Defence Forces Review 2019

Defence Forces
Review 2019
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Defence Forces
Review 2019
ISSN 1649-7066
Published for the Military Authorities by
the Public Relations Section at the Chief of Staff’s Branch,
and printed at the Defence Forces Printing Press, Infirmary Road, Dublin 7.
© Copyright in accordance with Section 56 of the Copyright Act, 1963, Section 7

of the University of Limerick Act, 1989 and Section 6 of the Dublin University Act, 1989.
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Launch of the Defence Forces Review
In conjunction with an Academic Seminar
University College Dublin, Dublin
05th December 2019
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Defence Forces Review 2019
Preface
“The secret of change is to focus all your energy, not in fighting the old, but on building
the new.”
Socrates
It is a privilege for me as Officer in Charge Defence Forces Public Relations Branch to launch
the Defence Forces Review for 2019. The purpose of the Defence Forces Review is to provide
a forum in which contributors can present their research and facilitate discussion on a wide
range of defence-related matters for the benefit of the wider Defence Community. I believe that
this issue of the Review will achieve all of these goals, and will, in turn stimulate widespread
discussion amongst readers.
Building on recent publications, this year’s review primarily focusses on a specific theme, in
the case of this year’s review the theme is: ‘The 22nd Century Military Force: Technology,
Innovation and Future Force Concepts.’ The articles reflect, among other things, the changing
character of warfare, the exponential changes in technology and the likely effects these will have
on militaries and the manner in which military operations might be conducted in the future
operating environment.
The Editor of the Defence Forces Review for 2019 is Lieutenant Commander Paul Hegarty.
Despite a very heavy schedule as an Instructor in the Command and Staff School he assumed
this editorial burden with energy and commitment, displaying a commendable level of academic
ambition for this project.
For this year’s edition, he has assembled a diverse group of contributors, working in academic
collaboration with the University College Dublin (UCD) School of Politics and International
Relations (SPIRe), and the UCD Clinton Institute. A special word of gratitude to his fellow
editors, Professor Ben Tonra (SPIRe, UCD) and Dr. Eugenio Lilli (Clinton Institute, UCD),
for their expert insights and invaluable contributions in making this collaborative effort
a success.
Again, many thanks to all our contributors without whose commitment and generosity the
production and publication of this year’s review would not be possible.
Further copies of the Review are available from the Defence Forces Public Relations Branch
at info@military.ie or online at http://www.military.ie/info-centre/publications/defence-
forces-review.
J. Whittaker
Lieutenant Colonel
Officer in Charge
Public Relations Branch
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Editor's Notes
The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those
who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn.
Alvin Toffler
The multiplicity of, and the threats deriving from technological based systems continues to
rise as the dawn of the fourth industrial revolution breaks on the horizon. Modern society is
undergoing a technological revolution that is fundamentally altering the way we live, work and
relate to one another. While it remains uncertain how this will exactly unfold, it is evident, that
the response required to manage it must be integrated and comprehensive, and will involve
all elements of society, including the military. The future will be characterised by a fusion of
technologies that are blurring the lines between the physical, digital and biological spheres.
Technology continues to advance at a rate not foreseen by those who have used it historically
in a military context, and while the fundamental nature of warfare may not be changing; its
character certainly is, as changes in thinking and technology evolve. How do we comprehend,
contextualise, and conceptualise the changes wrought by emerging technologies, which are
converging and being applied in completely unforeseen ways? History is littered with inflection
points, such as the infamous ‘horse and tank’ moment, and the future military organisation
will have to understand and learn to manage the power of information, in data processing,
Artificial Intelligence, robotics, bio-science, materials and autonomy, to name but a few.
While it is acknowledged that the starting point for future strategy must account for the world
as it is because of the way it is, the Defence Forces must be prepared to evolve and adapt as
threats develop. Military organisations, similar to the society they represent, must learn how
to manage and prepare for this (un)certainty and ensure that their structures, equipment and
doctrine evolve to meet both current and future potential threats. Fundamental to achieving
this objective is the need for military organisations to innovate and to work collaboratively
with external partners, such as business and academia, in learning and discussing
potential solutions.
This year’s edition of the Defence Forces Review is published in academic collaboration with
the University College Dublin (UCD) School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRe),
and the UCD Clinton Institute. It reflects on the current structure and associated capabilities
of the Irish Defence Forces, while simultaneously inviting comprehensive critical analysis with
a view to contributing to the current discourse so that we can learn about how to best prepare
for the future operating domain, and its associated challenges.
This edition presents contemporary assessments on selected topics in an attempt to add to the
current debate, and proposes solutions and a discourse that the Defence Forces can draw and
learn from. The papers cover topics that demonstrate a wealth of knowledge both internal to
the Defence Forces and in wider academia, both national and international, that in turn will
promote further debate on these pertinent and current issues.
In 2019, the Defence Forces delivered its first Joint Command and Staff Course (JCSC),
which marks a paradigm shift in how the Defence Forces trains and prepares its future senior
leaders on its flagship course. The abstracts from this course, as part of the MA in Leadership,
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Management and Defence Studies (LMDS) program are included in the Review. To view any
of these listed, please contact the Defence Forces Library at; info@military.ie.
The review concludes with short biographical details of the authors who kindly contributed
to this year’s edition. The Editorial team would like to thank the contributors for their
enthusiasm and willingness to prepare papers for submission, thereby participating to the
discourse on what a 22nd Century Defence Forces could resemble and what challenges it
may face. We are also indebted to the Defence Forces Printing Press (DFPP), in particular,
Lt (NS) Colm Fox, and Pte Shane Curran, for their time, patience and professionalism in
delivering a high quality finished product.
Editorial Team
Lt Cdr Paul Hegarty Prof Ben Tonra Dr. Eugenio Lilli
Command &Staff School SPIRe, UCD Clinton Institute, UCD
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Editor's Biographical Statement

Lt Cdr Paul Hegarty joined the Defence Forces in 2000 as a member
of the 40th Naval Cadet Class and currently works as an instructor in the
Command and Staff School. He has held several sea-going appointments,
and has served in a variety of command, staff and training appointments.
He has completed the Royal Navy International Long Navigation Course
at HMS Collingwood, holds a BSc in Nautical Science (CIT), a Masters
in Project Management (UL) and an H-Dip in Geographical Information
Systems (UCC). He is a graduate of the UK Joint Services Command and
Staff College and attended the Advanced Command and Staff Course in
2018 and completed an MA in Defence Studies from King’s College London. He has submitted
research to the Royal Irish Academy for publishing in the upcoming edition of Irish Studies
in International Affairs and has lectured on Maritime Security at the Whitaker Institute in
NUIG. His PhD research focuses on Change Management in military organisations and he
will complete his doctoral studies in early 2020.
Dr Eugenio Lilli is Lecturer and Coordinator of the Master Program

in American Politics and Foreign Policy, at University College Dublin,
Ireland. Eugenio’s primary area of research is the foreign policy of the
United States of America. His current work focuses on US cyber security
policy. He is especially interested in how advancements in Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) have affected US national security in
the areas of defense, homeland security, and foreign policy. Eugenio’s
publications also cover issues of US foreign policy toward the Middle
East, democracy promotion, and international terrorism. Previously,
Eugenio lectured at King’s College London (2015-16), at the Joint Services Command and
Staff College, part of the UK Defence Academy (2011-13), and at John Cabot University in
Rome (2016). He was also Honorary Visiting Research Fellow at City University London (2015-
16). Eugenio holds a PhD from King’s College London, War Studies Department.
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Ben Tonra is Full Professor of International Relations at the UCD

School of Politics and International Relations. At UCD he teaches,
researches and publishes in European foreign, security and defence
policy, Irish foreign, security and defence policy and International
Relations theory. Outside the university Ben has served as chair of the
Royal Irish Academy's Standing Committee on International Affairs
and is a co-leader of a research programme in EU security and defence
at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), Dublin.
Professor Tonra is a graduate of the University of Limerick (BA and MA)
and completed his doctoral studies at the University of Dublin (Trinity
College) in 1996.
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Table of Contents
Article Page
Network Centric Warfare with Software Defined 12

Networks Enabled Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
Dr. Mubashir Husain Rehmani and Dr. Donna O’Shea
Small States’ Capability Enhancement for Peacekeeping: 20

What can Ireland learn from other countries?
Dr. Brendan Flynn
“Relying on the goodwill of the individual, and luck” 30

The problematic nature of utilising the Army Reserve
skills base in the Single Force Concept.
Jonathon Carroll
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: 42

A Threat Analysis for the Irish Air Corps
Capt Kevin Fitzgerald, Capt James Northover,
Lt David Finnegan and Dr. Sharon Feeney
Pushing the Defence Technology Frontier: A Role for the EU? 50

Dr. Daniel Fiott
Beware the Boomerang Efects: Western Risk Society 58

and the Strategic Backlashes of Military–
Technological Modernisation
Eoin McNamara
Multi-Domain Operations: The Need to 68

Develop Resilience and Capability.
Comdt Gavin Egerton
‘First with the Truth’ 76

The Paradox of Future Information-led Conflict
Dr. David Reindorp
Tele-mental health and psychosocial support: 84

A case for implementation with Irish Defence Forces personnel.
Pte (AR) Eoin O'Shea,Capt (AR) Mathew McCauley
and Comdt Dorota O'Brein
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Table of Contents
Article Page
Joint Force Command the need for Change 92

Lt Cdr Paul Hegarty
What Implications Will Artificial Intelligence 106

Have on The Defence Forces over the Coming Decades,
and, are they Ready for the Associated Challenges
these Developments will Induce?
Comdt Ken Sheehan
Patrolling Below the Horizon; Addressing Ireland’s 114

Awareness of our Maritime Geospatial Domain.
Lt (NS) Shane Mulcahy
Is Organisational Culture a Barrier to Change 122

in The Defence Forces?
Comdt Michael Hosback
“National cyber deterrence and the 134

Irish Defence Forces’ contribution”
Caitríona Heinl
Persistent Engagement and Information Campaigning 146

Steven Harland and Dick Hemsley
Mapping Ireland’s Role in Cyber Warfare and Peacekeeping: 154

Developing Policy Towards Situational Awareness
and Incident Response
Matthew G. O'Neill and Mark Williams
Achieving “information superiority” of the maritime 164

domain in the network age.
Lt (NS) Steven Ryan
The Defence Forces and Future Peace Support Operations 172

Lt Col Timothy O’Brien
Meeting multiple threats in an Uncertain Future 182

Wesley Bourke
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Table of Contents
Article Page
The European Military Airworthiness Framework as a 190

Defence Force Enabler and an Interface with the
Irish Aviation Industry
Dr Kyriakos I. Kourousis
Generating Network Centric Warfare 202

Capabilities within the Defence Forces.
Capt (AR) Chris O Slatara
Abstracts 1 Joint Command and Staff Course 210

MA In Leadership, Management And Defence Studies (LMDS).
Short Biographical Statements of Contributing Authors 234
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Network Centric Warfare
with Software Defined
Networks Enabled Remotely
Piloted Aircraft Systems
Dr. Mubashir Husain Rehmani and Dr. Donna O’Shea
Ríomh - Intelligent Secure Systems Group, Department of Computer
Science, Cork Institute of Technology, Ireland
Network Centric Warfare with Software Defined Networks
Enabled Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
Abstract
It is envisioned that the 22nd century military will be heavily reliant on information and
communication technologies (ICT). The use of ICT in future military operations will dictate
how tactical strategies will be designed. In this context, network centric warfare will
provide the basis to consultation, command, and control (C3) for the military operations.
In the areas behind the enemy lines, where military personnel access is dangerous,
remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) will be used for military operations. RPAS are
generally unmanned, therefore, they need to be operated remotely and communication
between the RPAS and the operator is normally established through IEEE L-Band,
IEEE S-Band, and ISM Bands. The operator will issue the command and RPAS will
react accordingly to complete the tasks. However, these wireless spectrum bands are
susceptible to jamming by the attackers. Moreover, when these RPAS operate behind
the enemy lines, there is high probability that offensive cyber operations may break their
communication channels/links. Thus, there is a need to look for switching to reliable
communication links frequently for RPAS. To achieve this, software defined networks
(SDN) enabled RPAS are highly suitable. In this paper, we propose a counter strategy
that can be adopted by the Irish Defence Forces in order to operate in an environment
where offensive cyber operations have been used increasingly. We will model this
problem as Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) by using reinforcement learning (an advanced
machine learning technique) to help SDN controller to learn the strategy adopted by
the attacker. We also discuss that how the Irish Defence Forces will equip themselves
for joint operations with UN/EU/NATO forces for SDN-enabled RPAS and what
development should be implemented with professional and military education (PME).
Introduction – Why use Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems?

Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS)1, drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have
numerous applications, both in urban and non-urban settings2. Recently, RPAS are used for
commercial applications such as delivery of small packages and pizza delivery. RPAS have also
been deployed to support intelligent transportation system, to serve as aerial base station3 and
for emergency drug delivery4. Another prominent area of RPAS’ application is used in amateur
applications5 such as aerial photography, and for recreational use6. This wide applicability of
RPAS in different urban and military applications is due to the advancement in ICT and
availability of cheaper hardware devices.
RPAS are often lightweight and carry surveillance equipment over the regions which are
dangerous to access by military personnel. Additionally, RPAS can be controlled remotely
over several kilometres, thus decreasing precious military casualties at the cost of these low
1 European Defence Agency Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/remotely-
piloted-aircraft-systems---rpas
2 L. Gupta, R. Jain and G. Vaszkun, “Survey of Important Issues in UAV Communication Networks,” in IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 2, (2016), pp. 1123-1152.
3 Vishal Sharma, Navuday Sharma, Mubashir Husain Rehmani, Control over Skies: Survivability, Coverage and Mobility Laws for Hierarchical
Aerial Base Stations, arXiv:1903.03725v1, 2019.
4 Sedjelmaci Hichem, Sidi-Mohammed Senouci, Nirwan Ansari, and Mubashir Husain Rehmani, Recent advances on security and privacy in
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs), vol. 90, (2019), 101846, Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks.
5 Z. Kaleem and M. H. Rehmani, “Amateur Drone Monitoring: State-of-the-Art Architectures, Key Enabling Technologies, and Future Research
Directions,” in IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 25, no. 2, (2018) pp. 150-159.
6 X. Shi, C. Yang, W. Xie, C. Liang, Z. Shi and J. Chen, “Anti-Drone System with Multiple Surveillance Technologies: Architecture,
Implementation, and Challenges,” in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 56, no. 4, (2018), pp. 68-74.
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cost RPAS (if downed by the enemy). For tactical military operations, these RPAS are deployed
redundantly and forming clusters so that mission critical tasks can be achieved - forming a
RPAS network7. Recent examples have witnessed trials of RPAS networks as swarms, which
co-ordinate with each other establishing a multi-hop communication network to increase
the communication range, to relay Ground Control Centre (GCC) commands to the RPAS
operating at the forefront and to achieve last mile connectivity for ground troops.
There may be few other application scenarios in the battlefield where RPAS can play its role.
Imagine wireless sensor nodes are deployed in hostile environments and these sensor nodes
capture different information such as images, coordinates, videos, and audio. Since these sensor
nodes are energy-constrained devices, they cannot directly communicate this information
to the GCC. Therefore, RPAS can visit them and collect the required information, which
can then pass to the GCC for decisions, or the same information can pass to the ground
battlefield troops.
5G and beyond 5G communication networks are suggested with the vision to improve user
experience, more bandwidth and less delay. With these requirements in mind, the 5G public
private partnership (5G-PPP) suggested to increase the number of deployed base stations,
however, with such massive deployments of base stations at micro level, the expenditure to
deploy, operate, and maintain i.e., capital/operational (CAPEX/OPEX) will increase. An
alternative approach is to use RPAS for coverage where user traffic demands is increasing.
Consequently, the resulting network will be a RPAS network. This same concept can be
extended and used in battlefield environments to provide coverage and connectivity for troops
on ground.
Setting the context – Network centric warfare using remotely

piloted aircraft systems
Troops in the battlefield are not necessarily equipped with abundant ICT resources such
as powerful wireless communication devices along with limitless energy available for them
to operate8. It may be possible that the troops deployed behind the enemy lines may have
resource constrained energy devices and wireless communication equipment. For instance,
RPAS deployed for monitoring and image acquisition, wireless sensor nodes mounted on
vehicles and wireless radio transceivers carried by the troops are few examples of such resource
constrained energy devices.
The idea of network centric warfare was first developed by the Command and Control
Research Program (CCRP), United States Department of Defence (DoD)9. The goal of this
program was to improve the command and control activities by incorporating information and
communication technologies10.
7 J. L. Burbank, P. F. Chimento, B. K. Haberman and W. T. Kasch, “Key Challenges of Military Tactical Networking and the Elusive Promise of
MANET Technology,” in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 44, no. 11,(2006), pp. 39-45.
8 I. Zacarias, L. P. Gaspary, A. Kohl, R. Q. A. Fernandes, J. M. Stocchero and E. P. de Freitas, “Combining Software-Defined and Delay-Tolerant
Approaches in Last-Mile Tactical Edge Networking,” in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 55, no. 10, (2017), pp. 22-29.
9 D. A. Eisenberg, D. L. Alderson, M. Kitsak, A. Ganin and I. Linkov, “Network Foundation for Command and Control (C2) Systems: Literature
Review,” in IEEE Access, vol. 6, (2018), pp. 68782-68794.
10 A. K. Cebrowski and J. J. Garstka, “Network-centric warfare: Its origin and future,” US Nav. Inst. Proc., vol. 124, no. 1, (1998), pp. 28-35.
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In network-centric warfare, the high ranked decision making echelons can use information
and communication technologies (ICT) to monitor and guide troops deployed on ground
leading to the creation of Network-centric RPAS system. Therefore, for a timely and informed
decision, the importance of last mile connectivity of troops as well as real time information
communication to both high rank decision making echelons to battle field troops is important
to save lives and to avoid any collateral damage.
Advantages of using software defined networks enabled RPAS

in tactical networks
The wireless spectrum bands over which the communication between the GCC and RPAS is
established can be susceptible to jamming by the attackers. On top of this, since the operating
scenarios of these RPAS are tactical military environments, therefore, there is high probability
that offensive cyber operations may break the communication links/channels between GCC
and the RPAS. This necessitates the need to incorporate resiliency within the communication
network and this can be achieved by switching to reliable communication link frequently to
the RPAS. On top of this, there are certainly challenges for proper functioning of these RPAS
networks. These challenges include the availability of less computational on-board resources
including power, best route determination, intermittent and frequent link disruption, and link
jamming attacks through offensive cyber operations by the attackers.
Software defined network (SDN) is one such candidate technology which can help to support
the above mentioned communication task in a flexible manner. SDN controller at GCC
provides a global view of the whole RPAS network. All the activities ranging traffic and link
conditions will be available to the GCC. This will help to take the global decision to facilitate
longer lifetime of RPAS network and to achieve global optimal results. This global network
view of RPAS network at GCC will also help enable to reduce computational power at RPAS.
As a result, complex image processing algorithms as well as offline machine learning algorithms
can be applied to achieve data-driven optimization.
Separation of the control and data plane with the help of SDN technology for RPAS will allow
flexibility to use equipment, protocols, and algorithms, which are not vendor specific. This will
also help to achieve security, as behind the enemy lines, the enemy will not be able to readily
understand the working of underlying protocols. In the worst case, if the RPAS network is
compromised, the SDN controller at GCC can quickly adapt to the network conditions and
make the network secure and safe.
Another advantage that SDN technology will bring to RPAS network is to execute different
services such as monitoring, tracking, image capturing, and co-ordinate tracking and all such
services can be initialized without making any changes in the underlying hardware. Firmware
update in RPAS (SDN switch) will no longer be a problem as SDN switches will be built on
open source software. The same RPAS (UAV or drone) network can be used for urban setting
and public safety communication. Thus, this drastically decreases the cost of maintenance
and transition from one application to another. For efficient network management of these
RPAS networks and to deal with fast handovers in the RPAS network, SDN seems to be an
appropriate solution.
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It is worth mentioning that use of technologies such as SDN to support network centric warfare
is becoming prominent in military planning and operations. For instance, the United States
Army proposed third offset strategy (TOS) as Department of Defence (DoD)’s innovation
initiative in 201411. The goal of TOS is to form long range research and planning program
considering technological advancements in areas such as unmanned autonomous aircraft
systems, lasers, and cognitive warfare, and other promising technologies12. Other similar efforts
have been taken by research institutes in US such as Lincoln Laboratory in Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT)13 to develop prototypes for RPAS and investigate research
challenges and issues. In addition to these efforts, dedicated workshops have been taken place
in US to discuss secure and reliable communication for multi-domain operations1415.
A reinforcement learning based counter strategy for software

defined network enabled RPAS
This paper proposes to use software defined network enabled RPAS to achieve the
aforementioned goals (cf. Section 2 and 3)16. As a result, the SDN controller on GCC will
help RPAS to select reliable communication paths and thus good network performance can be
achieved. The general idea is that the SDN controller at GCC will issue commands to change
flow entries in RPAS (SDN switch). As a response, the RPAS (SDN switch) will update their
flow tables and thus, be able to select reliable communication links/channels. Figure 1 shows
the scenario depicting offensive cyber operations in tactical military environments.
Figure 1. Scenario depicting offensive cyber operations in tactical military environments
11 https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ARES-Group-Policy-Paper-US-Third-Offset-Strategy-December2016.pdf
12 https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/business/tech/the-us-army-is-apparently-very-close-to-having-laser-weapons-723251.html
13 https://www.ll.mit.edu/r-d/communication-systems/tactical-networks
14 http://jointnetworks.dsigroup.org/
15 https://futurenetworks.ieee.org/conferences/2019-workshop-tactical-and-first-responder-networks
16 V. Sharma, F. Song, I. You and H. Chao, “Efficient Management and Fast Handovers in Software Defined Wireless Networks Using UAVs,” in
IEEE Network, vol. 31, no. 6, (2017), pp. 78-85.
17
The proposed strategy focuses on allowing the SDN controller to utilise SDN technology as
an aid in learning the strategy being adopted by the attacker. 17. Each RPAS will act as an SDN
switch, which will get directions from the Ground Control Centre (GCC), where a centralized
SDN controller monitors all the activities and dynamics occurring within the RPAS network.
These dynamics also include the active monitoring of link characteristics. The SDN controller
at GCC will be running reinforcement-learning algorithm using Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB)
approach. For the sake of brevity, to avoid technical details and to consider the general
audience of this article (Defence Forces Review), we ask the readers to consult Algorithm 1
of our recently published work to know the exact working of this MAB algorithm that can be
applied for SDN based RPAS network18.
In the proposed strategy, the RPAS will act as the SDN-enabled switch using OpenFlow protocol.
OpenFlow protocol will be served as SouthBound Application Programming Interface (API)
and help GCC SDN controller to pass the commands to the RPAS (SDN switches). A dedicated
control channel will be used between GCC (SDN controller) and RPAS (SDN switches). The
RPAS may be equipped with various medium access protocols (depending upon the operating
environment) to communicate between each other. Note that though Satellite Communication
(SATCOM) can be used to establish communication between GCC and RPAS, this research
posits that it will increase the cost. Therefore, this paper suggests using IEEE L-Band, IEEE
S-Band, and ISM Bands for such communications.
Professional and military education regarding SDN-enabled

RPAS for Irish defence forces – A framework
The concept of RPAS based network centric warfare is not new from the EU context. For
instance, the Spanish Ministry of Defence supported a two year project named DRONE for
RPAS enabled network centric warfare19. The whole system of RPAS can further be improved
by incorporating the contributions of SDN and the Irish Defence Forces can avail of the
advantages of existing EU projects. In this context, the professional and military education
regarding SDN-enabled RPAS for Irish Defence Forces should be provided to build the capacity
of the DF.
What we are suggesting here is to promote the use of existing resources developed within
Republic of Ireland to strengthen the Irish nation. We give an example of Department of
Computer Science, Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) in which we have state-of-the-art online
facilitates and programs. CIT has heavily invested on its private cloud infrastructure to deliver
state of the art online MSc programs ranging from Cyber security to Cloud Computing and
from artificial intelligence to software architecture and design20. These MSc program are one
of its kind in the country, not only serving Irish students but students from EU and other
international countries are widely taking online these courses. State-of-the-art topics regarding
17 G. Secinti, P. B. Darian, B. Canberk and K. R. Chowdhury, “SDNs in the Sky: Robust End-to-End Connectivity for Aerial Vehicular Networks,”
in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 56, no. 1, (2018), pp. 16-21.
18 M. H. Rehmani, F. Akhtar, A. Davy and B. Jennings, “Achieving Resilience in SDN-Based Smart Grid: A Multi-Armed Bandit Approach,” 2018
4th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization and Workshops (NetSoft), Montreal, QC, (2018), pp. 366-371.
19 I. Vidal, F. Valera, M. A. Diaz and M. Bagnulo, “Design and practical deployment of a network-centric remotely piloted aircraft system,” in IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 10, (2014), pp. 22-29.
20 http://cs.cit.ie/online
18
ICT can be taught to DF in consultation with CIT. Irish Defence Forces Training Centre
(DFTC) can use the expertise developed in CIT. The Naval Service and CIT already have a
strong collaboration in the shape of National Maritime College of Ireland and this collaboration
can further be extended with Department of Computer Science, CIT and DFTC.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed how software defined network enabled RPAS can be used for network
centric warfare to support the joint operations with UN/EU/NATO forces for SDN-enabled
RPAS and what development should be implemented with professional and military education
(PME) by DFTC. We also presented the advantages of using software defined networks in
RPAS networks along with our proposed reinforcement learning based counter strategy to
reliable RPAS communication. As plan of future work, we intend to deploy a testbed consisting
of several RPAS and compare its results acquired after Mininet based simulation results. The
goal is to deploy an attacker to disturb and jamming the communication between GCC and
RPAS and then see how well the proposed strategy sustains under different jamming strategies
and attacks.
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20
Small States’ Capability
Enhancement for Peacekeeping:
What can Ireland learn from other
Countries?
Dr. Brendan Flynn
School of Political Science and Sociology, NUI, Galway.
Small States’ Capability Enhancement for Peacekeeping:
Abstract
This paper examines how small states manage technology for their future force profile in
the specific domain of procurement for peacekeeping, crisis and humanitarian response
missions. Given that small states typically have rather limited budgets, their ability to
innovate is usually narrow. This paper explores, briefly, whether other countries offer
lessons for the Irish military that are transferable? Three case studies on capability
procurements are offered. These include New Zealand’s procurement of a large multi-
role vessel to give strategic sealift capabilities, Austria’s purchase of Hercules transport
aircraft conferring operational mobility, and Finland’s ongoing investment in fleets of
protected tactical vehicles for overseas deployments. While none of these procurements
have been free from various political or technical problems, nor without significant costs,
they each offer lessons in how small states can procure capabilities that offer greater
operational and tactical flexibility, while enhancing their country’s strategic reach and
profile. The analytical point made here is that small states need to be ambitious, think
flexibly and act creatively to equip their peacekeepers.
Enhancing military capabilities for small states: penny packets?

Technology and innovation will surely be central to the future force profile of all militaries,
but for small states the challenges of managing such adaptations are daunting. Unlike the
larger military powers, most small state militaries typically lack the scale or the large budgets
to facilitate both the experiments or subsequent mainstreaming of high-tech future force
innovation at the strategic, operational and tactical level. It is sometimes suggested that ‘small
states’ can be nimble innovators, but this is usually limited to a handful of states that are
either very wealthy (Singapore, UAE), or face huge military threats (Israel), and even at that
they often innovate in relatively narrow areas. There is also the brutal fact of rising defence
inflation associated with modern military weapons, platforms and capabilities1. Scale matters,
and countries with limited budgets can easily end up with increasingly smaller and smaller
amounts of quality capabilities-the so called ‘penny packets’ phenomenon2.
Moreover, how can small states future-proof their force modernization given competing threats
and demands? Peacekeeping and crisis missions are often a major focus for their militaries but
require capabilities that may be of limited use for traditional territorial defence. Unfortunately,
the days of doing peacekeeping on the cheap are over. While for UN operations, costs can be
reimbursed albeit usually after a delay, EU peacekeeping operations generally work on a ‘costs
fall where they rise’ principle meaning no, or only very limited, scope for reimbursement exists.
More seriously, peacekeeping operations are globally encountering greater complexity and
more diffuse and lethal threats. It is not uncommon now for peacekeepers to be facing armed
opponents, often non-state forces, who could employ small drones, social media, advanced
anti-armour weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of a bewildering variety, sometimes
combined with extreme tactics, notably ‘suicide’ vehicle based (VBIEDs). The future may well
be a ‘disrupted’ scenario where aggressors threaten peacekeepers, and the populations under
1 Hartley, Keith (2017) The Economics of Arms. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Agenda, pp.43-48.
2 Till, Geoffrey (2014) “Are Small Navies Different?”, pp.21–31 in Mulqueen, Michael, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (eds.). Small Navies:
Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace. Farnham: Ashgate. At p.23.
22
their protection, with a blend of old and new weapons, tactics and strategies: Kalashnikov and
machete wielding militias with 3-D printed drones and mobile phone based offensive cyber
hacking and jamming capabilities3.
There has also been a shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine which places increasing emphasis
on protection of civilians and human security, as much as force protection, and several UN
missions have been criticized for neglecting the former, although depends on the details of a
specific mandate as to how extensive such responsibilities can be. The implication of this is that
tomorrow’s peacekeepers will require a balance between assets that protect themselves, and the
type of mobility and firepower that allows them to protect specific populations at discrete sites,
such as refugee camps.
The days of deploying lightly equipped basic infantry units in soft-skinned vehicles, protected
by their organic small arms and the blue UN flag are long gone. More flexible and joint forces
seem required, blending air, naval, intelligence specialists with local and other friendly forces.
Military co-operation with civilian decision-makers, agencies and NGOs has become essential.
Peacekeepers must be situationally aware and have excellent intelligence, with greater levels of
intrinsic force protection all of which tends towards numerically smaller deployments but with
higher technology needs and often a greater logistical footprint.
For some small states, one can discern a trend towards providing tiny niche forces, sometimes
following a Special Forces template, with the lightest of vehicles and weapons, de facto
operating under the logistical and protective screen of larger forces. However, this often places
such units at the operational mercy of other contingents, and the political influence of niche
units is easily diluted. A small state that always contributes a sub-platoon sized detachment of
Special Forces will not likely be given senior command positions or be much listened to at the
operational mission level4. If small states want to be relevant and influential in peacekeeping,
they need to figure out how to offer force packages that cross a threshold well beyond the
tokenistic or niche nor have them burdened by excessive national political caveats that limit
their operational flexibility. This implies land units of at least reinforced company size, and
credible aerial and maritime assets as well. In the following sections three diverse small states
are examined to draw lessons about force modernization with regard to specific procurements
relevant for peacekeeping.
3 On insurgent abilities for electronic and communication warfare see Gorman, Siobhan, Yochi J. Dreazen, and August Cole, “Insurgents
hack US drones.” Wall Street Journal December 17th, 2009, and Doubleday, Justin. “Russia-backed insurgents have’ exceptional’ jamming
capability: US Army Joins Ukraine’s Electronic-Warfare Fight Against Rebels.” Inside the Army 27, no. 4 (2015): 4-5. For a more reflective
piece: Weinbaum, Cortney, Steven Berner, and Bruce McClintock. SIGINT for anyone: The growing availability of signals intelligence in the
public domain. No. PE-273-OSD. RAND Corporation Washington United States, 2017; On the ubiquity of new technologies such as mobile
phones alongside old technologies see: Macdonald, Fraser, and Jonathan Kirami. “Women, mobile phones, and M16s: Contemporary New
Guinea highlands warfare.” The Australian Journal of Anthropology 28, no. 1 (2017), pp.104-119; See also: Lewis, Jeffrey William. “The Human
Use of Human Beings: Suicide Bombing, Technological Innovation, and the Asymmetry of Modern Warfare.” Global Politics Review 2, no. 2
(2016): 9-27. On insurgent use of drones see: Bunker, Robert J. Terrorist and insurgent unmanned aerial vehicles: Use, potentials, and military
implications. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, P.A., Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College Press, 2015, https://
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a623134.pdf; Esther, Ulrike. “The global diffusion of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or ‘drones’,” pp. 78-98
in Aaronson, Mike, Wali Aslam, Tom Dyson, Regina Rauxloh (eds.) Precision strike warfare and international intervention: strategic, ethico-legal
and decisional implications. Routledge, 2014; On the lethality and prevalence of simple and old weapons like machetes see: Verwimp, Philip.
“Machetes and firearms: The organization of massacres in Rwanda.” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (2006): 5-22, or for a more general
overview see Chapter 6 on “War” in Edgerton, David. The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global history since 1900. London: Profile, 2006.
4 Note this observation is not a critique of contributing special forces to peace-keeping missions per se. They can provide excellent situational
awareness, vital intelligence and are ideal for local forces training and interaction. The point is that such small force elements are not a substitute
by themselves for a more substantive national peacekeeping presence.
23
New Zealand’s procurement of a large multi-role vessel-buying

into jointness?
Peacekeeping remains a core operational priority for the New Zealand Defence Forces5, and
while some of these operations have been classic UN led missions, such as UNTSO6 in the
Golan, or the Sinai based MFO7, others have been more controversial and challenging, notably
the deployment of NZDF special forces deployments in Afghanistan.
Peacekeeping operations close to home in East Timor (1992-2012), the Solomon Islands/
Bougainville (2003-2013), and Tonga (2006) were intensive and reinforced the importance of
having credible maritime logistics and amphibious capabilities for remote regions. Aviation
assets could not reach every location nor deliver bulky supplies economically. The NZDF
have also engaged in peacekeeping or maritime stabilization operations much further away:
an infantry force in Bosnia (1994-96), making a P-3K Orion available to NATO and then
EUNAVFOR off the coast of Somalia and deploying a frigate in the Aegean with NATO’s
Operation Active Endeavor8.
To be globally relevant, the small and geographically remote NZDF has had to adopt an
expeditionary mindset as a default setting and the ways and means to give effect to this.
Crucially this strategic orientation has been recognized in successive official policy statements9
and in procurement decisions.
Accordingly, in 2004 the New Zealand government gave approval for a Multi-Role Vessel (MRV),
which is a logistics ship with some amphibious operationally capability. This was commissioned
into service in 2007 as HMNZS Canterbury. In fact, the idea for such a ship was a long-
standing goal10 and today there is a contemporary trend for MRV procurement with several
designs available. To save money, the Canterbury was based on a modified commercial ferry.
5 McDougall, Derek. “Peacekeeping from Oceania: Perspectives from Australia, New Zealand and Fiji.” The Round Table 106, no. 4 (2017):
453-466. For an up to date list of NZDF deployments see: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/default.htm
6 Typically, about 8 NZDF observers. See: https://untso.unmissions.org
7 See: http://mfo.org/en
8 On the New Zealand Navy, see: Paget, Steven. “The ‘best small nation navy in the world’? The twenty-first century Royal New Zealand
Navy.” Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 8, no. 3 (2016): 230-256.
9 See for example the Defence White paper of 2016, at pp.20-22. http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2016/Defence-White-
Paper-2016.pdf
10 In 2002 a Maritime Forces Review was conducted which suggested an entire integrated procurement programme, “Project Protector”, which
included dropping a third frigate for a more flexible multi-role vessel. Before that, in 2000, a report on Sea-lift capabilities had suggested such
a vessel be procured. Tringham, Kate (2016) ‘Canterbury tales re-told: RNZN multirole vessel deliver’, Jane’s International Defence Review, 8th
June. Available at: http://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Canterbury-tales-re-told-RNZN-multirole-vessel-delivers.PDF
24
In retrospect it might have been better to go with a more conventional and proven amphibious
support ship, because the initial entry into service was delayed by vessel handling, sea-keeping
and ballast problems. However, buying a traditional amphibious warfare ship would have been
much more costly, revealing a tension between being cost sensitive on the procurement of
very large and expensive assets versus running higher project management risks of technical
problems in meeting the desired specifications. Small states watching every penny can end up
skimping which means in the end actually spending more!
Moreover, these technical woes became for a brief period quite politicized after a fatality aboard
and no less than two separate court of inquiries and an independent expert commission
appointed to investigate11. A number of technical fixes were quickly adopted, and the
shipbuilders made a substantial financial settlement. Today it appears the NZ Navy are quite
happy with the vessel and in 2016, it was hard at work responding to a cyclone hit Fiji islands.12
The lesson here is that large-scale technically complex procurements require careful project
and political risk and communications management over the long-life cycle of the project,
with swift action to mitigate problems. There was sufficient institutional leadership within the
NZDF and the NZ Defence Ministry to see the project to its conclusion, a vital prerequisite for
what has been on balance, a procurement success.
The vessel was deployed operationally, in 2009, after a Tsunami struck Samoa and again in
dealing with the aftermath of natural disasters in Canterbury city (2011) and Vanuatu and Fiji
(2015-2016). The vessel demonstrated a unique ability to deliver thousands of tons of aid and
vehicles in roll-on-roll-off fashion, while also providing a secure offshore floating base for co-
ordination in situ13.
From the perspective of force modernization, Canterbury is the lynchpin for a Joint Task Force
concept which integrates NZDF land elements with air force expertise on helicopters all in a
combined tactically deployable and logistically resilient ‘package’14. The NZDF can deploy a
reinforced mechanized infantry company, their armoured vehicles and then sustain them from
ashore for up to 30 days, including providing them with command, control and intelligence
functionality from the ship as floating base, well beyond their entire Exclusive Economic Zone.
In this way the vessel has become a laboratory for ‘jointness’ across the entire NZDF, and a
good example of how some procurements have multiple force level benefits.
11 Tringham, Op.Cit.
12 See: http://www.navy.mil.nz/mtf/cant/default.htm
13 Paget, p.238-239.
14 Paget, p. 241-242.
25
Austria’s purchase of Hercules transport aircraft: second hand

heavy-lift for peacekeeping.
Like Ireland, Austria has a strong track record in peacekeeping, often in the classic UN led
operations but with a strategic culture very different from New Zealand, avoiding the use
of force or more kinetic roles15. Unlike Ireland, Austria is landlocked so does not require a
navy, and Austrian neutrality historically was different from Ireland’s experience, being
originally imposed by the Soviet Union as a condition of the return to full sovereignty in 1955.
Nonetheless, like Ireland, Austria remains outside of any formal military alliance and military
spending is low, even though a small domestic arms industry exists.
Because Austria is land-locked, heavy air lift has become a vital issue for participation in
overseas peacekeeping. Many European states have experimented with different ways to secure
heavy airlift, which is not easy because the huge aircraft involved are very costly.
Since 2009, there is a so called Heavy Airlift Wing, based in Hungary, which pools a fleet of
three C-17 strategic airlifters, access to which is shared among 10 NATO member states as well
as Sweden and Finland. Since 2010, the European Air Transport Command (EATC), based in
the Netherlands, is a consortium of seven EU states16 that have agreed to pool their large aerial
refueling aircraft and a suite of strategic and tactical airlift transporters (A400M, Hercules,
C295, etc.). It has on its books (actually a rota of ‘hours per tonne of cargo’) over 200 aircraft
or about 75% of the European air transport capacity17. Since 2006 the German led Strategic
Airlift Interim Solution (SAIIS), has provided a pool of Russian AN-124 giant aircraft available
for NATO and EU heavy lift requirements, however, since 2018 this contract has been non-
functioning due to ongoing tensions with Russia18.
For many years, the only air transport assets available to Austria were just two Shorts Skyvans.
Austria has not participated in any of these ‘pooling’ arrangements because the decision was
made in the late 1990s to procure their own heavy lift air transport assets, the only question
being how to afford these. Three ex-RAF C-130K Hercules were procured in 2002-2003 in a
15 Schmidl, Erwin A. (2013) ‘Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Austria’, Providing for Peacekeeping, at http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.
org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-austria/
16 Britain is leaving the EU but remains apparently committed to the EATC, so it is actually six: France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Italy,
with Belgium operating its own and a single A400M for Luxembourg.
17 See: See: https://eatc-mil.com/en
18 Waters, Will, (2018) ‘Volga-Dnepr confirms withdrawal from NATO SAlIS contract’, Lloyd’s Loading List, Tuesday, 01 May 2018. While
other commercial air charters are available for military cargo, they cannot economically carry outsize loads such as helicopters and the heavier
armoured vehicles.
26
government to government sale managed by the UK’s MoD Disposal Service Agency, explicitly
to support overseas peacekeeping. These aircraft were refurbished to a high standard19 by
Marshall Aerospace when originally delivered, and again after the Chad deployment in 2011
and 2013, including the fitting of some basic defensive aid suites20. The later expense probably
reflected concern over risks of surface to air missile attack. As part of the deal, Marshall
Aerospace were also contracted to provide technical service support and training was provided
for up to 9 crews.
These reconditioned aircraft certainly proved their worth in 2009 in Chad: at least 125 flights
were undertaken with 2,135 tons of cargo and the aircraft were also heavily tasked with support
of Austrian peacekeepers in Kosovo and Bosnia. Another important mission was in response
to the Asian Tsunami disaster in 2004. However, these assets are only enablers of mobility
for peacekeepers and the Austrian’s discovered during their 2009 Chad deployment that if
the main airport in any particular theatre is seized by hostile elements there is no way such
vulnerable aircraft can land, reinforcing the importance of joint capabilities to secure airbases21.
Finland’s ongoing evolution of protected tactical vehicles
The final case examined here concerns land mobility for peacekeepers, looking at Finland. The
Finnish situation is quite different from Ireland, with their conscript armed forces oriented
towards large-scale territorial defence. This means peacekeeping vies for salience with the need
for a large mechanized land army (Maavoimat). There is also a domestic arms industry and
therefore political pressure to buy Finnish.
The Finns (and Ireland) deployed the large, 1980s era, SISU Pasi armoured personnel carriers
(APCs), successfully in the Lebanon during the 1980s and 1990s22 However, the SISU’s were
relatively bulky and unwieldly, and while they had reasonable resistance to IEDs they had
19 According to one source these revisions included: “structural upgrade, major servicing and installation of an automatic flight management
system, upgraded avionics, a traffic collision avoidance system, INS navigation system, digital engine and fuel management systems and the
Rockwell Collins FMR-200x colour weather radar.” Ayton, Mark (2003) ‘Herks for Austria’, Air Forces Monthly, May, pp.68-69.
20 Mader, Georg (2010) ‘Survey Austria: On the Edge’, Air Forces Monthly, Feb, pp.74-78.
21 Early on in the Chad mission, rebels seized the Capital’s airport which prevented an Austrian Hercules from landing and for a short while,
French and Austrian forces were cut off and exposed. See: Tonra, Ben. “The (In) Justices of Peacekeeping: EUFOR Tchad/RCA.” GLOBUS
Research Paper 3 (2018), p.11.
22 In an interesting precedent, some of these vehicles were actually bought by the United Nations and indeed the UN continues to be a buyer of
armoured vehicles. By getting UNIFIL and the UN to adopt and pay for a fleet of APCs the Maavoimat had a ready pool of vehicles in situ. Semi-
permanent overseas basing of vehicles and/or buying vehicles, perhaps through the auspices of the UN as a shared asset, are just two possible
approaches which a country like Ireland could consider in future.
27
deficiencies in turret protection. For these reasons it became increasingly obvious they were
not ideal. Both the Irish and Finnish army had encountered the South African RG31 mine
resistant vehicles in the Lebanon and in Eritrea which were effective in reducing casualties.
Experience in Afghanistan, where since 2002 the Finns deployed a small contingent with ISAF
under a UN mandate, offered a number of steep learning curves. In 2006, the Finnish army,
concerned about deployability23 and the IED threat, choose a much smaller (under eight ton)
light armoured vehicle (LAV) from a non-national supplier, initially just six BAe RG32M which
is a smaller development of the RG31 in some aspects24. This order was repeated in 2010 (26),
in 2011 (23) and again in 2012 (25) bringing their total fleet to well over 7025. Interoperability
with the EU Nordic Battlegroup countries may have influenced this procurement, as it’s also
used by Sweden (200 examples) and Ireland purchased 27 in 201026. It is important to note
that the RG32M is conceived of as a scout or reconnaissance vehicle, replacing the use of jeeps
or Landrovers in such roles and offering some degree of protection from shelling, ambush and
mines. However, it is not a vehicle designed for combat, lacking sufficient armour, nor is it a
proper APC or MRAP.
The Finns deployed the RG32’s in Afghanistan as soon as possible and in 2009 one of these
was hit by an IED. The crew survived, albeit injured27. If there was a complaint, apart from
cramped vehicle ergonomics28, it was that there were never enough RG32s. Widespread use
had to be made of unprotected trucks and G-Wagens alongside the older Pasi. Moreover,
by 2011 it was evident such vehicles need better ability to protect themselves if ambushed,
so manual weapon mounts/shields were procured, which are much cheaper than remotely
operated weapon stations, and simpler to maintain overseas 29.
The Irish have also deployed the RG32M overseas, in UNIFIL and UNDOF. With its
increased mine and kinetic protection, it is an ideal fit for an overseas environment. It
has been learned however that it’s important prior to deployment to adopt an holistic
approach to training for operations and maintenance to maximize mechanical reliability and
readiness. The Finns by buying different procurement batches have mechanical variations,
which challenges maintenance, notably for the older vehicles30. However, there is dedicated
Finnish maintenance company, MILORG, which provides advanced technical support for
the Maavoimat.
The contrast with Ireland is interesting, because apart from the small batch of ‘one off’ RG32M
purchased and deployed in small number, the Irish DF have consistently relied more on the
23 BAE bought up the South African firm that produced the specialised mine resistant RG31 and the RG32 was a newer, substantially different,
variant. Two RG32s fit in a Hercules transport plane. Unlike Austria, Finland does not have any of these aircraft although it has excellent C295
medium transports (a modern version of Irish Casa 235s). Yet Finland is a member since 2009 of the Heavy Lift Group, based in Hungary, which
pools a fleet of just three huge C-17 strategic airlifters and gives access to these aircraft to the members of this group 10 NATO member states
as well as Sweden.
24 See: http://www.deagel.com/news/Finland-Orders-16-RG-32M-Armored-Vehicles_n000007337.aspx
25 The costs of the final trance was estimated at €12.5m in 2012 values. See: Army Technology News, (2012) ‘Finnish Army orders additional
RG32M vehicles from BAE, 4th June’, https://www.army-technology.com/news/newsfinnish-army-orders-additional-rg32m-vehicles-bae/
26 The Irish Army variant is different.
27 Overall Finland lost 2 soldiers and had 11 wounded in Afghanistan. See: https://web.archive.org/web/20160109100128/http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/03/content_12178191.htm.
28 Halvarsson A., Hagman I., Tegern M., Broman L., and Larsson H. (2018) ‘Self-reported musculoskeletal complaints and injuries and exposure
of physical workload in Swedish soldiers serving in Afghanistan’, PLoS ONE 13(4), p.12
29 http://www.asdnews.com/news-44536/finland_orders_weapon_stations_for_rg32m.htm
30 Lepoaho, Jussi (2015) Millog Oy Käytettävyyden Tuottajana – Partioajoneuvo RG32M-Millog as an availability service producer-Patrol
Vehicle RG32M, Masters Degrees Thesis, Jamk University of Applied Sciences,p.20-21,
https://www.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/97287/Jussi_Lepoaho%20YAMK.pdf?sequence=1
28
heavier Pirhana vehicles, with the consequence that these must be either transported by sea
or very elaborate arrangements have to be made for air heavy lift. The commercial market
for outsize heavy lift aviation is dominated by Russian aircraft and companies, and given the
current EU sanctions regime in place, political risk has now made such solutions unreliable.
This nicely illustrates how procurements are interlinked: because Ireland has invested in a
Pirhana fleet as the primary vehicle for peacekeeping deployments, this makes a dedicated sea
mobility solution the most logical and economic way of transporting the 14 Pirhanas typically
required for an Irish infantry company. The Finns have other options because of their ‘share’
in the Heavy Lift Wing and because they have more than enough lighter RG32s to equip
an entire company element if they chose to. New Zealand’s Defence Force has the option of
transporting large number of Pirhana sized vehicles on their Canterbury and they even have a
few Hercules as well.
Drawing Lessons from other Small State Procurement

What are the general lessons to be drawn from these cases for peacekeeping
related procurements?
The first two cases concerned strategic mobility, rather than enhancing firepower or protection.
Austria in some ways must invest in heavy lift aircraft because it is land locked and has chosen
the cost-effective way of refurbished second hand aircraft. While these aircraft have a good
few years of service left, in the longer term some sort of pooling arrangement seems logical for
countries like Austria. Ireland has excellent but rather small CASA 235 assets and if these were
replaced in future, they could potentially be pooled with partner countries, to add value and
reduce costs31.
Ireland has much firmer plans to procure a Naval Service MRV32, and the New Zealand
experience suggests that while such an asset does not come cheaply, it provides force wide
transformational benefits and a robust strategic mobility that is more resilient than heavy-air
lift. In time, European navies may begin pooling their logistics and support vessels following
the EATC template in some guise. The New Zealand MRV experience also suggests the merit
of procuring proven designs and avoiding false economies. Such assets are a one in a generation
capability and worth getting right.
Finland’s evolving protected vehicle fleets offers a number of more specific lessons: (1) a special
‘pool’ of protected vehicles is required for overseas peacekeeping that are easily transportable
and interoperable with other forces; (2) a sufficiently large number of vehicles is required to
be built up over time-it is no good buying a once off small job-lot; (3) armour protection must
evolve regularly in iterative updates, because threats against peace-keepers continue to evolve;
(4) protection cannot be the only criteria to select vehicles, there also has to be a balance
towards mobility/deployability and appropriate firepower. Crucially, like the experience with
HMNZS Canterbury, if technical problems do arise, then a long-term life cycle management
approach is needed using a Mid Life Upgrade to resolve any shortcomings. In this regard, one
31 At the time of writing Ireland had an open tender process for replacement aircraft for the CASA235s. See: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/
debates/question/2019-02-20/81/
32 At Para.6.5 Department of Defence. White Paper on Defence. Dublin, DoD, 2015. Available at: https://www.defence.ie/system/files/media/
file-uploads/2018-06/wp2015eng_1.pdf
29
very positive Irish development is the commitment in the Irish White Paper on Defence (2015)
to develop a funding model study that facilitates long-term planning and financing for life-cycle
procurement and updates33.
Overall, these case studies taken together reinforce the need for joint capability enhancement-
allowing land, air and sea elements to combine and understanding the interactions between
them. To be effective land units need mobility and air and sea assets confer this in different
ways, but equally the protection offered by hardened land forces is essential if ships are to dock
and aircraft to land.
All three examples are vehicles of some type, and this paper has not studied weapons
procurement, or the many other essential items of equipment modern peacekeepers require.
Nonetheless it should be evident that a balance needs to be found between procuring for force
protection and investing in capabilities that will permit defending civilians and the ability to
enforce mandates flexibly.
Finally, all of these cases show small states can be ambitious, creative in their thinking and
flexible in their actions. Moreover, the clearest lesson perhaps is the importance of national
political ambition to resource peacekeepers as best as they can. Even though Finland, Austria
and New Zealand have actually lower levels of GNI per capita than Ireland34, they have all
found the required funding to purchase new capabilities that improve their peacekeeping
presence in the world. Has Ireland’s public and political leadership demonstrated that same
level of support for ambition, creativity and flexibility in equipping our Defence Forces?
33 See Para.10.4.3 in DoD, Op.Cit, 2015.

34 Gross National Income is used rather than GDP which suffers from distortion, moreover it is easier to make comparisons at the per
capita level with purchasing power parity (PPP). According to World Bank Data, Austria had a GNI PPP for 2018 of US$55,960; Finland of
US$48,490; New Zealand of US$40,250 and Ireland was the ‘richest’ with US$66,810. See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.
PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true
30
“Relying on the goodwill of the
individual, and luck”
The Problematic Nature of Utilising
The Army Reserve Skills Base in The
Single Force Concept.
Jonathon Carroll
Texas A&M University, a United States Senior Military College
“Relying on the goodwill of the individual, and luck”
The problematic nature of utilising the Army Reserve skills base in the Single Force Concept.
Abstract
Recently, the role of reservists, particularly in the Communications Information Systems
(CIS) Corps, in developing and enhancing technological solutions through the application
of skills gained from civilian careers and educational qualifications has yielded interesting
results. While showcasing the potential contributions reservists can make, such results
should not be mistaken as capability-building, nor of the long-awaited harnessing of skills
to the Permanent Defence Forces that reservists possess. Reservists in the CIS Corps
have made excellent strides in technological innovation. However, such strides have only
been made possible by a combination of the goodwill of these individual reservists, and
luck. The example of the CIS Corps is the exception, not the rule. The Army Reserve
by reason of legislation, and structural organisation is largely prevented from enabling
the meaningful application of reservists’ skills in technological innovation or in any area
of specialisation beneficial to the wider Defence Forces. This paper draws on research
conducted into the Army Reserve and the Single Force Concept to argue that there
are significant obstacles preventing the Permanent Defence Forces from absorbing the
skills base provided by the Army Reserve. Consequently, far from capability-building, any
lasting application of skills in areas including technological innovation and development
is almost impossible. In making this argument, this paper will examine factors enabling
reservist skill contribution, including the example of the CIS Corps, but will also suggest
that the current force structure, and organisational practices governing the Army Reserve
prevent the efficient use of reservists’ skills. Furthermore, the legislation surrounding
service in the Army Reserve will also be examined to highlight the problematic nature of
retaining skilled reservists, or even utilising skilled personnel where necessary. Finally,
the Irish model will be compared briefly with international best practice. Any debate
surrounding a 22nd Century military must acknowledge that in the Irish context, the
mechanisms of utilising reservists’ skills, are fundamentally outdated.
Introduction
In 2015, reservists in the CIS Corps developed a system of transmitting encrypted video and
audio data via mobile phone signals. The system was tested for operational viability with the
Nordic EU Battlegroup and was due to be used by the Irish contingent of the German-Austrian
Battlegroup in 2016.1 However, legislative barriers to reservists serving overseas meant the
personnel who designed, and were best suited to operate this system, could not participate in
the mission readiness exercise in Germany.2 Their professional innovation, developed outside
the Defence Forces, showcased both what reservists can contribute to the Defence Forces and
the practical limitations of their engagement.3 Reservists in the CIS Corps, however, are the
exception, not the rule. In the age of growing cyber threats, the CIS Corps, arguably the corps
with the most potential in harnessing reservists’ skills, fell afoul of the reality that, for many
reasons, the Defence Forces cannot effectively harness the specialised skills reservists possess.
1 Commandant A (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.

3 Commandant F (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.
32
Legislative Obstacles and Legislative Non-Existence.

The Defence Forces cannot harness reservists’ specialist skills efficiently, meaningfully, or
reliably due to legislative weakness. Modern militaries require a dependable skill base for
capability development, skill maintenance and skill projection. This is critical where specific
skills are in short supply or are to be found outside the regular military force. A lack of skilled
personnel means reduced capabilities. Reserve forces mitigate this problem by providing a pool
of skilled individuals. For instance, in 2013, during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 38% of
the British military medical infrastructure was staffed by reservists.4 However, a reserve force
is only as good as its legislative enablers. In the Irish context this is the Defence Act 1954, the
principle legislation governing the Army Reserve and its utilisation. Reservists can be called up
by the Minister of Defence in a “state of emergency”, or in an Aid to the Civil Power scenario
for the “restoration of the public peace.”5 While a mechanism exists for calling out the Reserve
for large-scale emergencies, there is none for utilising skilled reservists on an individual basis in
a situation not requiring full force deployment. Compounding the issue is the legal situation
surrounding a reservist, if called up. Technically speaking there is no realistic punishment for
not reporting for duty when required. The legal status of a “reservist” is also a grey area.6 Added
to this is the absence of any employment protection legislation, guaranteeing reservists’ civilian
employment if called up to extraordinary military service. Likewise, no legal obligation exists
on employers to release reservists for duty, even in an emergency. Thus, the supply of specialist
reservist skills to the Defence Forces depends entirely on the ad hoc goodwill of the individual
reservist, and their employer. In a conflict of interest, between a reservists’ military obligations
and their civilian employment, who will the reservist more likely obey, their employer who pays
their salary and governs their future employment and promotion prospects, or the Defence
Forces offering neither substantial remuneration, nor job protection? Emergency scenarios
aside, and dialling back the level of national calamity to the current benign setting, can
reservists be expected to contribute specialist skills, and time, with all the pull factors being in
favour of their employer whilst the push factors work against the Defence Forces? The simple
answer is no, yet no action has, or is currently, being taken to change this calculus.
Employer Engagement
The problem could be eased, not solved, with meaningful employer engagement. Liaising with
employers to facilitate reservists attending training and committing their skills to the Defence
Forces was suggested in 1999.7 After 20 years, the only output of employer engagement is the
Reserve Defence Forces Employer Information Booklet, published in 2016. This merely encourages
employers to look kindly on reservists by granting annual or unpaid leave to attend training.
There is no mention of reservists being called up in an emergency, or that a skilled reservist
4 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the future force 2020 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), p.73.
5 The Defence Act 1954, s.87 and s.90.
6 Reservists are neither employees nor workers of the Department of Defence, they are classified as “volunteers.” Dail Eireann 22 Apr. 2008,
parliamentary debates; official report, vol. dclii, 2008 [no.2] (Dublin, Stationary Office). Furthermore, unlike members of the PDF, section 118
of The Defence Act 1954 states that reservists are only under military law, and subject to military discipline whilst in uniform. Moreover, section
243 of the same Act states that if a reservist fails to report for duty they can be charged with desertion or being absent without leave which
only incurs a monetary fine as opposed to a custodial punishment. But, even if a reservist commits this offence they must present themselves, in
uniform, to be charged. Therefore, theoretically, if an individual simply does not present themselves they will not be punished. Lt. Col. B (PDF),
interviewed by author, January 2016.
7 Department of Defence, Report of the steering group on the special study of the Reserve Defence Force (Dublin: Government Press, 1999),
p.5.
33
might be required by the Defence Forces for an extended period due to their expertise.8 Despite
considerable work putting it together, the handbook does not tackle the problem at all. It
assumes compliance and cooperation at all levels from employers without incentive, or an
established tradition of cooperation. Other countries, such as Britain and America, that enjoy
a strong societal martial tradition have nevertheless resorted to legislation to guarantee this
cooperation.9 That skilled individuals might be required by the Defence Forces may become
a real possibility, indeed an opportunity for the Army Reserve, given the current personnel
retention crisis. By failing to mention this, employers, who could have been geared up for the
possibility years ago may consider the last-minute request for their employee to be absent for an
extended period to be more trouble than it’s worth. For their part, the committed reservist may
be forced to choose between their sense of duty, and their employment.
The suggestion of employment protection legislation has been made consistently by those
arguing the tangible benefits for the Defence Forces. In contrast, others argue such legislation
is a “double edged sword” with the potential consequence of employers not hiring reservists
due to their military obligations.10 Justifying this is the reality that, despite Ireland’s anti-
discrimination laws, there are still cases where discrimination, based on gender for example,
still occurs.11 Nonetheless, such legislation would protect, at most, 3,869 personnel in the
Army Reserve if at full strength. Illegal discrimination, were it to occur, would likely affect
only small number of reservists, who would have legal redress. On balance, the decision lies
between providing a credible Reserve with a pool of skilled personnel, and, avoiding instances
of workplace discrimination. Thus far, there has been no appetite to amend legislation as it has
been argued that there has never been the need to deploy the Reserve.12 This ignores the large
FCA deployments to the border during the Troubles, the regional deployments during the
2015 Shannon flooding and future possible contingencies arising from Brexit.13 The double-
edged sword cuts both ways as the government and Defence Forces are deterred from using
the Reserve because reservists, in reality, can choose not to report for duty.14 No system exists
to compel or incentivise them to do so, and a material benefit to not contributing their skills
exists in the form of keeping their job, and being paid adequately for their time.
8 Department of Defence, Reserve Defence Forces Employers Information Booklet (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2016).
9 In the British Army Reserve, the Reserve Forces Act 1985 guarantees a reservists’ employment if deployed. Furthermore, any employer who
loses an employee due to overseas deployment with the Reserve is paid compensation by the government to offset any loss suffered and to
facilitate the employment of a temporary replacement. Ministry of Defence, ‘Rights and responsibilities for reservists and employers’ (https://
www.gov.uk/employee-reservist/financial-support-for-employers) (4 Jul. 2016). In the United States, the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act 1994 prohibits any discrimination or reprisals against members of the National Guard or the Reserve forces either in
terms of being employed, or for being deployed. The Act dictates that reservists deployed overseas shall not suffer in their civilian employment as
a result of having to serve. As such, in the event of deployment a reservists’ position is guaranteed to be waiting for them upon their return with
no loss of pay or career potential. The Act guarantees employment as if the deployment never occurred.
10 Lt. Col. C (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.
11 Main Political Party T.D. H, interviewed by author, April 2016.
12 Main Political Party T.D. H, interviewed by author, April 2016.
13 Beginning in 1969 the FCA provided garrison duties for a PDF that required time and the establishment of three new infantry battalions to
adequately secure the border with Northern Ireland at the outset of the Troubles. This resulted in the formation of the 27th, 28th and 29th PDF
Infantry Battalions; John P. Duggan, A history of the Irish Army (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1991), p.281. Reserve personnel from 1st, 6th and
12th Infantry Battalions along with elements of 1st Brigade Transport Company were utilised in flood relief efforts in 2015. Mr. Neil Richardson,
General Secretary RDFRA, interviewed by author, May 3, 2016.
14 Lt. Col. B (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.
34
The Overseas Problem

The most practical application of specialist reserve skills in modern militaries is overseas
deployments. For the Army Reserve this has been an issue of some cultural contention
within the Defence Forces. The deployment of reservists overseas is illegal.15 Internationally,
the benefit of using reserve forces overseas has been clearly demonstrated. During Operation
Iraqi Freedom in 2004, 37,000 of the 118,000 American troops in Iraq were reservists, and
in 2005 half of American combat brigades were units of the Army National Guard.16 Ireland
is not at war, but an example exists showing the potential of harnessing skilled reservists
being undermined by the system, or lack thereof. This is the abovementioned example of the
reservists’ contribution to the 2015 EU Battlegroup. Undoubtedly, the core rationale for these
reservists serving overseas is that these individuals had the skills to operate the system they had
designed, to troubleshoot malfunctions, provide on the spot technical expertise and to further
develop the system based on field experience. These reservists were legislatively prevented
from deploying for the Battlegroup exercise to put the fruits of their expertise and efforts
into action. Even if legislation enabled reservists to serve overseas, their civilian employer
would still be the final arbiter as to the Defence Forces having the benefit of their presence.
It must be remembered that “overseas” for a reservist means anything outside the territory of
the Republic of Ireland, even for just an exercise. The suggestion of sending suitably qualified
individual reservists overseas has been repeatedly made in policy documents and reports.17 A
pilot program, possibly trying to circumvent the legislation, was established in 2009 for KFOR,
and then quickly abandoned.18 Policy ambitions and recommendations aside, the current
legislation bars the deployment of reservists overseas. Consequently, the doctors, logisticians,
cyber security specialists, engineers and many other skilled and experienced reservists remain
unavailable to the Defence Forces, abroad, or even at home. Within the Defence Forces,
senior officers have described this as “completely outdated” and “farcical” in comparison with
international best practice.19
15 The Defence (Amendment) Act 1960, the Defence (Amendment) Act 1993 and the Defence (Amendment) Act 2006 which legislate for the
participation of Defence Forces personnel in UN peacekeeping missions, peace-enforcement missions and EU Battlegroups respectively all
specifically state that such service is for members of the “Permanent Defence Forces,” not reservists.
16 Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobcjek, The US Army in the Iraq War: Volume 1 (Carlisle: United States Army War College Press, 2019),
p.260.
17 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 2015 (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2015),p.100; Department of Defence, Report of the
steering group on the special study of the Reserve Defence Force (Dublin: Department of Defence, 1999), p.1.
18 In 2009 a training syllabus was completed to allow reservists deploy to Kosovo with KFOR. The PDF was looking for doctors, engineers,
medics, drivers, tradesmen and radio operators. The RDF Overseas Integration Course was to be a two-month upskilling course in CIS, CBRN,
tactics, weapons handling, helicopter operations and unarmed combat. As mentioned the first issue with reservists deploying overseas is a
legislative one and no amendments were made. Therefore, the plan was to enlist reservists into the PDF, thus legalising their deployment, for a
one-year contract. Problematically, this contract amounted to obtaining the services of professional specialists for the lowest cost possible with
no employment protection. Suitable reservists, who applied for overseas, regardless of their rank, were to be enlisted into the PDF at the rank
of 2-Star Private and paid the equivalent wage. Unsurprisingly, there was a lack of volunteers with the desired professional qualifications and
plans for reservists serving overseas were shelved in the financial crisis. Irish Defence Forces, TS RDF INF XX/2009 RDF overseas integration
course syllabus of training (Dublin: Defence Forces Training and Education Directorate, 2009); Directorate of Reserve Forces, Letter seeking
expressions of interest for overseas service (2 Sep. 2008); Reserve Defence Forces Representation Association, Press release pertaining to the
cancellation of overseas service for the RDF (undated, 2009).
19 Commandant D (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016; Lt. Col. B (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.
35
Army Reserve Discharges by Corps 2005-2015

6000
(PMS Data)
5410
5000
3808
4000
3000
1507
2000 1260
277 262 209 202 113 246
1000 413
169 93 72 72 47 133 27 114 8 41 40 87 61
0
Infantry Artillery Cavalry Engineers Military Medical CIS Transport
Police
FCA Discharged Post 2005 RDF Discharged 2006-2012 SFC Discharged 2013-2015
The Problematic Force Structure

Another obstacle preventing efficient harnessing of specialist reservists’ skills is the current
force structure. The Infantry Corps of the Army Reserve is 74% of the total force with 2,804
personnel.20 Adding in the Artillery and Cavalry Corps means 89% of the Reserve is combat
oriented. The Medical, CIS and Engineering Corps’, the decisive terrain for recruiting reservists
with professional experience generated outside the Defence Forces, amounts to just 6% of
the Reserve, or 198 personnel. On paper, this does not look too bad, but there are serious
issues here. Firstly, there is geographic disposition. If a civilian engineer wants to join the
Reserve they only have a choice between Athlone, or Cork. There is no reserve engineer unit
in Dublin, despite a quarter of the population living there with a large pool of professionals
who could be recruited. Similarly, for a medical professional, the choice is between two brigade
headquarters’ in Cork or Dublin. How far will a skilled professional be expected to travel with
no remuneration to contribute their skills essentially free of charge?
The second force structure problem is organizational; reserve recruitment and training.
Hypothetically, the average salaried professional in Ireland has four weeks leave a year. Factoring
in a hypothetical family spending two of those four weeks on annual holidays leaves just two
weeks a year for reserve full-time training (FTT). All reservists are trained as infantry soldiers,
completing recruit and 2-star training courses with either infantry battalions or the artillery
regiments. Both courses, required to become a 3-star private, take a combined four weeks
FTT to complete. Usually, a reservist will complete one course a year. Some individuals can
commit more time but on average it takes two years for most reservists to go from recruit to
3-star private. As these courses are mandatory for all reservists, it therefore takes two years
before a qualified engineer, a cyber-security specialist, or an EMT can complete periods of FTT
with their specialist unit. This depends on their sustained commitment for two years and luck
as to whether they are eventually assigned to the specialist unit reflecting their skills. Only in
the most recent 2019 recruitment competition could reserve applicants choose their preferred
corps. From 2013 to 2018 applicants could only choose their preferred geographic location.
Consequently, almost all those applicants were assigned to combat units, as these were the
20 Irish Defence Forces, Defence Force Regulation CS4: Numerical establishment of the Defence Forces (Dublin: Department of Defence,
2013).
36
units managing their recruit training.21 After two years infantry training, skilled specialists
still can’t do the job they, and the Defence Forces want them to do. Despite being qualified
professionals, conversion courses must then be completed in relevant corps-specific areas. For
some roles this makes sense, for others the system is inefficient. The Transport Corps provides
a working example.
Reservists cannot carry out mechanical vehicle maintenance, despite a shortage of qualified
mechanics in the PDF and many reservists being qualified civilian mechanics.22 If a civilian
articulated truck driver joins the Reserve no mechanism exists for a direct conversion to the
equivalent military qualification.23 The reservist must complete two years part time infantry
training to reach 3 Star-Private just to be eligible for military standard driving courses. The
equivalent military truck licence requires the further completion of three driving courses,
taking another 18 months to complete if said reservist has had no problematic issues with
their civilian employer. Consequently, for a professional truck driver to do the same job for
the Defence Forces takes between three and four years, if the reservist can attend two weeks of
FTT on a yearly basis. CIS Corps reservists cannot qualify as radio technicians despite there
being a shortage in the PDF and there being a demonstrated talent pool of reservists who either
already have the skills or could be trained.24 If it takes three to four years for a truck driver on
the outside to drive a truck on the inside, then what is the conversion timeframe for other
professional skillsets? A tangible opportunity is being missed here. Some roles could be filled by
direct-entry commissions, but every skilled reserve applicant cannot simply be made an officer.
For the various reasons set out above, a fundamental question must be posed. Is it efficient to
maintain this force structure or organisational practice? Reserve combat elements are prudent,
but with a shortage in the PDF of radio technicians, vehicle mechanics, doctors, air traffic
controllers and cyber-security specialists to name but a few, a clear argument exists for change.
Reducing the reserve personnel allocation to combat units in CS4 and increasing the allocations
to specialist units would allow the Defence Forces a bigger net to catch skilled individuals
willing to contribute their expertise. Supporting this argument is the Medical Corps. A 2009
review of medical capabilities found that the Medical Corps could only meet 40% of the needs
of the Defence Forces, not including reserve requirements. The review recommended looking
to the Reserve medical component to alleviate this. 25 At that time the Medical Corps had 226
reservists in three reserve medical companies.26 The 2013 Single Force Concept reduced that
Reserve medical component to just 32 personnel. The recommendations of the review were
ignored, leaving the Defence Forces with just 32 spots, instead of 226, for medical specialists or
doctors to fill. Personnel Management System (PMS) data clearly shows that specialist reserve
units have higher personnel retention rates compared to the combat units, where the reserve
21 Pesonnel Management System (PMS) Data for recruitment shows that from the inception of the Single Force Concept in 2013 to 2015 there
were 461 new recruits to the Army Reserve, they were assigned as follows: The Engineering, Medical and CIS Corps’(one recruit each), the
Transport Corp (two recruits), the Cavalry Corps (eleven), the Artillery Corps (seventy-eight) and the Infantry Corps (366 recruits). This is despite
the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery Corps’ discharging 1,748 personnel in the same period.
22 Commandant G (AR), interviewed by author, January 2016.
23 Said individual would have to begin with a Module 2B (Nissan Jeep) course, then a Ford Transit minibus course followed by the Module
3B Truck course; Irish Defence Forces, TI 03/2011 Defence Forces driver training policy (Dublin: Defence Forces Training and Education
Directorate 2011).
25 PA Consulting Group, Defence Forces Medical Services Review (Dublin: PA Consulting Group, 2009), p. 40-46, 97; Commandant G (AR),
interviewed by author, January 2016.
26 The 62nd, 54th and 31st Reserve Logistics Support Battalions headquartered in Dublin, Galway and Cork each had a medical company
within the battalion.
37
infantry component is unable to hold on to personnel.27 This suggests that where reservists can
bring, and apply, their civilian skills in the military, they stay longer than if they have nothing
to bring to the table. There is no real civilian equivalent for infantry, artillery or cavalry. For
military logisticians, medics, combat engineers and communications specialists, there is. This
should be capitalized upon.
Army Reserve Discharges by Corps 2005-2015

6000
(PMS Data)
5410
5000
3808
4000
3000
1507
2000 1260
277 262 209 202 113 246
1000 413
169 93 72 72 47 133 27 114 8 41 40 87 61
0
Infantry Artillery
Cavalry Engineers Military Medical CIS Transport
Police
FCA Discharged Post 2005 RDF Discharged 2006-2012 SFC Discharged 2013-2015
28
This brings up the cultural view of the Army Reserve by the Defence Forces, with varying
attitudes among PDF unit commanders towards the Reserve. Some believe it unreasonable to
expect personnel, with many external commitments, to work for free with no supporting legal
framework.29 The Medical Corps does not have the capacity to meet the needs of the Defence
Forces, yet reserve medical officers cannot be utilised to alleviate this as they would be unwilling
to perform a military function for free that they are paid for in a civilian capacity.30 Others
argue reservists don’t “join for the money” and want to get away from their civilian jobs to do
something different.31 If the Defence Forces hope to recruit specialist skills, then expecting
those skills for free is, at a minimum, optimistic. Furthermore, specialist units maintaining
better strength levels argues that reservists join specifically to use their skills, not get away from
them. Some argue that the Defence Forces does not buy into the potential of the Army Reserve
and fails to assess the broad skill base reservists have.32 This is hard to dispute. The suggestion
of a comprehensive survey of reservists’ skills and qualifications was made in 2003.33 To date
no comprehensive survey has ever taken place.34 Consequently, the Defence Forces does not
actually know who, what or how many skilled personnel the Army Reserve has
27 PMS Data records that in the 2005-2015 period the reserve infantry component recruited 4,346 new recruits but discharged 10,725
personnel.
28 PMS Data shows that in the wake of the 2005 reorganisation from the FCA to the Army Reserve, 4,761 FCA personnel were discharged
over time from the Defence Forces. PMS Data does not explain why these personnel did not transition into the Army Reserve. Many local FCA
posts were closed with the 2005 reorganisation due to the smaller organizational size of the new Army Reserve, this may explain some of
the personnel not continuing their service. A further 7,979 personnel were discharged from the Army Reserve between 2006 and the 2013
reorganisation to the Single Force Concept. Post Single Force Concept to 2015 an additional 1,931 were discharged for a total of 14,671
discharges between 2005 and 2015 with an average of 1,467 personnel per year.
29 Commandant F (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.
30 Lt. Col. J (PDF), interviewed by author, January, 2016.
31 Lt. Col. C (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.; Commandant E (PDF), interviewed by author, January, 2016.
32 Commandant K (PDF), interviewed by author, March, 2016.
33 Department of Defence, Department of Defence and Defence Forces strategy statement 2003-2005 (Dublin, Department of Defence, 2003),
p.10.
34 Mr. Neil Richardson, General Secretary RDFRA, interviewed by author, June 14, 2019.
38
to offer. Such data, quite easily obtained, should be the guiding principle behind designing the
force structure of the Reserve.
International Best-Practice.
Other militaries have tackled this problem in every way that Ireland has not. Legislation in New
Zealand, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States guarantees a reservists’
employment if deployed.35 Failure to report for duty can result in periods of imprisonment.36
Punitive impetus to report for service, coupled with legislative support, allows these nations
to have a usable reserve skills base. There is also no “voluntary unpaid training” as all reserve
service is incentivised, and in some cases pensionable.37 The Irish Army Reserve, by comparison,
has none of these enablers.
Ireland New Zealand Australia Canada UK United States38
Defence Acts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Legislative Enablers for No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reserve Forces
Integration with Regular Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Forces
Employment Protection No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Voluntary “Unpaid” Service Yes No No No No No
Deployment Overseas No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Furthermore, in terms of force structure, these other reserve forces are designed to harness
significant amounts of specialist skillsets in areas such as medicine, military intelligence, cyber-
security, engineering and logistics. This allows the regular armies to benefit from the professional
experience gained by civilian employment in specialist areas, via their reserves. While the
Canadian Army Reserve is primarily combat oriented, almost half of the Australian and New
Zealand Army Reserves are combat service support units. This reflects an acknowledgement
of what the regular army needs in terms of skills, thus allowing reserve forces to act as force-
multipliers. Tipping the scale completely in favour of specialist skills, the American National
Guard and Army Reserve combined have more medical, engineering, military intelligence, and
logistics units than the regular US Army. For the British, most of their medical establishment
is also in their Army Reserve, along with almost half of their intelligence and logistics units. In
both the American and British forces, there are almost twice as many specialist units compared
to combat formations of equal size. Legislatively, and organisationally, the Irish Army Reserve is
out of step with international best practice. Ireland may be neutral, while these comparators are
35 The relevant legislation is as follows, The Defence Act 1990 (New Zealand), The National Defence Act 1985 (Canada), The Reserve Forces
Act (UK), The Defence Reserve (Protection) Act 2001 (Australia) and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 1994
(United States, applying equally to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve).
36 All pieces of legislation noted above dictate custodial penalties relevant to that country’s military or civil law.
37 All training nights and weekends are fully paid, as are any travel expenses incurred due to reserve service. Furthermore, in the British model
reservists are paid a bounty, similar to the Irish gratuity scrapped in 2012, for attaining set annual training obligations with the bounty increasing
incrementally every year. There is also a pension contribution for reserve service. Ministry of Defence, Rates of Pay 2015 (London: Ministry of
Defence, 2015). Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011), p.8.
38 The United States Army reserve component is a combination of the Army National Guard, which focuses primarily on providing combat units
in the form of Brigade Combat Teams with some Combat Support units, and the United States Army Reserve which primarily focuses on Combat
Service Support.
39
not, but neutrality does not matter. Security environments merely dictate the size of military
forces, and the priority and division of contingent capabilities within those forces. However,
regardless of neutrality, all modern militaries strive to develop and retain contingent capabilities,
the only difference is the matter of scale. The Defence Forces should be no different.
The Reality
Conceptually, the British Future Reserves 2020 policy argues, “if Defence routinely asks more
than reservists or employers can reasonably give, then it is unlikely that Defence will have the
reservists needed to deliver an assured contribution to national security.”39 Data suggests that
the Irish Army Reserve has consistently asked more than reservists’ can give. Without legislative
support, meaningful employer engagement, and an ever-increasing emphasis on unpaid service,
14,671 reservists were discharged between 2005 and 2015.40 In 2013, when the Single Force
Concept was launched the effective strength of the Army Reserve was 3,410 personnel. By the
end of 2015, it was 2,434. In January 2019, it was just 1,620.41 With an establishment of 3,869,
the Army Reserve teeters at circa 30% strength or less.42 Clearly, reservists have voted with their
feet. In addition, any unit commander will admit the big difference between effective strength
and reservists on parade. The reality is, the Reserve may stand at 20-25% strength. A record
low numerically, proportionally and historically. It should be noted that, of the 1,620, 313 were
recruits or 2-stars, with another 626 being aged 45 or older.43 This is the result when relying
solely on the goodwill of the individual.
39 Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the future force 2020 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), p.28.
40 Irish Defence Forces, PMS Reports on annual discharges 2005-2015. PMS Data shows that in the wake of the 2005 reorganisation from
the FCA to the Army Reserve, 4,761 FCA personnel were discharged over time from the Defence Forces. PMS Data does not explain why
these personnel did not transition into the Army Reserve. Many local FCA posts were closed with the 2005 reorganisation due to the smaller
organizational size of the new Army Reserve, this may explain some of the personnel not continuing their service. A further 7,979 personnel were
discharged from the Army Reserve between 2006 and the 2013 reorganisation to the Single Force Concept. Post Single Force Concept to
2015 an additional 1,931 were discharged for a total of 14,671 discharges between 2005 and 2015 with an average of 1,467 personnel per
year.
41 Mr. Neil Richardson, General Secretary RDFRA, interviewed by author, June 14, 2019.
42 Defence Forces Regulation R5, the regulation governing the Army Reserve, an “effective” reservist merely has to attend a minimum of 24 two-
hour unpaid training nights, or 48 cumulative hours made up of training nights and training weekends annually. Personnel not achieving this are
categorised as “non-effective” and ultimately discharged. Attending paid training to be classified as effective is not a requirement. Undoubtedly
a reservist who has attended paid, full time training periods, in conjunction with the obligatory 48 hours is a higher trained soldier than one who
has only met the 48-hour minimum requirement. Thus, the effective strength is indicative of the quantitative, not qualitative strength of the force.
43 As of January 2019, the average age of a reserve Captain or Lieutenant was 50 and 44 years old respectively. In terms of non-commissioned
officers, the average age of a Sergeant was 49, and a Corporal, 39. Mr. Neil Richardson, General Secretary RDFRA, interviewed by author, June
14, 2019.
40
Conclusion – It’s now, or never.

Over the past 65 years the conduct of warfare, the global threat environment, the nature of
military service itself has evolved. The Army Reserve, the legacy issues, legislative barriers
and organizational problems have thus far remained unaddressed. Yet the expectation of
what reservists can do, of harnessing the unique skills earned by their civilian professional
experience and education remains juxtaposed with the reality that the current Army Reserve is
not designed to supply skilled reservists to the Defence Forces, and in many ways is prevented
from doing so. The 2013 reorganisation was a rebranding, nothing more, bringing nothing
new and no meaningful change. After all, reservists have worn black berets and been integrated
before.44 Members of the Army Reserve are mainly unpaid, and when paid, are paid on the
lowest increment on the scale according to rank, regardless of time in rank. They have no
pension benefits, no allowances and the annual gratuity payment was withdrawn. They have
little opportunity to utilise their military training or meaningfully bring their civilian skills to
the table. The media is currently full of headlines about skilled personnel leaving the Permanent
Defence Forces due to substandard remuneration. In such an environment how can skilled
reservists be expected to continually contribute almost free of charge, when the data shows the
continual decline of personnel in the organization? The innovation in the CIS Corps came
despite the system, not because of it. It only occurred because the right reservists, with the right
skills, were in the right unit at the right time, with flexible employers, and were willing to give
their time and expertise freely. It was a result of the goodwill of the individual reservist, and
luck. What might be possible if the structures and supports existed to institutionalise this?
None of this, however, should be confused with capability development. There is no middle
ground in modern militaries when it comes to capabilities. The Defence Forces either has a
usable pool of skilled reservists when and where needed, or it does not. Currently it is the latter,
for the reasons identified in this paper. If the force disintegrates, any future attempts to rebuild
will be that much harder. With the Reserve at its lowest strength in history and significant
data showing that the current model is unsustainable, meaningful change is now needed if
the force is to survive, especially if the Defence Forces wants the valuable skills on offer. Of
paramount importance, any change needs to be informed by what the Defence Forces needs and
a realistic appraisal of what the Reserve can provide. Fundamentally, the system should facilitate
the efficient absorption of reservists’ skills into the Defence Forces, not prevent it. It is time to
bring the Irish Army Reserve into line with other modern militaries, before the Reserve ceases
to exist.
44 The FCA numbered less than 25,000 when it was integrated with the PDF in 1959. Integration resulted in FCA units having regular army
commanders and training staff attached to each unit to provide the Irish Army with six integrated brigades of regular and reserve personnel. After
separation from the PDF in 1979, the FCA had a revised organisational establishment of 22,110 personnel. John P. Duggan, A history of the
Irish Army (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1991), p.238.
41
42
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS:
A Threat Analysis for the Irish Air Corps
Capt Kevin Fitzgerald
No. 3 Operations Wing, Air Corps.
Capt James Northover
No. 1 Operations Wing, Air Corps.
Lt David Finnegan
Maritime Surveillance and Airlift Squadron,Irish Air Corps
Dr Sharon Feeney
Head of Learning Development, College of Business,
Technological University, Dublin.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems:
A Threat Analysis for the Irish Air Corps.
Abstract
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) are the next generation of field aviation. They
have emerged in recent years and are proving to be more accessible, and more flexible
than traditional crewed aircraft.
The industry is in its infancy, and it is clear that the required controls have not kept pace
with the rapid expansion of the market. Legislation has only emerged in the past couple
of years. Many national aviation authorities around the world are still without strict rules
to control their use. The methods of preventing, protecting and intervening in the misuse
of RPAS are equally primitive. These elements combine to create an environment where
the next generation of aviation is posing a real threat to the current generation.
This study is the first of its kind to be conducted in Ireland. It provides a brief overview
of literature, along with findings from a questionnaire that was distributed to all pilots,
aircrew and air traffic controllers in the Irish Air Corps (IAC), which provided insights
into the extent to which RPAS poses a threat to the current and future flight operations
of the IAC.
The results of this study show that the international, national and IAC regulations
governing RPAS are insufficient. Flight statistics have shown a rapid acceleration in the
number of incidents involving RPAS.
Introduction
The issue of civilians using drones near civilian and military aircraft is an emergent issue for
pilots. This paper will examine the threat that these drones [also known as Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Systems (RPAS)] pose to aviation. The RPAS referred to in this study are operated by
civilians and are primarily comprised of a small electric motor powering a number of rotors,
and are piloted using handheld remote control devices or mobile phones. They are generally
small in size and are used for short distance operations, for example for aerial photography,
filming, conservation, and other missions. At present RPAS operate exclusively in airspace that
is segregated out for them. The operators of RPAS tend not to be professional aviators or even
aviation enthusiasts. This paper is the first to assess the levels of education and awareness of
RPAS among flight crews in the Irish Air Corps.
Context
Legislation has struggled to keep pace with the rapid expansion of emerging technology and
in the case of RPAS technology, regulation has been slow to appear. The majority of academic
research in this area has been carried out in the US although it is argued that1, the Federal
Aviation Authority (FAA) are “seriously behind” in the race to implement useful legislation.
Sanz et al. 2 take the view that the legislation required can only be reactive, and cannot have the
capability of controlling operators in the same way as manned aviation. They suggest that the
burden of regulation needs to fall on the manufacturers as it is a futile exercise to attempt to
1 Perritt, H. H. and Sprague, E.O. (2014). RPAS. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 17 (3), 672 – 749.
2 Sanz, D., Valente, J., del Cerro, J., Colorado, J., & Barrientos, A. (2015). Safe operation of mini UAVs: a review of regulation and best practices.
Advanced Robotics, 29(19), 1221-1233
44
maintain absolute control over the skills of individual operators. It is inevitable that there will
be malicious or incompetent people who will misuse drones, which may ultimately threaten
aviation safety. This potential is exacerbated greatly by the fact that the operators of drones
are not exclusively aviation enthusiasts or hobbyists, and are far more likely to be casually
uninformed or uninterested in flight safety. So the balance must be restored by focusing on the
regulation of the aircraft. The authorities cannot be sure whether an operator will transgress,
and therefore every effort must be made to ensure that the drone itself cannot transgress3.
RPAS use has not yet been studied in an Irish context so a series of questions are considered in
this paper in order to provide some insight into the Irish experience to date.
Methodology
This study seeks to ascertain the extent to which RPAS use is a threat to IAC flight operations.
Consequently there are three main research questions identified:
1. To what extent are RPAS a threat to flight safety in IAC?
2. To what extent is national and international legislation sufficient to protect IAC flight
operations in the area of RPAS?
3. Are IAC personnel sufficiently educated on the capabilities and threat potential of RPAS
with respect to flight safety?
Given that the interaction between piloted and remote aviation affects all aircrew involved
in the safe execution of flight operations, it was decided to administer a questionnaire to all
pilots, helicopter crew and air traffic controllers employed in the Irish Air Corps. The decision
to include pilots is obvious given the high likelihood that they would encounter RPAS in their
flying careers. Helicopter crew were chosen given the nature of their role in helicopter flight
operations: they are responsible for keeping the helicopter free from all obstacles and other
traffic when the helicopter is being operated in confined spaces away from the controls and
protection of airports. Air Traffic Controllers are also responsible for the separation of all air
traffic and provide an advisory role to aircraft of anything that has the potential to impact the
flights safe execution. The questionnaire response rate is provided in Table 1 below.
Specialisation Distributed Responses % of Respondents
Pilot - Fixed Wing 35 31 89%

Pilot - Rotary Wing 24 20 83%
Aircrew 26 24 92%
Air Traffic Controller 14 11 79%
Total 99 86 87%
Table 1 – Response Rates to Questionnaire
3 Ibid., 1221-1233.
45
Findings
The findings of the study are presented below with each research question is taken in turn.
To what extent are RPAS a threat to flight safety in IAC?
Findings from the survey suggest that RPAS poses a significant threat to flight safety in IAC.
Question number 12 in the Survey asked “In your opinion do RPAS pose a credible flight
safety threat to IAC flight operations?” 95% of those surveyed agreed that RPAS pose a threat
to flight safety in the IAC (see figure 1 below). The survey participants have a direct exposure
to airborne threats in the course of flight operations, and therefore have a personal stake in
the outcome of this study. Furthermore, the participants in the survey are privy to aircraft
flight safety reports, and conduct annual courses that encourage the development of an
organisational culture that promotes flight safety. This may engender a more cautious and
conscientious attitude to the threat of RPAS to Irish Air Corps Flight operations.
Figure 1: Responses on the perceived threats to flight safety
The research also looked the perceived ability of Air Traffic Control (ATC) to mitigate against
the threat that RPAS poses. Question number 13 asked, “Do you regard our ATC service as being
in a position to mitigate against the threat that RPAS may pose to flight operations?” It is interesting
to note that only 24% of personnel participating in the survey believed that ATC was in a
position to protect flight operations from the RPAS threat. Question 14 “Do you think the
IAC have adequately mitigated the risk RPAS may pose to flight operations?” shows that over 40% of
respondents do not believe that IAC have adequately mitigated against the risk RPAS might
pose to flight operations. Question 15, “Considering the recent rise in nuisance laser attacks on IAC
aircraft, do you foresee RPAS being utilised in a similar way to hinder or endanger flights?” shows that
RPAS is perceived to be a growing threat to flight safety, with over 70% agreeing that RPAS is
foreseen as having the possibility to be utilised to hinder or endanger flights.
To what extent is the national and international legislation sufficient to protect IAC
flight operations?
At the time of completing the survey, new rules and regulations were being finalised by the
Irish Aviation Authority. These were well publicised in the national media and will likely have
influenced the responses to question numbers 16, 17 and 18. Question 16 asked, “Do you agree
that An Garda Siochána are fully aware of the industry of RPAS in this country?” More than half of
46
the respondents answered ‘no’ to this question, with less than 20% reporting that they believe
that An Garda Siochána are fully aware of RPAS (see Figure 2 below). This is significant in
the context of upholding some of the regulations for users, and the likelihood of members
of An Garda Siochána to initiate prosecution for non-compliance and endangering citizens.
Similarly, question 17 asked, “Do you agree that An Garda Siochána are adequately prepared to
protect the airspace from RPAS operators on the ground?” Again, the majority of respondents (80%)
answered ‘no’ to this question. This is interesting in the context of the Garda Air Support Unit
(GASU), which is a helicopter unit comprising members of An Garda Siochána and piloted
by IAC personnel that operates from the IAC Baldonnel base. All helicopter operations are
carried out at a low level and in urban environments where RPAS usage would be higher. Only
6% of respondents agreed that An Garda Siochána are adequately prepared to protect the
airspace (see Figure 2 below)
100%
80%
60% YES
NO
40%
OTHER
20%
0%
Q16 Q17 Q18
Figure 2: Responses on awareness and assessment of legislation
Question 18 asked, “do you believe, from a base security perspective, a specific set of orders should
be drafted in order to protect IAC aircraft from the potential threat of RPAS overflying the airfield
boundaries?” This is a salient sample, given that the personnel responding to the survey have
a direct responsibility for the security of the base, in the normal course of their duties. The
sample are, therefore, fully aware of the challenge of maintaining adequate security at all times.
It is interesting therefore, that 87% respondents agreed that a specific set of orders need to be
created in order to address the emerging threat of RPAS being used for malicious purposes or
in an illegal manner, and in such a way as to contrive the safety of IAC. See Figure 2, above.
This finding has implications for other Defence Forces establishments throughout Ireland, as
each premises must maintain adequate security at all times.
Are IAC personnel sufficiently educated on the capabilities and threat potential of
RPAS with respect to flight safety?
The topic of education provided the most definitive findings in this study, with very little
division of response. Question 19 in the survey asked, “In your opinion is there sufficient education
currently being provided to personnel in your current role in relation to RPAS?” A particular focus of
this study was to examine whether personnel believed the information currently being supplied
on RPAS and the growth of the industry in Ireland was at the appropriate level required.
The overwhelming majority felt that the current level of RPAS education being supplied to
47
personnel was inadequate, with only 13% of respondents indicating that it was sufficient and
some 80% of respondents answering ‘no’ to this question (see Figure 3, below).
100%
80%
60% YES
NO
40%
OTHER
20%
0%
Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22
Figure 3: Responses on education on RPAS within the IAC
With regard to the suggestion that more formulaic RPAS training be instituted in the IAC, the
results were very clear. In answer to Question 20, which asked, “The IAA has proposed that An
Garda Siochána deliver a module on RPAS to new entrants training in Templemore. Do you think that
the IAC would benefit from incorporating such a module into Pilot, ATC, and Aircrew initial courses?” A
resounding 98% of respondents agreed that RPAS education should be incorporated into the
initial training of the pilot; aircrew and ATC courses (see Figure 3 above). Questions 20 and 21
dealt with issues relating to the knowledge management system in the IAC, known as ‘IKON’.
Question 20 asked “Do you agree that the Irish Air Corps would benefit from having a designated RPAS
IKON portal incorporating education, legislation and flight safety lessons learned?” and Question 21
asked, “Would you interact with such a portal if it was to be introduced?” Interestingly, over
90% of respondents agreed with both questions 20 and 21, which suggests there is an appetite
to record legislation updates and flight safety lessons learned in relation to RPAS activities (see
Figure 3 above). This finding has implications for other Defence Forces components and for
their premises throughout the country, and it raises an important matter that could warrant
further research.
Eight questions in the Survey were dedicated to ascertaining the level of awareness of RPAS in
the IAC, these are summarised in Figure 4, below. Question 4 in the Survey asked “Have you
ever witnessed an RPAS operating in your airspace during the course of your career?” and, question 5
asked “Have you ever heard a colleague discuss an encounter with an RPAS operating in their airspace?”.
The responses were consistent in that 34% of respondents reported having witnessed an RPAS
operating in their airspace during the course of their career (see Figure 4 below). Many of these
were helicopter pilots who operate at a lower flight level. Of the total group of respondents,
66% had heard a colleague discuss an encounter with an RPAS. Interestingly when the results
include just helicopter pilots, the number that had heard a colleague discuss an encounter with
an RPAS rose to 100%.
48
100%
80%
60% YES
NO
40%
OTHER
20%
0%
Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11
Figure 4: Response on awareness of RPAS within the IAC
In relation to respondents reporting their familiarity with the RPAS industry and the emergent
regulatory requirement for RPAS in Ireland, the survey contained six questions. Question 6
asked “Do you consider yourself well informed on the RPAS industry in Ireland?” while question 7
asked “Are you aware that the IAA introduced new regulation in December 2016 in response to the rapid
growth in RPAS operators in Ireland?” Question 8 asked, “Do you consider yourself well informed on the
IAA regulation that governs the use of RPAS in Irish airspace?” Question 9 asked, “Do you think that
the IAA regulation adequately controls the use of RPAS in this country”
Of the total group taking the survey, only 29% of the group considered themselves well
informed on the current industry in Ireland. Yet despite the fact that a greater proportion
of helicopter pilots experience RPAS in flight, 36% profess themselves well informed. Some
80% of respondents reported that they were aware of the regulation introduced by the IAA in
December 2016 in response to the rapid growth in RPAS operators in Ireland, however, just
over 40% of respondents consider themselves to be well informed on the IAA regulation that
governs the use of RPAS in Irish Airspace, with just over 50% reporting a no answer to this
question (see Figure 4 above). Fewer than 30% of respondents reported that they think the
IAA regulation adequately controls the use of RPAS in this country, with 40% reporting a no
response, while just over 30% reported ‘other’ in their response (see Figure 4 above).
Question 10 asked, “Do you agree that the IAC are properly aware of the RPAS industry?” and question
11 asked “Do you regard the IAC as being adequately prepared to deal with the RPAS industry?” Some
50% of respondents reported that they agree that the IAC are properly aware of the RPAS
industry, with just under 40% reporting a no answer to this question. Finally, just over 30%
of respondents report that they regard the IAC as being adequately prepared to deal with
the RPAS industry, with less than 50% reporting a no response to this question (see Figure
4 above).
49
Conclusion
It is clear from the study that concerns surrounding RPAS operations is increasing in the
IAC. The data analysed in this study suggests that most Air Corps personnel are concerned
about the effects that RPAS operations can have on Air Corps flight operations. The
overwhelming concern from operators in the IAC is that RPAS pose a threat to flight safety.
The questionnaires directly highlight the high level of concern that IAC personnel had with
regard to RPAS. The findings from this research suggest that the threat to flight safety from
RPAS is reaching a critical level. This threat is also relevant for civilian flight safety, although
that is not the focus of this particular study. Indeed, some incidents at civilian airports
(e.g. Gatwick Airport, UK in December 2018) have demonstrated the serious economic
and social consequences that an RPAS incident can have due to flight safety concerns.
It is apparent that measures are needed to combat a quickly evolving and uncontrolled
RPAS market. It is recommended that in order to mitigate the threat to IAC flight safety
a coordinated effort must occur between the IAA, IAC and An Garda Siochána. Training
modules need to be delivered to officers in the IAA, IAC and An Garda Siochána, with
inputs from all three bodies (the IAA, IAC and An Garda Siochána personnel) to ensure
that emerging regulation and legislation are fully enforced.
To what extent is the national and international legislation sufficient to protect IAC flight operations?
The issue of national and international legislation and regulation being sufficient to protect
IAC flight operations is a critical one. The majority of research in this area to date has been
focused on the legislative framework of the FAA. This paper represents the first attempt to
document the usability and efficacy of the Irish regulation. It should be noted that the IAA
were among the first regulators in the world to establish a framework of regulation around
the use of RPAS. However, the need to regulate the manufacture of RPAS is of primary
importance, if suggestions from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) with regard
to geo-fencing or electronic identification are to be realised.
The conclusion from the survey was that IAC personnel are well informed about the recent
legislation and regulation regarding RPAS. However, the overwhelming opinion unveiled
by this paper is the belief that current legislation is not sufficient to protect IAC flight
operations. This may also have repercussions for civilian flight operations also. Stricter
regulations need to be implemented. In the interest of traceability it is imperative that every
RPAS needs to be registered with the IAA. This would greatly deter unauthorised usage,
while also contributing to effective policing in the event that that rules are breached. These
findings have relevance to other Defence Forces activities and premises, as well as to other
State organisations, including the IAA and An Garda Siochána. Further research into these
issues might be timely and important, particularly in the context of flight safety, airport
operations and flight operations.
50
PUSHING THE DEFENCE
TECHNOLOGY FRONTIER:
A Role for the EU?
Dr. Daniel Fiott
Security and Defence Editor, EU Institute for Security Studies
Pushing the Defence Technology Frontier: A Role for the EU?
Abstract
With the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence
Fund, much of the attention has been placed on how these initiatives can assist the EU
member states fill capability gaps and enhance defence cooperation. However, these
new initiatives also symbolise an important development in relation to the way the EU
thinks about and invests in defence technologies. This paper explores the ways in which
the EU can manage its present and future technological and capability needs.
Introduction – a radical shift for the EU on defence?

With the introduction of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO), the European Union (EU) has taken a step forward in security and
defence cooperation. PESCO binds 25 EU member states into closer defence cooperation
over the longer-term, ensuring that the Union acts in a more structured way when it comes
to developing defence capabilities, investing in defence and being more credible with regard
to operational deployments. PESCO is also currently home to 34 defence capability projects
that are aimed at enhancing the strategic autonomy of the Union and ensuring that the EU
fills strategic gaps. Although more projects will be agreed by the end of 2019 and then in 2021,
the current set of 34 projects include cyber rapid response teams, a high atmosphere airship
platforms, medical command, the Eurodrone, integrated unmanned ground systems and more.
Ireland participates in projects such as the training centre for EU mission deployments1 and
maritime surveillance.2
The EDF, which sees the European Commission become a much more important actor in EU
defence, is earmarked to have €13 billion from 2021-2027 under the next multi-annual financial
framework (MFF) for the purposes of defence research and defence capability investments. For
defence research, the European Commission has a requested €4.1 billion over 7 years and €8.9
billion for defence capability development over the same period.3 Whereas the €4.1 billion
for defence research will cover up to 100% of the eligible costs of a project, the €8.9 billion
will cover a base line of 20% for programmes. This means that EU member states will have to
make up the remaining 80%, implying that the EDF could leverage more defence investment
(i.e. €1 billion worth of EDF investment in capabilities could unlock a further €5 billion in
government contributions – meaning €35 billion over 7 years).4
The Commission has also made clear that it will dedicate about 5% (€700 million) of the
overall €13 billion to disruptive technologies. This investment is geared to unlocking the EU’s
potential when it comes to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics,
nanotechnologies, etc. Such technologies are vital not only to support the competitiveness
of the European defence market, but also to ensuring that the Union has the defence
technologies required to continue to be a defence actor. The EU has already began to invest
in defence innovation. A pilot project has already seen €1.4 million dedicated to a study on
the feasibility of unmanned swarm systems (“EuroSWARM”) and the possibility of combining
1 With Germany, Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Romania and Sweden.
2 With Greece, Bulgaria, Spain, Croatia, Italy and Cyprus.
3 European Commission, “EU Budget for the Future: The European Defence Fund”, June 13, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-fund_en_0.pdf.
4 European Commission, “European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund”, Press release, November 20, 2016, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm.
52
unmanned systems, sensors and data for urban combat (“SPIDER”). Furthermore, under the
EU’s preparatory investments on defence research the Union has invested up to €90 million
in technologies such as maritime surveillance, adaptive camouflage, soldier communication
systems and advanced body armour.
Although these figures may seem relatively small when compared to say the defence budget
of the United States (US) or even some of the larger EU member states, this is a radical step
forward for the Union in the area of defence. Nevertheless, the EU’s venture into defence
research and capability development raises a set of questions. First, what capabilities and
technologies should be prioritised by the EU given the fixed envelope of €13 billion under
the EDF? Second, in what measure should the EU balance investments in existing capability
shortfalls compared to emerging technology domains? Third, why does the EU need to invest
in defence capabilities in the first place and for what purpose?
Balancing capability shortfalls and emerging technology

One of the biggest challenges facing the EU in terms of defence capabilities is how to
balance the need to plug long-standing shortfalls in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, communications and strategic airlift with future technology needs. Clearly,
there is no simple scientific formula for what proportion of investment should go on capability
shortfalls and on emerging technologies. Each EU member state government will have to decide
how it balances capability development and defence innovation, but there is an EU (and even
NATO) dimension to these national discussions. In fact, at the EU level the 2018 Capability
Development Plan (CDP) revision is a consolidated plan to manage this balancing act and this
means that national decisions are not made in complete isolation from broader EU-wide plans.
In what measure a member state decides to invest in capability shortfalls rather than emerging
technologies depends on national circumstances. A country may have the capital required
to both procure identified shortfalls and invest substantial amounts of money into defence
innovation. Other countries lacking in a defence industrial base may prioritise purchases of
systems and equipment that they lack. Other countries may want to promote niche technology
markets despite lacking prime defence firms that assemble high-tech weapon systems. Either
way, whatever decision is taken will affect the European defence market. For example, a
decision to simply fill capability gaps by buying off the shelf equipment from a third-country
outside of the Union may be a quick (although not necessarily cheaper) fix, but at what cost to
European industry?
Furthermore, the dichotomy that usually characterises the discussion between capability
shortfalls and future technologies misses the fact that many capability shortfalls require
continuous technological improvement to stay relevant in defence. In this regard, it is necessary
to think of capability shortfalls and technological frontiers in the same breath. Research shows
that existing capabilities profit from technological innovations that usually emanate from
the civil sector.5 So when we think about how the EU might push the defence technological
frontier, it is a question about harnessing new technologies but in a way that keeps costs for
5 Renaud Bellais and Daniel Fiott, “The European Defense Market: Disruptive Innovation and Market Destablization”, Economics of Peace and
Security Journal, vol. 12, no. 1 (2017), pp. 37-45.
53
weapons in check and allows Europe armed forces to profit from high quality systems
and equipment.
This is why it is promising to see how the European Commission has crafted its first work
programme calls on the preparatory programme for defence capabilities (i.e. the European
Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP)). Indeed, in 2019 the Commission
published a call for proposals for 9 key capability areas including: the protection and mobility
of military forces in areas such as counter CBRN and drones (a package worth €80 million);
intelligence, secured communication and cyber for enhanced situational awareness, early
warning and maritime surveillance (€182 million); conduct of high-end operations through
ground-based precision strike and future ground, air and naval systems (€71 million); innovative
defence technologies such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality and cyber technologies (€27
million) and a package for two PESCO projects on the Eurodrone and support for interoperable
and secure military communications (€137 million).6
Figure 1 – The 2019 Call for Proposals under the EDIDP

(Source: European Commission, 2019)
Such investments prove that the Commission is thinking about future technology needs whilst
also factoring in capability gaps in the EU’s defence armoury. Such steps also recognise that if
the EU gets left behind on the defence technology curve, this will come with significant political
and military costs. First, there are already political and technological gaps opening up in NATO
between the US and Europe NATO allies. Without European capabilities, the alliance is likely
to be lopsided and the long-term invest of the US in NATO could be questioned. Second, the
strategic landscape is shifting to such a degree that even basic Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) missions and operations will in the future be deployed in less permissive
6 European Commission, “European Defence Fund on track with €525 million for Eurodrone and other joint research and industrial projects”,
March 19, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/european-defence-fund-track-€525-million-eurodrone-and-other-joint-research-and-
industrial_en.
54
environments characterised by the existence of third powers (i.e. China and/or Russia in the
neighbourhood) and technological innovations (e.g. weaponised dual-use technologies such as
civil drones and cyber defence). Technology is one way for the EU to offset waning asymmetry
in parts of the world if thought were permissive for European forces.
The EU as a defence actor in a shifting strategic context

Of course, conversations about what types of defence technologies and capabilities the Union
should invest in are strongly related to ideas about what type of defence actor the EU is (or might
become). When one looks at the changing nature of warfare, it is clear that new technologies
and approaches such as cyber, automation, miniaturisation and durability are forcing European
armed forces to think about how “disruptive technologies” could affect the way they plan for
and fight wars. The current defence-technological context includes developments such as
directed energy weapons, hypersonic missiles, automated robotics, artificial intelligence, etc.
The question for the EU is, how far should it invest in such technologies or the narratives
accompanying them?
On the face of it, the EU is potentially limited in terms of the defence actor it can become
because of the EU treaties, which calls on the Union to prepare for crisis management
operations and missions outside of the borders of the EU. Since the introduction of the EU
Global Strategy (EUGS), the EU’s principal task of crisis management has been joined by
two further responsibilities including capacity building for partners and protecting Europe.7
Capacity building for partners is not such a controversial tasking, as the EU has a history
of supporting partners with security sector reform and training through military and civilian
CSDP. What is interesting, however, is the focus on ‘protecting Europe’ and the way the EU
could help with policies such as border management and hybrid threats by potentially engaging
CSDP tools, mechanisms and structures.
The lines between internal and external security and defence are becoming blurred, and this
means that the CSDP is having to evolve in line with the wishes of EU member states. This
is important to keep in mind because CSDP is evolving from purely a crisis management tool
into something potentially much broader in scope. While CSDP has been largely geared to
planning for the ‘Petersberg Tasks’8 which included peacekeeping, disarmament, separation of
forces, humanitarian tasks, etc., today the EU must also plan for potential continental security
contingencies under Article 42.7 TEU9 and Article 222 TFEU10. This, of course, does not
mean that the EU has suddenly entered the nuclear or conventional deterrence game, but
it does mean that it may need to plan for defence tasks that might occur on the territory of
the EU and for which NATO might not have a mandate (i.e. for non-NATO EU member
states). This evolution in the way we think about CSDP or EU security and defence more
broadly relates directly to the defence capabilities and research the EU could invest in. To put
7 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, June 2016,
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.
8 See this glossary of terms for the full list of tasks: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html.
9 This is otherwise known as the ‘mutual assistance clause’ and it states: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power...’
10 This is otherwise known as the ‘solidarity clause’ and it states: ‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a
Member States is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its
disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States…’.
55
it bluntly, if the EU needs to protect sea lines of communication as stated in the EUGS does
this mean that the EU should invest in a carrier group? Or, in order to prevent Russia from
invading a non-NATO EU member state should the EU invest in a new generation of tanks?
What about the Council Conclusions of 14 November 201611 on the need to plan for close air
support; should the EU invest in stealth fighter jets? The reality is, of course, that the Union
may have to invest in all of these areas and more if it is to credibly fulfil its role as a strategically
autonomous defence actor.
The problem is that debates over what capabilities should be prioritised in an EU setting are
political – not only because EU governments want to use PESCO and the EDF to fund projects
of national interest, but because industrial interests ensure that the debate is not just about
defence capabilities but also about juste retour, technology partnerships, skills, jobs and more.
This is even more reason why the EU needs to get capability prioritisation right. This begins
with calibrating correctly initiatives such as PESCO, EDF, the Coordinated Annual Review on
Defence (CARD) and the CDP but also by having a frank discussion at the EU level about what
precisely it is the EU should strive to achieve in the defence domain.
Such a conversation is needed now more than ever. Discussions in Brussels about EU ‘strategic
autonomy’ in security and defence are sensitive and are usually seen as either duplicating or
detracting away from NATO.12 Of course, EU defence initiatives have been set up in such a
way as to reinforce the European pillar in the alliance. Yet, it is necessary that governments in
the EU develop a better sense of strategic autonomy. The US has made it plain, for example,
that it will dedicate its political and military energies to China and this means that Europeans
will have to do more for their own defence. Politically, the EU needs defence capabilities as a
way to leverage its political independence. Let us picture future scenarios where war breaks out
between the US and China or the US and Iran. In both cases, sea communication channels in
the Indo-Pacific and Strait of Hormuz could be blocked. Would the EU join the US in such
conflicts? Probably not, so who will protect Europe’s strategic interests in such cases?
Conclusion
In terms of defence, it is clear that the EU is not yet in a position to compare itself with larger
players such as the US or China. It does not appear to be the Union’s intention to “compete”
in the traditional strategic sense. Nevertheless, it is still necessary for the EU to protect the
interests of its citizens and its territory. Whether it be peacekeeping, crisis management,
border management or protecting the global commons, the Union clearly has to strive for a
certain level of strategic autonomy. The US has repeatedly called for this, but the EU does not
need Washington to remind it of its responsibilities in the area of security and defence. An
increasingly shifting global context means that the Union must fend for itself and one way of
achieving this is to ensure that Europe’s armed forces have the equipment they need now and
in the future, plus making sure that the competitiveness of the European defence industry is
safeguarded. In short, without a defence industry and capabilities the EU will struggle to secure
its objectives in a global order that is being contested by partners and new and old powers alike.
11 Council of the EU, “Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence”, 14149/16, Brussels,
November 14, 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf.
12 Daniel Fiott, “Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?”, EUISS Brief, No. 12, November 2018, https://www.iss.
europa.eu/content/strategic-autonomy-towards-‘european-sovereignty’-defence.
56
Fortunately, EU member state governments have recognised this fact and this is why they have
committed to PESCO and the EDF. History will eventually tell us how far the Union was able
to push the technological frontier and its own defence, but it is clear that for the time being
there is not a minute to lose in developing defence capabilities. This means that the Union’s
institutions must continue to play a key role in overcoming national jealousies and mediating
between national capability and industrial preferences. If the EU is really going to push the
frontiers of defence technology for the benefit of its own security and defence, then difficult
choices will have to be made over what type of defence actor the EU needs to become and the
capabilities it needs to this end. Not seeing through the dramatic shifts in EU security and
defence will be too costly for the Union in the current and future global strategic landscape.
*The views contained in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
57
58
BEWARE THE
BOOMERANG EFFECTS:
Western Risk Society and the Strategic
Backlashes of Military–Technological
Modernisation
Eoin McNamara
University of Tartu, Estonia.
Beware the Boomerang Effects: Western Risk Society and the
Strategic Backlashes of Military–Technological Modernisation
Abstract
The transatlantic security partnership formed between the EU and the US has long
sought to maintain a stable international order. Changing levels of social acceptance
towards the use of military force combined with increased discord in transatlantic
diplomacy over recent years has led to fears that the Western commitment required
to maintain the military security burden that international stabilisation requires is swiftly
deteriorating. This article argues that Western governments are today confronted by
a challenging domestic-strategic contradiction. On one hand, most Western societies
continue to perceive it as crucial that the contemporary international order remains
stable. Conversely, these societies have become more risk-averse than ever before.
This has reinforced a popular reluctance towards the deployment of ground forces often
required for security management tasks. Centred on the US military-industrial complex,
social change has been an important catalyst to propel Western governments to invest
substantially in risk-efficient military technologies. This has arguably been the primary
means employed to ease this domestic-strategic predicament. Military drone technology
has revolutionised US counterterrorism policy over the past decade. While fostering
many obvious strategic benefits, this article will argue that the utilisation of this military
technology also harbours several severe strategic side effects.
Introduction – social change and dangerous modernisation

This article’s analysis perceives Western social change through the concept of risk society first
introduced by Ulrich Beck during the 1980s.1 The risk society outlook provides a broad macro-
level conceptualisation for the main patterns that define contemporary social change. The
concept can be divided into two interrelated strands. The first strand emphasises globalisation;
increased “individualisation” in society; the accelerated disappearance of self/other divides;
and a “presence of the future” consciousness as defining conditions in contemporary Western
society.2 These background trends combine with the more specific conditions of the second
strand relating to society’s increasingly reflexive character and include a social obsession
with the “management” of risk and the inevitable “boomerang effects” that manifest as side-
effects from technological modernisation in particular.3 When Western approaches to war
have previously been perceived through the risk society concept, the most important headline
argument has been that policy for recent Western-led military operations: encompassing those
in Kosovo; Afghanistan; and Iraq have been rationalised through the logic of risk management
in one form or another.4
Anthony Giddens has argued that the complete arrival of the Western risk society has meant
both “the end of nature” and “the end of tradition”.5 Bound-up in the sometimes, negative
unintended side effects of modernisation, “the end of nature” is conceptualised as today’s
inextricable intertwinement between the natural world and its social equivalent. Global climate
change has developed as an unexpected side effect of past and current industrial modernisation.
Nuclear energy is regularly explained as a seminal manifestation of risk technology. As a solution
1 Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986).
2 Ulrich Beck, Risk society: Towards a new modernity (London: Sage, 1992).
3 Beck, Op. Cit.
4 Yee-Kuang Heng, War as risk management: Strategy and conflict in an age of globalised risks (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).
5 Anthony Giddens, “Risk and responsibility,” The Modern Law Review, 62, no.1 (1999): 3.
60
for many of industrialisation’s problems, the nuclear energy option spells a significant reduction
in carbon emissions while ensuring an economically affordable energy supply. Nevertheless,
nuclear energy production also comes with the terrifying side effect that any negligence or
sabotage pertaining to its management could gravely endanger human habitation.6 The “end
of tradition” relates to the dilution of many traditional collective institutions in favour of the
greater “individualisation” of society. In earlier modernity, Western societies were structured
by a diverse set of collective institutions, including the main Christian Churches; the welfare
state; the social class-system; and organisations that promoted strong community-based social
capital. As many of these institutions have faded, social expectations now place individual
responsibility to form one’s own biography and social outlook in the foreground.7 Collective
social institutions were once the building blocks for the cohesive nation-state. This cohesion
created a relatively orderly social context that benefited governments implementing policy. The
eclecticism of today’s individualised Western societies means that government decision-making
is a more disruptive process by comparison. This is a point that holds particular resonance for
security policy. The risk society literature offers many über large-frame perspectives relating to
society’s ongoing modernisation trajectory. By narrowing the scope of this logic to the military-
technological sector, this article argues that the “dangers of modernisation” and government
policy at risk of disruption are important background factors to consider when analysing the
West’s evolving approach to the deployment of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS),
alternatively described as drones.
What Beck outlines as the “boomerang effect” can provide considerable insight concerning
the unintended side effects of Western military strategy today. The “boomerang effect” is a
social condition that Will Atkinson has described as “the reacting back of risks on those who
produced them”.8 The next section will examine the Western hegemonic security burden and
the domestic-strategic contradiction created for its risk societies because of this. The article
will then develop the argument that strategic side-effects from military drone utilisation
can be identified in three important areas. First, drone strikes can create the backlash of
stronger “siege mentalities” among the non-combatant population in conflict areas. This
risks galvanising radicalisation leading to the emergence of “accidental guerrillas”. Second,
unrivalled technological superiority can produce military doctrines that depend excessively on
this advantage. As an influence on force planning, this can leave ground forces unprepared and
underdeveloped, with the “versatility” that they specialise in still crucial for effective stabilisation
operations. Third, there is an eventual risk that Western-pioneered military technologies will
later disperse at different rates to aspiring strategic competitor states and terrorist organisations
seeking to destabilise Western strategic objectives. This article’s conclusion will reflect on
emerging military technologies within the context of the security strategies of smaller states.
Dilemmas of the hegemonic security burden

Social change has ensured that Western societies have become increasingly risk-averse in
producing the collective action that is required for international security management. With the
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, this risk-aversion has
6 Beck, Op. Cit, 60-61.
7 Darryl S.L. Jarvis, “Risk, globalisation and the state: A critical appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the world risk society thesis,” Global Society, 21, no.
1 (2007): 26-28.
8 Will Atkinson, “Beck, individualization and the death of class: a critique,” British Journal of Sociology, 58, no. 3 (2007): 352.
61
been transparently on display for more than a decade. While politically compelled to contribute
militarily to Afghanistan’s stabilisation, many NATO allies imposed stringent national caveats
to limit the combat exposure of their military deployments.9 This problematically exacerbated
the complexity of ISAF’s operational planning structure. Military fatality counts taken at
different intervals for ISAF routinely place the US and the UK, the missions leading states,
within the top five most affected participants. Other regulars in this bracket have included
Denmark, Estonia and the Netherlands, smaller states where a relatively low number of
fatalities can still produce a large per capita figure.10 Among NATO’s larger states, owing to
less combat exposure, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain all display significantly lower
military fatality rates per capita compared to the US and the UK.11 As well as discourse around
an unfair distribution of combat risk, US perceptions stressing a European over-dependence on
US military capabilities for expeditionary operations were further galvanised after Operation
Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya.12 In 2011, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates gave a
landmark speech in Brussels to highlight widening transatlantic ruptures. Gates warned of the
grave problem of NATO becoming a “two-tiered” alliance divided between allies that can make
a tangible military contribution and others unable to do so.13
In seeking to capture the deeper social roots shaping Western society’s increased risk-aversion
pertaining to the military burden for international security, Christopher Coker has combined
the risk society outlook with postmodern social theory. Central to this is the concept of
“liquid societies” first developed by Zygmunt Bauman.14 Just as liquids “do not hold their
shape for long”, postmodern “social bonds” are also extremely fluid. Many formative social
bonds are increasingly temporary in substance.15 The idea of “liquid alliances” fares well
to explain recent experience in NATO alliance politics. Political and military liaisons have
become increasingly flexible, with commitments undertaken on a contingent basis and long-
term strategic perspectives often conspicuously absent.16 These underlying social tendencies
illustrate a worrying pattern considering the vast range of socio-economic “public goods” that
have traditionally accumulated from the West’s management of international order.
Military power remains vital towards ensuring a stable and predictable international order.
Different military instruments are required to curb the prevalence of terrorist networks; to
reduce opportunities for transnational organised crime; and to manage the resurgence of
revisionist states orchestrating limited destabilisation for their own strategic ends.17 Should the
West disengage its military power from these functions, Richard Haass has a pessimistic view
towards the “non-polar” international order that might follow. Haass’ argument again captures
the domestic-strategic contradiction that currently confronts Western risk society. While
desired by some aspiring non-Western powers, enhanced multi-polarity will redistribute power
too chaotically within the international system. Finding the consensus required to manage
9 James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul,” International Affairs, 85, no. 3 (2009): 507.
10 Steve Coll, “Burden Sharing,” The New Yorker, March 11 2010, accessed September 2 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/steve-coll/
burden-sharing .
11 Coll, Op. Cit. For constantly updated data on NATO military fatalities in Afghanistan, see “iCasualties”, accessed September 2 2019, http://
icasualties.org/App/AfghanFatalities .
12 James M. Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership,” International Affairs, 87, no. 4 (2011): 779.
13 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium”, US Department of Defence, press
release, June 10 2011, accessed July 1 2019, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839.
14 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid modernity (London: John Wiley & Sons, 2000).
15 Christopher Coker, War in an age of risk (Cambridge: Polity, 2006): 20.
16 Coker, Op. Cit., 20.
17 For explanation of “limited war” as a form of destabilisation in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, see Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine
and the art of limited war,” Survival, 56, no. 6 (2014): 7-38.
62
many severe security risks will prove arduously difficult under such circumstances.18 Should
Western military hegemony decline, control will be further loosened on actors holding the
potential to destabilise international order.19 Despite the well-flagged risks that a reduction
in Western security management would likely create, the common transatlantic commitment
to undertake the responsibilities necessary for this continues to come in for doubt. “Burden-
shifting” remains a problematic practice.20
As a recent evolution of “burden-shifting” in Europe, it has been argued that once the US
stations a modest military deployment to support an allied state, populations in many of the
hosting states become less willing to commit resources to their own national defence.21 Such
attitudes tacitly portray a preference for the various risks of collective defence to be transferred to
Washington. Tense alliance politics over the thorny issue of NATO burden-sharing is not new.
Speaking in 1970, Harlan Cleveland, the US ambassador to NATO, described the alliance as
“an organised controversy about who is going to do how much”.22 However, while a prominent
transatlantic theme up until the Obama presidency, President Donald Trump’s rhetoric on
this subject has sometimes been especially abrupt and abrasive.23 Little chastisement has been
spared for some European NATO members that Trump perceives to be avoiding their fair share
of NATO’s collective defence responsibilities.24
Risk-aversion and the US strategic posture

Despite Washington’s long-standing frustrations towards its European allies, it can be argued
that the US has itself also become increasingly risk-averse in its security policy over recent
years. Seen primary through its approach to the Syrian war; the US has grown cautious
concerning ground force deployments.25 According to Mikkel Vedby Rassmussen, rather
than the traditional security dilemma, US foreign policy for the unipolar era has instead
been challenged by a “reflexive security dilemma”. The US and its allies have not as yet
had to contend with “a serious military threat from any [competing] power”.26 US security
management has instead focused on a fluctuating strategic environment that continuously
generates an uncertain set of risks. Under these circumstances, the challenge for Western
policymakers involves the rationalisation of “what conflicts or security issues in general, are
important to one’s security”.27 When military force needs to be applied in the absence of well-
defined strategic parameters, policymaking becomes open-ended. Policy questions surrounding
the correct utility and measure of military force become vital to effectively manage a particular
risk. Highlighted by the calamitous destabilisation caused by the US-led intervention in Iraq in
18 Richard N. Haass, “The age of nonpolarity: What will follow US dominance,” Foreign Affairs, 87, no. 3 (2008): 50-52.
19 Ibid., 51-52.
20 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly rivals: Bargaining and burden shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003): 7.
21 Jo Jakobsen and Tor G. Jakobsen, “Tripwires and free-riders: Do forward-deployed US troops reduce the willingness of host-country citizens
to fight for their country?,” Contemporary Security Policy, 40, no. 2 (2019): 135-164.
22 Harlan Cleveland cited in Tomáš Valášek, “A new transatlantic security bargain,” Carnegie Europe, May 23 2017, accessed September 2
2019, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/05/23/new-transatlantic-security-bargain-pub-70050 .
23 Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Between Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia: Nordic-Baltic security relations amid transatlantic drift,” Irish Studies
in International Affairs, 28 (2017): 74-77.
24 Katrin Bennhold, “German Defense spending is falling even shorter. The US isn’t happy,” The New York Times, March 19 2019, accessed
July 1 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/world/europe/germany-nato-spending-target.html.
25 Andreas Krieg, “Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East,” International Affairs, 92, no.
1 (2016): 97-113.
26 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “‘A parallel globalization of terror’: 9–11, security and globalization,” Cooperation and Conflict, 37, no.3 (2002):
328.
27 Rasmussen, Op. Cit., 328.
63
2003, Western policymakers have sometimes got this balance profoundly wrong. Failure here
has contributed to “war fatigue” across Western societies, creating a path-dependency that has
shaped only tentative approaches towards more recent conflicts. Despite this pattern, inaction
is regularly perceived as strategically unaffordable. Therefore, risk-efficient military technologies
have become increasingly crucial for Western security management. These technologies can
reduce the need for ground force deployments, thus easing the risk of military casualties.
Nevertheless, the Western military embrace of advanced technologies such as surveillance
and fighter drones will also inevitably harbour unintended “boomerang effects” that can later
unexpectedly undermine the West’s strategic objectives.
Accelerated by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that flourished during the 1990s,
precision-strike technology has since transformed NATO’s approach to peace enforcement.
The primacy of NATO airpower was seen in earnest with Operation Allied Force (OAF) against
Serbia’s military actions in Kosovo in 1999. However, it was the NATO-led OUP in Libya
in 2011 that illustrated how ineffective airpower on its own can be when stabilisation is the
ultimate strategic objective. Colin S. Gray argues that it is crucial to see war as “about the peace
it will shape”.28 Beyond the initial phases of an intervention, this is a task that airpower alone
is unable to service. An international peacekeeping presence was not agreed after OUP, Libya’s
fragile state institutions have since failed to prevent a descent into violent deterioration. One
major “boomerang effect” from OUP has been the dense outward refugee flows from war-torn
Libya. The subsequent management of these flows has created some severe political discord
within the EU since 2015.
Drone warfare has emerged as a central feature in the US approach to security management
over the past decade. Barack Obama has frequently been described as America’s “first drone
president”.29 The extensive use of drone strikes to combat suspected terrorist networks and
insurgency strongholds has continued under the Trump administration. President Trump has
approved legislation that reverses previous transparency concerning civilian deaths occurring
from US drone strikes outside Afghanistan and Iraq.30 US drone strategy is consistent with
the deeper “presence of the future” anxieties of the Western risk society. The logic of “targeted
killing” is preventative in its focus; it aims to disrupt or destroy important nodes in terrorist or
insurgent networks before these can coordinate attacks on American citizens or the US military
presence abroad. Risk-aversion has been a primary social condition that has underpinned the
evolution of drone warfare. Attempting to persuade the US population of the ethical virtues
of drone use, Obama has emphasised the headline message that “drone strikes have saved
lives”.31 With the objective to dismantle terrorist networks, drone strikes have been described
as a risk-efficient and “convenient” substitute for ground force deployments.32 According to
Daniel Byman, further advantages include constant disruption of the mobility of terror
group members; a light military footprint that only minimally violates the sovereignty of a
state where a strike takes place; and a decreased dependency on counterterrorism cooperation
28 Colin S. Gray, “How has war changed since the end of the Cold War?,” Parameters, 35, no. 1 (2005): 21.
29 Jared Keller, “America’s long history of hiding airstrikes,” Pacific Standard, October 6 2015, accessed July 1 2019, https://psmag.com/news/
americas-long-history-of-hiding-drone-deaths.
30 “Trump revokes Obama rule on reporting drone strike deaths,” BBC News, March 7 2019, accessed July 1 2019, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-47480207.
31 “Barack Obama: ‘drone strikes have saved lives’,” The Guardian, May 24 2013, accessed July 1 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
video/2013/may/24/barack-obama-drone-strikes-save-lives-video.
32 Daniel L. Byman, “Why drones work: the case for Washington’s weapon of choice,” The Brookings Institution, June 17, 2013, accessed July
1 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/.
64
with intelligence services from states with severely poor human rights records such as Pakistan
and Yemen.33
Drone technology and flawed exaggerations

Despite these strategic benefits, drone warfare does not render the US or its allies immune
from the “boomerang effects” that the utilisation of this technology can create. Drone strikes
for preventative counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations put severe pressure on
the vulnerabilities of the Western intelligence community. Mistakes with intelligence were
intrinsic to the profoundly flawed pre-emptive strategy employed by the US-led coalition
for the Iraq war in 2003.34 Decision-making for preventative drone strikes is heavily guided
by intelligence information. This information is gathering through an imperfect process.
Mistakes and misjudgements routinely occur. This increases the risk that drone strikes will find
unintended targets. These errors facilitate the destruction of innocent civilian life as well as
critical physical infrastructure.35 In earlier modernity, military strategy was defined by “means-
end rationality”.36 With drone strikes an important focal point, the rigidity of this thinking
is now very problematic. Contrary to an “end”, there is instead often a spill-over into second-
order risks. While meeting the first objective to destroy or disrupt a terrorist or insurgent
network in a particular location, drone strikes can still undermine the West’s wider strategic
objectives after this.
The attitude of the local civilian population is perceived by many strategists as the “centre
of gravity” that decides today’s counterinsurgency campaigns.37 While a formidably difficult
task, ground forces still have opportunities to gain the cooperation of local populations and
thus shape this “centre of gravity” more in their favour. By contrast, the ruthlessness and
facelessness of “targeted killing” through drone strikes carries high potential to create a “siege
mentality” against Western strategic objectives in a conflict area that cannot be counteracted.38
This pattern of events has occurred in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA),
a Taliban stronghold and a considerable menace for the NATO forces that have sought to
stabilise southern Afghanistan. Persistent US drone strikes in the FATA have constantly
agitated local residents. At the same time, NATO has had no “political presence” in the FATA
to ease the risk of aggrieved local residents becoming “accidental guerrillas”.39 This risk should
not just be seen as locally contained. With today’s strategic conditions sometimes described as
the “globalisation of civil war”, the transnational imagery of “targeted killing” can strengthen
the position of the “recruiting sergeants” that seek to bolster terrorist organisations in different
locations.40 Grievances elsewhere can still act as an asset for those seeking to radicalise “foreign
33 Byman, Op. Cit.

34 Robert Jervis, “Why the Bush Doctrine cannot be sustained,” Political Science Quarterly, 120, no. 3 (2005): 351-377.
35 Chantal Grut, et al., Counting drone strike deaths (New York: Columbia University Law School Human Rights Institute Report, 2012),
accessed July 1 2019, https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinal.
pdf.
36 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The risk society at war: Terror, technology and strategy in the twenty-first century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006): 13.
37 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Hearts and minds, cultural awareness and good intelligence: The blueprint for successful counter-insurgency?,”
Intelligence and National Security, 26, no. 4 (2011): 456.
38 Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig, “Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare?,” Security Dialogue, 43, no.4 (2012): 372-373.
39 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, “Drone warfare: Blowback from the new American way of war”, Middle East Policy, 18, no.3
(2011):126. The radicalisation process for “accidental guerrillas” is covered in detail in David Kilcullen, The accidental guerrilla: Fighting small
wars in the midst of a big one (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
40 Matha Crenshaw, “Why America? The globalization of civil war,” Current History, 100 (2001): 425-432.
65
fighters” into attacking Western societies or to disrupt Western stabilisation efforts within a
particular conflict area as a means of retaliation.41
The possession of sophisticated military technologies can lead to institutionalised over-
exaggerations that misguide force planning. Observing US military engagement in Afghanistan
and Iraq as well as Israel’s war against Hezbollah in south Lebanon in 2006, Herbert R.
McMaster draws the inference that technological superiority did not significantly reduce the
most important uncertainties, or the “fog of war”, typically encountered by state armed forces
fighting in asymmetric conflicts.42 The convenience of superior technology can misguide those
planning these operations into putting “theory before practice”.43 For McMaster, an obsessive
emphasis on technological solutions distracts attention away from military force preparation
geared towards the “human, psychological, political and cultural dimensions of conflict”.44
This remains crucial for the Western military organisations that seek to improve as agents
of stabilisation as their adversaries “use terrain, intermingle with the population, and adopt
countermeasures to technological capabilities” to frustrate their objectives.45
Risk and technological dispersal

At the level of strategic competition between the great powers, today’s intensified development
of Western-pioneered drone and a robotic technology also creates reflexive security concerns.
Peter W. Singer warns that there is never a “permanent first mover advantage” for the
militaries that initially achieve a technological advantage.46 Nevertheless, with the “rise of the
rest” touted as a consequence of the continuing redistribution of the international balance of
power, debate still persists concerning the speed at which sophisticated military technologies
will disperse to the states that seek to impede Western strategic objectives. Frank Sauer and
Niklas Schörnig outline that the US has utilised surveillance or fighter drones in states such
as Iran and Syria that possess considerable anti-aircraft capabilities. If a Western-manufactured
drone is captured, hostile forces can obtain the remains of the technology. Damaged drones
retain important clues for those seeking to replicate their design.47 As demonstrated by
China, when Western drone technology has been duplicated, the replicating manufacturer
has been able to add modifications to accommodate the strategic purposes of the procurer.48
Nevertheless, it has been argued that it is important not to exaggerate the speed at which
Western drone technology might disperse. According to Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, the
most sophisticated drone systems, capable of precise or maximised devastation, are incredibly
complex to produce.49 The management of immensely complex “industrial, organisational and
infrastructural” capacities is required to retain an edge in the development of military drone
technology. The drone manufacturing programmes of the most industrially advanced states in
the world the US, the UK, Germany and France have all occasionally suffered severe setbacks.50
41 Sauer and Schörnig, Op. Cit., 327.
42 Herbert R. McMaster, “On war: Lessons to be learned,” Survival, 50, no.1 (2008): 26-27.
43 Ibid., 25.
44 Ibid., 27.
45 Ibid., 27.
46 Peter W. Singer, “The future of war,” in Ethical and legal aspects of unmanned systems, ed. Gerhard Dabringer (Vienna: Institut für Religion
und Frieden, 2011): 79.
47 Sauer and Schörnig, Op. Cit., 371-372.
48 Ibid., 371-372.
49 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of drone warfare? Industrial, organizational, and infrastructural constraints,” Security Studies, 25,
no. 1 (2016): 50.
50 Gilli and Gilli, Op. Cit., 50.
66
Spurred on by the RMA’s focus towards Information Technology (IT), complexity in military
technology manufacturing has increased exponentially over recent decades. For Gilli and
Gilli, the more the complexity, the more “incompatibilities and vulnerabilities” are generated
within the production system.51 Through open-source information; conventional intelligence
gathering; and cyber espionage, China’s military-industrial base has been broadly exposed
to Western technological manufacturing practices. The research and development systems
that Beijing possesses for its military’s technology are still yet to cope with the same levels of
complexity as Western equivalents.52 While possessing a military-industrial base advantaged by
deeper historical foundations, Russia’s problems in the same area are more nuanced. President
Vladimir Putin has proclaimed Moscow’s ambition to “lead the world” in the development of
Artificial Intelligence (AI).53 However, as evidenced by the failure of his predecessor Dmitri
Medvedev’s “modernisation from above” initiative for Russia’s civilian economy, a society
that is perpetually riddled with “Endemic corruption, no protections for private property,
and a pervasive state security apparatus” is unlikely to stimulate the innovation required to
achieve Putin’s lofty objective.54 These deeply entrenched structural weaknesses connected
to the respective Chinese and Russian military-industrial complexes should provide US and
EU policymakers with some relief that the dispersal of advanced Western technologies will
not rapidly accelerate and thus majorly assist Russia’s or China’s military prowess over the
immediate term.
Nevertheless, while plausible from the angle of great power competition, this analysis has the
crucial flaw in that it does not account for non-state terrorist and insurgent organisations
and the profound harm that even rudimentary imitation of Western drone technologies can
still cause. Drone technology has been improvised by an anti-government militia in Yemen
to target a ceremonial parade attended by many of that state’s military elite. As it exploded
in the air to rain shrapnel on those below, the drone utilised by rebels resembled a remote-
controlled “dirty bomb”.55 In a brutal conflict where many grievous human rights atrocities
have been committed, Saudi Arabia has militarily intervened to support Yemen’s beleaguered
government. Exchanges between the Saudi military and Yemen’s Houthi militias provide
further lessons on how even rudimentary drone utilisation can strategically advantage guerrilla
forces. Houthi rebels have been able to use drones of modest sophistication to interfere with
the radar systems that guide Saudi Arabia’s US-manufactured Patriot anti-missile batteries. With
these temporarily nullified, Houthi militias have gained the opportunity to shower missiles
onto Saudi Arabia’s neighbouring territories.56 In a globalised world, effective insurgent tactics
assisted by improvised technologies can be quickly replicated elsewhere. The emerging centrality
of different drone technologies in contemporary conflict strategies is a “boomerang effect”
with its source in the modernisation led by Western states. Concerning the US development
of drone technology specifically, Conor Friedersdorf surmised the unintended repercussions
51 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China has not caught up yet: Military-technological superiority and the limits of imitation, reverse
engineering, and cyber espionage,” International Security, 43, no. 3 (2018/19):149.
52 Gilli and Gilli, Op. Cit., 187-189.
53 Radina Gigova, “Who Vladimir Putin thinks will rule the world,” CNN, September 2 2017, accessed July 1 2019, https://edition.cnn.
com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-world/index.html.
54 Aaron Bateman, “Russia’s quest to lead the world in AI is doomed,” Defence One, June 12 2019, accessed July 1 2019, https://www.
defenseone.com/ideas/2019/06/russias-quest-lead-world-ai-doomed/157663/.
55 Conor Friedersdorf, “The unstoppable spread of lethal drones,” The Atlantic, January 31 2019, accessed July 1 2019, https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/killer-drones/581722/.
56 Friedersdorf, Op. Cit.
67
with the outlook that “The United States [has] hastened the proliferation of a weapon that
diminishes its relative power”.57
Conclusion – risk technologies and smaller states

As the domestic-strategic contradiction continues to affect the security management approaches
taken by Western societies, the first-order strategic benefits that RPAS and other advanced
military technologies can offer will become insatiable for many governments. Many of the
second-order risks connected to the utilisation of these technologies, a sample of which this
article has discussed, so-far tend to only be seriously evaluated at a later stage, and often “after
the horse has bolted” where dangerous proliferation is concerned. The spread of today’s
advanced military technologies is not just a preserve for great power politics. In crafting their
military postures towards the 22nd century, demand for these technologies among many
smaller states will also be considerable. With the Baltic states as a potential European example,
autonomous, unmanned or unpiloted military technologies that are risk-efficient in terms of
manpower will prove particularly attractive for smaller states seeking to enhance deterrence as
a solution for asymmetric defence predicaments. The management of a perpetually war-torn
strategic environment in the Middle East will continue to attract other smaller states such
as Israel and the Gulf states towards the advantages of the same technologies as they evolve.
With RPAS already a firm fixture in many conflict areas, the large-scale debut of AI-directed
autonomous weapons systems is now an inevitable and imminent prospect.
This outlook indicates a conundrum for Ireland’s security policy. The 2018 US National
Defence Strategy (NDS) foresees that the globalised civilian commercial sector will continue to
lead in the production of emerging military technologies. This includes “advanced computing,
‘big data’ analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and
biotechnology”.58 The larger incorporation of these technologies with the military-industrial
complex has rendered “dual-use” components; interchangeable between military and civilian
adaptations, ever more common. These components will be vital for the continuing development
of remote-controlled and AI-driven autonomous weapons systems. The proliferation of these
weapons will risk a further separation between the practice of war and humanitarian ethics.
Ireland’s open economy is tightly interlinked with the global supply-chains that integrate
many military and civilian technologies. This is, therefore, not a pattern that Irish society can
ethically detach itself from. Projecting a prominent and informed voice to lobby for stronger
normative frameworks to regulate the flow of emerging military technologies will allow Ireland’s
foreign policy to make a responsible contribution to international security affairs as the 22nd
century approaches.
57 Friedersdorf, Op. Cit.

58 James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American military’s
competitive edge (Washington DC: US Department of Defence, 2018): 3.
68
MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS:
The Need to Develop Resilience and
Capability.
Comdt Gavin Egerton
Deputy Chief Instructor, EUTM, Mali.
Multi-Domain Operations:
The Need to Develop Resilience and Capability.
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of Multi-Domain Operations and its emergence
as the widely accepted template for managing contemporary and future conflict.
The paper adopts the position that Ireland as a country, but the Defence Forces
specifically, would benefit from a more pro-active approach to defence, developing
a comprehensive set of capabilities across increasingly important but less traditional
domains. The author will argue that the Defence Forces should adopt such an
approach not just to develop resilience to a multi-domain attack, but also invest in
acquiring an offensive capability.
The paper will offer historical context to doctrinal change, and how the Defence Forces
could benefit from studying how other countries have adopted change; using the U.S
Army’s implementation of Air Land Battle as an example. The paper will illustrate how
the multi-domain battle plays out, and how other militaries embraced change and
made significant leaps in doctrine and capability.
The paper will outline how a mind-set based on adherence to the ‘Mission Command’
leadership philosophy and the subscription to the ‘Manoeuvrist Approach’ will serve
as a foundation for building a multi-domain capability. The Defence Forces’ adoption
of both these philosophies has conveniently provided it with the doctrinal and cultural
starting point for Multi-Domain Operations. However, successful implementation
of a new concept and subsequent doctrine will be contingent on an open-minded
approach to future force structuring as well as securing necessary capital investment.
Introduction
Traditionally, dominance of the heretofore universally accepted three domains of operation
– air, land, and sea – has provided a conventional military force with a more than favourable
chance of victory over a similar opponent operating in or near those domains. However,
there is an increasing acceptance amongst contemporary militaries and academics that
“historical approaches to achieving superiority in the air, land, and sea domains may no
longer be valid”1. There has emerged, a new contemporary operating environment which
extends into multiple different domains. Some of the factors driving this change include the
affordability and accessibility of high-end technology, particularly in the air, space and cyber
domains, and the advent of information warfare. While on one hand Remotely Piloted
Aircraft System (RPAS) platforms are becoming smaller, cheaper, and more capable; on
the other hand information is becoming increasingly weaponised, and the willingness of
governments to engage in information warfare is growing rapidly.
Although the fundamental nature of war is unlikely to change, the ways and means in
which it is fought are evolving; expanding beyond the theory and practice of combined,
joint operations to include numerous traditional and emerging domains concurrently. This
paper will introduce the reader to the concept of Multi-Domain Operations, and highlight
1 Dr Jeffery M. O’Reilly, “Multi-Domain Operations: A Subtle but Significant Transition in Military Thought”, Air and Space Power Journal,
Spring (2016): 61-73
70
the opportunity presented to the Defence Forces to initiate and promote early discussion on
this topic, mitigate its impact, and develop a range of capabilities in this area.
What is Meant by ‘Multi-Domain Operations’?

The concept of Multi-Domain Operations is not new. The close relationship between
actions across the air, land, and maritime domains has been the key to success in many wars
throughout the 20th century. One just has to consider the Operation Overlord ‘D-Day’
landings at Normandy for a historical example. However, the domains the Allies operated in
during Overlord were not as expansive as what today’s battlefields present. The 2017 United
States Army/Marine Corps white paper ‘Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st
Century’ recognises the limitations of a two or three domain approach to military operations.
It posits that future wars will be fought across the “physical domains of air, land, sea, and
space, the ‘abstract’ domain of cyberspace, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS),
the information environment, and the cognitive dimension of warfare”2. While warfare will
likely continue to be focused on land, the integration of assets from other domains adds to
the existing challenges facing land component commanders. Looking at current trends, the
“number of actors able to employ capabilities in the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains
increases”3; meaning a conventional land force can no longer enjoy dominance of that domain,
and can be threatened by relatively low-cost technology from the air, and cyberspace domains.
The aim of Multi-Domain Operations is to overwhelm one’s opponent with multiple, disparate
yet interdependent problems, overloading decision making processes and ultimately rendering
defensive forces ineffective. By way of a definition, Multi-Domain Operations;
“provide commanders numerous options for executing simultaneous and sequential operations using
surprise and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains to present
multiple dilemmas to an adversary in order to gain physical and psychological advantages and
influence and control over the operational environment”4.
This is reflected in current U.S. Army doctrine, where according to the recently revised U.S.
Army field manual on operations: “All Army operations are multi-domain operations, and all
battles are multi-domain battles”5.
Implementing Doctrinal Change

Prior to examining Multi-Domain Operations in detail, it is pertinent to look to the recent
past where a significant evolution in U.S. military doctrine was successfully devised and
implemented. The introduction of new doctrine in the early 1980s and how it was adopted
gives an indication as to how the transition to Multi-Domain Operations might occur. A small
military like the Irish Defence Forces (DF) can draw inspiration from larger organisations as to
how they embrace change.
2 “United States Army-Marine Corps White Paper: Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century”, Jan 18 (2017),
3 Gen. David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle, The Advent of Twenty-First Century War”, Military Review, Nov-Dec (2017): 8-13.
4 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. “Multi-Domain Operations”, Oct 10 (2018). Accessed Jun 24 (2019). url: https://www.tradoc.
army.mil/Publications-and-Resources/Article-Display/Article/1655556/multi-domain-operations/
5 Department of the Army. “FM 3-0: Operations”. Oct 06 (2017): 1-17
71
In an attempt to bridge the gap between doctrinal text books and units executing tactical tasks,
the U.S. Army, in the early 1980s, devised a multidimensional warfighting doctrine called ‘Air
Land Battle’. Inspired by the combined arms German ‘Blitzkrieg’ of World War II, it was seen as
a “shift from a focus on low-intensity, small-unit, decentralized counterinsurgency operations to
larger-scale operations, heavily dependent on sophisticated technology for decisive operations
fighting outnumbered”6. This was a conscious migration from the Vietnam era warfare to the
potential European war against the Soviet Union; should the Cold War heat up. Air Land
Battle focused on the successful integration of land forces such as tanks, armoured infantry,
and mobile artillery; with close combat aviation support (i.e. attack helicopters) to destroy
enemy armour, and Air Force support to strike the enemy’s rear areas in order to restrict the
flow of logistics. It was devised in parallel with large scale procurement projects such as the
AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley infantry
fighting vehicle, and the UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter; recognising and exploiting new
capabilities and integrating them together for combined arms operations. The Air Land Battle
concept was rehearsed, refined, and repeated throughout the 1980s until it was finally tested
in combat in 1991. This trial by fire was not against the anticipated foe of the Soviet Union,
but rather Saddam Hussein’s vast Iraqi army during Operation Desert Storm in the Persian
Gulf. The joint offensive capability demonstrated during Desert Storm justified the extensive
investment in combined arms and joint training throughout the 1980s and established the
United States of America as the dominant world power; in military terms at least. But this
hegemony was challenged in the first decade of this century, by the shift from conventional
warfighting to asymmetric, terrorist, and hybrid warfare, forcing western militaries to rethink
their doctrine.
Relatively inexpensive improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan caused significant
casualties, and continue to do so. During the lifetime of the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO and coalition forces suffered 1,401 deaths to IEDs, just over
50% of total combat losses7. This is despite the presence of the most advanced combat and
force protection equipment ever produced and employment of a thoroughly rehearsed and
battle-proven combined, joint doctrine.
The United States’ adversaries or potential future adversaries have studied the performance
of the U.S. military during the Gulf War and are “adapting their methods of warfare, while
accelerating the modernization and professionalization of their combat forces”8. Instead
of trying to match or out-gun the U.S. military they strive “to gain strategic advantage by
offsetting the advantages [the U.S. military has] enjoyed over the last twenty years”9. Essentially,
asymmetry in terms of mass or combat power is no longer a decisive factor in battle.
6 Col. Scott King, U.S Army retired; Maj. Dennis B. Boykin IV, U.S. Army retired: “Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations
Isn’t Air Land Battle 2.0”, Association of the United States Army, Feb 20 (2019). Accessed Jun 25 (2019). https://www.ausa.org/articles/
distinctly-different-doctrine-why-multi-domain-operations-isn%E2%80%99t-airland-battle-20.
7 Areppim. “Afganistan War: Coalition Deaths 2001 – 2014”, Feb 17 (2015). Accessed Jun 28, 2019. url: http://stats.areppim.com/stats/
stats_afghanwar_ied.htm
8 Gen. David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle, The Advent of Twenty-First Century War”, Military Review, Nov-Dec 17: 8-13.
9 Ibid
72
Emergence of the Multi-Domain Operations Concept

The widespread promulgation of the phrase ‘multi-domain battle’ can be attributed to then
U.S. Army General, David G, Perkins. In 2016 Perkins proposed a future warfare concept10
that saw space and cyberspace being added to the heretofore hegemonic paradigm of ‘joint
operations’ utilising the air, land, and maritime domains. Perkins suggests that the close
synchronicity of interdependent and simultaneous assaults on the enemy from as many
domains as possible would overload enemy decision making, disrupting their command and
control. This saturation of the enemy with disparate and competing problems would frustrate
efforts to engage on multiple fields simultaneously. For example, a land force attacking a
similarly equipped force, would not only continue to operate with the traditional joint support
from air and maritime fires as with Air Land Battle doctrine, but could enjoy disproportionate
advantages by neutralising the enemy’s communications, harassing domestic populations with
economically and socially catastrophic cyber-attacks, targeting forward forces with numerous
cheap, low profile RPAS, whilst dominating public opinion via a well-scripted narrative in the
media to discredit the enemy’s activities and behaviours as illegitimate.
The DF cannot afford to ignore the advent of such warfare, and by engaging in healthy discussion
early, it can offset the potentially catastrophic impact of operating in such an environment.
Whilst the DF doesn’t necessarily need to prepare to engage in all of the methods listed above,
by maintaining a basic capability in a number of specific areas, relevant to national defence
needs, it would be able to develop a resilience based on a professional working knowledge.
The creation of a national security and defence strategy would provide a point of reference for
identifying and prioritising which capabilities the DF should pursue.
For example, the threat of cyber-attack is quite relevant to Ireland from an economic
espionage/terrorist perspective so the cyber domain should be considered a priority area in
which to develop a capability. Cyber-attacks are “becoming more of an issue globally with
data breaches, DDoS and ransomware attacks, financial scams and state-sponsored hacking
incidents all on the rise”11. The inherent responsibility for Ireland to protect the European
headquarters of the many large multinational corporations based here should be reason alone
to develop defences and capabilities in this area. The likely outcome of a cyber-attack would
be “widespread disruption for businesses and public agencies, but would also lead to serious
reputational damage”12.
Currently, Ireland as a community is quite vulnerable to cyber-attacks of smaller or greater
scales to that outlined in the previous paragraph. This creates an imperative to identify low
cost/no cost defences against such threats in the short term, whilst embarking on a capital
investment programme to develop more robust defences for the future. Potentially, Ireland
but the DF specifically could develop a world-leading cyber defence capability. However, the
study and preparation for operating in the emerging multi-domain environment must not
be shackled solely to building resilience from a defensive, or passive, mind-set. Instead, the
DF should actively pursue the structures to conduct a multi-domain battle organically, and
thus build a limited but credible offensive cyber capability. This has the potential to serve as a
deterrent against similar attacks against the DF.
10 Gen. David G. Perkins, panel discussion to Association of the United States Army audience, 04 Oct 16.
11 Charlie Taylor, “Ireland vulnerable to cybersecurity attack, says industry leader”, Oct 18 (2018). Accessed Jun 27 (2019). url: https://www.
irishtimes.com/business/technology/ireland-vulnerable-to-cybersecurity-attack-says-industry-leader-1.3666946
12 Ibid.
73
Multi-Domain Operations in Practice

The Russian military were early adopters of Multi-Domain Operations. Starting in 2008, the
Russian Army began a period of reorganising and modernisation, to “eliminate redundancies and
increase lethality and efficiency…creating organizations, equipment, and tactics to synchronize
operations across domains”13. Russian military doctrine has been adapted to embrace Multi-
Domain Operations down to the lowest possible level with battalion tactical groups availing of
air, electronic warfare, and cyber assets, as evidenced on multiple occasions throughout 2014
in the Ukraine conflict14. An illustrative example of the multi-domain approach at tactical level
is perhaps best articulated by the 11 July 2014 strike on Zelenopillya. This was a pre-emptive
strike against four Ukrainian brigades as they waited in assembly areas preparing to launch
a large scale attack against apparent Russian and Russian-backed partisan forces15. Tactical
level target acquisition RPAS and complex cyber-attacks against Ukrainian communications
systems preceded the strike, followed by an artillery and rocket barrage that killed 30 Ukrainian
soldiers, wounded many more and destroyed two battalions worth of combat vehicles16, thus
rendering that Ukrainian force no longer combat capable.
What is significant about the Zelenopillya attack is the marriage between higher level strike
assets with tactical level target acquisition and electronic warfare capability. This allowed the
rapid employment of higher formation fire support assets at the battalion level, giving the
smaller, apparently Russian or Russian-backed partisan unit the confidence and capacity to pre-
emptively engage a much larger conventional, armoured Ukrainian force; neutralising them in
their assembly areas, and thus preventing their planned assault.
How Should Ireland Invest Time and Resources in Multi-Domain

Operations?
In part due to the DF’s comparatively modest budget (Ireland spends 0.3% of GDP on Defence;
the lowest in the EU17), it has never been an exemplar at keeping up with advancing military
technologies; predominantly due to their prohibitively (from the DF’s perspective) expensive
nature. Furthermore, the traditional absence of a comprehensive approach to national defence
(and security), has resulted in a consequential lack of joined-up thinking. However, most of
the capabilities mentioned above would be far cheaper to defend against – or to develop an
offensive capability in – than large scale conventional threats; and would offer utility to a cross-
cutting myriad of national areas of interest. For the first time, Ireland might be in a positive
position to develop a specific set of military capabilities early and henceforth offset potential
threats far in advance, and potentially future-proofing its continued economic prosperity.
As the DF maintains and enhances its conventional capability through robust and realistic
training, coupled with continued combat equipment procurement, it should also seek to
acquire and maintain capability in emerging domains. As outlined above, cyber is an area that
should be given prioritisation and pursued immediately. By developing a resilience to cyber-
13 Griesemer, Thomas S., “Russian Military Reorganization: A Step Toward Multi-Domain Operations”, Over The Horizon Journal, Nov 19 (2018),
accessed Jun 27 (2019). url: https://othjournal.com/2018/11/19/russian-military-reorganization-a-step-toward-multi-domain-operations/
14 Ibid.
15 Amos, “The Russian–Ukrainian War: Understanding the Dust Clouds on the Battlefield”, Modern War Institute, Jan 17 (2017), accessed Jun
29 (2019), url: https://mwi.usma.edu/russian-ukrainian-war-understanding-dust-clouds-battlefield
16 Ibid
17 “How Much is Spent on Defence in the EU?”, Eurostat, May 18 (2018), accessed Jun 29 (2019), url: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180518-1
74
attack (and associated potential information warfare attack) it would reap benefits for both
on-island and overseas operations across all three DF components, as well as offering utility
to other State agencies. The potential reputational damage for Ireland as a nation, and the
associated multinational forces the DF deploy with is enormous, should an overseas Irish Army
infantry battalion or Naval Service ship be compromised via a deliberate or opportunistic
cyber-attack. By expanding this to an offensive capability at the tactical level – even just as a
deterrent – the DF could enhance force protection and increase the chances of mission success
if deployed on a robust crisis management operation, or if it found itself engaged in combat.
The threat of electronic warfare should not be overlooked. By ensuring its communications
networks are resilient to interference, the DF could protect its communications networks from
the type of electronic attack employed at Zelenopillya as outlined above, as well as guarding
important communications capabilities vital to the many overseas peace support operations the
DF are currently deployed upon. Finally, RPAS is an area the DF could quickly expand beyond
its current capability, pushing large numbers of (relatively) low-cost aerial surveillance into the
hands of tactical commanders both on-island and overseas, increasing situational awareness,
intelligence collection, and ultimately enhancing force protection.
Is the Defence Forces Ready for Such Change?

One could argue that the DF is perhaps already cognitively and doctrinally prepared for Multi-
Domain Operations. The DF capstone doctrine states that it recognises the ‘Manoeuvrist
Approach’ to operations, utilising “an indirect method to defeat the belligerent’s will…through
the creative application of effects against their critical vulnerabilities”18. The illustrative example
of Multi-Domain Operations in practice outlined above shows how apparently Russian-backed
separatists in Ukraine employed creative (indirect) use of low-cost, available air assets to target
concentrated (and thus vulnerable) Ukrainian formations, combined with cyber-attack to
defeat critical but vulnerable Ukrainian communications. DF doctrine also states that the
Manoeuvrist Approach is “multi-dimensional and involves capabilities from the different arms
and services of the Defence Forces across the different environments”19 which is essentially a
paraphrasing of what Multi-Domain Operations entail.
Furthermore, as stated in DF leadership doctrine, the organisation adopts the ‘Mission
Command’ philosophy20. This decentralised approach to tactical command is encouraged on
career courses for both officers and NCOs and one of the Infantry Soldier Principles is to
“Promote Mission Command”21. This empowerment “allows decision making and freedom
of action to be pushed down to the lowest level possible, empowering junior leaders”22. The
DF could draw inspiration from the Russian model of reorganisation discussed above. The
integration of ordinarily higher level assets to the tactical level such as the addition of low-
cost RPAS, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities to battalion (or even company) level,
or indeed to Naval Service ships, would likely meet little cognitive resistance or friction in
its implementation.
18 “Defence Forces Capstone Doctrine DFDM – J1”, Oct (2015): 50
19 Ibid.
20 “Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine” DFDM – J2, Apr (2016): 3-3.
21 “Infantry Ethos: The Combat Arm – An Lámh Comhrac”, May (2018).
22 Ibid.
75
Conclusion
Success for the DF in the multi-domain era will be largely contingent on a comprehensive
approach to procurement, preparation, and operation. Using the familiar DOTMLPFI
spectrum – doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, the DF
and Department of Defence will need to be pragmatic in its implementation. This means
developing new doctrine, and adapting existing tactics, techniques and procedures, redesigning
and adopting a force structure that is far more joint, far more multidisciplinary (all arms,
all domains) at the tactical and operational level, and far more flexible. The next generation
of procurement of weapons, equipment, and communications infrastructure will need to be
future-proofed against cyber and electronic attack, resilient to conventional attack, and capable
of operating in the multi-domain environment in all phases of war.
Multi-domain is not new and the close relationship between operations across the air, land,
and maritime domains has been the key to success in many wars throughout the 20th century.
However, dominance of one or more of those domains is no longer a guarantee of victory. The
contemporary operating environment and the likely nature of potential future conflicts require
commanders to consider the close integration of space, information, and electromagnetic
capabilities. The proliferation of low cost technologies such as RPAS, increased access to cyber
capabilities, and the weaponisation of information, means conventional militaries such as the
DF must be one step ahead of potential belligerents and spoilers. For the DF to move forward
into the Multi-Domain Operations environment, the key to success lies in the convergence of
services into a truly joint force, rather than the co-operation and integration of independent
service capabilities as is currently the case. This will take an open-minded approach by both
the DF and the Department of Defence, particularly where future force design and capital
investment are concerned. Perhaps inspiration can be drawn from this excerpt from the first
doctrinal manual published by the DF in the era of the newly emerging independent Ireland
in 1926:
“Our forces are not equipped as liberally as those of large armies, but a sound understanding of all
modern means of combat, including those which we do not possess (Aviation, numerous and heavy
Artillery, Tanks, etc.) will enable us to find the ways and means to sustain a struggle against an
enemy equipped with them.”23
23 “Defence Forces Regulations, Tactical Drill”, 1926, as quoted by Colonel (retd) Tom Hodson, “The College: The Irish Military College, 1930-
2000”, Dublin, The History Press, 2016.
76
‘FIRST WITH THE TRUTH’
The Paradox of Future
Information-led Conflict
Dr. David Reindorp
Execuitve Director, Opportuna: Insight Consulting.
‘First with the Truth’
Abstract
‘It is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations’1
In 2015, the Irish Government published a Defence White Paper which, among other points,
emphasised the Irish Defence Forces (DF) ‘continual (and continuing) involvement in UN
peacekeeping operations’.2 In 2018, a seminar directed by the author challenged conventional
wisdom regarding the practice of Command and Control (C2). The primary witnesses were
the UK commander of perhaps the final pre-information age conflict, and a recently retired
UK Chief of Joint Operations. They concluded that C2 as currently practiced is not fit for
purpose, and observed that while the UK had closed the gap between today’s capabilities and
tomorrow’s wars, it had not made similar progress with regard to concepts. Many of which
remain unchanged at a time when the operating environment to which they relate is becoming
more complex. The seminar audience acknowledged that closing this intellectual gap will be
difficult. They were, however, convinced of the need to do so, to avoid the future practice of
C2 being constrained by yesterday’s ideas.
Introduction
The UK Defence Doctrine and Concepts Centre’s (DCDC) Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/17
offers a Joint Action model where all military activity comes together into a single output
labelled ‘influence’.3 The prime enabler of which is to be a technology-enabled capability to
analyse and use information to make better decisions at the operational and strategic level.4
This is further developed by JCN 2/18, which introduces the concept of Information Advantage
and the idea that ‘information … is (now) a fully-fledged national instrument of power’.5 On
the surface these publications offer a compelling thesis, but deeper within questions begin to
emerge. For instance, can something intangible and the sum of everything (i.e. influence) also
be a unique source of power, which can generate advantage over an adversary? There is also an
element of assumed novelty to this thinking along with an assumption that information alone
can deliver conflict-winning benefit. However, the use of information for military purposes
is not new,6 and there is little doctrine associated with the practice of using information as a
source of power.7
Meanwhile, and building on this idea of ‘influence’, a recent multi-national command post
exercise sought to develop narrative-led campaign plans, each attempting to synchronise
information with other activity in an effort to be ‘first with the truth’, thus implying there
is a single truth to tell.8 However, given the increasingly relative nature of political (and thus
military) truth, and the declining levels of trust in governments and their institutions, is this a
viable objective?
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 481.
2 Irish Government Ministry of Defence, ‘White Paper on Defence’ (Dublin, 2015) 32. Available at https://military.ie/en/public-information/
publications/.
3 Defined as ‘the capacity to have an effect on the character, or behaviour of someone or something’.
4 The author and Vedette Consulting are supporting the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) Operational Decision Support
Tools (OpDST) and Innovative Models, Methods and Techniques (IMMT) projects. Both seek to engage with industry to develop decision-
enhancing technology such as military chatbots and Course of Action testing models for use in component-level HQs.
5 UK Government Ministry of Defence, Information Advantage, Joint Concept Note 1/18 (Swindon: Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre, 2018), iii.
6 The necessity to know you enemy is enshrined in literature while the use of deception and thus (mis)information is at the heart of the campaign
planning process. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz both support this view. The latter suggesting knowledge in warfare to be ‘a factor more vital than any
other’.
7 Although there is doctrine for public relations, media operations and strategic communications, none addresses how a measurable military
effect can be achieved by or through influence and information alone.
8 Observed by the author during a conversation between a 2* UK Commander and his Strategic Communications Advisor on Exercise Joint
Venture 2018.
78
This paper will explore the questions outlined above while avoiding a metaphysical discourse
on the nature of truth. From a premise that the truth – in political terms at least – is invariably
contested, it will posit that there is an emerging paradox at the centre of this information-led
renaissance which will challenge current approaches to strategy, planning, and thus the practice
of Command and Control (C2) and military decision making.
Smart and Soft

So where does this new fascination with influence and information begin? According to Utting
‘the British military has (now) elevated the importance of soft power ideas (to) the central …
purpose of all military activity ... as the proponents of this approach argue, it is now smart (i.e.
clever) to be soft’.9 This emphasis on being soft is usually linked to Nye’s apparent observation
that ‘it is not (now) whose army wins, but whose story wins’.10 While Nye acknowledges Arquilla
as the originator of this idea, his thinking does shape the smart-to-be-soft agenda.11 Particularly,
that soft power or ‘getting others to want the outcomes you want’ enables peaceable co-option
rather than forcible coercion.12 Here lies the genesis of the idea that information alone can
deliver advantage and win.13
Truth and Trust

Trust and truth are linked. For a persona to possess the former, it must also possess the latter.
Thus, for an institutional persona such as a military commander to be ‘first with the truth’
they must be trusted by their audience. However, trust in institutions is declining. According
to Lagarde, then chairman of the International Monetary Fund, the world ‘… is facing a crisis
of trust in institutions across all sectors that shows no sign of abating. In 20 out of the 28
countries surveyed by the Edelman Trust Barometer for 2018, average trust in government,
business, NGOs and media was below 50%’.14 Many reasons are offered for this decline: an
increasing lack of accountability; the centralisation of power; a growing and often unelected
bureaucracy; and increasing opacity in government policy and position.15 All underpin the rise
of ‘Distributed Trust’ or the idea that an audience instinctively no longer believe what a single
institutional source suggests to be true. 16 Rather, they prefer to trust what others say, often as
narratives or memes distributed and amplified by networks such as Twitter or the internet.
Thus removing the power of determining what is or is not true from a single institutional
source, and distributing it across a wide range of disparate sources.
Distributed trust is enabled by technology specifically designed to harness the power of data
(i.e. the building blocks of information) via advanced analytics such as machine learning and
artificial intelligence. This allows the harvesting and analysis of input from multiple data sources,
9 Kate Utting, “Strategy, Influence, Strategic Communication and British Military Doctrine” in Propaganda, Power and Persuasion, edited by
David Welch (London: IB Tauris & Co: 2014) 167. Utting is referring here to JCN 1/17. This use of the word ‘smart’ in this context should not be
conflated with Nye’s later development of ‘smart power’ as a combination of both hard and soft manifestations.
10 Ibid.
11 Joseph Nye, “The Information Revolution and Soft Power”, Current History, 2014 - 113(759): 19-22. Arquilla’s actual suggestion being ‘… in
today’s global information age, victory may sometimes depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins’.
12Ibid.
13 Many others contributed to the development of this concept. For a good review see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed; In Athena’s Camp
(Santa Monica: Rand 1997).
14 Christine Lagarde, ‘There’s a reason for the lack of trust in government and business: corruption’, The Guardian, May 04, 2018.
15 Maxine-Laurie Marshall, ‘The rise of distributed trust’, Oct 2018, https://www.i-cio.com/big-thinkers/rachel-botsman/item/the-rise-of-
distributed-trust.
16 See Rachel Botsman, Who Can You Trust – How Technology Brought Us Together and Why It could Drive Us Apart (London: Penguin
2018).
79
as controlled, and to an extent assured, by algorithms that learn what users are interested in. It
is this developed-as-understood process that generates the echo chamber effect of digital media
and its ability to turn a relatively innocuous story into a ‘shitstorm’.17 The cumulative outcome
of which is an increasing mistrust of the single truth of an institution, and a corresponding
increase in belief of the views of individual commentators or communities. As Botsam suggests,
‘… the idea is that trust, and alongside it power … can now flow directly between individuals
without the need for traditional institutions’.18 And here lies the first element of the paradox
of information-led conflict, in that the technologies used to harness the power of information,
and underpin the concept of influence, are also enabling the rise of distributed trust. Making
those who seek to be ‘first with the truth’ less likely to be trusted.
Control and Chaos

Outlining the second element of this paradox requires a return to theory specifically that of
the Post-modernists and Foucault who imagined the rise of politically powerful non-state actors
long before they became of interest to military practitioners.19 They argued, presciently, that
an increase in the accessibility of information would weaken the international system and
challenge state monopoly on global control mechanisms.
Foucault was perhaps the first to explore the utility of information (or more representatively
the accretion of information into knowledge) as a source of power. He posited that knowledge,
geography and culture were inseparable. This linking of knowledge to place is important for it
suggests that a truth can be constantly redefined though education, communication and the
reinforcement of political and cultural ideals. In short, information power is subject to the
norms of region and thus culture. Truth can thus be relative and arguably little more than a
political discourse about the rules according to which the true and false can be distinguished.
As Foucault wrote, ‘truth … induces regular effects of power… (but) each society has its regime
of truth, and its “general politics” of truth: that is types of discourse which it accepts and
makes function as true’.20 Contemporary political behaviour clearly evidences this view.21 So,
while debating the nature of truth remains outside the scope of this paper, acknowledging
its contested nature is absolutely necessary. As it is remarking that, this will challenge the
endeavour to be ‘first with the truth’.
For the commander fighting an information-led battle there is a more prosaic concern within
Foucault’s thinking. While the use of soft power is arguably not a form of coercion, it is
inextricably linked to the establishment of control. It has to be given the role of Influence to
persuade an adversary to behave in a more advantageous way. Control being usually achieved by
focusing power in the hands of a few or removing it from the many. Foucault, however, suggests
that knowledge or informational power is both diffuse and pervasive – it ‘is everywhere’ and
17 ‘Shitstorm’ - a term of art applied to social media’s ability to spread information rapidly to unlimited amounts of users, turning relatively
innocuous memes into a crisis and thence an online attack against a particular person, brand, idea etc as the counter-message ‘goes viral’. Its
origin is unknown but the term can be found in numerous online dictionaries and also in Durden, the German equivalent of the Oxford English
Dictionary. See https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2013/jul/04/shitstorm-german-dictionary-duden-shitschturm.
18 Marshall, Op. Cit.
19 For instance see Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected -Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, (ed. By C Gordon) (New York:
Pantheon) 121 – 190. Here Foucault suggests his rethinking of how information operates as power will allow it to ‘cut off the King’s Head’ (i.e.
state power) and ‘bring into being new schemas of politicisation’ that can be exercised by bodies other than the state.
20 See Paul Rabinow, ed, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s thought (London: Penguin, 1991).
21 For instance, the rise of the ‘false news’ debate and agenda.
80
‘comes from everywhere’.22 Unlike the more traditional concepts of diplomatic, economic and
military power, that are confined by policy, law and thus practice to the institutional few,
informational power can be gained and exploited for overt political benefit by anyone with the
ability to disseminate it. It gains in strength through dispersal, not concentration, and where
power is not, or cannot be centralised or contained, it tends to the opposite of what power has
traditionally been used for.
This then is the second element of the paradox of information-led conflict. In that its primary
enabler – the dissemination of information – dilutes the very power it seeks to create. It
reverses the adage that knowledge is power, and thus access to it should be restricted to the few,
by providing power to the many. Moreover, where no one group has a monopoly on power,
legitimate or otherwise, chaos tends to follow. Chaos, of course, being the antithesis of control
and not a normal objective of any planning and decision making process.
Making the Intangible Tangible, or Vice Versa

The possession of power has long been associated with material or tangible resources –wealth,
equipment, networks etc. In contrast, information has been seen as intangible and abstract.
However, for information to be conceived of as a unique source of power, it must be able to
generate a measurable benefit. Indeed, according to JCN 2/18, it must be able to deliver a
physical advantage over an adversary. So is information becoming more tangible, or is the
concept of power becoming more intangible?
To some this may be a purely academic debate, but to those who first imagined warfare in
the information age it will lead to some ‘interesting implications for the theory and practice of
warfare and strategy’.23 Arguably, we are beginning to see some of these. Perhaps one of the
most notable being the initial battle for Fallujah in 2004, which was described as ‘the (first)
use of global political and propaganda power by insurgents to defeat an otherwise successful
(kinetic) attack’.24 If this assessment is correct, what does it mean for the practice of warfare
in general and C2 in particular? Practice here being defined as the decision making necessary
to implement strategy by planning and delivering military operations that generate advantage
and thus win.25
The accepted military discourse on strategy and planning is rooted in the language of tangibility.
Its constituent parts are the rules or building blocks of strategy and operational planning
such as end states, objectives, centres of gravity, decisive conditions and supporting effects.
To which are added other tangible constraints. Joint Operating Areas (JOAs) confine activity
geographically. Timescales, often politically imposed, confine temporally. Rules of engagement
define and thus confine what and who can be targeted. There are some exceptions to this
tangibility, Clausewitz’s ‘fog’ and ‘friction’ being two examples. However, his counterpoint
ideas of culmination and rational calculus are physical in conception and thus tangible. As
22 Foucault’s ideas on power and information are spread across multiple works, many not instantly associated with strategic thinking.
Nevertheless they are relevant to the idea of Influence and Information Age warfare and conflict. This interpretation is abstracted from Michel
Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge Vol1 (New York: Pantheon Books 1978) 63 – 65. Retrieved from http:\\ suplaney.files.
wordpress.com/2010/09/foucault-the-history-of-sexuality-volume-1.pdf.
23 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Information, Power and Strategy”, in In Athena’s Camp, ed John Arquilla and David Ronsfeldt (Santa
Monica: Rand 1997) 142.
24 David Welch, “Opening Pandora’s Box” in Propaganda, Power and Persuasion, ed David Welch (London: Tauris 2014) 13.
25 The author acknowledges this is an incomplete definition but suggests it is sufficient for the purposes of this (short) article.
81
is the standard Plan, Refine, Execute, Assess (PREA) cycle adopted by NATO, UK and US
operational HQs. The governance of which is metric based and thus by definition, tangible.
Yet information-led conflict need not follow any of these rules. For example, the power of
information rests in its diffusion or spread, thus it is not confinable by geography. Unlike
conventional military power (air, land, maritime etc.) which can be developed before being
used, informational power is developed while being used. It cannot, therefore, be confined
within arbitrary and usually short, contingent timeframes. As Rothrock wrote in 1994, the
information-led battle ‘will not happen quickly … it will probably be years to decades … (and for)
employment in long-term campaigns such as the ‘war of ideas’’.26 How, therefore, are decisive conditions
and supporting effects to be measured and assessed? If power is now intangible, how are centres
of gravity derived? In addition, if progress is now indeterminable, how is culmination assessed
and a rational calculus differentiated? In sum, how does a commander design a viable theory of
military information and/or influence-led change, and then command and control its delivery?
Here, then, is the third and final element of the paradox of information-led conflict.
Informational power may generate advantage, and thus Influence may be the most apposite
high-level conceptualisation of military output. However, both will challenge the current
principles of strategy development and operational-level C2. Moreover, until addressed, they
will leave military decision makers playing a new game with old rules or fighting tomorrow’s
battles with yesterday’s concepts.
Conclusion
This paper suggests there is a widening gap between the concepts used to think about warfare
today and the capability to actually practice it tomorrow. It further posits that this gap
particularly effects C2 and military decision making. As evidence, it identifies an emerging
paradox at the centre of the current focus on the ability of information and Influence to
generate advantage and win.
This paradox has three components. First that the technologies used to become ‘first with the
truth’ also enable the ‘distributed trust’ which makes it less likely to be believed. Second, and
similarly, that by disseminating information the power of it declines, and with it the ability to
gain the control being sought. Indeed, and as the Fallujah example suggests, informational
power tends as much to chaos (in the form of counter-narratives) as control. Third, and
somewhat more prosaically, regarding information as power challenges the current building
blocks of operational planning and strategy. End states are diffuse, timescales potentially
endless and geographical boundaries no longer relevant. Consequently, previously tangible
planning tools such as centres of gravity, decisive conditions and supporting effects become
increasingly difficult to define, if not potentially obsolete.
Nevertheless, the military utility of information is clearly undergoing a renaissance. However,
whether it can be usefully conceptualised as a unique source of power has yet to be established.
Arguably, information in the form of a coherent narrative has the power to deny, at least
in political terms, the otherwise battle-winning capability of a more advanced adversary.
26 John Rothrock, “Information Warfare: Time for Some Constructive Scepticism”, ed John Arquilla and David Ronsfeldt (Santa Monica: Rand
1997) 219.
82
This, though, is not quite the same as being able to win or deliver victory. What this will mean
for traditional warfighting practices such as operational-level planning, campaign assessment
and C2 has yet to fully emerge. Nevertheless, that it will change them is beyond doubt. In the
interim, today’s commanders, despite being invited to do so, will find it challenging to be ‘first
with the truth’. They may be first with their truth, but in the information age, this will not
be enough.
So, to return to the beginning, the 2015 (Irish) Defence White Paper and the IDF’s history
of involvement in peacekeeping operations. The former offers a list of the tasks most closely
associated with this honourable tradition, including: ‘peace enforcement, peacekeeping,
disarmament, truce supervision, and/or observation, military training and education,
international humanitarian law and human rights law missions’.27 All of which involve the
maintenance of control by a trusted agent of the UN or some other similar institution.
Predominantly via the use of normative influence or messaging activity. However, as this paper
suggests, such trust is declining, and with it, the value of the ‘story’ – not the army – that
will deliver an information age ‘win’. It is arguable; therefore, that the paradoxical nature of
information-led conflict will pose a proportionately greater challenge to those – such as the
IDF - whose mission is to interpose, than those – such as the UK armed forces - who mission
is to defeat.
27 Irish Government, Op Cit, 32.
83
84
TELE-MENTAL HEALTH AND
PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT:
A Case for Implementation with Irish
Defence Forces Personnel.
Pte (AR) Eoin O'Shea
7 Inf Battalion
Capt (AR) Mathew McCauley

Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Irish Army Reserve.
Comdt Dorota O'Brien

Clinical Psychologist, CMU
Tele-mental health and psychosocial support:
Abstract
This article investigates the utility and efficacy of Tele-Mental Health (TMH) in the
context of enhancing military mental health services and operational psychosocial
support structures. This involves a review of research concerning the effectiveness of
TMH in military populations. Papers reviewed included those published since 2010
that report empirically observed benefits on numerous outcomes, which relate to
mental health and wellbeing; whilst also focusing on those that include technologies
and processes of viable application in moderately sized military organisations such
as Ireland’s Defence Forces (DF). Results are presented in terms of modality or
format (e.g. audio-visual platform, email, online support groups) and demonstrated
effectiveness for service recipients. The article considers a potential service provision
model deliverable through both the DF’s Medical Corps as well as its Personnel
Support Service (PSS). Distinctions between both the DF Medical Corps mental
health capability and the wellbeing support provided by the PSS in this regard are
explored, recognising the differences in remit between both entities.
Introduction
TMH has received considerable interest and support through international research. TMH
broadly refers to any form of mental health and wellbeing support provided over distance
through technological means; common examples include audio-visual interfaces (e.g. Skype,
Defence Forces Intranet) for assessment and treatment consultations, online support groups,
psychoeducational informational resources, and email support.1 More specifically, the
application of TMH in assisting military personnel and their families has been demonstrated
to represent an effective and viable option in mental health and wellbeing service provision.23
TMH may address barriers to effective care for these populations related to accessibility,
cost-effectiveness, and provision of more specialist medical corps interventions (e.g. clinical
psychologist, psychiatrist) for those serving on operational deployments overseas or at home.
Military Mental Health & Psychosocial Support

Current research concerning the mental health of military populations suggests a range of
factors that may place such personnel at an elevated risk of problem development during
and following operational service.45 Much of the English-speaking studies since 2010 have
referred to both the U.S. and U.K. operations in Iraq (i.e. Operation Iraqi Freedom/OIF;
Op Telic) and Afghanistan (i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom/OEF; Op Herrick). Caution
must therefore be advised in generalising such findings to those serving in United Nations
1 Barak, A., L. Hen, M. Boniel-Nissim, and N. Shapira. “A comprehensive review and a meta-analysis of the effectiveness of Internet-based
psychotherapeutic interventions. National Library of Medicine. PubMed Health. 2008 [cited 2015 Sep 26].” (2016).
2 Luxton, David D., Larry D. Pruitt, Amy Wagner, Derek J. Smolenski, Michael A. Jenkins-Guarnieri, and Gregory Gahm. “Home-based
telebehavioral health for US military personnel and veterans with depression: A randomized controlled trial.” Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology 84, no. 11 (2016): 923.
3 Bounthavong, Mark, Larry D. Pruitt, Derek J. Smolenski, Gregory A. Gahm, Aasthaa Bansal, and Ryan N. Hansen. “Economic evaluation of
home-based telebehavioural health care compared to in-person treatment delivery for depression.” Journal of telemedicine and telecare 24,
no. 2 (2018): 84-92.
4 Vogt, Dawne. “Mental health-related beliefs as a barrier to service use for military personnel and veterans: a review.” Psychiatric
services 62, no. 2 (2011): 135-142.
5 Vaughan, Christine A., Terry L. Schell, Terri Tanielian, Lisa H. Jaycox, and Grant N. Marshall. “Prevalence of mental health problems among
Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who have and have not received VA services.” Psychiatric Services 65, no. 6 (2014): 833-835.
86
(U.N.) operations (e.g. peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian relief), the likes of

which represent greater relevance to Ireland’s DF personnel. As examples of such elevated
risk among the personnel of countries that have engaged in expeditionary war fighting, a U.K.
study6 found, among U.K. Iraq- and Afghanistan-deployed personnel, a prevalence of 6.2%
for probable Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 21.9% for common mental disorders (i.e.
anxiety and depression), and 10.0% for alcohol misuse. These figures might be compared with
equivalent analyses of prevalence among the U.K. general population, such as a study by the
Mental Health Foundation 7 that places rates of PTSD and common mental disorders (i.e.
depression and anxiety) at 4.4%, and 17% respectively. Similarly, a large meta-analytic study8
on British military personnel (N=21,746) found that, despite rates of detectable PTSD and
alcohol misuse not changing based on duration since deployment (i.e. over a 3-year period),
psychological distress did. Such findings may underscore the importance of providing military
mental health and wellbeing services across the deployment cycle.
Nevertheless, as it has been pointed out9: “the operational characteristics (and mental health
consequences) [of U.N.-mandated peace-keeping missions] have similarities to those of
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and combat missions (p.3)”. As of 2018, a total of 3,767
fatalities have occurred across all U.N. peace missions since 1948.10 This has occurred within
the common peace-keeping operational rules of engagement, which are found across such
missions. Specifically, U.N. peace-keepers are prohibited from using force except in the defence
of either the mandate and/or themselves.11 Previous research concerning such U.N. personnel
suggest a wide range of deleterious mental health outcomes including PTSD, depression,
substance misuse, increased hostility, and suicide.12 13 14 To date, there has been no research
conducted concerning the prevalence of mental health disorders among Irish DF personnel.
Challenges exist in accurately assessing an exact prevalence of some mental disorders among
such U.N. personnel, as exemplified by a study15 of rates of PTSD among those serving on such
missions. The authors’ meta-analysis of previous work found decidedly heterogeneous results
between studies, with rates of indicated PTSD ranging from 0.05% to 25.8%. Clearly, more
research with standardised methods and timeframes of assessment is required in this regard.
A 2010 study16 more broadly examined distress, mental disorders, and suicide. It found some
studies suggesting a higher incidence of problems correlating to greater levels of experienced
6 Stevelink, Sharon AM, Margaret Jones, Lisa Hull, David Pernet, Shirlee MacCrimmon, Laura Goodwin, Deirdre MacManus et al. “Mental health
outcomes at the end of the British involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts: a cohort study.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 213, no. 6
(2018): 690-697.
7 Mental Health Foundation. “Fundamental Facts About Mental Health 2016”, (2016): Mental Health Foundation: London.
8 Rona, Roberto J., Howard Burdett, Samantha Bull, Margaret Jones, Norman Jones, Neil Greenberg, Simon Wessely, and Nicola T.
Fear. “Prevalence of PTSD and other mental disorders in UK service personnel by time since end of deployment: a meta-analysis.” BMC
psychiatry 16, no. 1 (2016): 333.
9 Shigemura, Jun, Masanori Nagamine, Nahoko Harada, Masaaki Tanichi, Kunio Shimizu, and Aihide Yoshino. “Peacekeepers deserve more
mental health research and care.” BJPsych open 2, no. 2 (2016): e3-e4. 3.
10 United Nations. “UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet: 31 August 2018.” UN, 2015. Accessed June 15, 2019. http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/documents/bnote1015.pdf.
11 Sareen, Jitender, Brian J. Cox, Tracie O. Afifi, Murray B. Stein, Shay-Lee Belik, Graham Meadows, and Gordon JG Asmundson. “Combat
and peacekeeping operations in relation to prevalence of mental disorders and perceived need for mental health care: findings from a large
representative sample of military personnel.” Archives of general psychiatry 64, no. 7 (2007): 843-852.
12 Shigemura, Jun, and Soichiro Nomura. “Mental health issues of peacekeeping workers.” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 56, no. 5
(2002): 483-491.
13 Souza, Wanderson Fernandes, Ivan Figueira, Mauro V. Mendlowicz, Eliane Volchan, Carla Marques Portella, Ana Carolina Ferraz Mendonça-
de-Souza, and Evandro Silva Freire Coutinho. “Posttraumatic stress disorder in peacekeepers: a meta-analysis.” The Journal of nervous and
mental disease 199, no. 5 (2011): 309-312.
14 Sareen, Jitender, Murray B. Stein, Siri Thoresen, Shay-Lee Belik, Mark Zamorski, and Gordon JG Asmundson. “Is peacekeeping peaceful? A
systematic review.” The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 55, no. 7 (2010): 464-472.
15 Souza, Op Cit, 310.
16 Sareen, Op Cit, 468.
87
combat. Importantly, the same authors noted that: “Perceived meaningfulness of the mission,
post-deployment social supports, and positive perception of homecoming were associated with
lower likelihood of distress (p.464)” and may therefore be regarded as protective factors.
In the Irish military context, the relevance of a timely and effectively supportive response from
the DF’s Medical Corps and PSS are of clear and likely value in relation to such findings.
In a more recent example of mental health morbidity among Australian peace-keepers17,
12-month prevalence of numerous mental disorders among personnel were of particular note,
namely: PTSD (16.8%), depression (7%), generalised anxiety disorder (4.7%), alcohol misuse
(12%), alcohol dependence (11.3%) and suicidal ideation (10.7%). Such findings reflect a
higher prevalence than that found among civilians and the presence of these mental health
conditions was most strongly and consistently associated with exposure to potentially traumatic
experiences (PTEs). These issues are primarily addressed in the Irish DF via the operational
resources delivered by the Medical Corps and the Personnel Support Service (PSS).
Mental Health Services in the Defence Forces

The provision of mental health services in the DF lies within the remits of both the Medical
Corps and the PSS. Such provision includes primary and secondary healthcare in the context
of an occupational health framework. It is delivered by mental health clinicians and additional
trained personnel throughout the organisation.
The provision of mental healthcare within the Medical Corps operates via a multi-disciplinary
team context. The clinical team consists of one Military Psychiatrist (currently a vacant
post), a PDF Military Clinical Psychologist and a full-time Department of Defence (DOD)
Clinical Psychologist, along with one RDF Military Clinical Psychologist. This clinical team is
responsible for delivering occupational mental healthcare to all serving members of the DF.
As outlined by two such psychologists18, such professionals provide a full spectrum of clinical
services that balance the needs of the patient with those of the organisation in achieving
the DF’s operational objectives. The Medical Corps’ mental health personnel retain a focus
on promoting mental health, preventing mental ill-health, detecting healthcare problems
that may arise, and delivering direct clinical services. They support command at home and
overseas, whilst functioning as subject matter experts and consultants to DF leadership
across the organisation. Such priorities are mirrored in the military mental health systems of
other nations.19 20
The PSS services are delivered by a combination of professional social workers, as well as
trained NCOs based at various barracks who function as Personnel Support Officers (PSOs).
They provide preventative critical incident responses, peer support programmes, pastoral
counselling, training of personnel tasked with the care and welfare of others, and informational
talks/workshops on subjects such as suicide awareness and stress. In both online and in-person
17 Forbes, David, Meaghan O’Donnell, Rachel M. Brand, Sam Korn, Mark Creamer, Alexander C. McFarlane, Malcolm R. Sim, Andrew B. Forbes,
and Graeme Hawthorne. “The long-term mental health impact of peacekeeping: prevalence and predictors of psychiatric disorder.” BJPsych
open 2, no. 1 (2016): 32-37.
18 McCauley, M., and D. O’Brien. “Military clinical psychology in the Irish defence forces.” The Irish Psychologist 44 (2017): 10-15.
19 Greenberg, Neil, and Norman Jones. “Optimizing mental health support in the military: The role of peers and leaders.” (2011).
20 McCauley, Mathew and Johno Breeze. “Dispatches from the editor: military psychology, a force multiplier.” Journal of the Royal Army Medical
Corps 165, no. 2 (2019): 63-64.
88
formats, personnel accessing these services can avail of signposting and referral to resources
of relevance concerning matters such as bereavement, substance misuse, family issues, and
relationships. A strong focus of the service is the support of families both during deployments
and beyond. The PSS also has links with, and provides supports for, veterans.
Tele-Mental Health
A significant body of research now exists concerning the use of distance technologies for various
forms of mental health and wellbeing-related information, assessment, and intervention. For
example, in a large-scale review21 of TMH trials, the authors conclude that research conducted
up until 2003 suggests strong evidence for patient and provider satisfaction with a range of
TMH services as well as evidence for the reliability of clinical assessments relative to face-to-
face versions. They also noted more minimal evidence supporting its use in treating specific
mental health disorders, limited additional benefits for specific populations, or comparable
effectiveness for populations such as older adults, children, or those living in rural areas with
lesser healthcare access. Encouragingly, research undertaken since then has utilised both better
technology, as well as more sophisticated research designs, most notably a growing number of
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs). According to one of the most recent RCTs conducted
to date, “tele-mental health has demonstrated equivalent efficacy compared to face-to-face care
in a variety of clinical settings and with specific patient populations”. An updated review22 is
similarly positive, suggesting:
Telemental health is effective for diagnosis and assessment across many populations … and for
disorders in many settings (e.g. emergency, home health) and appears to be comparable to in-person
care. In addition, this review has identified new models of care (i.e., collaborative care, asynchronous,
mobile) with equally positive outcomes… Telemental health is effective and increases access to care.
Much of the reviewed research outlined above pertains to video-conferencing interaction, a
format thought to maximise the amount of multi-sensory information otherwise lost to both
clinician and patient during interaction. However, a large meta-analytic study23 examined a
comprehensive variety of different types of online formats (e.g. email, video-conferencing,
psychoeducational materials, etc). The authors similarly conclude that: “A comparison
between face-to-face and Internet intervention … revealed no differences in effectiveness. The
findings of this meta-analysis… provide strong support for the adoption of online psychological
interventions as a legitimate therapeutic activity” (p.109). Furthermore, a distinction seems to
occur between a client’s initial perception of, and confidence in, the acceptability of online
versus in-person interaction once the client has actually experienced online service provision.24
Findings concerning patient satisfaction, as well as therapeutic alliance, compare equivalently
between both modalities.25
21 Richardson, Lisa K., B. Christopher Frueh, Anouk L. Grubaugh, Leonard Egede, and Jon D. Elhai. “Current directions in videoconferencing
telemental health research.” Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 16, no. 3 (2009): 323-338.
22 Hilty, Donald M., Daphne C. Ferrer, Michelle Burke Parish, Barb Johnston, Edward J. Callahan, and Peter M. Yellowlees. “The effectiveness of
telemental health: a 2013 review.” Telemedicine and e-Health 19, no. 6 (2013): 444.
23 Barak et al., Op Cit 109.
24 Gros, Daniel F, Cynthia Luethcke Lancaster, Cristina M López, and Ron Acierno. “Treatment Satisfaction of Home-Based Telehealth versus
in-Person Delivery of Prolonged Exposure for Combat-Related PTSD in Veterans.” Journal of Telemedicine and Telecare 24, no. 1 (January
2018): 51-55.
25 Jenkins-Guarnieri, Michael A., Larry D. Pruitt, David D. Luxton, and Kristine Johnson. “Patient perceptions of telemental health: Systematic
review of direct comparisons to in-person psychotherapeutic treatments.” Telemedicine and e-Health 21, no. 8 (2015): 652-660.
89
Military Applications of Tele-Mental Health

Broadly speaking, findings to date concerning the use of TMH with military populations seem
promising. Recent studies suggest positive comparisons with in-person interventions relating to
both currently serving personnel,26 as well as military veterans.27 28
RCTs used to explore such comparisons have yielded positive results across multiple mental
health disorders, including PTSD,29 30 depression,31 and substance misuse.32 Some studies
have replicated such findings in group- and individually-based interventions, providing
potential cost effectiveness improvements, as well as utilising group processes in therapy.33 34
At least one study35 has demonstrated the effectiveness of TMH treatment ‘in theatre’ for
Acute Stress Disorder (i.e. a clinical disorder diagnosed in the more immediate aftermath of a
traumatic event).
Possible military-cultural treatment challenges, as well as strategies to address same, have
been discussed elsewhere in detail36 and may include personnel attitudes to mental health
issues, unsupportive leadership, concerns about impacts on career (e.g. security clearances),
and long-duty hours impeding consistent engagement in treatment. Decisions regarding
the use of TMH should also be based on sound clinical judgment and characteristics of an
individual’s clinical presentation. For example, a study37 has demonstrated that factors such as
baseline severity of disorder, high anxiety and loneliness scores, and older age predicted less
symptom improvement. The evidence reviewed above suggests a broad comparability between
TMH for various disorders compared with in-person engagement. TMH may be effective for
those in rural/remote settings, even for conditions as clinically severe as PTSD,38 along with
those experiencing mobility issues39 and family members of personnel,40 whilst such options
for intervention may represent a more cost-effective method of service delivery under certain
26 Pelton, Dan, Bethany Wangelin, and Peter Tuerk. “Utilizing telehealth to support treatment of acute stress disorder in a theater of war:
Prolonged exposure via clinical videoconferencing.” Telemedicine and e-Health 21, no. 5 (2015): 382-387.
27 Gros, Daniel F., Matthew Yoder, Peter W. Tuerk, Brian E. Lozano, and Ron Acierno. “Exposure therapy for PTSD delivered to veterans via
telehealth: Predictors of treatment completion and outcome and comparison to treatment delivered in person.” Behavior Therapy 42, no. 2
(2011): 276-283.
28 Turgoose, David, Rachel Ashwick, and Dominic Murphy. “Systematic review of lessons learned from delivering tele-therapy to veterans with
post-traumatic stress disorder.” Journal of telemedicine and telecare 24, no. 9 (2018): 575-585.
29 Resick, Patricia A., Jennifer Schuster Wachen, Katherine A. Dondanville, Kristi E. Pruiksma, Jeffrey S. Yarvis, Alan L. Peterson, Jim Mintz
et al. “Effect of group vs individual cognitive processing therapy in active-duty military seeking treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder: A
randomized clinical trial.” JAMA psychiatry 74, no. 1 (2017): 28-36.
30 Gros et al., Op Cit, 53.
31 Luxton et al., Op Cit, 923.
32 Neighbors, Clayton, Melissa A. Lewis, David C. Atkins, Megan M. Jensen, Theresa Walter, Nicole Fossos, Christine M. Lee, and Mary E.
Larimer. “Efficacy of web-based personalized normative feedback: a two-year randomized controlled trial.” Journal of consulting and clinical
psychology 78, no. 6 (2010): 898.
33 Resick, Patricia A., Jennifer Schuster Wachen, Jim Mintz, Stacey Young-McCaughan, John D. Roache, Adam M. Borah, Elisa V. Borah et al.
“A randomized clinical trial of group cognitive processing therapy compared with group present-centered therapy for PTSD among active duty
military personnel.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 83, no. 6 (2015): 1058-1068.
34 Steenkamp, Maria M., Brett T. Litz, Charles W. Hoge, and Charles R. Marmar. “Psychotherapy for military-related PTSD: a review of
randomized clinical trials.” Jama 314, no. 5 (2015): 489-500.
35 Pelton et al., Op Cit, 384.
36 Hall-Clark, Brittany N., Edward C. Wright, Brooke A. Fina, Tabatha H. Blount, Wyatt R. Evans, Patricia K. Carreño, Alan L. Peterson, Edna
B. Foa, and STRONG STAR Consortium. “Military culture considerations in Prolonged Exposure Therapy with active-duty military service
members.” Cognitive and Behavioral Practice 26, no. 2 (2019): 335-350.
37 Smolenski, Derek J., Larry D. Pruitt, Simona Vuletic, David D. Luxton, and Gregory Gahm. “Unobserved heterogeneity in response to treatment
for depression through videoconference.” Psychiatric rehabilitation journal 40, no. 3 (2017): 303.
38 Rosen, Craig S., Kathleen M. Chard, Patricia Resick, and B. Christopher Frueh. “Cognitive processing therapy for posttraumatic stress
disorder delivered to rural veterans via telemental health: a randomized noninferiority clinical trial.” J Clin Psychiatry 75, no. 5 (2014): 470-476.
39 Price, Laura E., Paraskevi Noulas, Irina Wen, and Amanda Spray. “A portal to healing: Treating military families and veterans through
telehealth.” Journal of clinical psychology 75, no. 2 (2019): 271-281.
40 Grady, Brian J., and Ted Melcer. “A retrospective evaluation of TeleMental Healthcare services for remote military populations.” Telemedicine
Journal & E-Health 11, no. 5 (2005): 551-558.
90
circumstances.41 Furthermore, alterations in the process of communication may have some

positive implications in the military sector, with at least one study suggesting superior outcomes
for personnel and their families assigned to remote military locations.42
Future Developments
More research is required on the utility and efficacy of TMH for military personnel. Additional
investigations are also necessary, prior to any implementation of TMH within the Irish DF.
However, research reviewed in this paper suggests the potential utility of TMH and wellbeing
supports through both the Medical Corps as well as PSS. Examples are provided hereafter and
might fall under three broad categories, namely: (1) Broad informational and psychoeducational
support; (2) ‘In-theatre’ specialist assessment and intervention; and (3) ‘Home-based’ treatment
and care. Specific research examples concerning a range of potential applications are thereafter
provided in Appendix A. These include studies of TMH applied to the treatment of PTSD43
and other traumatic disorders44, more common mental health difficulties45, mental health
screening46, psychoeducation47, and the support of military families48.
Firstly, it seems entirely feasible to use distance-technologies to provide effective informational
support49 to a broad range of individuals in the context of the DF. In addition to information
already provided by the PSS in this regard, further options could include more comprehensive
psychoeducational and wellbeing-related information; these might be developed not only
for currently serving personnel, but also families and veterans, as per the stated remit of
the PSS. Brief online questionnaires, completely anonymised to ensure confidentiality and
GDPR adherence, could be utilised in actively bringing to the attention of personnel a variety
of services (both internal and external) of potential relevance, based on answers to specific
questionnaire items. The same process could be used to export, possibly in the form of a
‘personalised’ report, psychoeducational, and other health-related materials concerning a
broad range of subjects including stress management, diet, physical fitness, and relational/
family support whilst serving overseas.
Secondly, existing Medical Corps mental health expertise could be utilised more promptly
when required for personnel serving overseas. Psychological assessment, medication review,
second opinion evaluations, direct therapeutic intervention, as well as consultation with an
individual or unit’s Chain of Command whilst overseas could be expedited through the use
41 Bounthavong et al., Op Cit, 86.

42 Grady & Mercer, Op Cit, 555.
43 Morland, Leslie A., Anna K. Hynes, Margaret‐Anne Mackintosh, Patricia A. Resick, and Kathleen M. Chard. “Group cognitive processing
therapy delivered to veterans via telehealth: A pilot cohort.” Journal of Traumatic Stress 24, no. 4 (2011): 465-469.
44 Pelton, Dan, Bethany Wangelin, and Peter Tuerk. “Utilizing telehealth to support treatment of acute stress disorder in a theater of war:
Prolonged exposure via clinical videoconferencing.” Telemedicine and e-Health 21, no. 5 (2015): 382-387.
45 Luxton, David D., Larry D. Pruitt, Amy Wagner, Derek J. Smolenski, Michael A. Jenkins-Guarnieri, and Gregory Gahm. “Home-based
telebehavioral health for US military personnel and veterans with depression: A randomized controlled trial.” Journal of consulting and clinical
psychology 84, no. 11 (2016): 923.
46 Sadler, Anne G., Michelle A. Mengeling, James C. Torner, Jeffrey L. Smith, Carrie L. Franciscus, Holly J. Erschens, and Brenda M. Booth.
“Feasibility and desirability of web‐based mental health screening and individualized education for female OEF/OIF Reserve and National Guard
war veterans.” Journal of traumatic stress 26, no. 3 (2013): 401-404.
47 Bush, Nigel E., Charles P. Bosmajian, Jonathan M. Fairall, Russell A. McCann, and Robert P. Ciulla. “afterdeployment. org: A web-based
multimedia wellness resource for the postdeployment military community.” Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 42, no. 6 (2011):
455.
48 Gewirtz, Abigail H., Keri LM Pinna, Sheila K. Hanson, and Dustin Brockberg. “Promoting parenting to support reintegrating military families:
After deployment, adaptive parenting tools.” Psychological services 11, no. 1 (2014): 31.
49 Barak et al., Op Cit, 1.
91
of audio-visual technologies. In some research,50 even conditions such as Acute Stress Disorder
have successfully been treated in-theatre, and remotely. Similarly, this could facilitate mental
health specialists to make decisions about the necessity of an individual returning to Ireland
due to mental health concerns. Such a capability could help forego costly, disruptive, and
potentially unnecessary removal of personnel from operational duties.
Finally, both the Medical Corps and PSS could provide their respective supports to personnel
remotely in Ireland. In support terms, there is a Barrack Personnel Support Service Officer
and 16 chaplains available to personnel across every DF barracks. However, resources involving
in-person provision of clinical psychological assessment and evidence-supported treatment by
the Medical Corps, as well as personal counselling and pastoral support (PSS), are limited to
only a few locations across the country. Therefore, the increased use, and evaluation of, TMH
through both the Medical Corps and PSS seems worthy of further investigation. Through
judicious ethical and professional considerations51 52, coupled with a minimal investment in
the technological and practical resources required, numerous mental wellbeing supports could
be offered to personnel based at smaller military installations; or even in their own homes
under certain circumstances. Finally, the PSS support provided to families of currently serving
personnel, as well as veterans, could likely be enhanced through such means.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to review evidence concerning relevant studies of military mental health,
the effectiveness of TMH generally, and its use with military populations to date. The authors
have concluded with a brief description of a variety of ways in which TMH might benefit the
mental health and wellbeing of DF personnel, citing specific examples of research supporting
same. Though the current paper addresses such possibilities largely in relation to currently
serving personnel, similar applications may prove just as feasible for both families and our
country’s veterans. Based on such evidence, it is proposed that TMH supports be further
researched for future use by the DF, with due regard afforded to important issues concerning
safe implementation, technological requirements and the feasibility, confidentiality, and user
experience of the technologies involved.
50 Pelton et al., Op Cit, 386.

51 Anthony, Kate, DeeAnna Merz Nagel, and Stephen Goss, eds. The use of technology in mental health: Applications, ethics and practice.
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 2010.
52 Luxton, David D., Anton P. Sirotin, and Matthew C. Mishkind. “Safety of telemental healthcare delivered to clinically unsupervised settings: A
systematic review.” Telemedicine and e-Health 16, no. 6 (2010): 705-711.
92
JOINT FORCE COMMAND:
The Need for Change
Lt Cdr Paul Hegarty
Instructor, Command & Staff School
Joint Force Command: The Need for Change
Abstract
This paper examines the current structure of the Irish Defence Forces and seeks
to establish if its structure remains suitable in today’s operating environment. The
paper uses a combination of previous international experience and associated
transformations as a means of exploring if the application of a joint force command
structure would benefit the Irish Defence Forces. By presenting both historic and
current experiences through the use of literature and previous research, the paper
seeks to evaluate the benefits associated with moving away from a single Service
orientated construct and adopting a joint force command structure. In this regard, it
must be remembered that unlike other international militaries, the Defence Forces has
not evolved from its historic land-centric structure.
The paper additionally explains the need for a future joint force concept that looks out
to 2035-2040 and examines its relevance for the Defence Forces. An objective of this
concept is the idea that joint action, and therefore influence can be enhanced through
exploiting information, being more integrated as a force and being more adaptable.
The joint approach is in operation elsewhere and the consensus there is that this
approach is both inevitable and necessary. In no case where it has been applied,
particularly in the last 10 years, have there been moves to reverse course. The paper
concludes by presenting the argument for the necessary paradigm shift towards a
Defence Forces joint force command structure.
Introduction
“Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If we ever again should be involved in war,
we will fight with all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort”.1
Reflecting on General Eisenhower’s observations, particularly as Europe celebrates the 75th

anniversary of D-Day, this paper contends that the lessons of World War 2 and subsequent
developments in military force structure have not been absorbed by the Irish Defence Forces
(DF) and further posits that the DF is in urgent need of a modernisation process in order to
prepare it for both current and future operations, both at home and overseas.
The concept of ‘jointery’ has been developed within the literature on modern military
organisations over the last number of decades.2 While its role has traditionally focussed
on the three domains of land, air and sea, and their associated military connotations,
contemporary military operations have demonstrated that jointery should additionally
include the ‘integrated approach’.3 Figure 1 highlights the five domains, which now exist
within contemporary military operations and additionally emphasises the need for military
organisations to have the capability to achieve and maintain influence in all domains.
1 General Dwight D Eisenhower, ‘memorandum to Admiral Chester W Nimitz’, 17 April 1946. Quoted in Griffin, Stuart. Joint Operations: a
short History, Produced by Training Specialist Services, HQ, p.7.
2 Sullivan, Brian R. “The future nature of conflict: A critique of “the American revolution in military affairs” in the era of jointery.” Defense
Analysis 14, no. 2 (1998): 91-100.
3 Military and civilian organisations working together as on unified organisation.
94
Land
Cyber Maritime
Influence
Air Space
Figure 1 –Joint Operations and Influence4
Implicit within this acknowledgement is the necessity for commanders and their staffs to
conceive and prepare operations with regard to the “strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and
limitations of all Services” involved, and this is primarily the essence of joint operations.5
Moreover, contemporary military operations are conducted in an expeditionary context due
to the strategic requirement to ‘project power’, therefore, jointery becomes more of a necessity
in order to achieve this objective.6 It is therefore, inferred that a military organisation must
be structured to reflect the way in which it fights and this requires a joint approach, both
structurally and culturally.
In 2015, the Irish Department of Defence published its second White Paper on Defence,
(WP2015), and sought to encapsulate a modernisation programme that would ensure the
DF was capable of providing “an organisation that would be prepared to deliver a flexible
and adaptive response to any adverse changes in a dynamic security environment”.7 Within
WP2015, there was an acknowledgement that the DF would need to be capable of working
jointly in order to achieve this government policy objective8, however, the ability to operate
jointly has historically never been pursued by the DF.
Internationally, jointery is considered a routine modus operandi and is progressively replacing
single service methodologies towards joint military operations. It can, therefore, be proposed
that jointery has become “as much a state of mind as a method of prosecuting war”.9 Modern
operations will be complex and unconventional, and flexibility will be key to coming to terms
with this vague future and joint capabilities are universally accepted as being central to this.10
4 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. JCN 1/17 – Future Force Concept. Shrivenham: Forms and Publications Centre, 2017, 19.
5 B.A. Wood, “Joint Operations: An Essential Aspect of Today’s Armed Forces.” Australian Defence Journal (1999): 19-24.
6 Andrew Dorman, Dr Mike Smith and Dr Matthew Uttley, “Jointery and Combined Operations in an Expeditionary Era: Defining the Issues”,
Defence Analysis, 14, no. 1 (1998): 5. Doi: 1080/07430179808405745.
7 Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 2015 (Dublin, 2015) 5.
8 Ibid., 62.
9 Griffin, Joint operations, 7.
10 Ibid., 23.
95
Why Joint, why now?

Prior to critically examining the model of joint forces command and the DF’s current position
with respect to this concept, it is important to define the term ‘jointery”.11 There are many
different definitions of jointery and the NATO definition of joint is “an operation carried
out by forces of two or more NATO nations, in which elements of more than one Service
participate”12. The DF define joint as ‘the ability to operate jointly – that is to bring elements
of the army, air corps and naval service together to deliver effects in operations in a coordinated
and cohesive manner”13. Research of DF operations demonstrates, that while the DF do
complete joint exercises at the tactical level (Air Corps providing support to Army units during
MRET14 periods, etc.), at the operational and strategic level, there is limited understanding as
to how this is to be achieved, as tri-service joint operations are not supported doctrinally or
routinely exercised, particularly at the component or strategic levels.
For the purpose of this paper, the following discussions regarding ‘jointery’ will focus on
the permanent physical constructs such as force structures, rather than those joint task force
elements that are created temporarily for the purpose of single operations. To ensure a common
definition is established for this permanent force construct, this paper will additionally focus on
the Joint Force Command concept, which is defined as “a general term applied to a commander
authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force structure”15.
The concept of jointery and the Joint Force Command is seen by many as a threat to the
culture and identity of the single Service entities. The application of increased jointery has
the potential to create heightened levels of apprehension within the various single Services, as
the initial default position is to protect the single Services unique culture, ethos, values and
traditions.16 Whilst this protectionism is natural, there must be cognisance that tradition, habit
and jealousies will always remain between military organisations, irrespective of whether it is
Service versus joint structure, Service versus Service or joint structure versus joint structure.17
The obstacles to change and transformation will innately remain, and failure to accept this will
inevitably lead to additional issues being created. The critical requirement is that each Service
has the ability to specialise within its own domain and in addition, has the competence and
capability to deliver an effective presence within the other domains.18
Since World War II, the addition of sea power and air power has had a consequential impact
on the faith of jointery and its application. Irrespective of how compelling the integration of
forces may be, joint operations compounds the problems of assembling the forces for today and
transforming them for the challenges of tomorrow.19 It is necessary, therefore, to acknowledge,
“no one service bears sole responsibility for military operations in any one domain.”20 Colin
Gray further supports this observation and highlights that an exclusive strategic orientation,
11 For the purposes of this paper, jointery and jointness are taken to have the same meaning.
12 NATO, APP-6 (2015). NATO Glossary of terms in English and French, 2-A-12.
13 Defence Forces, Defence Forces Capstone Document (Dublin, 2016) unpublished, 6-10.
14 MRET refers to Mission Readiness and Evaluation Training and is carried out by units prior to deploying overseas.
15 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. UK Joint Operations Doctrine, 5th ed. Shrivenham: Forms and Publications Centre, 2014,
123.
16 Michael Codner, The Strategic defence review: How much? How Far? How joint is Enough?” p.6.
17 David C. Gompert, “Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2003. 1. Access 10 March 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP250.html.
18 James Jay Carafano “America’s Joint Force and the Domains of Warfare” The Heritage Foundation. p.23, accessed 21 April 2018, https://
www.heritage.org/military-strength/americas-joint-force-and-the-domains-warfare.
19 Gompert, “Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty,” 2.
20 Carafano, “America’s Joint Force and the Domains of Warfare,” 24.
96
which places too much emphasis on military strength, geared for a specific geography, be
it land, sea or air, can prove woefully vulnerable if strategic history takes an unanticipated
course.21 To prepare for the operations of the future there is a need to modernise and transform
towards the long-term future and not just the near-term. Military forces continuously deal
with uncertainty and this permeates the current security environment and the ‘fog of war’
will inevitably transcend our view of how the operational environment will evolve both in the
medium to long- term.22
In an attempt to provide context to the application of Joint Forces Command (JFC), the
following section will introduce two international experiences of transformation towards a
JFC and presents a synopsis of research already conducted by the author.23 The first review
will be that of the Royal New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF) and the second will be of the
Royal Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The NZDF was selected as it is comparable in size to the
DF, shares a similar mind-set and has a similar operating profile. The Canadian experience of
JFC is perceived internationally as an example of how not to implement a joint approach and
remains viewed as a “bold move, one that none of Canada’s allies has yet replicated.”24
International Experience of the JFC Concept

In 1989, the NZDF conducted and implemented an initial Defence Resource Management
Review and the changes wrought by this review resulted in the “abolition of the Security Council,
the separation of policy from operations, and to have the Ministry of Defence responsible for
the former, and the NZDF responsible for the latter.”25 This review was not a success and the
inadequacies of the implemented structure was exposed by Jane’s Defence Weekly:
“The resulting structure rather than separating operations from policy, as was the intention, has left
both institutions without the resources to fully carry out their respective functions, while at the same
time providing two conflicting streams to the government.”26
The contagion of the internal issues, which hindered command and control through the
existence of silo’s and inefficiencies, lead to the NZ Government to seek a new review that was
tasked with reviewing the accountabilities and structural arrangements between the NZ MoD,
the NZDF and each of the three single Services.27 The Hunn Report was published in 2002 and
recommended widespread changes for the NZDF, and based much of its recommendations on
the central argument that the “two arms be re-established as a single organisation, as neither of
these organisations had been functioning effectively and that the NZDF had been riven with
internal dissention.”28
The NZDF established its Joint Forces Headquarters in 2002 and the NZ Government sought
to institutionalize a greater degree of ‘jointness’ not only “within the NZDF but also between
21 Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017): 95.
22 Gompert, “Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty,” 4.
23 P Hegarty, “Joint Forces Command: The Irish Defence Forces ‘horse and tank’ moment?” Defence Research Paper. Joint Services Command
and Staff College, Shrivenham, UK. (2018)
24 Geoffrey Shaw, “The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification” Defense Analysis, Vol 17, no. 2, (2001): 161. doi: 10.1080/0743017012420.
25 Hon. D.F. Quigley, New Zealand Defence, Resource Management Review 1988, (Strategic Consulting Limited, 1991). 12.
26 Philip McKinnon, “New Zealand reviews Defence Structure”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 September 2001, p.10.
27 Greener, Peter. Timing is Everything: the Politics and Processes of New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making, (Canberra: ANU E
Press, 2009), 73.
28 Hunn, Don, K. Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence
Force, Wellington, 30 September 2002, p.vi.
97
the NZDF and the NZ Ministry of Defence.”29 A variety of measures were introduced to give
effect to this, including a public statement of intent by the NZ Government that set out a
joint approach as the new standard to be used in the NZDF.30  The primary command and
control and structural arrangements as outlined in the Hunn Report were adopted and
the Commander of Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) leads JFC and this includes
all “deployable NZDF Force Elements.”31 In addition COMJFNZ is responsible for the
command and control of all joint and/or combined (international) operations and exercises.
This includes the requirement of the three single Service chiefs to maintain the capability of
“raising, training and maintaining their own Services and bringing assigned forces to their
Directed Level of Capability (DLOC).”32
In order to ensure that the Single Services were capable of operating and delivering at the
joint operational level, internal changes were also initiated in many of the various command
and control and training functions. These changes included: “the Joint Forces Headquarters;
a joint staff college; a joint appointment process for senior staff requiring clearances by
all three Service chiefs; information technology centralisation and standardisation; and
development of a joint non-operational logistic and support organisation.”33
Furthermore, to achieve greater jointness and cooperation at the civilian-military level, a
new approach to allocating responsibility and accountability was implemented. The result
of these measures ensured that greater clarity was provided as to who was responsible for
advising Government on military matters, thus serving to underpin the Government’s
defence outcomes. Finally, all command and control accountability was assigned to the
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)34 and the Secretary of Defence on a similar but shared basis.35
The NZDF White Paper on Defence 2016 elaborated on the successes the previous reforms
have obtained and highlighted additional areas of organisational change that will occur as
the NZDF progresses towards an Integrated Defence Force by 2035.36 A revised corporate
structure now exists and additional joint functions have been added: Chief of Defence
Strategy and Governance, Chief Joint Defence Services and Chief People Officer, to ensure
that a more holistic view is being taken towards defence, as demonstrated in Figure 2.
29 NZMOD, Improving Joint Effectiveness in Defence, (Wellington, 2002), 1.

30 A Modern, Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand’s Needs’, 2001
31 NZDF, Headquarters NZDF, (accessed 05 March 2018), http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/about-us/hqjfnz/default.htm.
32 NZMOD, Improving Joint Effectiveness in Defence, 2.
33 Ibid., 2.
34 Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Chief of Defence (CHOD) both refer to the individual in command of their respective organisation.
Each country uses its own version of the term.
35 NZDF, White Paper on Defence 2010, (Wellington, 2010), 13.
36 NZDF Future35, Our Strategy to 2035, (Wellington, 2015), 65.
98
Figure 2 – NZDF Command and Control Organisation
The following section will review the transition of the Royal Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) initiated a unification process under the Canadian White
Paper on Defence in 1964 and sought to unify all three single Services under one single
Defence Force.37 The primary function of the strategy witnessed the loss in the legal status
of the single Services and legitimised the new organisation, which was termed the ‘Canadian
Forces (CF)’. The core objectives for pursuing this amalgamation was to create a force that was
more efficient and effective, to reduce operating costs and to create a common identity and
encourage a higher level of loyalty than that which is given to a single Service.38 By creating
a new organisational culture it was envisaged that the new force would rescind any previous
loyalty to the previous regimental system and that the induction of a new singular uniform,
“free of any historical distinguishing markings” would encourage acceptance of the new
single Service.39
Due to the significant change inflicted on the organisation there was a significant level
of opposition against the reorganisation and a high level of high-ranking officers and
personnel resigned from the CF and significant amounts of experience and knowledge were
lost. Frustration was directed at the perceived “cost saving initiative”, many considered the
reorganisation to be regressive and it took decades for the Canadian Forces to fully realise
and attempt to repair the damage that had been inflicted.40 To make matters worse, defence
policy in Canada over those years seldom originated from a strategic idea, “a notion Hellyer
had attempted to introduce in 1964, but, rather, it evolved from the dynamics of the annual
federal budget.”41 Without a national defence strategy or a coherent unified defence policy, the
maintenance of defence revolved around the maintenance of a balanced force, however this
focussed on maintaining certain minimal operational capabilities within each Service, a system
that sustained the Service orientated approach to defence planning and force development.42
The arrival of General Rick Hillier as CDS in 2005 provided a much-needed catalyst:
37 Paul Hellyer and Lucien Cardin. “White Paper on Defence.” (Canadian Government paper on the restructuring of Defence, (March 1964),
158.
38 Paul Hellyer and Lucien Cardin. “White Paper on Defence.”, 164.
39 Ibid., 160
40 Ibid., 160.
41 Bland, Douglas. “Chiefs of defence: Government and the united command of the Canadian armed forces.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 25,
no. 3 (1996): 158.
42 Ibid., 268-72.
99
“Canadian Forces identity – Our first loyalty is to Canada. Beyond this fundamental imperative,
all Service personnel must look past environment, component or unit affiliations to most closely
identify with the Canadian Forces. The greater good of Canada and the Canadian Forces will,
in every instance, take precedence over considerations of Service, component or unit affiliation.”43
In order to regain the initiative, organisational changes were required within the CF and these
focussed on three key areas; the CDS assumed control of the force development by establishing
a Chief of Force Development to focus on the now CAF transformation; creation of a Military
Personnel Command, responsible to the CDS; and, the dismantling of the Deputy Chief of
Defence Staff (DCDS) group and the establishment of a strong unified Strategic Joint Staff
(SJS) which reported to the CDS.44 The impact of the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) was positive and
improved the organisation’s ability to make decisions at the operational level, thus improving
military influence.
In 2009, there was recognition of the complexity facing Canada as the importance of its
geostrategic location had created cumbersome solutions and the organisational structure had
to be reformed.45 The new structure comprises of four components, army, air force, navy and
Special Forces that generate highly specialised capabilities and combat forces. From a command
perspective; “CAF has one functional command that groups common national support
functions and capabilities (CANOSCOM), two operational commands that employ CAF
assets for the conduct of operations (Canada Command and CEFCOM), and a unified chain
of command with a dedicated unified joint staff at the military strategic-political-diplomatic
interface that helps the CDS to command the CAF, to carry out his national command
responsibilities, and to advise the government.”46 Finally, in 2012 the CAF conducted a
further modernisation programme and established the Canadian Joint Operations Command
(CJOC) and merged the Canada Command, the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
and the Canadian Operational Support Command. CJOC’s role is to “anticipate and conduct
Canadian Forces operations, and develop, generate and integrate joint force capabilities for
operations.”47 In addition Canada also created a Directorate for Cybernetics, and that works
with Commander CJOC and Figure 3 presents a holistic overview of this new structure, based
on all changes that have taken place in the previous decade.
43 CDS Transformation Principle One, General Rick Hillier, CDS, The Maple Leaf, “CF Transformation: From Mission to Vision,” Vol. 8, No. 36,
(2005) p. 7.
44 Major-General Daniel Gosselin Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 years old – Part 1. (accessed on 20 April 2018)
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/03-gosselin-eng.asp.
45 Jeff Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants: The Changing Context of Canadian Defence Policy,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2003), 23.
46 Major-General Daniel Gosselin Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 years old – Part 2. (accessed on 20 April 2018)
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/03-gosselin-eng.asp.
47 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, CJOC, (accessed on 01 May 2018), http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/
canadian-joint-operations-command.page.
100
Chief of
Defence Staff
Strategic Joint
Staff
Canadian Joint Military

Operations Personnel Intelligence
Navy Army Airforce Command SOF Command
Command Command
Figure 3 – Canadian Armed Forces Structure
The following summary will reflect on the two JFC concepts that have been presented and will
reflect on common themes that were identified. The identification of four key themes were
used as a basis for discussing the core command and control issues discussed below.
Jointery & JFC Concept:

The rationale for the creation of a Joint Forces Command were very similar and inadvertently
adhered to a similar process that sought to implement a JFC and enhance jointness within their
organisations. The ‘Canadian Forces’ unified model was initially flawed and ultimately failed
as a concept and the efforts over the last five years have allowed the CAF to evolve towards
and implement a contemporary JFC construct. The role of NATO standards in assisting the
development of standardised command structures is notable, but the evidence suggests that
the two countries have developed structures that are aligned to their respective national and
international objectives. In essence, each country has customised the JFC concept to their
innate operational and training requirements.
The individual JFC’s are broadly similar, in that they have 4-Star or 3-Star commanders,
are at the same level as the various Chiefs (army, navy, air) at the strategic level, hold
responsibility for certain joint enablers (Special Forces and Communications and Information
Systems) and have subsumed certain elements that were previously held by the single
Services (medical).
Lessons Learned:
As posited previously, the initial model used by the Canadian Armed Forces continues to
be observed internationally as an approach not to be used and its evolution over the last five
years demonstrates what can be achieved when adhering to the contemporary model of a
JFC construct. Evidence does acknowledge that both countries learned lessons from previous
efforts to implement jointery and emphasis was put on the need to get individuals trained and
familiar with the JFC concept before creating and implementing a structure. This was certainly
the case with the NZDF and the CAF, particularly as they modernised their JFC over the recent
years. Capability planning is also something that is now completed at a joint level for the two
101
militaries analysed and the NZDF uses a ‘future force concept’ to design and identify their
future capability requirements. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of what a future
force concept resembles.
Figure 4 – NZDF Future Force Concept 203548
External Reviews:
Both nations have had external reviews forced upon them politically when there was a national
realisation that their previous existing structures were not fit for purpose. While the countries
did previously exhibit elements of jointery, there was a significant bias towards their respective
single Services, frequently to the detriment of their overall efficiency and effectiveness at
the operational level. A significant observation that was elucidated from the analysis is that
on completion of all of the external reviews, further enhanced levels of jointery was always
recommended and at no stage did any report call for the Services to become less joint.
Challenges:
The analysis has shown that each of the militaries reviewed have had similar challenges with
promoting the jointery mind-set and implementing the JFC concept. The development
of a suitable command and control system was pivotal in allowing both nations the ability
to design a system that was reflective of a contemporary military organisation. Each nation
has command invested in their CDS and this allows for the reporting lines to be clear
and concise, with one individual in charge. In all cases, the CDS is subordinate to their
respective Defence Ministers, as militaries should be, but on level par with the civilian
elements of the Defence Ministries (civilian staff). All individual services are subordinate
to the CDS but have equal standing at the management level. This issue is pertinent as it
was raised during the recent Canadian modernisation due to tension at the civil-military
level, and the new SJS ensures that the civil staffs do not assume functions that are within
the purview of the military staffs, and that the CDS can effectively command the CAF.
48 NZDF, FUTURE35, “Our Strategy to 2035”, New Zealand Defence Forces White Paper on Defence (2010): 5.
102
The Irish Defence Forces – Jointery, what’s the Problem?

“The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting the old one out”49
As outlined at the commencement of this paper, the DF does not currently operate a JFC
structure and jointery within the DF is minimal. The DF was established in 1924 and was
primarily based around a land centric organisation that was premised on the system the UK
military had used prior to the declaration of the Irish Free State.50 While air and maritime
components have been added, the structure has largely remained unchanged including the
command and control element.
At present operational command of DF elements is invested in the General Officer
Commanding (GOC) Aer Corps, GOC 1 and 2 Brigades and Flag Officer Commanding Naval
Service (FOCNS).51 The Chief of Staff of the DF, therefore, has no command over the force he
is in charge of and this has a significant impact on how the DF is organised. Figure 5 represents
the current C2 arrangements.
Figure 5 – Current Defence Forces Structure
As a force, the DF has not evolved when compared to other similar modern forces, such as,
those reviewed previously in the paper. The resultant impact of the land-centric command
and control legacy has had a consequential impact on the DF’s ability to promote jointery and
a JFC structure. It is noticeable that the staffing functions in DFHQ are aligned to the joint
functions ‘J1-J9’, particularly as no other services can fill these appointments. Figure 6 below
provides an alternate joint structure that could be used by the DF for a future JFC. Notable
points include; the creation of a Chief of Defence (CHOD) with overall control of the military,
a JFC Commander and Commander Joint Operations (CJO), thus allowing for a modern
command and control structure to be established, and the amalgamation of joint enablers
under the JFC, thus ensuring specialists such as the DF Special Forces have one commander.
This model would recognise that each geographically specialised form of military power is
vitally important, both in itself as a contributor to strategic effect, and as an enabling factor for
other contributing agents.52
49 Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, 1944.
50 Defence Forces, Defence Forces Capstone Document (Dublin, 2016) unpublished, 1-2.0
51 Defence Force Regulation A18, Military Command, (Dublin, 2015). 1-2.
52 Gray, The Future of Strategy, 95.
103
Figure 6 – Alternate Defence Forces Structure for potential JFC
In addition, the proposed new structure would allow the JFC Commander to become primus
inter pares and direct all operations through a truly joint system, within which, the function
of the single services, would be to raise, train and sustain forces for future DF operations, both
at home and overseas. Moreover, the creation of a unified chain of command would replace
the current opaque model that has never evolved to reflect best practice, thus aligning the
DF to more modern and interoperable structures, similar to its partners. Finally, the lack of a
credible and resourced joint cyber command is a notable omission in the current DF structure
and the transition to a new modern structure would ensure that the DF could be positioned
to meet current and future threats, as analysis has shown that the dogmatic adherence to a
‘conventional structure’ in an ‘unconventional world’ is hampering DF capability development.
Conclusion
This research sought to explore and answer the need for change within the DF and the
transition towards a Joint Force Command structure. Through the systematic analysis of the
concept of joint forces command and the evaluation of international applications of it, this
research has determined that the JFC concept is one that should be implemented within the
DF. The research has demonstrably shown that the benefits associated with the JFC concept
far outweigh the negatives and that the nations examined in this research have promoted the
concept is testament to its applicability and pertinence. While each nation faced challenges
and experienced difficulties with earlier command and control models, the intervention of
external review processes, driven by a political agenda successfully highlighted the deficiencies
with previous operating models. The recognition that change had to be introduced was
acknowledged and acted upon by each nation examined.
From a DF perspective there has never been an external review of the national command and
control structures that are currently in place. Any politically motivated changes that have been
implemented have traditionally been cost cutting exercises or personnel reductions and have
refused to address the overall command and control elements of the DF. It is both irregular
104
and unprecedented that an organisation that claims to be a modern and innovative military
organisation still retains the command and control structure that was established almost one
hundred years previous. Furthermore, the inability of the Chief of Staff to have control over
the force he must manage is another systemic failure that must be addressed if the DF is to
evolve and develop into a more joint organisation. Based on the analysis of this research the
modern concept of a JFC does appear to be a much more efficient and contemporary means
of successfully managing military operations in an effective manner. In an attempt to provide
strategic direction and enable long-term capability planning the development of a ‘Future
Joint Force Concept’ is a strategy that would significantly assist the DF in creating and then
implementing a JFC. To fulfil this requirement, it will be necessary for the DF to evolve towards
a joint operating model in order to create the synergies and efficiencies required to achieve
a force that is affordable, sustainable and efficient. The DF’s culture, traditions and history
must play a part in creating and developing its future, however, at present its future is being
constrained by the hand of history that refuses to allow the organisation to evolve. The solution
is evident, the need for change, imminent. Only two options remain, adapt or die.
105
106
WHAT IMPLICATIONS WILL
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
HAVE ON THE DEFENCE
FORCES OVER THE COMING
DECADES, AND ARE THEY
READY FOR THE ASSOCIATED
CHALLENGES THESE
DEVELOPMENTS
WILL INDUCE?
Comdt Ken Sheehan
115 Inf Bn, UNIFIL
What Implications will Artificial Intelligence have on the Defence Forces Over the Coming
Decades, and are they Ready for the Associated Challenges these Developments will Induce?
Introduction
To people of a certain age, Artificial Intelligence (AI) will always be synonymous with the
attempts of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s T-800 to kill or save John Connor. The generation that
watched these attempts in the Terminator series are now in senior leadership positions within
the Irish Defence Forces, and it is possible that their perception of AI may be more driven by
these cultural references, rather than any knowledge of Boolean logic or neural networks.
AI is an incredibly complex sphere of science, and it is easy to get bogged down in terms and
concepts. A useful broad definition is the concept of machines using a “perception-cognition-
action (or decision making)” sequence to acquire human-like intelligence.1 For brevities sake,
developments can be thought of in three separate ways:
Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) is task-specific and already exists. Examples include
image recognition, and voice assistants like Alexa.
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is considerably more complex, and does not exist. This
AGI describes human-level intelligence across a number of different tasks.
Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) is a theoretical concept that describes super human level
intelligence across a number of different tasks. 2
Despite the potential of AGI and ASI, it is expected that ANI applications will dominate over
the next ten years, generating 99.5% of total AI revenue.3 How quickly technology will advance
and impact on society is unclear, with some estimates predicting that it will take between 20
and 40 years before the impacts on employment patterns are completely felt. 4
This paper will examine the potential impact of AI on the Defence Forces by firstly examining
the potential developments in the next ten years, focusing on larger militaries and their
potential use of AI. It is likely that the Defence Forces will continue to deploy overseas in
support of Peacekeeping operations, so it is important to consider how these new technologies
are going to influence our partners in other, larger militaries.
Secondly, as a small military with a limited budget, the potential areas where AI could assist the
Defence Forces will be considered. Computers excel at assisting in routine, predictable tasks.
These attributes may impact on AI’s potential contribution to Human Resources and logistical
processes, and the potential for use in the Defence Forces will be examined.
Finally, the readiness or otherwise, of the Defence Forces to adapt to the changes that AI
will bring as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution will be examined. The Defence Forces
prioritisation of Information Technology will be considered through a People, Process,
Technology lens. It will be argued that the Defence Forces may struggle to adapt, and use AI
appropriately for an organisation of its size and goals.
1 Pant, A. (2018) ‘Future Warfare and Artificial Intelligence’, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, Occasional Paper 49, p. 4.
2 Price, M., Walker, S., & Wiley, W. (2018) ‘The Machine Beneath: Implications of Artificial Intelligence in Strategic Decision Making’, PRISM The
Journal of Complex Operations, Vol. 7(4), pp. 92-105, p. 96.
3 AI Forum New Zealand (2018) ‘AI Shaping a Future New Zealand’, AI Forum New Zealand, available: https://aiforum.org.nz/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/AI-Report-2018_web-version.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19], p. 35
4 AI Forum New Zealand (2018), Op Cit, 51.
108
Potential Military Developments In Next Ten Years

The major military powers have recognised the potential of AI, and have committed to its
development. The US National Defence Strategy pledges to invest broadly in AI to gain
competitive military advantages.5 China’s 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan
envisages the country being the world leader by 2030, with an AI sector worth $150 billion. 6
Russian President Putin recently stated “Artificial Intelligence is the future not only of Russia,
but of all of mankind.”7
While AI has been prioritised, and resources have been given to its development, technical,
ethical, and legal challenges mean that the advance from ANI to AGI will not be linear.
Considering the challenges that lie ahead, there may be three areas where the Defence Forces
may encounter AI being used by our partners in larger militaries in overseas deployments:
detection, preparation and protection.8
Unmanned Vehicles on land, air and sea have the potential to improve situational awareness
and increase the likelihood of detection of a threat. ANI is already used in a number of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and the technology is likely to lead to countries deploying
UAVs in swarms. Russia is also reportedly developing swarm technology using AI9, and the
US has carried out tests with over 100 drones being deployed from a F/A-18.10 In the cyber
domain, Project Maven, is reportedly already in use by US Africa and Central Commands.
This project is developing AI algorithms to intercept satellite and drone surveillance feeds.11
Intelligent Decision Support Systems (IDSS) may support commanders in preparations for
operations “by collecting and analysing evidence, detecting familiar patterns in the data,
checking hypotheses, suggesting possible courses of action, and evaluating the appropriateness
of proposed actions.” 12 The three block war concept has evolved into a multi-domain hybrid
conflict. The US Army has developed an Automated Planning Framework prototype to
analyse the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) with the goal of assisting the army in
understanding, planning and fighting in a multi-domain battle.13 An IDSS could help to “deal
with complexity better”14 as increasing amounts of information are provided to commanders by
AI enabled sensors. This could lead to better, quicker decisions, which may drive demand for
further AI innovation in the MDMP process. The practical, ethical and training considerations
that these systems could have on Peace Support Operations may become significant, as
militaries who use AI enhanced MDMP will change their tactics, techniques and procedures to
maximise their leverage from this advantage.
There are several weapon systems in service which use ANI to protect against a threat, such as
Israel’s Harpy (anti-radar) and Iron Dome (anti-missile); and the US’s Phalanx close in weapons
5 Price, Walke & Wiley, Op Cit,97.
6 AI Forum New Zealand, Op Cit, 16.
7 Price, Walke & Wiley, Op Cit, 97.
8 Fiott, D. & Lindstrom, G. (2018) ‘Artificial Intelligence What Implications for EU Security and Defence?’ EU Institute for Security Studies Briefs,
Nov, pp 1-8, p. 4.
9 Pant, Op Cit, 39.
10 Madrigal, A. (2018) ‘ Drone Swarms Are Going to be Terrifying and Hard to Stop’, The Atlantic, available: https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2018/03/drone-swarms-are-going-to-be-terrifying/555005/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
11 Fiott, D. & Lindstrom, G., Op Cit, 2.
12 Van den Bosch, K. & Bronkhorsy, A. (2018) ‘Human-AI Cooperation to Benefit Military Decision Making’, NATO Science & Technology
Organisation, available: https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-IST-160/MP-IST-160-S3-1.pdf
[accessed 01 Jul 19], pp. 1-13, p. 4.
13 Price, Walke & Wiley, Op Cit, 99.
14 Roke (2019) ‘STARTLE’, Roke, available: https://www.roke.co.uk/what-we-do/intelligent-sensors-and-unmanned-systems/startle [accessed
01 Jul 19]
109
system and Patriot anti-missile system. South Korea has deployed the Samsung Techwin SGR-A1
autonomous gun, which includes surveillance, tracking and firing technologies as part of its
border defences.15 The potential for these types of weapon systems to assist in the detection of
threats around a camp or a Forward Operating Base in a Peace Support Operation are clear.
Where Can AI Help The Defence Forces

Considering the limited size and budget of the Irish Defence Forces (2019 non-pay expenditure
is estimated to be €229 million16), it is unlikely that any of the bespoke military AI systems
will be purchased in the short term. However, rather than military systems, AI Research and
Development (an estimated $5 billion in 202017) is likely to be focused on dull, repetitive tasks
that are currently carried out by humans across a number of different industries.18 AI does have
the potential to substitute humans in a range of manual or repetitive tasks, allowing the same
people to be redeployed into higher value tasks. A New Zealand study found that this process
alone had the potential to increase its GDP by up to $36 billion by 2035.19
An obvious area where the Defence Forces could employ AI is in logistical management.
Logistical management is a labour intensive task, requiring expertise, but with significant
amount of repetition, and patterns. The practice of militaries using AI to assist in logistical
management started almost 30 years ago when, when the US military used the Dynamic
Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART) in the First Gulf War. 20 Since then, the use of AI to
assist with logistics has become more and more widespread. There are a number of logistical
companies using AI technology like Microsoft Cortana Intelligence to manage transportation,
and increase the accuracy of their forecasting. 21
There are several Human Resources (HR) applications that utilise the ability of machine
learning algorithms to infer a wide array of things about people.22 One potential use of AI in
the HR sphere for the Defence Forces is to better identify those that are at risk of leaving the
organisation. Recruit Holdings (a Japanese staff servicing group) uses a wide array of data to
compare employees to those who previously resigned. These employees are then interviewed
by managers to resolve potential issues.23 This is an obvious way in which retention could be
improved, if technology assisted to identify dissatisfied members in advance. There are also likely
to be cultural barriers that may prevent the use of AI in certain processes like promotion. There
are some studies showing the potential of techniques like “vocal analysis” and micro expression
analysis to identify traits which match those of existing high-performing employees. 24 This
is a possible area where the Defence Forces values could come into conflict with technology.
15 Pant, Op Cit, 42.
16 Kehoe, P. (2019) ‘Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence’ Dail Eireann Debate, available: https://data.oireachtas.ie/
ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/32/select_committee_on_foreign_affairs_and_trade_and_defence/submissions/2019/2019-03-05_opening-
statement-paul-kehoe-minister-for-defence_en.pdf [Accessed: 01 Jul 19]
18 Ibid, 35.
22 Tufekci, Z (2019) ‘Think You’re Discreet Online? Think Again.’ New York Times, available: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/opinion/
computational-inference.html [Accessed: 01 Jul 19]
23 Nikkei (2018) ‘Japan’s Recruit Employs AI to Stop Workers From Quitting’, Nikkei Asian Review, available: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/
Companies/Japan-s-Recruit-employsAI-to-stop-workers-from-quitting [Accessed: 01 Jul 19]
24 Buranyi, S (2018) ‘Dehumanising, Impenetrable, Frustrating”: The Grim Reality of Job Hunting in the Age of AI’, The Guardian, available:
https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2018/mar/04/dehumanising-impenetrable-frustratingthe-grim-reality-of-job-hunting-in-the-age-of-ai
[accessed: 01 Jul 19]
110
Defence Forces values are explicitly linked with the way the organisation thinks about and
understands both leadership and promotion.25 Culturally, no matter how good the science is, it
is impossible to see how the Defence Forces could move towards an assessment method that is
not open and easily understandable. The idea that a leader is in anyway evaluated by something
that is not detectable to the human eye is likely not to be accepted within the organisations
culture, at least in the short term.
A third area where AI could be used in the Defence Forces within the next ten years is to
assist with anomaly detection in communications networks. Currently, analysis of network
traffic is generally carried out by specialists. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) could reduce
the Communications and Information Services (CIS) Corps specialists required to defend the
network, utilising the ability of ANI to recognise patterns.26 This could allow the CIS Corps to
redeploy personnel away from repetitive, but important tasks, to be better used elsewhere. There
are also other areas where the ability to detect change in patterns could improve our personnel
and processes in the short term. UK Police forces are already using predictive policing models
in an attempt to offset financial cuts.27 This type of technology may improve the Defence Forces
ability to detect changes in patterns across different domains.
Readiness Of The Defence Forces To Adapt

Past performance is usually the best indicator of future behaviour. While assessing the
likelihood of the Defence Forces being ready to adapt, it is appropriate to consider briefly how
the organisation has adapted to technology over the last ten years through a people, process
and technology lens.
The Defence Forces has made a considerable investment in its personnel over the last ten years
to keep up with technology, with the Trainee Technician Scheme which awards trainees level
seven degrees in conjunction with IT Carlow28 and the CIS Young Officers Course awarding a
Masters level qualification. 29 However, the number of personnel that are in the Defence Forces
with these qualifications is arguably not sufficient considering the wide array of tasks that they
have. The CIS Corps currently has 22 technical officer appointments, and 202 technician
appointments. There are 66 technician appointments not filled. 30 These figures do not include
non-technical CIS appointments and those in training, however it is difficult to envisage how
the Defence Forces can meaningfully and consistently engage with emerging technologies with
very limited personnel. The AI expert shortage worldwide31 is also likely to create issues for
the Defence Forces, as any personnel that gain experience are likely to be very attractive to the
private sector. Other militaries, such as the New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF), have assessed
25 Irish Defence Forces (2016) ‘Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine’, Irish Defence Forces, available: https://www.military.ie/en/public-
information/publications/df_leadership_doctrine.pdf [accessed: 01 Jul 19]
26 Svenmarck, P., Luotsinen, L., Nilsson, M., & Schubert, J. (2018) ‘Possibilities and Challenges for Artificial Intelligence in Military Applications’,
NATO Science & Technology Organisation, available: https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-
IST-160/MP-IST-160-S1-5.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19], pp. 1-15, p. 4.
27 Marsh, S. (2019) ‘Ethics Committee Raises Alarm Over ‘ Predictive Policing’ Tool’, The Guardian, available: https://amp.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2019/apr/20/predictive-policing-tool-could-entrench-bias-ethics-committee-warns [accessed 01 Jul 19]
28 Irish Defence Forces (2019) ‘Communications & Information Services School’, Irish Defence Forces, available: https://www.military.ie/en/who-
we-are/army/defence-forces-training-centre/schools-of-the-dftc/cis-school/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
29 Irish Defence Forces (2019) ‘Defence Studies’, Irish Defence Forces, available: https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/army/defence-forces-
training-centre/the-military-college/defence-studies-programme/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
30 Kehoe, P. (2019) ‘Defence Forces Personnel Data’, Dail Eireann Debate, available: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/
question/2019-03-27/99/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
31 Horowitz, M., Allen, G., Kania, E. & Scharre, P. (2018) ‘Strategic Competition in Era of AI’, New American Security, available: https://www.
cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelligence [accessed 01 Jul 19], pp. 1-26, p. 5.
111
how technology can be used as a force multiplier. The NZDF have committed significant
resources and time (€60.7 million over the next four years32) to the Network Enabled Army
programme. This programme is expected to last 15 years, and it intends to exploit advances
in information systems to drive change, including mitigating the NZ Army’s lack of numerical
strength.33 The Defence Forces, despite investing in technology such as the Virtual Desktop
Architecture system and the Software Defined Radio project, do not currently have a long term
strategy to ensure that the organisation can adapt its personnel, its processes and its regulations
to use technology appropriately.
From a process lens, the 2015 White Paper of Defence referred to responsibilities in cyber for
the first time. A Cyber event is assessed as having a very high impact and a moderate likelihood
on the National Risk Matrix. 34 While the Defence Organisation is “committed to participating
in the delivery of measures to improve the cyber security of the state” 35 it is difficult to see
how the Defence Forces is in a position to assist significantly in the cyber security of the state,
considering the current number of personnel, what the CIS Corps is tasked with supporting,
and the level of spending (CIS capital spending was €11.1 million36 in 2017). As technology
expands further, it is hard to envisage how the Defence Forces will keep up unless there is
some process change. The example of the Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League
shows what is possible if an innovative approach is taken to how defence organisations mitigate
against the challenges posed by technology.37
Technically, there have been some real advances over the last ten years. Recent rollouts of
Sharepoint, 38 data centre innovation, 39 the Virtual Desktop Architecture Project 40 and
SITAWARE41 have shown that the Defence Forces currently retains the capability of delivering
technical solutions. There have also been attempts to ensure that Defence Forces is getting
value for money from these technical solutions, like the Chief of Staff’s innovation awards.
However, these technical advances have not been matched by changes in our structures to
provide support to these new technologies. As well as the personnel issues already outlined,
it could be argued the Defence Forces regulations have not kept pace with the changes in
technology, to, for example, ensure that routine administrative processes, are using technology
to its full potential.
AI is unique in a number of ways that will cause difficulties. As with most technical advances,
senior leadership within organisations will need to adapt, understand and prioritise AI before
32 Mark, R. (2019) ‘Next Stage of Network Enabled Army Programme to Begin’, Beehive, available: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/next-
stage-network-enabled-army-programme-begin [accessed 01 Jul 19]
33 New Zealand Defence Forces (2017) ‘Future Land Operating Concept 2035’, New Zealand Government, available: http://www.army.mil.nz/
downloads/pdf/public-docs/2017/20170626-future-land-operating-concept-2035.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19], p. 34.
34 Department of Defence (2017) ‘National Risk Assessment 2017’, Department of Defence, available: https://www.defence.ie/system/files/
media/file-uploads/2018-07/national-risk-assessment-ireland-2017.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19]
35 Department of Defence (2017) ‘DoD and DF Strategy Statement 2017-2020’, Department of Defence, available: https://www.defence.ie/
system/files/media/file-uploads/2018-06/ss2017_0.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19]
36 McCarthy, S (2018) ‘Vote 36’, Comptroller and Auditor General, available: https://www.audit.gov.ie/en/Find-Report/Publications/2018/vote-
36.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19]
37 Kaska, K., Osula, A. & Stinissen, J. (2013) ‘The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League’, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, available: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CDU_Analysis.pdf [accessed 01 Jul 19]
38 Spanish Point (2015) ‘Defence Forces and Spanish Point are awarded IT Professional Team of the Year’, Spanish Point, available: https://
www.spanishpoint.ie/news-blog/defence-forces-and-spanish-point-are-awarded-it-professional-team-of-the-year/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
39 Tech Awards (2019) ‘Tech Excellence Awards 2019’, available: https://techawards.techcentral.ie/winners-2019/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
40 Kehoe, P. (2018) ‘National Development Plan Funding’, Dail Eireann Debate, available: https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/
question/2018-10-23/section/135/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
41 Systematic (2019) ‘Ireland Conncets All Forces Through Sitaware’, Systematic, available: https://systematic.com/defence/cases/ireland-
connects-all-forces-through-sitaware/ [accessed 01 Jul 19]
112
it could reach its potential. This process will not take place in a bubble, and it is likely to be
influenced by AI use in the wider society, with autonomous drones being one of the most likely
widespread, noticeable uses of the technology in the next ten years.42 How humans interact
and “trust” AI enabled systems is recognised as being a significant challenge and studies are
underway to investigate how these systems can “build trust” with humans. One concept being
developed is “explainable AI”, where the AI would “explain” the reasoning used to make
a choice.43
Conclusion
In 2017, Ireland was one of 25 European countries signing a declaration of cooperation on
AI.44 However, Ireland does not have a National AI strategy. This is essential if Ireland Inc. and
the Defence Forces are to consider how and why AI will be used. A recent New Zealand report
describes the risks of non-engagement with AI starkly – “shape or be shaped”.45
The Defence Forces is likely to encounter AI enabled systems within the next ten years on
Peace Support Operations and also in other limited areas to assist with repetitive tasks. The
ability of the Defence Forces to adapt is uncertain given the limited amount of CIS specialists
to implement, maintain and operate these systems.
AI has the potential to change warfare by delivering “violence at a greater volume and higher
velocity than ever before.”46 It does not take too much imagination to look at the 2018 Winter
Olympics Opening Ceremony, which was performed with the assistance of 1,218 autonomous
drones,47 and imagine changes to come. This paper has concentrated on how the Irish Defence
Forces and its partners in multi-national operations could use AI, however it has not considered
how non-friendly actors could use this technology. The “cost of entry” for simple applications
could be low, as large tech companies are making their machine-learning tools freely available.48
Militaries could be vulnerable if non-friendly actors combined AI with social media to perform
large disinformation campaigns.49 It is not hard to imagine how difficult this type of a scenario
would be to deal with if an overseas unit were targeted.
There are challenges ahead, but technology will continue to drive changes within our society
and our Defence Forces. Considering the responsibilities that the Defence Forces has to state
security, the nature of Ireland’s economy, and its foreign policy goals, if there is not a considered
engagement with the constant process of catching up with technology, not only is there a risk
of missing out on the benefits of technology, but also of becoming that little bit less relevant.
42 Cummings, Op Cit, 12.

44 Fiott, D. & Lindstrom, G. Op Cit, 2.
46 Brose, Op Cit, 127.
47 Ibid., 127.
48 Ramamoorthy & Yampolskiy, Op Cit, 3.
49 Svenmarck, P., Luotsinen, L., Nilsson, M., & Schubert, J, Op Cit, 9.
113
114
PATROLLING BELOW THE
HORIZON:
Addressing Ireland’s Awareness of our
Maritime Geospatial Domain.
Lt (NS) Shane Mulcahy
Staff Officer, Naval Operations Command Centre.
Patrolling Below the Horizon:
Addressing Ireland’s Awareness of our Maritime Geospatial Domain.
Abstract
In January 2008 off Alexandria Egypt, two merchant vessels anchored in order to wait out
an approaching weather front moving through the Mediterranean. Heavy wind and swell
conditions caused the ship’s anchors to drag along the seabed; a common occurrence
at sea. On this occasion however, the anchors severed five submarine communication
cables in the process, crippling communications systems connecting Europe, North
Africa, and the Middle East. The sole remaining telecom link buckled under the
transferred stress, disrupting the internet connectivity of more than 80 million people,
including governments and businesses in the Middle East and Asia.1 Notwithstanding
substantial costs of repair, the economic effect of this accidental and relatively short-
lived interruption was felt internationally, with the event linked to global oil prices and US
dollar fluctuations at the time.2 Eleven years on, what has been learned about protecting
these vital subsea communication links?
How important are Undersea Cables?

Ireland’s central role in global communications far outdates the arrival of tech industry giants
like Apple or Microsoft to our shores. On August 16th, 1858, the world’s first trans-Atlantic
telegraph was sent along a copper cable wrapped in tree-sap, which stretched over 2,000 miles
from Newfoundland, Canada to Valentia Island off the Kerry coast. The message sent; a letter
of congratulations from Queen Victoria to US President James Buchanan. Comprising of less
than 100 words, it took almost 18 hours to transmit.3
Thankfully, transmission speeds have improved over time. Modern cables have replaced copper
with glass strands, allowing data to be transmitted down optical fibres as wavelengths of light,
travelling at about 180,000 miles per second. One such strand has the capacity to transmit data
at up to 400GB per second, the equivalent to around 375 million phone calls, or transfer every
single episode of Game of Thrones in high definition, per second. With a single undersea cable
(slightly thicker than a garden hose) containing upwards of 200 fibres, the scale of information
transfer occurring unnoticed along the seabed is staggering.
It was once assumed that modern satellite communication systems would replace the need for
these dated landlines. However, satellites continue to account for less than 3% of global data
transmission, with over 97% of all data passing along the ocean floor.4 The interest in satellite
data traffic of the 1980s was quickly replaced by the dawn of fibre-optic technology, which
could transfer data over five times faster than by satellite, and do so at a fraction of the cost; on
reflection, it is far cheaper to dispatch a repairman to the English Channel than into space.5
Today’s network of submarine cables comprises of over 200 separate systems, made up of over
500,000 miles of fibre, enough to wrap around the equator over twenty times.6
1 Rishi Sunak and James Stavridis, Undersea Cables: Indispensable, Insecure (Policy Exchange, 2017), 37.
2 John C. Dvorak, “Using the Internet as a Weapon,” (MarketWatch, 2008), 8.
3 Glover, B, History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communication from the First Submarine Cable of 1850 to the Worldwide Fiber Optic
Network: Atlantic Cable Broadsides and Lithographs. (Canada, FTL Design, 2010).
4 Sechrist and Belfer, New Threats, Old Technology: Vulnerabilities in Undersea Communications Cable Network Management Systems,
(Center for Science and International Affairs 2012).
5 Caroline Elliott et al., “An Economic and Social Evaluation of the UK Subsea Cables Industry,” Monograph, 2016.
6 Sunak and Stavridis, Op Cit, 38.
116
What makes these cables so important? Within the 2.5 billion gigabytes of data produced
globally every day are on average, 500 million tweets, 294 billion emails, and 2.7 billion
Facebook likes. It also includes the 15 million daily financial transactions which keep the
global economy afloat, valued at over US$10 trillion, every 24 hours.7 The steady increase in
our data dependence has caused undersea cables to silently become the bedrock of a modern,
globally interdependent society. Considering Ireland’s geostrategic location, the lattice of
submarine cables surrounding our Ireland has been well described as the ‘corporate and
physical backbone layers of the Internet’.8
What is the risk?

Around three quarters of all transatlantic cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or
near Irish waters.9 The risk posed to these cables ranges from curious sea-life, natural disasters,
accidental or deliberate human interaction, or from the sheer harshness of the marine
environment in which they reside. Our role in protecting this global network is becoming
increasingly evident. For example, in the unlikely event that the undersea network between
Europe and America were to fail, the entire capacity of every satellite orbiting the earth could
handle less than 10% of the communications sent from the United States alone.10 From an
accidental point of view, this risk is usually remote; today’s undersea cables are constructed to
extraordinarily high standards of reliability, on par with those seen in nuclear weapons and on
space shuttles.11 In terms of dependability, the average downtime of modern cables is measured
in seconds per year, with the global undersea network suffering an average of around 100
cable outages per annum. Network redundancy often allows such breakages to go relatively
unnoticed, however this is not always the case.
7 John Filitz, “UNDERSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE CRITICALITY,” n.d., 4.
8 Paul O’Neill, “Underwater Cables Leave Ireland Tangled – and Implicated – in the Internet,” Dublin Inquirer, February 20, 2019.
9 Kingfisher Information Services, “Offshore Renewables and Cables Awareness Interactive Map,” http://www.kis-orca.eu/map.
10 US Chamber of Commerce, “Statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Hearing on the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention,”
n.d. (2012)
11 Modern subsea cables are engineered to what is known as the ‘five nines’ standard. In other words they are reliable 99.999% of the time.
Sechrist and Belfer, New Threats, Old Technology, (Center for Science and International Affairs).
117
In December 2006, a 7.0 Mw earthquake triggered massive undersea landslides near the
160-mile-wide Luzon strait, which severed the vast majority of submarine cables linking internet
and phone services from North America to China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan.12 Considering the geographic realities which caused multiple systems to be
placed in such close proximity, it is worth pointing out that the majority of transatlantic cables
transiting past the Irish coast do so through a funnel less than 100 miles wide.13
Unfortunately, the most potent risk to our subsea domain may not be a natural or accidental
one. If these vital information arteries can be susceptible to a dragging anchor or rogue
fishing net, we are left with a far more worrying question to address: What about a deliberate,
hostile act?
In terms of strategy, cable cutting is a legitimate and often utilised tactic. Within hours of
declaring war in 1914, pre-positioned Royal Navy assets quietly severed all five of Germany’s
vital trans-Atlantic undersea telegraph cables.14 A full century later, the annexation of Crimea
by Russia in 2014 was aided by ‘little green men’ who cut all but one of the cable connections
linking the Crimean peninsula to the rest of Ukraine (the sole remaining internet exchange
point was already under Russian control, being used to control the flow of disinformation to
portray the legitimacy of Russia’s military action).15
Subsea cables are by their very nature a soft military target. They are fragile and geographically
concentrated, often in remote and hard to monitor locations. They can be attacked with little
risk of loss of life, and any unwitnessed tampering can usually be plausibly denied (important
for anyone looking to exploit the grey areas of NATO Article 5 mutual responsibilities). The
relative ease of severing a subsea cable means that a threat can easily emanate from non-state
actors, and their susceptibility is heightened by the public knowledge of their positions; to avoid
accidental damage from fishing activity, charts providing accurate locations of the majority of
commercial cables are freely available in the public domain.16
Aside from cables being cut – tapping of subsea communication lines has been common
practice since the cold war.17 As evidenced by NSA whistle-blower Edward Snowden in 2013,
the practice of undersea cable tapping certainly hasn’t been curtailed in any way by advances
in cable design. On the surface, a modern fibre optic cable can be tapped in just minutes using
a handful of modest tools; at depth, military powerhouses like the United States have ensured
that their ability to listen at will has not been compromised.18 Ireland is most assuredly not
immune from the risk of tapping. The widely known but unacknowledged Russian ‘Spy ship’
YANTAR made headlines in 2015 when it was found loitering over subsea cables off the US
coast.19 Carrying two submersibles capable of working at depths of 6,000 meters, YANTAR
is no stranger to European, and even Irish, waters. With global interest in the wealth of
information travelling along our seabed, it’s not a case of preventing cables from being tapped;
12 Sunak and Stavridis, Op Cit

13 Kingfisher Information Services, Op Cit
14 Martin Gibson, “Britain Cuts German Cable Communications 5 August 1914,” War and Security (blog), August 5, 2014.
15 Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power,” Chatham House,
2016.
16 Kingfisher Information Services, Op Cit
17 NSA-led US Navy Operation IVY BELLS in 1971 resulted in compromising a Russian subsea cable between two Soviet naval bases in the
Sea of Okhotsk in the Pacific Ocean.
18 The Associated Press, “New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability,” The New York Times, February 20, 2005.
19 “H I Sutton - Covert Shores,”, http://www.hisutton.com/Yantar.html.
118
governments, businesses, and even ordinary citizens should best assume that they are. With the
risk laid bare, what, if any, protection can the Defence Forces offer to this vital infrastructure?
This question must be considered not only from a capability standpoint, but also from a
legal one.
First of all, nations have tended not to own the communications cables linking them. Save
for a select number of military-focused links,20 economics dictate that trans-ocean cables are
predominantly privately owned and bankrolled by telecoms conglomerates or, more recently,
giants such as Facebook and Google.21 Afterall, subsea cables are expensive. The Southern
Cross Cable for example, linking the Australian and North American continents cost upwards
of US$1.5 billion.22 While the entrepreneurial approach to undersea communication has
been successful, it has led to a lack of clarity with regard to the international status of cable
infrastructure, and little protection at national government level.
Unlike the ship’s which lay them, subsea cables do not fly a flag, have no homeport, and
bear no legal association with any particular nationality. Numerous attempts have been made
to address this complicated status under international law. The 1884 Convention for the
Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables was a first attempt to make interference with subsea
cables a punishable offence at a national level,23 followed by the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas, which protected the creation of undersea cables in international waters.24
The most recent and comprehensive legal consideration has been the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), frequently referred to as a ‘constitution of the
seas’.25 This comprehensive convention, on which some 167 nations reached varying levels of
agreement, places significant theoretical protection on undersea cables in international waters,
but falls short in some vital practical aspects. One critical flaw in the protections offered lies
20 Thomas Nilsen, “Russia plans to lay a trans-Arctic fiber cable linking military installations”, The Independent Barents Observer, April 24,
2018.
21 Sunak and Stavridis, Op Cit.
22 Tara Davenport, “Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law: An Intersectional Analysis,” Catholic University Journal of Law and
Technology 24, no. 1 (2015).
23 Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, Chapter 49.
24 United Nations Convention on the High Seas 1958.
25 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS) 1982. Article 113.
119
in Article 113, which stops short of giving warships the right to board vessels suspected of
intentionally trying to damage undersea cables in international waters.26 Anything short of this
implicit power makes it almost impossible for naval powers of any nation to effectively deter
hostile vessels above or below the surface. While critical of the extent of these 1982 protections,
it must be remembered, that the birth of transatlantic fibre optics and our reliance on these
cable systems are all pre-dated by the 1982 UNCLOS agreement. Increased mandate for the
overt protection of these international networks would appear long overdue.
Some nations, having recognised the gap in international protections, have sought to fill the
void with policy solutions at a more local level. Australia and New Zealand, as Island nations
with communications-dependant economies, have introduced Cable Protection Zones (CPZs)
which provide a range of restrictions to prevent cable damage in sovereign waters.27 These CPZs
deliver the mandate for increased surveillance and intervention, as well as financial deterrents
of up to £250,000 for those found to be in breach.
Similarly, private companies have started to look at ways to protect their own investments
outside of existing conventions. Seismic sensors originally developed for the oil and gas industry
also have the ability to detect the vibrations created by surface or subsea vehicles operating in
their vicinity. These relatively low-cost sensors, placed around cable routes and other key subsea
infrastructures, can gather valuable information of a pending deliberate or accidental threat.28
Closer to home, the absence of assured legal footing makes the role of protection more difficult;
and increasingly grey. What mandate and methods remain to defend, protect, and support the
integrity of our maritime domain?
An Irish response to a Global Problem.

Some will argue that given the international effort required to secure the vast North Atlantic
maritime domain in which we reside, our part as a small, ‘neutral’ nation, should neither be
significant nor central. It is worth remembering however that as an Island that has successfully
grown a digital economy on a fragile maritime infrastructure, Ireland may have the most to lose.
Considering western preoccupation with weapons of mass destruction in previous decades,
it seems almost comical to find that a ship’s anchor could now be described as an ‘existential
threat’ to national security and prosperity.29 With no alternative to using these undersea
cables, Ireland must become proactive towards securing the maritime domain on which our
contemporary, digital society depends.
The Irish government’s 2015 White Paper on Defence provides limited direction, highlighting
the Naval Service’s ability to “express state sovereignty and political will at sea in order to
further national policy objectives in the maritime domain”.30 This is accompanied by the
stated intention to provide an ‘enhanced capability’ in ‘the protection of Ireland’s vital sea
lanes of communication’.31 This direction has thus far manifested in limited bottom profiling
26 Davenport, Op Cit.
27 NZ Ministry of Transport “Protecting New Zealand’s Undersea Cables” Ministry of Transport Publication, 2009.
28 Sunak and Stavridis, Op Cit.
29 Sechrist and Belfer, Op Cit.
30 Department of Defence, “White Paper on Defence 2015,” Para. 3.5.5.
31 Department of Defence, “White Paper on Defence 2015,” Para. 6.5.
120
capabilities from surface assets, and a recent foray into autonomous underwater vehicle sensors.
Without systems capable of subsurface detection linked to data analysis systems ashore, the
Naval Service remains quite literally, lost in the dark.
But there does appear to be some flexibility in how the Naval Service shapes its own perspective.
A tentative tender process has commenced with the aim of equipping Ireland’s principal sea-
going agency with more versatile and capable platforms, supported by government’s white
paper vision. Increased mandate for further development in countermine and counter-IED
capabilities ensures continued focus on monitoring and intervention on the seabed. The
development of a highly deployable multi-role vessel concept provides scope for a platform
more suited to ocean governance roles. In this regard, the Naval Service is firmly on the road
to employing more capable systems to progress its ability to peer beneath the horizon, slowly
building geospatial awareness. However, these limited measures fall well short of achieving a
robust level of maritime domain awareness and protection. Further work is needed.
When it comes to delivering cost-effective sovereignty to the seabed, The Royal New Zealand
Navy’s recent procurement success with HMNZS MANAWANUI provides an example worth
following.32 Instead of looking for a brand-new hull to fill the diving and hydrographic capability
gap that had been identified, the New Zealand Defence Force instead examined over 150
existing offshore subsea support vessels to find the most suitable candidate for modification.
They identified the 85 metre-long MV Edda Fonn, a Norwegian multi-role support vessel built
in 2003; after ten months of refit and a total bill of approx. 103 Million NZ dollars (€60m,
equivalent to the cost of Ireland’s newest patrol vessel, LÉ GEORGE BERNARD SHAW),
New Zealand now have a vessel who’s capabilities, according to defence Minister Ron Mark,
represent “a domestic game changer for the South Pacific Region”.33
Fig 3 MV Edda Fonn, built in 2003, has been refit and repurposed as HMNZS MANAWANUI, New Zealand’s
most capable subsea support vessel. Source: marinetraffic.com

What does the future hold for Ireland’s sub-sea domain? In order to support potential future
assets like the Manawanui above, reviews of critical national infrastructure will be needed
to address the vulnerability of our undersea cable networks and consider the adequacy of
our maritime assets to counter this risk. Consideration should be given towards adopting
Protection Zones in particularly vulnerable areas with a high density of subsea networks. The
introduction of legislation to encourage the provision of sensors and sensor data around
undersea infrastructure and along cable routes. Finally, national encouragement towards the
32 “RNZN - Manawanui,”, http://www.navy.mil.nz/mtf/manawanui/default.htm.

33 Hon Ron Mark, NZ Minister of Defence, “Commissioning of HMNZS Manawanui”, 07 June 2019.
121
adoption of modern international treaties which provide more robust protection of subsea
assets in sovereign and international waters.
With issues such as Brexit threatening to change regional balances of power, it is worth
remembering that the realities which made Ireland a key strategic landmark in the development
of global communication technology 150 years ago, still hold true. So long as Ireland remains
socially and economically married to the vital but delicate network of glass laying just offshore,
it is high time we considered protecting it.
122
IS ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE
A BARRIER TO CHANGE IN
THE DEFENCE FORCES?
Comdt Michael Hosback
Instructor, Command & Staff School
Is Organisational Culture a Barrier
to Change in The Defence Forces?
Abstract
This paper is an abridged version of a Master’s Thesis completed on the subject of
Defence Forces (DF) organisational culture, examining whether specific elements
of the DF cultural construct may be acting as a barrier to the effective integration of
specialised units. Organisational culture is a complex topic, increasingly the subject
of attention in terms of discussions of organisational effectiveness. Essentially culture
is to the organisation as personality is to the individual. The use of Schein’s model
of organisational culture, widely utilised in DF Leadership Doctrine, as a framework
to understand elements of culture is introduced and a cultural profile of the DF is
provided (using a representative sample of 150 personnel). Analysis of the constructed
culture profile indicates that there is a significant difference between the espoused
values of the DF as outlined in Leadership doctrine and the beliefs held by serving
personnel about the nature of DF organisational culture. The impact of this difference
between espoused values and unconscious beliefs on organisational effectiveness and
organisational ability to manage change and transformation are outlined. Additionally the
extent to which personnel’s perception of organisational values has changed over time is
explored, reflecting on civil military relations and the distinct difference between climate
and culture.
Introduction
The recent report of the Policing Authority on “Changing policing in Ireland” identified
organisational culture as one of the key enablers of organisational change and renewal.1 The
Report suggested that one barrier to effective modernisation within An Garda Síochána (AGS)
results from the impetus to change not being felt by personnel at the front line. The review also
referenced the results of a recent AGS cultural audit, which indicated considerable scepticism
amongst rank and file personnel towards modernisation. The Defence Forces has not to date
completed a comparable cultural audit of personnel to determine their attitudes towards
innovation and transformation. This is somewhat surprising given the focus in recent times
on workplace climate within the organisation and the understanding that climate is a current
manifestation of deeper cultural issues, topics which have been the source of considerable
public and political commentary since the publication of the 2015 Climate Survey in particular.
This paper is an abridged version of a thesis completed on the topic of DF organisational
culture. This topic is assessed as being particularly relevant given the focus of workplace climate
discussions has mainly taken place without consideration of what constitutes DF culture.
Prevailing academic opinion indicates that workplace climate change is unlikely to be successful
if not informed by an appreciation of underlying culture. This would suggest that the DF, in
addressing workplace climate issues, might have developed an incomplete visualisation of its
current operating environment.
The paper first outlines an overview of what constitutes organisational culture. The
Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is then introduced and the
methodology through which the OCAI was used to complete a cultural profile of the DF
outlined. The results of the organisational culture profile and associated analysis are presented.
1 Policing Authority of Ireland, Monitoring and Assessment of the measures taken by An Garda Siochána to implement the recommendations of
the Garda Inspectorate Report on Changing policing in Ireland, 7th Report (Dublin: Government Printing Office, April 2019).
124
What is Organisational Culture?

Organisational culture describes a framework through which the personnel of an organisation
interpret the interactions of their organisation and its members with other actors. Culture
essentially represents to the organisation the concept that personality represents to
the individual.
Cultural theorists and organisational psychologists provide numerous examples of the ways
in which a comprehensive understanding of organisational culture has been used to promote
effectiveness. Southwest Airlines, Amazon, Starbucks and Apple are all identified as corporate
entities that have parlayed, at various times and with varying degrees of success, a positive
organisational culture into a leading market position. Parr, referencing the famous “Culture
Eats Strategy for Breakfast” quotation in his writing contends that “culture is a balanced
blend of human psychology, attitudes, actions and beliefs that combined can create serious
momentum or miserable stagnation”.2 He identifies culture as one of the most important
drivers that had to be set or adjusted in order to achieve long-term success. He also outlines
five separate and distinct methods through which a positive organisational culture provides
significant benefits. These are by providing focus (aligning the entire company towards visions,
mission and goals), motivation (building employee loyalty), connection (building cohesiveness),
cohesion (encouraging co-ordination) and spirit (shaping employee behaviour at work).3 Goffee
and Jones suggest that without an effective culture a company lacks values, direction and purpose
and further contend that organisational culture can be an effective way to hold an organisation
together (glue) when more traditional mechanisms for integration such as hierarchies
and control systems are ineffective.4 Military organizations are interested in focus (mission
accomplishment) and motivation (building loyalty and esprit de corps). They are concerned
with cohesiveness, and spirit (morale) for the same reasons that their civilian counterparts
prioritize the creation of a strong sense of cultural identity. The construct of a group dynamic,
of a cause bigger than self and the creation of a sense of loyalty and duty are fundamental
elements of military training and infuse the military way of life.5 They are representative of
the way military personnel are asked to think about the external world and how these military
values and identity relate to the societies they represent. However, for military organizations, the
concept of competitive advantage, and the attributes, including culture, which may combine to
make the military successful over its competitors, possess a greater degree of finality than can
be measured in terms of growth, market share and profitability. Murray suggests a definition of
military culture as that which “represents the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms
of experience and intellectual study that contribute to a common core understanding of the
nature of war within military organizations”.6 He explicitly links military cultural identity to a
requirement for militaries to be both introspective and learning organizations. Without these
cultural attributes, he suggests that the military understanding of and appreciation of the world
in which it operates and of what it is expected to achieve will be lacking.
2 Shawn Parr, “Culture Eats Strategy for Lunch”, Fast Company, Jan 2012, accessed 04 April 2018, https://www.fastcompany.com/1810674/
culture-eats-strategy-for-lunch.
3 Ibid.
4 Rob Goffee and Gareth Jones, “What Holds the Modern Company Together,” Harvard Business Review 1 (Nov-Dec 1996): 8 – 23, Accessed
25 Oct 2018, https://hbr.org/1996/11/what-holds-the-modern-company-together.
5 Don. M Snider, “An Uninformed Debate About Military Culture”, Orbis 43, no.1 (Winter, 1999):14
6 Williamson Murray, “Does Military Culture Matter”, Orbis 43, no. 1 (Winter, 1999): 27.
125
As the importance of culture, and specifically organisational culture, has come to receive greater
recognition, a number of theories and definitions that attempt to encapsulate the concept
have been put forward.7 Schein’s theory of organisational culture is utilised in this paper as
a theoretical framework as it is heavily influences DF leadership doctrine. Schein defines
culture as:
A pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel as related to those problems.8
Schein posits a model for understanding organisational culture consisting of three cultural
levels. The first and easiest discerned level is that of artefacts as they represent a physical
manifestation of organisational culture. This can be as simple as the ways in which members
of the group dress and speak to one another, their participation in ceremonial events and the
myths and stories that members of the culture share with one another. Schein warns that while
the artefact level of the cultural model is easy to observe it can be difficult to decipher and it
is “especially dangerous to try and infer deeper assumptions from artefacts alone because one’s
interpretations will be projections of one’s own feelings and reactions”.9
The next level of culture identified by Schein is that of espoused values. Espoused values
represent what the organisation says about itself to others or the way in which organisations
may represent their goals and summarise their own cultures. Critically Schein contends
that cultural difficulties arise when espoused values are contradictory and inconsistent with
observed behaviour.
Figure 1. Schein’s Triangle Model on Organisational Culture10
The foundation of Schein’s model is the presence of underlying basic assumptions. These are
the elements of culture that are so ingrained in an organisation that its members take them
for granted in the absence of conscious thought. Schein contends that when basic assumptions
7 Jay M. Shafritz, J. Steven Ott, and Jong Suk Jang, Classics of Organization Theory, 8th Ed. (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2015), 294.
8 Edgar. H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2nd Ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc.,1992), 12
9 Ibid., 22.
10 Source: Schein, On Schein’s triangle Model (Research Gate, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/pn=Scheins-Triangle-Model-on-
Organisational Culture_fig4_301201939, Oct 10 2018).
126
to Change in the Defence Forces?
are strongly held in a group, members will find behaviour that is based on any other
premise inconceivable.11
A significant utility of the model developed by Schein is its aid in understanding cultural barriers
to adaptation. In organisations where basic assumptions are deep-rooted, deep anxiety can
result from the development of mechanisms or viewpoints that contradict those assumptions.
In order to pre-empt this, Schein argues that groups will unknowingly distort, deny, project
or even falsify what is going on around them to avoid conflict with basic assumptions. This
framing of a group viewpoint influenced by an organisation’s culture can clearly act as a
significant impediment to change and integration.12
Methodology
The Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is a validated research method
specifically designed to examine and assess organisational culture developed by Cameron
and Quinn. The OCAI utilises a structured questionnaire where participants are requested
to rate their organisation in a number of dimensions. These are Dominant Characteristics,
Organisational Leadership, Management of Employees, Organisational Glue, Strategic
Emphasis and Criteria of Success.
Data analysis enables the creation of a visual representation of the current (now) and desired (+
five years) status of an organisation’s culture determining the extent of internal versus external
focus and flexibility versus control. The model also use the intersection of these dimensions
to group organisational culture into four specific quadrants; the Clan (collaborative), Adhocracy
(creative), Hierarchy (controlling) and Market (competitive) quadrants. Each quadrant is
representative of different elements of organisational culture. If an organisation demonstrates
a tendency to be hierarchical in nature for example then clear lines of authority, standardised
rules and procedures and control and accountability mechanisms are valued as keys to success.
Effective leaders in this type of environment will be good coordinators and organisers who will
prioritise a smooth running organisation. Formal rules and policies are valued. Conversely
the Adhocracy culture is identified as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative workplace.
Personnel are risk takers and leadership is visionary, innovative and oriented. Commitment to
experimentation and innovation are high. The indications provided by the competing values
framework for organisational effectiveness and culture are outlined at Figure 2 below.
11 Ibid, 25.
12 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 22.
127
Figure 2. Competing Values Framework of Organisational Culture13
Additionally, an example of a unique organisational culture plot indicated by the OCAI is

presented at Fig 3. The representative model demonstrates the responses of US Army personnel
during research conducted into possible barriers to effective professional military education
resulting from organisational culture.
Figure 3. Representative Organisational Culture of the US Army14
13 Source: Cameron and Quinn, Competing Values Framework of Organizational Culture (Research Gate, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/
Competing-Values-Framework-adapted-from-Cameron-Quinn-2011_fig1_317592354, April 4, 2019).
14 Source: Pierce, Is the Organizational Culture of the US Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer
Corps? (Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2010/ssi_pierce.pdf, January 15, 2019), page 57.
128
A culture model of the Irish Defence Forces and its implications

Flexibility and Discretion
Clan Adhocracy
Int Ext
(Collaborate) (Create)
er er
nal nal
Fo Fo
cu cu
s s
Internal Focus External Focus
an an
and Integration and Integration
d d
Int Dif
eg fer
rat en
io tia
Hierarchy Market tio
n (Control) (Compete) n
Stability and Control Now

Preferred
Figure 4.Organisational Culture Model Irish Defence Forces15
The study population for quantitative analysis of the DF population was comprised of one
hundred and fifty service personnel (one hundred and fifty being identified by Cameron and
Quinn as a statistically significant sample size representative of organisational thought). This
sample size is comprised of a representative body from all ranks up to that of Commandant
thereby allowing the computation of differences in value scores to be calculated across the rank
structure. The sample body was comprised of personnel with between two and twenty years of
service in the DF.Figure 4 above represents the results of the OCAI distributed to members of
the DF as part of this study. The ‘now’ line indicates respondent’s current assessment of the
prevailing culture of the DF. The ‘preferred’ line is what those same respondents indicated
that they would like the cultural construct to be in five years. The same data is presented in
Table 1 below.
Numeric Values Irish Defence Forces Culture Model
Culture Type Clan Adhocracy Market Hierarchy

Now Value 18.65 14.43 36.24 30.66
Preferred Value 31.27 22.70 20.96 24.05
Table 1 – Numeric Values Irish Defence Forces Culture Model 16
The model indicates that the current membership of the DF perceives the culture of their
organisation to be imbalanced and weighted in favour of a Market type profile. This cultural
dominance indicates that personnel perceive of themselves as being members of a culture that
is driven primarily by the achievement of goals, is tough and demanding on personnel and
is focused on results. It should be noted, that the term Market is not synonymous with the
marketplace, as may be assumed, but refers to the type of organisation that is oriented towards
15 Michael Hosback, “Is the Organisational Culture of the Irish Defence Forces acting as a barrier to the effective integration of Special
Operations Forces” Master’s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, (2019).
16 Ibid
129
responsiveness to the external environment instead of internal affairs. The leadership type
associated with a Market culture is one of hard driving competitiveness, highly focused on
satisfying the demands of the external environment. Participants also indicated a significant
perception that the DF demonstrates a Hierarchical type organisational culture. The hierarchical
environment is one in which clear lines of decision-making, authority, standardised rules and
procedures, control and accountability are valued as the keys to success. Day to day actions tend
to be governed by procedural mechanisms and effective leaders are coordinators and organisers.
In the long term, the goals of the organisation are predictability and stability. Consensus in the
hierarchical organisation is achieved by adherence to rules and policies.
The extent to which these results are demonstrated across the rank structure are
outlined below.
Numeric Values Irish Defence Forces Culture Model Cross Rank Comparison

Corporal Rank
Now Value 16.67 15.44 35.85 32.01
Preferred Value 33.00 24.68 19.83 22.47
Captain Rank
Now Value 20.05 15.85 34.66 29.41
Preferred Value 30.75 22.16 22.62 24.45
Commandant Rank
Now Value 16.78 11.30 36.85 35.05
Preferred Value 28.78 23.48 21.65 26.07
Table 2 – Numeric Values Irish Defence Forces Culture Model Cross Rank Comparison17
Analysis and Conclusions

Analysis
The degree to which survey participants identify the dominant cultural characteristic of
the organisation to be that of achievement of externally mandated goals is significant. The
magnitude of Market rating is almost 2.5 times greater than the Adhocracy rating and 2.0
times greater than the Clan rating. Similarly, the Hierarchy rating is 2.2 times greater than the
Adhocracy rating and 1.6 times greater than the Clan rating. The low cultural strength of the
Clan score is notable and indicates that personnel feel that team and employee involvement
and commitment of the organisation to employees are not highly valued in the current
cultural construct.
17 Hosback, Op Cit.
130
Respondents consistently rated the Clan and Adhocracy culture types as least congruous with
their perception of the organisations current profile. The extent to which these results are
reflected, with only slight numeric deviation, across the rank structure are also significant.
They suggest that the same perception, possibly accepting slight change reflecting experience,
is consistent across the population, at least up until the rank of Commandant.
Given the DF espousal to practice a mission command type leadership doctrine and to be
a learning organisation, these results are discouraging. The espoused culture of the DF (the
learning organisation) is best represented by the Adhocracy culture type, one in which innovation
and transformation are encouraged. This suggests that there is a dissonance between what the
organisation suggests its values are and what surveyed personnel believe those values to be
in actuality.
The results of this analysis suggest that personnel hold the opinion that the leadership of
the defence organisation values the fulfilment of externally mandated requirements at the
expense of personnel development. They consider that the organisation is primarily concerned
with achieving mandated tasks, through rigid control structures and possesses a management
style which is characterised by strict adherence to regulation and which contravenes the DF
espoused values. The results indicate that the capacity for building a cohesive organisation
characterised by effective teamwork and built on trust, as espoused by DF doctrine, is currently
inhibited in the organisations cultural construct.
Cameron and Quinn have indicated that “discrepancies between the ‘now’ profile and the
‘preferred profile’ of between five and ten points usually indicate the need for a substantial
culture change effort”.18 Indeed, in the representative culture model of the US Army outlined
at Figure 3 discrepancies in perceived versus espoused culture indicated in the results were
the impetus for substantial cultural change initiatives. It is apparent that in this case a major
culture change initiative was initiated in a situation where the score discrepancies were not as
stark as that displayed in the model developed here for the DF.
Numeric Values US Army Culture Model

Now Value 21.17 11.77 37.95 28.84
Preferred Value 28.97 24.55 27.08 19.34
Table 3 – Numeric Values Irish Defence Forces Culture Model Cross Rank Comparison
(Source: Pierce, 2019, p.57)19
Pierce’s findings in the above referenced Table and associated research are that “the characteristics
of the Army professional culture are not supportive of long term environmental adaptability,
flexibility and innovation”.20 The current failure to acknowledge the requirement for cultural
understanding, evidenced by lack of existing analysis, farther supports the contention of
incomplete situational awareness.
18 Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based On the Competing Values Framework, 83.
19 James G. Pierce, “Is the Organizational Culture of the US army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer
Corps?” (Letort Papers, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 30 September 2010), 57.
20 Ibid., 52.
131
Conclusions
The current organisational profile of the DF as indicated by this research is inconsistent
with the organisation’s espoused values as enshrined in DF leadership doctrine. The cultural
model presented by this analysis indicates that of four specifically identified cultural types
outlined, the current profile of the DF is least like that which the organisation professes to
possess; the learning organisation. The research suggests that there is a dissonance between the
espoused values of the DF and the unconscious beliefs of members. It also indicates that the
current organisational climate of the DF is not disposed towards innovative behaviour. This
is a negative outcome for the DF as innovation and flexibility are two key characteristics it has
identified as necessary to succeed in the future operating environment.
Low levels of group cohesion and morale indicated by the 2015 climate survey support the
accuracy of a low clan culture organisation profile for the DF as evidenced in this research.
When considered in conjunction with the work of O’Brien (2013) who asserted that personnel
do feel an affinity towards DF values and feel that they are indicative of DF culture this would
suggest that the foundations of DF organisational culture are being eroded over time and
specifically that significant erosion has taken place since 2013.21 The Climate Survey revealed
large levels of dissatisfaction with life in the DF, particularly since the reorganisation and
downsizing in 2012 and the significant adjustments to pay, conditions and structure as a
result of the prevailing economic environment. This dissatisfaction has been characterised by
the significant and operationally damaging loss of personnel in recent years. The dissonance
between espoused values and perception of personnel surrounding organisational culture are
suggestive of an increasing disconnect between defence management and the personnel of the
DF, reflected in contemporary commentary.
A great deal of time and energy has been invested in recent years in the investigation and
classification of workplace phenomenon in the DF. Engagement in these areas is the subject of
ongoing consultation and revision. Training practices and interpersonal relationship policies
in the DF continue to be subject to review and effective oversight. It is arguable however that
the DF focus on climate without an effective appreciation of the established culture of the
organisation is erroneous. Attempts to address work place climate change are unlikely to
be successful in the short term as a result of a lack of awareness of cultural underpinnings
of organisational frames of reference. Climate is more easily measured than culture, which
perhaps explains why organisations have a tendency to engage in climatic introspection without
properly understanding the unconscious belief system that affects personnel. This research
suggests however that despite associated difficulties there is a requirement for the DF to be
more cognisant of the effect of organizational culture on workplace climate. The lack of
understanding of a common cultural basis for the DF is unfortunate given the widely accepted
levels of organisational culture as developed and postulated by Schein and acknowledged
by the DF in leadership doctrine. There are measures that the DF can take however to
address the perceived disconnect between espoused values and the beliefs of personnel. It is
noteworthy that the survey results indicated that personnel expressed a noted desire to move
towards a learning organisation culture in the medium term and expressed a preference for
an organisational culture more closely reflective of espoused DF values. The key takeaway for
21 Darragh O’Brien, “Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast but what is the Prevailing Culture of Óglaigh na hÉireann” (Master’s Thesis, National
University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2013).
132
the DF in this regard that a considered approach to cultural change supported by a more wide
ranging cultural audit and examining the existing reasons for the differences between espoused
values and beliefs of personnel is likely to contribute to effective change.
Previous studies of DF organisational culture have recognised the importance and impact
civil military relations in this area. Despite this knowledge it is arguable the DF has failed to
effectively educate their personnel in the importance of the civil-military relationship and in
particular the role and space for dissent or disagreement in the civil military sphere. Since the
time of writing of the two previous theses specific to the DF referenced here (O’Brien in 2013
and Crummey in 2014 respectively),22 the findings of this research indicate that ambivalence
surrounding the status of the military, on the part of military personnel, may be a contributing
factor to an undermining of military culture in Ireland. It is assessed as probable that the
current construct of the defence organisation, which limits military control of the levers of
organisational innovation (limited control of finance, restricted ability to restructure) may
be acting as an impediment in this regard and contributing to the impression of cultural
dissonance amongst serving personnel. Effective climate and cultural change measures are both
frustrated by the relative inability of DF leadership to take minimal ownership of the levers of
organisational change.
Given the current status of discourse surrounding resourcing of defence in the Irish model,
it is not speculative to state that lack of understanding of defined roles has impacted on the
operational capability of the DF. It is also apparent that the appreciation of DF personnel for
traditional values is likely to deteriorate further unless these issues are addressed.
22 Declan Crummey, “Exploring Dissent in Civil Military Relations” (Master’s Thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland, 2014).
133
134
“NATIONAL CYBER
DETERRENCE AND THE
IRISH DEFENCE FORCES’
CONTRIBUTION”
Caitríona Heinl
Director of The Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy, Ireland.
“National cyber deterrence and
the Irish Defence Forces’ contribution”
Abstract
There is a significant rethinking of deterrence and cyber deterrence being conducted
in many countries. This article will explore how other countries and military forces are
now approaching these questions with a view to adapting such thinking to suit the Irish
national security context. New national security strategies and second-generation cyber
strategies must now integrate such developments.
If it is expected that we will see even closer and more rapid integration of civil and military
agencies in the deterrence of and response to cyber aggression, how could (and should)
this be developed in Ireland? In the wake of tackling contemporary cyber aggression
and grey zone conflict during peacetime, the author will explore how both caution and
willingness to bring about constructive change are beginning to be exercised in other
states (and by extension may need to be exercised in Ireland) when questioning, and
potentially modifying, the traditional role of military for 21st Century risks.
Introduction
Even where adverse state activity within the cyber sphere in Ireland may not be immediately
evident, it would make little sense to not examine how trends elsewhere could unfold were they
to occur in the State by identifying appropriate responses and mitigation measures for persistent
and multi-faceted cyber aggression.1 Foreign states’ ability to impact Irish security in the cyber
sphere will continue to be dependent upon the Irish state’s capacity and continuing willingness
to take additional actions to prevent, reduce, deter and respond to espionage activities as well
as malevolent and hostile state activity. Such deterrence is traditionally understood to work
by conveying the message that costs – including political, economic, diplomatic and strategic
- will be imposed on a given action, either by making success more difficult or by threatening
a punitive response, so that a malevolent actor will likely consider the benefits of action
outweighed by the costs or punishment and thus choose not to act.2
A simple understanding of cyber deterrence is laid out within the EU’s latest cyber strategy
whereby effective deterrence is achievable if a framework of measures are put in place that
are both credible and dissuasive.3 The EU strategy argues that perpetrators who do not fear
reprisal will only continue their activities unless the chances of being caught and punished
by joint diplomatic or political response are increased. Ireland is not considered immune and
there is a belief that groups linked to other states are in Ireland and carrying out operations
in the State.4 Stronger, coordinated cross-governmental measures and responses will continue
to be needed nationally to address present-day cyber aggression – and like the EU strategy
lays bare, these steps must be both credible and dissuasive. At the time of writing, the still
applicable Irish National Cyber Security Strategy dating back to 2015 does indeed explain
that the strategy presents a cross-government framework for ensuring cyberspace remains safe,
secure and reliable with an emphasis on task-sharing and building trust between stakeholders.5
1 This adapted article comprises thinking based on a number of “think pieces” and speaking engagements by the author throughout 2019.
These include: “Food for thought: The cybersecurity landscape and role of the military”, 8 May 2019; and “Russia and China – Their impact on
Irish security from a cyber perspective”, 30 May 2019.
2 Wilton Park, “Military operations in cyberspace”, 5-7 September 2018.
See also HM Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021”, 2016, 47.
3 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joint Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”, 13 July 2017, 12.
4 Anonymous speaker, “Cyber Security Transatlantic Policy Forum”, Killarney Economic Conference, 10 May 2019.
5 Department of Communications, Energy & Natural Resources, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017”, Government of Ireland, 2.
At the time of writing, the second cyber strategy is due to be published.
136
The strategy further observes the changing nature of these technologies, rightly stating that
flexibility will be needed for the strategy’s implementation in an adaptive manner.6
Nonetheless, experts are scrambling to unpack the multi-level characteristics of cyber conflict
that include ideological, policing, security and economic dimensions – astutely described as a
humbling experience where we are advised to ideally exercise intellectual, political and strategic
humility in this space.7 The national security communities and militaries of technologically
advanced democracies are still trying to better understand the character and implications of the
phases of potential conflict in cyberspace - our understanding of cyberspace as an environment,
of conflict in that environment, and of the military role in such conflict is still work in progress.8
It is thus safe to conclude that the military role in advanced democratic states’ endeavours,
including Ireland, to deter and manage the use by state or non-state actors of contemporary
and future cyber capabilities needs both significant strategic refinement and investment.
Experts now ask, for instance, what exactly the role of the military is where there are several
types of persistent cyber activity such as espionage, attack, influence campaigns, and races to
acquire strategic future capabilities. What is the role of the military during “unpeace” defined
by Lucas Kello in his recent book as “mid-spectrum rivalry lying below the physically destructive
threshold of interstate violence but whose harmful effects far suRPAS the tolerable level of
peacetime competition and possibly even of war”. In other words, how should we analyse
and manage military operations that are in fact taking place in cyberspace?9 This begs the
deeper question as to how the Irish government should now approach cyber deterrence where
the nature of traditional deterrence is already evolving – military doctrine is beginning to
recognise that it is “no longer a defensive or semi-passive theory based on conveying intent and
capability; instead, it now has to involve active measures as part of a constant conflict below the
traditional threshold of what used to be called war”.10
This article argues that a number of steps can be taken to better enhance Ireland’s cyber
resilience, deterrence, and response in the 21st Century. This includes work that continues
to strengthen cyber resilience to reduce vulnerability, and to allow government freedom of
action for responding to and preventing future malevolent activity. These steps, which are
described in more detail below, include the following actions: (1) Continue to enhance cyber
resilience as part of deterrence by denial; (2) Increase all-source intelligence; (3) Align cyber
deterrence alongside national deterrence frameworks; (4) Unpack and adapt contemporary
military thinking on 21st Century cyber risks; (5) Recognise the Defence Forces’ workforce
as a critical cyber asset; (6) Adapting EU frameworks at national level for response to
malicious cyber activities; (7) Continue to increase the State’s international action and
engagement; and (8) Continue efforts to protect Ireland’s reputation vis-à-vis surveillance and
cybersecurity issues.
8 Ibid., 5-7.
9 Ibid., 5-7.
10 Ministry of Defence, “Deterrence: the Defence Contribution”, Joint Doctrine Note 1/19, UK Government, February 2019.
137
Continue to enhance cyber resilience as part of deterrence

by denial
Without citing each of the measures laid out within the Irish cyber strategy that aim to
enhance cyber resilience, the strategy already identifies tangible ways to enhance resilience
on an ongoing basis. Cyber resilience is understood to be the ability to prepare for, respond
to and recover from cyber incidents where traditional cybersecurity measures are no longer
perceived to be sufficient to protect against persistent activity.11 This is important given
that enhanced cybersecurity and resilience are in essence “a means of deterring attacks that
rely on the exploitation of vulnerabilities”.12 In other words, resilience is a key pillar of any
deterrence strategy.13
By continuing the State’s work to strengthen cyber resilience, this not only helps to reduce
vulnerability; it further supports the Government’s need for freedom of action and the
confidence to sometimes take unfavourable cyber and non-cyber related positions in relation
to other states. The Government would therefore be enabled to respond to unacceptable
behaviour and to possibly also prevent future malevolent state activity where the State’s own
vulnerability to possible retaliatory responses in the cyber sphere is reduced. For example,
where Irish decision-makers may decide to expel diplomats or take other actions in relation
to cyber and non-cyber state activity, then consistently strong cyber resilience will be required
as a factor in this decision-making process to buffet against possible cyber retaliation. Possible
examples of this quandary come to mind in the context of the discussion in 2018 about alleged
Russian involvement in the chemical incident in Salisbury involving a toxic chemical and
poisoning of three people where a review was then held on the presence and activities of
Russian diplomats and agents (which was ultimately followed by expulsions).14 Or more recent
reports about the potential for Chinese activity at Leinster House where queries were made
about the installation of surveillance cameras by a Chinese state-backed company.15 This means
that the State’s so-called “cyber house” must be in good shape to support, for example, Irish
leaders’ decisions and high-level statements where there is an intention to signal that the State
will not be bullied.16
Increase all-source intelligence

The presence of foreign actors on systems must naturally be taken very seriously, perhaps more
seriously than heretofore given the nature of the blurred lines between cyber espionage and
disruptive capabilities where actual intentions can often be difficult to decipher. Because of
the distinctive nature of the cyber sphere, this means that it may now bring about a need for
more debate in the Irish context about the greater need for all-source intelligence such as sigint,
11 ITGovernance.co.uk, “What is cyber resilience?”, Accessible at: https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/cyber-resilience.
12 HM Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021”, 2016, 47.
13 Ministry of Defence, “Deterrence: the Defence Contribution”, Joint Doctrine Note 1/19, UK Government, February 2019.
14 See also: Elaine Loughlin, “Ireland extremely vulnerable to cyber attacks from Russia”, 26 March 2018, https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/
ireland-extremely-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks-from-russia-468749.html: “Michael Murphy has raised serious questions around this country’s
capacity to deal with any Russian retaliation if Taoiseach Leo Varadkar orders an expulsion of diplomats….The former deputy director of military
intelligence said we are “naive” in relation to intelligence and espionageand could face attacks including the cutting of electricity or water in the
event of actions deemed unfriendly
towards Russia.”
15 Hugh O’Connell, “ Chinese cameras in Leinster House spark espionage concerns”, The Business Post, 28 April 2019.
16 See Niall O’Connor, Irish Mirror, 23 March 2018, https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/russian-hackers-already-accessed-
hse-12242336: In relation to Russian activity last year, see the commentary “When you step in to meet it the chances are it will decrease. What
Varadkar is doing is saying find some other small state to bully.”
138
osint, and humint (including foreign capabilities) in combination with technical attribution
where technical attribution alone is not sufficient. This situation is currently exacerbated
given concerns that the increasing use of publicly and commercially available cyber tools is
increasing the volume of unattributed cyber activity globally and the risk of misattribution and
misdirected responses by both governments and the private sector is higher.17 In other words,
cyber challenges should likely now be a forcing function to bring about wider changes in the
Irish national security apparatus.
Align cyber deterrence alongside national deterrence frameworks

It would seem that a nations’ wider deterrence framework (which is often relayed by way of
a national security strategy) should ideally support and establish stronger strategic thinking
on deterrence in cyberspace and take the evolving geopolitical and cyber threat landscape
into account. The current Irish cybersecurity strategy, by no fault of its own, must draw on
disparate documents such as the 2015 White Paper on Defence. The upcoming cybersecurity
strategy must likely draw on a number of other policy documents too. While this is likely a
challenge for other security fields in the Irish context, there is clearly a need for a higher order
strategic overlay for national security to establish better deterrence in cyberspace. The difficulty
in this case is that Ireland does not yet have a national security strategy. While a national
security strategy is expected to be developed in the near future under the mandate of the
National Security Analysis Centre, this will likely occur after the expected release of the next
national cybersecurity strategy in 2019. Consequently, the new cyber strategy could include an
objective that lays out future intentions that next generation cyber strategies will complement
the national security strategy (or strategies) in the interests of stronger deterrence in cyberspace.
Unpack and adapt contemporary military thinking on 21st Century

cyber risks
In the Irish context, general emergency planning processes in the State lie with the Principal
Response Agencies (including an Garda Síochána, the Health Service Executive and the
Local Authorities), Government Departments and other agencies overseen by the Office of
Emergency Planning within the Department of Defence and the Government Task Force on
Emergency Planning, chaired by the Minister for Defence and the National Framework for
Emergency and Crisis Management in Ireland aims to foster national resilience in the face of
crises.18 The Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment operates as
the lead Government Department for emergency situations relating to the failures of, or attacks
on, Information and Communications Technologies, and will operate in a secondary role to
other Departments in cases where incidents may have a cybersecurity dimension.
Although the current Irish cyber strategy includes an objective to build capacity across public
administration and the private sector to engage fully in the emergency management of cyber
incidents, the current shortfall of military personnel in the field of cyber does not seem to be
meeting this objective. Other objectives expected to be met under the current cyber strategy
17 Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community”, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 29 January 2019.
139
include civil-military cooperation whereby the Irish Defence Forces continue the strong culture
of cooperation between the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Defence Forces in
areas such as development of technical skill sets, technical information sharing and exercise
participation. The Defence Forces must also maintain a capability in the area of cybersecurity
to protect its own networks and users. Moreover, a Service Level Agreement was due to be
formalised with the Department of Defence to include a mechanism for sharing technical
expertise in the event of a national cyber incident or emergency. Specifically, two members
of the Defence Forces are generally seconded to NCSC (albeit dependent on the Defence
Forces having two officers to second which seems a challenging ask given the current exodus
of Defence Forces’ officers).19 In July 2019, the Defence Forces’ internal cybersecurity unit
was shut down because of a lack of resources and qualified staff, and they are no longer in a
position to provide staff to NCSC.20
In any case, the NSCS maintains close cooperation with the Defence Forces and An Garda
Síochána on national security issues with this secondment arrangement for both entities.21
The 2015 Defence White Paper also observes that the Department of Communications has
lead responsibilities relating to cybersecurity and the primary focus of the Department of
Defence and Defence Forces will remain the protection of Defence networks, but in emergency
situations, once Defence systems are supported, they will provide support to the CSIRT-IE
team. Nevertheless, it seems uncertain that the Irish Defence Forces can could currently
assist in past months in the event of a significant cyber crisis or national cyber-attack given
the media reporting of the more recent standing down of the Defence Forces’ cybersecurity
unit. Moreover, the ability to routinely and effectively defend and protect the Defence Forces’
networks from cyber-attacks and intrusions, which is regarded as an essential capability that
must be retained and developed, must now beshould have been more seriously called into
question at the highest levels if this reporting is accurate.22
Notably, these objectives do not seem to include advanced military strategic thinking on cyber
matters. These developments in Ireland seriously call into the question the ability of the State
to implement a credible and dissuasive deterrence framework with a defence contribution. This
is particularly concerning where other important questions about the role of military in these
types of contemporary “conflict” and “unpeace” should be addressed.23 Such questions that are
currently being explored in other advanced economies include the following: (1) Is the role of
military to fight in the traditional sense of an action/reaction struggle with an adversary? The
latest United States Department of Defense (DoD) cyber strategy posits, for instance, that its
military’s ability to fight and win wars in any domain, including cyberspace, is a foundational
national security requirement to deter aggression including cyber-attacks – it will now “defend
forward” to halt or degrade cyberspace operations targeting the DoD which could be construed
as pre-emptive behaviour. Nonetheless, experts are continuing to unpack the meaning of such
new strategies; (2); Is the military’s task to contain hostile actions in cyberspace and to prevent
them spreading to and compromising military activity in conventional domains like land, sea,
air and space?; (3) Should this defensive function be extended to society more broadly, with
military tasked not just to defend their own networks and platforms but to also ensure the
19 White Paper on Defence, Government of Ireland, August 2015, 43.
20 John Mooney, “Lack of staff stops army cyber-security team”, The Sunday Times, 7 July 2019.
21 Department of Communications, Climate Action & Environment, “National Cyber Security Strategy Draft Public Consultation”, March 2019, 3.
22 White Paper on Defence, Government of Ireland, August 2015, 63.
140
resilience of society’s critical infrastructure as a whole? Again, the U.S. DoD is now working to
defend, when directed, non-DoD critical infrastructure and Defense Industrial Base entities. It
will work (including by defending forward) to pre-empt, defeat or deter malicious cyber activity
targeting U.S. critical infrastructure that could cause a significant cyber incident “regardless
of whether that incident would impact DoD’s warfighting readiness or capability”; (4) Are
military-related activities such as cyber defence and resilience the most that can be expected of
military deterrence in cyberspace, or should the role of military be more organisational than
operational? For example, should military have a liaison and coordination function intended
to ensure integrated cross-governmental and intra-alliance responses?; and (5) Is there a need,
as laid out in the UK’s national cyber strategy, to improve the focus of intelligence agencies,
law enforcement and military in coordination with international partner agencies to identify,
anticipate and disrupt hostile cyber activities by obtaining pre-emptive intelligence on the
intent and capabilities of malevolent state and non-state actors?24 The U.S. DoD also alludes
to the need to increase “bi-directional” information sharing to advance mutual interests with
allies and partners.25
What is certain from recent expert reports is that militaries cannot effectively undertake
this analysis on their own and they must ideally be conducted as part of a “comprehensive,
integrated civil-military approach to conflict in cyberspace”. Nor is cyberspace seen to be
exclusively a military responsibility. Instead, it is recommended that there should be effective
coordination of civil-military capacity if cyber activities – of all kinds and at whatever levels –
are to be deterred and defeated. It is argued that military operations in cyberspace should be
fought as part of a comprehensive integrated civil-military approach in which civil and military
efforts are interdependent and thus more effective. A recent Wilton Park report on military
operations, which draws on the findings of key thought leaders and government representatives,
emphasises that civil-military cooperation is no longer optional and it is expected that we will
see even closer and more rapid integration of civil and military agencies in the deterrence of
and response to cyber aggression. This concept is known as fusion doctrine in the United
Kingdom whereby UK military operations in cyberspace should be seen as only one element
of a full spectrum cross-governmental strategic approach so that political leadership can at all
times receive advice from military commanders as to what military operations can and cannot
achieve in cyberspace. However, experts’ contributions in the Wilton Park report accept that
deterrence of cyber-attacks that constitute use of force seems to remain relatively straightforward
insofar as it comprises the traditional combination of denial and punishment. However, it is
more challenging where malicious activity falls below the threshold of the use of force, thus
calling for more nuanced positions, including during peacetime.
The EU also considers that it is well placed to promote synergies between military and civilian
efforts given the blurring lines between cyber defence and cybersecurity and the dual use nature
of cyber tools and technologies as well as the very different EU Member State approaches.26
While the United States DoD is now tasked to respond to cyber-enabled campaigns that erode
U.S. military advantages, threaten its infrastructure and reduce its economic prosperity. It will
work to expose, disrupt and degrade cyber activity threatening U.S. interests, strengthening the
24 See the United Kingdom’s approach: HM Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021”, 2016, 28.
25 United States Department of Defense, “Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018”, September 2018, 2.
26 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”, 13 September 2017.
141
cybersecurity and resilience of key potential targets and working closely (thus expanding DoD
cyber cooperation) with other departments and agencies, industry and international partners.27
Recognise the Defence Forces’ workforce as a critical

cyber asset
It is already recognised in the 2015 White Paper on Defence that the key requirement to
maintain the capability to effectively defend Defence Forces’ networks is for personnel with
appropriate cybersecurity skills sets – this was already considered difficult to maintain in 2015
given the transferability of such skills to the business environment.28
While the National Cyber Security Centre’s primary focus is on securing government networks,
assisting industry and individuals and securing critical national infrastructure, thought
leaders and seasoned practitioners conclude that since future crises will likely include a cyber
component and the military will not only likely be a target but also be required to contribute
to national security and defence in cyberspace. Therefore, the Defence Forces will need enough
highly trained practitioners for cyber defensive and counter-offensive operations. The U.S.
DoD cyber strategy captures this point succinctly by explaining that its “workforce is a critical
cyber asset”. At a time when defence budgets are constrained and talent can be attracted to the
more profitable private sector, this point is critical. EU strategies similarly recognise this very
important skills gap in cyber defence.29 The Cyber Education Training Evaluation and Exercise
Platform at the European Security and Defence College has subsequently been established
as one way to address this need for cyber defence training and education across EU Member
States. While this initiative is laudable, it is currently light years behind other initiatives such
as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The United Kingdom, for its
part, is still developing its own Defence Cyber Academy for cyber training and exercise across its
Ministry of Defence and wider Government, addressing specialist skills and wider education.30
This includes developing opportunities for collaboration in training and education between
government, the Armed Forces, industry and academia.
Adapting EU frameworks at national level for response to

malicious cyber activities
Given Ireland’s membership of the EU and close working relationship on cyber-related
matters, additional initiatives to examine for possible adaptation at national level in Ireland
could include response frameworks such as the EU’s so-called cyber diplomacy toolbox.
The Irish government already considers the EU as having taken a particularly coherent and
comprehensive approach.31 The toolbox is a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to
malicious cyber activities that harm political, security and economic interests. Similarly, the
more recently released framework that allows the EU to impose targeted restrictive measures
like sanctions to deter and respond to cyber attacks that have significant impact (or potentially
significant effect) and constitute an external threat to the EU or its Member States is another
27 United States Department of Defense, “Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018”, September 2018, 2-3.
28 White Paper on Defence, Government of Ireland, August 2015, 63-64.
29 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”, 13 September 2017.
30 HM Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021”, 2016, 56-57.
31 Department of Communications, Climate Action & Environment, “National Cyber Security Strategy Draft Public Consultation”, March 2019, 1.
142
example.32 This framework is regarded as an important step in the development of signalling and
reactive capacities at EU and Member State level by increasing capacity to attribute to influence
the behaviour of potential aggressors and taking into account the need to ensure proportionate
responses.33 In terms of developing such national response frameworks, the State may need to
again consider the role of all-source intelligence that is sourced primarily from Irish agencies
when making decisions related to attribution to support the political legitimacy of its responses
vis-à-vis foreign actors, and to ensure that a sovereign political decision is made given that
attribution continues to be a sovereign political decision based on all-source intelligence. The
EU cyber strategy makes clear that such attribution is essential to bring perpetrators to justice,
warranting an urgent need to improve capacity to identify those responsible for cyber attacks.34
A topical discussion related to collective deterrence and response for consideration in the
Irish context is the viability of the cyber deterrence initiative of the United States which builds
upon the United States National Cyber Strategy’s proposal in 2018 that collective action by
a coalition of states will have a more powerful effect than the efforts of one state alone to
deter. This raises the question as to how Ireland should engage in group initiatives like the
United States’ cyber deterrence initiative. The State must ideally examine how these initiatives
align with its own interests to promote a peaceful and prosperous environment that is in line
with the country’s democratic values and security needs. By doing so, this means that the
State does not (or is not seen to) unwittingly become part of such a group alignment that
could be perceived in alienating terms where current descriptions such as a “coalition of the
willing” or “the like-minded” could possibly bring military and five-eyes intelligence alliance
images to mind. Instead, the State could likely join such a group initiative where it finds that
it has like-minded foreign policy and economic interests including mutual security, economic
and value interests, as well as understandable information sharing needs. Moreover, how the
EU will choose to engage on this matter may further support Irish needs. By communicating
these types of decisions carefully, the State could then continue to protect its international
reputation as an honest broker and a country open to business, further protecting its ability
to negotiate favourably in other non-cyber related international discussions. Furthermore, this
type of thinking and action by the State could be in line with Irish foreign policy to work with
like-minded partners as laid out in the 2015 “Global Island” paper, while also meeting other
concerns that might arise in relation to collective security and neutrality/non-alignment.
Further examples of the types of actions that could be taken as part of a framework for effective
deterrence can be identified within the EU’s current cyber strategy, which reflects more evolved
thinking on cyber since the Irish cyber strategy was first written. These include (1) Improving the
capacity to identify malicious actors; (2) Stepping up law enforcement response to cybercrime
through effective investigations and prosecutions, updating the procedural framework, and
adhering to the Budapest Convention; (3) Enhancing public private cooperation against
cybercrime; and (4) Focusing on Member States’ defence capability by promoting synergies
between military and civilian efforts given the dual-use nature of these technologies and tools.
A number of other states, such as the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Australia also
32 Council of the European Union, “Cyber-attacks: Council is now able to impose sanctions”, 17 May 2019, https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/17/cyber-attacks-council-is-now-able-to-impose-sanctions/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=Cyber-attacks%3a+Council+is+now+able+to+impose+sanctions
33 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joint Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”, 13 July 2017, 16.
34 Ibid., 13.
143
emphasise that they have the means to take offensive action in cyberspace should they choose
to do so – in other words, the Irish national security community could examine whether the
ability to take offensive action by cyber and non-cyber means as part of a defensive posture is a
necessity for effective and credible cyber deterrence, including how this should be communicated
as part of an effective strategic communication framework given concerns about neutrality.
Continue efforts to protect Ireland’s good reputation vis-à-vis

national surveillance and cybersecurity issues
For many reasons, Ireland continues to be an attractive destination for Foreign Direct
Investment. One such reason that relates particularly to tech companies in the wake of
the Snowden fall-out is the State’s palatable approach to surveillance issues. There could,
however, be a risk of potential damage to this reputation if a perception were to grow that
other states, including friendly nations, have the ability to run amok with their own cyber-
enabled surveillance activities in the State. Where this is only a perception challenge and
the reality of the situation is markedly different, solutions will likely boil down to creating
strong communication strategies that relay otherwise. Otherwise, it could be damaging to the
State’s reputation if efforts are not made to counter negative perceptions about the strength
of the State’s cybersecurity initiatives. In addition, given the argument for a potential debate
about new structures for all-source intelligence due to the unique nature of cyber questions,
this situation will likely need to be further examined in the context of the State’s positive
reputation vis-à-vis surveillance.
In relation to those global tech companies with European headquarters in Ireland, some
politicians are concerned that cyber “attacks” could have major repercussions for the Irish
economy and jobs.35 Even where these global corporations are likely to have their own very
strong cybersecurity measures in place – sometimes possessing more sophisticated capabilities
than individual nation states - the State’s reputation for protecting FDI could arguably take a
hit. As the current national cybersecurity strategy outlines, “Ireland faces a more complex set of
risks than many other countries. The presence of a large number of data centric international
companies here, and the growing number of data centres present in the State means that the
potential for reputational damage is an important consideration.” While it has now become
relatively safe for states to communicate to their citizens that the nature of cyber risks means
that no one actor or State has the ability to fully secure against cyber risks, growing negative
public commentary about Ireland’s ambivalence or an ineptitude to deal with security and
cybersecurity could take hold. This could cause further damage to the country’s reputation,
which is a priority for the State to preserve. Examples include recent commentary citing the
Comptroller and Auditor-General report notes that the ‘top-level government committee
tasked with developing cyber security policy “had not met since July 2015”’ as well as the recent
standing down of the Defence Forces’ cyber unit.36
Even though the State continues to prioritise the importance of attracting FDI, those companies
– including those choosing to relocate because of Brexit concerns – could then instead consider
other EU Member States that already have strong global reputations for cybersecurity. Ideally,
35 See https://www.fiannafail.ie/irish-businesses-at-risk-of-cyber-attacks-as-government-leave-them-ill-prepared-kelleher/
36 See https://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/GCHQ-offers-help-to-embryonic-Irish-cyber-security-organisation
144
Ireland should therefore continue to leverage the reputation that the country is safe from
disproportionate surveillance while also deepening its reputation for being a safe place to do
business in relation to malevolent use of cyber capabilities.37
Continue to increase the State’s international action

and engagement
The current cybersecurity strategy includes an objective to continue to engage with
international partners and international organisations to ensure that cyberspace remains
“open, secure, unitary and free and able to facilitate economic and social development”. In
terms of international actions, the new strategy could add further depth to these objectives
by going beyond the current strategy’s short statements (for example, “European and global
discussions on network and information security, including in the context of the global debate
on the future of Internet governance”). By publishing Ireland’s thinking on these questions
within the new strategy (or by way of a more comprehensive international policy given the
importance of this field to Irish security and economic interests), it could help to foster a more
transparent and stable international environment that is conducive to reducing both global
and national cyber threats. At a minimum, it could include an objective to examine these
questions at length in the near future, including through public debate, and to become more
involved in shaping the international framework for global cyber stability in a way that is in
line with Ireland’s values, national interests and foreign policy priorities. This could include
showing solidarity with EU endeavours, fellow EU Member States, and like-minded partners
where interests clearly converge, including against malicious activity and greyzone state activity
during peacetime
The Irish Defence Forces’ could support such international cooperation in a number of
ways, including by continuing their engagement with the European Defence Agency (albeit
limited), the EEAS and Commission services that are tasked with advancing Member States’
cooperation and better guiding EU efforts to build cyber deterrence by facilitating strategic level
engagement between Member States’ cyber defence policymakers. Finally, it is worth exploring
whether there is space for defence diplomacy so that the Irish Defence Forces promote such
international cyber stability frameworks. By way of example, the U.S. DoD cyber strategy
now highlights that the DoD will work alongside its national and international partners to
promote international commitments regarding behaviour in cyberspace as well as to develop
and implement cyber confidence building measures.
37 See https://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/GCHQ-offers-help-to-embryonic-Irish-cyber-security-organisation - See for example “Behind

the scenes, there was also tensions over American mass surveillance in Ireland. While Martin was in Dublin, the Supreme Court was examining
a bid by Facebook to get off the hook of an Irish High Court finding that Facebook engaged in “mass and indiscriminate surveillance” in the
Republic of Ireland and the EU. Facebook was found to be acting as an agent for the US National Security Agency, which is a close partner
of GCHQ. Earlier this year, the Irish Government was forced to remove the Irish mass surveillance act from the statute book, following a critical
report from the former chief justice of Ireland, judge John Murray. He had condemned the act, placed on the statute book under intense American
pressure, for innumerable breaches of the European Convention of Human Rights, to which both the Republic of Ireland and the UK are
signatories as members of the Council of Europe, which is not part of the EU.”
145
Conclusion
While the Irish government already encourages civil-military cooperation (including in the
event of a national cyber incident or emergency) and the Defence Forces are expected to
maintain a capability in the area of cybersecurity to protect its own networks and users, this
capacity more recently came under threat with the apparent standing down of the Defence
Forces’ internal cybersecurity unit in 2019. This recent development could hinder effective
civil-military cooperation if left unresolved, and it seems unclear that the Defence Forces could
then assist in the event of a serious cyber crisis or attack. It is further uncertain that the
Defence Forces could routinely and effectively defend its networks. In short, it is not clear
that the Irish state would be able to implement an effective, credible and dissuasive deterrence
framework without such a defence contribution based on these media reports.
To conclude, this situation is exacerbated at a time when advanced military strategic thinking
is needed for contemporary analyses of cyber deterrence in the wake of modern cyber threats
that are often persistent and below the threshold of conflict, as exemplified in most advanced
democratic states. Such strategic thinking is described in this article, whereby a number of
measures could be considered in the Irish context. These include, steps such as (1) Continuing
the Irish government’s ongoing work to enhance cyber resilience as part of deterrence by
denial where resilience is understood to be a key pillar of deterrence strategy; (2) Unpacking
and adapting military thinking on 21st Century risks for the Irish security ecosystem as part
of comprehensive civil-military approaches to conflict in cyberspace; (3) Protecting the Irish
Defence Forces’ workforce as a critical cyber asset; (4) Adapting EU frameworks at national
level for response to malicious cyber activities where the Irish government already considers the
EU as having taken a particularly comprehensive approach; (5) Continuing to protect Ireland’s
reputation vis-à-vis national surveillance when tackling cybersecurity issues; and (6) Increasing
the State’s international action and engagement with a possible role for defence diplomacy to
promote Irish government positions on international cyber stability frameworks.
146
PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT AND
INFORMATION CAMPAIGNING
Steven Harland
Defence and Security Advisor
Dick Hemsley
Director, Vedette Consulting (Ireland) Limited
Persistent Engagement and Information Campaigning
Introduction
Our societies are changing fundamentally, becoming ever more complex and interconnected.
Ease of access to information and its enabling digital technologies is rapidly shifting the
balance of power from governments and formal organizations towards informal groups
and individuals. Access to near real-time information via digital channels provides fora to
the latter two to engage in activities previously reserved only to states and supranational
organisations. The all-pervasive nature of digitally-shared information makes it an
immensely powerful multi-dimensional agent of change, facilitating an unprecedented level
of connectedness across the globe. Given this context, we will argue that Western states and
supranational organisations are inextricably engaged in a non-discretionary contest in which
their core values are held at risk, and that Smart Power responses are needed in pursuit of
their legitimate interests. We contend that this has implications for current security policy
paradigms, which need to be adjusted to encompass Information Campaigning approaches
matched to the new and dynamic competitive space. Finally, we will argue that the core of
the advocated approach is directed at an Influence Nexus; that locus in an Information
Campaign design where strategic, operational and tactical-level activities will, together,
realise a set of mutually-reinforcing behavioural outcomes across selected target audiences.
A New Seam
The evolving character of contemporary strategic competition and armed conflict
increasingly encompasses complexity, instability, uncertainty, all-pervasive information
and rapid technological development. The emergent networked world is characterised by
diverse audiences that cannot be usefully categorised in conventional ways; these are no
longer passive, but are now themselves acting as influencers, opinion-formers and ‘news-
makers’.1 Issues of identity, trust and security2 in the virtual dimension now play out in a
wider political discourse about data privacy, inequalities and unfettered global enterprise.
These developments have ushered in a new seam of inter-state competition that challenges
states to align their strategic approaches to the structural realities of multiple information
environments.3 The distinction between conflict and peace is fast eroding, and adversaries
of the West, both state and non-state, increasingly threaten the stability of the extant
international order. There is a continuing competition among diverse state and non-state
actors, one conducted largely with non-military means, which involves subversion, political
agitation, sabotage, espionage and crime, and is mediated through and by cyberspace.
Hybrid Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare and Reflexive Control4 are all examples of how states
are already conducting such a contest in and via cyberspace to gain strategic advantage.5
1 Slaughter (2009) comments that the emerging networked world exists ‘above the state, below the state, and through the state’. A.M.
Slaughter, ‘America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2009. For mass self-communication see
M. Castells, Communication Power, Oxford University Press, 2009. For media ecology see J van Dijck, Culture of Connectivity: A Critical
History of Social Media, Oxford University Press, 2013, R. Grusin, Premediation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010; J. Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, London: Hurst & Co, 2009
2 Edward Lucas, Cyberphobia: Identity, Trust, Security and the Internet, 2015.
3 R.J. Harknett, Cyber Persistence: Re-thinking Security and Seizing the Strategic Cyber Initiative, National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, Medicine, Decadal Survey of Social & Behavioural Sciences for Applications to National Security, October 11, 2017; M.P.
Fischerkeller and R.J. Harknett , Deterrence is Not a Credible Strategy for Cyberspace, ORBIS, Vol 61, Issue 3, 2017, 381-393; R.J.
Harknett and E.O. Goldman, The Search for Cyber Fundamentals, Journal of Information Warfare, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016. Harknett
suggests that complexity arises from the fact the terrain is both a ‘space’ and a ‘means’.
4 Reflexive control is defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily
make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.
5 For commentary on Hybrid Warfare, see Galeotti, M, ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’
Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2016, pp. 282–301; R. Seely, Defining Contemporary Russian Warfare: Beyond the Hybrid
Headline, RUSI Journal, Vol 162, No 1, February-March 2017. For Asymmetric Warfare, see R. Thornton, The Russian Military’s New ‘Main
Emphasis’: Asymmetric Warfare, RUSI Journal, Volume 162, No 4, Oct 2017; For Reflexive Control, see T.L. Thomas, Russia’s Reflexive
Control Theory and the Military, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, 237–56.
148
States are now, essentially, persistently engaged at below the threshold of armed conflict.6
The effect of this on the present international order may be to dramatically reshape relations
between states, and between states and non-state actors, and bring a multitude of spatially
distant, previously objectively weak actors into the strategic mix.7 Some states have been
swift to recognise both the threat and opportunity these developments present, and have
adopted new long-term strategies as a result.
Russia and China have been characterised as executing Sharp Power strategies to ‘…penetrate,
or perforate, the political and information environments in the targeted countries…to
manipulate their target audiences by distorting the information that reaches them’.8 In so
doing, they are exerting pressure on their perceived adversaries using all four classical levers
of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Economic and Military – DIME), without
regard to Western norms of behaviour. Via extensive multi-dimensional campaigns of
disinformation, Sharp Power users seek to amplify the tensions between audiences which
seem suspicious of authority and unwilling to await the rebuttal of unsupported opinions
by governmental actors.9 Attribution of activity to actor is often difficult, in cyberspace,
particularly in the social media environment, and so the scope for deception and denial
is immense.10 Actions by the West’s strategic competitors are not nearly so constrained by
legal and ethical considerations. New ‘rules of the game’ are emerging, and so Western
states must swiftly learn how to play well by them – without compromising their liberal
democratic values. However, Western actors’ notions of the nature and primacy of truth
appear to be stressed in these new circumstances, and so may distort their strategic
responses.11 Furthermore, Joseph Nye observes that the West should be cautious about
offensive responses to the growing Sharp Power threat. Whilst accepting the tactical utility
of information warfare, he warns the West against launching major programmes of covert
information warfare which, if compromised and correctly attributed, could undermine its
strategic efforts at exerting its Soft Power12.
Information Campaigning
Within this dynamic strategic context, bringing influence to bear on actors and audiences is
becoming more complex and competitive, and yet is increasingly central to the protection,
6 Referred to by Chief of the General Staff, Gen Sir Nicholas Carter at this Opening Address to the RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 28
June 2016.
7 Mackinlay, ibid. Cairncross talks about the ‘death of distance’. F. Cairncross, Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution is
Changing Our Lives, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001.
8 C. Walker and J Ludwig, The Meaning of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian States Project Influence, Foreign Affairs, November 2017. C.
Walker, S. Kalathi and J. Ludwig, How Democracies Can Fight Authoritarian Sharp Power: New Laws Aren't Enough, Foreign Affairs, August
16, 2018. Wigell (2019) characterises this form of interference as a ‘wedge strategy’ that seeks to undermine governance. M. Wigell, Hybrid
interference as a wedge strategy: a theory of external interference in liberal democracy, International Affairs 95: 2 (2019) 255–275.
9 For example, S. Bradshaw and P.N. Howard, Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation,
Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University, 2018. P.N. Howard, B. Ganesh, D. Liotsiou, J. Kelly and C. Franciois, The IRA, Social Media
and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018, Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University, 2018. An assessment of the Internet
Research Agency’s U.S.-directed activities in 2015-2017 based on platform-provided data, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Research Summary, New Knowledge Report, December 2018.
10 In a ‘post-truth’ world, what does attribution achieve after the event when addressing social media manipulation, for example, Russia’s
Internet Research Agency (IRA) extended attacks on the United States using computational propaganda to misinform and polarize US
voters. See P.N. Howard, B. Ganesh, D. Liotsiou, J. Kelly and C. François, The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United
States, 2012-2018. Working Paper: UK Project on Computational Propaganda, Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University, 2018.
11 K. Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, March 2016.
12 J.S. Nye Jnr, How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence, Foreign Affairs,
2018. J.S. Nye Jnr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs; New Ed edition, 2005.
149
or advancement, of national and/or supranational interests. This makes it necessary

for state and supranational actors to understand the key structural characteristics of the
various information environments – a complex terrain characterised by constant contact
and continuous change, and one requiring persistent activity by protagonists in strategic
competition.13 Individuals, groups and formal organisations are increasingly interacting
in several different information environments – often simultaneously. The latter are not
defined by physical location, but by proximity to the consciousness of audiences, each
one interacting with others via both traditional and social media. We offer the following
framework, based on our analysis to date:
The Global Information Environment – a vast interplay of voices and activities, some of
which have indirect relevance to influencing a target audience.
The Strategic Information Environment – competing macro-narratives of ideas, words
and deeds, some of which have direct relevance to influencing a target audience.
The Local Information Environment – competing micro-narratives of words and deeds,
most of which have direct relevance to influencing a target audience.
The Intimate Information Environment – competing micro-narratives of words and
deeds, all of which have intimate, immediate relevance to influencing a target audience.
In the ongoing strategic competition, actors’ intentions are relatively difficult to discern,
and actions are very difficult to attribute. Hybrid tactics complicate attribution and create
dilemmas for any response.14 Effective deterrence in the virtual dimension is not defensive
or passive, but active in nature. It requires the building of a set of deterrent effects as part
of a dynamic contest, in which move and counter move may only be dimly perceived, and
often misunderstood, by those subject to their effects.15 Ambiguity and plausible deniability
are now the hallmarks of covert military operations which are synchronized with intelligence
agency-led clandestine operations to achieve strategic effects, whilst still allowing de-
escalation options and ‘off-ramps’.
We contend that to do these things within a liberal-democratic ethical and legal framework
is to exert ‘Smart Power’ in support of legitimate national or supranational interests.16
Smart Power entails the development of an integrated strategy, building alliances and global
networks to achieve strategic objectives, drawing judiciously on elements of both Hard
and Soft Power. This conception of Smart Power is consistent with that offered by Chester
Crocker: the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion and capacity building, aligned with the
projection of power and influence, which has political and social legitimacy.17 Legitimacy
rooted in an adherence to liberal-democratic norms differentiates Smart Power from
Sharp Power.
Given the centrality of the virtual dimension in this new competitive space, activities
undertaken within carefully selected information environments should increasingly be
13 R.J. Harknett, Op Cit.
14 Deterrence: The Defence Contribution, UK Joint Doctrine Note 1,19, 2019.
15 NATO defines deterrence as: The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would
outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act.
16 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America, 2007.
17 C. A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P.R. Aall, Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, United States Institute
of Peace Press, 2007.
150
a primary focus of Western security strategies. Smart Power can best be delivered through
Information Campaigning, which we define as: the operationalization of a defined Information-
led strategy via the exercise of ‘Smart Power’ in order to secure beneficial influence in pursuit
of national/supranational interests. Information Campaigning opens up a new channel for
strategic competition by seeking primacy in the contest of ideas and the battle to attract. Its
conduct therefore has profound implications for national and supranational security.
Protection and advancement of interests is at the heart of sound foreign and security policy-
making. Palmerston asserted that: ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow’18. It
follows that strategy-making should seek to promote and protect explicitly-identified interests,
encapsulated in policy which provides its ends. Only in, or on the very threshold of conflict,
should the West’s use of the military lever of power be predominant. In other circumstances,
the Diplomatic, Informational or Economic lever of DIME will be the supported one. When
a strategy has been chosen, it will be enacted via one or more campaigns, each of which will
be rooted in one of the levers of power. Given the centrality of the virtual dimension, the
Informational lever is now becoming predominant. As with military campaigning in the
physical domain, there may well be an ‘offensive premium’19 to be exploited in Information
Campaigning in the virtual one.
An Adaptive Approach
A liberal-democratic state can only undertake successful Information Campaigning by creating,
integrating and coherently developing a federation of capabilities which are typically owned and
separately exploited by different elements of the governmental enterprise. These governmental
capabilities include a set of ‘effectors’ responsible for: Diplomacy; Overseas Development Aid20;
International Trade Relations; Strategic Communication; Military Information Operations;
Active Cyber Operations and Secret Intelligence. They also include those capabilities
responsible for Homeland Security and Defensive Cyber Operations (as ‘protectors’), and
for the provision of Information Systems and Services and Science and Technology advice
(as ‘enablers’).
Credible and effective Information Campaigning requires that bespoke combinations of
these key instruments operate across multiple domains (cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum, space, sea, land and air) as part of cross-government efforts, integrated with
those of allies and partners. This integrated approach must go much wider, and deeper,
than previous initiatives (such the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’21 or the UK’s ‘Fusion
Doctrine’22). Furthermore, the challenge to state primacy is growing, as cyber and other
18 Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, speech in the House of Commons, 7th August 1844 (Hansard https://api.
parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1844/aug/07/foreign-policy-of-ministers accessed on 31st July 2019).
19 For example, Dr Philip Sabin (The Counter Air Contest, in The Dynamics of Airpower, HMSO 1996) asserts that, given the nature of the
air environment, offensive action has an inherent advantage and therefore, in principle, is more likely to lead to success in what is termed the
‘counter-air contest’.
20 The sensitivities associated with the internationally agreed objectives of Overseas Development Aid are acknowledged, but these may
nonetheless align with security objectives more often – and more seamlessly – than might at first be thought.
21 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy; European
Union, June 2016.
22 National Security Capability Review. Her Majesty’s Government, March 2018.
151
information activities can be undertaken ever more easily by non-state actors. This changes
the risk calculus for states, as it blurs the distinction they typically make between ‘home’ and
‘away’ operating spaces. In the new era of persistent engagement, states require a broader range
of tools, and both attributable and non-attributable methods with which to apply effective
pressure on adversaries below the Western military response threshold. Synchronization of
disparate activities in domain, space and time is essential in order to realise intended influence
effects. A useful capacity for Information Campaigning therefore requires pan-governmental
enterprise alignment, laterally, vertically and temporally23:
Horizontal alignment: Across each relevant governmental agency and department, including
between functional teams, to optimise strategic alignment and co-ordination of activity.
Vertical alignment: Along multiple developmental pathways to cohere strategies with
operational planning and design activities to enable the delivery of full spectrum effects.
Temporal alignment: Through active monitoring and evaluation, over time, to understand
the realisation of effects, and objectives and the nature and level of risk.
Given the dynamic nature of their security challenges and continual developments in
digital technologies, Western governments need to be robustly adaptive – technologically,
organisationally and behaviourally – in approaching capability innovation in support of
Information Campaigning.
Influence Nexus
Western states are inextricably engaged in a non-discretionary contest, one in which their core
values and interests are held at risk. Individual and collective responses to their adversaries’
use of Sharp Power have tended to be reactive, and largely defensive in nature. We have argued
that a more effective response is to exert Smart Power in support of legitimate national or
supranational interests. In their current form and by their inherent nature, Western states and
their supranational organisations exert more Soft than Hard power. However, much of their
Soft Power remains latent at the seams between their governmental institutions. Furthermore,
in response to Sharp Power approaches such as those of Russia and China, their application of
a wholly Soft Power strategy risks overmatch.
Current Western security policy paradigms should be adjusted to accommodate active
Information Campaigning within today’s dynamic competitive space: engaging multiple
target audiences whilst constraining adversaries’ freedom of manoeuvre; and changing their
risk calculus by creating a set of complimentary deterrence and compellence effects. The core
of this approach lies in carefully planned and coherently managed activities directed at an
Influence Nexus across selected target audiences, including adversaries and other actors. The
Nexus is that point within an Information Campaign design when all strategic, operational
and tactical-level activities realise a set of mutually-reinforcing behavioural outcomes across all
chosen target audiences. To affect an Influence Nexus requires the continuous conduct of an
analytical process of mapping and characterising targets of interest, combined with the active
23 At a supranational (for example, EU or NATO) level, an additional dimension of complexity obviously applies, as supranational institutional
capabilities must be confederated with Member States’ own federations.
152
monitoring and evaluation of the effects realised on them. Both these processes should drive,
and be intimately supported by, a dynamic and layered intelligence framework and architecture.
If states can acquire a capacity for effective Information Campaigning focused on an Influence
Nexus, they will gain the sophistication to use Smart Power to secure their societies without
compromising their core values.
153
154
MAPPING IRELAND’S ROLE
IN CYBER WARFARE AND
PEACEKEEPING:
Developing Policy Towards Situational
Awareness and Incident Response
Matthew G. O'Neill
Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice,Queen’s
University Belfast
Mark WIlliams
Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice,
Queen’s University Belfast
Mapping Ireland’s Role in Cyber Warfare and Peacekeeping:
Developing Policy Towards Situational Awareness and Incident Response
Introduction
This paper aims to explore how Ireland's Defence Forces and the Irish Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade can leverage their extensive experience of peacekeeping within
conflict and post-conflict societies in the context of potential future cyber conflicts. Such
an exploration is set within the context of Ireland’s collaboration within the European
initiative, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)1 and in a geo-political landscape
where cyber security threats are used as a form of diplomatic leverage.
Ireland has a strong and proud heritage of peacekeeping through the United Nations
with significant recent examples including activities in Liberia (2003), Chad (2007) and
Syria (2013). At present Ireland is involved in two major EU PESCO projects; Harbour and
Maritime Surveillance and Protection2 and the EU Training Mission Competence Centre3. Based
on its peacekeeping history and well-developed cyber sector, this research proposes Ireland
should play a leading role in the formation and development of cyber peacekeeping by also
seeking membership of the following PESCO mechanisms; the Cyber Threats and Incident
Response Information Sharing Platform4 and Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance
in Cyber Security5.
As cyber warfare becomes more prevalent it is increasingly important for peacekeeping
missions to have a cyber element to fully reflect future challenges and contexts and to ensure
a full reconstruction of post-conflict societies. It could be built upon within the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s combined approach of developing a conflict resolution
function in order to export Ireland’s own model6, based around the 4 Ps: Prevention,
Participation, Protection and Promotion7.
This proposed diplomatic model could be leveraged for other states focused on peacekeeping
while reinforcing Ireland’s leadership within this field, focusing on new initial cyber
assessment for conflict and post-conflict societies and exploring how monitoring can
contribute towards peace by identifying actions that violate ceasefire agreements, human
rights abuses and network infractions.
This model could also develop ‘new multinational strategies and institutions’ to ensure the
‘sovereignty and survival of states’8 by assessing the level of aid resources needed and the
capacity of the local IT sector to act.
1 European Deference Agency, The Permanent Structured Cooperation, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-
do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation
2 PESCO Projects, Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection (Harmspro), [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://pesco.europa.eu/
project/harbour-and-maritime-surveillance-and-protection/
3 PESCO Projects, European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC), [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://pesco.europa.
eu/project/european-union-training-mission-competence-centre/
4 PESCO Projects, Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://pesco.europa.
eu/project/cyber-threats-and-incident-response-information-sharing-platform/
5 PESCO Projects, Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security, [Accessed on 25. 07. 2019] https://pesco.
europa.eu/project/cyber-rapid-response-teams-and-mutual-assistance-in-cyber-security/
6 William A. Hazleton, ‘Look at Northern Ireland’: Lessons Best Learned at Home. In Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process, The
University of Wisconsin Press, 2013, 34 - 60
7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Speech by Tánaiste at launch of Ireland’s Third National Action Plan on Women, Peace and
Security, 21 June 2019 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/speeches-archive/2019/june/speech-by-
tanaiste-at-launch-of-irelands-third-national-action-plan-on--women-peace-and-security.php
8 Stephen Herzog, Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses, In Journal of Strategic
Security Vol. 4, No. 2, Strategic Security in the Cyber Age (Summer 2011), 49-60. [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.jstor.org/
stable/26463926?seq=10#metadata_info_tab_contents
156
Cyber Warfare and the move toward Blended Warfare

The term cyber warfare is frequently contested, with no agreed definition in international
law, with some experts claiming it does not and cannot meet any traditional definition of
warfare.9 Nevertheless there is a general consensus that cyber warfare refers to the use of
digital technology to launch an attack on the network, infrastructure, systems and/or data of
another nation to cause comparable damage, disruption or destruction as would be caused by
conventional weaponry. The Tallinn Manual10 uses the term Computer Network Operations
(CNO) to describe three types of activities comparable to cyber warfare11:
Computer Network Attack (CNA) – Operations aiming to “disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
networks themselves.”12
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – Operations aimed at collecting intelligence
and data from adversary automated information systems or networks. This is linked to and has
parallels with espionage13.
Computer Network Defence (CND) – Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyse, detect,
and respond to unauthorised activity within information systems and computer networks. And
prevention of CNA and CNE through intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and
military capabilities14.
Increasingly, cyber attacks have also been used as part of information warfare not only for
espionage purposes but also to distribute and disseminate propaganda, disinformation and
misinformation; as well as undermining democratic institutions, political processes and the
validity of the press15 16.
While a clear example of cyber warfare with specified antagonists is yet to occur – or at least
is yet to be discovered – a number of incidents have occurred that have inflicted serious
disruption to a nation’s infrastructure, suggesting they were sponsored by a nation state or
state-backed actors17. Examples of these sorts of attacks include the Titan Rain attack of 2003
and the attack on Estonia in 2007, which resulted in the West reconsidering the importance of
network security to modern military doctrine and led to the creation of NATO’s Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia18 19.
9 Thomas Rid, Cyber war will not take place. Journal of strategic studies, 2012, 35(1), 5-32.
10 The International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Cambridge University Press
11 Ziyad Hayatli, Cyber Warfare in International Law, The New Jurist, 6 December 2018, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] http://newjurist.com/cyber-
warfare-in-international-law.html
12 Ibid
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
15 Steve Ranger, Cyber war isn’t turning out quite how it was expected, In ZD Net, 18 July 2016 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.zdnet.
com/article/cyber-war-isnt-turning-out-quite-how-it-was-expected/
16 Emilio Iasiello, Cyber Strikes Do Not Equate to Cyber Warfare, In Technative, 10 July 2019 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.
technative.io/cyber-strikes-do-not-equate-to-cyber-warfare/
17 Steve Ranger, What is cyberwar? Everything you need to know about the frightening future of digital conflict, In ZD Net, 4 December 2018
[Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyberwar-a-guide-to-the-frightening-future-of-online-conflict/
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber Defence, NATO, 16. July.2018 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_78170.htm
19 Stephen Herzog, Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses, In Journal of Strategic Security
Vol. 4, No. 2, Strategic Security in the Cyber Age (Summer 2011), PP.49-60. [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.jstor.org/
stable/26463926?seq=10#metadata_info_tab_contents
157
While attribution was never fully confirmed in those two attacks, since states increasingly
find it easier to cover their tracks than do individuals involved in cyber offensives, it is
nevertheless possible based on the geopolitical situation to speculate on which aggressors might
be responsible20.
NATO’s recognition in July 2016 that cyberspace constituted a theatre of war/domain of
operations alongside air, land and sea, and the possibility that a cyber attack on a member state
if severe enough could trigger an Article 5 response, illustrates the increased reliance on digital
systems to operate and maintain most nations’ infrastructures and highlights the potential
harm a cyber attack could inflict on both an individual national ecosystem as well as the
global economy2122.
The International Strategy for Cyberspace outlined by President Obama in May 2011, further
underlined this point by stating that “all necessary means” including military operations
would be used to counter “hostile acts conducted through cyberspace”23. This move towards
a blended warfare model in which a digital attack can be met with a kinetic response was
recently illustrated by Israel’s attack on Hamas (June 2019)24 in response to a cyber attack and
the mobilisation of the US Air Force in response to the Iranian downing of a US surveillance
drone (July 2019)25.
These two events should not be seen as trivial or unique and the potential for future conflict
to be triggered by a digital attack cannot be downplayed. As the UN Secretary General,
Antonio Guterres, recently noted: “I am absolutely convinced that, differently from the
great battles of the past, which opened with a barrage of artillery or aerial bombardment,
the next war will begin with a massive cyber attack to destroy military capacity... and paralyse
basic infrastructure...” (2018)26.
While the full impact of cyber warfare is not yet fully appreciated, what is known is that cyber
related interventions will be needed to restore peace and security and assist the recovery and
rebuilding of nation states in both the physical and digital realms (Dorn, 2017)27. Peacekeeping,
therefore, will increasingly require a cyber element and Ireland can be well-placed to offer
this expertise28 29.
20 Emilio Iasiello, Cyber Strikes Do Not Equate to Cyber Warfare, In Technative, 10 July 2019 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.
technative.io/cyber-strikes-do-not-equate-to-cyber-warfare/
topics_78170.htm
22 Press Release, Exposure to cyber-attacks in the EU remains high – New ENISA Threat Landscape report analyses the latest cyber threats,
European Union Agency For Cybersecurity 28 January 2019 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/
exposure-to-cyber-attacks-in-the-eu-remains-high
23 John M. Donnelly, National security experts say America is woefully unprepared for cyber warfare, In Security Infowatch, 15 July 2019
[Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.securityinfowatch.com/cybersecurity/news/21088486/national-security-experts-say-america-is-
woefully-unprepared-for-cyber-warfare
24 Lily Hay Newman, What Israel’s Strike on Hamas Hackers Means For Cyberwar, 05 April.2019 [Accessed on25.07.2019] https://www.wired.
com/story/israel-hamas-cyberattack-air-strike-cyberwar/
25 Scott Shane, Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, ‘Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. to Its Core. In The New York
Times, 12.November, 2017 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/nsa-shadow-brokers.html
26 Report, ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2018: 15 Top Cyberthreats and Trends, January 2019, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.
enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2018
27 Walter Dorn, Cyberpeacekeeping: A New Role for the United Nations. In Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18, Issue 3 (Fall 2017).
[Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/geojaf18&div=54&?&collection=journals
28 Aleksandar Shopski, Cyber Peacekeeping Forces: the solution to a contemporary matter, In Techruption, May 2018, [Accessed on
25.07.2019] https://www.techruption.org/cyber-peacekeeping-forces-the-solution-to-a-contemporary-matter/
29 Helge Janicke, Cyber peacekeeping is integral in an era of cyberwar – here’s why, In The Conversation, 29 January 2019, [Accessed
on25.07.2019] https://theconversation.com/cyber-peacekeeping-is-integral-in-an-era-of-cyberwar-heres-why-90646
158
The European Union and Cybersecurity

The European Union's approach to cybersecurity has been one which focused internally on
setting policy and law in the direction of protecting its own internal market and combating
criminal law. With the incoming von der Leyen Administration, security and foreign affairs
matters will be at the top of the new commission’s five-year agenda. As addressed in the above
section, an emerging approach concentrating on cybersecurity techniques is being used to
develop leverage30.
The EU has already discussed plans to empower EU law enforcement agencies to respond to
cross-border cyber incidents, but the question remains, are these plans sufficient in the face
of the changing threat of cyber warfare? There will be a need to review issues within existing
legal practices and treaties that do not define specific areas of responsibility, while forming an
approach to tackling them31. Developing a cyber defence approach can no longer simply be
about protecting the internal nature of the EU but will have to move outside of the Union’s
internal borders32. Such a move will be in terms of direct cyber defences, but also - as addressed
in this paper - within the physical realm. It will be vital that EU battle groups can operate
within both these contexts33. For example, with the recent, and unusually highly reported,
cyber attack by the US on Iran, it is clear that cyber security is no longer used solely as a form
of gaining and collecting intelligence and protecting one's own information. In many respects
the use of cyber attacks has developed into a form of 21st century gunboat diplomacy34.
The EU will, within the limitations of its own Internal Digital Single Market, move towards
reform of cyber security policies with the aim of developing a holistic approach to the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework35. This however will not come without
challenges, as we have observed with the development of PESCO, which was not easy to
advance, build upon or harness. The EU’s strength as a security actor will remain its ability to
lend its sovereignty – and scale – for competence-based decision-making36.
To understand the role of Ireland within the emerging EU security framework it is important
to note the EU’s current approach to cybersecurity. This is built upon a legalistic framework
and a multi-stakeholder approach that ensures an ‘open and secure internet’37. Traditionally,
the EU has taken a bottom-up approach to the development and goal setting of its security
and of PESCO38. Despite this, different views on the concepts of Fortress Europe are useful
30 Alex Barker and Mehreen Khan, What to expect from President von der Leyen, 17 July 2019, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.ft.com/
content/f15b3e28-a818-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04
31 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention, In Philosophy and Technology, September 2018,
Vol 31, Issue 3, 379-407.
32 Council on Foreign Relations, Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms, 23 February 2018,
[Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-international-cooperation-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms
33 European Union External Action, Towards a stronger EU on security and defence, 19 November 2018, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headQuarters-homepage/35285/towards-stronger-eu-security-and-defence_en
34 Zak Doffman, Cyber Warfare Threat Rises As Iran and China Agree ‘United Front’ Against U.S., In Forbes, 6 July 2019 [Accessed on
25.07.2019] https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/06/iranian-cyber-threat-heightened-by-chinas-support-for-its-cyber-war-on-
u-s/
35 Political and Security Committee, CFSP Report – Our priorities in 2017, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
st10650_en-cfsp_report_2017.pdf
36 EU Competency Framework, EU Competency Framework for the management and implementation of the European Regional Development
Fund and the Cohesion Fund, [Accessed on 25.07.2019]
37 Anri Van der Spuy, What if we all governed the Internet? Advancing multi-stakeholder participation in Internet governance, 2017, [Accessed
on] https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000259717_eng
38 European Commission, Questions and Answers – EU Cybersecurity, 26 June 209, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_QANDA-19-3369_en.htm
159
to employ here, as within this concept Europe has become a laboratory of different security
practices, with cybersecurity no different39.
The current EU approach to designing cybersecurity policy has been one of a purely technical
nature or ‘logic of control’40. As this paper outlines, because cybersecurity will be used as a
form of diplomacy in coming decades it is vital that governments have policy and procedures
to enact in case they are in areas or conflict zones that have been affected by a diplomatic cyber
attack41.
The EU’s role on the international stage will be brought to the fore when institutions need
to be protected. With PESCO and the different strands of policy development under the new
commission it is clear that cybersecurity and cyber defence will be a key pillar for the EU to
become a ‘normative global actor’. This of course depends on whether the issues addressed in
this paper are resolved, and the EU could fully enact its potential to be a leading actor42.
A significant question within this context will be whether the EU will still be committed to an
open and free internet and making sure its citizens rights are not diminished. Within the EU,
individual members remain dominant in cybersecurity; and while Ireland still has a lot it can
learn from its neighbours, it is clear that within the emerging cybersecurity approach it has a
lot of experience to offer in how cyber warfare can affect conflict and post-conflict assistance
on the ground43.
The EU has an opportunity to be more than only a coordinator and facilitator of policies. It
could become a powerful cybersecurity actor in its own right and it is important that Ireland’s
voice is heard in this context, as it continues to support and consider its roles and responsibilities
within PESCO. The question is, will member states be able to produce an attributable response
to these pressing issues. The Defence Forces has had a distinguished history both of providing
peacekeeping missions on the ground and balancing practical diplomacy. Where it has not
yet been given the attention it rightly deserves is in the area of cyber peacekeeping within the
digital and real worlds44.
Currently small EU member states such as Belgium and Portugal are bringing together its
private, public and higher education sectors to lead on cyber defence projects under the
auspices of PESCO. Ireland could adopt a similar strategy to utilises the expertise of research
and development being carried out in Irish higher education institutions and in the private
sector to develop its cyber peacekeeping capabilities, as at present the Defence Forces currently
have minimal cyber capability.
39 European Defence Matters, PESCO: More Than Just Projects, 2019 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.eda.europa.eu/webzine/
issue15/cover-story/pesco-more-than-just-projects
40 European Union External Action, New tool to address cyber threats: the EU’s Rapid Response Force, 27.06.2018 [Accessed on 25.07.2019]
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-international-cyberspace-policy/47525/new-tool-address-cyber-threats-eus-rapid-response-force_en
41 The European Files, Guaranteeing Cybersecurity: Ambitions for a European Cyberspace, March 2019, No 57, [Accessed on 25.07.2019]
https://aioti.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Guaranteeing-Cybersecurity-Ambitions-European-Cyberspace-issue-57.pdf
42 Nathalie Tocci, Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners, CEPS, 27 May 2008, [Accessed on
25.07.2019] https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/who-normative-foreign-policy-actor-european-union-and-its-global-partners/
43 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019, [Accessed on 25.07. 2019] https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/813599/Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2019_-_Main_
Report.pdf
44 Council of the European Union, Cyber defence: Council updates policy framework, 19 November 2018, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/11/19/cyber-defence-council-updates-policy-framework/
160
Ireland's Potential Role as a Cyber Peacekeeper

The above paragraphs map out the political and structural challenges facing the Irish
Government and Defence Forces. In this section we will explore how both can take a proactive
approach in preparing Irish Peacekeepers to becoming Cyber Peacekeepers. The expertise of
Robinson, Jones, and Janicke45 can be used as a lens to frame how Ireland can fulfil this role.
Additionally, the case study of Ireland's involvement within the Colombian peace process will
be utilised to highlight how the Irish Government and Defence Forces can start mapping out a
digital course of action for strategies in aiding societies within conflict or post-conflict46.
Ireland has played an important role in aiding the Colombia peace process, offering
its model as well as being the head of the EU special delegation47. Sergio Jaramillo,
Colombia peace commissioner, stated that the “last part of renegotiation was
exhausting. It took us to the limit. But now we pass to something more difficult, which
is to change the conditions on the ground and benefit our campesinos. . . and to worry
about the security of communities’”48. Two years later in 2018 President Juan Manuel
Santos announced the foundation of the Integrated Centre for Electoral Intelligence
to ensure the integrity of future elections free from foreign and domestic interference.
President Santos addressed the issue of hacking and issue of the spreading of false
information to create a climate of apprehension and mistrust that may influence
voters and undermine a fragile peace49 50.
If Ireland is to develop a government department whose main mission is to export a post-
conflict model, it will have to consider the use of technology within societies and how its use
will affect the local population within their everyday lives.
This paper argues that the form of blended warfare that emerges from any new conflict
will inevitably have a digital element because of the very nature of globalisation. As such,
any society emerging from conflict will need corresponding peace agreements which cater
for cyber protection and reconstruction. Furthermore, this will benefit the development of
communications and infrastructure for the multi-level governance of the many strands of
former combatants, political actors and innocent parties within emerging societies. We also
must be cautious of the threat of misinformation and disinformation to the validity of any
peace accords signed and agreed. As Robinson, Jones, and Janicke stated, cyber peacekeeping
must not only preserve peace but also “assist in implementing agreements achieved by the
peacemakers.”51 Increasingly, this mission to secure hearts and minds must operate within the
digital realm.
45 Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H. and Maglaras, L., 2018. An introduction to cyber peacekeeping. Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, 114, 70-87.
46 Ibid.,70-87.
47 Press Release, ‘Colombia Peace Agreement’ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016 [Accessed on 25.07.2019], https://www.dfa.ie/
annualreport/2016/our-influence/colombia-peace-agreement/
48 Adriaan Alsema, Intelligence unit to fight ‘fake news’ and cyber-attacks in Colombia’s elections, Colombia Reports, 23 January 2018,
[Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://colombiareports.com/intelligence-unit-fight-fake-news-cyber-attacks-colombias-elections/
49 Ibid.
50 Ted Piccone, Is Colombia’s fragile peace breaking apart?, Brookings Institute, 28 March 2019, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/28/is-colombias-fragile-peace-breaking-apart/
51 Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H. and Maglaras, L., 2018. An introduction to cyber peacekeeping. Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, 114, 70-87.
161
Within the Irish Government's 4 Ps strategy: Prevention, Participation, Protection and

Promotion it will be vital that a cybersecurity element will be created, noting that whatever
the mission is within peacekeeping, the first and foremost task is always to defend and
‘preserve’ peace’52.
Key Term53 54 Definition Irish Application (4P’s)55
Adoption If cyber peacekeeping can be Participation and Promotion

demonstrated to work within the
established framework, decision Having all key groups round the table
makers are more apt to adopt it Using the domestic framework set out by
the National Cyber Security Centre
As well as current peacekeeping
frameworks
Comprehension By understanding existing doctrine, Participation and Prevention
it is more likely proposed ideas
will address issues significant to Observation, Monitoring and Reporting
peacekeeping operations. Aid socio-economic recovery
Restore State Authority
Protection and promotion of human
rights
Integration By sharing a common approach, Protection
cyber peacekeeping is flexible
enough to either operate alone or Disarmament, Demobilisation and
as part of a "boots on the ground" Reintegration
peacekeeping operation Security sector Reform
Electoral Assistance
Malware clearance / responsible
publication
Figure 1: compiled using the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare; NATO’s Cyber
Defence Principles; and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Strategy 2017-2020
As Robinson, Jones, and Janicke note, current UN peacekeeping doctrines will need to be
altered to apply to conflicts involving digital elements. To quote, "Organizations such as the
UN will find it an increasing necessity to operate in cyberspace in order to maintain peace."56
How can this be achieved and what role could Ireland play? Any cyber peacekeeping activity
will need to observe and respond to potential violations of ceasefire agreements and ensure
incidents are responded to.
52 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Statement of Strategy 2017-2020, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/
alldfawebsitemedia/aboutus/DFAT-Statement-of-Strategy-2017-2020.pdf
53 The International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Cambridge University Press
topics_78170.htm
55 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Statement of Strategy 2017-2020, [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/
alldfawebsitemedia/aboutus/DFAT-Statement-of-Strategy-2017-2020.pdf
56 Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H. and Maglaras, L., Op Cit, 70-87.
162
This task not only reflects observation, monitoring and reporting activities currently carried
out by UN Peacekeepers but also the work carried out domestically by the National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC)57. The NCSC could gain international recognition and be utilised to
undertake work securing systems and responding to incidents within an EU/UN context by
becoming a global centre of excellence that ensures the validation and continued verification
of ceasefire agreements in societies affected by cyberwarfare58 59.
Working with domestic and international partners, Ireland could ensure that risks to the
digital infrastructure of post-conflict societies are recorded and mitigated appropriately60. As
Robinson, Jones, and Janicke posit, this activity could be extended to include monitoring the
cessation of cyber attacks, maintaining a register of compromised systems, known vulnerabilities
and attacks and assisting with the reestablishment of critical systems and the dismantling of
botnets, malware etc.
Robinson, Jones, and Janicke also suggest that this activity is akin to the UN policies of
creating buffer zones and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, in which cyber
peacekeepers improve cybersecurity in areas under their control by rendering systems safe
through the dismantling of malware and holding attackers to account61. At present there is no
mechanism to gain access to international and national IT systems for these purposes.
Furthermore, Robinson, Jones and Janicke suggest that the United Nations could fund and
develop a framework in which service providers could be approached to aid in the attribution
of cyber attacks (Robinson et al, 2018). For example, this would be similar to how Interpol
currently assists member states efforts by coordinating and delivering specialised policing
services to ensure that transnational cybercrimes are combatted62.
This allows a society afflicted by digital conflict to be reintegrated into peacetime activities and
the wider global ecosystem. As such, future peacekeepers should not only improve cybersecurity
in a given area but also ensure that local capacity is developed to maintain cyber peace once
peacekeepers have left 63 64.
Ireland could be a leading voice within the EU and PESCO framework on how cyber
peacekeeping will be needed within the new era of blended warfare and how societies can
be restored following such conflict. Ireland can work towards this through its international
links and domestic institutions, while the EU should be at the heart of its development and
implementation.
The Irish Government and Defence Forces should consider being a part of the Cyber Threats
and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform and Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual
Assistance in Cyber Security. A new resolution adopted by the EU parliament on 12 March 2019
57 Mission Statement, ‘National Cyber Security Centre’, Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, 2019 [Accessed
on 25.07.2019] https://www.dccae.gov.ie/en-ie/communications/topics/Internet-Policy/cyber-security/national-cyber-security-centre/Pages/
National-Cyber-Security-Centre.aspx
58 Ibid.
59 Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H. and Maglaras, L., Op Cit,.70-87..
60 Steve Ranger, What is cyberwar? Everything you need to know about the frightening future of digital conflict, In ZD Net, 4 December 2018
[Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyberwar-a-guide-to-the-frightening-future-of-online-conflict/
61 Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H. and Maglaras, L.,Op Cit, 70-87.
62 Interpol, Our Cyber Operations, https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Cybercrime/Our-cyber-operations [Accessed on 25.07.2019]
63 TechRepublic, Cyberwar and the future of cybersecurity TechRepublic, 2018 [Accessed on 25.07.2019] https://www.techrepublic.com/
resource-library/whitepapers/special-report-cyberwar-and-the-future-of-cybersecurity-free-ebook/
64 Robinson, M., Jones, K., Janicke, H. and Maglaras, L., Op Cit, 70-87.
163
on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation (2018/2159(INI)) has not included the
threat cyber security issues present and potentially damage the preservation of peace65.
Conclusion
Based on the arguments in this paper it is vital that an EU state institution should be taking
the lead.
Furthermore, this paper posits that Ireland is in a prime position to fulfil this role based on
its experience of UN peacekeeping, its domestic digital infrastructure and its developing role
within PESCO. Based on EU requirements grounded on its foreign policy relating to conflict
and post-conflict societies, it will be vital in a world created by technology, that responses to
technological events will be required to also preserve the physical world and the societies which
will need diplomatic and military assistance.
The National Cyber Security Centre’s Computer Security Incident Response Team stated
as part of its mission to “seek international recognition... in the respective government and
national CSIRT communities so that it can effectively undertake its work on situational
awareness and incident response’. Ireland can achieve this aim because it has the mechanisms
and expertise to utilize both strategies together to realise a vision for aiding other nations who
have been through a period of cyber conflict.
This paper has proposed a concept of how this approach and international institutions can
work together. It seeks to instigate a timely discourse on cyber peacekeeping and the role
smaller nations can play. Such an approach should be integrated into The Irish Defence Force,
National Cyber Security Centre and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade working group on
Ireland's post-conflict Model.
There are clear potential benefits including transparency, ease of collaboration, information
sharing and the potential for states to contribute their cyber expertise – and experts – without
diminishing their capability at home.
65 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation
(2018/2159(INI)), [Accessed on 25.07.2019] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0158_EN.html
164
ACHIEVING “INFORMATION
SUPERIORITY” OF THE
MARITIME DOMAIN IN THE
NETWORK AGE.
Lt (NS) Steven Ryan
Security and Defence Editor, EU Institute for Security Studies
Achieving “Information Superiority” of the maritime domain in the network age.
Abstract
Naval warfare is platform centric and the 22nd century Naval Service (NS) will increasingly
rely on information and communications technology (ICT) to enable these platforms to
achieve mission success. Leveraging technology to enhance capabilities at sea and
ashore will allow this to be conducted more efficiently. The NS use of the Sitaware suite
to achieve sensor feed integration, ship-shore connectivity, and decision support, is a
small scale example of the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) in the Defence
Forces.
Introduction
Exploiting the advances in technology over time and integrating them into a C4ISR system
will allow the NS to gain full situational awareness across domains, and achieve “information
superiority” over an opponent, whether they are state or non-state actors. Ship launched
remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) will wirelessly feedback video data to operators in a
VR environment, acquire targets and enable over-the-horizon engagements, while supporting
command decisions. Copernicus satellites currently produce visual imagery and synthetic
aperture radar returns of the sea surface with access times dependent on priority. Indigenously
developed Cubesats with AIS and radar signal detection software will directly feed NS
operations and allow the NS to call upon near real time satellite data, fed through correlation
software, and then into Sitaware. Vessel wake analysis programmes will determine course and
speed of vessels who do not correlate to AIS/VMS tracks allowing NS operations to direct
interception assets.
The future NS platform will require significantly increased bandwidth to rely on the integrated
communications infrastructure and multi-sensor data fusion necessary to achieve and maintain
this “information superiority”. Maintaining this network access will involve developing defensive
capabilities in the cyber and electromagnetic domains with the resulting requirement for the
seagoing warfighter to be both sailor and network manager, necessitating the remodelling of
the Irish professional military education system.
The Need for Maritime Surveillance

Maritime security is a pressing issue for any coastal state, and the requirements of international
law to enforce both national and international legislation along this coastline and outwards
into jurisdictional waters pose a challenge for the agencies tasked with this mission. In order
to fulfil this mission, all available resources must be utilised. The modern maritime security
field is helped by an abundance of technologies across all domains and the Irish Naval Service
(NS) makes use of these when patrolling Irish waters. Due to the vast expanse of sea area it is
impossible to be in all places at once.
As a signatory to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and an
island nation, Ireland possesses a significant maritime jurisdiction relative to its land area. The
extension of the continental shelf westwards into the Atlantic gives Ireland a strong claim under
UNCLOS to extend our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) westwards to an area of over 490,000
166
square kilometres, a significant area to be managed 1. With a nine ship fleet and maintenance
and crewing requirements limiting the number of operational sea days per ship per annum,
it is vital for the NS to gain every advantage from technology to enforce jurisdictional control
of the Irish EEZ and maintain maritime situational awareness. This shift is ongoing with
the increasing use of a C4ISR suite, Symantec Sitaware, and the employment of remotely
piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) in overseas operations to expand the NS ability to conduct
maritime surveillance.
Current and Future Threats in the Maritime Domain

The contemporary security environment is vast and global. Law enforcement and state security
agencies need to utilise all available resources to combat the ever increasing threats. In terms of
the maritime security environment, the potential risks are numerous. Human trafficking, drug
and illegal goods smuggling, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing are some of
the major challenges facing maritime law enforcement agencies2. The increasing availability of
commercial off the shelf (COTS) products that would previously have been the domain of state
organisations are levelling the battlespace for non-state actors who exploit smuggling and IUU
activities at sea. A specific example would be how these actors can use numerous ways to hide
or spoof a vessels position: Global Positioning System (GPS) offsets, where the GPS receiver
software is modified to change the vessel’s position; switching off automatic identification
system (AIS); interfering with communications or communications jamming, that is blocking
or modifying the signal; or not reporting into coastal states at compulsory radio call in points3.
Vessels can use a technique known as meaconing, which is a system of receiving radio beacon
signals from NAVAIDs and rebroadcasting them on the same frequency to confuse navigation,
or mask their position4. This process can be used to rebroadcast an AIS or other identifying
signal to generate a false location for the vessel. With all the spoofing methods available to
bad actors, the one thing a ship cannot hide is its visual presence5. Once it is seen by a patrol
vessel or aircraft it can be identified, risk determined, and then the vessel can be tracked and
followed; the same concept applies to stealth vessels, a plane or ship that is “near-invisible” to
radar can still be seen with the naked eye6. Countering these threats as they evolve will require
investment in new and upcoming technologies and better connectivity between seagoing units
and shore based command.
1 Department of Housing Planning and Local Government, “Towards a Marine Spatial Plan for Ireland,” 2017, www.housing.gov.ie.
2 Christian Bueger, “What Is Maritime Security?,” Marine Policy 53 (March 1, 2015): 159–64.
3 Nina Louisa Remuss, “Space and Maritime Security-Strategies for Countering the Pirates,” Space Policy 26, no. 2 (2010): 124–25.
4 US Army, “FM 24-33 Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures,” 1990.
5 Jonathan F Solomon, “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike
Networks,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 4 (2013): 87–116, https://doi.org/10.2307/26397418.
6 Urška Kanjir, Harm Greidanus, and Krištof Oštir, “Vessel Detection and Classification from Spaceborne Optical Images: A Literature Survey,”
Remote Sensing of Environment 207 (2018): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2017.12.033.the number of studies based on optical satellite
data is quickly growing. Altogether we analysed 119 papers on optical vessel detection and classification for the period from 1978 to March
2017. We start by introducing all the existing sensor systems for vessel detection, but subsequently focus only on optical imaging satellites. The
article demonstrates the temporal development of optical satellite characteristics and connects this to the number and frequency of publications
on vessel detection. After presenting the methods used for optical imagery-based vessel detection and classification in detail, along with the
achieved detection accuracies, we also report possibilities for fusing optical data with other data sources. The studied papers show that the
most common factors greatly influencing the vessel detection accuracy are the following: different weather conditions affecting sea surface
characteristics, the quantity of clouds and haze, solar angle, and imaging sensor characteristics. All these factors bring great variations in the
selection of the most suitable method; some still continue to pose unsolved challenges. For higher relevance and wider usage, we suggest that
the algorithms for detection and classification should support a variety of targets and meteorological conditions, and ideally also a variety of
optical satellite sensors. At least, they should be tested on many images under different conditions. This is not usually the case in the existent
literature. We also observed that many authors omit an appropriate performance quantification, which is critical for a practical assessment and
a numerical comparison of the presented algorithms. Overall it can be seen that vessel monitoring from spaceborne optical images is a popular
research topic and has a great operational potential in the near future due to the large amount of satellite data, much of it free and open.
167
Advancing Current Technology Assets

Naval warfare is platform centric and the 22nd century NS will increasingly rely on information
and communications technology (ICT) to enable these platforms to achieve mission success.
Leveraging technology to enhance capabilities at sea and ashore will allow this to be conducted
more efficiently. The NS currently operations Phantom 4 Pro drones with an air time of
approximately 28 minutes and are can be operated in light weather conditions. While they
can enhance the visual detection abilities of the ship, their ‘time on-station’ limits the extent
to which they can constantly update the tactical picture. Improvements in battery capacity and
high-strength lightweight plastics will permit enhanced ‘time on-station’, thus resulting in a
future scenario where ship launched RPAS will enable over-the-horizon engagements, while
supporting command decisions for the full duration of an operation. Advancements in virtual
reality and augmented reality can integrate these video feeds into an operations room allowing
the command team to visualise the target and allow for better planning.
The European Commission’s Copernicus earth observation programme and its Sentinel
satellites currently produce high resolution visual imagery and synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
returns of the sea surface with access times dependent on priority7. These images are accessible
by partner nations and can be utilised for maritime surveillance, however due to limited satellite
paths and image processing time, by the time the image can be observed in an operational
setting it can be significantly out of date, up to several days8. Future programmes may possess a
near real time earth observation and surveillance satellite constellation over European waters,
which in conjunction with satellite AIS will allow the creation of a clear maritime situational
awareness picture9.
Satellite technology is becoming increasingly compact and accessible to smaller nations
and organisations. Ireland has the potential to be a maritime and technology research and
development hub and is well placed to progress this technology. Ireland is poised to launch its
first satellite in mid-2020. The Educational Irish Research Satellite-1 (EIRSAT-1) is a CubeSat, a
small satellite around the size of a shoebox, and will be used for educational research. However,
it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Ireland could launch its own SAR satellite in the
future, or launch a satellite as part of a European maritime surveillance satellite cluster10.
The European Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project, of which Ireland is a member, allows
rapid information sharing across seventeen European nations to share information such as
ship positions, tracks, identification data, or images11. The infrastructure is already in place
to share this information and integrating satellite imagery and radar information can add a
7 Carlos Santamaria et al., “Mass Processing of Sentinel-1 Images for Maritime Surveillance,” Remote Sensing 9, no. 7 (July 2, 2017): 678,
https://doi.org/10.3390/rs9070678.
8 Nina Louisa Remuss, “Space and Maritime Security-Strategies for Countering the Pirates,” Space Policy 26, no. 2 (2010): 124–25.
9 Iraklis Oikonomou, “‘All u Need Is Space’: Popularizing EU Space Policy,” Space Policy 41 (2017): 5–11.
10 UCD, “EIRSAT-1,” 2018, https://www.eirsat1.ie/.
11 Basil Germond and Celine Germond-Duret, “Ocean Governance and Maritime Security in a Placeful Environment: The Case of the European
Union,” Marine Policy 66 (2016): 124–31.this article proposes that ocean governance and maritime security have translated into states' and
regional organisations' increasing control over maritime spaces. This leads to a certain territorialisation of the sea, not so much from a sovereignty
and jurisdictional perspective but from a functional and normative perspective. The article starts by discussing the ways oceans have been
represented and shows that they are far from a placeless void, both in practice and in discourse. The article then frames the analysis of ocean
governance and maritime security within critical geopolitics, and elaborates on the case of the European Union's narrative and practice. It
concludes on the mutually reinforcing link between discourse and practice in the field of ocean governance and maritime security in general, and
on the consequences for the EU in particular. Scholars working on ocean governance and maritime security are encouraged to challenge the
traditional view that oceans are placeless.
168
vital confidence and certainty to the available information12. The technology to determine
ship heading and speed has been tested13 and the ability to discern vessels against backgrounds
is constantly improving14. This continuous development in satellite technology and quality is
matched by improvements in the ground based segment of the system where the analysis takes
place. Recent tests have shown a dramatic increase in the turnaround time of this information;
that is the time from the satellite taking an image to it being sent to the ground station,
analysed and interpreted, and then sent to an end user, be they military or other state agency
15
. Due to the large distances involved and the limited speed of vessels, the data need not be
available instantaneously, however, the sooner it is available, the better it can contribute to the
decision making process. The more quickly this information is made available to the end user,
the more valuable it is.
As an example, Norway is already developing and launching indigenous AIS detection and radar
detection satellites for its NorSat constellation, a geostationary maritime surveillance network
for monitoring its EEZ16. By including navigational radar which, in addition to AIS, is required
by international law, the ability to hide or falsify a vessel position will be greatly reduced, and
NorSat can help verify that ships in traffic meet those regulations. In the future Irish maritime
environment, indigenously developed Cubesats with AIS and radar signal detection software
will directly feed NS operations and allow the NS to call upon near real time satellite data, fed
through correlation software, and then into Sitaware. Vessel wake analysis programmes will
determine course and speed of vessels who do not correlate to AIS/VMS tracks allowing NS
operations to direct interception assets.
Network-Centric Warfare and the Naval Service

The NS use of the Sitaware suite to achieve sensor feed integration, ship-shore connectivity,
and decision support, is a small scale example of the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW)
in the Defence Forces. NCW aims at increasing the efficiency of the transfer of maritime
information among participating units (or nodes)17. NS elements operating as part of a Task
Group whether on counter narcotics operations or other missions need to be able to share
12 BOSILCA Ruxandra-Laura, “The Use of Satellite Technologies for Maritime Surveillance: An Overview of EU Initiatives,” Incas Bulletin 8, no.
1 (2016): 151–61.
13 Maria Daniela Graziano, Marco D’Errico, and Giancarlo Rufino, “Ship Heading and Velocity Analysis by Wake Detection in SAR Images,” Acta
Astronautica 128 (2016): 72–82.
14 Haibo Wang et al., “Detecting Ship Targets in Spaceborne Infrared Image Based on Modeling Radiation Anomalies,” Infrared Physics and
Technology 85 (2017): 141–46.
15 Kanjir, Greidanus, and Oštir, “Vessel Detection and Classification from Spaceborne Optical Images: A Literature Survey.”the number of
studies based on optical satellite data is quickly growing. Altogether we analysed 119 papers on optical vessel detection and classification for
the period from 1978 to March 2017. We start by introducing all the existing sensor systems for vessel detection, but subsequently focus only
on optical imaging satellites. The article demonstrates the temporal development of optical satellite characteristics and connects this to the
number and frequency of publications on vessel detection. After presenting the methods used for optical imagery-based vessel detection and
classification in detail, along with the achieved detection accuracies, we also report possibilities for fusing optical data with other data sources.
The studied papers show that the most common factors greatly influencing the vessel detection accuracy are the following: different weather
conditions affecting sea surface characteristics, the quantity of clouds and haze, solar angle, and imaging sensor characteristics. All these factors
bring great variations in the selection of the most suitable method; some still continue to pose unsolved challenges. For higher relevance and
wider usage, we suggest that the algorithms for detection and classification should support a variety of targets and meteorological conditions,
and ideally also a variety of optical satellite sensors. At least, they should be tested on many images under different conditions. This is not usually
the case in the existent literature. We also observed that many authors omit an appropriate performance quantification, which is critical for a
practical assessment and a numerical comparison of the presented algorithms. Overall it can be seen that vessel monitoring from spaceborne
optical images is a popular research topic and has a great operational potential in the near future due to the large amount of satellite data, much
of it free and open.
16 Norsk Romsenter, “Norway’s Satellites - Norsk Romsenter,” Norwegian Space Agency, 2018, https://www.romsenter.no/eng/Norway-in-
Space/Norway-s-Satellites.
17 Paul T Mitchell, “Small Navies and Network-Centric Warfare: Is There a Role?,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 2 (2003): 83–99.
169
target information and tracking both within the Defence Forces and with foreign military
partners. Information sharing is the backbone of modern military cooperation18.
How Information Superiority Defeats Maritime Threats

Traditionally, navies have practiced a system of decentralized C2 owing to the vast distances
involved and the difficulty of maintaining constant lines of communication. By contrast, the
modern networked and multi-domain environment create a new context within which C2 will
be practiced at sea19. Exploiting the advances in technology over time and integrating them into
a C4ISR system will allow the NS to gain full situational awareness across domains, as part of a
joint common operating picture between the Defence Forces component services, and achieve
“information superiority” over an opponent, whether they are state or non-state actors. This
is only achievable with the focused development of technological solutions and commitment
to system upgrades to maintain a competitive edge, and through cooperation with allies20.
Through PESCO, Ireland is a member of the Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance project which
aims to “enhance the Maritime Surveillance, Situational Awareness and potential Response Effectiveness
of the EU, by using the existing infrastructure, deploying assets and developing related capabilities in
the future”21. This increased cooperation helps offset the large capital expenditure required
to develop and maintain the data centres and computing technologies and ship hardware
upgrades that enable NCW.
Future Challenges
The future NS platform will require significantly increased bandwidth to rely on the integrated
communications infrastructure and multi-sensor data fusion necessary to achieve and maintain
this “information superiority”. Cybersecurity and cyber defence will be a major tenet of future
naval operations, as once the link to other units or information sharing platforms such as a
C4ISR system is cut, the ability to conduct NCW and maintain a full spectrum operational
picture dissipates22. A dedicated cyber division on board ships will be required to maintain
this network access and will be involved in the development and deployment of defensive
capabilities in the cyber and electromagnetic domains with the resulting requirement for the
seagoing warfighter to be both sailor and network manager, necessitating the remodelling of
the Irish Naval Service professional military education (PME) system. In order to maximise
the advantages granted by technological solutions, a commitment to upgrade both hardware
and software is required. The capital cost of this is one of the barriers to maintaining NCW
capability in small navy. In order for the NS to operate in a NCW environment and utilise
available technologies, a considerable investment in training will be required at all ranks, from
operator to maintainer level. This will require modifying the training environment, with the
use of augmented or virtual reality settings to facilitate training while allowing ships to remain
at sea.
18 Stephanie Hszieh et al., “Networking the Global Maritime Partnership,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 10–29.
19 Robert C Rubel, “Mission Command in a Future Naval Combat Environment,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 2 (2018): 109–21.
20 Patrick M Stillman, “Small Navies Do Have A Place in Network-Centric Warfare,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 1 (2004): 95–101.
21 “Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance | PESCO,” accessed June 30, 2019, https://pesco.europa.eu/project/upgrade-of-maritime-surveillance/.
22 Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and The Maritime Domain,” Naval War College Review 67, no. 2
(2014): 70–96.
170
Conclusion
The future NS structure will have to adapt to and exploit the increasing tactical and operational
advantages that technology provides, while developing doctrine to ensure effect use of these
systems across multiple domains. Due to the ever changing nature of NCW and fast-paced
technological developments, a robust research and development organisation will be required
to bridge the gap from trial to full implementation in the NS. The integration of these concepts
at the earliest stage of training and platform development, supported at all levels, will be crucial
in the ability to attain and maintain information superiority over an adversity.
171
172
THE DEFENCE FORCES AND
FUTURE PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
Lt Col Timothy O’Brien
OIC Planning and Capabilities Section, D Ops
The Defence Forces and Future Peace Support Operations.
Abstract
Although the grandparents of Defence Forces personnel who will serve on 22nd Century
Peace Support Operations (PSO) have yet to be born it is arguable that attempting to
predict future PSO challenges is worthwhile. Predicting the future is of course impossible
but perhaps the best way to proceed is by analysing current PSO challenges.
The Defence Forces 60-year PSO journey has taken us from the traditional peacekeeping
operations of the Cold War, through the regional peace enforcement operations of the
1990s, to today’s multidimensional crisis management operations. While the bulk of
our peacekeepers remain infantry, our response to PSO has evolved from only sending
infantry units abroad during the Cold War, to dealing with the challenges of the 1990s
onwards by using a combination of transport, military police, naval, special forces and
medical units, complemented by today’s training teams, experts in consular security
and on island stand by forces. Future PSO may see the Defence Forces having to
conduct counter insurgency operations in Africa, deal with the effects of migration and
climate change on the EU’s southern borders and assist Irish citizens worldwide on Non-
combatant Evacuation Operations.
An innovative use of our limited resources and budgets will be essential and this may, for
example, see the RDF being used to enhance our limited language capabilities and to
increase the number of female personnel we deploy, or the Naval Service and Air Corps
only procuring vessels and aircraft that can conduct joint PSO operations with the Army
and Army Ranger Wing. Members of the artillery corps currently use UAV technology on
PSO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and this is a prime example of how in the
future we will have to turn to technology to enhance our effectiveness on PSO.
Introduction
“The future security environment cannot be predicted with certainty.”1
On 24 June 2018 the Irish state marked the 60th anniversary of Defence Forces’ participation
in United Nations (UN) led or mandated Peace Support Operations (PSO) with a ceremony
in Dublin Castle attended by President Michael D. Higgins. In his address to veteran and
serving peacekeepers, President Higgins highlighted how over six decades nearly 66,700
individual members of the Defence Forces had served in peace support missions in Europe,
Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America and how this participation marked a tangible
demonstration of Ireland’s commitment to the pursuit of international peace2. This paper will
use that anniversary, which shone a light on the demanding PSO conducted by the Defence
Forces from the second half of the 20th century onwards, as a platform to consider what PSO
challenges future generations of the Defence Forces may face and what role innovation, and in
particular innovation in military education, future structures of the army and the role of the
Reserve Defence Forces (RDF), is likely to play in determining how they will plan, train for and
execute PSO.
1 Irish Government White Paper on Defence, (2015).

2 ‘Address on 60 Years of Peacekeeping, Dublin Castle, 24 June 2018’, President of Ireland. Last modified June 20, 2019. https://president.ie/
en/media-library/speeches/address-on-60-years-of-peacekeeping
174
An uncertain future global environment

The roles of the Defence Forces, including their participation on PSO, are determined by
government policy. The 2015 White Paper on Defence, which outlines Ireland’s current
defence policy, describes an uncertain security environment facing the state, encompassing
several overarching trends which are likely to have implications for the Defence Forces in the
years ahead. These include the evolving nature of conflict to what is commonly characterised
as hybrid warfare, the proliferation of weapons, the potential vulnerability of Ireland’s sea
transport routes, climate change, large scale illegal migration, energy and resource security,
cyber-attacks, terrorism, transnational organised crime and what are described as unknown
future threats or strategic shocks3. Preceding the White Paper by a matter of months the
government also published its first review of foreign policy priorities since 2006 and this
document bore witness to shifting patterns of global power and influence, conflicts, wars and
terrorism, as well as new technologies facilitating instantaneous worldwide communication and
a growing interdependence between economies, societies and people.4 All of these highlighted
concerns offer some food for thought in the years ahead for Defence Forces staff planning
either capability development, future training requirements or equipment procurement.
Analysing the past to help predict future challenges

While the above concerns can serve as guides to anticipating potential tasks the Defence Forces
may have to respond to as part of future PSO, this paper suggests that to speculate with any
reasonable authority on future challenges it is also helpful to analyse and understand how
throughout the last 60 years, but especially since the ending of the Cold War, Defence Forces
involvement in PSO has seen constant change, unexpected challenges and a diversity of roles,
all phenomena which there is no reason to believe will not continue into the coming decades.
The Defence Forces have participated in UN peacekeeping operations since 1958, when Ireland
was asked urgently to deploy officers as part of an observation force to Lebanon, as a result
of a deteriorating security situation resulting from that country’s dispute with neighbouring
Syria. The first of the Irish military observers deployed on 28 June 1958, only five days after
the UN’s request5. During the thirty years following that deployment, members of the Defence
Forces took part in a myriad of what are now labelled traditional UN peacekeeping operations.
These were of two types: either lightly armed infantry units deployed to separate warring
parties in areas of operation as diverse as Congo, Cyprus, Sinai and from 1978 onwards, once
again in Lebanon, or unarmed military observers sent to conflict zones worldwide including
Afghanistan, Central America, the Middle East, Namibia, the Indian Pakistan border, Iran
and Iraq6.
3 Department of Defence. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Defence Forces, 2015.

4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Global Island. Ireland’s Foreign Policy for a Changing World. Dublin, 2015.
5 Heaslip, Richard. “Ireland’s First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment.” Defence Forces Review 5
(2008):12
6 For an overview of the original or traditional peacekeeping operations see: Harbottle, Michael. The Blue Berets – The Story of The United
Nations Peacekeeping Forces. London: Leo Cooper, 1975 and Smith, Raymond. Under the Blue Flag, Dublin: Aherlow Publishers, 1980.
175
Contemporary PSO
However, in the early 1990s, it became apparent to both the UN and the international
community, especially following the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, that the traditional
model of peacekeeping that had served the organisation during the Cold War was no longer
effective. Traditional peacekeeping operations were insufficient to deal with post-Cold War
intra state conflict, where civilians rather than armed forces were deliberately targeted by armed
groups conducting asymmetrical warfare.7 These challenges required a new type of peacekeeping
response and the UN reacted by gradually expanding its field operations from the traditional
model, to today’s complex multi-dimensional operations which are designed to ensure the
implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for
sustainable peace8. Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations,
there are now many faces to modern peacekeeping including police officers and a range of
civilians such as legal experts, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs officers,
gender advisors and governance specialists.9 The Security Council mandates authorising these
PSO have also changed and today 95% of all UN mandated peacekeepers are on missions
where their priority tasking is no longer to monitor ceasefires or separate belligerents but rather
the protection of civilians10. In 2019 Defence Forces personnel operate under such protection
mandates in Lebanon, Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.11 The requirement
to protect civilians is likely to continue well into the future as despite having been a mandated
task for all new missions established since 1999 there are still thousands of civilians killed in
armed conflict each year worldwide12.
Examples of previous innovative PSO responses

While the term innovation might not necessarily have been used by the organisation in the early
1990s to describe how it was responding to the significant peacekeeping challenges outlined
above, with the benefit of hindsight innovative responses can be traced to 1991 when Defence
Forces personnel deployed on the organisation’s first non-UN led peacekeeping operation.
That was to the European Community’s Monitoring Mission to the former Yugoslavia13. Over
the next three decades the Defence Forces would continuously adapt to the demands of a
variety of UN, EU and NATO-led PSO, by establishing, training and deploying a diverse range
of units compiled of personnel with different skill sets to those of their Cold War predecessors.
Since the end of the Cold War the Defence Forces have successfully deployed quick reaction
forces as well as military police, transport, special forces and naval units on PSO, while the
light infantry battalions of the Cold War have been replaced by mechanised equivalents
which have significantly greater force protection, fire power, mobility and communications.
Smaller specialist contingents such as training, liaison and medical teams have also deployed
7 For an example of such a conflict see Jean-Pierre Lacroix, “Peace, progress and potential: The legacy of UN Peacekeeping in Liberia, Côte
d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, UN Peacekeeping, July 19, 2018, https://medium.com/unpeacekeeping/peace-progress-and-potential-the-legacy-of-un-
peacekeeping-in-liberia-c%C3%B4te-divoire-and-sierra-696ef83cb165.
8 For the background and rationale to this shift see Durch, William J., Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and
Moira K. Shanahan. The Brahimi Report and the Future of the UN Peace Operations. Henri L. Stimson Center,2003.
9 Peace Operations Training Institute. Protection of Civilians, by Julian Harston, Williamsburg. 2016, 19-20.
10 For details see “United Nations Peacekeeping.” United Nations. Last modified June 29, 2019. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protecting-
civilians
11 On 20 June 2019 Dáil Éireann approved the deployment of Defence Forces personnel to a third mission with a protection of civilian’s
mandate. This was for the UN Mission in Mali. See Marie O’Halloran, ‘Army Rangers set for Mali mission’, Irish Times, 21 June 2019.
12 For details of worldwide civilian casualties in 2017 see United Nations. Security Council. Report of the Secretary General on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict. New York.14 May 2018.
13 Daly, John. “Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia”, An Cosantóir 51, No. 7(1991): 2.
176
as have experts in remotely piloted aircraft systems and disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration. The Defence Forces now also deploy specialist personnel, on request from the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to Irish embassies worldwide to assist consular staff,
normally during periods of heightened security or crisis management and since 2007 they have
also participated in the EU’s Battlegroups14.
The potential face of future PSO

In the current decade the Defence Forces have engaged in several new types of PSO that give
hints of the potential taskings that the coming decades might bring. The following four types
of operation are examples:
Training Teams
In 2010 a military training team was deployed abroad for the first time as part of the EU
Training Mission to Somalia. Its task was to train the emerging post-civil war Somalian national
army. A similar team has been deployed to Mali since 2013 and in 2018, again for the first time,
the Defence Forces deployed a UN requested mobile training and education team to Burkino
Faso to assist that country’s army’s PSO pre deployment training for the UN Mission in Mali.15
Therefore, this paper suggests that training post conflict militaries to international standards
as well as assisting non-western militaries to operate in a PSO environment will become a
significant role for the Defence Forces in the coming decades. It is perhaps worth noting from
a planning perspective the importance that our nearest neighbours, the British Army, have
given to such training operations. Their infantry corps has been restructured to create four
specialised units which contribute to the United Kingdom’s overseas defence engagement, by
deploying a series of 12-man teams, each consisting of highly qualified soldiers, to train, advise,
assist and mentor foreign militaries.16
Non-combatant evacuation
In 2011 the non-combatant evacuation of Irish citizens from Libya17 saw the Air Corps deploy
fixed wing aircraft abroad for the first time in a crisis management role. While that was a
relatively small scale operation, larger evacuation operations involving Irish or indeed EU
citizens would require an innovate use of limited Defence Forces resources in the coming years
to procure appropriate vessels, vehicles and aircraft as well as training that would facilitate
combined naval, air, land and special forces personnel that such off island operations may
demand. Defence Forces planners considering the potential likelihood of such operations in
the coming years, will have taken note of the 2019 decision of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, to tender for the first time to procure the services of a global security company to
provide it with worldwide security advice and assistance including evacuation at short notice
for its officers and their eligible dependents. Media reports concerning this tender noted that
14 For an overview of these operations see O’Brien, Timothy. “The Origins and Evolution of Defence Forces Peacekeeping”, An Cosantóir 78,
No. 5(2018): 12-14.
15 Ibid., 12-14.
16 For examples of these types of training missions see https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/africa/
17 For details of the successful evacuation of 115 Irish nationals and family members from Libya see https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-
releases/press-release-archive/2011/march/successful-evacuation-irish-citizens-from-libya/-taoiseach-praises-successful-evacuation-of-irish-
citizens-from-libya.php and Lally, Conor. “BBC interview may have made Smith’s bid to get home more difficult”, Irish Times, July 6, 2019:2.
177
Irish diplomatic staff currently operate in several regions with a recent history of instability
including Sierra Leone, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria and the Central African Republic.18
Naval Operations
In May 2015 there was a momentous occasion for the Defence Forces, arguably of equal
significance to the army’s 1960 deployment to Congo, when the Naval flagship LÉ Eithne
deployed to the Mediterranean to take part in, what were initially bilateral migrant rescue
operations with the Italian navy, before the government subsequently approved follow on naval
vessels to participate in the EU’s naval force in the Mediterranean19. Naval vessels continued
to deploy as part of that force until 2018 and this paper suggests that similar deployments are
likely to occur in the coming years as Naval Vessels form part of multinational UN, EU or
NATO-led maritime task forces.
Crisis Management Operations

In the same year Sierra Leone was almost overwhelmed by an outbreak of the Ebola virus in
West Africa. The Defence Forces, on government direction for the first time, rather than at
the request of an international organisation such as the UN or EU, deployed medical teams to
assist in a British Army operation to counter the virus while simultaneously teams of logistics,
engineering and security specialists reinforced the consular staff manning the Irish Embassy
in Freetown20. Again, this paper suggests that similar operations, deploying the skill sets of
specialists within the Defence Forces, will be a feature of future PSO.
PSO Professional Military Education

Within the Defence Forces the Military College is the principle institution responsible for the
provision of training and doctrine to the organisation21. In 1993, as the Defence Forces faced
the significant challenges, outlined above, resulting from the post-Cold War transformation
of PSO, the first major change to the structure of the Military College since the early 1930s
occurred when a new school was established to specialise in PSO pre-deployment training22.
Twenty six years later the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI) remains the
location where both Defence Forces and foreign military personnel are educated to, amongst
other things, understand how to protect civilians, and how, as military, they have to recognise
and overcome the challenges posed by the necessity to work with civilian and police actors from
a variety of different cultural backgrounds on complex multi-dimensional operations23.
During 2018 two educational innovations occurred in the Military College which will benefit
future contingents of Defence Forces personnel deployed on PSO.
The Joint Command and Staff Course

The introduction by the Command and Staff School of a new joint Command and Staff course
will prepare the next generation of senior officers for PSO deployments while simultaneously
18 Gallagher, Conor. ‘Irish Diplomatic staff to get armed security’, Irish Times, 31 August 2019.
19 For an overview of these naval operations conducted see “Mission of Mercy”, Signal 13, No.2 (2015): 19-23.
20 Byrne, Karl. “Tackling Ebola”, An Cosantóir 75, No. 2 (2015): 12-13.
21 “The Military College.” Irish Defence Forces. Last modified June 30, 2019. https://military.ie/en/who-we-are/army/defence-forces-training-
centre/the-military-college/
22 Hodson, Tom. The College -The Irish Military College 1930-2000. Dublin: The History Press Ireland, 2016.
23 For information on courses run in the school see UNTSI. UNTSI Course Prospectus 2019, Dublin, Defence Forces Printing Press, 2018.
178
developing their understanding of single service, joint, combined and multi-agency operations.
Given the overarching trends highlighted in the 2015 White Paper on Defence, the new
course’s training objectives include helping students to develop a comprehensive grasp of
strategy, security, communications and defence in political, international and financial
contexts. Graduates will have an enhanced understanding of the national and international
context within which the Defence Forces operate, covering policy and strategy, diplomacy,
politics, economics and military technological trends24.
Security Sector Reform

A new PSO training initiative was also introduced by UNTSI during 2018. This was the
first Security Sector Reform course to be run in the Defence Forces. This course formalised
education within the organisation on the emerging topic of human security, while also giving
students a comprehensive understanding of the more traditional state centric concept of the
term. An understanding of human security will be essential on all future PSO undertaken by
the Defence Forces as human security encompasses the important PSO cross cutting thematic
issues of human rights, good governance, the protection of civilians, the gender perspective and
the access by a population to basic services25.
Planned innovation in military education

At the time of writing the Defence Forces are planning further innovative educational responses
to help future peacekeepers face what are yet unknown challenges. A new strategic leadership
course is being developed to cater for the educational needs of senior officers holding the rank
of Colonel or equivalent26, while a joint military and Department of Defence steering group are
working with civilian consultants to evaluate the potential of a new Institute for Peace Support
and Leadership Training. The latter initiative has its genesis in the 2015 White Paper on
Defence which foresees such an Institute having an international standing while contributing
to the overall development of knowledge and experience in the areas of peace support and
conflict resolution. If developed, the White Paper foresaw the Institute building on and forging
new educational partnerships with the world’s leading universities while developing strategic
partnerships with other appropriate organisations, including industry27.
Other potential innovations to support future PSO

Education is not the only area where innovation can be employed to prepare members of the
Defence Forces for the unpredictable PSO challenges that the future may hold. Two other
suggested areas are:
Future Defence Forces Structures
This paper has noted how the British Army has restructured several of its infantry battalions
so that they have the appropriate personnel resources to be able to conduct continuous train,
advise, assist and mentor missions, primarily on the African continent. While within the
24 ‘The Military College Delivery of Professional Military Education’, PowerPoint Presentation delivered in Military College on March 11, 2019 to
visiting New Zealand Armed Forces Delegation.
25 The International Security Sector Advisory Team. SSR in a Nutshell, Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform, Geneva,
2016,1-13.
26 ‘The Military College Delivery of Professional Military Education’, Op CIt.
179
Defence Forces both the army and the naval service have a proven record of operating in a
multinational environment, with the UN since 1958, the EU since 1991 and NATO since 1997,
since the establishment in 1960 of the very first unit to serve overseas in the Congo, the army
has, with minor exceptions28, always chosen to establish new units to deploy overseas29. These
units train, deploy and are then disestablished as soon as they return home. In many cases these
units often bear no resemblance to those existing in the current Defence Forces structure. PSO
units currently deployed by the army in Lebanon and Syria are in effect mechanised infantry
heavy, all arms battlegroups30, but such units do not exist in the army’s established organisation.
What this means in effect is that for each deployment of a unit overseas, commanders and
staff officers throughout the army must expend considerable effort in establishing these units,
normally by bringing together soldiers from a disparate number of units and locations. This is
arguably an inefficient way to conduct force generation for PSO and this paper suggests that
an important future innovation will be to restructure the army so that its units are equipped to
conduct PSO, without extensive outside assistance.
The role of reservists

Members of the RDF have never served on PSO and the 2015 White Paper on Defence
makes no reference to reservists deploying on PSO in the future. This is government policy31.
However, looking forward to the coming decades, there is no reason why an organisation as
small as the Defence Forces would not utilise the skill sets of individual members of the reserve
to complement the permanent Defence Forces on PSO. On 13 July 2018, acknowledging the
growing importance that the reserve plays in the organisation, the Chief of Staff announced
that the army’s Director of Combat Support and ISTAR would in future be also tasked with
overseeing the RDF32. Commenting on his new role in September 2018 the new Director with
responsibility for Reserve Forces stated that he was working to harness RDF skills and talent to
maximise their development in the areas of training and operations.33This paper suggest that
the organisation, as is currently the case with its EU counterparts, will not be able to ignore
the skill sets and talents of the reserve in the coming decades when selecting personnel to serve
on PSO and that it would be an innovative decision by government to change their policy on
this matter.
Conclusion
On 28 June 2019, the 61st anniversary of the first PSO deployment, there were 676 members of
the Defence Forces serving on UN, EU, OSCE and NATO led operations. They were deployed
as mechanised infantry units in Lebanon and Syria, as military observers in Western Sahara
and in the Middle East, as training teams in Mali and as land and maritime headquarter
28 The deployment of the ARW to Liberia and Chad, as well as the deployment of ARW and Infantry Battalion personnel as part of a New
Zealand Battlegroup to East Timor.
29 This approach has its origins in the 1960 decision of the then Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Sean McEoin to task each of the army’s Commands
to provide an infantry company for 32nd Infantry Battalion. Speaking in 1995 Lt Gen McEoin stated that this was “the easiest possible way” to
establish an overseas unit given the time constraints involved. In 1978 as the 43rd Infantry Battalion was being established to deploy to Lebanon,
DFHQ planners considered “the possibility of making a break with the past and sending out an existing battalion, or at least basing the unit on
an existing battalion”. This possibility was however disregarded as being impractical for a diverse, but unrecorded set of reasons. See E.D Doyle,
“The Beginning of UNIFIL”, An Cosantóir, 48 (10), October 1998,8.
30 A battlegroup, in the Defence Forces context, would consist of a combined arms battalion, reinforced with combat support and combat
service support elements
32 Fitzgerald, Wayne. “The Reserve Defence Forces Supporting the Front Line”, An Cosantóir 78, No. 7 (2018): 13.
33 Cleary, Brian. “Director with Responsibility for Reserve Forces”, Connect 22, No.3 (2018):1
180
staff throughout Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Balkans. At home, 152
soldiers were preparing to commence training for a German army led EU battlegroup,34 while
members of the Army Ranger Wing were preparing to deploy to the UN PSO in Mali35. The
ability of the Defence Forces to conduct such a diverse range of operations is a function of their
training, leadership and equipment. Additionally, this paper has demonstrated how the current
generation of peacekeepers have innovatively built on the experience of their predecessors
in responding to the demands of contemporary PSO. The paper has also highlighted how
educational initiatives in the organisation are preparing the next generation of peacekeepers to
deal with whatever challenges the future holds. Finally, in the spirit of innovation, the author
has suggested some changes to the army’s structure and to government policy on the RDF
which would potentially enhance the ability of the Defence Forces to conduct PSO in the lead
up to the 22nd century.
34 O’Halloran, Marie. ‘Dáil to debate Army’s EU role’, Irish Times,25 June 2019.
35 O’Halloran, Marie. ‘Army Rangers set for Mali mission’, Irish Times,21 June 2019.
181
182
MEETING MULTIPLE THREATS
IN AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Wesley Bourke
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), The Irish Military Heritage Foundation
Meeting multiple threats in an Uncertain Future
Abstract
A new chapter in world history has opened filled with uncertainty. The defence and
security environment have never been more obscure. China, Iran and Russia – are
increasingly asserting themselves on the world stage; geopolitics is back.1 A further
challenge are Non-State Armed Group – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or trams-
national drug traffickers for example – whose presence and impacts have destabilising
effects regionally and globally. The use of hybrid threats - a combination of low risk
activities including the use of organised crime, cyber-attacks, and information disruption
– is becoming commonplace. The above challenges generally take place in a space
regarded as the ‘gray zone’ resulting in strategic disruption rather than all-out war.
The challenges posed from the broader security spectrum - climate change, food
security, bad governance for example – have risen substantially. They not only directly
challenge a state’s ability to provide for its people, but can become threat multipliers by
interacting and converging with other existing risks and pressures thus increasing the
risk of fragility or violent conflict.
In an era where traditional distinctions between defence and security are becoming
increasingly blurred, what approach a state should take to meet the uncertainties of the
21st century is a prevailing question. In order to predict, prevent, and manage these
challenges this paper promotes a holistic intergovernmental approach at an international
level, mirrored with a whole-of-government approach at a national level. Such an
approach will maximise all available resources to meet challenges head on.
Introduction – the Post-Cold War

Reacting to regional and international challenges in the 1990s and early 2000s – intrastate
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 for example – it was realised
no single state could tackle the changing security environment.2 Relationships formed within
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs); the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
will be used as examples for this paper.3 Cold War territorial collective-defence was put aside for
security challenges such as: world governance, humanitarian relief, and peace-building. Each
with its own unique skillset, a comprehensive holistic approach involving political, civilian and
military instruments devolved.4 It became understood that the broadening security challenge
were complex affecting every facet of a state; political, security, economic and social; failure
in one risk failure in all.5 Through crisis-management mechanisms such as the EU’s External
Action Service (EEAS) frameworks developed ranging from: ‘counter-terrorism to governance,
conflict prevention and peacebuilding, trade promotion or development co-operation’.6
1 In this paper China refers to the People's Republic of China; Iran refers to Islamic Republic of Iran; Russia refers to the Russian Federation.
2 European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003)
3 Ugo Caruso, “Interplay between the Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO,” (Bolzano: EURAC Research, 2007)
4 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Lisbon Summit Declaration (Brussels: NATO, 2010).
url: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm
retrieved on 29 May, 2019.
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (Paris: OECD, 2007),
Principle No. 5.
6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile
States (Paris: OECD, 2008), 9.
184
Over the last decade, the security spectrum has shifted again causing the international
community to take note. The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy noted: ‘To the East, the European
security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the
Middle East, as well as Europe itself’.7 The strategy identified five broad security priorities that
endanger the EU’s future: ‘terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and
energy insecurity endanger our people and territory’.8 The strategy further outlines the need
for further integration with partners to predict, prevent, and manage conflicts and crises.9
The updated framework provides for the ‘integration of environment into security, paving
the way towards a more holistic approach and interaction between the foreign, security and
defence’ spheres.10
The UN is still the optimal organisation when it comes to international law, peacekeeping,
monitoring, mediation and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. It is complemented
and supported by other IGOs including the EU. NATO has adopted a strategy of ‘projecting
stability’ in which the ‘alliance helps to project stability in many different ways – including
through its operations, by training partner countries’ armed forces, and through political
engagement and dialogue’.11 The OSCE specialises within the fields of early warning, conflict
prevention, crisis- management and post-conflict rehabilitation. 12
A New Chapter – the balance of power

The United States (U.S.) sheer cultural, economic and military power seems unmatchable in
the coming century,13 This unipolar hegemony has allowed many states to reduce their defence
spending, in turn geopolitics moved away from territory and military power towards world
order, global governance, and the broader concept of human security.14 However, the west
fell into a false sense of security. Known as revisionist states - China, Iran, and Russia – never
bought into the geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War; they were unable to do little
if anything about it in their declined state. Today the world is witness to a shift in geopolitics
in a way that has elevated the risk of major international crisis. The revisionist states wish to
restructure the current international status quo and put in place a system more sympathetic to
them; a system that reflects their interests. While U.S. hegemony continues, its commitment
to providing defence and security for its allies is faltering; making the continuation of the wests
counterbalancing economic and military IGOs – the EU and NATO – all that more critical. 15
The revisionist states are a long way off matching the west in economic or military power. There
is no doubt they are regional powers; China and Russia with a global projection. Primarily in
reaction to western sanctions these latter actors have grown closer to the point of not trading in
7 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy (Brussels: European Union, 2016), 13.
8 Ibid, 19.
9 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 28-32
10 Kettunen, Noome and Nyman, Think 2030: Reinforcing Environmental Dimensions of European Foreign and Security Policy, 5.
11 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2018 (Brussels: 2019), 64.
12 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Berlin Declaration - OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (Berlin: OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly, 2018)
13 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 42.
14 Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics,” Foreign affairs, Vol. 93, No. 3 (2014): 69–79.
15 Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2018)
185
U.S. dollars 16 Through their own IGOs - Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union – China and Russia are
building regional economic and military partnerships. In 2013 China launched a global
development strategy; One Belt, One Road (renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)); a
global network of land and maritime silk roads with an aim to invest in infrastructure in 152
countries and international organisations. The BRI has been described as a reincarnation of
China’s Tribute system, while growing China’s economic power it is winning allies through
soft power attributes such influence, investment and trade.17
Over the past decade confrontations with the revisionist states have taken place in a space
referred to as the ‘gray zone’. These activities are not formal wars and do not resemble traditional
state on state conflicts; strategic disruption is generally the result. While some aggression or
use of force is used, ambiguity about the ultimate objective is a defining feature.18 This results
in the international community or the recipient state unsure how to respond. During Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 the U.S. and the EU could do little. Grygiel and Mitchel have
put forward that the western powers have an extensive ‘periphery or frontier problem that
invites probing’.19 Rather than directly challenging the west, the revisionist states are making
probing actions along areas of weakness. To the international community these ‘probes’ at
times can seem like minor infractions. The revisionist state then uses the failure of the west to
react to its political advantage.20
The use of Non-State-Armed-Groups (NSAGs) and hybrid threats are two common characteristics
of the ‘gray zone’ and probes. NSAGs - extremist groups, warlord led militias, organised crime
networks – at times with their own proto-states or fiefdoms such as Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, operate outside the realms of state governance. They can be used by or supported by
states to carry out proxy or third-party activities. 21 NSAGs are a threat multiplier exasperating
security issues including poverty, migration, human rights.
Hybrid threats are used by states and NSAGs to exploit an adversary’s vulnerabilities. There
are many definitions of hybrid threats. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering
Hybrid Threats best characteristics the unique attributes: a wide range of low risk and
ambiguous methods and activities including: ‘influencing information; logistical weaknesses,
[e.g. targeting] energy supply pipelines; economic and trade-related blackmail; undermining
international institutions by rendering rules ineffective; terrorism or increasing insecurity’.22
Ambiguity can be further exploited with the use of third parties such as non-combatants in
the carrying out of cyberattacks. For the most part NSAGs and hybrid threats cause strategic
disruption rather than direct conflict.
‘Gray zone’ or ‘probe’ activities are not unique to the 21st century, many have reflections of
the Cold War. Since 2014 Russia has continued to influence destabilising activities in eastern
16 “Russia, China to sign agreement on payments in national currencies, says decree,” TASS Russian News Agency, (5 June, 2019)
url: https://tass.com/economy/1061848 Retrieved: 1 September 2019.
17 Md. Nazrul Islam (ed), Silk Road to Belt Road: Reinventing the Past and Shaping the Future (Singapore: Springer, 2019); R. James
Ferguson, Rosita Dellios, The Politics and Philosophy of Chinese Power: The Timeless and the Timely (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2016)
18 Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” PRISM Vol. 7 no. 4, (2018): 30–47.
19 Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchel, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power (Princeton:
Princeton University Press), 52.
20 Ibid, 64-66.
21 C. Hofmann and U. Schneckener, “Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State- and Peace-building: Options
and Strategies,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, no. 883 (2011): 2-3.
22 The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. url: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/ retrieved: 5 September 2019.
186
Ukraine and has deployed military assets in support of the Assad regime in Syria; with some in
the west seeing it as a proxy war. Iran has repeatedly tested the wests resolve by using Hezbollah
as a proxy to antagonise Israel; the continuing slow-motion nuclear proliferation crisis;
continuing threats to oil supplies; challenging movement in the Arabian Sea; and support
for the Houthis in Yemen. China’s aggressive territorial claims and island militarisation in
South East Asia is some ten years old. The west’s limited response in many of these cases
has resulted in allies in the Baltic and South East Asia questioning if they will be protected if
directly attacked.23
While these actors may be ‘light years away from creating an anti-Western alliance,’ their IGOs
and their growing global influence is providing an incentive for states ‘to seek to strengthen the
cooperation with like-minded states within IGOs,’ whilst still providing a rules-based-system.24
Both Serbia and Turkey – a NATO member – have sought such cooperation for example.
Robert Kagan has put forward a long-cycles-of-history hypothesis. He argues that it is only a
question of time before former powers re-emerge.25 More recently Margaret MacMillan’s essay
‘The Rhyme of History: Lessons of the Great War’ makes the analogy between 1914 and 2014
making the point that geo-politics is back.26 It is unlikely these actors seek an all-out war.
Their activities would indicate geopolitical jousting will be confined to the ‘gray zone’ for the
foreseeable future.
A New Chapter - Climate Change

In recent years climate change has come to the fore of international and national attention
and is just one example of the complex challenges faced today. Extreme climate events can
have short, medium and long-term effects on a state’s economic, political and social stability.
For some states or societies climate change can be the principal risk they face; for example,
island states/societies are threatened by sea-level rise.27 Prolonged or recurrent climate
extremes lead to: ‘diminished coping capacity, loss of livelihoods, distress migration and
destitution’.28 Furthermore, climate-related disasters create and sustain ‘poverty, contributing
to increased food insecurity and malnutrition as well as current and future vulnerability to
climate extremes’.29
The links between climate change and conflict are not simple or linear. Climate change’s
increasing impacts do not automatically lead to more fragility and or conflict; rather it acts as
a threat multiplier. As such the impacts of climate change interact and converge with existing
risks and pressures in a given context and ‘can increase the likelihood of fragility or violent
conflict. States already experiencing fragility or conflict are particularly affected’.30 Climate
23 Gustav Gressel, “After Crimea: Does NATO have the means to defend Europe?” Commentary, The European Council on Foreign Relations,
(2 April, 2019). url: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_after_crimea_does_nato_have_the_means_to_defend_europe retrieved: 5
September, 2019.
24 Kenneth Rapoza, “Russia And China Only Look Like They Are Becoming Buddies. It’s Mostly Talk,” Forbes, (5 June, 2019) url: https://www.
forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/06/05/russia-and-china-only-look-like-they-are-becoming-buddies-its-mostly-talk/#1e0b874f64ed retrieved:
5 September, 2019.
25 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Vintage Books, 2009).
26 Margaret MacMillan, “The Rhyme of History: Lessons of the Great War,” Brookings Institution (2013)
url: http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2013/rhyme-of-history.html retrieved: 10 June, 2019.
27 Malin Mobjörk (et al), Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach (Stockholm: SIPRI, Oct. 2016). 14-16.
28 The State of Food Security and Nutrition around the World: building climate resilience for food security and nutrition (Rome: Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018), 79.
29 Ibid.
30 Report, Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate Analysing the Links Between Climate Change and Non-State Armed
Groups (Berlin: Climate Diplomacy, October 2016), 8.
187
security bridges chronic climate-related risks with human security such as famine, disease and
rights violations. Climate security and its exasperation of as a threat multiplier is understood
by states. 31 Internationally United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, António Guterres, warned
in 2016: ‘Many conflicts are triggered, exacerbated or prolonged by competition over scarce
natural resources; climate change will only make the situation worse’.32 As an example of the
effects of climate change can be shown in Lake Chad which has shrunk by 90% in 40 years. The
calamity has exacerbated existing inequalities, poverty and political instability; in turn leading
to violent conflict and population displacement. With abundant food and water shortages,
seven million people are suffering and two million displaced. The region became a breeding
ground for NSAGs Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa.33
With a global population that could grow to around 8.5 billion in 2030, 9.7 billion in 2050,
and 10.9 billion in 2100., the increased stresses put on the world’s resources by climate change
is extreme.34 Building the capacity for IGOs and states to manage stress, and ultimately prevent
risks, emerging from climate change is vital.35
Meeting the Challenge – the Intergovernmental Approach

To meet the challenges of the 21st century requires a comprehensive holistic approach – as
outlined in the introduction – achieved by deeper intergovernmental cooperation and mirrored
by a robust whole-of-government approach at a national level. Rather than taking an aggressive
stance against revisionist state that could trigger a Cold War, such an approach will ensure
fragile and vulnerable states will remain stable, while at the same time the broader security
challenges can be met. This section will discuss the intergovernmental approach.
Securing fragile states and meeting the complex challenges can be shown in the complementary
relationship between the EU, NATO, OSCE – in support of the UN; example missions in
Kosovo, Armenia, and Mali will be used.36 Since 1999, NATO has been leading a peace-support
operation in Kosovo.37 Through its stabilisation efforts it has allowed other organisations
to undertake diplomatic, judiciary, and development. The EU rule of law mission and the
political work by the EU Delegation and Special Representative, the EU supports the UN
and OSCE missions which focuses on areas of governance and judiciary.38 In Armenia the
OSCE takes the lead both in terms of the ongoing tensions with Azerbaijan and in its Security
Sector Reform activities. In this case the EU plays a supporting role primarily through EEAS
programmes of financial and technical cooperation supports; whereas the UN mostly focuses
31 Karen Parrish, “Hagel Announces DOD's Arctic Strategy,” DoD News (22 November, 2018)
url: https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121220 retrieved: 20 June, 2019.
32 “UN Environment Annual report 2016,” United Nations (2016)
url: https://www.unenvironment.org/annualreport/2016/?page=0&lang=en retrieved: 15 May, 2019.
33 Kettunen, Noome and Nyman, Think 2030: Reinforcing Environmental Dimensions of European Foreign and Security Policy, 8.
34 United Nations Report, World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights (New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division, 2019), 1.
35 Lisa M. Dellmuth, Maria‐Therese Gustafsson, Niklas Bremberg, Malin Mobjörk, “Intergovernmental organizations and climate security:
advancing the research agenda,” WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9, no. 1 (January/February 2018).
36 European Political Strategy Centre Brief, Joining Forces The Way Towards the European Defence Union (Brussels: EPSC, 2019)
37 NATO: KFOR - JFC Naples. url: https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor retrieved: 15 September, 2019.
38 S. Eckhard & H. Dijkstra, “Contested implementation: The unilateral influence of member states on peacebuilding policy in Kosovo,” Global
Policy, Vol. 8 (S5) (2017): 102–112; EEAS: European Union Office in Kosovo - European Union Special Representative in Kosovo. url: https://
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo_en retrieved: 15 September, 2019.
188
on development functions.39 In Mali, the EU is a significant actor with two civil/military

CSDP missions; European Union Training Mission in Mali and the EU Capacity Building
Mission in Mali. In this respect, the EU works alongside the UN peacekeeping mission
(United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) which provides
the lead security component. These efforts are securing and stabilising Europe’s borders,
building governance in fragile states, and tackling the causes of terrorism, organised crime, and
population displacement.40
These IGOs have taken steps to jointly respond to other challenges such as environmental
disasters. One example is NATO’s European Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
(EADRCC). The EADRCC consults with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the UN
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs providing a civil-military response. The
partners have deployed assets to the Balkans, Georgia, and Israel for example, to tackle floods
and wild fires.41
Meeting the Challenges – Whole-of-Government (WoG) Approach

To meet today’s complex and dynamic challenges states have to have an effective, efficient
holistic defence and security framework. Such a framework allows a state to support and
complement IGOs, and meet any domestic challenges. States have to prepare for the worst-
case scenarios resulting from: the collapse of a partner IGO, successful attack on world
energy supplies, domestic terrorist attack or environmental disaster, or increased instability in
fragile states. Many states have implemented reforms to meet the challenges and implement
a holistic approach, but in many cases the basic system remains episodic, stove-piped, non-
integrated, horizontal, and with duplication in many areas. This is understandable as each
state department has its own remit, priorities, ways of framing issues and understandings of the
complex security nexus.42 A WoG approach brings a unified effort between inter-governmental
agencies and departments to maximise all available resources in a collaborative scalable effort.
WoG can be defined as: ‘where government departments and agencies use joined up structures
and processes to eliminate silos and achieve seamless government’.43
It is understood that challenges faced today effect every facet of state security, therefore, it
is vital that ‘every appropriate lever available to the government’ is part of the planning and
implementation process.44 A state’s defence and security framework needs to operate as a system
rather than a collection of separate components. In dealing with fragile states for example
the 2005 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) Principles for
Good International Engagement in Fragile States highlights that successful development in a fragile
environment depends, in part, on well sequenced and coherent progress across the political,
39 EEAS: Delegation of the European Union to Armenia. url: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia_en retrieved: 11 September, 2019;
Hylke Dijkstra, Ewa Mahr, Petar Petrov, Katarina Đoki & Peter Horne
Zartsdahl, “The EU’s partners in crisis response and peacebuilding: complementarities and synergies with the UN and OSCE,” Global Affairs,
online, Vol. 4, no. 2–3, (23 October, 2018) url: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1530572 retrieved 7 September,
2019.
40 Center on International Cooperation Report, European Military Contributions to UN Peace Operations in Africa Maximizing Strategic Impact
(New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2015)
41 Niklas Bremberg, “European Regional Organizations and Climate-related Security Risks: EU, OSCE and NATO,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and
Security, No. 2018/1 (2018): 12.
42 Ibid. 14-15.
43 Centre for Effective Services Briefing Paper, Implementing Whole of Government Approaches (Dublin: CES, 2015), 2.
44 Patrick Blannin, “The Good Operation: notes on a whole-of-government approach to national security,” Modern War Institute West Point, 4
May, 2018) url: https://mwi.usma.edu/good-operation-notes-whole-government-approach-national-security/ retrieved: 30 August 2019.
189
security, economic and administrative domains. This requires donor countries to adopt a WoG
approach that will enable the donor state to respond with all available resources: security,
political, economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian
assistance.45 A successful WoG engagement in fragile states will result in ‘a well-sequenced and
coherent progress across the political, security, administrative, economic, and humanitarian
and emergency domain’.46 WoG approaches to the broad security spectrum have been employed
by states including Australia, Finland, New Zealand, United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.S.47
There are challenges to WoG, an example of which can be found in climate change. Tackling
climate change has proven a challenge for states; there still remains a disconnect between
climate change and security. This has resulted in states and their departments developing
different approaches to framing and understanding climate change.48 To overcome such
challenges ‘all stakeholders should have the same vision and buy-in to the same strategic
priorities; furthermore, they should be consulted from the beginning’.49 Fostering interagency
cooperation and understanding can be achieved through joint multiagency training and
exercises; and multiagency joint monitoring and readiness centres.50 Recognising the complexity
of the challenge Australia developed the National Security Capability Plan which provides a
single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable their nation to achieve national
security outcomes.51 Understanding the broad sphere of defence and security challenges ahead,
Australia ‘implemented several institutional transformations to ensure effective coordination
and integration within the National Security Community’.52
Conclusion
Our holiday from history is over. The future is here now. States have to be prepared for all
eventualities including thinking the unthinkable. Reacting to challenges is no longer enough,
they need to be predicted and met head on before they escalate. Leaving the issues siloed within
individual departments will leave a state fundamentally unprepared to adequately manage and
prepare for all challenges. The solution is not as opaque as it may seem; a clear strategic objective
supported by a balanced framework is a guiding principle. To meet the brood and uncertain
challenges requires the international community and states to utilise all available resources.
This can be achieved through a comprehensive holistic approach delivered through IGOs and
mirrored by a supporting state WoG defence and security framework. This approach will lead
to synergy between state agencies, cohesion, capability, capacity, and an adaptable leadership
that will ensure a state’s ability not just to react to challenges but predict and prevent them.
45 OECD “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.”
46 OECD, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States, 17-18.
47 Centre for Effective Services Briefing Paper, A Primer on Implementing Whole of Government Approaches (Dublin: CES, 2014), 3; For
examples see: Her Majesty’s Government, National Security Capability Review - Including the second annual report on implementation of the
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (London: Her Majesty’s Government, 2018); Simo Nikkar (et al),
“Joint External Evaluation of Finland: Enhancing Health Security through a Comprehensive Whole-of-Government Approach,” Public Health
Panorama, Vol. 4, issue 1 (March 2018), 91-99.
48 Overseas Development Institute Working Paper, Climate change in UK Security Policy: implications for development assistance? (London:
Overseas Development Institute, 2012), 13.
49 Centre for Effective Services Briefing Paper, A Primer on Implementing Whole of Government Approaches, 4.
50 James W. Derleth, “Fostering a Whole-of Government Approach to National Security from the Bottom Up Interagency Training at the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center,” Military Review, online exclusive, (February, 2018) url: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-
Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Feb/Fostering-Security/ retrieved 10 September 2019.
51 Australian Government, Guide to Australia Capability Plan. (Belconnen ACT: Australian National Security, 2013), 3.
52 Aaron Philip Waddell, “Security Community Integration in Australia: Cooperation and Integration among Australia’s National Security
Community,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 59, no. 3 (2015), 25.
190
THE EUROPEAN MILITARY
AIRWORTHINESS
FRAMEWORK AS A DEFENCE
FORCE ENABLER AND AN
INTERFACE WITH THE IRISH
AVIATION INDUSTRY
Dr Kyriakos I. Kourousis
Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor), School of Engineering of the University of
Limerick.
The European Military Airworthiness Framework as a Defence Force
Enabler and an Interface with the Irish Aviation Industry
ABSTRACT
Airworthiness is a key enabler for mission capable defence aircraft, both in peace and
conflict time. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has identified in 2008 the need for
harmonisation in airworthiness across the European Union (EU), establishing the Military
Airworthiness Authorities’ Forum and the European Military Airworthiness Requirements
(EMARs). EMARs have progressively evolved to a comprehensive framework for
managing the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of defence aircraft within
the EU and beyond. The basis of the EMARs is the civil aviation regulatory set of the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), adapted to cater for the defence aviation
environment. The EMARs have aligned defence regulations with best practice from civil
aviation, offering greater focus on safety and a vehicle for efficient interaction with the
aviation industry. Moreover, the EMARs enabled a much needed intra and inter-state
regulatory standardisation, with a positive impact on interoperability within the EU and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Irish Air Corps (IAC) operates a
highly diverse fleet of twenty-five aircraft, of seven different types, the majority of which
are civil-certified. The performance of aircraft maintenance, management of continuing
airworthiness and engineering design changes are governed by the IAC Military
Airworthiness Authority (MAA) rules. The adoption of the EMARs has yet to be realised
by the IAC, except for the EASA-approved Technical Training School. The retention
of an Irish Defence Forces’ specific airworthiness framework does not allow Ireland
to harmonise with other EU states that have transitioned to the EMARs (e.g. United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Netherlands, Portugal), as well as limits
the opportunities for interaction of the IAC with the vibrant Irish aviation industry. This
paper presents the operational and cost implications of this regulatory disconnect,
complemented by a discussion on the benefits of the EMARs’ adoption by the IAC.
Military Airworthiness
In broad terms, airworthiness is the condition of a civil or military aircraft for safe operation.
Perhaps the most accurate and complete definition of airworthiness comes a historical
regulation of the Australian Defence Force, which describes it as a concept:
“…the application of which defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for judgment of
the suitability for flight of that aircraft, in that it has been designed, constructed, maintained
and operated to approved standards and limitations, by competent and authorised individuals,
who are acting as members of an approved organisation and whose work is both certified as correct
and accepted on behalf of Defence.”1
Moreover, in this definition one can find the activities encompassed by the two distinct (yet
interconnected) domains of airworthiness, that of:
• Initial Airworthiness, design and construction of aircraft;
• Continuing Airworthiness, maintenance and operation of aircraft.
1 “Glossary of Terms”. Australian Defence Force AAP 7001.053 Technical Airworthiness Management Manual, Last modified July 3, 2019. http://
www.defence.gov.au/dasp/Docs/Manuals/7001053/eTAMMweb/1307.htm
192
In civil aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) offers the overarching
framework for the regulation of commercial aircraft airworthiness. Each of ICAO state is
responsible to implement, in a legislated way, this high-level policy. State aircraft, including
military aircraft, are specifically excluded from the ICAO provisions. In military aviation, there
is no equivalent to ICAO, with each state utilising a unique set of airworthiness rules, orders,
etc., for their military aircraft. This is mainly attributed to the role of military aviation, which
is to maintain war capability. This role imposes additional, or even, contradicting requirements
to airworthiness. Historically, this has led to a fragmented regulatory environment at
international level, despite the apparent and unavoidable interactions between different states
or even between defence services within the same state (i.e. Air Force, Army, Navy).
The European Military Airworthiness Requirements

In an effort to tackle fragmentation in the military airworthiness space, the European Union
(EU) European Defence Agency (EDA) established in 2008 the Military Airworthiness
Authorities (MAWA) Forum, having the following goals2:
• Develop a common regulatory framework;
• Develop a common certification process and certification/design codes;
• Develop common approach to organisational approvals;
• Develop common approach to preservation of airworthiness;
• Establish arrangements for mutual recognition;
• Promote the formation of a European Military Joint Airworthiness Authorities
Organisation (EMJAAO).
The EDA MAWA Forum has developed progressively the European Airworthiness Requirements
(EMARs), which constitute a common set of requirements based on the civil airworthiness
framework of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations. The EMARs can be
adopted by the European Union (EU) States, via national legislation, as regulations specific
to military airworthiness management. The following EMARs have been published so far
(covering both the initial and continuing airworthiness domain)3:
Initial Airworthiness
• EMAR 21: Certification of Military Aircraft and related Products, Parts and Appliances
and Design and Production Organisations.
Continuing Airworthiness
• EMAR M: Continuing Airworthiness Requirements;
• EMAR 145: Requirements for Maintenance Organisations;
2 “Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAWA) Forum”, European Defence Agency, Airworthiness, Last modified July 4, 2019. https://www.eda.
europa.eu/experts/airworthiness/mawa-forum
3 “Approved MAWA Documents”, European Defence Agency, Airworthiness, Last modified July 4, 2019. https://www.eda.europa.eu/experts/
airworthiness/mawa-documents
193
• EMAR 66: Military Aircraft Maintenance Licensing;

• EMAR 147: Aircraft Maintenance Training Organisations.
The EMARs are supported by the corresponding Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)
and Guidance Material (GM), as well as the following set of complementary documents for
the set up and operation of a military airworthiness framework3: EMAD 1 ‘Acronyms and
Definitions Document’, EMAD R ‘Recognition Process’, EMAD MFTP ‘Military Flight Test
Permit Procedure’, European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria (EMACC) and
EMAR Forms Document.
The MAWA Forum initiative enjoys a high-level political support, however it has yet to reach
to its full potential. According to publicly available information, the following EU States have
adopted to date the EMARs (either fully or partially): France, Germany, United Kingdom,
Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, Finland and Slovenia. It is of note,
however, that two non-EU countries have already adopted the EMARs, Australia and Norway.
Australia has been a strong advocate of the EMARs, as an emerging international standard for
the management of military airworthiness, which is expected to influence countries in the Asia
and Pacific region towards adoption of the EMARs (such as Malaysia, which has mirrored in
the past the Australian military airworthiness framework).
The EMARs are also utilised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Air
and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC), membered by United States, Canada, United
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, as a framework facilitating interoperability between
different defence forces4. The case of the EMAD-R ‘Recognition Process’ is of interest, as this
structured methodology enables mutual recognition of airworthiness systems, which is key in
running effectively and efficiently multinational projects (i.e. certification of new/modified
aircraft platforms, acceptance of design/maintenance organisations, etc.).
Airworthiness Management in the Irish Air Corps

When examining any military airworthiness system, it is important to consider the primary role
assigned to the aircraft operator. The role, in conjunction with the operational environment
and the configuration of the aircraft, has a direct impact on both the initial and continuing
airworthiness of any military aircraft. In the case of the Irish Air Corps (IAC), the role
description (provided in the Defence Force website) sets a clear distinction between the war
and peacetime role:
“The role of the Air Corps under the Defence Act is to contribute to the security of the State by
providing for the Military Air Defence of its airspace. However in times of peace it is more usual for
the Air Corps to fulfil the roles assigned by Government through the deployment of a well-motivated
and effective Air Corps.” 5
4 Purton, Leon and Kourousis, Kyriakos. “Military Airworthiness Management Frameworks: A Critical Review”. Procedia Engineering 80 (2014):
545-564. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2014.09.111
5 “Air Corps”, Irish Defence Forces, Last modified July 10, 2019 https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/air-corps/
194
Under this umbrella definition of the IAC role, aircraft can be assigned a range of missions:
army support, air ambulance, military transport, Presidential, Ministerial and VIP transport,
general utility, Garda air support, offshore & inshore maritime patrol, search and rescue top
cover, parachuting operations, escort surveillance & monitoring, inshore fishery patrol, drogue
towing, ab-initio/advanced/instructor pilot training and close air support. In turn, to fulfil
these roles, the IAC operates a highly diverse fleet of twenty-five aircraft, of seven different
types, the majority of which are civil-certified6.
In reviewing the organisation of the IAC on airworthiness management one can find in the
Defence Force website7 a basic overview of the IAC structure and units, including a reference to
a Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA). Thus, two secondary sources were used to obtain
information on the IAC airworthiness system, an independent review conducted in 20158 and
a previously published article in the Defence Force Review9.
The responsibility of the IAC aircraft airworthiness belongs to the General Officer Commanding
(GOC), obtained through successive delegation from the Minister of Defence to the Defence
Force Chief of Staff. It is understood that airworthiness in the IAC is governed by a set of
internal rules, the implementation. This set of rules are described in the Air Regulations
Manual (ARM), issued by the GOC. It is noted that Air Regulations are not part of the
Defence Force Regulations, which are issued by the Minister of Defence. In particular, the
Defence Act 1954 stipulates that the Minister of Defence is authorised to regulate the “The
flying, certification and maintenance of service aircraft and the certification and maintenance
of service aircraft material.”10. Instead, the issuance of Air Regulations is another responsibility
delegated (directly) from the Minister of Defence to the GOC, via the Defence Regulation11
The GOC is supported and advised by the MAA. In particular, the scope of work of the MAA
includes:
• Oversight of the Air Regulations’ implementation (i.e. issuance of technical and flight
operations’ instructions, certification of staff, approval of maintenance programs, accident/
incident investigation, aircraft modifications, liaison with aircraft Type Certificate holders,
etc.);
• Advising of the GOC on airworthiness matters (i.e. new equipment/tender specifications,
civil aviation regulations impacting IAC aircraft operation, etc.).
A synoptic overview of the IAC airworthiness management construct is illustrated in Figure 1.
6 “Air Corps Fleet”, Irish Defence Forces, Last modified July 10, 2019. https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/air-corps/the-fleet/
7 “About the Air Corps”, Irish Defence Forces, Last modified July 10, 2019. https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/air-corps/about-the-air-corps/
8 Corcoran, David. “Just Flight Safety Culture and the Irish Defence Forces: It’s A Question of Law!” Defence Forces Review (2016): 197-216.
9 Irish Aviation Authority. Independent review into allegations concerning the certification, qualification and experience of Air Corps Aircraft
Inspectors, by E. Sullivan, N. Butterfield and M. Purcell, December 3, 2015.
10 Defence Act [1954-1987].
11 Defence Force, Defence Forces Regulation CS 8 - Air Corps Military Aviation Regulations and Directives, July 20, 2012.
195
Figure 1. Airworthiness Management within the Irish Air Corps (IAC).
A Need for Change in the Irish Air Corps Airworthiness

Management
Fragmentation of rules is one of the most common issues identified in military airworthiness
systems4, mainly due to limited standardisation, diversity of the aircraft types, mission profiles,
etc., and the progressive erosion of the rules attributed to military management philosophies.
The airworthiness framework of the IAC may not be fragmented as that of other, larger, defence
forces. However, it is reasonable to assume that the diversity of the fleet, when combined with
possible limitations on the availability of (human and material) resources, can pose challenges
for the effective and efficient management of airworthiness. Regulatory standardisation, at
high level, promotes consistency in the creation, change and implementation of airworthiness
rules. This standardisation in airworthiness can be achieved when reverting to practices widely
accepted in military and/or civil aviation (with necessary adaptions to account for the military
aviation needs).
Another issue one may observe in the airworthiness construct of the IAC, presented in Figure
1, is the lack of independence between the airworthiness regulator and the aircraft operator, as
both roles are exercised by a single officer (GOC). This is fundamentally inconsistent with the
civil aviation practice. Moreover, it is unknown in what extent the IAC regulatory framework is
aligned with civil (or other defence) airworthiness regulatory frameworks, apart from a reference
to Maintenance Management Organisation Exposition in the ARM and the operation of the
Air Corps Technical Training School under the approval by the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA)
(as an EASA Part 147 Maintenance Training Organisation)12.
12 “Part 147 Approved Training Organisations”, Irish Aviation Authority, Last modified July 10, 2019 https://www.iaa.ie/personnel-licensing/
maintenance-engineer---amel-licensing/part-147-approved-training-organisations-1
196
As discussed, harmonisation between States’ practices in the airworthiness field is one of the
main objectives (and deliverables) of the MAWA Forum. The lack of harmonisation with other
EU States that have adopted the EMARs is a limiting factor for expanding and improving the
interactions with these States but also with the Irish aviation industry. Closer interactions
are especially important for a defence aircraft operator of the size of the IAC, as the level
of commonality of an airworthiness system with other civil/military systems is a positive
contributor to achieving economy of scale.
To summarise, reducing regulatory fragmentation, establishing an independence in the
airworthiness management roles and responsibilities and promoting harmonisation are
considered some of the main reasons to initiate changes in the IAC airworthiness system.
Moreover, these reasons will have to be assessed in conjunction with the benefits that an
EMAR-based airworthiness system can offer to the IAC (discussed in the next section).
Nevertheless, as with every change, especially of this magnitude, one would need to examine
the challenges associated. The implementation of the EMARs requires the establishment of a
suitable legal instrument, which, in the case of the IAC, would be a new Defence Regulation,
issued by the Minister (as per the provisions of the Defence Act 1954). This new Defence
Regulation is necessary to provide the Basic Regulation as the framework (basis) for the EMARs-
derived set of airworthiness regulations. This Basic Regulation would reflect the EASA Basic
Regulation, with adaptions, similarly to the approach followed by the Australian Defence Force
in their adoption of the EMARs13.
Benefits of the EMARs for the Irish Air Corps and the Irish
Aviation Industry
An effective and efficient airworthiness system can be an enabler for the Irish Defence Force.
Moreover, linkage of the IAC with the vibrant aviation industry is an opportunity offered
by adopting a civil-based airworthiness system. In line with the aforementioned reasons for
a change in the existing IAC airworthiness system, the adoption of the EMARs can offer
substantial benefits.
Aviation safety can be enhanced by following best regulatory practice from civil aviation.
Namely, the EASA system (mirrored by the EMARs) can be a positive contributor to safety. In
a report accompanying the 2015 Defence Forces Climate14 a number of safety concerns were
reported in connection to organisational matters, i.e.:
• “We can’t do things safely. We need to say no to outputs.”, indicating possible discrepancies
in the airworthiness decision making processes;
• “It keeps us up at night.. ‘is this safe’… we are signing off on people who don’t have experience”,
implying a lack of confidence in the maintenance staff certification process;
• “We are double and triple jobbing. That would be illegal in the private sector”, illustrating a low
esteem for the defence regulations.
13 “Defence Aviation Safety Regulation”, Australian Defence Force, Last modified July 10, 2019 http://www.defence.gov.au/DASP/Docs/
Manuals/8000-011/DASRWeb/index.htm#8797.htm
14 “Workplace Climate in the Defence Forces” Phase 2: Results of the Focus Group Research, Last modified July 14, 2019
https://www.defence.ie/system/files/media/file-uploads/2017-12/workplace-climate-defence-forces.pdf
197
However, it is noted these claims, and the assumption that the EMAR-based system can improve
the safety record, cannot be fully substantiated due to the unavailability of safety performance
indicators for the IAC.
Standardisation in the airworthiness standards, specifications and processes can be achieved
through the adoption of EMARs and the associated/supporting documents. The benefit of
standardisation can be witnessed in some recent examples of specifications published for new
aircraft procurement purposes. In particular, in the Request for Tenders (RfT) for a new fixed
wing utility aircraft15 and the Request for Proposals (RfP) for a new maritime patrol aircraft16
issued by the Irish Department of Defence, one can find references to EASA certification
specifications, combined with requirements reflecting in practice certification specifications
(examples of such references are provided in Table 1). This can be considered as a reflection of
limited standardisation, which may have an impact on the accurate capture and definition of the
certification specifications. Most importantly, under an EMARs-based system, the certification
basis of new aircraft can be defined in an accurate way and tailored, where necessary, to the
needs, operating environment and available budget of the Irish Defence Force.
Document Section of Document Reference to Airworthiness

Requirements
Request for Appendix 1: Requirements and Specifications: All configurations and equipment must be
Tenders (RfT) for Type Certified or Supplemental Type Certified
a new fixed wing 1. Specification (STC), or another standard, which meets the
utility aircraft15 1.4 Applicable Documents requirements of the Irish Air Corps Military
Airworthiness Authority (MAA).
Appendix 1: Requirements and Specifications: The contractor must design, build, install,
test and certify the proposed aircraft to the
2. Scope of Work/Aircraft Configuration requirements of EASA CS23.
2.1 General Aircraft Requirements
Request for 4. Qualification Criteria b. The aircraft must be built to EASA CS25
Proposals or equivalent standard. All additional items
(RfP) for a new fitted to the aircraft must have manufacturers’
maritime patrol Supplemental Type Certification (STC).
aircraft16
t. The aircraft must have extensive, evidence
based Corrosion Prevention measures, including
paint schemes, airframe and engine-wash
programmes, panel sealing, internal cavity
liquid protection, and corrosion inspection
programmes.
Table 1. Examples of references to airworthiness requirements from Request for Tenders (RfT) and Request for
Proposal (RfP) documents issued by the Irish Department of Defence.
15 Department of Defence, Request for Tenders for the Supply of Fixed Wing Utility Aircraft for the Irish Air Corps, Reference CON/0013/2017,
May 4, 2017.
16 Department of Defence, Request for Proposals for the Supply of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) to the Irish Defence Forces, Reference
CON/001/2018, May 11, 2018.
198
Linkage with the Irish civil aviation sector can be facilitated by adopting the (EASA-based)
EMARs. Examples of such interactions include:
• Outsourcing of IAC maintenance work to Irish-based EASA Part 145 Aircraft
Maintenance Organisations where and as necessary;
• Outsourcing of IAC engineering design and production work to Irish-based EASA Part
21J Design and Part 21G Production Organisations;
• Outsourcing of IAC fleet management to EASA Part M Continuing Airworthiness
Management Organisations (CAMOs);
• Inward and outward mobility of EASA Part 66/EMAR 66 civilian/IAC licenced aircraft
maintenance technicians and mechanics, enabling the quick filling of skills/man-hour
gaps in the Irish civil and military aviation industry;
• Offering of helicopter basic and type training by the IAC EASA Part 147/EMAR 147
Maintenance Training Organisation to the Irish, EU and international civil aviation
industry (currently no EASA Part 147 Maintenance Organisation in Ireland offers such
training courses).
Work satisfaction of the IAC staff can be improved by working within a modern civil-based
airworthiness management system. As identified in the 2015 Defence Forces Climate survey17,
the measured level of organisational procedural justice (perceptions of staff around the
organisation’s fairness in terms of procedures and policies) suggest dissatisfaction. Moreover,
the acquisition of globally recognised qualifications (i.e. EASA/EMAR 66 maintenance
licences) is also expected to contribute positively to the morale of the IAC staff, both in terms
of the appreciation exhibited to them from their organisation and future career prospects. This
can have a positive effect in retaining talent in the IAC.
Interoperability can be improved, since servicing of IAC aircraft, pooling and sharing of
human resources and equipment, common training, etc. can be served better by a common
regulatory framework. The EMARs can offer that both at EU and international level
(due to their increasing use by non-EU States). A cross-state operation of IAC can be not
only a force multiplier for the Irish Defence Force (where and as necessary) but also an
opportunity for closer interaction with other military aircraft operators employing advanced
operational practices.
The EMARs as an Enabler for Irish Air Corps Capabilities

The airworthiness of a military aircraft fleet can sometimes be perceived by the commanding
officers (at the various levels of military hierarchy) as a de-facto condition. However,
airworthiness, by definition, does not simply imply safe to operate aircraft but also aircraft
ready to accomplish their intended mission. In the military world, airworthiness is maintained
via a continuous balancing act between safety and operational readiness, which involves risk
management. Thus, one should pay close attention to the relation that exists between efficient
and effective military airworthiness management and force capabilities.
17 “Wellbeing in the Defence Forces”, Report on the Defence Forces ‘Your Say’ Climate Survey 2015, Last modified July 14, 2019 https://www.
defence.ie/en/press/publications/report-defence-forces-your-say-climate-survey-2015
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Assuring the technical integrity of the aircraft (defence capability platform) is what an
airworthiness framework covers. Technical integrity comprises of all those norms, regulations
and practices covering Product, Behaviour and Process (PBP) integrity18 for initial airworthiness
(design and construction of aircraft) and continuing airworthiness (maintenance and operation
of aircraft) assurance. The Product element corresponds to the technical system (aircraft), while
Behaviour covers the human requirements’ element (training, certification, competency of staff),
with the Process element covering all process/procedural requirements and implementation
across the board. The EMARs, as discussed in the previous section, are able to contribute
positively in enhancing aviation safety, standardisation, work satisfaction and interoperability
in the IAC. In effect, these contributions can ensure, in different ways each, the PBP integrity
and enable the short, medium and long-term capabilities of the IAC. The interactions and
the overall relationship between capabilities and the EMARs, as a comprehensive system for
military airworthiness management, are illustrated schematically in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The interaction and relationship between the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs) and
the Irish Air Corps (IAC) capabilities.
Conclusion
In summary, an EMARs-based systems approach to airworthiness management can:
• Offer a modern military-tailored framework for the airworthiness management of the
diverse fleet and mission profile of the IAC;
• Promote standardisation across the initial and continuing airworthiness functions of
the IAC, including the definition of procurement requirements;
• Enhance the work satisfaction of the IAC staff, with a positive effect in retaining talent;
18 Purton, Leon; Clothier, Reece and Kourousis, Kyriakos. “Assessment of Technical Airworthiness in Military Aviation: Implementation and
Further advancement of the Bow-Tie Model”. Procedia Engineering 80 (2014): 529-544. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2014.09.110
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• Link the vibrant civil aviation industry in Ireland with the IAC;
• Improve interoperability in EU and international level;
• Offer a comprehensive solution for the assurance of technical integrity;
• Enable the current and future Irish Defence Force capabilities by providing safe and
mission-ready aircraft to the IAC GOC.
The adoption of the EMARs by the IAC is believed to be towards a positive direction, both for
achieving a more effective and efficient airworthiness system. This paper, through its analysis,
hopes to have provided enough details to stimulate further discussion on this matter within
the Irish Defence Force organisation. A full justification and planning of the implementation
of the associated change would be the logical next steps, similarly to several defence
forces in the EU (and internationally) that have decided to transform their airworthiness
management systems.
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202
Generating Network Centric
Warfare Capabilities within the
Defence Forces.
Capt (AR) Chris O Slatara
CIS School, DFTC.
Generating Network Centric Warfare Capabilities
within the Defence Forces.
Abstract
This paper looks at Mission Command and Network Centric warfare, what advantages
they might bring to the Defence Forces, and how those advantages might be realised.
Mission Command and Network Centric warfare are popular topics. In the modern
military of today it is necessary to practice both in order to operate within, and excel, in
the coalition/battlegroup format espoused by the US Army and NATO. In this paper it is
argued that the Defence Forces can excel in this area with a far lesser expenditure and
effort than might be thought.
What is Mission Command

Mission Command is a style of command. There are many others, from micromanagement,
to laissez-faire. From a military point of view, the tribunes of the Roman Empire would have
been well-versed in mission command, when the Senate and Caesar despatched them to Gaul.
Mission Command can be summarized in short as “tell your subordinates what a good end
looks like – and let them get on with it”. This allows for initiative and much more to be
exercised. As we know it today, Mission Command was first seen in the revived Wehrmacht
in the 1930s - German doctrine stated that ‘the emptiness of the battlefield requires fighters
who think and act on their own and can analyse any situation and exploit it decisively and
boldly’ (W.Murray, 2001). In battle, commanders are told what success should look like. In
most cases, as well, they are told what their limits will be, for example “You will proceed no
further than Phase Line X-Ray” This style of Command was evident all through WW2, the
Wehrmacht‘s decentralization doctrine meant commanders were told what the end state and
limits of exploitation were, and told then to get on with it. Even farther back, we can look at
WW1. The German word for this style of command is known as ‘Auftragstaktik’ or ‘Mission
Command’. So, what are the key factors of mission command – what distinguishes it? It is
loose, flexible, and decentralized. It is accepted doctrine that the Defence Forces must use it, as
it is the philosophy and system of how we train and how we should fight.
Mission Command is characterized by a much stronger attraction to duty than anything – in
a sense, contracts of trust. Much of this is normal to military life in any event but what is new
here is the utter reliance and trust that both commander and subordinate understand each
other – that the commander will issue orders that the subordinate can achieve, and provide the
right support to do so, and in addition that the subordinate will act within the intent of the
commander. A key difference here between Mission Command and inflexible orders with no
room for interpretation is that on the battlefield, unknown circumstances may likely arise – the
commander and subordinate know that the subordinate will take the best action s/he could
have taken, without needing to refer back to the commander.
In addition, the contract of trust also results in a much-minimized set of orders, with only an
end state and limits of exploitation; this can open the battlefield as it allows for initiative and
seizing of opportunities as they arise. With production of reduced orders comes a reduction in
misunderstanding, and so an improvement in tempo, as there is no requirement in most cases
to refer to higher command for guidance.
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However, mission command is not without its drawbacks. With forces that are not trained to a
high standard, or commanders that are not sure of their subordinates, then detailed orders may
be necessary, thus resulting in a lack of flexibility. The US Army refers to Mission Command
as an “approach” (Army, 2019)(Army, 2014) “The Army’s approach to command and control
that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to
the situation” is guided by the principles of:
1. Building cohesive teams through mutual trust,
2. Creating shared understanding,
3. Providing a clear commander’s intent,
4. Exercising disciplined initiative,
5. Using Mission Orders,
6. Accepting Prudent Risk.
In the above discussion we have mentioned trust, intent, initiative and mission orders. This
concept of shared understanding will be revisited as it will recur again and again. Risk is
also an important factor – no military option is without risk, but the prudent acceptance
and a decision to proceed is one of the factors that characterizes a commander using
Mission Command. We now mention Shared Understanding – here, what is required is
the creation of a shared understanding of the operational environment, the problems and
approaches of solving those problems and the reasons the operation exists in the first place.
This is no easy task – information management require time and effort to create the shared
understanding – it is rarely done via email and always requires some type of contact to do so.
This, then, begins our journey into Network centric warfare, and we consider again the tribune
leaving Rome to conquer a foreign land, who– he would have understood Mission Command.
What is Network Centric Warfare

Here we attempt to present Network Centric Warfare (NCW), firstly as a definition, but
then placing it in context. “It is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces
(consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared battlespace awareness that can be exploited
via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to achieve commanders’ intent”
Network Centric warfare was reallywas first defined in a seminal paper from 1998 in the U.S.
Naval Institute by Vice Admiral Cebrowski and John Garska. In order to place it in context, we
must understand the massive change in how we perceive technology in the last 20 years; the rise
of the Internet and World Wide Web has revolutionized how we store and process information.
Just as importantly is how we can now form networks in an ad-hoc fashion (Facebook, Tinder,
WhatsApp, Boards.ie are all obvious examples) to carry out a pastime or purpose. They are all
enabled by this ability to create networks – without the capability to form networks, Facebook
and the other sites would not exist. What Network Centric warfare does is attempt to translate
this ability to create networks into a military advantage. Cebrowski’ s and Garska paper
attempted to visualise what effects the Internet and more specifically the formation of networks
might have on war. It lays out the principles and how a fighting advantage may be gained.
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The Principles of Network Centric Warfare

A Robustly networked force improves information sharing
Exploring this statement is important - robust networks are difficult to achieve. Consider the
use of tactical radios in the Defence Forces. Unless all kit is working properly with a trained
operator, communications tends to be difficult at best and other forms of communications
are used as fallback. Proper PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) planning is
vital to ensure communications are maintained, and robust, and users are trained. Without
these, the networks cannot be said to be robust. Robust in this context also means secure –
although no radio is completely proof against jamming, blocking or interference, it does mean
comparatively, a robust network is difficult to jam and difficult to intercept. ‘Networks’ in this
instance also mean primarily data networks – able to exchange messages and data.
Information Sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational

awareness
The next point to mention is that Information Sharing can now take place over the robust
networks between staffs and troops on the ground, or between troops on the ground. The
very fact that they are networked means that maps, positions, pictures, information, text, chat
messages can now be sent across the network, rather than writing information down from
a message copied over radio (and as everyone knows, this can be extremely prone to error).
This enhances the quality of information. This sharing of information translates into a shared
situational awareness – i.e. knowing what is happening on the battlefield OR alternatively,
knowledge of the battlespace is available, critically, in the network. You must also have
applications/software that can display this information in a manner that you, the user, have
been trained to use and fight with
Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and

enhances sustainability and speed of command
When mentioning the sharing of information, it must be remembered that even though the
information is shared, it may not have been processed or acted on by the users. This is the
important point here – self-synchronization now becomes possible. This means that the users
can make use of the information themselves, without having being directed to do so The
shared environment thus allows for self-synchronization without being directed to do so - the
implication is that a user is trained and empowered to collaborate and pick up what information
they need from the shared situational picture Thus, speed of command is increased – because
we self-synchronize and collaborate, the end result is better than what went before
These in turn dramatically increase mission effectiveness.

So, the last point of Network Centric warfare is the increased effectiveness from self-
synchronization; if we can see what others are doing we can reinforce our allies and disrupt
our enemies, all in a faster and better cycle than our enemies, most especially if they have
not decided to fight with a Network Centric Warfare tool and approach - and by association
lack the aforementioned trust in their field commanders, staff and troops. As we can see,
there are many tenets of Network Centric Warfare and Mission Command that reinforce and
complement one another. We will now examine these, and the requirements to enable them.
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Network Centric Warfare and Mission Command from the Irish Point of View
The Irish situation can be explained by looking at the current global trend and identifying
the position in respect to that, and looking at ways to harmonize operational art along those
lines. The politics of the modern defence arena show that operations by the US Military in
the Middle East for the last 20 years (and more) have been focused on coalition operations.
As nearly always the largest provider to said coalition operations, it has been a tenet of their
coalition dealings that partner nations must be able to interoperate with them - and, of course,
this means ‘Robust Networks’ as meant in the context of Network Centric warfare, quite apart
from the nature of staff duties and following NATO Standard Agreements (STANAG)s. This
has followed the practice from NATO, where considerable standardization and networking
meant that forces could interoperate easily and work together to achieve their aims. Ireland’s
participation in European Union Battlegroups practices this from a limited point of view – we
deploy with force packages of Mechanized Infantry Companies which slot into the host nations
force package.
From the point of network centric warfare however, it leaves a lot to be desired as the package,
while networked to some extent, does not accept and build the robust networks in order to
fully exercise the principles of Network Centric Warfare. Participation in exercises such as
VIKING18 shows that considerable effort on several fronts needs more work in order to fully
embrace the concepts and approach of Network Centric warfare. As discussed above, robust
networks and information sharing improves mission effectiveness. In order to gain the benefits
to our forces the correct doctrine, tools and training must be in place. This training must exist
in the HQ - training the staff function. It must exist with the troops on the ground, afloat, or
in the air; it must exist with the IT soldiers keeping these systems running. Unless all three
capabilities (Staff, troops and IT support) are practiced individually, and collectively, Network
Centric Warfare Capability cannot be generated or maintained. The US Army recognizes this
– They have established several centres of excellence, and created troop grades specifically
to assist with this process (Digital Master Gunner), and established several digital ranges to
practice. In addition, all of the training tables to certify and qualify are publicly available, giving
any military personnel wishing to bootstrap themselves a huge leg up.
From the Irish Point of View, the Staff Process remains largely overlay/paper-based when
teaching MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process). There are arguments made strongly on
both sides of this debate, as a very strong case can be made that the nature of the MDMP
process requires that it be able to operate when communications or power has been disabled,
and the Brigade/Formation must still be able to operate, and so commanders at all levels must
be able to revert to doing without computers, if forced to do so.
Separately, participation in any overseas role now requires collaboration, usually with some type
of network centric warfare -enabled platform. This places a very strong drive on staffs to be able
to operate at an exceptionally high level in these roles. Arguably, indeed, they should operate
‘as native’ in a digital context and therefore Staff Officers from the Defence Forces should be
able to execute MDMP via these networks and using those appropriate tools. Furthermore,
in order to gain the most benefit for troops, they should not just be ‘able’ they should excel.
Long and painful experience teaching these toolsets and networking shows that a huge benefit
occurs when highly trained staffs at these toolsets are working as they should with the correct
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tools and technology. The training required is comparatively small to get this kind of benefit.
This can best be achieved within the Defence Forces by the formation of Centres of Excellence.
Much the same benefit can be had by troops on the ground. The main difference is that staffs
are normally located in Formation Headquarters, or tactical operations centres (TOCs), while
troops are normally located in vehicles, ships or aircraft. The networks and tools themselves
are normally heavily integrated with the vehicle – for example some platforms can pick up and
relay turret positioning from Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) - in addition the vehicles are
nearly always highly mobile. This produces a much greater training requirement as the soldier
must be able to keep their vehicle and integrated communication network running, AND learn
how to do TLPP (Troop Leadership) on the ground using these robustly networked systems and
tools. Much of this can be dealt with by the establishment of digital ranges within a Centre
of Excellence framework but the proper exercise of vehicles requires practice in the field with
individual and collective training to properly learn to fight the formation.
The next part of the training need is that for the communications soldiers, both in the planning
and in the operation of the networks. Paradoxically, this is usually easier, as they are normally
the introducers of the networks and applications. However, they do need the collective training
in high-tempo operations, as the very nature of combat means tools need support, and systems
need repair, and the practice in doing this is vital, as is establishment of communications. One
important point to make is that it is NOT the responsibility of the communications soldiers
to operate these systems – as mentioned above this is the responsibility of the staff and troops
on the Ground.
The next point to be addressed is that of the Applications themselves that are used for
Information Sharing and Situational Awareness. Historically, militaries paid software vendors
very large amounts of money to deliver custom solutions to address the needs of the military
at that point in time. However, this ran into problems almost from the start because the
computers available evolved rapidly as did the capability of the vehicles in which the hardware
was carried. In addition, military capability (for example, precision strike capability and UAVs
to take just a couple of examples, arrived in modern warfare, as did the need to operate in loose
coalitions of nations. These reasons, coupled with a lack of detailed requirements and little
headroom in the systems to expand to meet these needs, resulted in the delivery of systems
typically years overdue and obsolete or with very limited capability almost at delivery military at
that time. The net result was a huge mistrust of custom applications to deliver network centric
warfare capabilities.
Therefore, the current approach is not to use custom applications, but instead to use Commercial
Off The Shelf (COTS) applications to generate Network Centric Warfare capabilities. Advances
in standards, security, and enhancements to the products which benefit all, can be easily taken
on by installing the latest version. The Irish Defence Forces have settled on using the Sitaware
family of products, from the Danish company Systematic.
These products are used in the Staff Roles “Sitaware Headquarters” and in the Vehicle
“Sitaware Frontline” and on the commander on the ground “Sitaware Edge (on a battle vest)”.
This is the same product used by a number of military establishments. The US Army uses
Sitaware Headquarters in its new Command Post of the Future programme (CPOF), where
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it is known as the Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE). Similarly, the US Army
are planning on the use of Frontline in the Vehicle Role where it is known as the Mounted
Computing Environment (MCE).
The Sitaware product suite is, at its, heart, dedicated to enabling Mission Command and
Network Centric Warfare. It does this via enabling information be shared, received and
transmitted via Compliance with a large and diverse set of technical standards and protocols
- for example VMF, MIP, JREAP, LINK16, ACO, NATO STANAGs. This ensures that it can
talk to other nations in the air, sea, and land domains. In addition, it provides Blue Force
Tracking display capability, integrating friendly force tracking for both air, sea, vehicle and
individual soldiers. It also provides chat message capability, which is fast becoming the
preferred communication method in modern Command and Control systems. In addition,
detailed Military planning tools to enable the military decision-making process (a standard
process, usually just called MDMP) are available to enable doctrine-led operations planning. It
enables a Common Operating Picture via advanced mapping and GIS capability, and NATO
standard symbology.
One vital part to note is that it – importantly – is able to work with the concept of resilience.
Any military network can and will get disrupted – importantly with Sitaware, if networks are
disrupted messages will reroute or hold until they can be delivered, thus making the network
self-healing, and validating the PACE concept (having alternate means of communication) so
vital to the operation of network centric warfare. In addition, networks may be disrupted by
radio silence for operational reasons – in these cases, again, the network will automatically
heal itself once radio contact is re-established. The network can also cope with bandwidth
limitations – for example the SINCGAR radio has extremely limited bandwidth compared to
3G/4G networks, but can be used by Sitaware by prioritising traffic.
It has been shown above that robust networking and enabling information sharing can strongly
improve effectiveness – these are the keys that enable Network Centric Warfare. The Naval
Service, in its creation of the Recognised Maritime Picture (the first uses of Sitaware in the
Defence Forces), has led the way in the Defence Forces and now it is the turn of the other
arms of the Defence Forces. As discussed above, the doctrine, training and equipment must
be in place to gain the benefits of Network Centric warfare. Other nations farther along the
transformation process have formed, based Centres of Excellence to enable the training of
the NCW approach and tools to end users and enable feedback to doctrine. This can happen
immediately and at relatively little cost and without waiting for expensive technologies. The
creation of Centres of Excellence, designed to provide the Defence Forces with the necessary
capabilities to empower the future force is a critical first step to a broader and more effective
application of these cutting-edge principles. In addition, for example, other technical advances
may be possible – as the openness of the tools make it straightforward to plug in such current-
generation approaches like Machine Learning or Artificial intelligence. Within the context of
the Defence Forces and their participation in coalition operations, the benefits to be gained are
clear and the embrace of Network Centric Warfare something that should happen fully across
all the arms of the Force
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ABSTRACTS
1st Joint Command and Staff
Course
MA In Leadership, Management
And Defence Studies (LMDS).
ABSTRACTS · 1st Joint Command and Staff Course
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES’

INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMME: STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS
By Comdt Barry Byrne
This thesis examined an internationally recognised programme carried out by the Irish Defence
Forces (DF) between 2012 and 2016. This programme was aimed at improving Information
and Knowledge Management (IKM) across the organisation. A Return On Expectations
(ROE) methodology was selected as the most suitable assessment methodology in this instance
(Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2010). A multi-methodological approach was used for conducting
this assessment across multiple stakeholder groups. Semi-structured interviews were conducted
with senior leadership of the DF who were key stakeholders in this programme. These were
compared and contrasted against a survey conducted with 130 respondents. The use of a case
study further strengthened the validity of this research. This was supported by the introduction
of an international perspective from interviews with eight experts in the field. These results
were measured against the original objectives of the IKM programme and the standards set out
in the new International Standards Organisation (ISO) global knowledge management system
standard: ISO 3041. The analysis revealed that while the programme was successful in the early
stages, there are clear capability gaps. These gaps challenge the IKM programme’s resilience and
its continued viability. Key recommendations were made, which are internationally relevant.
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“I usually go training to relieve stress…” But what if you can’t

train?: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE JOB DEMANDS RESOURCES
MODEL IN THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES
By Comdt Andrew Burke
In today’s world stress is omnipresent. While personnel across the Irish Defence Forces
understand that stress exists, their ability to deal with it is self-taught and superficial in terms
of understanding its causes and what can help to ameliorate stress.
The Job Demands Resources (JD-R) Model is an occupational stress model that sets job
demands against job resources. Job demands are those aspects of the job that require sustained
physical and/ or psychological effort and are associated with physiological and/ or psychological
costs. Job resources are those aspects of the job that reduce job demands and the associated
physiological and psychological costs.
The research showed that service in the Irish Defence Forces is stressful and that the
organisations understanding of stress is limited. While serving personnel accept this, their
ability to deal with stress is self- taught and based on the need to get ‘space’ by carrying out
recreational activities. While the model was introduced to research participants summarily,
they all acknowledged its relevance and suitability.
The findings demonstrate the need for a better understanding of stress in the Irish Defence
Forces. It is also recommended that the Job Demands- Resources model is adopted as the
occupational stress model of choice across the Defence Forces to better understand job
demands and resources.
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HOW CAN THE DEFENCE FORCES MITIGATE THE RISKS POSED

BY NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT?
By Comdt Greg Burns
British MOD (2018) have stated “that information is no longer just and enabler, it is a fully-
fledged national level of power, a critical enabler to understanding, decision making and
tempo, and a weapon to be used from strategic to tactical level for advantage”. The significance
of this evidence indicates that the Irish Defence Forces cannot operate in a vacuum when it
comes to the threats posed by hybrid warfare in the information domain.
The literature highlights the growing weaponisation of the internet and its application by non-
state actors to conduct hybrid warfare in the information environment. The application of
these hybrid methods by ISIS and Al-Shabaab have demonstrated the significant capabilities
provided by the internet as a platform to manipulate perception and radicalise followers. This
thesis explores these challenges and investigates the methods employed by nation states to
counter these hybrid threats.
The research of this thesis adopted a qualitative phenomenological research methodology,
utilising a combination of semi-structured interviews and case studies. As part of this process,
experienced DF personnel were consulted to provide an organisational perspective and subject
matter experts from outside the organisation provided an in-depth look at the global challenges
at the strategic level.
The research indicates the substantial security risks that exist in the information domain
to the force protection of DF soldiers serving overseas. The key findings proposes that the
platform provided by social media permits non-sate actors to express or exploit anger setting
off additional torrents of rage. Recommendations from this study determine that the DF needs
the capability to decipher reality from perception in the information domain particularly in the
context of an overseas deployment
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MANAGER BEHAVIOUR IN THE DEFENCE FORCES AND THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2014 – PERCEPTIONS OF
SENIOR STAFF
By Comdt Cathal English
“Never write if you can speak; never speak if you can nod; never nod if you can wink” is a quote
attributed to attributed to an old New York Democratic boss (Smyth, 2003, p. 86).
In a modern democracy where openness and transparency is rightly expected, a military
organisation must find the balance between its responsibilities for security and its obligations
to the institutions of civil society. This thesis sets out to explore how manager behaviour in the
Irish Defence Forces has been effected by the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act
2014 and the perceptions of senior military staff around those impacts.
The research adopted a post-positivist qualitative methodology and phenomenological
perspective and utilised a combination of a case study, a focus group, and semi-structured
interviews with senior executives of the Irish Defence Forces.
The research results indicated that a culture of openness, an increase in transparency, and an
increase in accountability have resulted from the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act
2014 in the Irish Defence Forces. The results also indicate that, after initial wariness around
Freedom of Information within the military context, military management are positively
disposed to the impacts that the Freedom of Information Act produced.
This thesis concludes that the culture of openness, the increase in transparency, and the increase
in accountability have led to better decision making and an increased level of trust with both
external and internal audiences. Finally, a number of recommendations were reached which
include the release of routine military processes that would negate the necessity for Freedom
of Information requests, targeted rank-appropriate education in the Freedom of Information
area, specialised training in the area of ‘big-data’ and the consideration of.
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PLACES, SPACES, AND PEDAGOGIES: IS THE DEFENCE

FORCES’ LEARNING ENVIRONMENT SUPPORTING THE NEEDS
OF ITS LEARNERS?
By Comdt Colin Lawlor
This thesis aims to answer the central research question: is the Defence Forces’ learning
environment supporting the needs of its learners? A theoretical framework based on the three
components of places, spaces, and pedagogies that comprise the military learning environment
is employed to guide this inquiry. This research is informed by workplace learning theory,
learning spaces design, and adult learning theory.
A mixed methods approach was adopted for this research. Initially, data was collected through
documentary analysis of key Defence Forces’ education policy documents. This was followed by
the creation of a ‘military learning environment survey’ using ‘Survey Monkey’ to assess military
learner’s perceptions of the military learning environment. The survey was administered to
members of the current Junior Command and Staff Course and Joint Command and Staff
Course at the Military College. The final stage of data collection was the conduct of semi-
structured elite interviews with strategic leaders responsible for officer education in the
Defence Forces.
Analysis of Defence Forces education policies highlight the value placed upon education by
the Defence Forces, however, some difficulties with delivering on the ambitions for education
have emerged. These include inadequate funding; the absence of a coordinated Capability
Development Plan with a supporting Infrastructure Development Plan, and the dilution of
infrastructure responsibilities across directorates and command boundaries. Results from
the survey indicate that learners are motivated to learn so they qualify for promotion and
also to enhance their professional knowledge. Barriers to learning in the military workplace
include inadequate time to complete tasks, heavy course workloads, and learning infrastructure
problems. Findings also point to widespread dissatisfaction with the infrastructure of the Military
College, accommodation facilities, learning facilities, and internet connectivity. Facilitators of
learning include teaching quality, the Military College link to Maynooth University, and peer
knowledge and experience sharing.
It can be inferred from these results that military learners have similar pedagogic and proxemic
needs to other adult learners. Military learners also experience similar barriers and enablers
of learning to other workplace learners, confirming that workplace learning theory is a useful
theoretical lens for understanding learning in the military workplace.
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CAN RESILIENCE ENGINEERING THEORY BE USED TO

IMPROVE RESILIENT PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING SAFETY
PERFORMANCE) IN COMPLEX SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS?
By Comdt David Browne
This thesis seeks to explore whether resilience engineering theory can be used in practice
to improve resilient performance (including safety performance) in complex sociotechnical
systems. In order to answer the question, the practical application of the theory was applied
to a real complex sociotechnical system, namely the Irish Air Corps’ Emergency Aeromedical
Service. The research addresses a gap in academic literature within the field of organisational
resilience, in that to date no research has been conducted into the practical application of
resilience engineering’s recently developed Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) model in an
organisation that engages in complex flying operations.
The study required a background understanding of psychological and ecological resilience
theory in order to develop a sufficiently deep understanding of the existing theories that led to
resilience engineering. Resilience engineering emerged in response to the lack of satisfactory
performance of traditional safety management systems over the last three decades, especially in
professional aviation organisations. It aims to use the knowledge that has already been gained
through psychology and ecology and apply it to sociotechnical systems.
The theory proposes that successfully performing sociotechnical systems must be able to
monitor the critical, respond to the actual, anticipate the potential, and learn from the factual.
The RAG model, on which this theory is based, was created to assist in the practical assessment
of organisational resilience and to identify where improvements in resilient performance could
be made. An adapted form of this model was therefore used to assess organisational resilience
in the Air Corps’ EAS operation, and identify where improvement interventions could
be made.
A pragmatic mixed-methods iterative approach was adapted through the use of focus groups and
semi-structured interviews, with the quantitative element providing the basis for the graphic
presentation of results, and the qualitative element providing the basis for a rich understanding
of the problems encountered within the system and therefore allowing the opportunity to
propose effective and valuable interventions for improvement.
Following data collection and analysis, it was found that the EAS operation performs reasonably
well in the system’s ability to monitor and respond, but considerable effort is required to
improve resilient performance with respect to learning and anticipation. These improvements
would create conditions for improved performance (including safety performance) and would
ultimately result in the Air Corps providing greater safety for crews, improved patient care, a
more efficient operation and the confidence to be prepared for the unexpected. The study
demonstrated that resilience engineering theory can be used to assess organisational resilience
in a complex sociotechnical system, and identify where improvements to resilient performance
could be targeted.
217
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

OR POLITICAL INTERFERENCE?
By Comdt David Duff
The 2011 NATO-led intervention into Libya was predicated under a protection of civilians
mandate and was the first instance of the UNSC authorising intervention into a nation
without that nation’s consent. Libya therefore, affords an opportunity to further the debate on
the subject of both humanitarian intervention and the protection of civilians. Moreover, Libya
offers a contextual platform from which to analyse the development of NATO’s protection of
civilians (POC) framework and may help determine the efficacy and practicality of the POC
policy or indeed of intervention for humanitarian purposes itself. As primarily a defence
alliance, with its raison d'être being the principle of collective defence, NATO has demonstrated
its willingness to conduct humanitarian interventions in order to protect civilians. However,
the current instability in Libya since the 2011 NATO-led intervention and the subsequent
second order effects of that intervention give cause to question the efficacy of the intervention.
These second-order effects include but are not limited to, lack of central government control,
ongoing violations of human rights and the proliferation of armed groups, in particular the rise
of Islamic State in parts of Libya. This has also had the consequence of contributing to regional
instability through spill over from Libya into Mali and Egypt.
At the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO nations endorsed a specific POC policy, with
its stated aim being to “instil a coherent, consistent and integrated approach to POC” (NATO
2016: 2). Can NATO’s POC policy be operationalised to ensure that humanitarian intervention
remains impartial and that a post-intervention Libya does not reoccur in the future? Moreover,
against this background, can genuine humanitarian intervention be separated from the politics
of national interest? The aim of this thesis is to examine NATO’s POC policy in the context of
the broader interpretation of POC and to determine if NATO is best suited to carry forward
the developing political and normative assumptions of POC. It additionally evaluates the
efficacy of NATO as an intervening agent on behalf of the UN and assesses the effect that the
Libyan intervention has had on the development of the POC policy endorsed at NATO’s 2016
Warsaw Summit.
The findings from this research suggest that NATO’s POC policy itself provides nothing new
and presents no further obligation to its members. As such, the policy in essence represents the
bringing together of all current POC obligations of NATO nations under one policy document.
Additional findings indicate that the separation of humanitarian intervention and national
interest is nigh impossible and that although NATO is in itself not an altruistic organisation,
it nonetheless may represent the only response option in instances of grave violations of
human rights.
218
NEGOTIATION, A SKILL WORTH FIGHTING FOR: IS CURRENT

IRISH DEFENCE FORCES NEGOTIATION TRAINING SUFFICIENT
FOR OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS?
By Comdt Dermot Earley
Irish Defence Force officers will find themselves negotiating in conflict regions, between
warring parties, on complex issues, where an alternative to peace is possible injury or loss
of life. At all levels, Irish officers should be fully prepared to navigate any negotiation
process successfully.
In order to identify shortcomings in the area of negotiation training, this study explores how the
Irish Defence Forces train and develop the negotiation skills of its officers. It further examines
avenues for professional development and competency to ensure our officers are fully prepared
to negotiate effectively at home and more specifically, overseas.
A qualitative phenomenological study was accompanied by interviewing serving and retired
officers who were centrally involved in overseas negotiations at varying levels. Their knowledge
and experiences provided a rich description of the challenges they faced negotiating overseas
and the training, or lack of, they received in preparation for such appointments. Content
analysis revealed a close alignment with the literature reviewed and the research findings.
The research findings indicate that current negotiation training in the Irish Defence Forces
is not adequate. It is further posited that due to our innate ability to interact and adapt with
people and situations when required, negotiation training in the Irish Defence Forces has
never received the focus it necessitates and therefore should become part of Defence Force
formal training.
In light of these findings, a number of conclusions and recommendations are made. This
thesis proposes the requirement for a modularised crisis negotiation course, for officers serving
overseas in appointments that necessitate negotiation, and should be conducted in the pre-
deployment phase of training. It further describes a model for crisis negotiation training, which
is recommended for officer education within the Defence Forces. The adoption of such a
model will meet the Defence Forces requirement to advance our current knowledge and skills
in negotiations.
219
DESTRUCTIVE INNOVATION: AN EXAMINATION OF INNOVATION

BY IRREGULAR FORCES
By Comdt Enda Moynihan
This thesis examines the nature of innovation by irregular forces such as terrorists and insurgents
in order to address the following questions: 1. What drives and/or enables innovation for
irregular forces? and 2. What are the most appropriate responses by conventional forces when
faced with disruptive innovation from irregular forces?
In addition to examining scholarly work in the defence and security field, this work also draws
on sources from the fields of business management, public policy and sociology in order to gain
as holistic a view of the phenomenon as possible. The research took the form of semi-structured
interviews with subject matter experts both with Counter IED experience and specialist
knowledge on innovation. The relevance to the Defence Forces, as a whole, is that a better
understanding of such innovations could lead to improvements in how we approach C-IED.
The key findings of the study on the question of innovation by irregular forces are that it is
driven by many factors from cost, emulation, practicality and overcoming countermeasures.
These factors additionally are influenced by a group’s relationship with other groups and the
nature of the environment in which the irregular force can operate.
Concerning the response by conventional forces, it is found that the employment of certain
types of technological countermeasures and proactive measures against threat networks are
limited in their effectiveness. Great value can be extracted from improved tactics techniques
and procedures. The effect of organisational culture for a conventional force is significant and
the degree of inertia that is inherent in large organisations is clearly an obstacle which needs
to be addressed.
220
A REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE FORCES EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT

SCHEME: DOES IT CONTRIBUTE TO POSITIVE SOCIAL IMPACT
By Comdt Eoghan O’Sullivan
As Ireland's economy approaches full employment, the rate of youth unemployment is well
above the levels during the height of the Celtic Tiger. The Defence Forces Employment
Support Scheme aims to provide participants between the ages of 18-24, with the knowledge
and skills that will enhance their capacity to pursue employment, work experience or further
educational opportunities.
The aim of this research was to review the Defence Forces Employment Support Scheme from a
social impact perspective, as outlined in the White Paper on Defence (2015). In conducting the
research, the relevant literature was reviewed in detail, along with qualitative analysis involving
a number of key individuals who have been instrumental in developing and overseeing the
scheme since its inception.
The key findings of this research were that the scheme has a positive social impact. All of
the research participants spoke highly of their involvement with the scheme. An unexpected
finding related to the positive effect, which the scheme has had for the Defence Forces. This is
positive in an era where the Defence Forces can struggle to justify its relevance.
In conclusion, the Defence Forces Employment Support Scheme is a success. Further study
may be required to evaluate the progress of the participants after the completion of the course
in order to fully assess if they are in full employment, education or on the live register.
221
PROCUREMENT EFFICIENCY IN THE DEFENCE FORCES:

BALANCING EXPERT OPINION
By Comdt James Hourigan
Procurement is a critical function for any large modern organisation. Many large modern
organisations, with a wide globally-distributed structure, function optimally under centre-led
procurement as they can take advantage of a number of factors that enhance efficiency. The aim
of this research was to elicit consensus of expert opinion on the current state of procurement
within the Defence Forces, how it might be improved, whether centre-led procurement would
improve procurement efficiency and effectiveness, whether there was any appetite for change
at the senior management level and to what extent change to centre led procurement was
desirable or feasible for senior management in the Defence Forces.
Semi-structured interviews were carried out in order to ascertain the data in a qualitative
approach. Four interviews were carried out with experts within the Defence Forces and the
Department of Defence at the senior management level and one with a senior representative
of the Office of Government Procurement, to provide an external unbiased perspective.
Each interview was prefaced by the provision of a case study on centre led procurement to
contextualise the area of research. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and thematic
coding used to identify recurring themes.
The results showed a significant degree of consensus from interviewees within the Defence
Forces/Department of Defence in that there was no requirement or utility for change, except
in special cases, as procurement was currently working well. The Office of Government
Procurement interviewee demurred, expressing the need to constantly refine process and
practice to maximise efficiency and effectiveness.
Challenges such as the cash accounting system and lack of multi-annual budgets were identified
as significant impediments, in addition to skills fade due to the constant turnover of personnel
and the unique nature of military service. There was a large variation in the appetite for
change. Ultimately, centre led procurement was recognised as the way ahead with regards to
complex and bespoke procurement, but there was no clear vision or roadmap identified by
senior management as to how it should be achieved.
This thesis identified a natural tension between the need for compliance and the need for
innovation and evolution of processes and practices. This should provide a platform for
future research into the harmonisation of both approaches to exploit the positives from
each viewpoint.
222
MOTHERHOOD AND THE MILITARY- APPOSING FORCES A

FEMALE PERSPECTIVE
By Comdt Orla Jennings
Becoming a mother is a life altering experience on its own. When women who serve in the
military become mothers for the first time their cover as conceptual men is broken. Motherhood
ultimately alters the playing field.
The review of the literature focused on the institutions of work and family and examined
the intersection between these two opposing arenas. Both institutions have been termed
“greedy” within the literature. Role conflict emerged as a theme in two guises, first as a result
of involvement in two competing systems and second from having a range of competing duties
to perform. One of the major obstacles put forward for women in pursuing a career is that
of balancing the new roles associated with motherhood and their previous existing work
related roles. The literature points to the construct of masculinity as an emergent theme when
considering women in an organisation such as the Defence Forces where they are a minority
grouping. The literature also ranks organisations maturity in respect of work life balance
polices and supports provided to women and the perception of these supports within both the
organisation and by the recipients of these supports.
The research employed a post-positivist, qualitative research methodology utilising semi-
structured interviews with senior HR managers both internal and external to the Defence
Forces. Focus groups with participants drawn from all three services, Army, Air Corps and
Naval Service and including both commissioned and non-commissioned officers were also
exploited. This provided a broad range of views. The unique experiences of women as mothers
and soldiers was captured.
This study confirmed that women re-evaluate their future careers when children arrive and based
on current requirements for career progression within the Defence Forces are self-selecting not
to progress. It also confirmed that the current career obstacles for many to overcome require a
clear choice between family and work. This research drew attention to the fact that women are
disadvantaged by common practices of performance appraisal when absent for maternity leave.
This research has also demonstrated that women are highly committed to the Defence Forces
and deeply appreciated of the statutory entitlements they receive.
In conclusion for the Defence Forces to recruit, retain, promote and increase the number of
women within the organisation it is essential that it acknowledges that the current practices do
not fit with the way women work. Failure to do so will continue to result in a loss of capability
which the Defence Forces cannot afford.
223
SHOULD THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES DEVELOP AN

ADAPTATION PLAN FOR CLIMATE CHANGE?
Comdt Louise Fitzsimons
Ireland’s climate is changing in terms of sea level rise, increases in average temperature, changes
in precipitation patterns and weather extremes. The observed scale and rate of change is
consistent with European and global trends. The Irish Defence Forces has been requested by
local authorities throughout the country to supply defence aid for every adverse weather event
since 2010. Notwithstanding supplying defence aid, defence infrastructure is experiencing
the effects of climate change during these extreme weather events with increased demand for
heating and cooling of buildings. This is similar to what other militaries experienced and who
have since developed adaptation plans for climate change. This difference between the Irish
Defence Forces and other militaries who have developed adaptation plans for climate change
is that they were legislated to do so by their government.
This research found that there is a level of concern for the impact of climate change by
Government, Department of Defence and Defence Forces. The Government are producing
the All Government Climate Action Plan, the publication of which keeps being postponed.
The Department of Defence had input into this document, yet the Defence Forces say they did
not. Production of after-action review of aid to the civil authority callouts for extreme weather
events vary but where produced they consistently fault equipment available to use and the
suitability of military equipment for civilian use.
While the Government, Department of Defence and the Defence Forces are interested in
addressing climate change they have not come together to address the issues being faced. It
is therefore essential that the Defence Forces develop an adaptation plan to climate change
with the support of Department of Defence and Government to have a unified approach to
becoming climate resilient.
224
THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES:

IS IT FIT FOR PURPOSE?
By Comdt Michael Parsons
Is the Command Structure of the Defence Forces Fit for Purpose? This thesis examines the
Command Structure of the Defence Forces and whether it is fit for purpose. The history of the
Command Structure of Óglaigh na hÉirean is examined in detail in order to establish why the
Defence Forces has the command structure it currently has, if it is suitable or are there more
suitable options available.
It explores the militaries of several other nations who are in the process of changing or have
already changed their Command Structures in response to the evolving security and defence
arena as well as changing strategic threats. It contrasts that which caused these other nations
to change their C2 against the unchanging structure of the Defence Forces. The thesis also
explores various change theories, asks what the best change model for the Irish Defence Forces
would be and how the Defence Forces could change were the political will to do so present.
The study revealed several findings including the fact that Jointness, in some form at the
strategic level at least, may be a solution to command and control issues bearing in mind that
the small scale of the Defence Forces makes this difficult to achieve. The subject matter experts
interviewed in Chapter Four all agree that the Command Structure needs to change to some
extent or another. It also became apparent that the Chief of Staff needs more autonomy, both
from a legal and command perspective.
As a result of these findings a number of recommendations were made including changes to
the establishment of the Defence Forces, the introduction of Jointness in some form tailored
specifically for Irish military tasking’s, the need for new branches such as cyber- warfare to deal
with evolving strategic threats and the creation of a land component commander.
225
PREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL EMERGENCIES IRELAND’S

APPROACH TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: A
GAP ANALYSIS
By Comdt Paul Connolly
The aim of this research is to examine the national approach to emergency preparedness and
to determine how prepared Ireland is for an emergency that would require the activation
of the National Emergency Coordination Group. The research applies the Clark and Estes’
(2008) Gap Analysis Model to identify the existence and causes of the gaps in national
emergency preparedness.
The research first establishes the national high-level goals for emergency preparedness
and through document analysis and interviews attempts to define the current levels of
preparedness. Then by applying the Gap Analysis Model, the research examines three areas,
namely Knowledge, Motivation, and Organisation, to determine the root causes of the gaps. By
then comparing the gaps to the desired end state, a road map to a better level of preparedness
is proposed.
Through this research I have found that Ireland is moving towards improved preparedness for
national level emergencies. Policy and guidance documents exist, and key individuals recognise
the need for a developed emergency management system. However, gaps also exist and will
need coordination and collaboration amongst all members of the Government Task Force
for Emergency Planning along with leadership and guidance from the Lead Government
Departments and the Office of Emergency Planning if those gaps are to be resolved.
226
THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES’ APPROACH TO CONTEMPORARY

CIMIC OPERATIONS IN UNIFIL: IS THE DEFENCE FORCES
DEVELOPING THE NECESSARY CAPABILITY TO MEET THE
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF ITS UN CIMIC ROLES?
By Comdt Rory Esler
The thesis will examine the Irish DF’s approach to contemporary CIMIC operations in UNIFIL.
The question that provides direction for this thesis is: Is the DF developing the necessary capability
to meet the operational requirements of its UN CIMIC roles? Essentially, this research examines how
the DF selects and trains personnel for this operational task to ensure the organisation can
meet the UN’s requirements.
Selection for overseas service is generally conducted in a structured way within the Defence
Forces to ensure a fair system is available to all personnel. This research examines whether
there is a link between individuals selected for operational roles overseas and the suitability of
such individuals.
Pre-deployment training of personnel selected for tactical CIMIC appointments in UNIFIL
is the main focus of the research. International military best practice is considered, as well as
published literature regarding areas of importance for pre-deployment training. In particular,
training in cultural awareness, negotiation and language skills is examined to establish what
level of training in these softer military skills is available to military personnel, pre and
post-deployment.
Interviews conducted with the selection and training authorities within the DF reveal how
the organisation deals with these areas. Focused semi-structured interviews with officers with
a combined total of five years’ experience in tactical CIMIC appointments in UNIFIL provide
detail of the lack of formal training in these skills. However, the Irish DF still manage to meet
all operational requirements assigned by the UN.
There is no doubt that the Irish DF is meeting the operational requirements of its UN CIMIC
tasks, but it may be doing so by consequence of its soldiers’ collective attitudes and behaviour,
rather than by design. The empathetic nature of Irish soldiers and their ability to apply an ‘Irish
approach’ to any and all scenarios they encounter during deployment positively influences the
attitude of the local population towards the deployed force. The intricacies of peace-keeping
appear to come naturally to Irish soldiers.
227
MOTIVATIONAL CLIMATE IN THE CADET SCHOOL:

THE INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE IN A PHYSICAL
TRAINING ENVIRONMENT
By Comdt Ross Dunphy
This thesis examines if the motivational climate in the Cadet School of the Irish Defence Forces
facilitates individuals to reach their physical fitness potential. It examines specifically the impact
of organisational climate and outlines the current understanding of how climate influences
motivation. The conceptual framework draws from the existent literature in organisational
climate, motivation, sensemaking, social comparison and goal setting and situates these in the
context of inductees in this military training environment.
A mixed methods research approach was employed. This comprised of questionnaires, previous
fitness test results, focus groups and semi-structured interviews with both newly commissioned
officers and cadets, and key influencers in the Cadet School. The key findings indicate that
section commanders, platoon sergeants and platoon commanders are the main architects of
climate within the Cadet School. Climate plays a significant role in restricting certain cadets
from achieving their full physical training potential, and this has knock-on effect on the other
areas of their training. The findings also indicated a gendered nature to this phenomenon.
A physical training regime that incorporates a realistically high level of personal challenge
and which also includes the possibility of both ability-based individual and group elements of
physical training increases motivation to succeed. Approaches to the recognition of injury on
the part of key influencers have serious implications for psychological well-being for feelings of
efficacy in relation to other areas of cadet preparation.
Recommendations include a comprehensive approach to human performance, development
of an educational framework for both staff and students and a physical training environment
centred on a team-based military ethos incorporating individual and group-based goals.
228
THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES: APPLICATION OF FORCE

PROTECTION ACROSS UN MISSIONS
By Comdt Shane Phelan
As soldiers, it is expected that we will be placed, at times, in harm’s way. We do after all
deploy soldiers to assist our public services in on-island operations, including tasks such as
flood relief and firefighting. We conduct live fire training exercises and deploy our soldiers on
overseas missions suffering injury and loss of life. This aim of this research is to determine best
practice when assessing risks and their application to Force Protection measures adopted on
UN missions from an Irish military perspective.
Combining semi-structured interviews of highly competent individuals with some pre-existing
textual data, the study found that many factors at the tactical, operational and strategic level
influence a mission’s, country’s or an individual’s appreciation and application of force
protection. The adoption of a Force Protection doctrine and its implementation will mitigate
those risks which soldiers can be subjected to on overseas missions to as low as is reasonably
possible while also fulfilling the mission those troops were sent to achieve.
The main findings of this study are that NATO Force Protection doctrine is the best approach
to Force Protection and should be implemented and espoused by the Irish Defence Forces on-
island and overseas. National and individual approaches to force protection significantly affect
a mission’s approach to force protection. In general, culture changes slowly, with the possible
exception being shocks to systems which can generate a more rapid rate of change. Ireland’s
significant contribution to peacekeeping can be further enhanced by being a positive influence
for change in the area of force protection and the safety of all soldiers on overseas missions.
229
MAKING A CASE FOR IRELAND TO ADOPT A NATIONAL

MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY.
By Lt Cdr Bernard Heffernan
Ireland, as an island nation, is heavily dependent on the seas for social, political and economic
deliverables and requires that this maritime domain is secure for its survivability. Despite this
requirement for security, Ireland has not developed a maritime security strategy.
The aim of this thesis is to make a case for Ireland to adopt a national maritime security strategy
as the literature review highlighted that island nations with a heavy dependency on the oceans
should implement a maritime security strategy. The literature review also highlighted that the
creation of a maritime security strategy can be utilised to define the maritime governance of a
state and that the methods to complete this requirements requires states to conduct maritime
security sector reform.
This research adopted a qualitative research design with a social constructivist approach. Data
was collected utilizing a focus group to form the questions for the conduct of semi-structured
interviews of the senior command of the Naval Service and of a leading Irish academic expert.
The findings of this research indicate that a maritime security strategy is required as it would
resolve the current siloed approach in Ireland towards maritime national security. This is due
to the disperse allocation of maritime responsibility across all government departments that
has no central coordinator with authority. The findings of the research further reflect that a
maritime security strategy is a key enabler to economic development of the maritime sector,
however, maritime sector reform is required.
The key finding of this research is that a case does exist for Ireland to adopt a maritime
security strategy.
230
THE FUTURE MODEL OF JOINTNESS WITHIN THE IRISH

DEFENCE FORCES: HOW DO WE GET THERE?
By Lt Cdr David Memery
Irish Government policy expresses the intent that the Defence Forces should operate ‘Jointly’,
that is to deliver effects in a coordinated and cohesive manner. Building on previous research,
the aim of this study is to identify, analysis and ultimately recommend what model of ‘Jointness’
is best suited for application within the Defence Forces.
As part of this analysis, it is important to take cognizance of the prevailing cultures within
the component services that constitute the Defence Forces and how such cultures will impact
upon the transition to achieving joint effects, with particular emphasis upon the level of
understanding that exists within the Defence Forces as to a ‘Joint’ concept and the application
of various levels and models of joint organizational structures that can be employed.
This study initially examines a broad swathe of academic literature, determining that although
a significant proportion of this literature is focused upon the implications of Joint structural
dynamics in larger, more kinetic, military structures, there exists utility in its employment in
the context of establishing an analysis of Jointness within the Irish context.
This study also adopts a Realist, Post-Positive ethnographic approach to examine the individual
service culture, the overall organisation Defence Forces culture, and how they interact in the
context of organisational change.
Findings from this research indicate that the Defence Forces has developed to become
increasingly Joint and that a broad, yet diverse, understanding of the utility of a joint concept
exists. Findings also determine that the organisational cultural dynamics have reduced in
severity, despite the existence of cultural barriers.
This shift in the cultural organisational dynamic provides a window of opportunity for the
Defence Forces to further develop a Joint concept; however, the window of opportunity is
finite and may close if the Defence Forces does not take advantage of its current position.
231
“THE NEW COLD WAR”

By Lt Col Daniel Wicke
After the end of the Cold War NATO’s old adversary, the Soviet Union had fallen apart and
its successor, Russia, sank into insignificance. NATO faced other conflicts and concentrated its
efforts on fighting international terrorism and other threats for the international community.
But fighting insurgents and terrorists worldwide influenced NATO Forces on both sides of the
Atlantic Ocean, in their structure as well as in their ideology and mindset. In Europe, former
Warsaw Pact members decided to join NATO and took shelter under the umbrella of NATO.
Consequently, military forces were adjusted to the new security environment and were reduced
dramatically throughout Europe.
With NATO expanding its area of responsibility to the East, Russian sphere of influence has
been decreased and Russia expressed – more than once – its unwillingness to accept this new
situation of being surrounded by its previous enemy. In March 2014 the Russian bear roared
again and reminded Europe that the old and well-known adversary of the west is back on
stage. The Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Waleri Gerasimov used a new strategic
concept of expanding Russian influence through all possible means. This approach was later
described as the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” and illustrated the idea of hybrid warfare.
Acknowledging the problematic history of the German – Russian relations, this thesis describes
the development of the German Army, after Russian illegal annexation of the Crimean
Peninsula and its aggression in Eastern Ukraine. It assesses the development of NATO towards
a higher status of readiness and responsiveness and describes the political framework in which
German forces are set.
This thesis is aimed to provide an impression of the capabilities modern Land Forces must
provide to withstand a hybrid adversary on a more and more digitalised battlefield. They are
derived from the lessons learned from current conflicts, a possible path of development for the
German Army described, as well as several individual actions are recommended.
232
TRANSFORMATIONAL VERSUS TRANSACTIONAL LEADERSHIP

IN US ARMY LOGISTICS LEADERS
By Major Samantha Smay
The US Army is a global network that would not be effective without a good logistics network.
A good logistics network needs effective Logistics Officers to be effective. The purpose of
this research paper is to examine which leadership style is more effective, transformational or
transactional for US Army logistics officer.
This study aims to determine the effective leadership style for US Army Logistics Officers in
order to gain a better understanding of the current leadership styles used and when to use
them to be more effective. After analysing the current literature, the research revealed that
past studies used the Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) as a basis for research, and
there is a gap in styles of leadership used in logistics. While the MLQ is a sound model, it does
not reveal the human aspects of leadership. Therefore, the study used a qualitative method of
research using authoritative knowledge, subjective epistemology, relativist ontology, naturalist
methodology and balanced axiology to conduct the research.
The study was conducted through semi-structured interviews analysed using reoccurring themes
by coding the data into smaller packets. Ultimately the study confirmed five characteristics of
an effective logistics officer in explaining the why, communication, building the team, trust,
and accomplishing tasks based in current literature.
The study revealed three factors in choosing which leadership styles is more effective based on
situation-based, position-based and environment-based. The findings of the study demonstrate
that further research is needed using qualitative methods and a larger sample to examine using
a blend of two leadership styles based on the three factors.
233
234
SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL
STATEMENTS OF
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
Dr. Donna O’Shea is Head of Department of Computer Science at Cork Institute of
Technology, Funded Investigator at the SFI research centres CONNECT and ENABLE and
group lead of Ríomh – Intelligent Secure Systems research group and member of Nimbus
Research Centre. Donna’s research expertise lies in the area of enterprise security (i.e. SDN
and NFV security) and network and service management with a specific focus on the design,
analysis and optimisation of wired and wireless communication systems, networks and services.
Dr. Mubashir Husain Rehmani received a B.Eng. Degree in computer systems engineering
from Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro, Pakistan, in 2004, the M.S.
degree from the University of Paris XI, Paris, France, in 2008, and the Ph.D. degree from the
University Pierre and Marie Curie, Paris, in 2011. He is currently working as Assistant Lecturer
in the Department of Computer Science, Cork Institute of Technology, Ireland. Prior to this,
he worked as Post Doctoral Researcher at the Telecommunications Software and Systems
Group (TSSG), Waterford Institute of Technology (WIT), Waterford, Ireland. He also served
for five years as an Assistant Professor at COMSATS Institute of Information Technology,
Wah Cantt., Pakistan. He is currently serving as an Area Editor of the IEEE Communications
Surveys and Tutorials. He is also serving as Column Editor for Book Reviews in IEEE
Communications Magazine.
Dr. Brendan Flynn is a lecturer at the School of Political Science and Sociology, NUI, Galway.
His current research interests include maritime security and defence and security studies more
broadly. He teaches European politics and Ocean and Marine politics and has lectured at
the Joint Senior Command and Staff Course. He was a co-editor of the 2018 Defence Forces
Review. Recent publications include: Flynn, Brendan (2019) “From hand-me-down navies to
niche players? Comparing the navies of (very) small European states”, pp. 51-70 in McCabe,
Robert, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller (eds.) Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security
Balancing Traditional Roles and Emergent Threats in the 21st Century. London: Routledge;
Flynn, Brendan (2018) 'PESCO and the Challenges of Multilateral Defence Cooperation for
Ireland: More of the Same or Sea Change?'. Irish Studies In International Affairs, 29 :1-23.
Jonathan Carroll, a graduate of Maynooth University with a Degree in Civil Law and
a Master's in Military History and Strategic Studies, is currently a PhD student in Military
History at Texas A&M University, a United States Senior Military College. Jonathan's research
focus is on military operations other than war (MOOTW). He is currently working on a project
examining the multinational military interventions in Somalia from 1992-1995. Previously,
Jonathan was an adjunct lecturer with the Center for Military History and Strategic Studies
at Maynooth University, providing academic instruction to Defence Forces cadets, potential-
officer, and officer progression career courses. Jonathan also served in the Army Reserve as
an NCO, and subsequently a commissioned officer, with units in Dublin, Athlone and the
Defence Forces Training Center
236
Capt Kevin Fitzgerald works as a helicopter pilot in No. 3 Operations Wing in the Air
Corps, and as a press and public relations officer. He has a background in aeromedical flying
and police flying, and works primarily as a flight instructor in the helicopter school. Kevin has
a particular interest in development of the Special Operations Forces rotary capability in the
Defence Forces.
Capt James Northover

BSc In Management and Aeronautical Studies, DIT
BSc Honours Aviation Technology with Pilot Studies. University of Leeds.
BSc Honours Management and Aeronautical Studies
Lt David Finnegan is a pilot with the Maritime Surveillance and Airlift Squadron of the Irish
Air Corps. He is also a founding member of the Defence Forces RPAS school who provide
education, training and flight safety information to all members of the organisation in all
matters pertaining to RPAS operations both at home and overseas
Dr. Sharon Feeney is Head of Learning Development, College of Business, Technological

University, Dublin. She is a board member of the Higher Education Authority (in the role
of Deputy Chair from 2016 – 2020) and is Chair of the Audit and Risk Committee (2016 –
2021). Her research interests focus on higher education policy at the institutional, national
and international levels, with particular emphasis on gender equality, teaching and learning
enhancement in higher education, quality systems, and qualifications and awards frameworks
Dr. Daniel Fiott is Security and Defence Editor at the EU Institute for Security Studies
(EUISS). At the EUISS, Daniel analyses European defence policy, CSDP, defence capability
and industrial issues and hybrid threats. Daniel was educated at the University of Cambridge
and he holds a PhD from the Free University of Brussels (VUB). He is the author of
Defence Industrial Cooperation in the European Union: The State, the Firm and Europe
(Routledge, 2019).
Eoin Micheál McNamara is currently in the completing stages of a PhD in political science
at the University of Tartu in Estonia. His monograph is focused on NATO stabilisation strategy
in Afghanistan. Since 2013, McNamara has taught extensively at Tartu’s Johan Skytte Institute
of Political Studies, convening courses in: foreign policy analysis; transatlantic relations; EU
security policy; alliances in international politics; and power in international politics. His
research interests include: NATO transformation; comparative security policy in Central and
Eastern Europe; Nordic-Baltic security; and the strategies of war in the contemporary world.
McNamara’s academic and policy publications have appeared in the NATO Review, the Revue
Militaire Suisse, New Eastern Europe and Irish Studies in International Affairs, as well as
with research institutes including the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Helsinki)
and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia). His commentary on security and
defence affairs has been quoted in many international media outlets; these include the New
York Times, the Irish Times and the Estonian Public Broadcasting Service (ERR). In July and
August 2019 he was awarded the Think Visegrád Fellowship at the Institute of International
237
Relations (IIR) in Prague, Czech Republic to undertake research on the Visegrád states and the
development of collective security along NATO’s ‘Eastern flank’. He holds an MSc in security
studies from University College London; an MA in European Union – Russia studies from the
University of Tartu; and a BA (Hons.) in history and politics from University College Dublin.
Comdt Gavin Egerton is a professional Army officer with 17 years’ service in the Infantry
Corps. He was commissioned in 2004 and commenced his career with 3 Infantry Battalion.
He later served in 1 Mechanised Infantry Company; 4 Infantry Battalion; 1 Brigade Training
Centre; Officer Training Wing, Infantry School; and Strategic Planning Branch, DFHQ. His
most recent appointment was as Officer-in-Charge and Chief Instructor of the NCO Training
Wing, Infantry School. He has served overseas on three previous occasions: as a CIMIC officer
with 101 Infantry Battalion MINURCAT, as Company 2IC with 108 Infantry Battalion UNIFIL,
and as battalion operations officer with 110 Infantry Battalion UNIFIL. Comdt Egerton holds
a Bachelor of Business degree from GMIT; a Higher Diploma in Leadership, Defence, and
Contemporary Security from Maynooth University; as well as a first class honours Master’s
degree in Political Communication from Dublin City University. He is currently deployed to
EUTM Mali where he is serving as the Deputy Chief Instructor in the Education and Training
Task Force.
Dr. David Reindorp is a member of Vedette Consulting Limited’s Battle Staff Coaching
Cadre. He is currently working with the UK’s 2* Maritime Battlestaff and Standing Joint
Force HQ as they develop the decision making skills and processes necessary for warfighting in
today’s uncertain and ambiguous operating environment. David has a PhD in Strategic Studies
and an MPhil in International Relations. In a previous career he commanded warships for the
Royal Navy and developed military and defence strategy for the MOD.
Pte (AR) Eoin O'Shea serves as a reservist in 7 Inf Bn but is currently seconded to the PSS for
research taskings. His civilian professional career involves working as a counselling psychologist
and CBT therapist. He is additionally qualified in both CISM (IT Carlow) and Psychological
First Aid (International Federation of Red Cross, Copenhagen). Areas of experience and interest
include: Psychological therapies (primarily cognitive behavioural therapy/CBT), occupational
stress, psychological trauma and PTSD, online mental health support, and training/lecturing.
He currently works for the Irish Red Cross where he provides psychosocial support for Syrian
refugees settling in Ireland, as well as training and support for staff and volunteers at the
organisation. Previous employment has included the post of Senior Psychologist at ‘Combat
Stress’, a UK mental health charity for veterans and reservists affected by PTSD as a result of
their service.
Capt (AR) Mathew McCauley is a commissioned army officer and the first consultant
clinical psychologist to serve in the Irish Army Reserve. He is assigned to DF Headquarters
as consultant advisor in the Office of Director, Medical Branch. Capt McCauley completed
his doctoral residency at the UK’s Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, followed by training
at Britain’s Defence School of Healthcare Education and the US Centre for Deployment
Psychology. Prior clinical psychology appointments include six years with the US Department
of Defense as part of a Global War on Terror assignment, where he was based with the USAF’s
238
48th Medical Group, 48th Fighter Wing and 423rd Medical Squadron, 501st Combat Support
Wing. His background also involves seven years with Defence Medical Services, Joint Forces
Command, UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), where he was lead MOD consultant clinical
psychologist in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Capt McCauley has served as an observer
controller on Operation Bushmaster with the US Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences. He is currently assigned to NATO’s Science and Technology Organisation and he
remains active in military psychology research as an academic at Trinity College, University
of Dublin. Capt McCauley was the guest editor and co-author of the 2019 Special Issue on
Military Psychology for the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps. He is furthermore a co-
founder and committee officer for the Section on Psychology in Defence and Security within
the British Psychological Society; and is also a member of the executive committee of the
Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association.
Comdt Dorota O’Brien is a commissioned army officer and is the first fulltime clinical
psychologist to serve with the Irish Permanent Defence Forces (PDF). She has held this clinical
appointment for over 12 years and is currently the manager of the PDF clinical psychology
service, which operates as part of the DF Central Medical Unit. Comdt O’Brien oversees
the clinical management and provision of psychological care to personnel who serve within
the Irish army, air corps, and naval service. She supports serving personnel on main overseas
deployments to UNIFIL and UNDOF as well as on smaller tours of duty to KFOR, UNTSO
and MINUSMA. As a member of various working groups and boards, she is responsible for
creating and delivering Defence Forces Mental Health and Wellbeing Policy and Defence
Forces Transgender Strategy. On an international level Comdt O'Brien represents Ireland on
the Military Mental Health Expert Panel for NATO and PfP. She remains an active member on
an international panel with her most recent involvement in drafting the consensus of fitness
to deploy for all nations.
Comdt Ken Sheehan is a Communications and Information Services (CIS) Officer with
17 years service. He has served in a wide variety of appointments and units throughout the
Defence Forces, including 1 BTC, 1 Bde HQ, 1 Bde CIS and 2 Bde CIS. Comdt Sheehan has
just completed a two year appointment as OC 1 Bde CIS Coy, where the main effort of the
unit was the roll out of the Virtual Desktop Architecture system. He has served overseas with
UNMIL, EUFOR Chad, KFOR and UNTSO. Comdt Sheehan holds a MA in International
Relations from DCU, a HDip in Leadership, Management and Contemporary Security from
NUIM and a BSc in Computer Science from UCC. He is currently serving overseas with the
115 Inf Bn, UNIFIL.
Lt (NS) Shane Mulcahy is an Operations branch officer with 15 years’ experience in the
Naval Service. He qualified as a Naval Diving Officer in 2010, and was the first DF member to
complete the Royal Canadian Navy’s Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving course in 2013 and
was awarded best student. He deployed to the Mediterranean in 2015 as the Search and Rescue
officer for the first NS overseas humanitarian mission, OPERATION PONTUS. He has served
239
in various appointments ashore and afloat, deploying on diving operations across the country
as a member and officer in charge of the Naval Service Diving Section (NSDS). He holds a
BSc Hons in Nautical Sciences, and is currently completing a LLB in Law while serving as staff
officer in the Naval Operations Command Centre.
Comdt Mike Hosback was commissioned in 2003 as an Infantry Officer. He has served in
a variety of command, staff and training appointments in 2 Bde, the Defence Forces Training
Centre and Defence Forces Head Quarters. His overseas postings include tours of duty with
the United Nations in Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo, NATO in Kosovo and
the European Union in Somalia. He holds a BA and MEconSc from University College
Dublin, an MA in History and Strategic Studies from NUI Maynooth and an MMAS from the
United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Comdt.
Hosback is currently posted as a member of the instructional staff at the Command and Staff
School, Military College.
Caitríona Heinl is Director of The Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy, Ireland.
With over ten years experience in think tank and academic environments, she continues
her work on issues that include international cyber policy, cyber diplomacy/military cyber
stability and the implications of other emerging and disruptive technology security challenges
for state behaviour and international stability as well as the EU and Asia Pacific regional
security architectures. She publishes policy reports, academic articles, and government reports,
contributing to research projects for government and corporate clients. She frequently lectures
and addresses audiences globally, including at forums such as ASEAN/ARF, OSCE, UN,
NATO and Track 1.5/Track 2 government events.
Steven Harland is a strategic advisor currently working with the UK Ministry of Defence
on Information Manoeuvre and Full Spectrum Joint Effects, with a particular emphasis on
operations below the threshold of armed conflict. He has worked on future conflict, Network
Centric Warfare, intelligence fusion for counter terrorism, and the application of cyber and
information operations. Steven was formerly Intelligence and Cyber Programme Lead at MOD
Niteworks and is an Associate Fellow of the British Psychological Society.
Dick Hemsley is a former soldier and airman, who established Vedette Consulting in 2010.
His private passions include the study of military history, whilst his professional interests
are centred around the command and control of integrated operations, and the innovative
exploitation of digitally-shared information and intelligence in their support. The practical
application of strategic theory in the new era of ‘persistent competition’ is a current focus.
Matthew G O'Neill is a Leverhulme Interdisciplinary Network on Cybersecurity and Society

(LINCS) postgraduate research student in Political Science at the Senator George J. Mitchell
Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice at Queen’s University Belfast. His research
explores the European Union Digital Single Market.
240
Mark Williams is a Leverhulme Interdisciplinary Network on Cybersecurity and Society
(LINCS) postgraduate research student at the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global
Peace, Security and Justice at Queen’s University Belfast. His research explores the interface
between the social sciences and electronic engineering and computer science focussing
primarily on the criminal use of social media. In his project, he is looking at ways of detecting
and preventing inappropriate and criminal behaviour in social media, with particular emphasis
on the mitigation, policing and prosecution of offensive online expressions.
Lt (NS) Stephen Ryan is an Operations Branch officer in the Naval Service, commissioned
in 2016 with the 54th Naval Cadet Class. He holds a BSc in Zoology from UCC, a BSc in
Nautical Science from CIT and an MSc in Conservation and Land Management from Bangor
University. His interests include reading, photography, and hiking. He is currently serving as
the Gunnery Officer on LÉ William Butler Yeats.
Lt Col Timothy O’Brien is OIC Planning and Capabilities Section in Defence Forces
Headquarters Directorate of Operations and Planning. Commissioned in 1990 an infantry
officer he has served in a variety of command, staff and training appointments throughout
the Defence Forces, most recently as School Commandant of United Nations Training
School Ireland. His overseas deployments include tours of duty with the United Nations and
NATO in Lebanon, East Timor, Afghanistan, DR Congo and Syria. A graduate of UCG,
DCU, NUI Maynooth and the Institute of Public Administration, Lt Col O’Brien’s academic
qualifications include a Masters in International Relation Relations and a Diploma in European
Union Studies.
Wesley Bourke is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of The Irish Military Heritage
Foundation. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree (Hons) in War and Security Studies from the
University of Hull; a Master’s Degree in War in the Modern World from King's College
London; and a Master’s Degree in Military History and Strategic Studies from NUI Maynooth.
He is currently involved in an extensive project exploring identity, culture, and reconciliation
in modern Ireland. He has been invited to participate in The Institute of International and
European Affairs (IIEA) defence series entitled: The Security and Defence of Small European
States: Challenges, Options and Strategies in the European Union.
Dr. Kyriakos I. Kourousis is a Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in the School of

Engineering of the University of Limerick. He is the Director of the undergraduate and
postgraduate programmes in airworthiness. Dr Kourousis also leads the establishment of the
University’s new 3D Printing Hub, following the recent award of a Metal 3D printer from
General Electric. Dr Kourousis holds a BSc (Hons) in Aeronautical Engineering, from the
Hellenic Air Force Academy, and an MSc and PhD in solid mechanics and metal plasticity,
both from the National Technical University of Athens. He has 19+ years of professional and
research experience in the fields of airworthiness, metal plasticity and additive manufacturing,
241
as both an aeronautical engineer and a University academic in Ireland and Australia. He
has extensive experience on fighter aircraft maintenance, airworthiness and structural
integrity management, earned from his 12 years’ career in the Hellenic Air Force as an
Aeronautical Engineering Officer, where he specialised on the Mirage 2000. He is currently
a Major of the reserve force. To date, Dr Kourousis has authored 72 peer reviewed
journal and conference papers and more than 30 technical and engineering reports in the
fields of his research and professional expertise. His research work has been recognised
internationally, has attracted funding from various civil, and defence organisations and
companies. Dr Kourousis has led research, consultancy and training projects on military
airworthiness, funded by the Australian Defence Force technical airworthiness authority
and other defence clients. His work on aerospace metals has been primarily focused on
the development and implementation of plasticity models for military aircraft fatigue life
predictions, for application in life extension and airworthiness sustainment. Dr Kourousis
is a Chartered Engineer, registered with the United Kingdom Engineering Council, and a
Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society. He is also a member of the Royal Aeronautical
Society’s Airworthiness and Maintenance Specialist Group and a Professional Member of
the International Federation of Airworthiness.
Capt (AR) Chris O Slatara enlisted FCA 1986 Griffith Barracks . Commissioned 2001
into 20 Inf Bn Rathmines , then served 62 Inf Bn, 1 Mech Coy, and transferred to CIS in
2016, serving as instructor in CIS School, DFTC. Work as Principal Consultant for Version
1 Software in Dublin, largely in database, integration and cloud areas. Experiences with
European Union Battlegroups and Viking led to authoring the End User training syllabi for
Sitaware, the selected Common Operating Picture for the Defence Forces.
242
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Editor's Biographical Statement

Dr Eugenio Lilli is Lecturer and Coordinator of the Master Program

Ben Tonra is Full Professor of International Relations at the UCD

Network Centric Warfare with Software Defined 12

Small States’ Capability Enhancement for Peacekeeping: 20

“Relying on the goodwill of the individual, and luck” 30

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: 42

Pushing the Defence Technology Frontier: A Role for the EU? 50

Beware the Boomerang Efects: Western Risk Society 58

Multi-Domain Operations: The Need to 68

‘First with the Truth’ 76

Tele-mental health and psychosocial support: 84

Joint Force Command the need for Change 92

What Implications Will Artificial Intelligence 106

Patrolling Below the Horizon; Addressing Ireland’s 114

Is Organisational Culture a Barrier to Change 122

“National cyber deterrence and the 134

Persistent Engagement and Information Campaigning 146

Mapping Ireland’s Role in Cyber Warfare and Peacekeeping: 154

Achieving “information superiority” of the maritime 164

The Defence Forces and Future Peace Support Operations 172

Meeting multiple threats in an Uncertain Future 182

The European Military Airworthiness Framework as a 190

Generating Network Centric Warfare 202

Abstracts 1 Joint Command and Staff Course 210

Short Biographical Statements of Contributing Authors 234

Introduction – Why use Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems?

Setting the context – Network centric warfare using remotely

Advantages of using software defined networks enabled RPAS

A reinforcement learning based counter strategy for software

Figure 1. Scenario depicting offensive cyber operations in tactical military environments

Professional and military education regarding SDN-enabled

Enhancing military capabilities for small states: penny packets?

New Zealand’s procurement of a large multi-role vessel-buying

Austria’s purchase of Hercules transport aircraft: second hand

Finland’s ongoing evolution of protected tactical vehicles

Drawing Lessons from other Small State Procurement

33 See Para.10.4.3 in DoD, Op.Cit, 2015.

1 Commandant A (PDF), interviewed by author, January 2016.

Legislative Obstacles and Legislative Non-Existence.

The Overseas Problem

Army Reserve Discharges by Corps 2005-2015

The Problematic Force Structure

Army Reserve Discharges by Corps 2005-2015

Defence Acts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Conclusion – It’s now, or never.

Pilot - Fixed Wing 35 31 89%

Figure 1: Responses on the perceived threats to flight safety

Figure 3: Responses on education on RPAS within the IAC

Figure 4: Response on awareness of RPAS within the IAC

Introduction – a radical shift for the EU on defence?

Balancing capability shortfalls and emerging technology

Figure 1 – The 2019 Call for Proposals under the EDIDP

The EU as a defence actor in a shifting strategic context

Introduction – social change and dangerous modernisation

Dilemmas of the hegemonic security burden

Risk-aversion and the US strategic posture

Drone technology and flawed exaggerations

33 Byman, Op. Cit.

Risk and technological dispersal

Conclusion – risk technologies and smaller states

57 Friedersdorf, Op. Cit.