G.R. No.

139930               June 26, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIA
CLARA LOBREGAT, JOSE ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE CONCEPCION,
ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL
HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IÑAKI R.
MENDEZONA, DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. REYES, EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM, SIGFREDO
VELOSO and JAIME GANDIAGA, Respondents.
FACTS:
We upheld the Sandiganbayan's ruling that the coconut levy funds
are special public funds of the Government's declaration that
Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") 755, Section 3,
Article III of P.D. 961... and Section 3, Article III of P.D. 1468, as well
as the pertinent implementing regulations of the Philippine Coconut
Authority ("PCA"), are unconstitutional for allowing the use and/or the
distribution of properties acquired through the coconut levy funds to
private individuals... for their own direct benefit and absolute
M. ALMEDA,
ownership. The Decision also affirmed the Government's ownership
of the six CIIF companies, the fourteen holding companies, and the
CIIF block of San Miguel Corporation shares of stock, for having
likewise been acquired using the coconut... levy funds. Accordingly,
the properties subject of the January 24, 2012 Decision were
declared owned by and ordered reconveyed to the Government, to
be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the
development of the coconut industry.
In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted creating the

Facts: Coconut Investment Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut

the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails and seeks to annul a portion of the Partial Summary
Judgment dated July 11, 2003, as affirmed in a Resolution of
December 28, 2004, both rendered by the Sandiganbayan in its Civil
Case ("CC") No. 0033-A (the judgment shall hereinafter be referred
to as "PSJ-A")
Investment Fund ("CIF"), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be
sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of... copra.
Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was or ought to be
issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition
of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers
declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration ("PHILCOA" now
"PCA") as... having the largest membership. The PCA, by statutory
provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of
the... coco levy.
5. The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by
P.D. No. 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code), read:
Section 5. Exemption. The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all
disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed … as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the
national government within the... contemplation of PD 711; … the
intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as
herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be
owned by them in their private capacities
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or
indirectly to [finance] various projects and/or was converted into
various assets or investments.[11] Relevant to the present petition is
the acquisition of the First United Bank ("FUB"), which was
subsequently renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank ("UCPB").
The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all of Pedro Cojuangco's... shares
in FUB. However, as later events unfolded, a simple direct sale from
the seller (Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it was made to appear
that Cojuangco had the exclusive option to acquire the former's FUB
controlling interests.
Emerging from this elaborate, circuitous arrangement were two
deeds.
The first one was simply denominated as Agreement, dated May
1975, entered into by and between Cojuangco for and in his behalf
and in behalf of "certain other buyers", and Pedro Cojuangco in which
the former was purportedly accorded the... option to buy 72.2% of
FUB's outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the "option
shares," for brevity), at PhP 200 per share.
The second but related contract, dated May 25, 1975, was
denominated as Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank
for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. It had PCA,
for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from
Cojuangco... the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for
PhP200.00 per share. As additional consideration for PCA's buy-out
of what Cojuangco would later claim to be his exclusive and personal
option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco shall receive
equity in FUB... amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully
paid shares. And so as not to dilute Cojuangco's equity position in
FUB, later UCPB, the PCA agreed under paragraph 6 (b) of the
second agreement to cede over to the former a number of fully paid
FUB shares out of the shares it
(PCA) undertakes to eventually subscribe. It was further stipulated
that Cojuangco would act as bank president for an extendible period
of 5 years.
Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.
admit that the PCA used public funds x x x in the total amount of
P150 million, to purchase the FUB shares amounting to 72.2% of the
authorized capital stock of the
FUB, although the PCA was later reimbursed from the coconut levy
funds
Issues:
Cojuangco's petition formulates the issues in question form, as
follows:
a.  Is the acquisition of the [so-called Cojuangco, Jr. UCPB shares]
by petitioner Cojuangco x x x "not supported by valuable
consideration and, therefore, null and void”?
b. Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction, in Civil Case No. 0033-A,
an "ill-gotten wealth" case brought under [EO] Nos. 1 and 2, to
declare the [Cojuangco UCPB shares] acquired by virtue of the
Pedro Cojuangco, et al. Agreement and/or the PCA Agreement null
and... void because "not supported by valuable consideration”?
c.  Was the claim that the acquisition by petitioner Cojuangco of
shares representing 7.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB
(later UCPB) "not supported by valuable consideration", a "claim"
pleaded in the complaint and may therefore be the basis of a
"summary... judgment" under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court?
d. By declaring the [Cojuangco UCPB shares] as "not supported by
valuable consideration, and therefore, null and void", did the
Sandiganbayan effectively nullify the PCA Agreement? May the
Sandiganbayan nullify the PCA Agreement when the parties to the
Agreement, namely: x x x... concede its validity? If the PCA
Agreement be deemed "null and void", should not the FUB (later
UCPB) shares revert to petitioner Cojuangco (under the PCA
Agreement) or to Pedro Cojuangco, et al. x x x? Would there be a
basis then, even assuming the absence of... consideration x x x, to
declare 7.2% UCPB shares of petitioner Cojuangco as "conclusively
owned by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines"?
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of... the
subdivided amended complaints,... including the shares allegedly
acquired by Cojuangco... by virtue of the PCA Agreements.
The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided
amended complaints has peremptorily been put to rest by the Court
in its January 24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic. There,
the Court, citing Regalado[27] and settled... jurisprudence, stressed
the following interlocking precepts: Subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of
the parties.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has upheld the Sandiganbayan's
assumption of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos.
0033-A and 0033-F.[29] The Court wrote:
Judging from the allegations of the defendants' illegal acts thereat transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law
made, it is fairly obvious that both CC Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F under the Civil Code.
partake, in the context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14, series of 1986, the
III
nature of ill-gotten wealth suits.

THE PCA-COJUANGCO AGREEMENT IS A VALID CONTRACT

The Court can take, as it has in fact taken, judicial notice of schemes
FOR HAVING THE REQUISITE CONSIDERATION.
and machinations that have been put in place to keep ill-gotten
assets under wraps. These... would include the setting up of layers Provisions of the Civil Code state:
after layers of shell or dummy, but controlled, corporations[31] or
manipulated instruments calculated to confuse if not altogether Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

mislead would-be investigators from recovering wealth deceitfully

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
amassed at the... expense of the people or simply the fruits thereof.
Transferring the illegal assets to third parties not readily perceived as (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
Marcos cronies would be another.
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (Emphasis supplied)
We, therefore, reiterate our holding in COCOFED v. Republic [42]
respecting the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
Civil Case No. 0033-A, including those matters whose adjudication
beginning:... x x x x
We shall resolve in the present case.

PRELIMINARILY, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PCA AND
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. DATED MAY 25, 1975 CANNOT
BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF A LAW FOR THE LACK OF THE
REQUISITE PUBLICATION.
Publication [of the law] is indispensable in every case x x x
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction;
After a circumspect study, the Court finds as inconclusive the
evidence relied upon by Sandiganbayan to support its ruling that the
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement is devoid of sufficient consideration

The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot

Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the
be overthrown by the bare uncorroborated and self-serving assertion
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary
of petitioners that it has no consideration. To overcome the
presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration...
must be shown by preponderance of evidence. Petitioners failed to
discharge this burden x x x.
Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a contract
void under Article 1355 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of
cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud,
mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Vales v. Villa[51] elucidates why a bad transaction cannot serve as
basis for voiding a contract
There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what
the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the... courts are
authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis ours.)
A government agency, like the PCA, stoops down to level of an
ordinary citizen when... it enters into a private transaction with private
individuals.
While consideration is usually in the form of money or property, it
need not be monetary. This is clear from Article 1350 which reads:
Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for
each contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service
by the other; in remuneratory ones, the service or benefit which is
remunerated; and in contracts of pure... beneficence, the mere
liability of the benefactor. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sandiganbayan viewed the compensation of petitioner of 14,400
FUB shares as exorbitant. In the absence of proof to the contrary and
considering the absence of any complaint of illegality or fraud from
any of the contracting parties, then the presumption that "private...
transactions have been fair and regular"[53] must apply.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is left with no option but to uphold
the validity of the two agreements in question.
IV
COJUANGCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE UCPB SHARES
WHICH WERE BOUGHT WITH PUBLIC FUNDS
AND HENCE, ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY.
.
The coconut levy funds were exacted for a... special public purpose.
Consequently, any... use or transfer of the funds that directly...
benefits private individuals should be... invalidated.
coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which, in general,
are enforced proportional contributions from pers
Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an
enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties; b) it
is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied
for the support of the government. The coconut levy funds fall...
squarely into these elements
Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or
donations by the people. They were enforced contributions exacted
on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:
"3. Any person or firm who violates any provision of this Decree or
the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, shall, in addition to
penalties already prescribed under existing administrative and
special law, pay a fine of not less than P2, 500 or more than
P10,000, or suffer cancellation of licenses to operate, or both, at the
discretion of the Court."
They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely
no question that they were collected to advance the government's
avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry.
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in
the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
it is at once apparent that any property acquired by means of the
coconut levy funds, such as the subject UCPB shares, should be
treated as public funds or public property, subject to the burdens and
restrictions attached by law to such property.
Consequently, Cojuangco cannot stand to benefit by receiving, in his
private capacity, 7.22% of the FUB shares without violating... the
constitutional caveat that public funds can only be used for public
purpose. Accordingly, the 7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were given
to Cojuangco shall be returned to the Government, to be used "only
for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the...
coconut industry."... not only were the laws unconstitutional for
decreeing the distribution of the shares of stock for free to the
coconut farmers and therefore negating the public purposed declared
by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect
the coconut... industry. They likewise reclassified the coconut levy
fund as private fund, to be owned by private individuals in their
private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for the creation of
such fund. To compound the situation, the offending provisions...
effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of
public funds which normally can be paid out only pursuant to an
appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into
private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these
provisions. Clearly... therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos.
755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI,
Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by
PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy
fund a special fund of the... government to the coconut farmers is,
therefore, void.
We, therefore, affirm, on this ground, the decision of the
Sandiganbayan nullifying the shares of stock transfer to Cojuangco.
Principles:
ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and Sandiganbayan's Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-
acquired by taking undue advantage of relationships or influence A, shall... read as follows:
and/or through or as a... result of improper use, conversion or
Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE:
diversion of government funds or property.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed
There was no actual need for Republic, as plaintiff a quo, to adduce by Plaintiff.
evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA
subject matter of the complaints
and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor
Moreover, the Court finds no rule that directs the plaintiff to first prove did it give the Agreement the binding force of a law because of the
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court before which the complaint non-publication of the said Agreement.
is filed. Rather, such burden falls on the shoulders of defendant in the
The Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
hearing of a motion to dismiss... anchored on said ground or a
Jr. dated May 25, 1975 is a valid contract for having the requisite
preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is alleged in the
consideration under Article 1318 of the Civil Code.
answer.

The transfer by PCA to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. of

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
14,400 shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) from the "Option Shares"
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
and the additional FUB shares subscribed and paid by PCA,
The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of consisting of
the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the
Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of
contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential
the authorized but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and paid
decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of... effectivity
by PCA;
would not satisfy the publication requirement.

Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the

WHEREFORE, Part C of the appealed Partial Summary Judgment in
increased capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0033-A is AFFIRMED with
modification. As MODIFIED, the dispositive portion in Part C of the Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11
(iv) (d) of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement dated May 25, 1975 or the
so-called "Cojuangco-UCPB shares"... is declared unconstitutional,
hence null and void.
The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred
to defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by
the Republic of the Philippines to be used only for the benefit of all
coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry,
and... ordered reconveyed to the Government.
The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and
dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of
the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by the PCA with public
funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF,
belong to the... plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and
beneficial owner.
Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) v. HON.
MARGARITO B. TEVES
G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011
R.A. No. 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 and its IRR are
constitutional.
FACTS:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enacted R.A. No.
9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends
to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A.
No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the
fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs
Employees Association (BOCEA), directly filed the present petition
before this Court against respondents.
In essence, BOCEA contends that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR (1) gives an undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;
(2) violates the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of
laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process because R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC
employees as compared to employees of other revenue generating
government agencies which are not subject to attrition, (2) that the
assailed law because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or
class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the
fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue
targets.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
Delegation of Legislative power
        In Abakada, the Court held,
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2)
the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it
sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to
guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. In sum, the Court
finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is
complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue
delegation of legislative power to the Board.
Equal protection of the laws
          Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions —
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
Moreover, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure
of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC.The guarantee of security
of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due
process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays
down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant CITIZENSHIP

factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to

inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for
removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and COMELEC,et al.

compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a
group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise,
and the lack of judicial trial
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR
or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof.
The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights
of the concerned employee are amply protected.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe
declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that
her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo
and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and
JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to
the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was
then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s
deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on
February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines
on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as
a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the
MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From
then on, she stopped using her American passport.
REPORT THIS AD
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot
be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc  cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements
and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and
held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino
citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For
that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino
shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency
from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a was granted by the SC.
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are
Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical
EN BANC
parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence
are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-
born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely
exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
DECISION

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born

citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered
ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER: Poe is not qualified to be a member of
and supported by the UN Convention Law.
the Senate on account of her not being a natural-born citizen.
1. Poe does not fall under any of the classes of natural-born
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year citizens enumerated in Sec. 1, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution
residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS a. To be a natural-born citizen, one’s parents must be
MANENDI  (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS Filipino citizens. Poe cannot claim natural-born status as
NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new her parents are not known and cannot be presumed as
domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to Filipino citizens.
the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her 2. The provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the
 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are
not applicable because the Philippines has yet to accede to
both Conventions.
2. Poe’s adoption did not confer upon her the status of natural-
born citizen. The effect of the adoption is to confer unto her
legitimate status.
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT: Poe asserts that she is a natural-born
citizen and is eligible to sit as a Senator
1. As early as the 1935 Constitution, it was always the intention
of the framers to consider foundlings found in the Philippines
as Filipino citizens.
2. Poe invokes Art. 7 of the UNCRC and Art. 24 of the ICCPR.
Both treaties are ratified by the Philippines.
a. These treaties create an obligation on the part of the
Philippines to recognize a foundling as its citizen from
the time of the foundling’s birth.
b. Although neither the ICCPR nor the UNCRC was in force
when she was born in 1968, each may apply
retroactively to the date of her birth. To rule otherwise
would be to discriminate against foundlings born before
the ratification of these treaties.
3. Poe invokes Art. 15 of the UDHR which recognizes the right
of everyone to a nationality.
3. Poe invokes Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Conflict of Nationality Laws. The presumption that a foundling
is a citizen of the State in which she is found is a generally
accepted principle of international law.
4. Poe invokes Art. 2 of the UN Convention on Statelessness
which expresses a rebuttable presumption of descent from a
citizen, consistent with jus sanguinis.
5. Finally, Poe argues that she validly reacquired her natural-
born status pursuant to R.A. No. 9225.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a Senator of the Republic.
RULING OF THE SET ON POE’S CITIZENSHIP:
1. From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention on citizenship, it was never the intention of
the framers to exclude foundlings from natural-born
citizenship status.
· “Children or people born in a country of unknown parents
are citizens of this nation” and the only reason that there
was no specific reference to foundlings in the 1935
provision was that these cases “are few and far in
between.”
· Evident intent was to adopt the concept found in the
Spanish Code “wherein all children of unknown
parentage born in Spanish territory are considered
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard.”

2. Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on
Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is presumed to
have been born on the territory of the State in which it
was found until the contrary is proved.
· Although the Philippines is not a signatory to said
convention, its provisions are binding as they form part of
the law of the land pursuant to the incorporation clause.
· Sr. Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional Convention
remarked “By international law the principle that children
or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized…”
➢ By referring to this rule in international law (which
was no other than Art. 14 of the Hague Convention
of 1930), what was effectively created in the
Constitution itself, was an exception to the general
rule of natural-born citizenship based on blood
descent.
3. Hence, foundlings (children born in the Philippines with
unknown parentage) were, by birth, accorded natural-
born citizenship by the Constitution.
· “natural-born citizens by legal fiction”
· The framers of the Constitution were sufficiently
empowered to create a class of natural-born citizens by
legal fiction, as an exception to the jus sanguinis rule
➢ This is evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who
are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on nationality
to be determined by the law of that State) of the 1930
Hague Convention
4. Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino
citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, as required under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225
· Before assuming her position as MTRCB Chairman, Poe
executed an affidavit of renunciation of foreign
citizenship. This was sufficient to qualify her for her
appointive position, and later, her elective office as R.A.
No. 9225 did not require that her Certificate of Loss of
Nationality filed before the U.S. Embassy be first
approved in order that she may qualify for office.
· Records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Poe still
used her U.S. passport after having taken her Oath of
Allegiance but not after she has renounced her U.S.
Citizenship.
5. Hence, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 187567               February 15, 2012
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NORA FE SAGUN, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent in this case is the legitimate child of
Albert S. Chan, a Chines national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City
and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded
and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a
Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her
birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election
of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her
birth certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a
Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local
schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the
Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her
part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a
Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of
Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in
local and national elections as shown in the Voter
5
Certification issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the
Commission on Elections of Baguio City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has
effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should
be annotated on her record of
birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine
passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring
respondent a Filipino citizen. Hence, this petition by the
Solicitor General.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding
respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since
her purported election was not in accorda nce with the
procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a
“reasonable time.” Petitioner points out that while respondent
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was
no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship.
Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered
with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she
was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age
of majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond the period allowed
by law.
ISSUE
Whether respondent failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a validand effective election of Philippine
citizenship – YES
HELD:
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
“those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-
five” are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that “those born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority” are Philippine citizens. It should
be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not
be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in
the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not
been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that
of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of
majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father
a nd that illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered
a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:

(1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance DIVISION

to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)

[ GR NO. 170603, Jan 29, 2007 ]
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry. Records of the case at bar undisputably EDISON SO v. REPUBLIC +
show that respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had DECISION
not executed a sworn statement of her election of
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a
Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence
Petition for Naturalization3 under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473,
submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He
election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she
alleged the following in his petition:
reached the age of majority, which was unregistered, which was
clearly not within a reasonable time, which is 3 years from He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen
reaching the age of majority. who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth;
as an employee, he derives an average annual income of
The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted
around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits;
stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise
he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog;
of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be
citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act
allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon
(C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines,
her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly
and studied in a school recognized by the Government where
elect Philippine citizenship.
Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person
of good moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Birth,5 Alien Certificate of Registration, 6 and Immigrant Certificate of
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as Residence.7
with the community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order 8 setting the petition for
the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all
the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all
persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the
the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the
petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes,
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is
including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered
opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching
that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9
assassination for the success or predominance of men's ideas; he is
not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not
the entire petition and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20,
suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental
200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper of general
alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the
circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.
Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991
particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family's business. He
Philippines from the time of the filing of the petition up to the time of would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by
his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition was docketed petitioner's family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking,
as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. and possessed of good moral character, including all the
qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit 4 of Atty. Artemio
petitioner was gainfully employed and presently resides at No. 528
Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner's Certificate of Live
Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been practicing
Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner
had been socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed
Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas.
According to the witness, petitioner was not disqualified under C.A.
No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to organized
government or believes in the use of force; he is not a polygamist
and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable
disease.12
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has
known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in
1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo
Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a
member of some school organizations and mingled well with
friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week,
and during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to
petitioner's house. He has known petitioner to have resided in Manila
since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good moral character,
and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner
has a gainful occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to become a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of
the Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in
evidence the following documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth; 14 (2)
Alien Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate of
Residence;16 (4) Elementary Pupil's17 and High School
18
Student's  Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College;
(5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo
Tomas;19 (6) Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November
20, 2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and Certificate of Withholding
Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from Metrobank that
petitioner is a depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he has not been
charged or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; 23 and
(10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the
Philippine General Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in
evidence.
ISSUE:
WON Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into
the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges
of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways
by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws
– the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter
covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that
they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
52
Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.  To reiterate,
the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than
judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is
a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is
nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended
to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature
had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring
Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens.
The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to
prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible
person" is not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police
record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the
declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such
person must have a good standing in the community; that he is
known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is
precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to
oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not
constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained
it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the
granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final
grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of
the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose
the petition before the lower court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit.
G.R. No. 160869             May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER -
HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official
capacity as the Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of
Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws
governing citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued
to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled An
Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No.
63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No.
9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution that states, Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Issue:
1. Is R.A. 9225 constitutional?
2. Does the court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
dual allegiance?
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship.
He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual
allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2
allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign
citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship
by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely
declares as a state policy that Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship. The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not
allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is
an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact
that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme
authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation
of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.

From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the
intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or
not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.
9225.
judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to
dual allegiance.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.
The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate
the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance
when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining
what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,

vs.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
FACTS: (chronological order)
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the
1. In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
2. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro.
In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
3. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on
the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to
own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioner.
4. Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was
pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate
No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto).
5. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought
the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private
respondent’s family.
6. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner
for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the
filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed
before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
7. On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting
petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect
in his MLA which was void ab initio.
8. Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who
had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his
citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification
for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. 9225
HELD:
NO. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country  shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3.  Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have  reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic.nRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,  after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the
conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino
citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group,
and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before (first group) and
after (second group) the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the
heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and
“retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of
the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was
lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign
country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost.
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance
under the new law.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, wherein the following was
explained:
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

“The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine

citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63…The second
aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to
future instances… eacquired for those who previously lost
[Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and
retention for those in the future.”

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian

citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public

document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as