Quieting Title in the Philippines

Quieting of Title (Arts.
476-481 NCC)
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract,
instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive
prescription.
Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have received from the latter, or
reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.
Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
in conflict with this Code.
Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be governed by
such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgated.
Nature.
1. Suit quasi in rem

 judgment is enforeacible only against the defeated party and his privies and shall not prejudice
persons who are not parties to the action
 conclusive only between the parties
 res – subject matter of the controversy is within court’s jurisdiction
o not essential that the court acquire jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
o jurisdiction of the property is determined by the gross value
 pendency of an action for quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the city of MTC of its
jurisdiction with the ejectment case over the same property.
2. Common Law Remedy

 to secure an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the
complainant is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may forever
afterward free from the danger of hostile claim.
 Competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other
claimants.
 Art 476 of CC
 Not an appropriate remedy where the action would require the court hearing to modify or interfere
with the judgment or order of another co-equal court.
 Doctrine of Noninterference – a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a
court of equal jurisdiction much less to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court.
3. Action for declaratory relief

 Special proceeding specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court and similar remedies
which are different from ordinary civil actions
4. Action for Reconveyance – seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered in the name of another to its
rightful and legal owner. Distinct from action to quiet title. But one may be treated as similar to or in the
nature of the other
Prescription.
1. Plaintiff in possession – imprescriptible

a. Does not prescribe until the claimant is ousted
b. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
wait until the possession is disturbed
2. Plaintiff not in possession
a. 10 years or 30 years depending on ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period
>Ordinary prescription—requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for
the time fixed by law; possession of 10 years
> Extraordinary prescription—uninterrupted adverse possession thereof within 30 years
without need of title or of good faith
> Good faith—consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received
the thing was the owner thereof, and he could transmit his ownership.
i. Action may be brought with the period of limitations, it may be barred by laches
(essence: doctrine of estoppel)
laches
n. the legal doctrine that a legal right or claim will not be enforced or
allowed if a long delay in asserting the right or claim has prejudiced the
adverse party (hurt the opponent) as a sort of "legal ambush."
Estoppel
A legal principle that bars a party from denying or alleging
a certain fact owing to that party's previous conduct, allegation, or denial.
Who are allowed to bring.

 Art. 477
 A person with legal and equitable title to or legal interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action
o Title – the claim, right, or interest in the property
 Different from certificate of title – document of ownership under the Torrens
system of registration issued by the Register of Deeds
o Legal Title – full ownership or in naked ownership which is registered in the name of the
plaintiff
 Bare legal title to property,carrying with it none of the benefits of
ownership.Usually the titleheld by a trustee,with the beneficiary holding
equitable title.
o Equitable title – plaintiff has beneficial interest in the property the legal title of which
pertains to another.
 Ex. Cestui que trust - beneficiary of a trust; the one who trusts or a person who
will benefit from the trust and will receive payments or a future distribution
from the trust’s assets.
o Interest in property – any interest short of ownership
 Ex. Mortgage or usufructuary
Requisites:
1. There is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective
2. Such instrument is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable despite the
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy or extinguished or terminated or has been
barred by extinctive prescription
Cases
Heirs of Olviga v CA; G.R. No. 104813. October 21, 1993.
FACTS
Eutequio Pureza and his father cultivated a forest land in 1950. The same land was surveyed in 1954 by the
Bureau of Lands in the name of Eutequio Pureza and has since been known as Lot 13,Pls-84. However,
Godofredo Olviga protested and claimed that 1/2 hectare of the surveyed land belonged to him and not to
Pureza. In 1960, Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Since his application had not been acted
upon, he transferred his rights in said land to Cornelio Glor. Unfortunately, the said transfer was also not
acted upon by the Director of Lands for undisclosed reasons. In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered
title for Lot 13 in a cadastral proceeding in fraud of Pureza and Cornelio Glor. He also failed to disclose
that the land in dispute was currently in possession of the Glors. Angelita Glor, wife of Cornelia Glor,
testified that she did not receive any notice about the said proceedings. Glor then filed an action for
reconveyance over Lot 13.
HOMESTEAD PATENT
> Chapter 4 of the Public Land Act governs the disposition of alienable public lands through homestead
> Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of 18 years, or the head of a family, may enter a homestead of not exceeding
12 hectares of agricultural land of the public domain
> The applicant must have cultivated and improved at least 1/5 of the land continuously since the approval of the
application and resided for at least 1 year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality in which the
land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same, and then, upon payment of the required fee, he shall be entitled
to a patent
ISSUE
Whether or not the action for reconveyance has already prescribed
HELD
No, the cause of action should be considered to have accrued not from the date of registration of the title of
Olviga over Lot 13 in 1967, but on 1988 when the Glors gained knowledge of the said proceedings. The
rule that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
10 years cannot be applied in this case because it only applies when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property. However, if a person claiming to be owner of the property is in actual possession of the
property,in this case the Glors, then their right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. In Faja vs CA, it
was held that the owner who is in actual possession of the property may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
Pingol v CA; G.R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993.
DOCTRINE
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and
had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who
had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an
equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
FACTS
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of
Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of
P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with
Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of
Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because
Pingol were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was
conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s
breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’ continuous
occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco

(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title
RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of
the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that the parties intended an
absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco upon its actual (upon
Donasco’s possession and construction of the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of the
contract). The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the
expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made upon him either
judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property.
(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was actually an
action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the title had been
transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol
adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to
transfer the title.
Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to
clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should
have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to
quiet title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title to property in
ONE’s POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
Titong v CA; G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998.
DOCTRINE
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be
complied with meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance setting forth the cloud
or doubt over the title. Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful
detainer, accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.
FACTS
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being
disputed in this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants, however legal title over the property
can only be given to one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of
Masbate decided in favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as the true and lawful
owners of the disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and
declared for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate occasions, private resps, with their hired
laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an approximate area of 2 hectares and began
plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On the other hand, private resps denied the claim and said
that the subject land formed part of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no controversy had sprouted between
them for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary between the land sold to
Espinosa and what remained of Titong’s property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong employed
Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water
to the lowland at the southern portion of Titong’s property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titong’s, saying that the area and boundaries of disputed
land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him,
Titong first declared land for taxation purposes which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and
was bounded on the north by the B. River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on
the west by property owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter
reacquired the property pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titong’s hands only for 4 days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then
became a part of the estate of Espinosa’s wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed an
“Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale” whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio
for 5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the
same as those appearing in the name of Titong’s.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First survey was made by Titong, while the
second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. Because of which, certain discrepancies
surfaced. Contrary to Titong’s allegation, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot
nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosa’s was left with only an area of 4.1841
hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by Titong to him.
Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and
filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of which were suspended because of
instant case.
Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6
hectares property of the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by Verano, on the east by
Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the extrajud settlement, Titong’s share
bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached upon his property and declared it
as part of his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the north by Verano, on the east by B.
Titong, on the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied that Titong diverted
course of the B. river after he had repurchased the land from Verano because land was immediately sold to
Espinosa thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property

RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the
NCC wherein it says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or preventive measure. Under 476,
a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground for filing a
complaint for quieting title must be “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument, claim etc be clouded over his
property. Through his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title were Laurio’s alleged
acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action for forcible
entry and not quieting title.
In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when
Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and were transferred to
Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the
thing sold. Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Sps. Portic v Cristobal; G.R. No. 156171. April 22, 2005.
FACTS
In 1968, spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door apartment from spouses
Alcantara even though they’re aware that the land was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying
SSS. The Portics then executed a contract with Anastacia Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the said
property for P200k. Cristobal’s down payment was P45k and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract
between them states:
That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall
retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND
PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said
apartment; (payment is due 22 May 1985, if Cristobal will not be able to pay Portic will reimburse)
A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was not able to pay on the due date. A
suit ensued to lift the cloud on the title.
ISSUE
Who is the rightful owner of the parcel of land?
HELD
The Portics insofar as there was no contract of sale. What transpired between the parties was a contract to
sell. The provision of the contract characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not
a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the
Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition,
and failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity
of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains
ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither
did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as
evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they
actually have prior to registration.
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith
must concur. Clearly, Cristobal has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains
unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against the Portics.
The CA’s finding that she had a valid title to the property must be set aside.
Co-Ownership (Arts. 484- 501 NCC)
26. In General (distinguish from joint tenancy, partnership)

Definition (Arts. 484-486; 493; 1620))
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
Title. (392)
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proved. (393a)
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
be changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a)
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-
owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion
to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
Co-Ownership vs. Joint Ownership
Co-Ownership Joint Ownership

“tenancy in common or “joint tenancy”
ownership in common”
Ownership of share Each co-owner is the owner of There is no abstract share
the whole undivided thing or ownership by the co-owners, the
right but at the same time his own rights of the joint tenants being
ideal part thereof inseparable
Disposition of shares permitted to dispose of his share Not permitted to dispose of his
or interest in the property without share or interest in the property
the consent of the others without the consent of the others
Effect of death His ownership dies with him and His ownership dies with him and
instead of his heirs inheriting his instead of his heirs inheriting his
share, the survivors are share, the survivors are
subrogated to the rights of the subrogated to the rights of the
deceased immediately upon his deceased immediately upon his
death by virtue of the right of death by virtue of the right of
survivorship or jus accrescendi survivorship or jus accrescendi
Legal disability or incapacity Does not inure to the benefit of Inures to the benefit of the others
the others for the purposes of for the purposes of prescription
prescription (prescription will not run against
the latter who can invoke the
disability as a defense.)
Co-ownership vs. Partnership
Co-ownership Partnership
Creation May be created without the Can be created by a contract
formalities of a contract expressed or implied (except
conjugal partnership
Personality No juridical or legal personality Juridical personality distinct from
the partners exists
Purpose Collective enjoyment of a thing To gain profits
or right
Disposal of Share Can dispose of his share without Unless authorized, cannot dispose
the consent of the others with the of his share without the consent
transferee automatically of the others an substitute another
becoming a co-owner as a partner in his place
Mutual agency Generally no mutual A partner can generally bind the
representation partnership
Distribution of profits The distribution of profits must Subject to the stipulation of the
be proportional to the respective partners.
interests of the co-owners
Effect of death or incapacity Not dissolved by the death or Such fact dissolves a partnership
incapacity of a co-owner
Duration An agreement to keep the thing There may be a new agreement as
for more than 10 years is void to any definite term without limit
although may be extended by a set by law.
new agreement
Co-ownership vs. Easements
Co-ownership Easements
Each co-owner has a right of dominion over the Precisely a limitation on the right of dominion
whole property and over his undivided share
Right of ownership rests solely on each and every the right of dominion is in favor of one or more
co-owner over a single object persons and over two or more different things
Cases
Pardell v Bartolome; G.R. No. 4656, November 18, 1912.
PARDELL v. BARTOLOME
G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
FACTS:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin
Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin.
On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it
upon themselves without an judicial authorization or even extra judicial
agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel.
These properties included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a
house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes Street,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and
parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in
restoring and returning to them one half of the total value of the fruits and
rents, plus losses and damages from the aforementioned properties.
However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the
plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and
her husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation
of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.
ISSUE: Is defendant Matilde Ortiz, as co-owner of the house on Calle Escolta,
entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to her co-owner,
Vicenta Ortiz, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have
produced, had it been rented to a stranger?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their
occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of their right to use the
same as a co-owner. Each co-owner or tenant in common of undivided realty
has the same rights therein as the others; he may use and enjoy the same
without other limitation except that he must not prejudice the rights of his co-
owners, but until a division is effected, the respective parts belonging to each
can not be determined; each co-owner exercises joint dominion and is entitled
to joint use.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use
as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof
that, by so doing, Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the
community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing
the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of
the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to
the plaintiffs.
G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
FACTS:
RULING:
to joint use.
the plaintiffs.
Facts:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the
existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de
Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without anY judicial authorization or even extra judicial
agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a
house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in
MagallanesStreet, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land in
Candon, Ilocos Sur.Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in restoring and
returning to them one half of the total value ofthe fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the
aforementioned properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted that shenever refused to give the plaintiff
her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are obliged to
pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.
ISSUE
Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said property
RULING
No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was a
mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owner’s right of
use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at
bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they prevented
Vicenta from utilizing the same.
FACTS:
Appeal by bill of exceptions.
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to
her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four
children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal
heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as
heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial
agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and
collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite
repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had
been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other
excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.

RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses were
compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused
or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That
motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
“Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their
object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from
utilizing them according to their rights.”
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of
joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment
to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said
upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an
accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every
one of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde
Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named,
assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said
province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not
at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and
proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several
years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that
founded on the right of co-ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and
care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not
obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper
story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom
thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the
litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said
house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from
living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a coowner of the property.

G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
FACTS:
RULING:
to joint use.
the plaintiffs.
5. Basa v. Aguilar, G.R. No. L-30994, September 30, 1982.
202 Phil. 452
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case
No. 2513, entitled " Olimpia Basa, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Genaro Puyat, et al., Defendants."
The seven (7) petitioners are owners co-pro- indiviso of an undivided ONE-HALF (1/2) share of a parcel of
land located in Barrio San Mateo, Arayat, Pampanga, with an area of 32,383 square meters, more or less.
Private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina were the owners of the other undivided half of the
same parcel of land.
On March 6, 1964, Genaro Puyat, with the marital consent of Brigida Mesina, sold his ONE-HALF (1/2)
share of the parcel of land in question for the price of ONE THOUSAND (P1 ,000.00) PESOS in favor of
private respondents Primo Tiongson and Macaria Puyat. Primo Tiongson is a son-in-law of Genaro Puyat
who is married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat.
Seven (7) days later, or on March 13, 1964, the herein petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2513, praying that
they be allowed to exercise the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, for which purpose
they deposited with the court the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) as redemption money.
The trial court rendered the judgment dismissing the case. It ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to
exercise the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, reasoning out as follows:
"There is nothing repugnant, from the point of view of public policy, for parents to sell to their children. It
could not, therefore, have been intended by the framers of the Civil Code of the Philippines to include
within the purview of the term 'third person' the children of a co-owner of a thing. For after all, these
children have an inchoate right of succession to the same property. To hold otherwise, is to stretch the
meaning of the law into ludicrous (sic) situations."
The logic of His Honor, the trial judge, carries more sentiment than law. It disregards the express letter of
the law invoked by the petitioners and ignores the philosophy of the same. Article 1620 of the Civil Code
reads:
"ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion
to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common."
Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly
for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a
disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th Ed., 317.) It is
intended to minimize co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption
when the shares of the other owners are sold to "a third person." A third person, within the meaning of this
Article, is anyone who is not a co-owner. ( Sentencia of February 7, 1944 as cited in Tolentino, Comments
on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 160.)
Private respondent Primo Tiongson is definitely not a co-owner of the land in question. He is not even an
heir of private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, nor included in the "family relations" of the
said spouses as defined in Article 217 of the Civil Code. The circumstance that he is married to Macaria
Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, is of no moment. The conveyance to the Tiongson
spouses was by onerous title, made during the lifetime of Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina. The alleged
inchoate right of succession from Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, which pertained only to Macaria
Puyat, is thus out of the question. To deny to the petitioners the right of redemption recognized in Article
1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing co-ownership and to contravene the public
policy in this regard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of what, in the
words of Manresa, "might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which they have been thrust."
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and in lieu thereof, a new one is
rendered declaring the petitioners to be entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption under Article 1620
of the Civil Code with respect to the ONE-HALF (1/2) share sold by private respondents Genaro Puyat and
Brigida Mesina in favor of their co-respondents Primo Tiongson and Macaria Puyat. The private
respondents shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia, G.R. No. L-49219, April 15, 1988.
DOCTRINE
When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated, Article 448 governs in case real
property (like a house) encroaches the land of another. This is provided that good faith exists.
FACTS
The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in
Cebu City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45
square meters (which is about the size of a typical Starbux café).
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square meters went to
the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered
that the house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The
parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.
The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be
obliged to pay for the portion of defendant’s house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot
be obliged to pay for the price of the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-
ownership should govern, and not that of accession.
RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their
house encroaching the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family
home, hence they appealed. CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.
ISSUE
w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that used to be co-owned, but was
subdivided.
HELD
The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448
therefore governs. The house of Defendant overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith.
Hence, the plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options
> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after indemnifying the Defendants; or
> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home rested. ( or they can rent it).
Delia Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988.
Oliveras v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-29727, December 14, 1988.
Tagarao v. Garcia, G.R. No. 40064, December 04, 1934.
Rivera v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 47757, April 17, 1942
Gatchalian v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 45425, April 29, 1939
Special rights of co-owners (Arts. 487-492; 494; 1088; 1620; 1623)
12.Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay, G.R. No. 32047, November 01, 1930.

13.Lavadia v. Cosme de Mendoza, GR No. 47996, May 09, 1941
14.Tuason v. Tuason, Jr., G.R. No. L-3404, April 02, 1951
15.Mariano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101522, May 28, 1993.
16.Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 02, 1997.
17.Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006.
Special rule on marital properties (Art. 90 Family Code)
Art. 90. When a marriage is annulled, the court shall award the custody of the children as it may deem best,
and make provision for their education and support. Attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the litigation
shall be charged to the conjugal partnership property, unless the action fails. (33a)
Acquisition
d. Marriage (Family Code 88; 91-93; 96; 116-7; 120)

Art. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
e. Cohabitation (Family Code 147-8)
f. Joint purchase (NCC 1452)

Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken
in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion to the interest of each.
g. Succession (NCC 1078)

Art. 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)
h. Donation (NCC 573; 753)
Art. 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things which, without being consumed, gradually deteriorate
through wear and tear, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use thereof in accordance with the
purpose for which they are intended, and shall not be obliged to return them at the termination of the
usufruct except in their condition at that time; but he shall be obliged to indemnify the owner for any
deterioration they may have suffered by reason of his fraud or negligence. (481)
Art. 753. When a donation is made to several persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal shares, and
there shall be no right of accretion among them, unless the donor has otherwise provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to donations made to the husband and wife jointly,
between whom there shall be a right of accretion, if the contrary has not been provided by the donor. (637)
15) Chance (NCC 472)

Art. 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the mixture
occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not separable without injury, each owner shall acquire
a right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of the things mixed or
confused. (381)
j. Hidden treasure(NCC 438)
Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any of its
subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he
shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science of the arts, the State may acquire them at their just price, which
shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated. (351a)
k. Easement of party wall (NCC 658)
Art. 658. The easement of party wall shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, by the local
ordinances and customs insofar as they do not conflict with the same, and by the rules of co-
ownership. (571a)
l. Contract In general (NCC 494)
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
Universal partnership (NCC 1778-1780)

Associations (NCC 1775) m. Occupation (NCC 713-720)
18.Punsalan v. Liat, G.R. No. 18009, January 10, 1923. N.
Condominium (RA 4726 Condominium Law)

19.Twin Towers Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003.
28.Termination (NCC 494-501; 543; 1092-3)

f) Total destruction of thing.
g) Merger of all interests in one person.
h) Acquisitive prescription.
i) Partition or division. (NCC 494-496)
 Right to ask for partition/limitations
 Effect of partition
 Right of creditors of individual co-owners.
 Procedure (Rule 69 Rules of Court).
POSSESSION (Arts. 523 to 561)

Definition and concept.
vii. In general (Arts. 523-561 NCC)
CHAPTER 1
POSSESSION AND THE KINDS THEREOF
Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. (430a)
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in that of another. (413a)
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept of
owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another
person. (432)
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.(433a)
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof. (434)
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. (435a)
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved. (436)
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession. (437)
CHAPTER 2
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION
Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. (438a)
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal representative, by
his agent, or by any person without any power whatever: but in the last case, the possession shall not be
considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of possession was executed has ratified the
same, without prejudice to the juridical consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)
Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and
from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the same. (440)
Art. 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession
of the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of possession in
good faith shall not benefit him except from the date of the death of the decedent. (442)
Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; but they need the
assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights which from the possession arise in
their favor. (443)
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the
thing. (441a)
Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the
possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. (444)
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in
the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession
are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein
he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of
Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of the
complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (446a)
Art. 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion. (447)
Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. (448a)
Art. 542. The possession of real property presumes that of the movables therein, so long as it is not shown
or proved that they should be excluded. (449)
Art. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to have exclusively
possessed the part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entire period during
which the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the possession of the whole or a part of a thing possessed in
common shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of
Court shall apply. (450a)
Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time they are gathered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor in good faith in that proportion. (451)
Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor
shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion
to the time of the possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two possessors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the possessor in good faith the right to finish the
cultivation and gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation
and the net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason whatever should refuse to accept this
concession, shall lose the right to be indemnified in any other manner. (452a)
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Art. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal thing, the possessor
in good faith may remove them, unless the person who recovers the possession exercises the option under
paragraph 2 of the preceding article. (n)
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith;
but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended. (454)
Art. 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of
Article 546 and in Article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure
shall not be refunded to the possessor in bad faith, but he may remove the objects for which such expenses
have been incurred, provided that the thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not
prefer to retain them by paying the value they may have at the time he enters into possession. (445a)
Art. 550. The costs of litigation over the property shall be borne by every possessor. (n)
Art. 551. Improvements caused by nature or time shall always insure to the benefit of the person who has
succeeded in recovering possession. (456)
Art. 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing possessed,
except in cases in which it is proved that he has acted with fraudulent intent or negligence, after the judicial
summons.
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused by a fortuitous
event. (457a)
Art. 553. One who recovers possession shall not be obliged to pay for improvements which have ceased to
exist at the time he takes possession of the thing. (458)
Art. 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some previous time, is presumed to have held
possession also during the intermediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary. (459)
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (460a)
Art. 556. The possession of movables is not deemed lost so long as they remain under the control of the
possessor, even though for the time being he may not know their whereabouts. (461)
Art. 557. The possession of mmovable and of real rights is not deemed lost, or transferred for purposes of
prescription to the prejudice of third persons, except in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
Law and the Land Registration laws. (462a)
Art. 558. Acts relating to possession, executed or agreed to by one who possesses a thing belonging to
another as a mere holder to enjoy or keep it, in any character, do not bind or prejudice the owner, unless he
gave said holder express authority to do such acts, or ratifies them subsequently. (463)
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)
Art. 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they are under one’s control; domesticated or tamed
animals are considered domestic or tame if they retain the habit of returning to the premises of the
possessor. (465)
Art. 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all purposes
which may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without interruption. (466)
Who exercises (Arts. 524; 532; 535; 538 NCC)
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in that of another. (413a)
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal representative, by
his agent, or by any person without any power whatever: but in the last case, the possession shall not be
considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of possession was executed has ratified the
same, without prejudice to the juridical consequences of negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)
Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; but they need the
assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights which from the possession arise in
their favor. (443)
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in
the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession
are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
Status (Arts. 526-29 NCC)
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.(433a)
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved. (436)
Essential requisites of possession.
Holding/control of thing or right.
Animus possidendi.
Degrees of holding of possession.
o. Mere holder without title
p. With juridical title but not ownership.
q. With just title or title sufficient to transfer ownership, but not from the true owner.
r. With just title from true owner.
Cases of possession.
j) In one’s own name; name of another. (Art. 524 NCC)
k) Concept of owner; mere holder. (Art. 525 NCC)
l) Good faith; bad faith. (Art. 526 NCC) What things or rights may be possessed. (Art. 530 NCC)
What may not be possessed by private persons.

Acquisition of possession.
 Ways of acquiring possession (Art. 531 NCC)
 By whom possession acquired. (Art. 532 NCC)
 What does not affect possession (Arts. 536; 537; 538 1119)
Effects of possession.
xvi. Right to be respected, protected and restored of possession.
20.Actions to recover possession:
Accion interdictal
Accion publiciana
Accion reivindicatoria
Replevin
21.Self-help (Art. 429 NCC)
xvii. Entitlement to fruits (Arts. 544 & 549 NCC)
xviii. Reimbursement for expenses (Arts. 552; 553 NCC)
xix. Possession of movable acquired in good faith (Art. 559 NCC)
Effect of possession in concept of owner.
7) Possession after lapse of time may ripen into full ownership.
8) Presumption of just title (Arts. 541; 1131 NCC)
9) Possessor may bring actions (except accion reivindicatoria)
10)Self-help (Art. 429 NCC)
11)Register real right in Registry of Property.
12)Good faith- right to fruits and reimbursement.
13)Upon recovery of possession – fruits and damages.
14)Rights over the thing possessed that the law authorizes.
15)Good faith’bad faith possession.
Presumptions in favor of possessor.
 Good faith until contrary is proved (Art. 529 NCC)
 Continuity of initial good faith (Art. 528 NCC)
 Same character in which possession was acquired (Art. 529 NCC)
 Non-interruption of possession in favor of present possessor (Arts. 554; 1120-24 NCC)
 Art. 561 NCC.
 Other presumptions (Arts. 426; 533; 1078; 541; 1141 NCC)
Possession may be lost by (Arts. 555-557 NCC):

 Abandonment
 Assignment
 Destruction; goes out of commerce
 Possession by another (subject to Art. 537 NCC)
Cases:
 Pleasantville Devt. Corp. v. CA.; G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996.
 Kasilag v Rodriguez; G.R. No. 46623. December 7, 1939.
 Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson; G.R. No. L-3088. February 6, 1907.
 Macasaet v Macasaet; G.R. Nos. 154391-92. September 30, 2004.
 Cuaycong v Benedicto; G.R. No. 9989. March 13, 1918.
 Astudillo v PHHC; G.R. No. L-28066. September 22, 1976.
 Peran v CFI; G.R. No. L-57259. October 13, 1983.
 Yu v Honrado; G.R. No. L-50025. August 21, 1980.
 Cordero v Cabral; G.R. No. L-36789. July 25, 1983.
 Lasam v Director; G.R. No. 42859. March 17, 1938.
 People v Estoista; G.R. No. L-5793. August 27, 1953.
 Tan Queto v CA; G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.
 Edca Publishing v Santos; G.R. No. 80298. April 26, 1990.
 Ledesma v CA; G.R. No. 86051. September 1, 1992.
 Suobiron v CA; G.R. No. 109903. November 20, 1995.
USUFRUCT (Arts. 562 to 612 NCC)

Cases on Usufruct
Fabia v. David, G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945.
Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-28034,
February 27, 1971.
Baluran v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-44428, September 30, 1977.
MCSS
Baluran v. Navarro
79 SCRA 309
FACTS:
Spouses Paraiso executed an agreement entitle “BARTER” whereby they agreed to “barter and exchange”
with spouses Baluran their residential lot with the latter's unirrigated riceland. The documents allowed the
parties to enjoy the material possession of their respective properties, reap the fruits of the unirrigated
riceland for spouses Paraiso and build a house in the residential lot for spouses Baluran. Also, it was
conditioned upon the event that if any of the children of Natividad Obencio, daughter of spouses Paraiso,
shall choose to reside in this municipality and build a house in the residential lot, spouses Balura shall be
obliged to return the lot with damages. Lastly, neither party shall encumber, alienate or dispose of in any
manner their respective properties as bartered without the consent of the other.
Antonio Obendencio, son of Natividad, filed a complaint to recover the residential lot. Avelino Baluran
alleged that the barter agreement transferred to him the ownership of the residential lot in exchange for the
unirrigated riceland.
ISSUE:
WON there was a transfer of ownership between the parties. -- NO
HELD:
It is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract courts are not bound by the name or title given
to it by the contracting parties. The stipulations in said document are clear enough to indicate that there was
no intention at all on the part of the signatories to convey the ownership of their respective properties; all
that was intended, and it was so provided in the agreement, was to transfer the material possession thereof.
In the third condition, the parties retained their right to alienate their respective properties which right is an
element of ownership.
All that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the Property of
another. Under the document, spouses Paraiso would harvest the crop of the unirrigate riceland while
Baluran could build a house on the residential lot. The mutual agreement was subject to a resolutory
condition, that the children of Natividad, shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his house on
the lot, which would terminate the right of possession and use.
Usufruct may be constituted for any period of time and under such conditions as they may deem convenient
and beneficial subject to the provision of the Civil Code. The manner of terminating or extinguishing the
right of ususfruct is primarily determined by the stipulations of the parties which in this case is the
happening of the event agreed upon.
The right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and each is entitled to a return of his property.
National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148830, April 13, 2005.
Alunan v. Veloso, G.R. No. 29158, December 29, 1928.
Claridad v. Novella, G.R. No. L-12666, May 22, 1959.
Mercado v. Real, G.R. No. 45534, April 27, 1939.
Vda. De Albar v. De Carangdang, G.R. No. L-13361, December 29, 1959.
Vda. De Albar v. Carangdang

106 Phil. 855
DOCTRINE: Under the law, usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the
encumbrance. Any war damage payment received by the naked owner should also be subject to usufruct for
life if such payment has not been used in the construction of a new building. A usufructuary who is the only
recipient of all the benefits of the property subject of the usufruct, and who has bound himself to pay the
real estate taxes on the property in a formal agreement approved by the court, should pay such taxes.
FACTS:
Doña Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a building and
improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated she devised the naked
ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for
life.
During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of Manila, the
building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other improvements that were not
destroyed by the fire.
One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at the same time agreeing
to construct on the lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary sign the
agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to cede the property
by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while on the other hand the
naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was extinguished when the building was destroyed, the
right of the usufructuary being limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in order
that the agreement of lease may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary compromise whereby the
naked owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the
balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title
to the building to be constructed would accrue to the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot
covered by the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked owners but subject to the right of
usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective claims after the
termination of the contract of lease to determine which of said claims was legally correct.
By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United States War Damage
Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused to the property, paid to and
received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due on the
property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.
ISSUE:
W/N the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner
(VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real estate
taxes?
HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that when the
deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo streets, she
meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the land on which it is erected for indeed the
building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land, being an indispensable part
of the rented premises cannot be considered as having no rental value whatsoever." Moreover, in the
Spanish language, the term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as well.
(Diccionario Ingles-Español, por Martines Amador) Since only the building was destroyed and the usufruct
is constituted not only on the building but on the land as well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished
by the destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the
thing subject of the encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is addressed to the
wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the administrator
of the property. This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536, which was
litigated between the same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision of the will has been the
subject of interpretation.
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the real estate taxes
paid by respondent in her capacity as usufructuary for several years previous to the present litigation should
be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in
a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and the same properties
subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which was approved by the court wherein
the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and
insurance premiums, and make all the necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct
and in accordance with said agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954
Pascual v. Angeles, G.R. No. 1511, July 26, 1905.

Pichay v. Querol, G.R. No. 4452, October 01, 1908.
Reyes v. Grey, G.R. No. 6969, December 20, 1911.
Tufexis v. Olaguera, G.R. No. 9865, December 24, 1915.
Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, G.R. No. L-3485, June 30, 1950.
Orozco y Mortera v. Araneta, G.R. No. L-3691, November 21, 1951.
Bachrach v. Seifert, G.R. No. L-2659, October 12, 1950.
Vda. de Bautista v. Marcos, G.R. No. L-17072, October 31, 1961.
Gaboya v. Cui, G.R. No. L-19614, March 27, 1971.
Hemedes v CA G.R. No. 107132. October 8, 1999..||
Lopez v. Constantino, G.R. No. 48882, March 17, 1943.
EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES (Arts. 613-693 NCC).
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to
whom the encumbered estate does not belong. (531)
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act
of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs
that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Nonapparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence. (532)
Art. 616. Easements are also positive or negative.
A positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner of the servient estate the obligation of allowing
something to be done or of doing it himself, and a negative easement, that which prohibits the owner of the
servient estate from doing something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist. (533)
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. (534)
Art. 618. Easements are indivisible. If the servient estate is divided between two or more persons, the
easement is not modified, and each of them must bear it on the part which corresponds to him.
If it is the dominant estate that is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement
in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way. (535)
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easements. (536)
SECTION 2. - Modes of Acquiring Easements
Art. 620. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of
ten years. (537a)
Art. 621. In order to acquire by prescription the easements referred to in the preceding article, the time of
possession shall be computed thus: in positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant
estate, or the person who may have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient
estate; and in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act
which would be lawful without the easement. (538a)
Art. 622. Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title. (539)
Art. 623. The absence of a document or proof showing the origin of an easement which cannot be acquired
by prescription may be cured by a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate or by a final
judgment. (540a)
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by
the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division
of a thing owned in common by two or more persons. (541a)
Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an easement, all the rights necessary for its use are considered
granted. (542)
Art. 626. The owner of the dominant estate cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the
immovable originally contemplated. Neither can he exercise the easement in any other manner than that
previously established. (n)
SECTION 3. - Rights and Obligations

of the Owners of the Dominant and Servient Estates
Art. 627. The owner of the dominant estate may make, at his own expense, on the servient state any works
necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude, but without altering it or rendering it more
burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the servient estate, and shall choose the most convenient time
and manner so as to cause the least inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate. (543a)
Art. 628. Should there be several dominant estates, the owners of all of them shall be obliged to contribute
to the expenses referred to in the preceding article, in proportion to the benefits which each may derive
from the work. Any one who does not wish to contribute may exempt himself by renouncing the easement
for the benefit of the others.
If the owner of the servient estate should make use of the easement in any manner whatsoever, he shall also
be obliged to contribute to the expenses in the proportion stated, saving an agreement to the contrary. (544)
Art. 629. The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.
Nevertheless, if by reason of the place originally assigned, or of the manner established for the use of the
easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent
him from making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be changed at his expense,
provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused
thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the
easement. (545)
Art. 630. The owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is
established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement. (n)
SECTION 4. - Modes of Extinguishment of Easements

Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be computed from
the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which
an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but it shall
revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when
the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of
the preceding number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or
conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates. (546a)
Art. 632. The form or manner of using the easement may prescribe as the easement itself, and in the same
way. (547a)
Art. 633. If the dominant estate belongs to several persons in common, the use of the easement by any one
of them prevents prescription with respect to the others. (548)
CHAPTER 2
LEGAL EASEMENTS
SECTION 1. - General Provisions
Art. 634. Easements imposed by law have for their object either public use or the interest of private
persons. (549)
Art. 635. All matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by
the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this
Title. (550)
Art. 636. Easements established by law in the interest of private persons or for private use shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title, without prejudice to the provisions of general or local laws and
ordinances for the general welfare.
These easements may be modified by agreement of the interested parties, whenever the law does not
prohibit it or no injury is suffered by a third person. (551a)
SECTION 2. - Easements Relating to Waters
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. (552)
Art. 638. The banks of rivers and streams, even in case they are of private ownership, are subject
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three meters along their margins, to the easement of
public use in the general interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
Estates adjoining the banks of navigable or floatable rivers are, furthermore, subject to the easement of
towpath for the exclusive service of river navigation and floatage.
If it be necessary for such purpose to occupy lands of private ownership, the proper indemnity shall first be
paid. (553a)
Art. 639. Whenever for the diversion or taking of water from a river or brook, or for the use of any other
continuous or discontinuous stream, it should be necessary to build a dam, and the person who is to
construct it is not the owner of the banks, or lands which must support it, he may establish the easement of
abutment of a dam, after payment of the proper indemnity. (554)
Art. 640. Compulsory easements for drawing water or for watering animals can be imposed only for
reasons of public use in favor of a town or village, after payment of the proper indemnity. (555)
Art. 641. Easements for drawing water and for watering animals carry with them the obligation of the
owners of the servient estates to allow passage to persons and animals to the place where such easements
are to be used, and the indemnity shall include this service. (556)
Art. 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he can dispose shall
have the right to make it flow through the intervening estates, with the obligation to indemnify their
owners, as well as the owners of the lower estates upon which the waters may filter or descend. (557)
Art. 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:
(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended;
(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third persons;
(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and
regulations. (558)
Art. 644. The easement of aqueduct for private interest cannot be imposed on buildings, courtyards,
annexes, or outhouses, or on orchards or gardens already existing. (559)
Art. 645. The easement of aqueduct does not prevent the owner of the servient estate from closing or
fencing it, or from building over the aqueduct in such manner as not to cause the latter any damage, or
render necessary repairs and cleanings impossible. (560)
Art. 646. For legal purposes, the easement of aqueduct shall be considered as continuous and apparent,
even though the flow of the water may not be continuous, or its use depends upon the needs of the
dominant estate, or upon a schedule of alternate days or hours. (561)
Art. 647. One who for the purpose of irrigating or improving his estate, has to construct a stop lock or
sluice gate in the bed of the stream from which the water is to be taken, may demand that the owners of the
banks permit its construction, after payment of damages, including those caused by the new easement to
such owners and to the other irrigators. (562)
Art. 648. The establishment, extent, form and conditions of the servitudes of waters, to which this section
refers, shall be governed by the special laws relating thereto insofar as no provision therefor is made in this
Code. (563a)
SECTION 3. - Easement of Right of Way
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the
proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by
others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity
shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own
acts. (564a)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. (565)
Art. 651. The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. (566a)
Art. 652. Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates
of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the right
of way. (567a)
Art. 653. In the case of the preceding article, if it is the land of the grantor that becomes isolated, he may
demand a right of way after paying a indemnity. However, the donor shall not be liable for indemnity. (n)
Art. 654. If the right of way is permanent, the necessary repairs shall be made by the owner of the dominant
estate. A proportionate share of the taxes shall be reimbursed by said owner to the proprietor of the servient
estate. (n)
Art. 655. If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because its owner has
joined it to another abutting on a public road, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the
easement be extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the
indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the easement.
The same rule shall be applied in case a new road is opened giving access to the isolated estate.
In both cases, the public highway must substantially meet the needs of the dominant estate in order that the
easement may be extinguished. (568a)
Art. 656. If it be indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a
building, to carry materials through the estate of another, or to raise therein scaffolding or other objects
necessary for the work, the owner of such estate shall be obliged to permit the act, after receiving payment
of the proper indemnity for the damage caused him. (569a)
Art. 657. Easements of the right of way for the passage of livestock known as animal path, animal trail or
any other, and those for watering places, resting places and animal folds, shall be governed by the
ordinances and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the usages and customs of the
place.
Without prejudice to rights legally acquired, the animal path shall not exceed in any case the width of 75
meters, and the animal trail that of 37 meters and 50 centimeters.
Whenever it is necessary to establish a compulsory easement of the right of way or for a watering place for
animals, the provisions of this Section and those of Articles 640 and 641 shall be observed. In this case the
width shall not exceed 10 meters. (570a)
SECTION 4. - Easement of Party Wall
Art. 658. The easement of party wall shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, by the local
ordinances and customs insofar as they do not conflict with the same, and by the rules of co-
ownership. (571a)
Art. 659. The existence of an easement of party wall is presumed, unless there is a title, or exterior sign, or
proof to the contrary:
(1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the point of common elevation;
(2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in cities, towns, or in rural communities;
(3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural lands. (572)
Art. 660. It is understood that there is an exterior sign, contrary to the easement of party wall:
(1) Whenever in the dividing wall of buildings there is a window or opening;
(2) Whenever the dividing wall is, on one side, straight and plumb on all its facement, and on the other, it
has similar conditions on the upper part, but the lower part slants or projects outward;
(3) Whenever the entire wall is built within the boundaries of one of the estates;
(4) Whenever the dividing wall bears the burden of the binding beams, floors and roof frame of one of the
buildings, but not those of the others;
(5) Whenever the dividing wall between courtyards, gardens, and tenements is constructed in such a way
that the coping sheds the water upon only one of the estates;
(6) Whenever the dividing wall, being built of masonry, has stepping stones, which at certain intervals
project from the surface on one side only, but not on the other;
(7) Whenever lands inclosed by fences or live hedges adjoin others which are not inclosed.
In all these cases, the ownership of the walls, fences or hedges shall be deemed to belong exclusively to the
owner of the property or tenement which has in its favor the presumption based on any one of these
signs. (573)
Art. 661. Ditches or drains opened between two estates are also presumed as common to both, if there is no
title or sign showing the contrary.
There is a sign contrary to the part-ownership whenever the earth or dirt removed to open the ditch or to
clean it is only on one side thereof, in which case the ownership of the ditch shall belong exclusively to the
owner of the land having this exterior sign in its favor. (574)
Art. 662. The cost of repairs and construction of party walls and the maintenance of fences, live hedges,
ditches, and drains owned in common, shall be borne by all the owners of the lands or tenements having the
party wall in their favor, in proportion to the right of each.
Nevertheless, any owner may exempt himself from contributing to this charge by renouncing his part-
ownership, except when the party wall supports a building belonging to him. (575)
Art. 663. If the owner of a building, supported by a party wall desires to demolish the building, he may also
renounce his part-ownership of the wall, but the cost of all repairs and work necessary to prevent any
damage which the demolition may cause to the party wall, on this occasion only, shall be borne by
him. (576)
Art. 664. Every owner may increase the height of the party wall, doing at his own expense and paying for
any damage which may be caused by the work, even though such damage be temporary.
The expenses of maintaining the wall in the part newly raised or deepened at its foundation shall also be
paid for by him; and, in addition, the indemnity for the increased expenses which may be necessary for the
preservation of the party wall by reason of the greater height or depth which has been given it.
If the party wall cannot bear the increased height, the owner desiring to raise it shall be obliged to
reconstruct it at his own expense and, if for this purpose it be necessary to make it thicker, he shall give the
space required from his own land. (577)
Art. 665. The other owners who have not contributed in giving increased height, depth or thickness to the
wall may, nevertheless, acquire the right of part-ownership therein, by paying proportionally the value of
the work at the time of the acquisition and of the land used for its increased thickness. (578a)
Art. 666. Every part-owner of a party wall may use it in proportion to the right he may have in the co-
ownership, without interfering with the common and respective uses by the other co-owners. (579a)
SECTION 5. - Easement of Light and View
Art. 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the party wall any window or
aperture of any kind. (580)
Art. 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be counted:
(1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or
(2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the
window is through a wall on the dominant estate. (n)
Art. 669. When the distances in Article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall which is not party wall,
adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another, can make in it openings to admit light at the
height of the ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters square,
and, in every case, with an iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a wire screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the openings are made can
close them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to
that having such openings, unless an easement of light has been acquired. (581a)
Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view upon or
towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two meters between the
wall in which they are made and such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be a
distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription. (582a)
Art. 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct views from
the outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the latter when they do,
and in cases of oblique view from the dividing line between the two properties. (583)
Art. 672. The provisions of Article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated by a public way or alley,
which is not less than three meters wide, subject to special regulations and local ordinances. (584a)
Art. 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a
distance of three meters to be measured in the manner provided in Article 671. Any stipulation permitting
distances less than those prescribed in Article 670 is void. (585a)
SECTION 6. - Drainage of Buildings
Art. 674. The owner of a building shall be obliged to construct its roof or covering in such manner that the
rain water shall fall on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his neighbor, even
though the adjacent land may belong to two or more persons, one of whom is the owner of the roof. Even if
it should fall on his own land, the owner shall be obliged to collect the water in such a way as not to cause
damage to the adjacent land or tenement. (586a)
Art. 675. The owner of a tenement or a piece of land, subject to the easement of receiving water falling
from roofs, may build in such manner as to receive the water upon his own roof or give it another outlet in
accordance with local ordinances or customs, and in such a way as not to cause any nuisance or damage
whatever to the dominant estate. (587)
Art. 676. Whenever the yard or court of a house is surrounded by other houses, and it is not possible to give
an outlet through the house itself to the rain water collected thereon, the establishment of an easement of
drainage can be demanded, giving an outlet to the water at the point of the contiguous lands or tenements
where its egress may be easiest, and establishing a conduit for the drainage in such manner as to cause the
least damage to the servient estate, after payment of the property indemnity. (583)
SECTION 7. - Intermediate Distances

and Works for Certain Constructions and Plantings
Art. 677. No constructions can be built or plantings made near fortified places or fortresses without
compliance with the conditions required in special laws, ordinances, and regulations relating thereto. (589)
Art. 678. No person shall build any aqueduct, well, sewer, furnace, forge, chimney, stable, depository of
corrosive substances, machinery, or factory which by reason of its nature or products is dangerous or
noxious, without observing the distances prescribed by the regulations and customs of the place, and
without making the necessary protective works, subject, in regard to the manner thereof, to the conditions
prescribed by such regulations. These prohibitions cannot be altered or renounced by stipulation on the part
of the adjoining proprietors.
In the absence of regulations, such precautions shall be taken as may be considered necessary, in order to
avoid any damage to the neighboring lands or tenements. (590a)
Art. 679. No trees shall be planted near a tenement or piece of land belonging to another except at the
distance authorized by the ordinances or customs of the place, and, in the absence thereof, at a distance of
at least two meters from the dividing line of the estates if tall trees are planted and at a distance of at least
fifty centimeters if shrubs or small trees are planted.
Every landowner shall have the right to demand that trees hereafter planted at a shorter distance from his
land or tenement be uprooted.
The provisions of this article also apply to trees which have grown spontaneously.(591a)
Art. 680. If the branches of any tree should extend over a neighboring estate, tenement, garden or yard, the
owner of the latter shall have the right to demand that they be cut off insofar as they may spread over his
property, and, if it be the roots of a neighboring tree which should penetrate into the land of another, the
latter may cut them off himself within his property. (592)
Art. 681. Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent land belong to the owner of said land. (n)
SECTION 8. - Easement Against Nuisance (n)
Art. 682. Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or
possessor from committing nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water, glare
and other causes.
Art. 683. Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may be
maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.
SECTION 9. - Lateral and Subjacent Support (n)
Sec. 684. No proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
Art. 685. Any stipulation or testamentary provision allowing excavations that cause danger to an adjacent
land or building shall be void.
Art. 686. The legal easement of lateral and subjacent support is not only for buildings standing at the time
the excavations are made but also for constructions that may be erected.
Art. 687. Any proprietor intending to make any excavation contemplated in the three preceding articles
shall notify all owners of adjacent lands.
CHAPTER 3
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
Art. 688. Every owner of a tenement or piece of land may establish thereon the easements which he may
deem suitable, and in the manner and form which he may deem best, provided he does not contravene the
laws, public policy or public order. (594)
Art. 689. The owner of a tenement or piece of land, the usufruct of which belongs to another, may impose
thereon, without the consent of the usufructuary, any servitudes which will not injure the right of
usufruct. (595)
Art. 690. Whenever the naked ownership of a tenement or piece of land belongs to one person and the
beneficial ownership to another, no perpetual voluntary easement may be established thereon without the
consent of both owners. (596)
Art. 691. In order to impose an easement on an undivided tenement, or piece of land, the consent of all the
co-owners shall be required.
The consent given by some only, must be held in abeyance until the last one of all the co-owners shall have
expressed his conformity.
But the consent given by one of the co-owners separately from the others shall bind the grantor and his
successors not to prevent the exercise of the right granted. (597a)
Art. 692. The title and, in a proper case, the possession of an easement acquired by prescription shall
determine the rights of the dominant estate and the obligations of the servient estate. In default thereof, the
easement shall be governed by such provisions of this Title as are applicable thereto. (598)
Art. 693. If the owner of the servient estate should have bound himself, upon the establishment of the
easement, to bear the cost of the work required for the use and preservation thereof, he may free himself
from this obligation by renouncing his property to the owner of the dominant estate. (599)
a) Easements
1) Definition
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)
2) Characteristics – NCC 617-618

Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively
belong. (534)
Art. 618. Easements are indivisible. If the servient estate is divided between two or more
persons, the easement is not modified, and each of them must bear it on the part which
corresponds to him.
If it is the dominant estate that is divided between two or more persons, each of them may
use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more
burdensome in any other way. (535)
3) Classification – NCC 613-616, 619, 634, 688

Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or
more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. (531)
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the
intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts
of man.
Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by
external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Nonapparent easements are those which show no external indication of their
existence. (532)
Art. 616. Easements are also positive or negative.
A positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner of the servient estate the
obligation of allowing something to be done or of doing it himself, and a negative
easement, that which prohibits the owner of the servient estate from doing something
which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist. (533)
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The
former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. (536)
Art. 634. Easements imposed by law have for their object either public use or the interest
of private persons. (549) – LEGAL EASEMENTS
Art. 688. Every owner of a tenement or piece of land may establish thereon the easements
which he may deem suitable, and in the manner and form which he may deem best,
provided he does not contravene the laws, public policy or public order. (594)
4) Rights and obligations – NCC 624-633

Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established
or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively,
unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be
provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be
removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the
division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons. (541a)
Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an easement, all the rights necessary for its use are
considered granted. (542)
Art. 626. The owner of the dominant estate cannot use the easement except for the benefit
of the immovable originally contemplated. Neither can he exercise the easement in any
other manner than that previously established. (n)
SECTION 3. - Rights and Obligations

of the Owners of the Dominant and Servient Estates
Art. 627. The owner of the dominant estate may make, at his own expense, on the
servient state any works necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude, but
without altering it or rendering it more burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the servient estate, and shall choose the most
convenient time and manner so as to cause the least inconvenience to the owner of the
servient estate. (543a)
Art. 628. Should there be several dominant estates, the owners of all of them shall be
obliged to contribute to the expenses referred to in the preceding article, in proportion to
the benefits which each may derive from the work. Any one who does not wish to
contribute may exempt himself by renouncing the easement for the benefit of the others.
If the owner of the servient estate should make use of the easement in any manner
whatsoever, he shall also be obliged to contribute to the expenses in the proportion stated,
saving an agreement to the contrary. (544)
Art. 629. The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.
Nevertheless, if by reason of the place originally assigned, or of the manner established
for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of
the servient estate, or should prevent him from making any important works, repairs or
improvements thereon, it may be changed at his expense, provided he offers another
place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to
the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the
easement. (545)
Art. 630. The owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which
the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the
exercise of the easement. (n)
SECTION 4. - Modes of Extinguishment of Easements

Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be
used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should
again permit its use, unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for
prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is
temporary or conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient
estates. (546a)
Art. 632. The form or manner of using the easement may prescribe as the easement itself,
and in the same way. (547a)
Art. 633. If the dominant estate belongs to several persons in common, the use of the
easement by any one of them prevents prescription with respect to the others. (548)
5) Creation
29.By title – NCC 622, 624

30. By will of the owners – NCC 619, 688-693
31.By law – NCC 619, 634-636
32.By prescription – NCC 620-622
6) Termination/abatement – NCC 631(2)
Cid v. Javier, 108 Phil 239; G.R. No. L-14116. June 30, 1960.
DOCTRINE
"With regard to easements in the negative, from dominant to a servient, it must be accompanied by a
'formal act.' The law is explicit in stating that it should be in an instrument acknowledged by a notary
public."
FACTS
The review for certiorari arises with the conflict of Javier effectively blocking the easement of light and
view, although both structures are in accordance with their corresponding lots. The conflict can be assisted
by the interpretation of a formal act which has different applications in the Spanish Civil Code as well as
our Civil Code. In the former, it was discussed that any act would suffice. As long as there is a positive act
of prohibition whether orally or implied. However, the distinction was made apparent in the latter's
discussion. The court does not aver and makes plain and distinguishes between a formal act. In this case,
the effectivity of said act would be in the negative. This act (i.e. prohibition) would be coming from the
dominant directed towards the servient. Moreover, such an act could only be validly appreciated once it is
in a legal document that is notarized. Only with such acknowledgement can an easement be binding and bar
anyone who committs to undermine and deprive the right of a land owner to his pleasures, in this instance
privacy, sunlight and a view.
ISSUE
W/N respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view
arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by
Torrens titles.
HELD
NO. The requirement for an easement to be applicable would be that it be annotated and affixed together
with the registry of the Torrens title specifying the prohibition in question. Also, Article 538 provides that
the requirement to be fulfilled for prescription to run is that a formal act such as prohibition coming from a
dominant estate to a servient one be in an instrument duly acknowledged by a notary public. Otherwise,
there is no prescription or easement to speak of.
Francisco v. Paez, 54 Phil 239; G.R. No. 31118. January 14, 1930.
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 134 Phil 122; G.R. No. L-22733. September 25, 1968,|
Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil 471; G.R. No. 7012. March 26, 1913.
Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil 123; G.R. No. 28491. September 29, 1928.
Hidalgo v. Balandan, 91 Phil 489; G.R. No. L-3422. June 13, 1952.
Sitchon v. Aquino, 98 Phil 458; G.R. No. L-8191. February 27, 1956.
Velasco v. Manila Electric Co., 40 SCRA 342; G.R. No. L-18390. August 6, 1971.
Farrales v. City Mayor of Baguio, 44 SCRA 239; G.R. No. L-24245. April 11, 1972.
Timoner v. People, 125 SCRA 830; G.R. No. L-62050. November 25, 1983.
Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals199 SCRA 595; G.R. No. 95279. July 25, 1991.|||
Tamin v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 863; G.R. No. 97477. May 8, 1992
7) Legal Easements
a) In favor of adjacent properties
RIGHT OF WAY – NCC 649-657

SECTION 3. - Easement of Right of Way
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the
proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by
others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity
shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own
acts. (564a)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. (565)
Art. 651. The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. (566a)
Art. 652. Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates
of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the right
of way. (567a)
Art. 653. In the case of the preceding article, if it is the land of the grantor that becomes isolated, he may
demand a right of way after paying a indemnity. However, the donor shall not be liable for indemnity. (n)
Art. 654. If the right of way is permanent, the necessary repairs shall be made by the owner of the dominant
estate. A proportionate share of the taxes shall be reimbursed by said owner to the proprietor of the servient
estate. (n)
Art. 655. If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because its owner has
joined it to another abutting on a public road, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the
easement be extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the
indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the easement.
The same rule shall be applied in case a new road is opened giving access to the isolated estate.
In both cases, the public highway must substantially meet the needs of the dominant estate in order that the
easement may be extinguished. (568a)
Art. 656. If it be indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a
building, to carry materials through the estate of another, or to raise therein scaffolding or other objects
necessary for the work, the owner of such estate shall be obliged to permit the act, after receiving payment
of the proper indemnity for the damage caused him. (569a)
Art. 657. Easements of the right of way for the passage of livestock known as animal path, animal trail or
any other, and those for watering places, resting places and animal folds, shall be governed by the
ordinances and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the usages and customs of the
place.
Without prejudice to rights legally acquired, the animal path shall not exceed in any case the width of 75
meters, and the animal trail that of 37 meters and 50 centimeters.
Whenever it is necessary to establish a compulsory easement of the right of way or for a watering place for
animals, the provisions of this Section and those of Articles 640 and 641 shall be observed. In this case the
width shall not exceed 10 meters. (570a)
s. Archbishop of Manila v. Roxas, 22 Phil 450; G.R. No. 7386. March 30, 1912.
t. Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil 781; G.R. No. 9989. March 13, 1918.
u. Valderrama v. North Negros, 48 Phil 492; G.R. No. 23810. December 18, 1926.
v. North Negros v. Hidalgo, 63 Phil 664; G.R. No. 42334. October 31, 1936.
w. Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil 131; G.R. No. L-7248. May 28, 1955.
x. Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527; G.R. No. 63996. September 15, 1989.
y. Costabella v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 80511. January 25, 1991.
z. Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 74; G.R. No. 77628. March 11, 1991.
aa.Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong, 195 SCRA 748; G.R. No. 90596. April 8, 1991.
KGS
Solid Manila v. Bio Hong Trading
195 SCRA 748
DOCTRINES:
1. Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part, and even if they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or mortgaged
separately.
2. The vendee of real property in which a servitude or easement exists, did not acquire the right to close
that servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the public from using it.
FACTS
Solid Manila Corp. (petitioner) owns a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the
vicinity of another parcel owned by Bio Hong Trading (respondent). The latter’s title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way approx. 914sqm
converted as a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. As a consequence, an annotation was
entered in the respondent’s title. The petitioners and its neighbors made use of the private alley and
maintained and contributed to its upkeep. Thereafter, respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use. Respondent filed a case to remove said gates and to allow full access to the easement,
which was granted. In the Court of Appeals, it was held that since respondent has acquired title to the
property, “merger” brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
ISSUE
Whether the easement still exists or had been extinguished by merger?
HELD
The easement still exists on the property of Bio Hong Trading.
It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that
the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and
maintains an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which
they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are possessed of
a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no
argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on
the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi). As the petitioner
indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring
914sqm, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ."
and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account
of the easement.
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property ––
including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley
or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude,
the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger
took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the
Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be
noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in
favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may also
be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate
does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said,
presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that
relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public –– if
that is possible –– no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
bb.Quimen v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 163; G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996.
PARTY WALL – NCC 658-666

m) Lao v. Heirs of Alburo, 33 Phil 48; G.R. No. 10372. December 24, 1915.
LIGHT & VIEW – NCC 667-673

n) Cortes v. Yu-Tibo, 2 Phil 24; G.R. No.911 . March 12, 1903.
o) Fabie v. Lichauco, 11 Phil 14; G.R. No. 3598. July 24, 1908.
p) Saenz v. Figueras Hermanos, 13 Phil 666; G.R. No. 2085. August 10, 1909.
q) Amor v. Florentino, 74 Phil 403; G.R. No. 48384. October 11, 1943.
r) Gargantos v. Yanon, 108 Phil 888; G.R. No. L-14652. June 30, 1960.
INTERMEDIATE DISTANCES – NCC 677-681

LATERAL & SUBJACENT SUPPORT – NCC 684-687
b) Pertaining to waters Natural drainage – NCC 637, Pres. Decree 1067 (Water Code) 50
Riparian banks – NCC 638, Water Code 51
Drainage of buildings – NCC 674-676
Dam – NCC 639, 647, Water Code 38-39
Drawing water – NCC 640-641, Rep. Act 7942 (Mining Code), s. 73
Aqueduct – NCC 642-646, Water Code 13, 25, 46-49, 67
Sluice gate – NCC 647

 Tanedo v. Bernad, 165 SCRA 86; G.R. No. 66520. August 30, 1988.
 Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, 9 Phil 215; G.R. No. L-3144. November 19, 1907.
 Lunod v. Meneses, 11 Phil 128; G.R. No. 4223. August 19, 1908.
 Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242; G.R. No. L-21727. May 29, 1970.
 Relova v. Lavarez, 9 Phil 149; G.R. No. L-3623. November 6, 1907.
c) Easement against nuisance – NCC 682-683

d) Special easements – Mining Code (RA 7942) Sec .75
b) Waters
1) Ownership – NCC 502-503, Water Code (P.D. 1067 as amended) Secs. 5-6
2) Use of public waters – NCC 504-506, Water Code 31-52
3) Waters in private property – NCC 507-511, Water Code 5-6, 13-14, 25, 32, 41
4) Subterranean waters – NCC 512-514, Water Code 8-9, 13, 17, 32, 39, 64
5) General provisions – NCC 515-518, Water Code (all remaining provisions)
NUISANCE (Arts. 694-707 NCC)
Title VIII. - NUISANCE (n)
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.
Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that
property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who
created it.
Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages
for its past existence.
Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance
are availed of.
Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be
commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings,
is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
Art. 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to
himself.
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing,
or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the
local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
Art. 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:

(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying
the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary
injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a
private person be followed.
Art. 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages:
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
xx. Smart Communications, Inc. v. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013.
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Occupation, intellectual creation, donation, etc.
DONATION
33.Nature of donations.
34.Requisites of donations.
35.Kinds of donations .
As to taking effect: inter vivos, mortis causa, propter nuptias
As to cause or consideration.
As to effectivity or extinguishment.
Importance of classification.
Characteristics of a donation mortis causa.
Distinction between mortis causa and inter vivos.
36.Who may not give or receive donations.
37.Who may give or receive donations.
38.Acceptance of donations: who may accept; time of acceptance .
39.Form of donations.
40.What may be donated.
41.Effect of donation.
42.Revocation and reduction of donations.
Cases: Shopper's Paradise Realty & Development Corp. v. Roque, G.R. No. 148775, January 13, 2004.
SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs ROQUE
G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president,
Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a
parcel of land in the name of Roque. Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000.00 by way of
“reservation payment.” Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of
agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the
property. Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00
“downpayment” to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized,were never annotated on the
Certificate of title because of the untimely demise of Roque. Roque’s death constrained petitioner to deal
with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations
broke down due to some disagreements. In a letter, respondent advised petitioner “to desist from any
attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and memorandum of agreement”. On 15 February
1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement,
with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction before the RTC alleging that he had long been the
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by
his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter
into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly
acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by
respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of donation. The title to the property, however,
remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of respondent
sixteen years later.
Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere
administration of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only
after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement.
ISSUE: W/N there was valid donation to respondent?
HELD: YES. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is undisputed. The
trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-registration of a deed of donation
does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. In donations of immovable property, the law
requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code provides, however, that
“titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in
the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons.” It is
enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in a public
document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property
(Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Castro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20122, April 28, 1969.

C-J Yulo & Sons Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo Inc., G.R. No. 133705, March 31, 2005.
Sec. of Education v. Heirs of Dulay, Sr., G.R. No. 164748, January 27, 2006.
Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007.
PRESCRIPTION
cc. Concept and kinds of prescription.
Art. 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription. (1930a)
dd.Prescription of ownership and other real rights.

ee.Prescription of actions.
Cases:
s) Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, September 03, 2013.
Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic

August 6, 2017Light
G.R. No. 179987
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title
covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he
and his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession
of the said land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather which
passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties
which the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by
the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and
disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect them. The case settles
down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to
those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not
repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from “agricultural” by
PD 1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being
only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration.
Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the
application, the land is already classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory and the
provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an
independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the
reverse is true, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art.
1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the patrimonial
property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in use, is
converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or
Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the
land was classified as alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be
acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other substantive
evidence was presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does
not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Petition Denied.
t) Heirs of Padilla v. Magdua, G.R. No. 176858, September 15, 2010.
Padilla v Magdua Case Digest (OBLIGATIONS & CONTRACTS)
Padilla v Magdua
GR No. 176858
September 15, 2010
PRESCRIPTION
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without
the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Juanita, the mother of the heirs had allegedly executed a
notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him
the sole owner of the land.
(2) The land was subsequently sold by Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador).
RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The
RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-
heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in.
The RTC added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it
would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo's
daughters in favor of Dominador.
ISSUE: The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPLICABLE LAW/S: • Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
• Section 1, Rule 9 of the rules of Court. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HELD: No, it has not prescribed.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-
owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case, all three
requisites have been met.
After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother's land. The heirs, including
Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as
his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land had
now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In
Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners,
it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date
petitioners received notice of Ricardo's repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an
action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001,
only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive
prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus,
Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on
the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to the land.
Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally
entitled to the land.
u) Cutanda v. Heirs of Cutanda, G.R. No. 109215, July 11, 2000.
DOMINICA CUTANDA v. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA

FACTS
Roberto Cutanda owned 2 parcels of land in Bohol, and upon his death, his children became owners of said
land by inheritance. They left Bohol and established residence in Leyte. In 1988, they returned to Bohol
hoping to work on the land that was left to them. However, they discovered that these lands were already in
the possession of their relatives—heirs of their uncles and aunts.
Petitioners averred that the land in question is actually owned by their late uncle, Anastacio Cutanda, who
died without children, and left the lands to his siblings, one of which was Roberto Cutanda.
Furthermore, they claim rightful ownership of the land as they have been in open, contiguous, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of these for about 55 years.
The trials court found for the Petitioners. However, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the rights of the heirs of Roberto Cutanda have already prescribed, thus, giving rightful
ownership to the Petitioners?
HELD
The action brought by the respondents to the court was one of accion publiciana to recover the right to
possession and to be declared rightful owners of the land. Since the complaint actually put in issue the
ownership of the land, it should thus be treated properly as an accion reinvindicatoria.
Nevertheless, both have already prescribed as these rights are extinguished if not brought within 10 years
from dispossession. Therefore, the petitioners have indeed acquired possession and ownership of the land
in question by prescription, as the respondents failed to bring this action only 55 years later.

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Quieting of Title (Arts.

1. Suit quasi in rem

2. Common Law Remedy

3. Action for declaratory relief

1. Plaintiff in possession – imprescriptible

Who are allowed to bring.

Heirs of Olviga v CA; G.R. No. 104813. October 21, 1993.

Pingol v CA; G.R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993.

(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco

Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property

Sps. Portic v Cristobal; G.R. No. 156171. April 22, 2005.

26. In General (distinguish from joint tenancy, partnership)

Co-Ownership vs. Joint Ownership

Co-Ownership Joint Ownership

Co-ownership vs. Partnership

Co-ownership vs. Easements

Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.

5. Basa v. Aguilar, G.R. No. L-30994, September 30, 1982.

202 Phil. 452

Special rights of co-owners (Arts. 487-492; 494; 1088; 1620; 1623)

12.Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay, G.R. No. 32047, November 01, 1930.

Special rule on marital properties (Art. 90 Family Code)

d. Marriage (Family Code 88; 91-93; 96; 116-7; 120)

e. Cohabitation (Family Code 147-8)

f. Joint purchase (NCC 1452)

g. Succession (NCC 1078)

h. Donation (NCC 573; 753)

15) Chance (NCC 472)

j. Hidden treasure(NCC 438)

k. Easement of party wall (NCC 658)

l. Contract In general (NCC 494)

Universal partnership (NCC 1778-1780)

Condominium (RA 4726 Condominium Law)

28.Termination (NCC 494-501; 543; 1092-3)

POSSESSION (Arts. 523 to 561)

Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. (430a)

Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

Who exercises (Arts. 524; 532; 535; 538 NCC)

Status (Arts. 526-29 NCC)

What may not be possessed by private persons.

Possession may be lost by (Arts. 555-557 NCC):

USUFRUCT (Arts. 562 to 612 NCC)

Vda. De Albar v. Carangdang

Pascual v. Angeles, G.R. No. 1511, July 26, 1905.

EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES (Arts. 613-693 NCC).

Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.

SECTION 2. - Modes of Acquiring Easements

SECTION 3. - Rights and Obligations

SECTION 4. - Modes of Extinguishment of Easements

SECTION 4. - Easement of Party Wall

SECTION 5. - Easement of Light and View

SECTION 6. - Drainage of Buildings

SECTION 7. - Intermediate Distances

SECTION 8. - Easement Against Nuisance (n)

SECTION 9. - Lateral and Subjacent Support (n)

2) Characteristics – NCC 617-618

3) Classification – NCC 613-616, 619, 634, 688

Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent.

4) Rights and obligations – NCC 624-633

SECTION 3. - Rights and Obligations

SECTION 4. - Modes of Extinguishment of Easements

29.By title – NCC 622, 624

6) Termination/abatement – NCC 631(2)