Written Report in Statutory Construction

Topics: Effectivity of Laws and Statutes of a Later Date Prevails (A6)

Presenters: Caguimbal, Marinelle
Gonzaga, Maricon Mae
Guia, Angelica Lhane
Maquinto, Zymon Andrew M.

I. Effectivity of Laws

General Rule: Laws shall take effect after15 days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. (CIVIL CODE,
Art 2 as amended by E.O No. 200, s. 1987)

Note: The term “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the 15-day period and not to the
requirement of publication. The publication is an indispensable requisite; the absence of which
will violate due process as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it. (Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig Inc. v. Military Shrine Service, G.R. No.
187587, June 5, 2013)

Rules on Period Provided by Statute:

1. Shorter or Longer period than 15-day period
-The period provided in the statute shall prevail
2. Takes effect immediately
-The statute shall take effect immediately after publication with the 15 day
period being dispensed with
3. No provision as to its effectivity
-15 days after publication, the statute takes effect

Newspaper of General Circulation

To be a newspaper of General Circulation, it is enough that it is (a) published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; (b) that it has a bona fide subscription; and
(c) it is published at regular intervals. (Fortune Motors Phils Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, G.R. No. 115068, November 28,1996)

Exception to the General Rule:

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. (Tañada v.
Tuvera, G.R.No L-63915, April 24, 1985).

The publication is not also required in the following cases:

1. Supreme Court Decisions
2. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors on rules or guidelines
to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties.
3. Municipal Orders ( covered by the Local Government Code)

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL

G.R. No. 176006
March 26, 2010
CORONA, J.
FACTS:

The National Power Corporation issued Circular No. 99-75 on October 8,1999 in order to set the
guidelines in the disposal of Scrap Aluminum Conductor Steel-Reinforced. The item 3 and 3.1 of
the circular provide that the Qualified Bidders are partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as raw material.

The said circular was not published and it was addressed only to particular persons, or class of
persons, namely the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials
involved in the disposition of ACSRs.

In April 2003, NPC published invitation for the pre qualification of bidders for the public sale of
its scrap ASCR. The Respondent, Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials submitted a
pre qualification form to NPC which was denied by the latter through letter date April 29, 2003. A
reconsideration was submitted by the respondent but NPC denied it.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not NPC Circular No. 99 75 must be published.

HELD:
In the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, the court stressed the need for publication in order for statutes
and administrative rules and regulations to have binding force and effect, viz.:“x x x all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by
the legislature.

Tañada, however, qualified that: “Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not
be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.”

In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an
internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was
merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and
efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of
the public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process.

Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.

II. Statutes of a Later Date Prevails

As a rule, where two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of a later date prevails.

The statute of a later date is presumed to be the latest expression of the legislative will
on the subject. Hence, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 should give way to the
provisions of the Tariff Customs Code and to RA 1937, which took effect on July 1, 197, much
later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. Besides, it is more reasonable to conclude that the
legislative intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property
that is subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
(Pacis v Averia, G. R. No. L-22526 November 29, 1966).

Jurisprudence 1:

MAGDALENA C. DILLENA v. MARIANO ALCARAZ

GR No. 204045
December 12, 2014

FACTS:
Magdalena C. Dillena filed a Petition with Very Urgent Motion for the Immediate Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Status Quo Order dated June 30, 2004 with the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Malolos, Bulacan against Mariano Alcaraz,
Bernardo Alcaraz, Joselito Alcaraz and Amor Alcaraz Sta. Ana alleging that Salud Crespo was
the original owner of the subject landholding, a fishpond with an area of more than ten (10)
hectares located in Barangay Nagbalon, Marilao, Bulacan; sometime in 1950, Salud Crespo
instituted Catalino Dillena as tenant of the subject landholding; when Ana Alcaraz purchased the
subject landholding sometime in 1960, she recognized Catalino Dillena's tenancy over the
same; and when Catalino Dillena died, petitioner’s husband, Narciso, succeeded to the former's
tenancy rights.

PARAD rendered a Decision dated September 15, 2006 declaring petitioner as a bonafide
tenant who is entitled to peacefully possess and cultivate the subject landholding.
Respondents]filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the PARAD in an Order
dated February 26, 2007. [Respondents] interposed an appeal to the DARAB, which rendered
the assailed Decision dated March 2, 2009 affirming the PARAD's Decision.

Petitioner essentially argues that the CA erred in failing to consider that her case falls within the
exceptions laid down in Republic Act (RA) No. 7881, in that there is an existing tenurial
arrangement between her and respondents which must be respected; that the amendments
introduced in 1995 by RA 7881 to RA 6557 (CARL) cannot be given retroactive application as to
deprive a farmer of his rights under previous agrarian laws; that while the subject landholding is
no longer covered by the CARL, the parties' tenurial arrangement subsists and remains
governed by RA 3844 as it was vested prior to the effectivity of RA 7881; and thus, the PARAD
and DARAB possess jurisdiction over the parties' dispute.

Respondents counter that the operation of fishponds is no longer an agricultural activity but an
industrial one; that under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 3, Series of
1995, it is specifically declared that under R.A. 7881, aquaculture, fishponds, and prawn farms
are excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); that
under the CARL, a fishpond is not an arable land; that in Spouses Romero v. Tan, the Court
held that the PARAD has no jurisdiction over cases involving fishponds, as they are no longer
considered agricultural lands; and that the relationship between the parties is that of civil law
lessor and lessee. Thus, respondents pray for denial of the instant Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Fishponds are not considered agricultural lands in view of RA 7881
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.

Respondents aver that the subject fishpond is not an agricultural land; fishponds are exempted
or excluded from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) pursuant to Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7881 or ''An Act Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657." Respondents allege that, since a fishpond is not
an agricultural land, no agricultural tenancy relationship can be created between the parties and
no agrarian dispute can emanate therefrom. Respondents further aver that petitioner has no
security of tenure, being a mere civil law lessee over the subject fishpond.

Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7881, under R.A. No. 3844 (“Agricultural Land Reform Code)
and R.A. No. 6657 (“Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law”), fishponds were considered as
agricultural lands. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 7881 on February 20, 1995,
fishponds were exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARL. Following the
pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in Sanchez, Jr. vs. Marin, the present rule is that
fishponds are no longer considered as agricultural lands in accordance with the explicit
provisions of R.A. No. 7881.

Under Section 2 of RA 7881, which took effect on February 20, 1995, b) Private lands actually,
directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage
of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.