ASSIGNMENT

CRIMINAL LAW 2
TOPICS REPORT & CASE DIGESTS
(Article 251 – 350)

Submitted by:
WILLY C. DUMPIT
First Year – LLB

Submitted to:
JUDGE EDILU HAYAG
Professor
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor.

Elements:
1. That there be several persons.
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally.
3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner.
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray.
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased.
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.

PEOPLE Vs. UNLAGADA

GR No. 141080, Sep 17, 2002

FACTS:

On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left his
house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, toattend a public dance
at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later,
or around 11:00 o'clock that evening,Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from
dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside,
they decided tohave a drink and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby
store.Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve
himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) metersfrom Danilo who was
relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo
and stabbed him at the side. Daniloretaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled
bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7),
ganged up onDanilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones
and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly asDanilo
was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and
died before he could be given any medical assistance.Edwin Selda testified that on 29
January 1989 the police invited him to the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his
statement regarding thekilling incident and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the
suspect who was then in their custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit andaffirmed
before the police authorities that the man under detention, whom he later identified as
accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same manwho stabbed his friend
Danilo.Respondent however contended that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27
January 1989 while he was inside the dance hall, an altercationensued near the gate
between the gatekeeper and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite their
disruptive behavior, were eventually allowedto get through the gate. At around 11:00
o'clock, a gunshot suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble
had taken placeand that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's
identity only the following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo Patos werebrought
by a police officer to the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building,
he heard somebody asking who "Lapad" was and analleged eyewitness, who later
turned out to be Edwin Selda, pointed to him as the man referred to by that name.
Anecito Unlagada and LorenzoPatos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against
them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case against
Lorenzowas dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of murder.The trial
court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the testimonies of the
defense witnesses negating Anecito's culpability.Accused Anecito Unlagada now
assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith
and credence to the loneand uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and
in finding that the crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in
atumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed was “death caused in a tumultuous affray"
under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose ofassaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of theaffray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physicalinjuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor.A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the courseof which a
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.5 The
quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct groupof individuals, one of whom was
sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common,
particular victim. It is not, as thedefense suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the
meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where
severalpersons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a
confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury ofone or some of
them. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUEa.k.a.
"Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, plus moral damages in the reducedamount of P50,000.00. Costs against
accused-appellant
Art. 252. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. When in a tumultuous
affray as referred to in the preceding article, only serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the participants thereof and the person responsible therefor cannot be identified,
all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the offended party
shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that provided for the physical injuries
so inflicted.

Elements:
1. That there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article.
2. That a participant or some participants thereof suffer serious physical injuries
or physical injuries of a less serious nature only.
3. That the person responsible therefor cannot be identified.
4. That all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the
offended party are known.

Art. 253. Giving assistance to suicide. Any person who shall assist another to
commit suicide shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor,1 if such person lends his
assistance to another to the extent of doing the killing himself, he shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal.9 However, if the suicide is not consummated, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods9 shall be imposed.

Acts punishable as giving assistance to suicide.

1. By assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is
consummated or not.
2. By lending his assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent
of doing the killing himself.

Art. 254. Discharge of firearms. Any person who shall shoot at another with any
firearm shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods,10 unless the facts of the case are such that the act can be held to constitute
frustrated or attempted parricide, murder, homicide, or any other crime for which a
higher penalty is prescribed by any of the articles of this Code.

Elements:
1. That the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person.
2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person.
 GERONIMO DADO v. PEOPLE
GR No. 131421, November 18, 2002

FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review... of the Regional Trial Court... finding petitioner
Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept cattle
rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of petitioner
SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and
Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team
saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. When he was about 5 meters
away from the team,... Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his
right side, was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas
could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single
shot. The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo
Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Silvestre Balinas
died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. For his part, petitioner testified
that on the night of the incident. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were
being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward.
It was only when accused Eraso embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo
Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot. Trial court convicted petitioner and
accused Eraso of the crime of homicide. The aforesaid judgment of conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed by accused Francisco
Eraso but the same was denied which became final and executory. Hence, as regards
Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide
has become final.

ISSUE:
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and
(2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented... by
the prosecution.

HELD:
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show
that the prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy.The words
"conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or
their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The language used by
the prosecution in charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference to
conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from the information. Moreover,
even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be
considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Although the agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such
agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself,
conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that
neither joint nor simultaneous action is... per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. In the
case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso's seemingly concerted and almost
simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a
common plan to kill the victim. In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to
perpetrate the offense. Petitioner could not be made to answer for the acts done by
his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly and
personally in the commission of those acts. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic
Examination. Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a
copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of
a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm," and not a part of a .45 caliber bullet. said metallic
fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet fired from the .45
caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the
present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Evidently, the prosecution
failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are
particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by
petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction
for the crime of homicide. In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for
the wound inflicted on the victim's right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there
is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused by the
bullet fired from petitioner's .45 caliber pistol. The Court sustains the finding of the trial
court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that. Petitioner
had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Absent an intent to kill in firing the
gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge
of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime
are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2)
that the offender has no intention to kill that person. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Art. 255. Infanticide. The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder
in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three
days of age.

Elements of infanticide.
1. That a child was killed.
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
3. That the accused killed the said child.
 Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal,13 if he shall use any violence upon the
person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor,'* if, without using violence, he shall act without
the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,15 if
the woman shall have consented.

Abortion, defined.
Carrara has denned abortion as the willful killing of the foetus in the uterus, or the
violent expulsion of the foetus from the maternal womb which results ih the death of
the foetus. (Guevara)

Ways of committing intentional abortion:

1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. By acting, but without using violence, without the consent of the woman. (By
administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman without her
consent.)
3. By acting (by administering drugs or beverages), with the consent of the
pregnant woman.
Elements of intentional abortion:
a. That there is a pregnant woman;
b. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the
accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
c. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or
any other act of the accused, the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom;
d. That the abortion is intended.

Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods16 shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion
by violence, but unintentionally.
Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom.

Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods17 shall be imposed upon
a woman who shall practice an abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other
person should do so. Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her
dishonor shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of
them, and they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
2. That the abortion is intended.
3. That the abortion is caused by
a. the pregnant woman herself;
b. any other person, with her consent; or
c. any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of

abortives. The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in their maximum
period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
2. That the abortion is intended.
3. That the offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes, or
assists in causing, the abortion.
4. That said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific
knowledge or skill.

As to pharmacists, the elements are:

1. That the offender is a pharmacist.
 2. That there is no proper prescription from a physician.
3. That the offender dispenses any abortive.

Art. 260. Responsibility of participants in a duel. The penalty of reclusion

temporal2' shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill his adversary in a duel.

Duel, defined.
It is a formal or regular combat previously concerted between two parties in the
presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who make the selection
of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight.
Acts punished in duel.
1. By killing one's adversary in a duel.
2. By inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries.
3. By making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted.

Art. 261. Challenging to a duel. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period23 shall be imposed upon any person who shall challenge another, or incite
another to give or accept a challenge to a duel, or shall scoff at or decry another
publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.

Acts punished under Art. 261:

1. By challenging another to a duel.
2. By inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel.
3. By scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a
challenge to fight a duel.

Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him,
either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

Two kinds of mutilation:

1. By intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction.
2. By intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping off any part
of the body of the offended party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to
deprive him of that part of his body.
 Elements of mutilation of the first kind:
1. That there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation, such as the penis or ovarium.
2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive
the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. (Guevara)

Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor,3 if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,4 if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an
eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such
member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was
theretofore habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,5 if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have
lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance
of the work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety
days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period,6 if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the
illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.
How is the crime of serious physical injuries committed?
It is committed —
(1) by wounding;
(2) by beating; or
(3) by assaulting (Art. 263)
(4) by administering injurious substance. (Art. 264)

UNITED STATES v. SANTOS et al.

553 U.S. 507 (2008)

FACTS:

In an illegal lottery run by respondent Santos, runners took commissions from

the bets they gathered, and some of the rest of the money was paid as salary to
respondent Diaz and other collectors and to the winning gamblers. Based on these
payments to runners, collectors, and winners, Santos was convicted of, inter alia,
violating the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1956, which prohibited the
use of the "proceeds" of criminal activities for various purposes, including engaging in,
and conspiring to engage in, transactions intended to promote the carrying on of
unlawful activity, 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h). Based on his receipt of a salary, Diaz
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
convictions. On collateral review, the District Court ruled that, under intervening Circuit
precedent interpreting the word "proceeds" in the federal money-laundering statute, §
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) applied only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal
receipts. Finding no evidence that the transactions on which respondents' money-
laundering convictions were based involved lottery profits, the court vacated those
convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner United States appealed.

ISSUE:

Should the word “proceeds” in the federal money-laundering statute apply only to
transactions involving criminal profits?

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the rule of lenity required it be interpreted in favor of
defendants as "profits." According to the Court, if "proceeds" meant "receipts," nearly
every illegal-lottery violation would also be money-laundering, as paying a winner
involved receipts intended to promote the lottery. Interpreting it as "profits" eliminated
the merger problem. While it meant the Government had to prove more, it ensured the
severe money-laundering penalties would be imposed only for the removal of profits
from criminal activity, which permitted the leveraging of one criminal activity into the
next. The prosecution had to show only that a single instance of specified unlawful
activity was profitable and gave rise to the money involved in a charged transaction.
The Court concluded that "proceeds" meant "profits" absent contrary legislative
history.

Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. The penalties

established by the next preceding article shall be applicable in the respective case to
any person who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious physical
injury, by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or by
taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.
 Elements:
1. That the offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury.
2. That it was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances
or beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.
3. That he had no intent to kill.

Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate
the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance
for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.

Matters to be noted in the crime of less serious physical injuries.

1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for ten days or more (but
not more than 30 days), or needs medical attendance for the same period of
time.
2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding
articles.

Qualified less serious physical injuries.

(1) A fine not exceeding P500, in addition to arresto mayor, shall be imposed
for less serious physical injuries when
(a) there is a manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or
(b) there are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense.
(2) A higher penalty is imposed when the victim is either
(a) The offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers; or
(b) Persons of rank or persons in authority, provided the crime is not direct
assault.

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period;
 2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party
from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos
when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Republic Act No. 8353 which
took effect on October 22,1997).

PEOPLE vs. ORITA

G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990

FACTS:

• March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student
at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought
her home from a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a
frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite
pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which
led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second
floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong"
to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he
commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered
Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With one hand
holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take off her clothes.
Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on
the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina.
Still poked with a knife, she did as told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his
penis entered her. He then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him.
Still only a small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his
hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When
he pursued her and climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then
she jumped out through a window.

• Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding
house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the
building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the
building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat.
Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house where they heard and saw somebody
running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern
Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
• Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.

• RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is frustrated rape?

HELD:

NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.

• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:

o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony

o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will

• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force
or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which
acts it is his intention to perform

o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on
the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out
penetration of the genital organ of the victim.

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives
the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer, (cited in People vs. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501)

PEOPLE vs. GUNGON

G.R. No. 119574 March 19, 1998

FACTS:

It was about 3:30 in the afternoon of 12 January 1994. Agnes Guirindola, a 20-
year old De La Salle University student, was driving a red Nissan Sentra car along
Panay Avenue, Quezon City,on her way to a bookstore, and thereafter, to fetch her
mother from work when a man, passing himself off as a traffic enforcement officer and
wearing a “PNP” reflectorized vest, flagged her down and motioned her to execute a
U-turn towards him. She complied. She came to know that it was Venancio Roxas who
said that she had wrongly traversed a one-way street where, barely two days ago, a
little girl had figured in an accident. Agnes surrendered her driver’s license. Roxas told
her to open the door. He came on board the car and directed Agnes to proceed to the
next intersection where Roxas motioned her to turn left. After executing a left turn, she
stopped and handed over to him a fifty pesos (P50.00) bill which he accepted. He then
returned her license. Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him off, instead, he
suddenly pointed a gun at her and switched off the engine, saying, “Miss kailangan ko
lang ito,” referring to the car. Roxas unlocked the rear door to let another man in.
Roberto Gungon, immediately reclined her seat and pulled her over to the back seat
by her arms while Roxas promptly slid into the driver’s seat. Momentarily, Roxas
pulled over and alighted from the vehicle while Gungon held Agnes and poked a gun
at her. When Roxas returned, he had with him a bottle of softdrink and skyflakes which
he offered to Agnes. Agnes refused to drink after seeing some tablets floating inside
the bottle. The car stopped a second time to load gas at a gasoline station. Once
again, Gungon insisted that she take the drink. Fearing his menacing look and the gun
pointed at her. She took a sip from the bottle. She was, still later, also forced to swallow
two tablets which Roxas gave to Gungon. She took the tablets but had them under her
tongue. Agnes noticed the address on the signboard reading, “Sto Tomas Batangas
and then she lost consciousness. It was about 9:30 p.m. when she found herself lying
at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. She noticed that her pieces of
jewelry, bracelets, earrings, ring, necklace and a wristwatch, as well as cash, were
missing and that her pair of shoes had been removed. She was told that the items
were just being meanwhile kept for her. The pair of shoes, however, were returned to
her. By this time, a third man was already seated in front of the car with Roxas. Roxas
stopped the car at a deserted area. Gungon escorted her to a place not far away from
the car and there she was shot. When she came to, Roxas, Gungon, and the third
man, as well as the car, were nowhere insight. She managed to get up and slowly
walked down the road until she reached a small house. She was bleeding profusely
from the neck and face. She looked around the house but not finding anyone, she
went to the sala to lie down. People soon arrived on a vehicle. She again lost
consciousness and regained it only at the Batangas Regional Hospital and later
transferred to a Manila hospital. NBI agent Feneza met with and talked to Agnes at
the V. Luna Medical Center, and showed her about 3 or 4 pictures from his files. Agnes
had thereby positively identified Roberto Gungon. Gungon could not be arrested
sooner. Based on information given to the NBI, he and his live-in partner had left
Manila by car on a Wednesday, passed through Catbalogan Samar, and were bound
for Davao. The agents located the arrested him and detained him at their Regional
Office in Davao. They flew him back to Manila of the first available flight on Monday.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gungon is guilty of robbery. WON Gungon is guilty of Anti-

Carnapping Act?
HELD:

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery to be one committed by
any“ person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything xxx.” Robbery may thus be committed two ways: (a) with violence, or
intimidation of persons and (b) by the use of force upon things. To be then liable for
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, the following elements must
concur.

1) that there be personal property belonging to another;

2) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
3) that the taking must be with intent to gain; and
4) that there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon
things.

It would appear that the taking of the victim’s jewelry and cash came only by
way of an afterthought on the part of the appellant. The taking was not attended by
violence or intimidation upon the person of Agnes. The absence, however, of violence
or intimidation did not exculpate appellant from liability for the crime of theft,
punishable by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code.
“Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent
to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”
“Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
“1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum ans medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the things stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years.” Since the value of the personal property taken from the victim
amounted to P38,000.000 the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 309 which is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods plus one year for the additional ten thousand pesos in excess of
P22,000.00. Lastly, appellant contends that he should not have been convicted of
violation of Republic No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, because
the taking of the subject motor vehicle. Roxas had already acquired effective
possession of the subject vehicle. This would have been consequential had there
been no finding of conspiracy between appellant and Venancio Roxas. In conspiracy,
to once again stress it, the act of the other co- conspirator and, therefore it is of no
moment that an accused had not taken part in the actual commission of every act
constituting the crime each of the conspirators being held in the same degree of liability
as the others.

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal2 shall be
imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the
next preceding article without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated therein.
 Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of
his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.

Art. 269. Unlawful arrest. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized
by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the
purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.

Elements:
1 That the offender arrests or detains another person.
2. That the purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper
authorities.
3. That the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no
reasonable ground therefor.

Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua* shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of
a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
(As amended by Republic Act No. 18)

Elements:
1. That the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether
over or under 7 years but less than 21 years of age).
2. That he deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.

Art. 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. The penalty of prision
correccional5 and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos shall be imposed upon
anyone who shall induce a minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or
the persons entrusted with his custody.
 Elements:
1. That a minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the
home of his parents or guardian or the person entrusted with his custody.
2. That the offender induces said minor to abandon such home.

Art. 272. Slavery. — The penalty of prision mayor1 and a fine of not exceeding 10,000
pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap, or detain a
human being for the purpose of enslaving him.

Elements:
1. That the offender purchases, sells, kidnaps or detains a human being.
2. That the purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being.

Art. 273. Exploitation of child labor. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon anyone who, under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted with the custody of a minor, shall, against
the tatter's will, retain him in his service.
Elements:
1. That the offender retains a minor in his service.
2. That it is against the will of the minor.
3. That it is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor.

Art. 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt,
shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm
laborer.

Elements:
1. That the offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household
servant or farm laborer.
2. That it is against the debtor's will.
3. That the purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt.
Art. 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one's own
victim. The penalty of arresto mayor1 shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall
find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can
render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission
shall constitute a more serious offense;
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has
accidentally wounded or injured;
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age,
shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to
take him to a safe place.

ANTONIO A. LAMERA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991

FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle
and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.As a consequence thereof, two
informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article
275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. On June 1987
the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article
275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the RTC of
Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned for violation of
Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty. He filed a petition for review in the CA but
which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot be penalized twice for
an “accident” and another for “recklessness.” He maintained that since he is facing a
criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense carries heavier penalties under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article
275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has
accidentally injured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same
Code because it constitutes double jeopardy?
HELD:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses.
The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not,
therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised
Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, the SC held that it is a cardinal rule that the
protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other. The two informations filed
against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, for reckless imprudence
(Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen
(Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, for
Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes
Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book
Two of the same Code. Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means
of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged.

Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. The penalty of arresto mayor2 and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall abandon a child under
seven years of age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.

Elements:
1. That the offender has the custody of a child.
2. That the child is under seven years of age.
3. That he abandons such child.
4. That he has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned.

Art. 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody;

indifference of parents. — The penalty of arresto mayor5 and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who, having charge of the rearing or
education of a minor, shall deliver said minor to a public institution or other persons,
without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his care or, in the absence
of the latter, without the consent of the proper authorities.

Elements of abandonment of minor by one charged with the rearing or

education of said minor.
a. That the offender has charge of the rearing or education of a minor.
b. That he delivers said minor to a public institution or other persons.
c. That the one who entrusted such child to the offender has not consented to
such act; or if the one who entrusted such child to the offender is absent, the
proper authorities have not consented to it.

Elements of indifference of parents:

a. That the offender is a parent.
b. That he neglects his children by not giving them education.
c. That his station in life requires such education and his financial condition
permits it.

Art. 278. Exploitation of minors. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods6 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen years of age to
perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength, or contortion.
2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, ropewalker, diver, wild-animal
tamer or circus manager, or engaged in a similar calling, shall employ in
exhibitions of these kinds, children under sixteen years of age who are not his
children or descendants.
3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next preceding
paragraph who shall employ any descendant of his under twelve years of age
in such dangerous exhibitions.
4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher, or person entrusted in any capacity with
the care of a child under sixteen years of age, who shall deliver such child
gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in
paragraph 2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar.

Art. 279. Additional penalties for other offenses. The imposition of the penalties
prescribed in the preceding articles, shall not prevent the imposition upon the same
person of the penalty provided for any other felonies denned and punished by this
Code.
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will, shall be punished by arresto mayor1 and a
fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Elements of trespass to dwelling.

1. That the offender is a private person.
2. That he enters the dwelling of another.
3. That such entrance is against the latter's will.

Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter the
closed premises or the fenced estate of another, while either of them is uninhabited, if
the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser has not secured the permission
of the owner or the caretaker thereof.

Elements:
1. That the offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of
another.
2. That the entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited.
3. That the prohibition to enter be manifest.
4. That the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the
caretaker thereof.

Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon
the person, honor, or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to
a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he
threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding
money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said
offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained
his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat
shall not have been made subject to a condition.
Elements of grave threats where offender attained his purpose:
a. That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the
latter's person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter's family, of any
wrong.
b. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
c. That there is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed,
even though not unlawful.
d. That the offender attains his purpose.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG,

BELLOSILLO, J.
G.R. No. 98400, May 23, 1994

FACTS:

On 6 October 1989, Lucita Romero Corpuz went to the Manila City Jail
bringing her 1 year and 4 months old daughter, Carla May, with her to visit her
husband, Antonio Corpuz, but was not allowed this time to bring her daughter
inside. Cherry Bondoc, appellant, who was standing in front of the gate
approached her and volunteered take care of the child while Lucita visits her
husband. After Bondoc’s explanation of her good intentions, Lucita entrusted
her child to her but after fifteen minutes both Bondoc and the child were
nowhere to be found and a woman told Lucita that the appellant had left with
the child; fearing that her child was kidnapped, Lucita reported the kidnapping
to the WPD, which was recorded in the police blotter and then published in the
People’s Journal. Appellant was then placed under arrest for kidnapping, and
on 19 Jan. 1990 an information for kidnapping for the purpose of selling was
filed against her but she denied the charges,nevertheless, trial court convicted
her, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court is right in convicting the appellant of

kidnapping defined and penalized under Art. 270 of The Revised PenalCode?

HELD: “The trial court observed that Lucita, testifying before the court in a
spontaneous, straightforward and candid manner, pointed to and identified
appellant as the person to whom she entrusted Carla May and who later
absconded with her child; that prior to Lucita's identification in court she had
immediately pointed to the appellant as the kidnapper of her child on the day
she 241.
2. saw appellant at the Herbosa police station when Carla May was
presented.”1 “The bare denial of appellant that Lucita was not the one who
entrusted Carla May to her constitutes self-serving negative evidence which is
not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of Lucita. As the denial of
appellant was weak, uncorroborated and inherently improbable, the clear and
straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses should prevail. Even if
 there is no evidence to show appellant's intention to sell the young girl for profit,
the two elements of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of
The Revised Penal Code are already present, namely: (a) The offender has
been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and (b) The offender
deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardian. 10 With the
positive testimony of Lucita, the prosecution has proved the presence of the
above elements to establish the criminal liability of appellant. Moreover,
appellant has admitted the existence of the two elements by testifying that after
having been given custody of the child, she kept the latter in her sister's house
for three (3) or four (4) days without seeking any assistance from the police
authorities so that the child could be immediately returned to her mother. This
admission shows the falsity of her claim of innocence. Instead, it affirms her
deliberate refusal to return the child to her mother.”2 Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason
and Kapunan,JJ.,concur. 31 Phil. 509 [G.R. No. 10331 September 27, 1915.

Art. 283. Light threats. A threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in
the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished
by arresto mayor.

Elements:
1. That the offender makes a threat to commit a wrong.
2. That the wrong does not constitute a crime.
3. That there is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even
though not unlawful.
4. That the offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his
purpose.

Art. 284. Bond for good behavior. In all cases falling within the two next preceding
articles, the person making the threats may also be required to give bail not to molest
the person threatened, or if he shall fail to give such bail, he shall be sentenced to
destierro.

In what cases may a person be required to give ball not to molest another?
1. When he threatens another under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 282.
2. When he threatens another under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 283.

Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period12
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
 1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw such weapon
in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense;
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some
harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts shows that he did
not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of
the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code;
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting
a felony.
Acts punished as other light threats.
1. By threatening another with a weapon, or by drawing such weapon in a
quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. By orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm (not)
constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat.
Note: The word "not" in this paragraph is enclosed in parenthesis, because the
inclusion of that word in paragraph 2 of Art. 285 is a mistake.
3. By orally threatening to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

Art. 286. Grave coercions. The penalty of prision correccional13 and a fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong.

Elements of grave coercions:

The three elements of the crime of grave coercions are:
1. That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or that he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
3. That the person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the
authority of law or the right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint shall
not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

Art. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize
anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment
of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period15 and a
fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
 Elements:
1. That the offender must be a creditor.
2. That he seizes anything belonging to his debtor.
3. That the seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence
or a display of material force producing intimidation.
4. That the purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment
of the debt.

Art. 288. Other similar coercions - (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and

payment of wages by means of tokens). The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging
from 200 to 500 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person, agent, or officer
of any association or corporation who shall force or compel, directly or indirectly, or
shall knowingly permit any laborer or employee employed by him or by such firm or
corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or commodities of
any kind.

Acts punished as other similar coercions:

1. By forcing or compelling, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permitting the
forcing or compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him.
2. By paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or
objects other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless expressly
requested by such laborer or employee.
Elements of No. 1:
a. That the offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or
corporation.
b. That he or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees.
c. That he forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be
forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him or from said firm or
corporation.
Elements of No. 2:
a. That the offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by
him by means of tokens or objects.
b. That those tokens or objects are other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines.
c. That such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid
by means of tokens or objects.
 LEE vs. CA
G.R. No. 93695, February 4, 1992

FACTS:

A complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International Corporate Bank,
Inc. against the private respondents who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against
ALFA and the petitioners. The trial court issued an order requiring the issuance of
an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of the petitioner's
letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon
them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP. The
DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since
the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate and distinct corporate
personality and existence. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order advising the
private respondents to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. The
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that Rule 14, section 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer officers of ALFA
and that the private respondents should have availed of another mode of service under
Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper service
upon ALFA. The private respondents argued that the voting trust agreement dated
March 11, 1981 did not divest the petitioners of their positions as president and
executive vice-president of ALFA so that service of summons upon ALFA through the
petitioners as corporate officers was proper. The trial court upheld the validity of the
service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners reiterating their stand that by virtue of the
voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they
could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA and
in support thereof, they attached a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the
stockholders of ALFA and the DBP whereby the management and control of ALFA
became vested upon the DBP. The trial court then reversed itself and declared that
service upon the petitioners cannot be considered as proper service of summons on
ALFA. The case was elevated to the CA which reversed the above-mentioned Orders
holding that there was proper service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the execution of the voting trust agreement by a stockholder
whereby all his shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives
the stockholder of his position as director of the corporation;

(2) Whether or not the service of summons on ALFA effected through the petitioners,
as president and vice-president, of the subject corporation after the execution of the
voting trust agreement valid and effective;

HELD

1. Yes. By its very nature, a voting trust agreement results in the separation of the
voting rights of a stockholder from his other rights. The execution of a voting trust
agreement, therefore, may create a dichotomy between the equitable or beneficial
ownership of the corporate shares of stockholders, on the one hand, and the legal title
thereto on the other hand. In the instant case, the petitioners maintain that with the
 execution of the voting trust agreement between them and the other stockholders of
ALFA, as one party, and the DBP, as the other party, the former assigned and
transferred all their shares in ALFA to DBP, as trustee and thus, they can no longer
be considered directors of ALFA. Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a
director, strictly speaking, cannot be adversely affected by the simple act of such
director being a party to a voting trust agreement inasmuch as he remains owner
(although beneficial or equitable only) of the shares subject of the voting trust
agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the stockholder's shares in favor of the
trustee is required. No disqualification arises by virtue of the phrase "in his own right"
provided under the old Corporation Code. With the omission of the phrase "in his own
right" the election of trustees and other persons who in fact are not beneficial owners
of the shares registered in their names on the books of the corporation becomes
formally legalized. Hence, this is a clear indication that in order to be eligible as a
director, what is material is the legal title to, not beneficial ownership of, the stock as
appearing on the books of the corporation. The facts of this case show that the
petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all
their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee.
Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at least one share standing in their
names on the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new Corporation
Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of the enterprise.
The petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of the petitioners' shares
to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of ALFA.
Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred
legal ownership of the stock covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter
became the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. Both
parties, ALFA and the DBP, were aware at the time of the execution of the agreement
that by virtue of the transfer of shares of ALFA to the DBP, all the directors of ALFA
were stripped of their positions as such. There can be no reliance on the inference
that the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986
so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso
facto reverted to the petitioners as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of
section 59 of the new Corporation Code which reads:
"Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall
automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificate as
well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby be
deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the
transferors."

On the contrary, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement
between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon
the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. There is evidence on
record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners on
August 21, 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so
that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.

2. No. Under section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that:
"Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent
or any of its directors."
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate
and distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the above rule on
service of processes of a corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation
who can validly receive court processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer
can bind the corporation considering the existence of a corporate entity separate from
those who compose it. The petitioners in this case do not fall under any of the
enumerated officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through the petitioners,
therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise, as correctly argued by the petitioners, will
contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts
which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority. WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED.

Art. 289. Formation, maintenance, and prohibition of combination of capital or

labor through violence or threats. The penalty of arresto mayor11 and a fine not
exceeding 300 pesos shall be imposed upon any persons who, for the purpose of
organizing, maintaining, or preventing coalitions of capital or labor, strike of laborers,
or lockout of employers, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree as to compel
or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or
work, if the act shall not constitute a more serious offense in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.

Elements:
1. That the offender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to compel
or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry
or work.
2. That the purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or
labor, strike of laborers or lockout of employers.

"Mortera et. Al v Atty Pagatpatan

A.C. No. 4562 June 15, 2005

FACTS:
From the execution of a judgment in a civil action for rescission of contracts,the
complainants, then the plaintiffs, secured judgment under which the defendant in that
case was to pay them P155,000 for the property. The plaintiff’s counsel, Atty.
Pagatpatan, agreed with Aguilar (defendant in civil action), toacceptP150,000 as
partial payment of the judgment sum, issuing a receipt for theamount.He then
deposited the money in his personal bank account without theknowledge of
complainants. Until now, respondent adamantly refuses tosurrender the money to
complainants, despite the successive Orders of the RTCand the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this present case for disbarment.Respondent admits his secret agreement with
and receipt of the money from Aguilar, saying that his clients would not have paid him
his fees had he not donewhat he did. Respondent narrated his years of service as
counsel for thecomplainants and their mother. He alleged the amounts they owed him
althoughhe presented no evidence of any agreement between him and the
complainantsfor the exact amount of his compensation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper for an attorney to appropriate for himself
the judgment sum due to his clients considering the latter’s non payment of fees for
services previously rendered by the former?
HELD:
No. Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated
inCanons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The four rules
governing this situation were: he owed candor to his clients; he was bound to account
for whatever money he received for and from them; as a lawyer, he was obligated to
keep his own money separate from that of his clients; and, although he was entitled to
a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful fees, he was also bound to give
prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to them upon demand
or when due. Respondent violated each and every one of these rules. Respondent is
suspended from the practice of law for two years."

Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. The penalty of

prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods1 and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any private individual who, in order to discover
secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the
exercise of his official function.
2. That he seizes the papers or letters of another.
3. That the purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person.
4. That offender is informed of the contents of the papers or letters seized.
(People vs. Singh, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 5, 35)

Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor and
a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee, or
servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and
shall reveal such secrets.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a manager, employee or servant.
2. That he learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity.
 3. That he reveals such secrets.

Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods4 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon the person in charge, employee, or workman of any manufacturing or industrial
establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of
the industry of the latter.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a person in charge, employee or workman of a
manufacturing or industrial establishment.
2. That the manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the
industry which the offender has learned.
3. That the offender reveals such secrets.
4. That prejudice is caused to the owner.

Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take
any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

Robbery, defined.
Robbery is the taking of personal property, belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.

Elements of robbery in general.

a. That there be (1) personal property; (2) belonging to another;
b. That there is (3) unlawful taking of that property;
c. That the taking must be (4) with intent to gain; and d. That there is (5) violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon anything. Elements of
robbery in general.

PEOPLE vs. SALAS

G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
FACTS:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before
he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the
illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone.
Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings
until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court
on certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape?

HELD:
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal
prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." The purpose of
this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past
be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the
defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his
presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long
as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large.
As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable even by
his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of
the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19,
which now allows trial in absentia,
Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution
and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he
has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the
right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under
Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact
of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping,
placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Art 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,2 when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson;
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua,3 when by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted;
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal,* when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted;
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period,5 if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission
of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of
the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263;
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period in other cases. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7659).

PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. l-6025, May 30, 1964

FACTS:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal
Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No.
15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-
6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The
appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson
and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from,
but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026)
the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are
Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres
Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal. A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court
rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
HELD:

The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party

of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close
connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of the
crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount
of the costs. In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other
CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press
releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong
to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a
Communist. However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez,
Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas,
Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to
commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five
years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their
proportional share of the costs. Advocacy of Communism put into Action.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an
advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle
is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the
actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force
and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and
seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended
or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the
supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the
reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered
as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist
advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion. Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-
appellants. All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of
rebellion as charged in the information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty
of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and
to pay their proportionate share of the costs. Legal Considerations — Before
proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not
necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their
criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have
exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that
mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable,
either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership
and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any
action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is
coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to
commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand,
membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or
rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring
class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and
the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used
to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing
more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.

Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and
by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. If the offenses
mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have
been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band or by attacking a moving train,
street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers' compartments in a
train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective
conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with
the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
proper penalties. (As amended by Republic Act No. 12, Sec. 2, and Republic Act No.
373)

When is robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons qualified?

If any of the offenses denned in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Art. 294 is committed
1 in an uninhabited place, or
(2) by a band,or
(3) by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle, or airship, or
(4) by entering the passengers' compartments in a train, or in any manner taking
the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or
(5) on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the
use of firearms, the offender shall be punished by the maximum periods of the
proper penalties prescribed in Art. 294.

PEOPLE vs. SALVILLA

184 SCRA 671 (1990)

FACTS:
The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with
homemade guns and hand grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office. In the
office of Rodita; her two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside. One of the
accused asks Mary to get the paper bag which contained money. All accused held
victims as hostage when the police and military authorities had surrounded the lumber
yard. After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police makes their move in assaulting
the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused also got an injury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated?
HELD:
From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the
culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

Art. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. When
more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall
be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the
commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon
all the malefactors shall be the maximum period of the corresponding penalty provided
by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such
unlicensed firearm.
Outline of the provisions.
1. When at least four armed malefactors take part in the commission of a
robbery, it is deemed committed by a band.
2. When any of the arms used in the commission of robbery is not licensed, the
penalty upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding
penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal
possession of such firearms.
3. Any member of a band who was present at the commission of a robbery by
the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the
band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

PEOPLE vs. PANCHO PELAGIO Y. ALFONSO

G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967

FACTS:
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose Guico to death for the crime of robbery
with homicide Jose Guico, an ex-convict, and Evelyn Villanueva lived in common law
relationship Pancho Pelagio Pancho Pelagio came to see the spouses Guico and
Villanueva. Pelagio's wife had just delivered a child and he wanted to borrow money
for the hospital expenses. Armando Manalang, taking advantage of the said visit,
informed Pancho Pelagio of a robbery he, Manalang, was planning with some other
friends who later were revealed by Manalang to be Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo and
Arcadio Balmeo. Jose Guico's participation in the first meeting is unclear... arch 24,
1955, Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang and Arcadio Balmeo set
out for the execution of their plan. Aling Nena's residence. Caymo ordered Manalang
to hail and hold a taxi which the latter did. At the gate, however, they failed to find
Pancho Pelagio. They found Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi. Caymo
and Balmeo then rode on it. When the stranger was very near the taxi already.
Manalang instructed Caymo to shoot at the man as the latter was a police officer.
Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell dead. Caymo and
Balmeo proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they met Pancho Pelagio. He latter
explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo and Balmeo had gone down
because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the house apparently to summon the
police.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant the accused should only be convicted for simple
robbery and not for robbery with homicide?

HELD:
Court finds appellant Oscar Caymo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances, all recited
in the information and proven at the trial, of nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle
without any compensating mitigating circumstances. On the other hand,
appellant Pancho Pelagio is hereby determined to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, attended
by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and recidivism, having been at the time
of the trial, as recited in the information and proven at the trial, previously convicted
for robbery. There is no mitigating circumstance appreciable in his favor. For both
appellants, therefore, the penalties prescribed by law should be imposed in their
maximum period, although appellant Pancho Pelagio is still qualified to avail of the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the reasons given above, appellant
Jose Guico should be, as he is hereby acquitted. WHEREFORE, this Court affirms the
decision under appeal insofar as it imposes the death penalty on appellant
Oscar Caymo, but modifies the conviction of appellant Pancho Pelagio from robbery
with homicide to simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5, R.P.C., with the
aforementioned aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said appellant is hereby sentenced to a prison
term of from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years and
one day of prision mayor. The abovenamed appellants, moreover, are hereby
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended parties named in the decision
under appeal the sums therein stated. The indemnity for the death of Pat. Francisco
Trinidad, payable to his heirs, should be raised from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 and
charged alone against appellant Oscar Caymo. Finally, the conviction of appellant
Jose Guico is hereby set aside and let judgment be entered acquitting him for the
reasons given above. Costs against the appellants.
Art. 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain
circumstances. When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery
a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,6 unless the homicide
committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.

Art. 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation.— Any person

who, with intent to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation, shall compel
him to sign, execute, or deliver any public instrument or document, shall be held guilty
of robbery and punished by the penalties respectively prescribed in this Chapter.

Elements:
1. That the offender has intent to defraud another.
2. That the offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public
instrument or document.
3. That the compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.

Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to

worship. — Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or
public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion
temporal,1 if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if —
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery is
committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;
3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools;
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or
sealed furniture or receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside
the place of the robbery.
 PEOPLE V. TAYAG
G.R. No. 40512, March 3, 1934

FACTS:

On September 12, 1933, a little after two o'clock on the morning, of the said
twoappellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go
Cuay'sstore/dwelling (with a little more than P40 in cash and merchandise valued at
aroundP1,000) at No. 325-A, San Marcelino Street, Manila. Believing that they
were unnoticed,they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the
tools bolo and screwdriver which they then carried and which, of course, were not the
proper means for thatpurpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars
of the door and uponbecoming aware that the inhabitants of the store had been
awakened, they tried to escapebut policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who
up to that time had been watchingthem, detained and placed them under arrest. The
lower court convicted the accused withattempted robbery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is attempted robbery?

HELD:
No. The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of
trespasscommitted by means of violence, as defined in article 280 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code.In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay there were, at that time, a little
more than P40 incash, which represented the proceeds of his sales the day before,
and merchandise valuedat around P1,000. However, there is absolutely nothing of
record to show that the saidappellants' intention on that occasion was to commit
robbery, or that they somehow knewthat they would find money amounting to P40
therein.In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by means
ofcompetent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere
inferences,however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains, as
in this case, asufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from that of
committing robbery.It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that had the
appellants succeeded inentering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay, they would
have carried away all the goodstherein, because they would not have been able to do
so by themselves, not having anyvehicle at their disposal.

Art. 300. Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band. The robbery mentioned
in the next preceding article, if committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided therefor.

Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to

religious worship and their dependencies. Inhabited house means any shelter,
ship, or vessel constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though the
inhabitants thereof shall temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is
committed.

Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. Any robbery

committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the
first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos
shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,10
provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress;
2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken;
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks, or
other similar tools;
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle
has been broken;
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.

Elements:
1. That the offender entered an uninhabited place or a building which was not
a dwelling house, not a public building, or not an edifice devoted to religious
worship.
2. That any of the following circumstances was present:
a. The entrance was effected through an opening not intended for entrance or
egress;
b. A wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window was broken;
c. The entrance was effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other
similar tools;
d. A door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle was
broken; or
e. A closed or sealed receptacle was removed, even if the same be broken
open elsewhere.
3. That with intent to gain, the offender took therefrom personal property
belonging to another.

Art. 303. Robbery of cereals, fruits, or firewood in an uninhabited place or private

building. In the cases enumerated in articles 299 and 302, when the robbery consists
in the taking of cereals, fruits, or firewood, the culprit shall suffer the penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. Any person who shall, without
lawful cause, have in his possession picklocks or similar tools specially adopted to
the commission of the crime of robbery, shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

Elements of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools.

1. That the offender has in his possession picklocks or similar tools.
2. That such picklocks or similar tools are specially adopted to the
commission of robbery.
3. That the offender does not have lawful cause for such possession.

Art. 305. False keys. The term "false keys" shall be deemed to include:

1. The tools mentioned in the next preceding article;

2. Genuine keys stolen from the owner;
3. Any keys other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock forcibly
opened by the offender.

PEOPLE vs. MARK DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 181545, October 8, 2008

FACTS:
Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to the poseur-
buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by companions identified to be
an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the charge and said that he was
arrested after refusing to give information about Amay, whom the police were after.
His testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Lower court gave weight to the
testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld the presumption of regularity in the
operation conducted by the officers. Appellant appealed, questioning the identity of
the shabu allegedly confiscated from him in view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165
(inventory of seized drugs) and Section 21 (3) of the same law (certification of the
forensic laboratory examination results).

ISSUE:
Whether Mark de la Cruz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. Citing
jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of
the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins. The chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the
prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic
sachets, containing shabu from the time they were first allegedly received until they
were brought to the police investigator. There were no records to show that the
procedural requirements in Section 21 were complied with. The presumption of
regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of presumption of evidence in
view of the circumstances. “The presumption of regularity is merely just that--a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth.” The appellant was acquitted.

Art. 306. Who are brigands. When more than three armed persons form a band of
robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping persons
for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be attained
by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers or brigands.

There is brigandage when:

1. There be at least four armed persons.
2. They formed a band of robbers.
3. The purpose is any of the following:
a. To commit robbery in the highway; or
b. To kidnap persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom; or
c. To attain by means of force and violence any other purpose.

Art. 307. Aiding and abetting a band of brigands. Any person knowingly and in any
manner aiding, abetting, or protecting a band of brigands as described in the next
preceding article, or giving them information of the movements of the police or other
peace officers of the Government (or of the forces of the United States Army, when
the latter are acting in aid of the Government), or acquiring or receiving the property
taken by such brigands, shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period
to prision mayor in its minimum period.
 Elements:
1. That there is a band of brigands.
2. That the offender knows the band to be of brigands.
3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
a. He in any manner aids, abets or protects such band of brigands; or
b. He gives them information of the movements of the police or other peace
officers of the Government; or
c. He acquires or receives the property taken by such brigands.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent
to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to
the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another,
shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him;
and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or
farm products.

Elements of theft:
1. That there be taking of personal property.
2. That said property belongs to another.
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain.
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner.
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000;
People vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598)
Note: In the case of U.S. vs. De Vera, supra, the phrase "taking away" is used
in stating one of the elements of theft. But in the case of People vs. Yusay,
supra, citing Viada, the word "away" is not used in connection with the taking
of personal property.
 PEOPLE v. ISAGANI GULINAO Y ALZONA
GR No. 82264-66, December 04, 1989

FACTS:
On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, appellant Gulinao (driver-
bodyguard of Dr. Chua), Virgilio Caguioa (secretary of Dr. Chua), Vice Mayor Teofilo
Reyes of Malabon, Dante Reyes (nephew... of Vice Mayor Reyes), Boy Salazar and
other politicians were having a caucus in the house of a certain Torre in Acacia,
Malabon. After the caucus at about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua boarded Dr.
Chua's car and that of Vice Mayor Reyes and proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House
along McArthur Highway, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. "Upon arriving at the disco house,
Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol, swapped the same with
a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. Gulinao then tucked the .45 caliber
pistol in his right waist. "Inside the disco house, Dr. Chua, Gulinao and companions
occupied 2 tables which were joined together near the stage. Later, Gulinao went to
the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber... pistol. He then returned to his seat
beside Dr. Chua (pp. 14-15 TSN May 18, 1987). "While Dr. Chua was watching the
floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at close range with the .45
caliber pistol (pp. 16-17 TSN May 22, 1987). When Gulinao was about to leave the
disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with
12 diamonds. Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr.
Chua. "Poking the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former
to leave the car. While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but
missed (pp. 27-29 TSN April 6,... 1987). On the other hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire
at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but the Ingram jammed. (pp. 16-17 TSN
May 18, 1987). "Gulinao drove the car towards Monumento (p. 29 TSN April 6,
1987). However, he was constrained to leave the car and take a taxi when the car he
was driving figured in an accident in Malabon . "Dr. Chua, who sustained gunshot
wounds on the head, was brought to the nearby Our Lady of Fatima Hospital where
he died on arrival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Guinao is guilty of illegal possession of firearm, murder and

theft?

HELD:

As stated by the court a quo, there is no possibility of double jeopardy, as the possession
there of had taken place in two separate and distinct places and jurisdiction and the two information
state different dates of commission. As the trial court itself noted, on the basis of Patino's testimony,
the taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr.
Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring. Gulinao's contention in his fourth assignment of error
that there was no proof of intent to gain in the taking of Dr. Chua's car is bereft of merit. Intent
to gain, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the car. This
presumption was unrebutted. In view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated Nov. 23,1987,
with respect to the cases for "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Murder" (and "Carnapping" (Crim.
Is affirmed it being in accordance with the law and evidence. With respect to the case for "Robbery"
(Crim. Case No. 8017V- 871), par. 2 of the dispositive portionof the appealed Decision is MODIFIED
to the effect that Gulinao is convicted of the crime of Theft and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9months and 10 days of prision
correccional as minimum and 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 yearsand 8 months of prision
mayor, as maximum.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,1 if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph and one year of each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,2 if
the value of the property stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,3 if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period,4 if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor in its full extent,3 if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,6 if such value does not
exceed five pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and
the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said
amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when
the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted
under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the
support of himself or his family.

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article,
if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Big. 71, approved May 1,1980)
Theft is qualified:
1. If the theft is committed by a domestic servant.
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence.
3. If the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter, or (c) large cattle.
4. If the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation.
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERLINDA A. SISON

G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017

FACTS:
Casuera and Magalona met appellant and the latter briefed Castuera on the
requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia. She introduced Castuera to
another man who related that he was able to go to Australia with her help. She also
showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped to get
employment in Australia. Appellant further narrated that a couple she had helped had
given her their car as payment. Because of her representations, Castuera believed in
her promise that she could send him to Australia. Appellant asked Castuera for
₱180,000 for processing his papers.
Appellant, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. Together
with Dedales and Bacomo, appellant convinced Castueara that that it was difficult to
get an Australian visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia
to get one. Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in Indonesia
was denied. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his U.S. visa, which he
paid. However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian
passport bearing an Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return
to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of syndicated estafa?

HELD:
Yes. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment
for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit
or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042.
In this case, appellant herself admits that she has no license or authority to
undertake recruitment and placement activities. Since it was proven that the three
accused were acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal
recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal
recruitment involving economic sabotage.

Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum. If
the property stolen be any property of the National Library or of the National Museum,
the penalty shall be arresto mayor8 or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos, or both,
unless a higher penalty should be provided under other provisions of this Code, in
which case, the offender shall be punished by such higher penalty.

Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. Any
person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him,
shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum for the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
Elements:
a. That the offender takes possession of any real property or usurps any real
rights in property.
b. That the real property or real rights belong to another.
c. That violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in
occupying real property or usurping real rights in property.
d. That there is intent to gain.

Art. 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks. Any person who shall alter the
boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or estates, or any other marks
intended to designate the boundaries of the same, shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 100 pesos, or both.
Elements:
1. That there be boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or estates,
or any other marks intended to designate the boundaries of the same.
2. That the offender alters said boundary marks.
Art. 314. Fraudulent insolvency. Any person who shall abscond with his property to
the prejudice of his creditors, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor1 if he be a
merchant, and the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period,2 if he be not a merchant.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a debtor; that is, he has obligations due and payable.
2. That he absconds with his property.
3. That there be prejudice to his creditors.

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period,1 if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,2
if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period,3 if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,4 if such amount
does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the
fraud be committed by any of the following means:
With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the
offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such
obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration;
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property;
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank,
and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of
the offended party or any third person.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or
by means of other similar deceits.
b) By altering the quality, fineness, or weight of anything pertaining to his art or
business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice
to the action for calumny, which the offended party may deem proper to bring
against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty.
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from the bank and/ or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended
by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17,1967)
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like
without paying therefore, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager
thereof, or by obtaining credit at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by
abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel,
inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house after
obtaining credit, food, refreshment, or accommodation therein without paying
for his food, refreshment, or accommodation. (As amended by Com. Act No.
157)
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document;
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling
game;
(c) By removing, concealing, or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record,
office files, document, or any other papers.

Elements of estafa in general:

1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
 CHUA-BURCE vs. CA
G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000

FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested FructuosoPenaflor,
Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the vault, which
should total to P4 million. They found out that there was a shortage of P150,000. After
4 investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, the reports concluded that Cristeta
Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian, was primary responsible for the shortage. Unable to
explain the shortage, the services of the accused was terminated. Chua-Burce,
together with her husband Antonio Burce, were charged with the crime of estafa. A
civil case was also instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal case due
to a prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by the CA. The CRIMINAL and
CIVIL cases continued. The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa.
CIVIL CASE also found her liable for the shortage of P150,000. She appealed both
rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the two TC rulings. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was a valid trial?
(2) Whether or not the elements of estafa were proven beyond reasonable
doubt?

HELD:

(1) Yes, there was a valid trial. The accused allege that the public prosecutor
did not intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did not
present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for the accused to be
convicted). But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively participated
with the criminal case. And both parties, during the pre-trial, agreed to adopt
their respective evidences in the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The
agreement was reduced into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court. Being
bound by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in the day to challenge its
contents.
(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven. The elements of Estafa, ART. 315
(1) (b), are the following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration,
or any other circumstances, with the duty return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial that he received
it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another
d) There is demand for such property
The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the tranferee both material
and juridical possession of the personal property. Juridical possession means
 the transferee has a right over the thing which he may even set up against the
owner.The possession of the accused of the money had no juridical
possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is akin to that of a bank
teller. And possession of a bank teller is possession of the bank. she was a
mere custodian.
*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but double jeopardy is
already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER – payment to the teller is a
payment to the bank, he is a mere custodian. AGENT – he can assert his
independent, autonomous right to retain money, even against the owner.

Art. 316. Other forms of swindling. The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods9 and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall
convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same;
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of
the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;
3. The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its lawful
possessor, to the prejudice of the latter or any third person;
4. Any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious
contract;
5. Any person who shall accept any compensation given him under the belief
that it was in payment of services rendered or labor performed by him, when in
fact he did not actually perform such services or labor;
6. Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil
action, without express authority from the court or before the cancellation of his
bond or before being relieved from the obligation contracted by him, shall sell,
mortgage, or, in any other manner, encumber the real property or properties
with which he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation.

Elements:
1. That the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building.
2. That the offender who is not the owner of said property should
represent that he is the owner thereof.
3. That the offender should have executed an act of ownership (selling, leasing,
encumbering or mortgaging the real property).
4. That the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.
Art. 317. Swindling a minor. Any person who, taking advantage of the inexperience
or emotions or feelings of a minor to his detriment, shall induce him to assume any
obligation or to give any release or execute a transfer of any property right in
consideration of some loan of money, credit, or other personal property, whether the
loan clearly appears in the document or is shown in any other form, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor10 and a fine of a sum ranging from 10 to 50 per cent of the
value of the obligation contracted by the minor.

Elements:
1. That the offender takes advantage of the inexperience or emotions or
feelings of a minor.
2. That he induces such minor (1) to assume an obligation, or (2) to give
release, or (3) to execute a transfer of any property right.
3. That the consideration is (1) some loan of money, (2) credit, or (3) other
personal property.
4. That the transaction is to the detriment of such minor

Art. 318. Other deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than
the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit
not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.

Other deceits are:

1. By defrauding or damaging another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles.
2. By interpreting dreams, by making forecasts, by telling fortunes, or by taking
advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, for profit or
gain.

VICENTE VILLAFLOR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC.
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997

FACTS:

The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140)
hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain,
but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property, have
been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After
acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.
In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit
Lumber Co.Inc. However, an “Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was
entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the
requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property since
then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over the
property to bolster his claim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same
year as proof of an “Order of Award” issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made
several collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the Bureau
of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantial
rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the subsequent
issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands. Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration at the Ministry of Natural Resources which likewise dismissed the
petition.

On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity
of Contract ( Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two
parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages” at about the same time that he
appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the
President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioner’s heir substituted in his
behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance
of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted
the due execution and genuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving its
nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e)
of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription
and/or laches.

The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by

upholding the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale is valid?

HELD:

No. The provision of the law is specific that public lands can only be acquired
in the manner provided for therein and not otherwise (Sec. 11, CA. No. 141, as
amended). In his sales application, petitioner expressly admitted that said property
was public land. This is formidable evidence as it amounts to an admission against
interest. The records show that Villaflor had applied for the purchase of lands in
question with this Office (Sales Application V-807) on 2 December 1948. There is a
condition in the sales application to the effect that he recognizes that the land covered
by the same is of public domain and any and all rights he may have with respect
thereto by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation are relinquished to the
Government of which Villaflor is very much aware. It also appears that Villaflor had
paid for the publication fees appurtenant to the sale of the land. He participated in the
public auction where he was declared the successful bidder. He had fully paid the
purchase price thereof. It would be a height of absurdity for Villaflor to be buying that
which is owned by him if his claim of private ownership thereof is to be believed. The
area in dispute is not the private property of the petitioner.

It is a basic assumption of public policy that lands of whatever classification belong to

the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same
as dominus. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied from the government. It is indispensable then that there be showing
of title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. Such sales
applicant manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same
is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the
application was submitted, all of its acts prior thereof, including its real estate tax
declarations, characterized its possessions of the land as that of a “sales applicant”.
And consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is
not, therefore, its owner.

The rule on the interpretation of contracts (Article 1371) is used in affirming, not
negating, their validity. Article 1373,which is a conjunct of Article 1371, provides that,
if the instrument is susceptible of two or more interpretations, the interpretation which
will make it valid and effectual should be adopted. In this light, it is not difficult to
understand that the legal basis urged by petitioner does not support his allegation that
the contracts to sell and the deed of relinquishment are simulated and fictitious.
Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is a declaration of a fictitious will,
deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purpose of
deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from
that which was really executed. Such an intention is not apparent in the agreements.
The intent to sell, on the other hand, is as clear as daylight. The fact, that the
agreement to sell (7 December 1948) did not absolutely transfer ownership of the land
to private respondent, does not how that the agreement was simulated. Petitioner‟s
delivery of the Certificate of Ownership and execution of the deed of absolute sale
were suspensive conditions, which gave rise to a corresponding obligation on the part
of the private respondent, i.e., the payment of the last installment of the consideration
mentioned in the Agreement. Such conditions did not affect the perfection of the
contract or prove simulation Nonpayment, at most, gives the vendor only the right to
sue for collection. Generally, in a contract of sale, payment of the price is a resolutory
condition and the remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a substantial
breach, to rescind the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. However, failure
to pay is not even a breach, but merely an event which prevents the vendor‟s
obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force.

The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act are: (1) the
possession of the qualifications required by said Act (under Section 29) and (2) the
lack of the disqualifications mentioned therein (under Sections 121, 122,and 123).
Section 121 of the Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a corporation from a
grantee: The private respondent, not the petitioner, was the direct grantee of the
disputed land. Sections 122 and 123 disqualify corporations, which are not authorized
by their charter, from acquiring public land; the records do not show that private
respondent was not so authorized under its charter.
Art. 319. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property. The penalty of arresto
mayor1 or a fine amounting to twice the value of the property shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall knowingly remove any personal property mortgaged under
the Chattel Mortgage Law to any province or city other than the one in which it was
located at the time of the execution of the mortgage, without the written consent of the
mortgagee or his executors, administrators, or assigns.
2. Any mortgagor who shall sell or pledge personal property already pledged, or any
part thereof, under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the consent of the
mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record thereof in the
office of the register of deeds of the province where such property is located.

Elements of knowingly removing mortgaged personal property:

a. That personal property is mortgaged under the Chattel Mortgage Law.
b. That the offender knows that such property is so mortgaged.
c. That he removes such mortgaged personal property to any province or city
other than the one in which it was located at the time of the execution of the
mortgage.
d. That the removal is permanent.
e. That there is no written consent of the mortgagee or his executors,
administrators or assigns to such removal.

Art. 320. Destructive arson. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death1 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning,
or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different
occasions;
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general
or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as,
but not limited to official governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to
a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had
knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set
on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation, and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing
bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
 PEOPLE vs. MACABANDO
G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013

FACTS:
At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on the road holding
G.I. pipe, andshouted that he wanted to get even (“ manabla ko ”). Afterwards, he
uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He got a pail of
water, and poured itscontents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the
barangay headquarters to get a fireextinguisher. When Eric approached the burning
house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bagand a gun, told him not to
interfere; the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant also told thepeople
around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of his radio
cassettes for sale had beenstolen. He appellant claimed that he went to sleep after
looking for his missing radio cassette, and thatthe fire had already started when he
woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house andmaintained that he did not
own a gun. He added that the gunshots came from the explosion offirecrackers that
he intended to use during the New Year celebration.The prosecution charged the
appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC.The RTC
found him guilty and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
affirmed
ISSUE:
Whether or not he was guilty?
HELD:
Yes. The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of
circumstantial events that leads toan unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the
exclusion of others, set fire to his house. Thecombination of these circumstances,
indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fireto his house.
We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from
putting out the firein his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing
to do with the crime. The first impulseof an individual whose house is on fire is to save
his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to humannature, reason and natural
order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the firein his
burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed
hisdetermination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact
that the appellantcarried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed
deliberate planning and preparednesson his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise
contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside hishouse when the fire broke out,
and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’sindifferent
attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out
the fire,coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of
innocence.ISSUE: What is the crime he is guilty of? Arson under PD 1613.HELD:
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels,buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercialestablishments by any person or group of persons.
PD 1613 governs simple arson
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson . The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua shall beimposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2. Any
inhabited house or dwelling ;
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, notincluded in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659. This law punishes simplearson with a lesser penalty because the acts that
constitute it have a lesser degree of perversityand viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, andnational
security implications than destructive arson."

Art. 321. Other forms of arson. When the arson consists in the burning of other
property and under the circumstances given hereunder, the offender shall be
punished:
1. By reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua:
(a) If the offender shall set fire to any building, farmhouse, warehouse, hut,
shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more
persons;
(b) If the building burned is a public building and the value of the damage
caused exceeds 6,000 pesos;
(c) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy
evidence kept therein to be used in instituting prosecution for the punishment
of violators of the law, irrespective of the amount of the damage;
(d) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy
evidence kept therein to be used in any legislative, judicial or administrative
proceedings, irrespective of the amount of the damage: Provided, however,
That if the evidence destroyed is to be used against the defendant for the
prosecution of any crime punishable under existing laws, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua;
(e) If the arson shall have been committed with the intention of collecting under
an insurance policy against loss or damage by fire.
2. By reclusion temporal:3
(a) If an inhabited house or any other building in which people are accustomed
to meet is set on fire, and the culprit did not know that such house or building
was occupied at the time, or if he shall set fire to a moving freight train or motor
vehicle, and the value of the damage caused exceeds 6,000 pesos.

Art. 322. Cases of arson not included in the preceding articles. Cases of arson
not included in the next preceding articles shall be punished:
 1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,10 when the damage
caused does not exceed 50 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period,11 when the damage caused is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200;
3. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,12 if the damage
caused is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000; and
4. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,13 if it is over
1,000 pesos.

Art. 323. Arson of property of small value. The arson of any uninhabited hut,
storehouse, barn, shed or any other property the value of which does not exceed 25
pesos, committed at a time or under circumstances which clearly exclude all danger
of the fire spreading, shall not be punished by the penalties respectively prescribed in
this chapter, but in accordance with the damage caused and under the provisions of
the following chapter.14

Art. 324. Crimes involving destruction. Any person who shall cause destruction by
means of explosion, discharge of electric current, inundation, sinking or stranding of a
vessel, intentional damaging of the engine of said vessel, taking up the rails from a
railway track, maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving trains,
destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other system, and, in
general by using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as those above
enumerated, shall be punished by reclusion temporal15 if the commission has
endangered the safety of any person; otherwise, the penalty of prision mayor16 shall
be imposed.

Elements of crimes involving destruction:

1. The offender causes destruction.
2. Destruction is caused by any of the following means:
a. explosion
b. discharge of electric current
c. inundation, sinking or stranding of a vessel, or intentional damaging of the
engine of said vessel
d. taking up the rails from a railway track
e. maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving trains
f. destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other system
g. using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as those above
enumerated
Art. 325. Burning one's own property as a means to commit arson. Any person
guilty of arson or causing great destruction of property belonging to another shall suffer
the penalty prescribed in this chapter, even though he shall have set fire to or
destroyed his own property for the purpose of committing the crime.

Art. 326. Setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender. If the property
burned shall be the exclusive property of the offender, he shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period,17 if the
arson shall have been committed for the purpose of defrauding or causing damage to
another, or prejudice shall actually have been caused, or if the thing burned shall have
been a building in an inhabited place. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 5467)

Art. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief. Any person who shall deliberately
cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next
preceding chapter, shall be guilty of malicious mischief.
Elements of malicious mischief:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another.
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction.
3. That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it.
Note: This third element presupposes that the offender acted due to hate, revenge or
other evil motive.

YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON

T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON
G.R. No. L-7821405 December 1988

FACTS:
Macario Alicaba & Millenes family, predecessors-in-interest of petitioner,
agreed to lease to private respondent Abajon a portion of subject land to construct the
latter’s house & to plant corns & bananas. They agreed to a monthly rental ofPHP2.00
& 50-50 share of crops.
Petitioner Caballes & her husband acquired, through a deed of sale, the whole
land which includes the portion occupied byprivate respondent. They informed private
respondent of their intention to build a poultry close to his house & persuadedhim to
transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the land. On his part, private
respondent offered to payrent on the land occupied by his house, but such offer was
not accepted.
Later, the spouses asked private respondent to vacate the premises, saying that
they needed the property. But he refused.Despite the confrontation before the Brgy.
Captain, the parties failed to reach an agreement. All efforts by the landownersto oust
private respondent were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.
 Petitioner then filed a criminal case for malicious mischief against private
respondent, alleging that the latter maliciouslycut down the banana plants worth
P50.00, (note: all banana plants, were planted by Abajon).
Pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the regional
office of Ministry of Agrarian Reform(MAR) to determine the relationship of the parties.
As a result, MAR issued an order declaring the existence of a tenancyrelationship
between Caballes & Abajon. It also declared the criminal case for malicious mischief
filed by petitioner againstprivate respondent as not proper for trial; since such case is
filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farm.
On appeal, then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella reversed the certification and
declared the criminal case as proper for trial,since the land involved is a residential lot
consisting only of 60-sq. m.
On motion for reconsideration, herein respondent and new Minister of DAR,
Heherson Alvarez issued an order finding thecriminal case as not proper for trial due
to the existence of tenancy relations between the parties. o Private respondent
invoked Sec. 10 of RA 3844, which provided that new owners are bound to respect
the tenancyregardless of the size of the land being tilled.

ISSUE :
Whether or not Abajon is a tenant of spouses Caballes?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that Abajon only occupied a miniscule portion of
the lot. RA 3844, as amended. The 60-sq. m.cannot be considered as an economic
family-size farm protected by the aforementioned law. Planting camote, bananas,
&corn on a 60-sq. m. land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet the farm family’s basic needs.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and6. There is sharing of harvests"

Art. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. — Any person who shall cause
damage to obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or
corrosive substance; or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who
causes damage to the property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any
archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common
by the public shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,1 if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor,2 if such value does not exceed the above-mentioned amount but
is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos.

Art. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article
shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,3 if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,4 if such value is over
200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does not exceed 200
pesos or cannot be estimated. (As amended by Com. Act No. 3999)

Art. 330. Damage and obstruction to means of communication. The penalty of

prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods5 shall be imposed upon any
person who shall damage any railway, telegraph or telephone lines.

Art. 331. Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments, or paintings. Any

person who shall destroy or damage statues or any other useful or ornamental public
monuments, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period.

Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same
line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
 INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA CARUNGCONG
vs. PEOPLE
G.R. 181409, February 11, 2010

FACTS:
Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De
Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William
Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced
Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb
mark a special power of attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document pertaining
to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of the latter’s
properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case.

As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives
who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot
be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further counters that the
same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his
spouse Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused,
did not on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law relationship between
Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed from the protective
mantle of Art 332.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida,
extinguished the relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.

2. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship to Manolita.

HELD:

1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the
deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless
of whether the marriage produced children or not.

2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies
to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the
State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that
it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It
does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed
with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332 considering
that the crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the
crime estafa through falsification of public document and does not anymore concern
private relations of family members. He then can be held criminally liable.

Art. 333. Who are guilty of adultery. Adultery is committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void.

Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods

If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without
justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree2 than that
provided in the next preceding paragraph shall be imposed.

Elements of adultery:

(1) That the woman is married;

(2) That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband;

(3) That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he must
know her to be married.

ARROYO, JR. vs. CA

G.R. No. 96602, December 18, 2018

FACTS:
Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and
Eduardo Arroyo for adultery. In November 1982, Ruby went to Baguio with Mrs. Sare
and witness Jabunan. They stayed at the Neri spouses’ Mines View Park
Condominium. Arroyo arrived at 7:00 p.m. at the condominium. Jabunan said he
opened the door for Arroyo and knocked on Ruby Neri’s door. Ruby then asked Mrs.
Sare, who was in the room with her, to leave her and Arroyo alone. The two were left
alone in the room and went out 45 minutes later. In December 1982, Dr. Neri then
found incriminating pictures of his wife and Arroyo in bed. When questioned by her
husband, Ruby admitted that she and Arroyo slept together in Baguio.
On August 26, 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, praying that the case against his
wife and Arroyo be dismissed because he had tacitly consented to his wife’s infidelity.
Ruby moved for reconsideration, contending that pardon had been extended by her
husband and that Dr. Jorge Neri had married another woman with whom he is
cohabiting. Both Arroyo and Ruby Neri filed their respective motions praying for the
dismissal of their cases based on Dr. Neri’s manifestation.
Arroyo and Ruby used Dr. Neri’s affidavit to cast doubts on the doctor’s credibility as
witness.

ISSUE:
1. Is Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his
credibility?
2. Had Mrs. Neri’s constitutional right against self-incrimination been violated?
3. Does Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair preclude him from filing the criminal
complaint on the ground of pari delicto?
4. Is Dr. Neri’s manifestation a sufficient basis for granting a new trial?

HELD:
1. No. It has been the Court’s constant holding that in certiorari proceedings, the
findings of fact of the lower court as well as its conclusions on the credibility of
witnesses are generally not disturbed.
2. No. As held in Gamboa v. Cruz, “the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused.” Because Dr.
Neri is not an investigating officer, Mrs. Neri’s confession to her husband could not be
rejected by the court. As held in Aballe v. People,
“The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may
be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood all of it.”
3. No. The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code but only in
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the said article relates only to contracts
with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involved any illegal contract.
4. No. Dr. Neri’s manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of
testimony given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by
witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial.

Art. 334. Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Three ways of committing the crime of concubinage:
1. By keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; or
2. By having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who
is not his wife; or
3. By cohabiting with her in any other place.
Elements:
(1) That the man must be married.
(2) That he committed any of the following acts:
a. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
b. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman
who is not his wife;
c. Cohabiting with her in any other place.
(3) That as regards the woman, she must know him to be married.

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s
wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home
and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently
filed a criminal complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal
case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage?

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The
pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Elements:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness of lewdness;

2. That the act of lasciviousness is committed against a person of either sex;

3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances;

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authoity;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

PEOPLE vs. PEREZ

831 P.2d 1159 (1992)
FACTS:

On September 30, 1988, Mr. Perez (Defendant) parked his car near the house
of Victoria Mesa. He surreptitiously entered the house while Mesa was warming her
car. Defendant beat Mesa and then stabbed her multiple times with a steak knife from
Mesa’s kitchen. After the steak knife broke, Defendant found another knife in the
kitchen, which he used to inflict additional wounds on Mesa. Mesa died as a result of
the attack. The only connection between Defendant and Mesa was that they had gone
to high school together ten years earlier. Defendant was found guilty of first degree,
premeditated and deliberate murder. Defendant appealed, and the court of appeals
reduced his conviction to second-degree murder. The prosecution challenged the
court of appeals’ decision.

ISSUE:

Whether combined evidence of planning activity, motive, and manner of killing

supports a finding of first degree murder where any one category of evidence on its
own would be insufficient to prove that the homicide was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.

HELD:

Yes. The court of appeals’ ruling is reversed. First-degree murder includes

killings that are willful, deliberate, premeditated, and perpetrated with express malice
aforethought.

First-degree murder includes killings that are willful, deliberate, premeditated,

and perpetrated with express malice aforethought. This means that a defendant
commits first degree murder where he kills intentionally, after carefully considering the
consequences of his actions. To determine whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to support a conviction for deliberate and premeditated murder, courts
typically consider three categories of evidence: planning activity, motive, and manner
of killing. This list of considerations is nonexclusive. Here, the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. First, evidence of planning activity
can be found in the following: Defendant did not park his car in Mesa’s driveway; he
entered Mesa’s home surreptitiously; and he obtained the murder weapon from
Mesa’s kitchen. Second, evidence of motive may be inferred from the fact that
Defendant and Mesa knew each other from high school, which means that Mesa could
have easily identified Defendant to law enforcement if she survived. Third, evidence
of the manner of killing suggests that Mesa’s death was deliberate and premeditated
to the extent that Defendant sought out a second knife from the kitchen after the steak
knife broke. Although no one of these factors is sufficient on its own to sustain a finding
that Defendant acted deliberately and with premeditation when he killed Mesa, their
combination provides sufficient support for such a finding.

Art. 337. Qualified seduction. The seduction of a virgin over twelve years and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, house
servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Two classes of qualified seduction:

(a) Seduction of a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age by certain persons,
such as, a person in authority, priest, teacher, etc.; and

(b) Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant by her ascendant, regardless

of her age or reputation.

Elements of qualified seduction of a virgin:

1. That the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried and
of good reputation.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the

offender.

PEOPLE vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO

GR No. 177743, January 25, 2012

FACTS:
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the
provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly
struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the
ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla
desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan,
the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and
Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced
dead on arrival. On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union
filed an information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC. The accused pleaded
not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that
they were only several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they
shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and that they were able to see and
to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of their father-in-law because the area was then
well-lighted. Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of Olais, attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had
suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined
that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once,
considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull
had been radiating.
 At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the
incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a
nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he
had then talked to Olais nicely,... the latter had continued hitting him with his fists,
striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with
both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone
with which he had hit the right side of the victim's... head, causing the latter to fall face
down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that
Olais was no longer moving. Fontanilla's daughter Marilou corroborated her father's
version. On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged. The RTC
rejected Fontanilla's plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to
employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due
to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer
any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not
receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have
suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital that Fontanilla's failure
to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with
his plea of self-defense and that the manner of attack against Olais established the
attendance of treachery.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. Fontanilla did not establish the
indispensable element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to
the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated
the plea of self-defense; and that the nature of the victim's injury was a significant
physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not
just to defend himself.

ISSUE:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE. EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

HELD:
We affirm the conviction. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-
defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the
victim is established self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. The
character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified
killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under
the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful... aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material
attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a)
actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual
or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point
of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder
or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed
the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais
did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla's act of
hitting the victim's head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional
to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim's fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some
injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity
was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital;
hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to
him. Nor was any medication applied to him.
In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had
been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for
the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted
on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack
from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds... manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court
of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused
Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate
damages... and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the P50,000.00 as
death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum
on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.The accused shall pay the costs of
suit.
Art. 338. Simple seduction. The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of
good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of
deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.3

Elements:

1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18 years of age.

2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That it is committed by means of deceit.

UNITED STATES vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 9405. December 24, 1914

FACTS:
An informant and a DEA agent posing as his wife met the defendant in a coffee
shop, during which the two testified there was talk of a cocaine transaction. The two
later met the defendant at a service station and followed him to his tire shop. At that
time, two packages of cocaine were presented, and the defendant was arrested on
the way to the place where payment was to be made. At trial, the prosecution elicited
testimony, over the defendant’s objection, from the DEA agent, that an investigation
had been opened as a result of a tip from another federal agency that defendant was
a drug smuggler. The testimony was reiterated and embellished during closing
argument. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the testimony was inadmissible.

ISSUE:
Whether the statements by the agent that another agency had tipped off the
DEA that the defendant was drug smuggler constituted reversible error?

HELD:

Yes. The statements were made out of court by someone other then the
declarant, and they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. They were
not offered to prove state of mind, which was irrelevant, but rather to show that the
defendant was, in fact, a drug smuggler. These statements were inadmissible under
Federal Rules of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) Rules 802, 403 and 404(b). The statements
made by someone else to the DEA agent were out of court statements offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. Even if it were accepted that the statements were
offered for some non-hearsay reason, the statements were still overly prejudicial as
compared to their probativeness, failing the F.R.E. Rule 403 balancing test. Moreover,
evidence of past crimes to show propensity was inadmissible under F.R.E Rule 404(b).
As a result, the statements constituted reversible error and the conviction was
overturned.
Art. 339. Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party. The
penalty of arresto mayor* shall be imposed to punish any other acts of lasciviousness
committed by the same persons and under the same circumstances as those provided
in Articles 337 and 338.

Elements:

1. That the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness.

2. That the acts are committed upon a woman who is virgin or single or widow
of good reputation, under 18 years of age but over 12 years, or a sister or
descendant regardless of her reputation or age.

3. That the offender accomplishes the acts by abuse of authority, confidence,

relationship, or deceit.

Art. 340. Corruption of Minors. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution or corruption of persons under age to satisfy the lust of another, shall be
punished by prision mayor5 and if the culprit is a public officer or employee, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall also suffer the penalty
of temporary absolute disqualification.6 (As amended by BJ*. Big. 92, approved on
Dec. 24,1980)

Art. 341. White slave trade. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods1 shall be imposed upon any person who, in any manner, or under
any pretext, shall engage in the business or shall profit by prostitution or shall enlist
the services of women for the purpose of prostitution. (As amended by BJ*. Big. 186,
March 16,1982)

Acts penalized as white slave trade.

They are:

1. Engaging in the business of prostitution.

2. Profiting by prostitution.

3. Enlisting the services of women for the purpose of prostitution.

Art. 342. Forcible abduction. The abduction of any woman against her will and with
lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal.
The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under
twelve years of age.

Elements of forcible abduction:

1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status,
or reputation.

2. That the abduction is against her will.

3. That the abduction is with lewd designs.

REPUBLIC vs. CAYANAN

G.R. 181796, November 7, 2017

FACTS:

Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her
husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG. She
contended that a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the
CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo without any warrant of arrest, and
had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame; and that despite
repeated demands, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo. The
CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. The CIDG
filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having
detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. Regina,
albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended her petition
to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the writ
of amparo. Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection order
and witness protection order, and it was granted. Pascua did not appear in the
proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his non-appearance.

The RTC issued an order maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to
continue its investigation into the disappearance of Pablo; directing respondent SPO1
Pascua to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection order
permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina in the Witness Protection Program
of the Department of Justice. The CIDG filed an MR, but it was denied. Hence, the
CIDG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. It contended that there was
no sufficient evidence to support the writ of amparo; and that a mere accusation
accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for the court to
issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity. Pascua, on his part, contended
that Regina failed to establish by the required burden of proof that he caused the
“forced disappearance” of Pablo Cayanan within the ambit protected by the rule on the
writ of ampar; that following Mexico’s Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the
supposed victim to establish where he is being held; that Philippine rule on amparo
specifically covers “public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity,”
which evidently precludes a government institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-
PNP; and that enforced or forced disappearance means that it must be established
that agents of the state perpetrated its commission.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the
RTC?

2. Whether or not the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo?

3. Whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo was defective?

4. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua’s
right to the presumption of his innocence?

HELD:

Although a Petition for Review on Certiorari is usually limited to the

determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo explicitly allows the review by the SC of questions of fact or of law or of both.

1. Yes, the SC held that Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving

petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ
of amparothe observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced disappearance
is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked
to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to
bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Here, Regina fully discharged her duty to present
substantial evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay before the NBI, whereby an eyewitness detailed the
events of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon was consistent and credible in itself.

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting
himself as another victim of the same abduction. Yet, he did not furnish details of the
abduction that would have given to the investigators firm leads to quickly corner the
perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His
omission was fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the abduction
by issuing a blanket denial. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful in light
of Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the leader of the
perpetrators of the abduction.
Thirdly, Pascua’s version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no
consideration. For one, he could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle
that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such inability was
uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him.

Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses to corroborate the allegation on the

occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the
person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.

2. No, the SC held that the CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence.
The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various
operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not
thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly
continuous searches had been conducted.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the
RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s
whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-
compliant in that regard.

3. No, the SC held that the petition for the writ of amparo was not defective. Section 5
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the petition for the
writ of amparo. The said section did not require e petition to state the probable
whereabouts of the victim.

The SC clarified that the application and implementation of the rule of amparo adopted
in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its being
patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries, particularly those in
Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo promulgated by the Court should not
be wholly dependent on how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have been
implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are only best
practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all.

4. No, the SC held that the issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair Pascua’s right
to the presumption of innocence. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the
guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are
meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate
remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption
of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due
process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Art. 343. Consented abduction. The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs, shall be
punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.2

Elements.

1. That the offended party must be a virgin.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender.

4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

RUSTAN ANG v. CA
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

FACTS:

Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish
decided to break up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a live‐in partner whom
he had gotten pregnant. Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish
to elope with him. Irish, however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.
He used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text
messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. On June 5, 2005, Irish received
through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face
superimposed on the figure. The sender's cellphone number was one of the numbers
that Rustan used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages
from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous
pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through the internet. Irish
sought the help of the police in apprehending Rustan. Under police supervision, she
contacted Rustan and asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort.

When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They
searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi
ka kasi!". Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him to help her
identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the
sender's number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that
he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from
his cellphone. According to him, this explained why the obscene messages appeared
to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself
who sent the obscene picture to him.

The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The trial court found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s MR. Rustan
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term
is defined in R.A. 9262; and

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in
this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

HELD:

1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that
the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

a. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;

b. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts

of harassment against the woman; and

c. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.

Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a

situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. Rather, it used the noun "romance"
to describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair. The law itself distinguishes a
sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Section 3(e) defines
"dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to
a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child."
The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a
sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. An "away‐bati" or a fight‐and‐
kiss thing between two lovers does not mean that the romantic relation between the
two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates
into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined
based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her
legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face, was clearly an obscene picture
and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in
the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a
picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture
with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.

Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,

abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.

Prosecution of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of

lasciviousness.

1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by the

offended spouse.

2. Seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness must be prosecuted

upon complaint signed by —

a. offended party,

b. her parents,

c. grandparents, or

d. guardians in the order in which they are named above.

PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen)

and respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were
married at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and
had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling. The private respondent
initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local court
in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouse. On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a
trial court in Manila. After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
the complaint for adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner
had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married. Petitioner
filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against
her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing
to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action tenable?

HELD:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is
logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status
and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and,
such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.
Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality
principle under the Civil Code on the matter of civil status of persons. Private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.

Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Persons guilty
of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced:

1. To indemnify the offended woman;

2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so
doing;

3. In every case to support the offspring

Art. 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons

entrusted with the custody of the offended party. The ascendants, guardians,
curators, teachers, and any person who, by abuse of authority or confidential
relationship, shall cooperate as accomplices in the perpetration of the crimes
embraced in chapters second, third and fourth of this title, shall be punished as
principals.

Persons who cooperate as accomplices but are punished as principals in rape,

seduction, abduction, etc.

They are:
 (1) Ascendants,

(2) Guardians,

(3) Curators,

(4) Teachers, and

(5) Any other person, who cooperates as accomplice with abuse of authority or
confidential relationship.

Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child. The simulation of births and
the substitution of one child for another shall be punished by prision mayor1 and a fine
of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Acts punished under Art. 347.

1. Simulation of births.

2. Substitution of one child for another.

3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such child
to lose its civil status.

Art. 348. Usurpation of civil status. The penalty of prision mayor3 shall be imposed
upon any person who shall usurp the civil status of another, should he do so for the
purpose of defrauding the offended party or his heirs; otherwise, the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods4 shall be imposed.

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor1 shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Elements:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO MENDOZA

G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017

FACTS:
During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Ricote, together with the CI, met the
appellant in a sari-sari store and the CI introduced P02 Ricote as a buyer of marijuana.
Appellant then told PO2 Ricote that the price per teabag of marijuana was ₱50.00 to
which the latter agreed to buy 4 teabags. Appellant then took out from his right pocket
the four teabags of suspected dried marijuana leaves and handed them to PO2 Ricote
who, in tum, gave the marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills to the former. PO2
Ricote then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal, and PO3 Parena, who was
inside a parked vehicle which was three meters away from the sari-sari store,
immediately run to help in arresting appellant.
Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he, together with friends, were along
the road, repairing a pedicab. When they all went to a sari-sari store to rest, they were
joined by a certain Andy Makabenta. He then saw the arrival of a white vehicle and a
motorcycle with two people riding on it. A person alighted from the motorcycle and
held the wrist of Makabenta, while another police officer alighted from the vehicle and
pointed to him saying "you also apprehend that.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale of marijuana?

HELD:
Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following
elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and. the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.34 What
is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.
In this case, PO2 Ricote, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the seller
of the four teabags of suspected marijuana and to whom he handed the marked two
pieces of one hundred peso bills as payment therefor. The substance sold by appellant
to PO2 Ricote was sent for analysis and upon the examination, it showed that the four
teabags yielded a positive result for marijuana, a dangerous drug. The marijuana was
presented to the court and was identified by PO2 Ricote to be the marijuana he bought
from appellant based on the markings he made thereon.
Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods2 shall be imposed upon any person
who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall
contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied
with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.

Elements:

1. That the offender contracted marriage.

2. That he knew at the time that —

a. the requirements of the law were not complied with; or

b. the marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.