proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme and would
earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled
to pay for her insurance premiums. Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered ₱200,000 to Osorio, who
in turn issued Philam Life receipts. A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance
policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the
matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take responsibility.
Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset
Management (PMIAM), thanking her for investing in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM
informed Gabriel that her investment would earn interest on a semi-annual basis starting 20 June
2002. Gabriel confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained
that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what had happened,
Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment.
On August 2, 2002, Gabriel received ₱13,000.00 from PMIAM as evidenced by PMIAM Voucher
No. 001854. 16 In spite of this, Gabriel insisted on the refund.
Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be
released to her on 14 May 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She then visited the
Philam Life office to see Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to
a certain Atty. Cabugoy who sent a demand letter to Osorio.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of estafa. The RTC held that Gabriel was induced
to part with her money through Osorio's misrepresentation that it would be invested in Philam Life,
a company with an established reputation. It rejected Osorio's defense that Gabriel later on
consented to the placement.
170
HELD:
NO. Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:
(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a). The false
pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under the first element exists when the accused
uses a fictitious name, pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused commits other similar deceits.
There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when she obtained private
complainant's money.
Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life.
During her first meeting with private complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling
card as proof of her identity and employment.54 Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values
and Compliance Department, even admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life
agent as of December 2000.
The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other
similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar
deceits" in Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
[T]he petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced.
The said provision reads:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The SC modified the conviction to Other Deceits (Art. 318).
171
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT CORPORATION,
Respondents
Campos v. People
FACTS:
On 17 March 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000. Petitioner issued several
postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these
checks drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 with BPI Family Bank-Head
Office, however, were dishonored when presented for payment.
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of
B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being
arraigned.
MTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of fourteen (14) counts of violation
of BP 22.
RTC Ruling: Affirmed the MTC Ruling.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22.

HELD:
YES. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos
through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from
FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an
element of the offense ,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the
second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element
172
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, as it reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
173
G.R. No. 129764 March 12, 2002
GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, Petitioner
v.s.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE
MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., Respondents
Griffith v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
for a term of two (2) years at a monthly rental of ₱75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred
rental arrearages, petitioner Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued
two (2) checks under Far East Bank and Trust Co. payable Phelps Dodge Philippines Inc. The
voucher for these checks contained the instructions: “These checks are not to be presented without
prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986.” Also written on the
face of the voucher was the following note: “However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for payment.
This is final and irrevocable.”
On 29 May 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on 30
May 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier
paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard.
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R.
Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard
warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln
Gerard that its properties would be placed in our compound and under our custody.
On 2 June 1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two (2) checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln
Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them within the
time prescribed by law. Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to
Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincolns inability to fund said checks due to the strike. Subsequently,
on 19 June 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed.
Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on 20 June 1986, despite Lincoln
Gerard’s protest.
Lincoln Gerard countered with a civil case for damages; however, the court held that despite the
proceeds of the auction sale, Lincoln Gerard still owes an outstanding balance.
MTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of two (2) counts of violation of BP 22.
RTC Ruling: Remanded jurisdiction to MTC.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the MTC Ruling.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of violation of BP 22.
174
HELD:
NO. The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who
seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.
Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference
for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to best serve the ends
of criminal justice.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that
imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at actual and potential
wrongdoers. Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the
checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason
duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial
foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards
property for cash amounting to ₱1,120,540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said
property was already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was
moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals
was only ₱301,953.12. Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps
Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling ₱215,442.65. In fact, it
impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This
was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two
counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps
Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment
thereof as involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already
collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal
charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered
to pay or return ₱1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these
circumstances, see how petitioners conviction and sentence could be upheld without running afoul
of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its
proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should
not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with
the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the
law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life.
This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization would not serve the ends of justice
but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover
the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtors
president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer
tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
175
G.R. No. 190834 November 26, 2014
ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner
vs.
Lim v. People
FACTS:
Petitioner Lim issued two (2) checks under Bank of Commerce payable to CASH, in the amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱I00,000) for each check. He gave the checks to Castor as his
campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered the
delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the
printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment"
order for the two (2) checks. Private complainant Badiee sent two (2) demand letters to petitioner,
dated 20 July 1998 and 23 July 1998 and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint
against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor. It was revealed that the checks were
dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial, when the bank officer was presented
on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated 8
September 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00). Private
complainant Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
MTC Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two (2) counts of violation of BP
22.
RTC Ruling: Affirmed MTC Ruling.
CA Ruling: AFFIRMED RTC RULING in toto.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of violation of BP 22.
HELD:
NO. It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must
determine whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the
law. Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned
cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the
elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be
abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, petitioner should not be
penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact
that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information
in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and
stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently
176
made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been
filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has
already attained the purpose of the law.
177
G.R. No. 163938 March 28, 2008
DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, Petitioners
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Buebos v. People
FACTS:
On 1 January 1994 around 3:00 AM, private respondent Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. She was lying down when she heard some
noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four (4) accused,
Buela, Sarmuelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When
she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of
coming to her immediate succor, the four (4) fled.
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then
drinking with Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw
a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able
to identify petitioners with Buela and Cornel Jr. running away.
Defense denied the allegations and provided alibis.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of arson.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Conviction with modification of the crime to simple arson. The CA
held that the act was simple arson.
ISSUES: WON petitioners are guilty of simple arson.
HELD:
YES. The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity
and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless
be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts
punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established
178
to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-
appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned"
cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse,
heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his
wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the
prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-
appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the
act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
179
G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013
vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant
People v. Macabando
FACTS:
On 21 December 2001, at 4 PM, accused-appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I.
pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he uttered that he would
burn his house. At 6:35 PM, Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When
Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the accused-appellant’s
house. He got a pail of water and poured its contents into the fire. Quilantang, a neighbor whose
house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire
extinguisher. When Quilantang approached the burning house, the accused-appellant, who was
carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots
in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be
killed.
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces.
Quilantang also returned to his house to save his belongings.
FOII Naive and FOI Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and concluded, among
others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional. Barangay
Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he
assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage.
Accused-appellant denied the charges saying that the fire have already started when he woke up.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of destructive arson.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling in toto. CA held that findings were based on unrebutted
testimonial and documentary evidence. Further, that the totality of the presented circumstantial
evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of destructive arson.

HELD:
NO. The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other
hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.
180
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire
to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department
likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified
that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That
the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration
spread to the neighboring houses.
Accused-appellant is guilty of simple arson.
181
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,
REPRESENTED BY MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, AS ADMINISTRATRIX,
PETITIONER
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILLIAM SATO, RESPONDENTS
Intestate of vda. De Carungcong v. People
FACTS:
On 24 November 1992, respondent William Sato, before the death of Manolita Carungcong,
through fraudulent means secured the thumbmark of the latter in order to make it appear that the
deceased was merely signing tax documents. Wendy Sato, petitioner’s 20-year old niece, was
authorized to be attorney-in-fact in order to sell four (4) properties in Tagaytay through the
machinations of her father. Wendy Sato claimed that the considerations appearing on the deeds of
absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father from the buyers of
her grandmother's properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid ₱7,000,000 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. As per the
statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid ₱8,000,000 for the property covered by
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William
Sato. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato
has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she
was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong.
Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her
father's orders. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total ₱22,034,000, William Sato failed to
account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong.
Demands were made but to no avail. In a resolution dated 25 March 1997, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City dismissed the complaint. On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and
set aside the resolution and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information.
Sato moved for quashal, claiming that under 332 (Absolutory clause- limits the responsibility of
the offender to civil liability and frees him from civil liability by virtue of his relationship to the
offended party) of the RPC his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, was an exempting
circumstance. Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
RTC Ruling: Quashed the Information on the ground of Absolutory Cause. The RTC held that
while it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused
with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida's mother, herein complainant, are still
son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond
the death of Zenaida.
ISSUES: WON the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document is covered
by the prohibitions of Absolutory Causes.
182
HELD:
NO. The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows: (1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document; (2) deceit
was employed to make the offended party sign the document; (3) the offended party personally
signed the document and; (4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that
the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for
estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes
of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of
the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents. Therefore, it would be
incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for
falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime
and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the
document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the
document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision. In
People v. Salvilla, the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to
facilitate and insure the commission of the other. In this case, the crime of falsification of public
document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and
carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the
SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.
The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing
estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. The
damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Decision of the CA is reversed and remanded back to the RTC.
183
G.R. No. 199100 July 18, 2014
vs.
ROSENDO AMARO, Accused-Appellant
People v. Amaro
FACTS:
On 26 March 1998, AAA, a seven (7)-year old girl was walking on her way home from school
when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a accused-appellant, who asked her to buy
cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to accused-appellant, the latter gave her bread
and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought
to the house of appellant. When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant
then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing
her to feel pain. AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for
six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that the accused-appellant’s
penis touched the outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant because the
latter promised to bring her home. On the last day of her detention, AAA and accused-appellant
went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and
immediately picked her up and brought her to the police station. Accused-appellant noticed AAA
being taken away but he did nothing.
BBB, AAA’s mother, narrated that on 26 March 1998, she was in the house when AAA came
home at around noon time to eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that she had to go back to school. At
around 5:00 PM when AAA had not come home, BBB went to the school to look for her. When
the teacher told BBB that that school children had already been sent home, she proceeded to the
police station to report her missing daughter. After six (6) days, AAA was found by BBB’s former
employer who brought her to the police. Upon receiving a call from the police, BBB immediately
went to the police station and saw her daughter. BBB observed that AAA was still in shock and
could not walk properly so she was brought to the doctor on the following day. She only learned
that her daughter was raped after the medical examination
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of forcible abduction with rape.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or
(3) when she is under twelve years of age.
184
The victim, AAA was a seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who
told her that he knew her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could
have easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the
forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage
of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs
in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, saysthat she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show thatrape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified
is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Moreover, AAA
testified in a straightforward manner.
185
G.R. No. 200080 September 18, 2013
vs.
MARVIN CAYANAN, Accused-Appellant
People v. Cayanan
FACTS:
On 1 February 2001, while victim AAA, a fifteen (15)-year old girl, was alone inside her house in
Bulacan. Accused-appellant Cayanan, victim’s brother-in-law, being married to her older sister,
caressed her while she was asleep. He then started kissing her and told her to remove her shorts.
When she refused, Cayanan forcibly took it off and after the latter took off his own under garment,
he inserted his organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA
if she resisted and informed anybody of the incident.
On 26 February 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend Adriano when
Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Manalastas. Cayanan then pulled AAA towards
the tricycle. She tried shouting but he covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded
a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop in Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of
clothes as she was in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his
sister’s house and raped her inside a bedroom. Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie talked
to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office where she was asked to execute a document
stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latter’s mother and sister-in-law who
brought her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of the incidents only after
her classmate Adriano informed her family of what happened in school and of the rape incidents.
AAA testified that she did not immediately tell her family because she was still in a state of shock.
Adriano and the victim’s mother corroborated her testimony. A resident psychiatrist at the National
Center for Mental Health also testified that AAA was suffering from mental depressive
symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse.
Accused-appellant invoked the sweetheart defense; however, to no avail.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Qualified Rape and Forcible Abduction with
Qualified Rape.
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of Qualified Rape and Forcible Abduction with
Qualified Rape.
HELD:
NO. The SC held that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape. Forcible abduction is
absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this case,
circumstances show that the victim’s abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after
Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his sister’s
house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape absorbed the
forcible abduction.
186
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, Respondents
Capili v. People
FACTS: Crimes Against Civil Status of Persons
On 8 December 1999, petitioner Capili married a Shirley Tismo while in a subsisting lawful
marriage with Karla Medina-Capili without the benefit of the previous marriage being annulled or
legally dissolved.
Karla filed a civil case for the declaration of nullity for the second marriage which under a
prejudicial question would absolve the petitioners of the charges of criminal bigamy. The RTC of
Antipolo granted the decree for the nullity of the said marriage.
RTC Ruling: Granted the Motion to Dismiss due to the nullity of the subsequent bigamous
marriage.
CA Ruling: Reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on 28 June 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as
the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime
of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s
187
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
188
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
People v. Odtuhan
FACTS:
On 2 July 1980, a marriage was solemnized between respondent Odtuhan and Jasmin Modina. On
28 October 1993, respondent married Eleanor Alagon. Sometime in August 1994, Odtuhan filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On 23 February 1999, the RTC of Pasig
granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. On 10November 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private
complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.
She thus filed a ComplaintAffidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
Odtuhan filed a motion to quash; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal
of the information on two grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2)
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of criminal bigamy. The RTC ruled that there
was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy.
The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal
liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one
of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
CA Ruling: Ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in making its decision. The
RTC is ordered to allow the presentation of evidence.The CA applied the conclusion made by the
Court in Morigo v. People, and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash
filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab
initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. The appellate court further
held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such
doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for
the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the
complaint for bigamy was filed against him.
ISSUES: WON respondent is guilty of criminal bigamy.
HELD:
YES. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the
CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately
189
filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is
a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
The SC ruled that the CA committed grave abuse of the discretion by granting the petition against
the RTC. The case is remanded to the RTC.
190
G.R. No. 187061 October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner
v.s.
RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent
Santos v. Santos
FACTS:
On 18 June 1980, a valid marriage was solemnized between the petitioner and the respondent.
They moved to Tarlac where they were engaged in the buy and sell business. Ricardo claimed that
their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he
allowed her to work abroad. She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in
February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. Respondent
claimed that he tried to locate the petitioner. He went to her parents’ house in Quezon City and
asked her friends for information, but to no avail. Respondent then petitioned the Court for a
Declaration of Presumptive Death after twelve (12) years she was gone, believing she was dead.
On 17 November 2008, petitioner motioned the annulment of the decision on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner denied leaving the conjugal home in Quezon City and working abroad.
She claims that it was the respondent who left for Tarlac and cohabited with another woman.
Further, petitioner stated that the Court never had jurisdiction because it was never published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
RTC Ruling: Granted respondent’s petition for Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death.
CA Ruling: Petition for annulment of decision was dismissed for wrong judicial remedy. The CA
held that the proper avenue to file Affidavit of Reappearance is with the Civil Registrar.
ISSUES: WON the lower courts committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition
for annulment of judgment.
HELD:
YES. The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse
for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent
spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence
of another marriage.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC's judgment, order, or resolution has
become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." For fraud to become a basis
for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or
could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such
that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
191
G.R. No. 200233 July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Santiago v. People
FACTS:
Nicanor Santos was validly married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974. On March 1997, Nicanor
remarried petitioner Leonila. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on
29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." Four (4) months after the
solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, petitioner Santiago and Nicanor Santos faced an
Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the
criminal suit.
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven (11) years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of criminal bigamy. The RTC appreciated the
undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang.
Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal
wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner
that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. The RTC declared that as indicated in
the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with
Santos long before the celebration of their marriage."
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the
validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
ISSUES: WON petitioner may be a co-accused in a bigamy suit claiming she had no knowledge
of the first marriage.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It
192
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending
on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house
of her inlaws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned
person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more
credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.
193
G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014
NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner
vs.
Lasanas v. People
FACTS:
On 16 February 1968, Judge Salazar of the MTC of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage
of accused petitioner Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license.
Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the
marriage license. On 27 August 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a
religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo. They submitted
no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced
by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto
because of irreconcilable differences.
On 27 December 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious
ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On 26 July 1996, petitioner filed for
the declaration of annulment of marriage with Patingo on the grounds of deceit employed vitiating
consent. In October 1998, Patingo filed a case for bigamy against petitioner.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of criminal bigamy.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally
married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
This Court concedes that the first marriage between petitioner and Patingo was void because of
the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. Neither can the church
wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in
those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the
religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying
Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently,
he violated the law on bigamy.
194
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner
vs.
Ronulo V. People
FACTS:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on 29 March 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then
dressed in barong Tagalog, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed
by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
MTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Performance of Illegal Marriage Ceremonies.
The MTC held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he
made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner
violated Article 352 of the RPC.
RTC Ruling: Affirmed MTC Ruling. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties
must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC.
HELD:
YES. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1)
authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In
the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the
only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended.
195
G.R. No. 225010 November 21, 2018
ELISEO SORIANO, Petitioner
v.s.
Soriano v. People
FACTS: Crimes Against Honor
On 31 July 1998, petitioner Soriano (otherwise known as ‘Ka Ely’), through a broadcasted radio
program “Ang Dating Daan” of DZAL launched a few defamatory statements directed towards
JMCIM, a religious sect, and its pastors. The whole broadcast was heard across the Bicol Region,
the station being centered in Iriga City. Soriano remarked certain negative criticisms against the
pastors calling them “pastor ng demonyo” among many others.
The broadcast in question insinuated and made it understood by the public who heard it as referring
to the whole JMCIM because it was only its evangelist leader, Wilde Almeda, who placed his
hands on the head of De Venecia and decreed that he would be the next president of the Philippines
before a multitude in Luneta, Manila duly covered with nationwide telecast in a prayer rally
immediately before 8 May 1998 elections and its pastors openly supported for De Venecia, in this
manner causing the dishonor, discredit and ridicule of the persons comprising the JMCIM, wherein
complainants are pastors thereof, before the bar of public opinion, to the damage and prejudice of
the complainants.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of two (2) counts of libel.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of libel.
HELD:
YES. Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is defined "as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." "[F]or an imputation to be libelous, the
following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it
must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable."
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, a charge is sufficient if the words
are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against
whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty,
virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.
196
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: (1) A private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
Petitioner is therefore guilty of the crime of libel against complainant Almeda and acquitted for
the other charge for being lacking of the fourth element which is identifiability of the victim. The
Court reiterated the ruling in IDCP v MVRS that reputation that reputation is personal, separate
and distinct in the community. People belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a
varying interest and a divergent political and religious view - some may be conservative, others
liberal. An individual may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as
an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is
no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give
rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person.
197
G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner
v.s.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ, Respondents
Buatis Jr. v. People
FACTS:
On 18 August 1995, petitioner Buatis sent a letter to private complainant Pieraz containing
defamatory remarks pertaining to his alleged incompetence in terms of his job as a lawyer.
Petitioner’s letter was in response to the alleged threats made by complainant on his client, Mrs.
Quingco.
Pieraz filed a suit for libel pertaining to the insulting statements by the petitioner. As a result of
the letter, not only did complainant incur litigation expenses, his health condition also worsened.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of libel. The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer
"inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is intended not only for the consumption
of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned;
the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing as a lawyer.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice
of other persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of
identity was also established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s
stance that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted
that he had to reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a
member of petitioner’s association.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of libel.
HELD:
YES. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of
a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person,
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this
case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to
someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioner’s subject letter-reply
itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it
to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in
an envelope thus, open to public. The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject
letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
198
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense.
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down
in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is
defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading of
petitioner’s subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such
a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s
good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference
of malice.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a
qualified privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication
under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of
the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;
and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
199
G.R. No. 161032 September 16, 2008
ERWIN TULFO, Petitioner
v.s.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, Respondent
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161176
SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY, Petitioners
v.s.
COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS SO, Respondents
Tulfo v. People
FACTS:
Private Complainant Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs filed four (4) separate Informations against
Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay, accusing them of libel
in connection with the publication of articles in the column “Direct Hit” of the daily tabloid
“Remate”.
The column accused So of corruption and portrayed him as an extortionist and smuggler in the
Bureau of Customs by exploiting the dirty dealings in South Harbor and is able to get away with
it because of his close connections with the Iglesia ni Cristo. So and Aquino were subjected to
accusations of having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying
their reputation, discrediting and ridiculing them before the bar of public opinion.
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that
he neither knew Atty. So, nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his
criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but
against a person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the
practice of certain people to use other people’s names to advance their corrupt practices. He also
claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his
source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not
do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on
his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South
Harbor.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of libel.
ISSUES: WON petitioners are guilty of libel.
HELD:
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
200
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from liability. The provision in the
RPC does not provide absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically
states the responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not
a matter of
whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law
simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their
paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say
that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when
they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as
the president in the publishing company. YES. The Court has long respected the freedom of the
press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made on public figures and matters of
public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight over the
rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and
unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes
with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free
license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.
The Journalist’s Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
shows that the press recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom;
that this freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists
"recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly." Art.
VIII states that journalists "shall presume persons accused of crime of being innocent until proven
otherwise."
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalist’s Code of Ethics and
exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.
201
G.R. No. 211120 February 13, 2017
MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN, Petitioner
vs.
Belen v. People
FACTS:
On 12 March 2004, petitioner Belen filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer
D. Belen, Sr. and was assigned to ACP Lagman for preliminary investigation. In order to afford
himself the opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing.
Without acting on the request, ACP Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and furnished copies thereof to Nezer and
the Office of the Secretary of Justice in Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a
sealed envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received
by its Receiving Section. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are first
received and recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to the records section before referral
to the City Prosecutor for assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
ACP Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for libel on the basis of the allegations
in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). The Regional State Prosecutor issued
an Order in the investigation of the libel complaint. State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution
finding probable cause to file a libel case against petitioner.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of libel. The RTC stressed that the allegations
and utterances against ACP Lagman in petitioner's Omnibus Motion are far detached from the
controversy in the estafa case, thereby losing its character as absolutely privileged communication.
On the element of publication, the trial court noted that the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight
to ACP Lagman, but passed through and exposed to be read by third persons, namely: prosecution
witnesses Flores and Enseo who are the staff in the receiving section of the OCP of San Pablo
City, as well as Michael Belen, the son and representative of Nezer in the estafa case.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling. The CA pointed out that the defamatory matter was made
known to third persons because prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo, who are the staff in the
OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, as well as
Michael, son and representative of Nezer in the estafa case then being investigated by ACP
Lagman, was furnished copy of the motion. Anent the applicability of the rule on absolutely
privileged communication, the CA ruled in the negative because the subject statements were
unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the estafa case filed by petitioner
against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on the personality, reputation and
mental fitness of ACP Lagman.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of libel given that the element of publication is allegedly
lacking.
202
HELD:
YES. In Buatis, Jr. v. People, the Court stated the twin rule for the purpose of determining the
meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous: (1) that construction must be adopted which
will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was uttered; and (2) the published matter alleged
to libelous must be construed as a whole. "In applying these rules to the language of an alleged
libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being
called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the
readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes
too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be from the words used in the
publication." As the persons who, aside from ACP Lagman, had also read the Omnibus Motion,
prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo are competent to testify on their own
understanding of the questioned statements, and their testimonies are relevant to the trial court's
determination of the defamatory character of such statements.
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to
someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of the defamatory
matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-
esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in
which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope
addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in
such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous
communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching
the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel, however, should not
be presumed from the fact that the immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that
there is reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.
203
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO and EVANGELINE PONCE,
Respondents
Ivler v. San Pedro
FACTS: Criminal Negligence
In August 2004, a vehicular collusion occurred involving petitioner Jason Ivler. Petitioner was
charged with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty
to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
In a petition for certiorari to the RTC, Ivler sought the suspension of the MTC proceedings in
criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of
the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
MTC Ruling: Pleaded Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries. MTC refused the quashal of the second charge due to lack of
identity of the two offense.
RTC Ruling: Affirmed MTC Ruling due to petitioner’s non-appearance. The RTC emphasized
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
ISSUES:
WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
HELD:
204
NO. Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest
him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The SC held that reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property
are Material Only to Determine the Penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the
same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses,
The SC held that Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. The MTC attempted to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1)
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies
because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as
grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized
as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects
of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,
penalizing each consequence separately. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more
than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court.
205
G.R. No. 178145 July 7, 2014
REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner
vs.
Mariano v. People
FACTS:
At about 6:30 PM of 12 September 1999, complainant Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner
type jeep along Brgy. Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan with his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old
son on their way home from a baptismal party. Luis, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the
baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was
driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got
mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the
jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and
Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and
kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought
the assistance of Luis. Luis intervened and told the two to just forgive what happened. They went
their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house
in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother
and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters
away and lost consciousness. Urbanita identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand
as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for two and
a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱17,800.00 On September 15, 1999,
Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed until
September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱66,243.25. He likewise spent
₱909.50 for medicines, ₱2,900.00 for scanning, ₱8,000.00 for doctor’s fee and ₱12,550.00 for the
services of his caregivers and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered
multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural
hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr.
Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical Center. Urbanita, received the amount of ₱50,000.00
from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated 15
September 1999.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of Frustrated Homicide. The RTC held that the
incident involved evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, which ordinarily
would have caused the death of the victim, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said Ferdinand de Leon.
CA Ruling: Modified conviction to Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries.
206
ISSUES: WON accused-appellant is guilty of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical
Injuries.
HELD:
YES. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) offender does or fails to do an act; (2) the doing
is involuntary; (3) without malice; (4) material damage results; (5) there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person doing or failing to do such act taken into consideration (a) his
employment or occupation, (b) degree of intelligence, (c) physical condition, (d) other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
The SC held that "Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place." To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct
causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In
Manzanares v. People, the petitioner was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding that hehad driven the Isuzu truck
very fast before it smashed into a jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People, a public utility driver driving
his vehicle very fast was held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid hitting
a swerving car. In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s
observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the
jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s
injuries.
The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary
care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which
will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the
highway. As held in People v. Garcia: "A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection
in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for
acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury."
207
G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner
vs.
Gonzaga v. People
FACTS:
At around 6 AM of 25 June 1997, private complainant Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle
along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc to bring his two (2) minor
children, Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry to school. While they were ascending the curving road going to
Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by
petitioner Gonzaga was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio,
Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the
Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the
Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the
motorcycle.
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle.
Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown
over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, causing injuries to their legs.
Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their
own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together on the rightmost side of the road
facing Brgy. Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2) sisters to cater to
the victims. He found the Kagawad who had just opened his store, and informed the latter of the
vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas
proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolf’s assistance. Meanwhile, Rolf
went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia. Thereafter, the victims were
brought to the Emergency Hospital of Maramag where they were treated. Operations were
performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherry’s
leg was placed in a cast and she was confined in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more
than one (1) month, or until 26 July 1997. All the expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information charging Rogelio
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property "with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to
the injured party such help that was in his hands to give" before the RTC. Upon arraignment,
Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane along the
descending curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of
about 70 m. away, he saw the motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the
curve from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on
the Land Cruiser’s lane while Rolf was on his proper lane. Undecided which side of the road to
take to avoid collision, Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr.,
nonetheless, bumped into it. As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over
the roof and the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road, while
208
Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned beneath the land Cruiser. With the use of a jack
handle and the assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived
at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the Land
Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought to
the hospital, but the vehicle turned out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure
another vehicle instead.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. It held that Rogelio’s act of driving
very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the
death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Considering further
that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling and reinstated the original penalty.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty as charged.
HELD:
YES. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown
that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than
a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of
action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the
inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the
operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault. The very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of
imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by
driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would
enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.
209
G.R. No. 204095 June 15, 2015
DR. JAIME T. CRUZ, Petitioner
vs.
FELICISIMO V. AGAS, JR., Respondent
Cruz v. Agas
FACTS:
Sometime in May 2003, petitioner underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid tests
conducted by the employees and doctors of the St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC) for a medical
examination. On May 29, 2003, he was sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a scheduled
gastroscopy and colonoscopy; and because the specialist assigned to perform the procedure was
nowhere to be found, he gave the colonoscopy results to the attending female anesthesiologist for
the information and consideration of the assigned specialist. Thereafter, he was sedated and the
endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he regained consciousness, he felt that
something went wrong during the procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold clammy perspiration
and experienced breathing difficulty; that he could not stand or sit upright because he felt so
exhausted and so much pain in his abdomen; that when he was about to urinate in the comfort
room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he
was nowhere to be found; and that his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe
his critical condition and immediately referred him to the surgical department which suspected
that he had hemorrhage in his abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical
operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the ICU on May
30, 2003, he found out that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because of the internal
bleeding; that he learned that the doctors cut a portion of the left side of his colon measuring 6-8
inches because it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused the internal bleeding; that
despite the painkillers, he was under tremendous pain in the incision area during his recovery
period in the ICU and had fever; and that he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms, subclavian
artery on the left part of his chest and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the colonoscopy procedure but the latter
insisted that nothing went wrong. On 7 June 2003, he was discharged from SLMC. Nevertheless,
he complained that he had a hard time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed every two
hours because he easily got full; that he had fresh blood stools every time he moved his bowel;
that he had lost his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he was
in good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the time of the
filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
On February 16, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution dismissing the
complaint for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the DOJ Resolutions. The CA explained that, as a matter of sound judicial
policy, courts would not interfere with the public prosecutor’s wide discretion of determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation unless such executive determination was tainted with
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. It stated that the public prosecutor’s finding of lack of
probable cause against Dr. Agas was in accordance with law and that his alleged negligence was
not adequately established by Dr. Cruz.
210
ISSUES: WON the CA was correct in affirming the decision of the DOJ that no probable cause
exists for filing an information against the respondent, that the respondent was not negligent and
that there was no denial of due process.
HELD:
NO. A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor,
like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done,
or that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure
or action caused injury to the patient. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only
prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would
not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are
duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas.
Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa
of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless
conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that
particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr.
Cruz did not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question
of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide on matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government,
or to substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by
the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an Information, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility.
211
In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in finding
that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious
Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury.
212
G.R. No. 192914 January 11, 2016
NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner
vs.
Senit v. People
FACTS:
On 2 September 2000, private complainant Toor Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the
direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda, their three-year-old
son Toor Jr., and househelper Mezelle. He turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan
when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner Senit and coming from Malaybalay, suddenly
overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the
right towards the shoulder of the road and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and
could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the right side of private
complainant’s pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital,
Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the
Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital in Valencia City. Rosalinda sustained an open fracture of the humerus
of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal femur of the right lower
extremity which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident
and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Toor Sr. spent about ₱580,000 for her treatment and ₱3,000 for Mezelle Jean
Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered
a complete fracture of the scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr.
sustained abdominal injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which required suturing. The
damage sustained by the pick-up reached ₱106,155.
RTC Ruling: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of violation of Land Transportation and Traffic
Code in absentia.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC Ruling with the penalty.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty as charged.
HELD:
YES. Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that
the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution
213
on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. All
elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.
Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on
the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the
highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a
curve in the highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of
automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and diligence
to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite
direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they have the
right to pass.
214
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner
vs.
Sevilla v. People
FACTS:
On 2 July 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false
narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). That in answer to the question of whether there is a
pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer
despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520,
was likewise filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official
document and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio, the Court, in the Resolution
dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s
administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer vis-à-visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, he averred
that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza, a member of his
staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his
house. Ataround two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to
accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before
five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of
his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him
by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries
therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending
criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City
Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall
on July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter,
they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw
Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Sandiganbayan Ruling: GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Falsification of Public
Documents Through Reckless Imprudence. The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an
untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public document, and that, in so doing, he took
advantage of his official position since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his
position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to
prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there
was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was
215
able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public documents. The
Sandiganbayan further held that Sevilla cannot be convicted of violation of Art. 171 of the RPC
since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However,
considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false
entry therein.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is guilty of Falsification of Public Documents through Reckless
Imprudence.
HELD:
YES. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like;
when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’;
or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."
The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly committed
by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished
under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However,
the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime
in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, the Court explained that the notion that quasi-offenses, whether
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it"
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming
them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures
for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure
cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
216
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
217

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Book 2: The Revised Penal Code and Related Special Penal Laws

A CASE DIGEST OF THE SIGNIFICANT JURISPRUDENCE

FELICIANO GALVANTE, Petitioner,

FACTS: Crimes AgainsttheFundamentalLawsoftheState

EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias

FACTS: Crimes Against Public Order

ISSUE: WON the granting of the writ of prohibition meritorious.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant were guilty of the crime charged.

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty as charged.

JUVY DESMOPARAN A.K.A. "MASYADOR," Petitioner

FACTS: Crimes Against Public Interest

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

CESARIO URSUA, Petitioner

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of violating the Anti-Alias Law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of violating CA 142.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty as charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

RTC Ruling: Petitioner Hilarion is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Illegal Sale.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

ROMEO R. ARAULLO, Petitioner,

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

JESUS TORRES, Petitioner

RTC Ruling: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Malversation of Public Funds

MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS, Petitioner,

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds.

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of technical malversation.

ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, Petitioner

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of failure of accountable officer to render accounts.

HENRY T. GO, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case.

CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. NO. 175482

ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for violating Section 3e of RA 3019.

VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner,

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3g of RA 3019.

OFELIA C. CAUNAN, Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 182020-24

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 3g of RA 3019.

LILIA B. ORGANO, Petitioner,

JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

ISSUE: WON petitioner may be tried for plunder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

CA Ruling: Affirmed decision of the RTC in its totality.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty as charged of the crime of murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.