Mind Association

The "Polytheism" of Plato: An Apologia

Author(s): A. E. Taylor
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 47, No. 186 (Apr., 1938), pp. 180-199
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2249877
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 III.-THE " POLYTHEISM " OF PLATO: AN
APOLOGIA.
BY A. E. TAYLOR.
LIKE otherstudentsof Plato, I have recentlybeen readingwith
much enjoyment,and I hope muchprofit, Prof.F. M. Cornford's
valuable translationof and commentary on the Timaeus (Plato's
Cosmology, 1937). Neithermy enjoymentnor my profithas, I
trust,been seriouslydisturbedby the fact that I myself,as a
recentcommentator on and translatorof the dialogue,come in,
in the courseof the volume,fora good deal of adversecriticism.
It is true that I may be inclinedto thinkthat Mr. Cornfordat
timesoverdoeshis flagellations, perhapsfroma pious anxietyto
carry out the apostolic injunctionto reproveboth " in season
and out of season ". His polemic,I think,at timesdisguisesan
agreementbetweenus on essential points which is not much
alfectedby the more superficialdivergenceswhichhe prefersto
dwellupon. But in the main I have no reasonto take objection
to his procedure. How is advance to be made in Platonic
exegesis except by correctionof one another's oversightsand
mistakes,and who is the naturaltargetof the latest expositorof
the Timaeus but his immediateprecursor ? I shouldin any case
have expectedto findmyselfa principalobject of Mr. Cornford's
animadversions; I make no complaintof them,and I do not
doubt that a fairnumberof themwill prove to have been fully
deserved,since,in the memorablewordsof Johnson,it is certain
that a " falliblebeing will fail somewhere ". But thereis one
standinggrievanceagainst me urged withsome vehemenceall
throughPlato's Cosmology, whichappears to me to rest in the
main upon prejudiceand misconception, and, at the same time,
to be a matteroftoo much importanceto be simplypassed over
withoutany replyfromthe incriminated party; and it is of this
that I would speak brieflyin these pages.
The accusationis made fromthe outsetin the Preface(p. xi),
whereI am said to make all throughmy own Commentary the
" suggestion thatPlato " (or Timaus ?) " is a monotheist,and not
farfrombeinga Christian". " The Demiurge", it is added, " is
not fully recognisedas a mythicalfigure,but creditedwith
A. E. TAYLOR: " POLYTHEISM OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 181

attributesbelongingto the Creatorof Genesis or even to the

God of the New Testament." And the reader is referredto a
footnoteto my treatmentof Tim. 29d, 30c and 69c 3 forillustra-
tions. I will deal directlywith the particularpassages thus
incriminated;forthe momentI would make some remarkson
the wav in whichthe main accusationis formulatedwhereit is'
firstintroduced.
Manifestly,I should have said, two things are both true:
that there are points of contact betweenChristianity and the
religiousteachingof Plato, and there are points of difference.
The realityof the differences will, of course,be insistedon at
once by Mr. Cornford, and has neverfora momentbeen denied
by me.' That pointsof contactare also there,I conceiveeven
Mr. Cornford himselfmust admit. If theywere not there,how
could we explain the place given to Plato in the Christian
Theismof Clement,of Origen,of Augustine,or the " Cambridge
Platonists", or again the carping depreciationof Christianity
itselfby Nietzscheas no morethan Platonismus fiursVolk? Mr.
Cornford, I take it, wouldnot denythe resemblances, and I have
no desire to deny the differences.The only point which can
reallybe in disputebetweenus is the precisenatureand extent
of,these resemblancesand differences, and a conclusionon that
issue is only to be reachedby a carefulexaminationof details,
not by a " slap-dash" pronouncement like that whichI have
quoted.
I note again that in the pronouncement itselfthereis a certain
ambiguityas to the maingravamenof the charge. Is my crime
(1) that I wronglyimaginePlato as a ' Monotheist', or (2) that
I do not recognisethe " mythical" characterof his Demiurge,
or (3) thatI transfer to theDemiurgecertainunspecified character-
isticstakenfromthebook ofGenesisorfromtheNew Testament?
It would be perfectlypossible to do any one of these things
withoutdoingthe others,and I am not surewhetherI am being
called on to answerone articleof impeachmentor three,or, if
three,whichis supposedto be the head and frontofthe offending.
1 Some remarkswillbe foundon them,forexample,in connection with
the treatmentof Plato, in my article" Theism" in the Encyclopaedia of
Religionand Ethics,whereI have been careful,while insistingon the
significanceof Plato's Theism,to remarkthat his God is " not altogether
all that Christianthinkershave meant by the Supreme." (I did not
meanmerely, whatis naturallyobvious,thatPlato's Godhas notcharacters
whichChristianthinkers have generallyagreedin regarding as onlyknow-
able to us by a specifichistorical'revelation', but that he mustnot be,
withoutmoreado, assumedto have all the characters Christian theologians
and philosophers have oftenregardedas demonstrable by " the lightof
naturalreason".)
182 A. E. TAYLOR:

A littlemorelightwill, no doubt, be thrownon the matterby

considerationof the stricturesto be made in dealing with the
passages mentionedin the foot-note. But beforeI come to
them,I may be allowed to make one or two remarksabout the
generalindictment.
(1) As to 'Monotheism', at this stage of the argument,I will
merelyobservethat a comparisonwith page 30 seems to show
that my crime consists in renderingPlato's repeated OEOs'
(withoutthe article)by ' God ' (witha capitalletter),ratherthan
'the God' (a renderingI not unnaturallypreferred to keep for
OEos}1 This, it appears,is to forgetthat Plato was a 'pagan
polytheist'(oc. cit.). But now,just what is a 'pagan', and just
whatis a ' polytheist'? If everyone is a ' pagan ' whohas never
heard of,or does not accept,a writtenCanonicalScripture,and if
everyone is a polytheistwho uses the wordsOEoQ,di, gods,in the
plural,no doubt Plato is a ' pagan polytheist'. But the word
'pagan', as we use it to-day,has cometo have an ethicalsignifi-
cance whichmakes it almost as misleadingto call AZschylusor
Plato 'pagans' as it wouldbe to call themreligieux.2 And what
does 'polytheist' mean ? If Plato is a ' polytheist'because he
speaksof ot OEo as wellas of 0oEs,is Newtona polytheistbecause
he maintainsin the famousScholiumgeneraleat the end of the
Principia that " deity" consistsin dominatio entisspiritualis,and
actuallyappendsa noteexplainingthatthe " Gentiles" wereonly
wrongin callingdeceased princesgodsbecause,in theircase, the
dominiumis absent? Was Miltona " polytheist" because he
but I have tried,as faras
1 It is not possibleto attainrigidconsistency,
Englishidiomwill permit,to make my usage in the matterconformto
Plato's own. In point of fact, the commonGreek T OEEovitself seems to me
to have muchthe same " monotheistic " flavouras the eighteenth-century
English " the Deity". Are we to creditall the English writerswho,
apparentlyfromfear of "anthropomorphism ", preferredto say "the
Deity" ratherthan " God " withbeingpolytheists ? On the otherhand,
is it not rightlygenerallyrecognised that the driftof the thoughtbothof
ABschylus and of Euripidesabout To' OEov is " monotheistic" in spite of
the constantappearanceof the Oeol of currentmythologyamongtheir
dramatispersonae?
2 If thereare two thingsregularly impliedabout a man when he is
currently calleda pagan,theyare (1) thathe rejectsthe wholeconception
of the supremesignificance of the moralvalues and a divine'government
of the world' in accordwiththem,and (2) that,in consequence,he extols
the followingof " blood-instincts ", especiallyin mattersconnectedwith
sex, as againstthe inhibitions of disciplineand " convention ". On both
pointsPlato is on the side of the Christiansand againstthe " pagan
The kind of poetrypermittedin his State would have a strongfamily
resemblanceto the " psalms of Galilaeans" whichmoved the scorn of
Swinburne. In a word,a " pagan" is worldly,whereasit is the standing
complaintagainstPlato thathe is so other-worldly.
 THE " POLYTHEISM OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 183

used the word gods of his fallen angels? Indeed, was Christ
himselfa polytheistwhen he called attentionto a passage in
whicha psalmist" called them gods to whomthe word of God
came " ? Or is Plato's polytheismsupposedto be shownnot so
muchby languageabout GEoQ as by thefactthatin his sketchofa
cultusforthe city of the Laws he providesa numerousbody of
recipientsof worship? He does so, but they are not more
ntumerous than the saintsand angelswho figurein the Calendars
ofgreatChristianChurchesand are certainlythe objectsofsome-
thingwhichcan fairlybe called cultus.
It seemsto me thatthetruthis not onlythat,as has oftenbeen
remarked,the question whetherthere is only one " God " or
morethan one was neverfeltto be primaryby a typicallyGreek
thinker,but furtherthat the real and importantdistinction
betweenwhat is essentiallypolytheismand what is not must be
drawnwhere,forinstance,St. Thomasdrawsit. Whereworship
is givento a pluralityof beingswho are supposedto be indepen-
denitof one another,and possiblyhostileto one another,thereis
real fundamentalpolytheism. Where the beings to whom
worshipis addressedare conceivedas under the sovereigntyof
a singlesupremewill and intelligence,of whichthe rest are the
subordinateministersand executants,thereyou have at least an
implicitmonotheism. It is on this ground that St. Thomas
regards the ancient philosophersas much nearer to the true
conceptionofDeitythantheManichaeans(S.C.G. 1, 42 adfin.: hac
autem veritaterepellunturGentiles,deorunm multitudinemcon-
fitentes;quamvisplureseorumunumdeumessesummumdicerent,
a quo omnesalios quos deos nominabantcreatos esse asserebant,
omnibussubstantiissempiternisdivinitatisnomen adscribentes,
et praecipue ratione sapientiae et felicitatiset rerumguber-
nationis. Quae quidem consuetudo loquendi etiam in sacra
Scripturainvenitur,dum sancti Angeli aut etiam hominesvel
iudices dii nominantur.. . . Unde magis huic veritatividentur
contrariiManichaei,duo primaprincipiaponentesquorumaltera
alteriuscausa non sit.) And,in fact,it mightfairlybe contended
thatin IEschylus,forexample,the relationof Apollo and Athena
to Zeus as the executorsorrevealersofhis purposesdoes not differ
in principlefromthat ofthe angelsofChristiantheologiesto God.
But if we drawthe line of distinctionhere,thereis, I conceive,
no doubt on whichside of it Plato is to be found. In the story
of Timaeus,the lower 'visible' gods (the heavenlybodies) are
made by the Demiurge (40a), who addresses them (41a)--for
argument's sake I adopt withoutprejudice the reading and
renderingof Mr. Cornfordhimself-as " beings whereofI am
184 A. E. TAYLOR:

themakerand of worksthefather". The " invisible" gods, the

figuresof the currenttheogoniesare all said to be offspring
(40e) of Earth and Heaven, and Earth and Heaven have already
been describedas made by the same artificer. So in the tenth
book of the Laws the Platonic theodicyturnson the point that
" our King" ,(904a) has " contrivedto post each severalitem"
ofthe community of souls " so as to providemostutterly,easily,
and wellforthetriumphofvirtueand routofvice throughout the
whole". Clearlyit is meant at least that thereis nowherein
the universeany independentpowerwhichcan cause this divine
purposeto fail of its intent. This being so, to allow Plato to
speak of God (withthe capital letter)is, I submit,to run much
less risk of falsifying his thoughtthan to call him a " pagan
polytheist."1
Again,it cannotbe made the basis fordiscrimination between
Plato and Christianity that the Demiurge of the Timaeus is a
" mythicalfigure", whereasthe God of Christianity is not. For
though the language used about the Demiurge, when he is
describedas mixingcertainingredientsin a Kpac7p and com-
poundingthe bvXy of the universe,or the rationalsouls of men,
fromthem,as deliveringan orationto the " createddivinities",
or as sowingthe souls whichhe has fashioned,like crops,in the
earth and the planets,is, of course,franklypictorialimagery
applied to the unimaginable,and so " mythical" in the Platonic
senseofthe wordthe Demiurgeofthe storystandsforsomething
-a supremerational and righteouspurposiveagent operative
throughoutthe whole of the universe-whichPlato regardsas
no fancybut the most tremendousof realities,as Mr. Cornford,
withthe naturaltheologyof the Laws beforehis eves, of course
1 Or,I wouldask,ifwe are to deal in thesehardand fastdiscriminations,
was Plotinusa " polytheist " and was he a " pagan " ? If you meanby
the wordsonlythathe admitteda pluralityof beingswhomhe called OmoL,
and made no objectionto the official cultusof the Roman state,he was
a polytheist. But it wouldproducea completely false impressionif we
said that the difference betweenPlotinusand Origenis that Plotinusis a
worshipper of manygods,Origenof onlyone. The real personalreligion
of Plotinus consistedin a life-longeffortafter " unification " with an
objectofworship,thetranscendent " One," by comparison withwhichthe
Deus unusettrinusof Origenand theCreedsmightbe said to be " many".
And similarlyto call Plotinus a "pagan " would conveya completely
falseimpression as to the pointsofresemblance and disagreement between
his ethicsand those of the ChristianChurchof the thirdcentury. It
mightfairlybe said that,fromthe Christian pointofview,the chiefdefect
in his ethicsis that he sets too exclusivea value on the " cathartic" (as
Hume wouldcall them,the " monkish") virtues,and under-rates thoseof
the ordinarygood neighbourand citizen. Here he is, if anything,not
pagan enough.
 THE " POLYTHEISM OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 185

fullyadmits. And on the otherside, the real " non-mythical "

characterof the God of the Old Testamentor of Christianitv
does not mean that Jew or Christiancan avoid the constant
use of pictorialand, in the Platonic sense," mythical" language
in describingthe divine activities. When the apostle, for
example,says that " we shall all standbeforethe judgement-seat
of Christ", he meansto be assertinga factof suprememoment;
but can we suppose that the judgement-seatwas, even to the
writer'sown mind,more than an imaginativesymbol? that he
thoughtofit as a literalbenchof wood or stone,? Liber scriptus
Ex quomundusjudicetur;butdid a divineoftheMiddle
proferetur,
Ages ever suppose that recordto be made withactual ink on
actual paper or parchment? Christ,the Creedsassert,is sitting
" at therighthandoftheFather", but in whatage ofChristianity
has it ever been imaginedthat the Father,in any literalsense,
has a righthand or a left? 1 The differences, whatevertheyare,
between Plato's conceptionof God and the Christian,do not
arise fromthe presenceof "myth " in Plato and its absence
from the language of Christians; they must be differences
betweenthe entirelynon-mythical realitiesforwhichthe parties
take the word God or 0E0o'sto stand,a point to which I shall
shortlvreturn.2
Once more,the accusationthat I have importedinto Plato
1 Or again does any Jewor Christian(not beingan American" Funda-
mentalist") imaginethat thereis nothing" mythical" in the description
of God as extractinga rib fromthe side of Adam and makingit into a
woman,as layingaside " in thesky" thebow whichHe has been wielding
duringtheDeluge,as " comingdown" to Sodonito seeforHimselfwhether
the misconductof the inhabitantsis as grave as has been reported,as
" lookingontheEgyptiansoutofthepillarofcloud" andsoforth? Johnson
was traditionally orthodoxenoughforany man, but he had the sense to
tell someone whomade difficulties about the destruction of Sennacherib's
army," you are not to supposethat the angelof the Lord knockedthem
on thehead,man by man".
2 By sayingthatthedivinevovs, ofwhichtheDemiurgeis the imaginative
symbolis itselfa non-mythical real agent,I do not, of course,mean to
prejudgethe difficult questionhow this vovs is related to the Pvx^ of
the universe. CertainlyI believe that, with the whole of the Opera
Platonis beforeus, we cannotwellholdthatPlato meanssimplyto identify
thetwo,and on thatpointat least,it seemsto me thatI have the support
of M. Robin in the difficultpages of his Platon (244-252) whichdeal with
" the Platonic Deity" (though,unfortunately, M. Robin (op. cit., 248)
fallsintothe time-honoured mistake,rightlyavoidedby Mr. Cornford, of
translating lKdV -ro voT-oD cO'S, alu9ros (Tim., 92, a, 7) as though it
meant " a god perceptibleto sense,an image of the intelligiblegod ",
whereasit clearlymeans " an image of the intelligible
~4oov". Editors
woulddo well to repunctuatethe whole clause thus,4Coovoparov -ra opara
7replEXov, E&KWV TOVVOqTOV , fO'os aa0,q-7-O'S).
186 A. E. TAYLOR:

ideas foreignto him borrowedfromthe Old or New Testament

must,no doubt, be tested by an impartialexaminationof the
evidencewhichis offered later,but it is unconsciously prejudging
the issue to introducea preliminary referenceto the "cCreator"
of Genesis. The suggestion,I take it, is that God, in the nar-
ratives of Genesis-I do not know whetherthis means the
narrativeof the Priestercodex (Gen. I), or the more primitive
story of " JE " (Gen. II)-really is a Creator,but that the
Demiurgeof the Timaeus is not representedas creating,but as
arranginghis material,whichmust,therefore, be supposedto be
pre-existent.Now ifthisis whatis meant,I wouldobservethat
in theBiblical,as in the Platonic,storiesas told,thereis naturally
no explanationof the originof the material. If the Demiurge
in the Timaeus storyis said to " take over" certainmaterialsin
a chaoticstate and reducethemto order,it is equally not clear
fromthe langugcye of Genesisthat the writersoriginallyintended
to say that the " void and formlessinfinite " was itselfcreated
ex nihilo. That it was so is the Christiandogma, but it is
another question whetherthe dogma, however true, can be
extractedfromthe wordsof the narrativesalone.' On the other
hand,sinceMr. Cornford is at one withme in rejectingthe inter-
pretationaccordingto whichTimeaus'spictureof the worldas it
was beforeGod had reduced it to order,representsa state of
thingswhichwas ever actual, he cannotarguethat the wordsof
the Timaeus compelus to believe in a divinitywho merely
arrangespre-existing" material" of some kind. At most he is
entitledto say that in his own opinionthe narrativesof Genesis
ascribea moreunrestricted causalityto God thanthat of Timeaus
does to theDemiurge,and thepointofhiscriticism is consequently
blunted. It is bluntedstillmorewhenit is observedthat in no
passage whichhe can citefromme have I everused thetechnical
expression(which I was, indeed,carefulto avoid) " creationex
nihilo" in speakingof the cosmologicalstoryof the Timaeus.2
1 In the JE narrativethe verbused forthe divineactionis simplythe
ordinarywordfor " to make", which,of course,impliesnothingabout
the originof the material. The P storyuses a different verb; whether
this is intendedto conveythe notionof creationex nihilois a question
for Hebrewphilologists.In any case, thoughI have spokenof Plato's
Demiurgeas a Creator,as Plato himselfcalls him a 7rotofr
js-,I have never
-in my life spoken of him as creatingthe world ex nihilo. Where his
" materials" come fromis a question I have left unraised,as Plato
himselfseemsto me to have done.
2 In speakingof the Demiurgeof the Timceus as a " creator", I meant
to indicatethat I do not regardhim as a " mythical" doublette of the
ozpavos or its Ovx-(as, e.g.,Archer-Hind
did), withoutcommitting myself
by thewordto anydecisionon thefurther questionwhether he is supposed
to createex nihilo.
 THE " POLYTHEISM" OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 187

I believe, however,that, so far as the complaintabout im-

portationsfrom Genesis is concerned,what is reallv in Mr.
Cornford'smindis explainedby the footnoteto page 27. Here
he quotes me as sayingthat the meaningof creationin Christian
theologyis " that the physicalworlddoes not exist in its own
right,but depends on a really self-existing being, God, for its
existence", and retortsthat " myriadsof Jewsand Christianrs "
have believedandldo believein a temporalbeginningofthe world.
The suggestionis that " creation" implies an antecedenttime
when therewas no world,and that I am therefore inconsistent
with myselfin both speakingof Plato's Demiurgeas a creator
and accepting,withMr. Cornford himself,the standingAcademic
view that Plato believedin no such time beforethe worldwas.
But hereI mustpersist,withall respect,in holdingthat my own
utterancesare perfectlyconsistentand that Mr. Cornfordhas
simplyfalleninto error. It is true,as he says, that myriadsof
Jews and Christianshave believed,and do believe,in a " first
momentof creation". But theirreasonforthe beliefis notthat
theythinkcreationab aeternoan intrinsicimpossibility, but that
theyregardit as false on the strengthof the " revelation" made
in the openingwordsof GenesisI.
The positionof St. Thomas on this matteris perfectlyclear,
and it has been made by his argumentsgenerallydominant
among Christiantheologianswho adhereto the traditionalview
of the inerrancyof Scripture. St. Thomas held that it can be
strictlyprovedwithoutany appeal to theologicalauthoritythat
the worldoriginatedby creation,and that creationmeans the
completecausation of the wholerealityof that whichis said to
have been created. (De potentia,Q. 3, art. 1. Tenendumest
firmiterquod Deus potestfacerealiquid ex nihilo et facit. ...
Unde per suam actionem producittotum ens subsistensnullo
praesupposito,utpotequi est totiusesse principium,et secundum
se totum. Et haec eius actio vocatur creatio.)' At the same
1 The " proof" oftheproposition quodDeus ex nihiloproduxitresin esse
is givenat full lengthin S.C.G. II, 16. It claimsto be a philosophical
demonstration, and, as usual in the S.C.G., whichwas intendedto be of
service to missionariesamong the " Gentiles", no appeal is made to
Biblicalauthority exceptthat,whenthedemonstration has beenconcluded,
we are toldthatourresultis confirmed by thewordsof GenesisI, 1. The
question whetherthe created world has always existed is discussed
separately(II, 31-37),and the conclusionreachedis simplythat " there
is nothingto forbidthe assumptionmade by the CatholicFaith that the
worldhas not always existed"; in II, 38 the argumentsproducedby
" some" to provethatthe world musthave had a beginning are reviewed
and pronouncedinconclusive," non de necessitateconcludunt,licet
probabilitatem habeant". Cf.W. R. Inge,Godand theAstronomers, p. 242,
188 A. E. TAYLOR:

time,he caused a veritablesensationby the essay de aeternitate

mundi,in whichhe set himselfexpresslyto refutethe previously
currentattemptsof earlierschoolmento prove the necessityof
a firstmomentof creation,and to showthat, so faras reasonis.
concerned, thefactthattheuniverseis a createdthingis perfectly
compatiblewithits havingalways been in existence. We know,
he said, that it has notalwaysbeen there,but we onlyknowthis
fromthe authoritativedeclarationof God himselfin the Penta-
teuch that " in the beginningGod made heaven and earth".
The questionforphilosophy, he says,is this: utrumesse creatumn
a Deo secundumtotam substantiam,et non habere durationis
principiumrepugnentad invicem,vel non. Quod autem non
repugnentsic ostenditur,and he proceedsto developehis argu-
ments. Thus in distinguishing betweena created thingand a,
thingwhichmustnecessarilyhave had a beginningI am at least
in good company. I do not complainthat Mr. Cornfordshould
apparentlynot know the Thomisticpositionin the matter,but
I am surprisedthat he shouldhave writtenas thoughthe belief
of ordinaryJewsand Christianshas been based on anythingbut
acquiescencein an authoritative" revelation". (I trustit willbe
clear that my appeal to St. Thomasin this matteris not meant
in any way to suggestthat his view must be the correctone.
If I had thoughtthat in commenting on the Timaeus I had any
rightto introducemy ownpersonalopinion,suchas it is, on such
a topic, I should have stated that, rightlyor wrongly,it does
seem to me at least the probableview that the universehad a,
" beginning", but I should have thoughtit an impertinence to
dwellon thepoint.' And I mayadd thatforany one whoregards
the questionas one to be settledby the authorityof Scripture,
independentlyof philosophicalargument,it would always be
possibleto combinethe doctrineof creationwith the assertion
that the world has always been in existence,by adoptingthe
Augustinianinterpretation of the words Ev acpXii,in principio,
accordingto whicb the " beginning"? meant is not a "first
moment", but the divine Word or Wisdom itself; ipsum est
verbumtuum,quod et principiumest (Confessions, XI, viii, 10).
I come now to considercertainmore specificstricturesmade
by Prof.Cornford in the courseof his commentary. I may deal
thoughI thinkhe is goingtoo far whenhe says that the positionwhich
St. Thomasacceptedon theauthorityofScripture
was clearly" unwelcome
to him ".
1 And likewiseif I had thoughtit rightto importone's own personal
opinionsabout themeaningof " omnipotence " intothediscussion
it would
have beenfoundthat mine,forwhattheyare worth,are,provisionally at
any rate,moremoderatethanthoseof eitherScotistsor Thomists.
 THE "POLYTHEISM" OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 189

firstwiththosewhichare made in connectionwiththe exposition

of Tim. 29e ff. Timseusis hereprofessing to explain-I give his
wordsas Mr. Cornfordrendersthem-why " becomingand this
universewere framedby him who framedthem". The reason
for this is said to be that " he was good; and in the good no
jealousy in any matter can ever arise. So, being without
jealousy,he desiredthatall thingsshouldcomeas nearas possible
to beinglikehimself". In myowncommentI had firstremarked
that " jealousy" does not quite unambiguouslyreproducethe
forceof Plato's word 0&0vos',whichmeans, to speak morepre-
cisely,the " dog-in-the-manger " temperwhichdesiresto engross
all that is good to one's self. I went on to say " just because
God is good, He does-notkeep His blessednessselfishly to Him-
self. He seeks to make somethingelse as muchlike Himselfin
goodness." (Here I regretthat by an oversightthe words" as
possible" have somehowfallenout ofmytext after" Himself".)
" It is of the verynatureof love and goodnessto ' overflow'".
The remarks,observesmy critic,are misleading. For (1) the
use of the capital letterin the wordGod suggeststhat Plato was
a monotheist,whereasin fact he believedin the divinityof the
world and of the heavenlybodies. (2) The Epinomis contem-
plates a cult of theseheavenlybodies. (3) The Demiurgeis not
an 'object of worship' or a 'religious figure', and therefore
mustnot " be equated withthe one God ofthe Bible,whocreated
the wholeworldout of nothing,and is also the supremeobject of
worship". (4) " Still less is therethe slightestwarrantin Greek
thoughtof the pre-Christian centuriesfor the notionof ' over-
flowinglove ', or love of any kind,promptinga god to make a
world." Now as to (1) and as to the clause about creatinga
world"out of nothing", I thinkI have alreadysaid sufficiently
all that I have to say. With regardto (2) and to what is said in
(3) about an " object of worship", a " religiousfigure'", I should
like to draw a necessarydistinguo. What is meant here by an
"object of worship"? It is true enough,and I presumeMr.
Cornfordwouldnot disputemy acquaintancewiththe fact,that
no provisionis made in the cult of the citycontemplatedin the
Laws and Epinomisforpublic worshipof any deities,superiorto
the heavenlybodies and the patronsof the city and its various
divisions. It is not even clear to me that the Epinomis con-
templatesany public ritesin honourof the Ov'pavo's' as distin-
guishedfromthe heavenlybodies it contains,and the Laws says
nothingof any such ritualin honourof " our King " or of "the
best soul ". But is it meant that the feelingsbetrayed by
Plato's languagein all these dialoguestowardsthe " makerand
190 A. E. TAYLOR:

fatherof all ", "the King ", " the best soul " are not specifically
emotionsof religiousveneration? The questionis not simplyto
whomor what does Plato expectthe citizensof " Magnesia" to
do public worship,but rather,whom or what does Plato in his
own view adore as the summumnumen. Every readermust,no
doubt,answerthisquestionforhimself,accordingto the personal
impressionwhichthe Platonicutterancesmake upon him,and no
one reader can expect to demonstrateto anotherthat his own
interpretationof the mind of Plato is the one " objective'
interpretation.I must be content to record my own deep
impressionthat the language with which Plato speaks of that
suprememorallyrighteousintelligenceforwhich the Demiurge
stands in the Timaeus, and the apcrr'a OavXryin the Laws, is
chargedwitha deep emotionof a kind whichcan onlybe called
religious. If there is on my side a possible danger of reading
too muchinto Plato, thereis, I am convinced,a worsedangerof
evacuatinghis profoundest meaningin such a note as that which
Mr. Cornford writeson page 35 of his book, wherethe Demiurge
of Timaeusis all but equated withbeingslike the Baiame of the
Australians,superannuated" makers" who at some distanttime
constructed theworldand have now" retiredfromactiveservice".
A comparisonof thiskind simplyignoresthat moralgovernment
of men and the universewhichis as prominent in the Timaeusas
it is in the Laws, and wouldhave been stillmoreprominent ifthe
Critiashad not remainedthe fragmentwhichit is.'
The point which I have numbered(4) calls for rathermore
remark. It does not seemto have occurredto Mr. Cornford that
in the sentenceto whichhe takes exceptionI was intendingan
allusionnot only to the sayingsof the Christianmysticsabout
the love which" cannotbe idle ", but to the Neo-Platonicthesis
that the supreme " One ", which is also the "Good ", mtust,
because it is " more than full" (v'7rp-ErA-qpES) "overflow ". It
is just because it is good that it "flows over". Timaeustells us
that it is a sufficient answerto the questionwhythe Demiurge
should " make " at all, to say that he is good, and therefore will
not keep his goodnessas a solitarypossessionforhimself, but will
communicateit to somethingelse. Thereis, as it seemsto me,
a real analogybetweenthisthoughtof a goodnesswhichwill not
let its possessorbe contentwiththe havingof it to himself,and
the laterthought,to whichI alluded,of the " love whichcannot
1For it is plain that the moralpurposeof " the God of gods Zeus "
to chastenthe 5fipts,
of the Atlantidoe
was to be the motifof the whole
story. It was to be not onlyan eulogyofthe virtueofprehistoric
Athens
but the recordof a divine" mightyact ".
 THE " POLYTHEISM OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 191

be idle ", and I holdthat I was justifiedin indicatingthe analogy.

That thereis morethan an analogyI did not say and do not say.
In fact,I thinkit quite clear wherethe fundamentaldifference
comes in. That thereis a sense in which God loves man, His
creature,is a thoughtwhich, as I hold, cannot be denied to
Plato withoutmakingnonsenseof,forexample,the eloquenceof
the Republicon the text that the just man is 0EoqtA'soand the
unjust 0O,EoVt rJs (X, 612e), and many anotherpassage in the
dialoguesofsimilarpurport. It was not reservedforChristianity
to " reveal" it to the worldthat " the righteousLord loveththe
righteous". But in the Platonic dialogues,as in much of the
Old Testament,a' man has firstto make himselfan object
deservingof God's regardby being righteousbeforehe becomes
OEoqtAjs. The novelty by which Christianitycaused infinite
scandalto therespectableofthe ancientworldwas its declaration
that the " righteousLord " loves the sinnerand the unrighteous.
and has set himselfto win theirlove at an infinitecost. " He
firstloved us ", " whilewe wereyet sinners,Christdied forus ".L
Wheneveryou come upon the thoughtof the prevenient graceof
God, you are dealingwith somethingnew in Christianity which
had its anticipationsin Hebrew prophecy,but not in Greek
philosophy,and I do not think I can be justly charged with
having overlookedthe fact. CertainlyI did not dwell on the
point in commentingon the Timaeus; I thoughtthat to do so
would have been both irrelevant,and in view of the familiarity
of the fact, superfluous.It appears from Prof. Cornford's
stricturesthat I was mistakenin my judgement. But the error
ofjudgement,ifit was an error,seemsto me a venialone. Prof.
Cornford's anxietyto divestthe wordsofhis " pagan polytheist"
of all possibleresemblancesto anythingChristianseemsto me to
lead to a gravererrorin the other direction. He emptiesthe
statement,that the goodnessof the Demiurgeis the explanation
of the existenceoftheuniverse,ofits significance, and the " most.
characteristic revelationsof the Founderof Christianity " (p. 35)
of the verythingwhichis mostcharacteristic ofthem.2
I Celsus,for example,makes a special point of
complainingthat the
ranksof the Christiansare recruitedfromthe criminaland disreputable
classes. He thinks,in fact, that if Christwere divine,he should have
cometo call not sinners,but the just menwho need no repentance. If I
had anywhereprofessed to findthe redeeming and sanctifyinglove of the
ChristianGod in Plato, I own I shoulddeserveMr. Cornford'srebukes.
The great" new" declarationof the Gospelwas not that God has created
theworldand caresforit, butthatHe has " sentredemptionto hispeople".
2 J grantat oncethat if I had shownthe slightestdesireto imitatethe
earlyFatherswho foundthe ChristianTrinity,or something verylike it,
192 A, E. TAYLOR:

There is a furtherpolemic against myself,closelyconnected

with the same general subject, in the part of Mr. Cornford's
commentary wherehe is discussingthemeaningofthe" necessity"
which is said at Tim. 48a and elsewhereto be a subordinate
causativefactoralongwiththeDemiurge,or " God ", or " mind"
in the constructionof the universe. On what is meant by this
ccnecessity" in the firstinstance,indeed,we seemto be in pretty
close agreement. We are both convincedthat it does not mean
anythinglike " naturallaw ", and both,I think,equally agreed
-thatwhat it does stand foris what I have called bare " brute
fact ", arrangements whichwe findto be actuallytherein things
but which cannot be seen to serve any good and reasonable
purpose,or even seem,on the face of it, to counteractsuch pur-
poses,the apparent" dysteleology " in nature,as it is sometimes
,called. This is at least what I understandPlato to mean, and
I thinkI am not wrongin sayingthat Mr. Cornford understands
him in the same sense. What Prof. Cornfordobjects to is my
furthercomrnment that even wherewe do not see " whatthe good
of" such bruLtefact is, " if we think with Timaeusand Plato
we feelsatisfiedthat it satisfiessomegood end. . . . If we could
everhavecomplete we shouldfindthatavayKn
knowledge, had
vanishedfromour account of the world." Mr. Cornfordcom-
plains (p. 165) that the remarkis due to an illegitimate" desire
-tomake Plato's Demiurgereallyomnipotent ". His own inter-
pretationis that the Demiurgeis not omnipotentbut hampered
in his proceedingsby the fact that he is dealing withmaterials
" whichhe can, withinlimits,turnto his purpose,but whichhe
did not institute". He does the best he can, in fact,and if the
best is oftenonlya poor job, we must lay the blame not on the
'well-intentioned workmanbut on his materials.
Now I admit,of course,that it is perfectlypossibleto read the
language of the dialogue in this sense. But I deny that it is
imperativethat we shoulddo so. I do not findin the Timaeus,
or anywhereelsein Plato, any morethanI findin any philosopher
or divine,an " explanation" of the existenceof " evil ", and I
in the Timaeus,I shouldrichlydeserveall Mr. Cornford has said of me.
Thereone is reallytrenching on the specialChristian" good news" of the
xredemptive actionof God. But merelyto say that Plato conceivesof the
whole" naturalorder" as expressing the consciouspurposeof a sovereign
moral intelligencewhich he describesin language which would fairly
entitleit to be called,in the terminology of a muchlater age, personal
does not seem to me to be ascribinganythingpeculiarlyChristian,or
Biblical,to him. To abstainfromsayingas muchas this,out of fearof
beingthoughtto 'modernise',seemsto me to be doingan injusticeto a
,greatreligiousthinker.
 "
THE " POLYTHEISM OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 193

do not suppose that he had one. It is Air.Cornfordwho puts

such an explanationinto Plato's mouthby makinghimsay that
the Demiurgeis doing all he can with materialswhichhe can
only veryimperfectly control. My reason forbeing dissatisfied
with this exegesisis not that I start with the conceptionof a
God who is omnipotent,in the sense of being able to do " just
anythingand everything ", and am determinedto read this
notioninto Plato at all costs. It is the very different reason
that the theoryof external" limitations" due to the incontrol-
labilityof " material" seems to me to ruin that demonstration
of the sovereigntyand finalityof the moral governmentof the
worldby " our King " on whichthe Laws lays so much stress.
If the " King " is only,to use thephraseofDescartes," a Jupiter
or a Saturn", I do notsee howPlato can speakoftheimpossibility
of escapefromhis judgementswiththetoneof absoluteassurance
whichhe does in factemploy,and I simplycannotbelievethatin
the Laws he is preaching,forpurposesof edification, a doctrine
whichhe does not reallyhold. The very wordsof my own to
which Mr. Cornfordtakes exceptiondo not seem to me to go
beyondwhatis implicitin such utterancesas thoseof Laws 903,
" For each and all thereare, in everycase, governorsappointed
of all doingand beingdone to, downto the least detail,whohave
achieved perfectioneven to the minuteparticulars.. . . Thou
hast forgottenin the business that the purpose of all that
happens is what we have said, to win bliss for the life of the
whole; it is notmadeforthee,butthouforit. For anyphysician
or craftsmanin any professiondoes all his workforthe sake of
some whole,but the part he fashionsforthe sake of the whole,
to contributeto the generalgood, not the wholeforthe part's
sake." It is just possible, no doubt, without formal logical
self-contradiction to talk thus,meaningno more than that the
" craftsman " to whomthe moralorderin the worldis due does
the best he can for" the whole", whenthe difficulties ofthetask
are fairlytakenintoaccount; but one whomeantonlythiscould
hardly,I think,ventureto speak of the outcome in the tone
of " sure and certainhope " whichpervades the whole of this
outburst. Can it reallvbe said thata studentwithsuchlanguage
in his mindis falsifying Plato's thoughtin ascribingto him-and
it is all I have ascribed to him-the beliefthat the so-called
" dysteleology " in thenaturalorderdoesafterall serve" thegood
of the whole", thoughwe may neverbe able to see how? 1
1 It may,no doubt,be said thaton Plato's ownshowing
in theLaws there
are bad soulsas wellas goodones-and wheredo thebad soulscomefrom?
As to thatI can onlysay that Plato has neveroffered
anyexplanationand
13
194 A. E. TAYLOR:

- I suspectthat Mr. Cornfordhimselfwould have scrupledless

about my language but foran unfortunate prepossessionof his
own whichis itselfa kind of theologicalprejudice. He seemsto
me to writewithhis mindfullof a rathercrudenotionof divine
omnipotence as meaningability,as I have put it,to " do anything
and everything "; to suppose mistakenlythat I mean to read
omnipotenceof thiskindinto the Timaeus,and to denouncethis
as an improper" Christianisation " of Plato. I am surethat on
reconsideration he will see that I have never creditedPlato's
" fatherand maker" withomnipotence ofthissort,and moreover
that it is not what seriousChristiandivineshave meant when
they have talked of the omnipotenceof God. The schoolmen,
for example, were all agreed that God is omnipotent,yet, as
Mansel once remindedMill,theirworksare fullofenumerations
of " thingswhichGod cannotdo ". And I remarkthat the well-
selected examples of " dysteleology " by which Mr. Cornford
illustrateshis interpretationof Plato's thoughtwill,all of them,
equally well illustratemy own. He remarks,forexample,that
"the functionof bone ", accordingto our dialogue, "is to
protectfrominjurytheseat oflife,thebrainand marrow." Bone
therefore mustbe hard,but its hardnessentails" as a necessary
but undesirableconcomitant " that it shall also be brittleand
liable to fracture. It wouldbe in itselfdesirable,again,that the
skull shouldbe protectedagainst injury,like otherparts of the
osseousstructure, by beingthickand havinga coveringof flesh.
But in that case sense-perception, and consequentlyintelligence,
would be duller. Hence our " artificers " have preferredto
sacrificethe minorbenefitsto the major (p. 175). But he does
not observethat all thismightbe freelyadmittedby philosophers
who would absolutelydeny that their Deity is limitedin his
action by any extrinsicconditions.-Leibniz, for example,who
was a pronouncedTheistand creationistand believedhimselfto
be championinga very high conceptionof divine omnipotence,
would have said at once that the sortof " dysteleology"illus-
trated by these examplesmerelyresultsfromthe consideration
that I conceivehim to have had no explanatorytheoryto produce. I
do not believehe thoughtany dogmaor philosopheme would solve " all
questionsin the worldand out of it ". So, in the Timaeusitself,we may
ask in vain wherethe contentsof the vt7roSoXo come from. Clearlythey
are inchoatedisorderlyKtv7EaLts, and all Ktv7 acts, we may presume,are
due to IvXai. But the only IvXata of whichthe dialoguehas anything
to say are representedas made by the Demiurgewhenhe takes overthe
and reducesthemto order. The storyis myth,
contentsof the vt7roSox7
to be sure,but it muststandforsomething, and it is not clearwhatit can
standfor.
 THE " POLYTHEISM OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 195

that not all thingswhichare singlypossibleare also compossible;

it is true that God cannot combinethe incompossible, but the
reason why God cannot do so is not that He is confronted by
conditions independent ofHim in thefaceofwhichHe is powerless,
but that the undertaking is, in its own nature,irrational,and is
thereforemade impossibleto God by His ownintrinsic rationality.
He cannot make bones whichhave the otherqualities of bone
withoutits brittlenessforthe same reasonthat he cannotmake
anotherGod, or make it falsethat an eventwhichhas happened
has happened.
I am not, of course,suggestingthat Plato was a Leibnizian,
but merelytryingto pointout that the same distinction between
the " work of God " and the " work of necessity" wvhichis
exemplified by the illustrationsMr. Cornfordproducesfromthe
Timaeus,recursalso in a philosophywhichis fromfirstto last
theistic,and entirely opposedto therecognition ofany " outside,"
conditionsas limitingGod's creativeactivity; the recognition of
the distinction,then,does not commitus to a denial.ofdivine
omnipotencein any sense in whichthe God of most Christian
philosopherscan be said to be omnipotent. If we ask why
every arrangementof thingswhich mightappear to us to be
desirableis not compossiblewith everyother,Plato's language
leaves it possibleto supposethat the reasonlies in some external
limitationsrestricting the " makerof all things", but it does not
necessitate that interpretation.Thereis nothingin what he says
which is inconsistentwith the beliefthat the liabilityof our
bones to fractures, howeverinconvenientto ourselves,may yet,
in some unknownway, contributeto " the good of the whole".
And as foranothersentencewhichis quotedfromme (pp. 172-173)
fordisapprobation, that " Plato does not mean that somethings
are due to intelligence and othersto mere mechanism", its real
sense is so innocuousthat Mr. Cornfordmightadopt it himself.
I meant in those wordsonly to say that we must not call one
concrete.fact A a productof God in which " necessity" plays
no part,and anotherB a productof necessityin whichGod has
playedno part; any A or any B is at once a " product'ofGod "
and a " productofnecessity". The bones,to take Mr.Cornford's
example,are describedby Timaus as made by God (or the gods)
on a certainplan and fora certainpurpose; in virtueof their
uinfortunate brittlenessthey are also a productof "necessity".
Whicheverof us is rightabout the way in which "necessity"
originates,I hold that I am merelyrepeatingTimaus himself
in adding the comment- that, according to him, "God ", or
 196 A. E. TAYLOR:

"intelligentpurpose" is the " principal", "necessity" onlythe

in all undertakings.'
virrqpErn.
I do not,indeed,contendthat Plato mustbe supposedto have
carriedout this convictionwithabsoluteself-consistency.Such
strictconsistencywithone's selfin all one's utterancesseemsto
be an idealwhichno actualhumanmindeversucceedsin attaining.
Has thereeverbeena philosopher againstwhomcritically-minded
successorshave not been able to bringthe chargeof unconscious
self-contradiction? It has been used alike against Aristotle,
Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz,Kant, to mentiononlynamesof the
firstorderof distinction,and in all these cases the chargeseems
to have beenfairlymade out. Whymustthe "divine Plato " be
supposedto be immunefromthe commonlot of mankind,even
of metaphysicalmankind? And it is particularlywheremen
are broughtface to face withthe issues raised by theirrelation
to God-or whatever-other name they give to the suLpreme
reality of realities (o -t 7io-E ovopacdopEvos- pa'Atr-r'av S'XoC?o,
aremostlikelyto
covopa40c)-that suchinconsistencies
Tovi' 71/iv
make themselvesfelt. Most of the greatestphilosophershave
also been men witha real religionwhichhas meanta greatdeal
to them,even whentheirreligionhas been, as has been said of
Aristotle,one peculiar and private to themselves. It is not
amongmen ofthe kindwho have been called " deity-blind" that
1 And thoughI have used the obviousexampleof Leibnizto showthat
the admissionof the apparent" dysteleology " in naturedoes not necessi-
tate the beliefthat God mustbe confronted withunfavourable" external
conditions I do notmeanto commitmyself
" inHis activity, to acquiescence
in the Leibniziansolutionof the problem. For Leibnizremains,whenall
has been said, at bottom,a strictPredestinationist.Godis, afterall, the
ultimatefirstcause of the treason of Judas, which He has included
ab aeterno in hischoiceto createjust that " possibleworld" whichhas been
created. Here, though tentativelyand with full recognitionof the
obscurityof the problem,I thinktoo littleis concededto the freewill of
man. On ethicalgroundsI feel myselfdrivento agreewithKant's view
that a rationalagentis not onlya freecause but a firstcause of his own
acts,and that the wordsof the Republicare strictlytrue,aIrta C'Ao,uvov,
coEs ava'rtos, and I know that many Christian divines would say the
same thing. But even if this be grantedto constitutein some sense a
" limitation " on the " omnipotence" ofGod,it is a limitation whichmust
arise not from" externalconditions " but fromthe intrinsiccharacterof
the divinepurposeto createfreemoralagents. And I am not suggesting
that thisviewwas, in fact,that of Plato. I onlysay of it thatit could,
-like otherviews-be, in the languageof Mr. Cornford himself(op. cit.,
p. 39) " supportedby a suitableselectionof texts" fromthe dialogues.
That all " souls" have been made by a supremefreeagentis assertedin
the Timaeus,and however" mythical " the storyof theirmakingmaybe,
it does at leastseemto meanthattheydependentirely and solelyon Him
fortheirexistence.
 THE "POLYTHEISM" OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 197

the superlativelygreatmetaphysicians have been found. And a

man's attitudetowardshis numenor nutmina,though it is, or
oughtto be, an attitudeof thewholeman,of his intellectno less
than of his willor his emotions,is apt to be pregnantwithmuch
which cannot be fittedinto the neat rubric of " clearly and
distinctly" conceivedcategoriesand distinctions whichhe applies
to that whichis feltto stand on the same level withhimself,or
with the mere " things" he findssubject to his manipulation.
If you startby docketingA as a " pagan polytheist" and B as
a " Christianmonotheist ", and imagine yourselfin this easy
way to have pluckedthe heartout of theirmystery, why,then,
I shouldsay,unlessboth men are of a verycommon-place order
of mind, you will only succeed in misrepresenting them both
alike. Minds of any real depth are like the " Lesbian " archi-
tecture; the " canons" you apply to themmust be uoAi/83vot,
"flexible".
There is just one other passage upon which I have made
remarkswhichare singledout by Prof.Cornford forcondemnation
on the same generalgrounds. It is said at Tim. 69c 3 that of
our " divine" part the Demiurgeav-rTo ylyvErac &?lALoVPvyos',
whereasin respectof our " mortal" part, he merelyinstructs
" his offspring
" to fashionit. Since the distinctionis made so
pointedly,I was led to supposethat in writingthe wordsavTos'
ylcyvErar 8)(Lovpyos' Platohadinmindthefamiliar
wordavirovpyos'
commonlyused of the " peasant cultivator" who is too poor to
have his bodilylabour done forhimby slaves, as opposedto the
"large proprietor " who merelysits at his ease and sets other
handsto workon the " menial" tasks. This led me to make the
commentthat the thoughtof God as " serving" His creatures,
or beingaccessibleto themat all, exceptthroughthe mediation
of a wholehierarchyof officials, is commonlyheld to be speci-
ficallyChristianand quite un-Hellenic. The remark,I said, has
truth," if not pressedtoo far", but the languageof our passage
showsthat " its authorunderstoodtheprincipleof the words,I
am amongyouas one thatserveth ". I shouldhave thoughtthat
the observation,given as it was as a mere caution against
pushinga roughlysound distinctiontoo far,and confining itself
to a mentionof the principle(not the full scope of application)
of the New Testamentphrase quoted, was innocentenough.
But Mr. Cornfordspeciallycalls attentionto it forreprobation
in his Preface(p. xi), and whenhe comesto the passage in his
own commentary,magisteriallyobserves (p. 280) that " there
is no suggestionin the Greek avio'S of the 'lowly peasant'
(a3Tovpyo's) " whomI have broughtinto the matter. Now how
 198 A. E. TAYLOR:-

doesMr.Cornford knowthis2 avwrovpyoswas a familiarword,and

did regularlyimplya lowlv status. It is deliberatelymeant,for
example,by Euripides,whenhe depictsElectra as marriedto an
avvrovpyos', that Aegisthus was not satisfiedwith making a
" farmer'swife" of a Pelopid princess; he safeguardedhimself
furtherby taking care that the farmershould be a person so
utterlyinsignificant that he could not employlabourersto do his
hard work. Is thereanythingunnaturalin the suggestionthat
Plato could hardlywrite j8quoV'pyqacEvav-os' withoutthinking
oftheselinguisticassociations,and thathe meantbv it something
like this, " on our divine part God (or the god, if Mr. Cornford
prefersthat rendering)did the workthat had to be done with
His own hands ? " Of course,it is impossibleto prove that
Plato may not have used a phrase,whichso naturallyrecallsthe
av3rovpyos?,unintentionally, and I should have no commentto
make ifMr. Cornford had simplygivenit as his personalopinion
that Plato did so. I should,I believe, still have thoughtthis
unlikely,but should never deny that it is possible. What I
dispute is any man's right-presumablyon the strengthof an
a priori theoryas to what is and what is not Hellenic-to state
his opinionon the pointas unqualifiedfact.'
There are certain observationsof Prof. G. Murray,in the
Preface to his versionof the Hippolytusand Baccchae,which
seem to me veryapposite. " Who is to say whatthe 'spirit ' of
Euripidesreallywas ? My versionof it will differgreatlyfrom
that of many men of fargreaterlearning. Some good scholars,
again (and innumerable bad ones !) have a rigidlyfixedconception
of what is in the limits of ' ancient thought', and what is
' Christian' or ' modern', and may considerthat I oughtto have
stoppedmy ears and refusedto listenwhenEuripidesseemedto
transgressthese limits." Substitutethe name of Plato here for
that of Euripides,and the remarkseemsto me equally pertinent.
LEschylus,again, as Lewis Campbell said, might seem to us
1 I mighteven ask whetherMr. Cornford's remarkshave not a family
resemblanceto the suggestionthat " the gods" disdainto troublethem-
selves with any close attention to their KcT-q'IaTa out of p,aovwa Kcat Tpvdf5,

whichis so decidedlynegativedat Laws, 901e. Let us'hear Plato's own

conclusion (ib., 902c), Mq -rot'vvv,ueiKpa X uevyaAatLst#acTc Ta-rTa etvat Tots
OeOtgS oV'8eTEpCV yap TOts KECKT17/eVOS 'q/aSz a/IEApEvav Wi) Trpo(7qKov, Ef/EAEcord-
rots ye oiat KaC &ptaToog. And again, 907a, Tov%g 8) KdcAAWTa rdEre vpdy/zay a
OvAcrTovrag,84a'TpovOc %0E aihots #vAaKi71rpo apET14v, KVVWVXELPOVs KaL aVOpwwV
Iuc&rwvEtvatcfYqao/Lev; It does notshockthis" paganpolytheist " to compare
"gods " withshepherdsor sheep-dogsin chargeof a flockof sheep; why
thenshouldMr. Cornfordtake suchexceptionto my remarksabout the
avTovpyog ?
 THE " POLYTHEISM" OF PLATO: AN APOLOGIA. 199

curiously" modern" in the prominencehe gives all throughthe

Agamemnon to thethoughtthat " greatconquerorshave muchto
answerfor", but how muchoLhis meaningwe shouldmissif we
read him withtoo overpowering a dread offinding" modernity "
in him. I do not feelthat I have the rightto allow preconceived
distinctionsof this kind to make me.insensitiveto the subtler
suggestionsof a masterof languagelike Plato.'
1 Thereare two contrasted prejudicesagainstbothof whichwe need to
be constantlyon our guardin dealingwithGreekmoralityand religion,
and both alike make for the exaggerationof the 'differences between
" Hellenic" and " Christian". A manstrongly convinced thatChristianity
rests on a unique divine revelationwill be temptedto under-ratethe
significanceof the contactsbetweenHellenismand Christianity fromhis
verysenseof the uniquenessof Christianity.Dislike of Christianity will
equallyinclinethe anti-Christian who happensto admirethe greatGreeks
to shuthis eyesto thesecontactsforfearof havingto admitin themany
likenessto that whichhe despises. But a perceptiveman, Christianor
anti-Christian,should surelybe able to understandthat the secretof
Plato'slife-long to " tragedy" is hisantipathyto the" paganism"
hostility
of the ritualsand legendsupon whichtragedywas based.