Cabana, Adrian C.

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.

G.R. No. 122445

November 18, 1997

Facts

Heirs of Lydia Umali filed a case against Petitioner – Dr. Ninevetch Cruz for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in Homicide. Heirs of Lydia Umali contends that Petitioner being then the
attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon caused by her of lack of foresight and skill results to the
death of Lydia Umali. Petitioner averred that as a physician she exercised the requisite degree of
skill and care in the treatment of his patient. Respondent undergone to a surgical operation by D.r
Ninevetch but in effect it was a failure due to “Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation”. Heirs rebut
the assertion of Petitioner as the latter shown unprofessionalism as a doctor by not asking consent
about the transfer of the patient to the other hospital, and by manifestation of negligence; untidiness
of clinic, lack of provision of supplies, the fact that the transfer was needed mean that there was
something wnog in the way Dr. Cruz Conducted operation and by no showing that pre-surgery
procedure was conducted.

Issue

Whether or not Dr. Umali is liable for reckless imprudence and for civil liability for Tort?

Ruling

Dr. Umali is not liable for reckless imprudence resulting in Homicide because the elements of the
crime did not meet the act of the petitioner but the latter shall be liable for civil indemnity for tort. The
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science. When the physician’s qualification are admitted there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the
best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established by expert testimony.
People vs Ligon
People vs Ligon

Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who
was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon
clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell down the pavement as the car sped up. On
appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.

Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability

Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and
negligence.

Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the
guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at
the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of
evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to
Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
 Philippine Rabbit vs. People
G.R. No. 147703             April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event
of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of
a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Ruling
No.  It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing
in court when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

The subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to
the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from
the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability
in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control
of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining
civil interest therein.
 CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918

FACTS:

On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he was an
employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight
from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice because
it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the
platform. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company’s trains. The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were
negligent in placing an obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

HELD:

In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is to say, whether
the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at
the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The
Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train
was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
 FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.

G.R. No. 108164

February 23, 1995

Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his
request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then
Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a
restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.

Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt.
The vice-president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a

complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a
decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come
to this Court with this petition for review.

There is merit in this appeal.

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to
have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a
contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger
attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.

Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the
cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can
aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable
tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to
underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing
contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of
quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated
solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission
complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.’
 JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC., respondents

G.R. No. 98695

January 27, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioners were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan
Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance
against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of
damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. According to the complaint,
petitioners and respondents entered into a contract for the burial and inter of the
remains of their son in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery on July 25, 1978. On or
about the burial day, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased had a hole
approximately three (3) inches in diameter. Upon opening the vault, it became apparent
that there was evidence of total flooding, the coffin was entirely damaged and the
exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were damaged. The complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants
P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Manila Memorial Park Cemetery was liable for Tort?

Ruling

NO, there was no negligent act on the part of the cemetery.

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence
of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there
was no negligence. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict

Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of
Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the
relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there
been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held
liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article
1170 of the Civil Code
Fact

The plaintiff, Rafael Carrascoso, paid for and was issued a “First class” ticket by Air
France from Manila to Rome. During a stopover in Bangkok, the manager of Air France
asked the plaintiff to vacate his seat because a white man has a “better right” than him. At
first, the plaintiff protested, but, as things got heated up, he was asked by the other
Filipinos on board to give up his seat and transfer in the tourist class. After the trip,
Carrascoso sued Air France for the embarrassment and inconvenience he suffered. The
trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.Air France assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance of a first class
ticket does not guarantee Carrascoso a seat in the first Class.

Issue: Whether or not Air France is liable for the damages to Carrascoso and on what
basis

Yes. Air France is liable based on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana. Culpa
Contractual There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso.
There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That
said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, t h a t t h e r e w a s b a d f a i t h w h e n A i r
F r a n c e ’ s e m p l o y e e c o m p e l l e d Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” an d to ta ke a se a t in
th e to u ri st cl a ss, by rea so n o f wh i ch he su ffe re d in convenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a
first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first
class seat. Such claim is simply incredible. Culpa Aquiliana. Here, the SC ruled, even
though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is
also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely
for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct onthe part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.