B7TH CONGRESS SENATE JDOCUENT

1st Session I No. 14

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF
JANUARY 6, 1961

A SUMMARY AND INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF

SENATOR, ALEXANDER WILEY

BY THE
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

FEBRUARY 22, 1961.-Ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
N7 11 WASHINGTON : 191

--- ---.. -.- - - ---. --.-

 CONTENTS

I. Summary of report--------.----- ..---.-

II. Summary of speech
...---- ---------
-., 1
2
--------------- .., ----- ---

A. Introduction--------------. 2
B. An era of victory of communism -------------- 2
C. On building communism in U.S.S.R. and prospects for a world
Socialist system ..------.------------.---------.
- 3
D. IPreveinting global war: A "vital" question----------- 4
E. On liquidating colonialism and tactics in former colonial areas. 5
F. Ideological questions of the Communist movement----- 5
G. On consolidating the Communist movement ------------- 6
III. An interpretive analysis----------------------------------- 7
In
 KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961
A Summary and Interpretive Analysis
I. SUMMARY OF REPORT
Ostensibly, the main purpose of Khrushchev's speech of January 6,
1961 was to report to Soviet party officials on the November con-
ference of world Communist leaders. He regarded the declaration
of the conference as a basic formulation of Communist theories and
policies for theto present era. the structure of world
According Khrushchev, politics today is
determined by the following main forces:-(1) the disintegration of
Western imperialism and the decline of Western power and influence;
(2) the growth of a powerful Communist world system; (3) the
emergence of new independent states from the colonial and former
colonial areas of the world with an anti-imperialist, and thus "pro-
orientation; (4) the shift in the balance of world-power
Soviet," the
favoring Communist bloc.
Khrushchev discussed the importance of economic expansion and
economic cooperation within the bloc. To outstrip the most advanced
Western countries introduction, he said, was the primary task of all
Communists. The problem of averting a thermonuclear war was,
however, the most "vital" problem for mankind. He defined three
types of modern warfare: world wars, local wars, and wars of national
liberation. He opposed world war, criticized the idea 'of 'limited"
war, and supported wars of liberation. In a general discussion of
foreign policy, he stressed Soviet success in. seizing the initiative and
increasingand influence inhadworld
its influence affairs. He contended that Western
prestige declined and that world capitalism was
now in a new stage of "general crisis." He also gave particular
stress to the importance of disarmament.
Turning to problems in the colonial areas, Khrushchev emphasized
the importance to the Soviet bloc of success in these areas and made
special note of the Cuban revolution. In matters of tactics,:he urged
alliances with all forces in the colonial areas opposed to imperialism;
he restated earlier views on differing roads to socialism and discussed
its implications; he pledged aid to these areas as an "international
duty" of all Communists.
In a discussion of ideological matters, Khrushchev stressed again
familiar formulations of Soviet theory on the modes of transition from
capitalism theto socialism. Peaceful transition, he said, was possible,
providing "ruling classes" submitted willingly. Otherwise, revolt
and civil war were the only other alternatives. He called for an
"implacable war" against all forms of deviation from Marxism-Lenin-
ism which, he said, weakened the Communist movement, Finally, he
urged unity and solidarity within the Communist bloc, stated that the
CPSU was no longer at the "head" of world communism, and pre-
dicted future victories for the movement.
1
2 KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961
Seldom has Khrushchev been so explicit in asserting that Com-
munist victory was near. Aside from this statement, the speech con-
tained few striking innovations. It was, however, an important re-
statement of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence"; it spelled
out the tactical utility of."peaceful coexistence" in forwarding Soviet
purposes. -It was also important as'Khrushchev's interpretation of
the December declaration of world Communists. This was a com-
promise document which attempted to reconcile the conflicting views
of Peiping and Moscow on the controversial question of "peaceful co-
existence" and the "inevitability of wars." In his speech Khrushchev
seems to have drawn from the declaration those ideas suitable only to
his own views and purposes. As a result, the speech was a detailed
exposition:on the advantages he expected to gain from his policy of
"peaceful coexistence."
This exposition on "peaceful coexistence," however, reveals the
fundamental dilemma in which Khrushchev finds himself. He may
want to avoid a war that would destroy Soviet civilization, but he is
committed to the destruction of capitalism, and in his specific policies
and actions accepts grave risks that in themselves could invite the
thermonuclear danger he seeks to avoid.
II. SUMMARY OF SPEECH
A. INTRODUCTION
Khrushchev's 20,000-word speech, entitled "For New Victories of
the World Communist Movement," was delivered on January 6, 1961,
at a meeting of party organizations of the Higher Party School, the
Academy of Social Sciences, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
Ostensibly, purpose of the speech was to report on the Novem-
the
ber conference of world Communist leaders. According to Khru-
this conference demonstrated "fraternal unity," "party democ-
shchev,and
racy," the "spirit of proletarian internationalism" within the ranks
of world communism. The declaration issued in December after the
conference adjourned was, he said, a "militant Marxist-Leninist docu-
ment of tremendous importance." It provided a "profound analysis"
of new developments in world affairs and contained "important theo-
retical and political deductions" for the world Communist movement.
In Khrushchev's words, it would "serve as a true compass" for future
Communist activities and "point the way for development of the world
Socialist system and for further unification of the Socialist camp."
B. AN ERA OF VICTORY FOR COMMUNISM
Khrushchev asserted that history was no longer "working for
socialism" (that is, communism), but that "socialism" was "working
for history." Presumably, he meant that the emergence of a powerful
Communist bloc accelerated historical forces that "inevitably" would
lead to the triumph of communism. The "basic content" of the con-
temporary historical process would now, as Lenin had predicted,
enable communism to be established and consolidated on an "inter-
national scale."
Khrushchev cited the following characteristics of the new epoch:
(1) Marxist-Leninist teaching, as a theory and "living reality,"
was now encompassing the globe. The time was not "far away when
 KHRUSHCHEV*S' SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 3
Marxism-Leninism will possess the minds of the majority of the world's
population." Communism. was now' a powerful world system"
whose forward movement, could not be checked.
(2) The Western colonial system "verges on complete disintegra,
tion," and imperialism was "in a state of decline and crisis."
(3) The balance of world forces now favored the Communist bloc.
(4) The United States, "the mightiest power of capitalism," faced
"growing difficulties and crises" in the economic field and in interna-
tional politics. This was its "twilight phase," the final stage of its
decline.
(5) The entire capitalist world has reached. a "new stage" of
"general crisis." This was brought about by (a) the change in the
correlation of world forces favoring communism; (b) conditions of
"competition and struggle" between communism and capitalism; (c)
"acute aggravation" of all contradictions in imperialism; (d) condi-
tions of "world coexistence" that checked the "aggressive actions"
of the "imperialists"; and (e) the combined forces of "democracy,
national liberation, and socialism."
(6) The continued crisis of capitalism created new opportunities
to be exploited. "New successes" were now possible.
C. ON BUILDING COMMUNISM IN U.S.S.R. AND PROSPECTS FOR A-WORLD
SOCIALIST SYSTEM
Communism's "primary task,t Khrushchev said, was "to outstrip
as soon as possible, the world capitalist system in absolute volume of
industrial and agricultural production, and then to overtake the most
developed capitalist countries in per capita production and living
standards."
The Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), Khrushchev asserted, con-
tinued to concentrate on the problem of building a Communist society
in the U.S.S.R. The party aimed at achieving these goals:
(1) to create the "material-technical base of commrunism'; ,
(2) to develop "on this foundation" Communist "social
relations";
(3) to mold "the man of the future Communist society."
To fulfill all the expectations and goals of the 7-year plan was the
most important factor for creating the foundations of communism.
In discussing the Soviet economy, Khrushchev made the following
points: :
(1) The annual rate of Soviet growth exceeded that of the
United States.
(2) The Soviets had made great strides in education. These
successes have raised the cultural level of the masses.
(3) The time was approaching when the Communist bloc would
take first place in world production.
(4) Victory over the capitalist system in the economic field
would be "the biggest turning point in, ;itory." This would
be demonstrable proof of the vigor and strength of the Com-
munist system. .; *i
Khrushchev went on to discuss various theoretical problemstb^at
have arisen in the course of establishing coramunism in the Soviet
Union. He cited particularly the efforts of the Commuaist Party of
the Soviet Union to solve these problems. He stressed the "natural
4 KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961
law" of extensive economic cooperation within the world Communist
continued "solidarity, unity, collaboration, and
system and urged best
mutual aid" as the way to strengthen and consolidate the "coin-
mon economic base" of communism.
D. PREVENTING GLOBAL WAR: A "VITAL" QUESTION
Khrushchev described the problem of preventing global thermo-
nuclear war as the "most burning and vital problem for mankind."
He warned that wars would be totally abolished only when commu-
nism triumphed globally. At that time, according to Marxist-Leninist
doctrine, the division of society into "hostile antagonistic classes"
would be eliminated, and all social and national causes for war would,
therefore, be removed.
Khrushchev placed war in the following categories and defined
them accordingly:
(1) World war.-Capitalist countries caused world wars; Communist
countries opposed them. The "most probable" wars, he said, would
occur among the capitalist states. Soviet strength and power deterred
the capitalists from launching a war against the Communist bloc.
"Peaceful coexistence" was, therefore, assured.
(2) Local wars.-Khrushchev stated that capitalist states planned
for local wars (i.e., "limited" war, such as the conflict over Suez) out
of fear that world war would destroy their system. Opportunities
for unleashing such wars, he said, were now "becoming fewer and
fewer,"could the shift in the balance of world power. Since local
owing to into
wars grow a "world thermonuclear rocket war" the Soviets
had to be prepared for both types.
(3) Wars of national liberation.-Wars of this type (i.e., as in Viet-
nam and Algeria) would continue as long as imperialism and colonial-
ism existed. The Soviets regarded them as "sacred" wars. Khrush-
chev, therefore, pledged aid to all peoples "striving for their in-
dependence."
Khrushchev discussed in detail the grave consequences of a world
war. He reaffirmed his "resolute" opposition to such wars. He
confidently asserted that the "laws of historical development" gave
assurances that the victory of communism was "now near" and that
for this victory wars were "not necessary."
In a general discussion of foreign policy, Khrushchev made the
following points:
(1) The prestige of the Communist bloc had risen to "unprece-
dented" heights; it holds the initiative in world politics. By contrast,
the "imperialist" states 'defend themselves with their backs to the
wall." Their prestige and influence "have never been so low."
(2) The Soviet Union was determined to build its military strength,
expose the "aggressive essence" of all military and political alinements
of the West (such as, NATO, SEATO, and CENTO), isolate them,
and ultimately liquidate them.
(3) With regard to Berlin, he stated that the Western Powers
must be brought "to their senses." They must recognize their
"particularly vulnerable" position, take the "actual position into
account," and terminate their "occupational regime." If not, the
Soviet Union would take "decisive measures."
 KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 5
(4) Disarmament was "the most important factor for averting
war." This was "not a tactical move." "We sincerely want dis-
armament," he said. Two forces operated within the "ruling circles"
of the capitalist camp: one aimed at war; the other accepted the idea
of peaceful coexistence "in some form." Communists were instructed
to enlist support from those elements who sought "peace."
E. ON LIQUIDATING COLONIALISM AND TACTICS IN FORMER COLONIAL
AREAS
Khrushchev praised the national liberation movements in colonial
areas because against imperial-
they (1) dealt "more and more blowscontributed
ism"; (2) helped consolidate "peace"; and (3) to the
advance of social progress. Asia, Africa, and Latin America, he said,
were now the key revolutionary centers against imperialism. He
cited Latin America as "one more front of active struggle against
American imperialism" which has been formed in recent years. No
longer is Latin America "an appendage of the UnitedtheStates." "The
whole world," he said, "has heard the thunder of heroic Cuban
revolution." This revolution, he went on, was "not only repelling
the onslaught of the imperialists" but was going "deeper and broader"
by making the people "masters of their own wealth." "Solidarity
with revolutionary Cuba" was not only the "duty" of Latin Americans
but also the "duty of the Socialist countries, of the entire international
Communist movement, the proletariat of all areas of the world."
Khrushchev indicated that Communist parties operated in nearly
50 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He emphasized that
they alone could apply the theories of Marxism-Leninism best suited
to their nation's needs. He denied that the national liberation move-
ment was independent of the "class struggle" for communism and
assailed the notion that the "colonizers" granted freedom to the former
colonial countries. The purpose of those advocating these views, he
claimed, was to isolate the new independent states from the Com-
munist camp and prove that they could become a "third force" in
international politics while at the same time not opposing imperialism.
Khrushchev credited the Bolshevik revolution and the forces issuing
from it with dooming colonialism.
In discussing tactical problems in the colonial areas, Khrushchev
urged Communists to enlist support from all persons at all levelsthe- of
society so long as they opposed imperialism. Marxist-Leninist
ories, he advised, should be adapted to particular national situations,
balancing with the means
the end of achieving communism and destroying im-
of tolerating unique national conditions.
perialism
Khrushchev concluded with a warning that the Communist bloc
had an "international duty" to give "all-round" support to econom-
ically underdeveloped countries so that they could establish their
"independence."
F. IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
The guarantee of future victories, Khrushchev went on, depended
upon "faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism." Future strategy and
tactics must continue to be formulated upon this basis. Khrushchev
made special note of the growing Communist membership. At the
6 KHRUSHCHEV'8 SPEECH, OF JANUARY: 6, 19 6
first Comintern Congress in 1920, 30 countries were represented.
Only five parties existedin all Europe outside of Russia; none were
established in Asia, Africa, Australia, and Oceania. Today, the party
functioned in 87 countries, uniting into one movement mor, than 36
million people.
In a discussion of the transition to communism, Khrushchev re-
peated theoretical positions established at the 20th Party Congress
in 1956:
(1) A proletarian revolution and establishment of a dictatorship
were central requirements in transforming society from capitalism to
communism.
(2) Owing to diversity in national situations, transition to com.
munism everywhere did not have to occur through armed uprising
and civil war.
(3) Peaceful transition was possible, providing the "ruling classes"
submitted willingly. Otherwise force and civil war were essential.
(4) The growing strength o{ the "world Socialist system" and
in the organizations of workers in capitalist countries
improvements
enhanced conditions for Communist revolution.
(5) Use ofinparliamentary institutions, and other governmental
institutions, an era of transition was permissible providing the
majority membership parliament 'represented all revolutionary
in
forces under the political leadership of the Communist Party. Under
these conditions the bourgeois bureaucracy could be overthrown, and
a new proletarian state system, parliamentary in form, could be created.
(6) The problem of determining the proper forms and methods
of seizure of power was the task of the proletariat in each country and
its Communist Party.
Khrushchev stated further that Communists opposed the "export
of revolution." Similarly, they opposed the "imperialist export of
counterrevolution" and regarded it their "international duty" to rally
all forces against intervention by "imperialists" into the internal
affairs of a country that had already revolted. Khrushchev stressed
the importance of the youth as a "great revolutionary force" to be
won over and also the working class which he termed, "the leading
revolutionary force of our times."
Khrushchev called for an "implacable war" on "opportunism,"
"revisionism" (no doubt having in mind Tito's Yugoslavia), "dog-
matism and sectarianism" (i.e., insistence upon the hard, Stalinist
line as in China and Albania), and all forms of deviation from Marx-
ism-Leninism that weakened the world Communist movement.
G, ON CONSOLIDATING THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

According to Khrushchev, unity and solidarity within the Com-

munist movement were vital. The common aim of world com-
munism required "a unity of will and action" of all parties. This
was the "supreme international duty" of every party. Khrushchev
explained the relationship between the CPSU he and the other parties.
All parties were "equal and independent," said. None were
superior or subordinate. In reality, the CPSU didin not exercise leader-it
ship over the other parties. Its importance lay the fact that (1)
was the firSt "to blaze the trail to socialism"; (2) the U.S.S.R. was the-
most powerful country in the "world Socialist system"; .(3) it had
 IcTUSHCHEBVS SPEZECH OF JANUARY 6 , 19 61 7
acquired much experience; and (4) it was the first to enter "the period
of comprehensive construction, of communism." The December
declaration and other documents omitted any reference to the CPSU
as being "at the head of the Communist movement." They did stress,
according to Khrushchev, that "the universally acknowledged
vanguard of the world Communist movement has been and still
remains the CPSU, as the most experienced and hardened unit of the
international Communist movement." Alluding to the diffusion of
power among individual parties and the particular tasks facing them,
Khrushchev indicated that it was no longer possible or necessary to
exercise leadership over "Socialist countries and Communist Parties"
from "any center at all."
Khrushchev did not believe that decentralization in this manner
would weaken the movement. The main condition of unity and
solidarity, he said, was loyalty to the common ideology of Marxism-
Leninism. This was the "guiding light" for all Communist activities.
Adherence to this doctrine, he said, brought economic success,to the
Communist countries. The world could thus see that "socialism and
communism" were the "'greatest force of our times" and that the
"future belongs to communism.". He stressed again the need for
recognizing the principle of differing roads to socialism, called for
unity and solidarity within the bloc, pointed to the strong bonds of
"fraternal" friendship with the Chinese Compiunists, and concluded
with a declaration of future victories for communism.
III. AN INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS
Seldom has Khrushchev been so explicit in asserting that Com-
munist victory was near. Aside from this statement, his speech
contained fewsstriking innovations. It seemed to be a restatement of
many of his familiar formulations in Marxist-Leninist theory and
practical policy. , ,
The importance of the speech appears to be not so much the content
but what it inferred that is,the growing divergence in policy and
theory between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Both accept
and operate on the premise that the correlation of world forces now
favors the Communist bloc. But, the difference lies in formulating
practical measures for advancing from. this point. Inferentially,
Khrushchev seemed to take account of 'this divergence by (1) his
detailed exposition of the merits of "peaceful coexistence" (2) his
recognition of the diffusion of power within the Communist bloc;
and (3) ackowledgment that the Soviet Union was no longer at the
"head" of the Communist movement,
Ostensibly, the speech was intended to be a personal report on the
November conference of world, Communist leaders, Khrushchev
interspersed his remarks with frequent allusions to,. and direct quota-
tions from, the conference declaration. But, his comments clearly
reflected Soviet views and policies, Western observers have widely
regarded .the December declaration as a. compromise document
hamrnered out to satisfy both, Mocow, and, Peiping. Specific views
of each,particularly,dn the controversial,quion of "peaceful coexst-
ence" ad,,thq "inevitability of war, are clearly discernible. Each
could draw from the document theoretical formulatiqop to buttress
their own positions. What: Khrushchev seemedto do in his January 6
81-528'-61 S. Docs., 87-1, vol. 1-- 11
$ KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961
speech was to extract only those elements supporting Soviet policies
elaborate upon them, while ignoring the harder, more sharply defined
Chinese views. Byand his
large, speech was, therefore,
an appeal
for continued support of "peaceful coexistence" and rejection of the
neo-Stalinist approach of Communist China and its supporters within
the bloc and within the CPSU.
Khrushchev's appeal for support took the shape of a general re-
statement of his oft-repeated rationale for "peaceful coexistence."
In Soviet terminology, "peaceful coexistence" does not mean accept-
ance of the status quo and establishment of a- harmony of interests
in the American sense. Rather, the Soviets understand it to mean
unimpeded progress of communism. It is a continued commitment
to the conquest of power. The "struggle" against capitalism con-
tinues. The tactics employed are more subtle in content and diver-
sionary in character, but the goal remains constant: to destroy world
capitalism.
In explaining the wisdom of "peaceful coexistence" as a valid
policy, Khrushchev restated basic Soviet assumptions on what are
the main forces operating in world politics today:
(1) the growing economic and political power of the entire
Communist bloc;
(2) the decline of colonialism;"
(3) the formation of a new "pro-Soviet" grouping of powers
from the emerging states in the colonial and former colonial areas;
(4) the continuing decline of Western power as the base of its
strength is weakened with the liquidation of imperialism and
disintegration of colonialism;
(5) the "decisive" shift in the balance of world power favoring
the Communist bloc.
A final element in Khrushchev's definition of the structure of world
politics is his expressed awareness of the danger ofofthermonuclear war
this danger, he
and its consequences for humanity. Because
seemed to say, there is no other 'alternative policy than "peaceful
coexistence." He opposed world war as a capitalist invention and
described in some detail the effects of a thermonuclear global war on
mankind. He discounted the relevance of "limited" war, given the
present strength of the Communist bloc toa deter "imperialist" aggres-
sion. For him, the task of preventing global thermonuclear war
was the "most burning and vital problem for mankind." Disarma-
ment was, therefore, no "tactical" move, but rather a matter for
serious consideration.
But, what is most significant about Khrushchev's discussion of
"peaceful coexistence" is the flat assertion that through-this policy
communism could now triumph without risking thermonucpar war.
Again, this is a familiar though relatively recent Soviet position. He
stressed the peaceful aspects of the "struggle," citing particularly
the economic strength of the Communist bloc and the example it gave
the world for emulation. He pointed to the emerging states in the
colonial areas and assumed their allegiance to the "Socialist bloc,"
presumably either as potential or actual allies. He urged all Com-
munists to enlist the support of all strata of society, however politically
unacceptable they may be, so long as they supported "peaceful co-
existence," and, presumably, other Soviet policies. He cited the
decline of the West and the disintegration of colonialism as proof
 KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 9
that the triumph of communism was now only a matter of awaiting
the natural evolution of the historical process.
But, as Khrushchev said, the Soviets were also "working for history"
that is, they hastened the "inevitable" process that insured success
through theirto own active involvement. As revolutionary activists,
they sought shape history and thus confirm its judgment.
This is the other side of "peaceful coexistence." It is this side
that compounds Khrushchev's dilemma in foreign policy: He may
want to avoid a war that would destroy Soviet civilization, but he is
committed to the destruction of capitalism and in his specific policies
and actions accepts grave risks that in themselves could invite the
thermonuclear danger he seeks to avoid.
Khrushchev may not want a thermonuclear war, but it is clear
that he supports all wars of "liberation" in colonial areas. While
he accepts the idea that there are many roads to communism (i.e
through parliament), he does not deny that armed revolt and civil
war may be necessary if the "ruling circles" do not willingly submit
to the transfer of power. And rather than easing tension in Berlin,
he seeks to exploit what he terms the "vulnerable" Western position
and threatens "decisive" measures if the West doesn't withdraw.
Thus, what Khrushchev at seems to say in this speech is this:
(1) The Soviets cannot present accept the risks of a thermo-
nuclear rocket war.
(2) They can, however, continue the "struggle" with capitalism in
the political, economic and even the military realm. Presumably,
this view is based on the ambiguous assumption that the "struggle"
can be directed on a diminished level of danger but not diminished
in intensity.
(3) New successes can be gained by using power-in-being to trans-
form specific political situations (i.e., Berlin) to the Soviet advantage.
(4) They can hasten the erosion of Western "imperialism" by "all-
round" aid to colonial and former colonial countries.
(5) By the continuing engagement of power, they can weaken the
political positions of the Western Powers, thus advancing the cause of
communism.
As if to further impress upon the audience his belief that the "politi-
cal line" of "peaceful coexistence" was the "correct one," Khrushchev
reminded them that the prestige and influence of the Communist bloc
had reached an "unprecedented height" and that it now held the
initiative in world politics, while the Western Powers had "their backs
to the wall" and their prestige had never been so low. He confidently
reminded them that the West had entered a new stage of disintegra-
tion, while the triumph of communism was near.
Nevertheless, the dilemma inherent in Khrushchev's "peaceful co-
existence" policy remains: for he cannot avoid accepting great risks
of war while he simultaneously seeks the historic goals of communism.
0