Social Movement Studies, 2015

Vol. 14, No. 2, 230–236, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2014.938733

PROFILE

Marching Against the Dictator: Chernobyl

Path in Belarus
OLENA NIKOLAYENKO
Department of Political Science, Fordham University, Bronx, NY, USA

ABSTRACT The protest campaign Chernobyl Path is held annually in Belarus to commemorate
victims of the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, raise public awareness of
environmental issues, and call for democratization in the post-communist state. The size of this
protest event, however, has declined since the mid-1990s. This Profile argues that protest tactics and
state countermoves account for a low level of citizen participation in the protest event. The empirical
analysis focuses on the protest campaign held in the capital city of Minsk in spring 2013. The present
analysis examines tactics deployed by regime opponents and state authorities during this protest
campaign. The study illustrates how civic activists in an authoritarian regime seek to put
environmental issues on the public agenda.

KEY WORDS : Environmental movements, anti-nuclear campaign, repression, authoritarianism,

Eastern Europe, Belarus

Belarusian civic activists annually hold a protest event titled Chernobyl Path
(Charnobylski Shliakh). This protest event takes the form of a march to commemorate
victims of the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and advance public
awareness of environmental issues in the country. Moreover, given the repressive
character of the current regime, this environmental campaign raises broader political
issues that beset Belarusian society. Protest event organizers identify democratization as a
pre-condition for addressing environmental problems in the state. In turn, the incumbent
government treats any protest event as a threat to the current regime and systematically
inhibits the organization of the protest campaign.
Over the past two decades, the number of participants in this protest campaign has
sharply declined. The size of the protest march in the capital city of Minsk peaked at
50,000 people in spring 1996 and subsequently dropped to a few thousand people
(Dubavets, 1996, p. 8). In 2001, for example, approximately 5000 people participated in
the march (Chernobyl Path, 2001). According to various estimates (Belarusian Helsinki
Committee, 2013; Chernobyl Path-2013: An online report, 2013; Kuchta, 2013), between
700 and 1000 people participated in the protest event in spring 2013. This study argues that
protest tactics and state countermoves account for low levels of citizens’ participation in
the protest march.

Correspondence Address: Olena Nikolayenko, Department of Political Science, Fordham University, Faber Hall,
Rm. 677, 441 East Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458, USA. Fax: þ 1 718-817-3972; Tel.: þ 1 718-817-3961;
Email: onikolayenko@fordham.edu
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
 Marching against the dictator 231

The empirical analysis focuses on Chernobyl Path-2013, marking the 27th

anniversary of the accident. The protest campaign was organized by the environmental
non-governmental organization Ecodom (Eco-House) and several political parties in
opposition to the current regime: Belarusian Christian Democratic Party, Belarusian
Social-Democratic Party, BNF Party, and the United Civic Party of Belarus. Civic activists
received an official permission to hold a protest event in Minsk, but state authorities
deployed a wide range of measures to depress the level of citizens’ participation in the
protest march.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following manner: Section 1 briefly
describes the political climate in Belarus. Section 2 discusses main demands advanced by
protesters. Section 3 examines the use of protest tactics. Section 4 analyzes the deployment
of state repression. Section 5 points out the importance of environmental movements in
non-democracies.

1. Europe’s Last Dictatorship

Belarus is a former Soviet republic bordering on the EU member states (Latvia, Lithuania,
and Poland), Russia, and Ukraine. The country has a population of approximately
9.5 million people, with 83.7% of ethnic Belarusians (http://www.belstat.gov.by/homep/
en/census/2009/pc_results.php). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Belarus gained national independence and embarked upon transition from communism.
But the election of Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the country’s president led to the rollback of
democratic reforms and the consolidation of the authoritarian regime. Lukashenka
extended executive powers and removed constitutional term limits on the presidency,
ruling from 1994 to the present day. His 20-year presidency is marred with gross human
rights violations, including the government’s crackdown on the political opposition and
civil society. Given the repressive character of the current regime, this East European state
became known as Europe’s last dictatorship (on Belarusian politics, see Wilson, 2011).
Belarus is one of the most censored countries in the world, according to the New York-
based NGO Committee to Protect Journalists (http://www.cpj.org/reports/2012/05/10-mos
t-censored-countries.php#10). There is no independent TV station, and a few radio stations
critical of the regime (e.g. Radio Racyja and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) try to
broadcast uncensored news from outside the country. The print media market is dominated
by state-controlled newspapers and magazines. State authorities obstruct the production
and distribution of independent print media, which significantly limits citizens’ access to
alternative information. Moreover, the sole Internet service provider in the country – the
state-owned telecommunication company Beltelecom – tries to block websites deemed as
threatening to the current regime. The strangulation of independent media imposes
constraints on the organization of protest events in Belarus.
Another impediment to the organization of protest events is the government’s
encroachment upon the freedom of assembly enshrined in Article 35 of the Constitution of
Belarus. Participants in protest events are frequently detained, subject to inhumane
treatment at the police station, and denied the right to free and fair trial (for an overview,
see Stefanovich, 2013). Youthful protesters, for example, are routinely threatened with
expulsion from university and sentenced to a two-week imprisonment for alleged
hooliganism. The government fears any public display of dissent, so both large protest
events organized by the political opposition and small-scale acts of resistance performed
232 O. Nikolayenko

by a few individuals are penalized. In February 2012, for example, Alyaksandr

Artsybashau and Paval Vinahradau were sentenced to a 10-day imprisonment for ‘an
unauthorized protest’: they placed a few soft toys with small placards referring to such
issues as police brutality and violations of the freedom of expression in Independence
Square in central Minsk (Second Belarusian activist, 2012). In this political climate,
Chernobyl Path was organized in spring 2013.

2. Main Issues
The main issue tackled by the protest campaign was the impact of the Chernobyl accident
on Belarus. Explosions on the nuclear power plant on 26 April 1986 were approximately
400 times more potent than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, with large
amounts of radioactive elements released into the air. Though the nuclear plant itself was
located in neighboring Ukraine, more than two-thirds of radiation fell on the territory of
Belarus, which affected the country’s population and in particular youth (for an overview
of health effects, see Bennett, Repacholi, & Carr, 2006). Because the thyroid gland in
children is highly sensitive to the induction of cancer by radiation from external sources,
most health research focused on the incidence of thyroid cancer and found ‘the sudden and
unprecedented rise in thyroid cancer among children in Belarus’ (Astakhova et al., 1998,
p. 353; Jacob et al., 2006). In addition, adults in the contaminated area reported higher
rates of psychological distress and medical service use than residents in an unexposed
region (Havenaar, de Wilde, van den Bout, Drottz-Sjoberg, & van den Brink, 2003;
Havenaar et al., 1997). Yet, the government of Belarus refuses to collect and disclose full
information about the effects of the environmental disaster on Belarusian society. The
dearth of reliable health-related data has given rise to two divergent framing tactics. On the
one hand, organizers of the protest event place heavy emphasis on the disastrous
consequences of the Chernobyl accident and organize the event as a vigil to commemorate
Chernobyl victims. On the other hand, the government seeks to downplay the Chernobyl’s
detrimental effects and promote settlement in the contaminated area. For example, the
state-sponsored youth organization Belarusian Republican Union of Youth in cooperation
with government agencies implemented a cultural program ‘Chernobyl Path – the Road to
Life’ and assisted with the organization of charity concerts in contaminated regions (The
arts program, 2013). Furthermore, state authorities began to repopulate the contaminated
area, requiring a quarter of university graduates to take job assignments in the region. If
unwilling to move to the Chernobyl-affected area, college-educated youth are required to
pay a hefty fine to the government.
Another contentious issue during the 2013 protest campaign was the government’s plan
to build a nuclear power plant in Hrodna region. The government’s unilateral decision
clashed with the widely held idea of a nuclear-free Belarus in the wake of the Chernobyl
disaster. The Astravets site selected for the construction of the new nuclear plant was
located in a contaminated area with reportedly high radiation levels. Moreover, this site sat
on a tectonic trench, a seismically active zone approximately 18 miles from Lake Narach,
the country’s largest lake and a popular tourist destination. Another major cause of public
concern was that the government of Belarus contracted the Russian company
AtomStroyExport to provide nuclear power equipment and manage the construction.
Environmental groups and civic activists questioned the company’s capacity and
commitment to compliance with international environmental safety standards, given lags
 Marching against the dictator 233

in technological advancement and a high rate of corruption in post-Soviet Russia.

Furthermore, Russian involvement in the project was perceived as a threat to the country’s
sovereignty due to the reinforcement of Belarus’s energy dependence on Russia.
Democratization was seen as critical to the solution of urgent environmental problems
in the country. In particular, the return of the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly,
and free and fair elections were viewed as a precondition for the exercise of citizens’
environmental rights (Chernobyl Path, 2013). As the first step toward democratization,
protesters called for the release of political prisoners. Since the start of Lukashenka’s
presidency, dozens of Belarusians were imprisoned for criticism of the current regime and
organization of protest events. Among the first political prisoners in the 1990s were Yury
Khadyka and Viacheslau Sivchyk, organizers of Chernobyl Path-1996. The next section
discusses the use of protest tactics during the protest campaign.

3. Use of Protest Tactics

Since its inception in 1988, the protest campaign followed a standard format. There was a
march followed by a public rally. Protesters would gather near the National Academy of
Science, attend a public rally in the park Friendship of Peoples, and lay down flowers at a
plaque to Chernobyl victims. As usual, event organizers adopted the familiar repertoire of
collective action in spring 2013. Participants in the march held the white-red-white flags, a
banned symbol of Belarusian statehood, chanted ‘Long Live Belarus!,’ and carried
placards with such slogans as ‘The Price of a Nuclear Power Plant is Our Lives,’ ‘We Are
Against a Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant,’ and ‘Power to the People – Freedom to
Youth.’ In addition, this protest event had elements of a funeral procession. A bell and the
icon of Our Lady of Chernobyl were carried at the beginning of the procession,
symbolizing Chernobyl’s heavy toll on Belarusian society. The act of laying flowers and
lighting candles at a memorial plaque also added to the atmosphere of grief over
Chernobyl victims.
A lack of creativity, however, contributed to a relatively small number of participants in
the protest event. For several years, civic activists pointed out that opposition political
parties should develop more innovative ways of engaging the general public, but
opposition politicians continue to use the familiar format. In April 2011, for example,
Andrei Dzmitryeu, campaign manager for Uladzimir Niakliayeu’s 2010 presidential
campaign, commented on this phenomenon:

Maybe, we could have gathered more people if we had a TV channel that aired ads
of Chernobyl Path for a whole month. But since we don’t have such a TV channel,
we need to attract people with a unique offer, something of interest to them,
something that would make them pause when they pass by. In contemporary Belarus
it is obviously neither a politician’s speech at a rally nor a simple march. (quoted
from Ivashchenko, 2011)

Moreover, protest event organizers wrestled with the threat of state repression.
In general, event organizers were intent on holding a protest march regardless of state
countermoves. In 2001, for example, civic activists refused to take a state-sanctioned route
laying on the outskirts of the city and marched through downtown Minsk in defiance
of state orders. More specifically, event organizers tried to experiment with the logistics.
234 O. Nikolayenko

For example, civic activists attempted to organize the rapid arrival and swift departure
of protesters from the site of gathering to minimize the incidence of pre-emptive arrests. In
response, state authorities stepped up the level of repressive measures against participants
in protest events. The next section details a series of state countermoves.

4. State Countermoves
Given the regular scheduling of the protest event, the coercive apparatus took a number of
preemptive measures, including preemptive arrests of event organizers and intimidation of
potential participants in the protest event. In particular, college-educated youth was seen
as a threat to the stability of the current regime. In advance of the protest event, Deans
threatened students with expulsion from university for participation in the march. Another
economically vulnerable group – public sector employees – was threatened with the loss
of employment for showing solidarity with the protest campaign.
Delegitimation of the protest campaign was another major strategy pursued by the
government. State-controlled media framed Chernobyl Path as a PR stunt by a handful of
opposition politicians who coveted public attention to realize their political ambitions. The
perceived politicization of the protest campaign played in the hands of the incumbent
government because most Belarusians placed little trust in political parties. According to
an opinion poll conducted by the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political
Studies in December 2012, only 20% of Belarusians trusted opposition political parties
(Borowska, 2013). In light of public opinion, another savvy state countermove was
preemptive detention of environmental activists scheduled to speak at the public rally. The
chair of the NGO Ecodom Irina Sukhii was arrested on trumped-up charges and kept in
custody for the length of the protest event in Minsk. Similarly, Mikalai Ulasevich, leader
of the public campaign ‘Astravets Nuclear Power Plant is a Crime,’ was detained on the
suspicion that he forged his driving license and stole a car. Public statements by these
environmental activists would have added legitimacy to the protesters’ demands.
As Maksim Viniarski, an activist from the civic campaign ‘European Belarus,’ put it,

It is one thing when opposition [political] activists speak about it [the construction of
Astravets nuclear power plant], and it is a totally different matter when it is done by
authoritative experts who provide well-grounded scientific arguments and whose
opinion counts with international organizations. (Hot Chernobyl Path, 2013)

Another state countermove was the government’s interference with the organization of
the protest event. The municipal government refused to accommodate several requests
lodged by event organizers. First, local authorities refused to close a line for vehicles and
facilitate the safe passage of protesters through downtown. Participants in the march were
supposed to walk on the sidewalk and stop at each traffic light, which slowed down the
pace of the procession and reduced the visibility of the protest march. Second, the
municipal government did not authorize the use of public address system at the rally,
which limited the audibility of public speeches. Another disruptive measure was the
presence of plain-clothed police officers who patrolled the streets and video-recorded the
protest event.
The protest event ended with arrests of some protesters, journalists, and human rights
activists. In particular, the coercive apparatus targeted youth activists and imprisoned
 Marching against the dictator 235

them for ‘disorderly conduct.’ The police arrested several members of an anarchist
movement acting in favor of nuclear-free Belarus. Two journalists who captured on
camera the police beating of the anarchist Igar Truhanovich and two Radio Racyja
journalists who covered the protest event were also detained in an attempt to disrupt media
coverage of Chernobyl Path. For his observation of arbitrary police arrests, the human
rights activist Viacheslau Dashkevich himself was arrested and sentenced to five days in
prison for alleged ‘failure to comply with police orders.’

5. Conclusion
The Chernobyl accident has triggered multiple protest campaigns in the former Soviet
Union. A large number of environmental groups were formed in the late Gorbachev period
to press for the government’s accountability and responsiveness to citizens’ needs
(Dawson, 1996; Steger, 2009; Yanitsky, 2012). Demands for greater public control over
the management of natural resources became closely intertwined with calls for national
independence in the former Soviet republics. The Belarusian Popular Front was a driving
force behind the first protest march held in Minsk in April 1989. Since then, Chernobyl
Path has become an annual protest event and regained its political significance during
Lukashenka’s presidency. Environmental groups and opposition political parties in
present-day Belarus share a common understanding that democratization is a prerequisite
for addressing urgent environmental problems in the country. At the same time, the overt
involvement of opposition politicians as event organizers and public speakers alienates
some environmentally concerned citizens from joining the protest campaign due to lack of
public trust in the political opposition.
Environmental movements can play a vital role in non-democracies. In the short term,
environmental issues have the potential to unite different segments of the population
against the incumbent government. Moreover, the focus on nuclear power issues can link
local activists with a transnational network of environmental NGOs and strengthen their
position vis-à-vis their opponents. In the long term, the development of a dynamic
environmental movement may lay the foundation for a more forceful push for democracy
in the future.

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Olena Nikolayenko is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Fordham

University, USA. Her research interests include comparative democratization, social movements,
and youth, with the regional focus on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Her publications
include the book Citizens in the Making in Post-Soviet States (Routledge, 2011) and articles in
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Political Science
Review, and other journals. Her current research focuses on nonviolent youth movements in post-
communist societies.
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