Japan’s Diplomatic Style

“Introduction and Chapter 1: Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance”

By Michael Blaker; Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War byu Gerald Curtis, ed.
Prepared By: Dela Cruz
I. Introduction
Japan’s foreign relations covers a wide variety of subject matter-diplomatic style, foreign
economic policy, issues of national security, and its role in multilateral organizations. Some are
impressed with Japan’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals; others are as impressed with
its diplomatic shortcomings and failures.

There are various contributors with different perspectives and views on how to evaluate Japan’s
diplomatic behavior or what future developments to expect.
1. Common theme:​ ​Japan’s minimalist strategy in dealing or “Coping “ with foreign policy
issues​. Japan has pursued a low-risk strategy throughout the postwar years. Japan’s
foreign policy has been to cope effectively with situations created by other countries.
Blaker mentioned that the strategy term is called “Coping”. However, the strategy was
questioned about its effectiveness and success in coping foreign policy issues.
2. Second theme: ​The primary importance of the American connection in Japanese foreign
policy. ​ Japan’s economic challenge may not fully appreciate the degree to which
Japanese decision makers and the public at large, view their nation’s foreign policy
through the prism of its relationship with the United States. This was strikingly illustrated
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. For Japan, the Gulf conflict demonstrated clearly how
much more difficult managing the U.S. relationship had become the complex post-Cold
War international environment.
3. Third theme:​ The challenge to Japanese foreign policy posed by the combination of
Japan’s rise to economic superpower status and the end of the Cold War. Some will
argue that Japan will be able to break out its traditional diplomatic mold and design a
new foreign policy despite these changes in world politics and the international
economy. Others argue that Japan is already moving toward a new, more active role in
international affairs. Yasutomo and Ueki, emphasize multilateral settings as having
significant potential for Japan to play a major role worldwide.
Although, there is much written about Japanese foreign policy processes, there is relatively little
about why Japan does what it does in its foreign relations; what are the intentions, principles,
motives, ideas, and concepts behind Japan’s pursuit of its national interests.

Japanese Diplomatic Style

Japanese diplomacy results from a heavily bureaucratized policy-making and from a core of
widely shared Japanese beliefs, which are:
a. notably an uneasiness towards the outside world
b. an obsession with Japan’s vulnerability, and
c. an ultrasensitivity to foreign criticism.
All of these factors combine to form a Japanese diplomatic style of “coping” which may be
defined as cautiously appraising the external situation, weighing and strong every option,
deferring action or contentious issues, crafting a domestic consensus on the situation faced,
and adapting to a situation with minimal risk.

However, based on the case studies of the protracted United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference (1973-1980) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), Blaker mentioned that Japan’s
coping strategy has been unsuccessful. Although, the central goal of the “coping” strategy is
freedom from foreign criticisms, there were heavy criticisms on Japan in these two cases; on
how much Tokyo officials misread the international environment, the degree of American
decline and Japanese independence in new global circumstances, and the extent of foreign
expectations.

Japan - US Relations
John Campbell raises another perspective that challenged the idea of Blaker’s. According to
Campbell, much of the friction in U.S. - Japanese relations and much of the criticisms leveled
against Japan are part of a highly ritualized scenario of accusation, negotiation, threats and
resolution that constitute the U.S. - Japanese relations “game”.

The U.S. - Japanese relations at the government-to-government level has been remarkably
strong and stable. With deepened economic interdependence; there has been a high degree of
cooperation or parallelism in the two countries’ policies towards third countries wherein a pattern
of close bilateral cooperation and coordination on security issues has been firmly established.
Campbell contends this stability results from two governments’ commitment to handling the bulk
of their affairs through a​ set of games with fairly well-defined rules. ​These games emerged after
major crises that threatened the relationship.
- The crises in the political sphere emerged in the early 1950’s but since then Japan
deferred to the United States on virtually all diplomatic issues.
- In the military field, since the security treaty crisis of 1960, the US and Japan have
argued each year about how much Japan would undertake to raise its “burden-sharing”
effort.
- In trade, the crisis produced by the dispute over Japanese textile exports led to an
American-demand and Japanese-response ritual which in subsequent years invariably
has produced a “solution” with Japanese concessions insufficient to resolve fundamental
problems but sufficient to allow the game itself to continue.

In each area, political, military, and economic, the United States has been the side to initiate the
interaction, set the agenda by specifying the problem or issue and proposing a solution, and win
in the sense that Japan ends up ascending at least partially to American demands.

From Japan’s perspective, this is what diplomatic minimalism is all about: defining its goals by
the least concessions required to avoid provoking a crisis in its relations with the United States.

The third chapter, diplomatic style treats an institution rarely discussed where issues of postwar
Japanese foreign policy are concerned.

On the other hand, David Titus’ analysis offers an illuminating perspective on the century-long
struggle in Japan to define a collective Japanese identity that can resolve the tension between
the pull of universality and the tug of cultural uniqueness and a preoccupation with that makes
Japan different.
- Titus points out, despite their drastically reduced roles in Japanese policy compared to
what they had been from 1868 to 1945, the emperor and the members of the imperial
family have been more active in international affairs since the Allied Occupation ended in
1952, than at any other time in Japanese history.
- Since 1868, the imperial institution has facilitated Japan’s “internalization” by putting the
imprimatur of this most Japanese of Japanese institutions on the importation of the
 world’s cultural and material resources. ​The emperor faces the world;l as a symbol of the
unity of his people, he reflects as the faces of the Japanese. ​Thus, the emperor is in a
unique position to connect the outside world to the Japanese people, and his activities
are managed by the government and the palace to maintain Japan as a unique
community within the world. However, the 1990 enthronement ceremony highlighted the
problems of Japan in reconciling its sense of communal self and a unique culture with a
more universal notion of civilization.
- Analysis by Nathaniel Thayer looks at the issue of political leadership in the conduct of
Japanese foreign policy. One of the most strongly entrenched images of Japanese
policy making is the image of a “leaderless” process.
Bureaucratic dominance, consensus building, the absence of charismatic
leaders, and a constitutional structure limiting the prime minister’s authority and
autonomy are widely regarded as producing a system marked by the absence of strong
political leaders.
- However, at critical moments in postwar Japanese foreign foreign policy, political leaders
have been the driving force behind major policy decisions.
Examples: Yoshida Shigeru’s push for a security treaty with the United States;
Hatoyama Ichiro’s initiative to normalize relations with the Soviet Union; Sato Eisaku’s
determination to realize the reversion of Okinawa; Tanaka Kakuei’s move to establish
formal diplomatic relations with mainland China; and Nakasone Yashurio’s efforts to
carve a new security policy.

Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy

A key dimension of postwar Japan’s foreign policy: its thrust for economic success.
Controversy goes around the issues of how Japan has manipulated the levers of government
power to secure benefits for Japanese industry.
- Japan’s early postwar export-oriented policy was part of a system that regularly
favored small businesses, farming families, and large manufacturing firms, while
treating organized labor and consumers with political neglect.
- There are also numerous factors in the international environment which pushed
Japan toward greater internal economic openness and a much heavier level of
overseas investment.
 - Despite market liberalization, certain politically sensitive areas remain heavily
protected and foreign investment in Japan remains very low.

An analysis by T.J. Pempel underscores the importance of relating changes in economic foreign
policy to changes in the structure of domestic political power. There is a relative shift of power
from the central bureaucracy to politicians and big businesses. Small business interests and
farmers are less significant than before, while the white-collar and blue-collar workforce wield
more influence more influence than in earlier years.

Lastly, Frances Rosenbluth examines Japan’s political handing of the issue of yen appreciation.
In particular, she discusses how the political leadership sought to balance demands from the
international community to strengthen the yen against demands from small and medium sized
businesses to protect them from the adverse consequences of yen appreciation.

Despite the LDPs heavy dependence on these companies for electoral support, the LDP did
very little to assist this sector. The LDP leadership only acted according to uts view of what was
necessary to serve the collective interests of LDP Diet members. Rosenbluth notes that LDP
leaders are moving away from electoral dependence on the country’s economically
noncompetitive sectors and toward resilience on groups having a stake in policies of freer trade.
● In her analysis, ​any discussion of Japanese foreign policy which neglects domestic
policies will fail to capture the dynamics of the policy process.
● Timothy Curran ​discusses the role of Japanese multinational corporations in U.S.
Japanese relations and addresses non-governmental actors in Japan’s external
relations. ​It is important because it focuses on the globalizing Japanese company,which
is the engine of Japan’s integration into the world economy.
- Japanese multinational firms in the United States are moving toward establishing
fully integrated businesses including product design, value engineering, and
other value-added aspects of the manufacturing process.
- The pattern of growth of Japanese multinational corporations will likely create
powerful a constituencies in the United States, that will work in favor of a strong
and stable U.S. - Japanese relationship.
- Growing ties between the Japanese U.S.- based multinationals and their local
American suppliers will open up the much-criticized keiretsu which is considered
 the “ iron triangles” of bureaucrats, LDP politicians, and local businessmen that
often act as an effective nontariff barrier.

Japan’s Issues of National Security

● How has Japan sought to provide for its security in the postwar (post World War II)
years?
● Norman Levin reviews ​the postwar Japanese national security policy and the challenges
to this policy posed by changes in Japan’s international environment.
- Levin argues that Tokyo has followed a clear strategy throughout the postwar era
with two elements explaining the strategy: 1) economic growth through an
aggressive export policy, and 2) national security through low military
expenditures.
- The basic strategy of the early postwar years has continued to provide the
fundamental goals of Japanese foreign policy despite dramatic changes in the
international situation.
- Martin Weinstein argues that despite the profoundly changed international
environment for the U.S. - Japanese relations in the past few years, the
Japanese still see the alliance with the United States as the best vehicle for
serving their national interests. Weinstein concludes therefore, that Americans
have as high a stake in preserving the U.S. - Japanese alliance as Japanese do.

Japan’s Role International/Multinational Organizations: UN-Centrism

● Given the constraints on Japanese foreign policy that arise from its constitutional
restrictions, strongly anti military public opinion, and the difficulties in its relations with its
neighbours, t​he United Nations and other multilateral forums provide an arena where
Japan will play a significant international role.
● Multilateral institutions, especially the development banks, assist Japan in forging a new
diplomacy, serving as conduits for specific regional policies, legitimize controversial
policies which allow Japan to fulfill international responsibilities as a non-military power;
supplement national resources; compensate for diplomatic shortcomings and
inexperience; permit greater independence from the United States; and enhance
national prestige.
 ● Yasuhiro Ueki describes Japan’s pursuit of a more activist role in the United Nations and
the obstacles that stand in the way. Japan’s search for a larger international role
commensurate with its economic power has coincided with the passing of the Cold War
and with a new degree of UN involvement in regional conflict resolution.
● The Japanese government used the appeal of the UN and the rhetoric of “UN-centrism”
to try to loosen domestic resistance to a more activist role abroad. Japan’s activism is
manifest in its role in brokering a resolution of the Cambodian conflict, and its pursuit of
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
● As Japan’s position in the world changes, its companies continue to globalize, its
financial and commercial power expands, and its desire for international status grows,
Japan will seek out a new way to play a more assertive role in international affairs.

II. Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance

A. “Coping With Change in the International System”
● Japan follows a highly bureaucratic policymaking in a diverse society. Significant
foreign policy issues cause havoc or chaos within the government, forcing
politicians and bureaucrats in charge of policy to address the issues and find
solutions for them.
● Tokyo University international affairs theorist Kumon Shumpei wrote “ Once one
recognizes the current, one dares not swim against it.” - describing Japan’s
“situational ethic” or “ go-with-the-flow” style of diplomatic conduct.
● Japan’s postwar diplomacy has been following the minimalist approach because
they have strictly adhered to Yoshida Shigeru’s advice: “ If you like the shade,
find yourself a big tree” with the tree being the United States.
● Japan has three pillars of post-World War II diplomacy:
1) UN Centrism
2) Japan in Asia
3) Close ties to the United States, with the United States pillar being the
more significant amongst the others.
● Others think Japan’s minimalist, coping approach has become inappropriate to
Japan’s expanded international presence today.
 ● Observers assailed Japan’s performance in the UN Law of the Sea negotiations
as pathetic, while appraisals of Japan’s response to the Persian Gulf Crisis were
worse. Their efforts were branded a failure a month after the crises began.

Japan and the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences (1973-1980)

The Seas as Japan’s Lifeline

● Japan’s post-WWII prosperity stemmed in large measure from unfettered commerce and
shipping, assuring the resource-poor nation a stable flow of raw materials, and supplies
to fuel its industrial machine and access top overseas markets for manufactured
products.
● Japan is also the world’s largest importer of raw materials, and is heavily dependent on
the import of the materials to be found on the seabed.
● With their geographical location, Japan has been blessed with fruitful waters thus
making them a distant fishing nation, catching a quarter of the world’s fish.
● Japan prospered by limited or narrow territorial seas; freedom of the high
seas;unimpeded freedom of fishing.navigation,and access to and use of the seas
through straits; and the opportunity to use its highly advanced technology to exploit
oceanic resources; including deep seabed minerals.
● The sea is truly Japan’s lifeline, and to some extent, it’s strategic shield, protecting it
against potential threats to the home islands from the continent and, with its own
Self-Defence Forces backed by U.S. naval deployments in the Pacific, against possible
disruption of its sea lanes and lines of supply.
● Japan has a vital stake in maintaining the existing maritime regime. Japanese officials at
the time had repeatedly declared their resolve to participate actively in multinational
diplomacy. UNCLOS III seemed the perfect opportunity to be present at the creation, to
participate in the establishment of an international regime governing an area of Japan’s
most vital interests.
● Japan also encountered restraints as well. Japan’s blossoming global economic role was
cut short by the mid-1970s OPEC cartel’s control. The oil “shock” brought an end to
cheap energy supplies essential to Japan’s sustained economic prosperity. Through the
oil “shock”, the Japanese were left acutely aware of their nation’s fragility,dependence,
and resource vulnerability.
 ● Another concern stemmed from the rising assertiveness and expected clout of the less
developed “revisionist” states bent on pushing a new “new international economic order”
through confrontationist diplomacy. Peru, Chile, Guatemala, and many other coastal
states had already imposed unilateral restrictions on others' access to their adjacent
waters. The following wave of sensitivity towards issues of the environment, resources,
energy, pollution, and endangered species would affect Japan.
● Japan was criticized in the press for unprincipled, irresponsible plundering of the world’s
fishing areas, for its aggressive whaling practices, and for being the world’s number one
water polluter. Widespread public attention to these excesses, along with intensified
competition for a total world catch down by half from 1965-1975 made Tokyo official
squirm even more.
● In addition, to their woes, Japan was linked to a weakened America still bogged down in
Vietnam. Japanese analysts saw the United States as a fading economic power, a
“crumbling giant” whose “era was over”.
● Japan’s faith in the advantages of having a U.S. Protective Shield declined, and its lack
of capability to defend its own sealanes or to monitor and defend a widened costal space
magnified the seriousness of threats from the resource rich-states and lessened its
estimation of its own bargaining clout.

Omnidirectional Diplomacy
● Japan’s “defenseless from every side” diplomatic approach was the solution to Japan’s
weak position in the world. It was essentially a policy of maintaining political neutrality in
foreign affairs while expanding economic relations wherever possible.
● Okita Saburo, renowned economist and later foreign minister, wrote that Japan must
avoid becoming a danger to any other country in the world and “being friends with
everyone” may be justified as Japan’s basic principle of Japan’s diplomacy in the present
and years to come.

Japan’s Diplomacy and the Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-1991)

● Towards the end of the 1970’s, Japan transformed its foreign policy toward a far more
open, meaningful, and comprehensive alliance relationship with the United States.
● Four factors that explain the shift in Japan’s foreign policy:
 1.) Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - projecting the Soviet Union’s strategic pressure
into Asia at the same time that its Far East naval deployments were being
increased
2.) American economic decline after defeat in Vietnam
3.) Proven effectiveness of Japan’s resource diversification policies
4.) Realization that Japan’s economic prosperity depends on the open access to the
US market for high value-added Japanese manufactured goods.

Japan’s “Motivated” Diplomacy at the end of the Cold War

● The collapse of socialist regimes in 1990 (at the end of the Cold War) seemed to
bolster Japan’s prospect for unshackling itself from its narrow diplomacy of the
past to become a major world actor. At this extraordinary juncture, it seemed
Japan might be able to win recognition as a leading global player, enhance its
prestige, gain greater independence, and separate politics from economics at last
by elevating economics above military strength without having to deal seriously
with defense/security limits upon its diplomacy.
● “Motivated Diplomacy’ was Japan’s formula to deal with the emerging post-Cold
War order. Based on the premise that cooperation now replaced missiles and
tanks as tools for achieving order and that the role of military might is diminishing,
Prime Minister Miyazawa declared it Japan’s “change and duty” to marshall its
economic and technological strength, along with its store of experience and its
conceptual ability” in facing the challenges of the new order.

Japan’s Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf Crisis 1991

● Given this pre-crisis mentality, Japanese leaders would not be prepared for the sort of
operational role the crisis in the Gulf would require from Japan. The 1991 Persian Gulf
crisis was to shatter any illusions of an early transition to a new post-Cold War
international order.
● Whatever the opportunity of the Japanese leadership might have had in the Persian Gulf
case to seize the moment, to assert Japan’s stated global interests and to demonstrate
its heavy stake in the Middle East stability and the depth of commitment to the US
alliance, these were all lost at the outset.
● Since Japan’s original interest in the Gulf crisis had been limited, the Japanese
leadership in Tokyo seemed to be open to advice and the Bush Administration was even
more prepared to provide it.
● From the outset, Tokyo seemed bereft of ideas, beyond “checkbook diplomacy” that
would satisfy American and other foreign critics. But Japan’s ‘coping’ strategy was
unsuccessful because Tokyo misread the international environment, the degree of
American decline and Japanese independence in new global circumstances and the
extent of foreign expectations of Japan.

● When the Gulf War erupted (Japan imported only 5.8% oil from Iraq and 5.9%
from Kuwait), Japan readily joined the US in imposing economic sanctions.
● However there had been intense lobbying among the US public, urging Japan to
take assertive action - recommendations for Japan to send minesweepers, use
Japan’s airlift capabilities, transport food and supplies for the US-led multinational
force, expanding cooperation on Japan’s sealane defense & raising the sums
paid to support American military forces in Japan.
● Bush also made phone calls personally appealing to Japanese officials - the
intensive arm twisting transformed Japan’s response into what was a test of
Japan’s commitment to the US-Japanese alliance.
● Japan grappled with the dilemma: non-participation was not even an option - it
had to contribute as an economic and not military superpower - Japan should
play its role in a ‘world division of labor’; Japan had to something but it was not
clear what it should be - ​there would be criticism if contribution would only be in
the form of economic sanctions but military contribution would also be ruled out.
● In the end, Japan’s package: 100 medical volunteers, 2 ships and 2 planes to
provide supplies to allied forces and equipment to guard the troops against heat;
if US was disappointed w/ the package, carrying out of the pledges was even
more disappointing - only 17 doctors volunteered and Japan’s follow through on
delivery of promised equipment became snarled in bureaucratic tangle.
 ● In both UNCLOS and Persian Gulf crisis, Japan had neither an ocean policy nor
a Middle East policy - it may have guarded its own interest but fail;ed to project
its interests in a wider multilateral or military/security context.

Discussion
● In the Law of the sea and Persian Gulf episodes, Japan- the perpetual outsider, the
latecomer who joins the international structures already in place-was offered two
chances to share in historic regime building processes at the global level.
● Japan seems to lack the will to execute its professed diplomatic goals. Japan will never
risk its economic interests or the lives of its citizens on behalf of some principle or cause,
another country or ally in need, or the international community.
● In the Persian Gulf crisis, Tokyo failed to grasp the Bush administration’s perception of
the crisis as a test to the American alliance structure’s ability to handle a major threat
and of allied willingness to respond positively. In both cases, Japan’s first response
reflected its preoccupation with its own narrow economic interests. Bureaucratic
insighting and miscalculation seriously impaired the process of adjusting Japan’s
responses.
● In the end, Japan did not jeopardize its own interests but acted methodically,
pragmatically and when necessary, opportunistically to secure and protect those
interests. ​Rejecting the military option and restricting both financing and manpower
support in the Gulf case illustrate vividly the paramount significance Japan attaches to
certain basic national interests.​ In the Persian Gulf example, Japan’s response has not
been based on Iraq’s act of aggression in annexing Kuwait, nor did Japan’s approach
reflect moral outrage over Saddam Hussein’s actions, no matter what the outcome,
Japan’s task would be to place priority on setting up a crisis management organization.
Some Costs of Japan’s Minimalist Diplomacy
● Unappreciated Efforts​. Japan rarely associates its own success with that of the
conference, the alliance, or the organization. Japan’s commitment to carrying out its
goals is lukewarm, even to the point of jeopardizing the success of larger endeavors to
which its own success is linked.
● Communication Static. ​Without articulating foreign policy objectives clearly, it squanders
energy just to gauge what others want it to want or not want. In seeking to clarify and
 confirm others’ policies, motives, and meanings, Japan unduly complicates its
diplomacy.
● Distrust and Resentment. J​ apan’s half hearted effort to execute an externally prescribed
agenda attracts the criticisms it wishes to avoid. Japanese officials often seek
recognition for their contribution toward some development assistance program,
multilateral agency, or issue (ex: whaling, refugees, trade with South Africa) even though
that ‘contribution’ comes from a reluctant Japan kicking and screaming every effort of the
way. But when the efforts are unacknowledged or unappreciated, Japan turns resentful.
In the case of the Persian Gulf, one is likely to hear: “We made great efforts to do
everything in the United States wanted, but we can never do enough to satisfy them”
● ​ hat passes as Japan’s domestic debate on
Alice in Wonderland Domestic Debate. W
foreign policy reinforces these misconceptions in that key policy issues are radically
altered when discussed in Japan’s political arena. As in past controversies, the Gulf
crisis bore dispute along peripheral factional, opposition, bureaucratic, and ideological
battle lines (ex: whether the Soviet “threat” to Japan is “indirect” or “direct”, What “1% of
GNP” for defense really means, the third of the “Non Nuclear Principles”, distinguishing
“offensive” from “defensive” weaponry, defining “alliance” with the United States).
● Japan’s Future Left to Others. ​Japan lacks reciprocity in monitoring the monitors which
then lets control over its own future slip. There remains to be a gap between Japan’s
contributions and their influence in defense, foreign aid, and in multilateral organizations.
Japan has allowed the game, the rules, and the scoring to be handled by others. Japan
had neither an ocean policy nor a Middle East policy - Japan guarded its own interests
but was unable to express its interests in a multilateral or military/security context.