N-G-HE - 200 - EN Pressure Safety Relief

TC Technical Community - North America N-G-HE 200
Guideline
Safety, Health and Environmental Protection - Safety Page 1 of 77
Pressure Safety Relief Issue Aug 2006
Supersedes
N-G-HE-200:August 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS
2. DEFINITIONS
3. SCOPE
4. PROCEDURE
4.1 Pressure Safety Relief Devices

4.1.1 Introduction
4.1.2 Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valves
4.1.3 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves
© 2012 BASF
4.1.4 Rupture Discs

4.1.4.1 Types of Rupture Disks
4.1.4.2 Materials of Construction
4.1.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
4.1.4.4 Rupture Disk Guidelines
4.1.4.4.1 Burst Pressure
4.1.4.4.2 Operating Pressure
4.1.4.4.3 Operating Temperature
4.1.4.4.4 Interchangeability and PRV Combinations
4.1.5 Specialty Relief Devices
4.1.5.1 Tank Cars
4.1.5.2 Fusible Plug
4.1.5.3 Breaking Pin
4.1.5.3.1 Rupture Pin Applications
4.1.5.3.2 Rupture Pin Specifications / Sizing
4.2 Causes of Overpressure
4.2.1 Relief System Philosophy
4.2.2 Basic Design Considerations
4.2.3 Utility Failure
4.2.3.1 Electric Power
4.2.3.2 Steam
4.2.3.3 Cooling Water
4.2.3.4 Instrument Air
Published: Intranet Extranet For internal use only

Technical Rules BASF N-G-HE 200 EN.doc / 10.01.2012
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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4.2.3.5 Fuel
4.2.3.6 Other Utilities
4.2.4 Closed Outlets
4.2.4.1 Pumps
4.2.4.2 Compressors
4.2.4.3 Pressure Vessels
4.2.5 External Fire
4.2.5.1 API-521 Fire Exposure Calculation
4.2.5.2 NFPA Fire Exposure Calculation
4.2.5.3 Liquid Filled Vessels – Relief for Vaporization
4.2.5.4 Gas Filled Vessels
4.2.5.5 Vapor Depressuring Systems
4.2.6 Thermal Expansion
4.2.7 Mechanical Equipment Failure
4.2.7.1 Heat Transfer Equipment
4.2.7.2 Check Valve Malfunction
4.2.8 Failure of Automatic Control Devices
4.2.8.1 Inlet Control Devices
4.2.8.2 Outlet Control Devices
4.2.9 Abnormal Heat Input
4.2.10 Water Hammer
4.2.11 Steam Hammer
4.2.12 Loss of Reflux
4.2.13 Operator Error
4.2.14 Internal Explosion
4.3 Sizing of Pressure Safety Relief Devices
4.3.1 Basis of Pressure Safety Relief Device Sizing
4.3.2 Helpful Suggestions
4.3.3 Available Sizing Software
4.3.4 Physical Properties
4.3.5 Sizing of Pressure Safety Relief Valves
4.3.5.1 Selecting the Relief Valve
4.3.5.1.1 Effective Area and Effective Discharge Coefficient
4.3.5.1.2 Actual Area and Rated Discharge Coefficient
4.3.5.2 Gas or Vapor
4.3.5.2.1 Sizing for Critical Flow
4.3.5.2.2 Sizing for Subcritical Flow
4.3.5.3 Sizing for Steam Relief
4.3.5.4 Sizing for Liquid Relief
4.3.5.5 ASME Code Certified Relief Valves
4.3.5.6 Non-ASME Certified Valves
4.3.5.7 Vent and Inlet Pressure Drops
4.3.6 Sizing for Rupture Discs
4.3.6.1 Gas
4.3.6.1.1 Gas Flow – Short Pipe
4.3.6.1.2 Gas Flow – Long Pipe
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4.3.6.2 Liquids
4.3.6.2.1 Liquid Flow – Short Pipe
4.3.6.2.2 Liquid Flow – Long Pipe
4.3.6.3 Steam
4.3.7 Combination of Pressure Safety Relief Valves and Rupture Discs
4.3.8 Sizing for Specialty Devices
4.4 Installation of Pressure Safety Relief Devices
4.4.1 Inlet Piping Helpful Suggestions
4.4.2 Discharge Piping Helpful Suggestions
4.5 Pressure Safety Relief Valves for Steam Generation
4.6 Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks
4.6.1 Normal Venting
4.6.1.1 Inbreathing
4.6.1.2 Outbreathing
4.6.2 Emergency Venting
4.6.2.1 Tanks with Weak Roof-to-Shell Attachment
4.6.2.2 Tanks without Weak Roof-to-Shell Attachment
4.6.2.3 Venting Requirements for Specific Liquids
4.6.3 Alternative Vent Requirement Determination for External Fire
4.6.4 Credit Factors
4.6.5 Maximum Allowable Pressure While Venting
4.7 Flame / Detonation Arresters
4.7.1 Applications
4.7.1.1 Stand Alone Tank System
4.7.1.2 Closed or Manifold Tank System
4.7.2 Sizing Criteria for Flame / Detonation Arresters
4.7.2.1 Element Selection
4.7.2.2 Arrester Flow / Pressure Drop Sizing
4.7.2.3 Instrumentation
4.7.2.4 Piping Design
4.8 PSV – Calc Program
4.8.1 Key Items
4.8.2 How to Use the Template
4.8.2.1 Description of Worksheets
4.8.2.2 Description of Scenarios
4.8.2.3 Description of Data Sheets
4.9 Guidelines for Two-Phase Flow Through Relief Devices
4.9.1 Background & Models
4.9.2 Reactive and Non-Reactive
4.9.3 Rate of Volume Generation
4.9.4 Composition at Vent Entrance
4.9.4.1 Churn-Turbulent Vessel Model
4.9.4.2 Bubbly Vessel Model
4.9.4.3 Homogeneous Vessel Model
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4.9.4.4 Model Choice

4.9.4.5 Maximum Venting Rate
4.9.5 External Fire – Non-Reactive Liquid in Pressure Vessel
4.9.6 External Fire – Non-Reactive Liquid in Low Pressure Storage Tank
4.9.7 Reactive Decomposition / Runaway Reaction
4.9.8 Long Term Storage Materials Prone to Decomposition
4.9.9 Two-Phase Flow Nomenclature
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
6. REFERENCES
6.1 Documents from other sources
6.2 Further documents for information
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1. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS
The intent of these guidelines is to provide basic directions for the process engineers to evaluate a given
process system, select the worst-case scenario, select an appropriate relief device, size the device, design
proper overall relief system and install the system. Where feasible, several examples are provided to illustrate
the procedures.
2. DEFINITIONS
2.1 Pressure Safety Relief Valve (PSV)

2.1.1 A spring-loaded pressure relief valve actuated by the static pressure upstream of the valve. It is characterized
by rapid opening or pop action or in direct proportion to the pressure increase, depending on the application.
2.2 Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP)

2.2.1 The MAWP is the maximum internal pressure permissible in a vessel at a specific temperature.
2.3 Set Pressure

2.3.1 The set pressure is the inlet pressure at which the pressure safety relief device opens.
2.4 Burst Pressure

2.4.1 The burst pressure is the set pressure at which a nonreclosing pressure safety relief device opens.
2.5 Back Pressure

2.5.1 Back pressure is the pressure on the discharge side of a PSV. It is the sum of the superimposed and built-up
back pressure.
1) Constant Back Pressure – back pressure which does not significantly change under any condition whether
the pressure relief device is closed or open.
2) Variable Back Pressure – back pressure which develops as a result of built-up back pressure or
superimposed back pressure.
3) Built-up Back Pressure – the pressure in the discharge header that develops as a result of flow due to an
open pressure relief device.
4) Superimposed Back Pressure – the static pressure that exists at the outlet of a pressure relief device when
the device is open. It is the result of pressure in the discharge system coming from other sources and may
be either constant or variable.
2.6 Overpressure
2.6.1 Overpressure is the pressure increase over the set pressure of the relieving device, expressed in pressure
units or as a percent. It is the same as accumulation (definition 2.7) when the relieving device is set at the
maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of the vessel, assuming no inlet pipe loss to the relieving
device.
2.7 Accumulation
2.7.1 Accumulation is the pressure increase over the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of a vessel
during the discharge through the pressure relief device expressed in pressure units or as a percent.
2.8 Operating Pressure

2.8.1 The gauge pressure at which the vessel or piping is normally subjected in service.
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2.9 Rupture Disk

2.9.1 A rupture disk is a thin diaphragm designed to burst at a designated pressure and temperature.
2.10 Fusible Plug

2.10.1 A fusible plug is a non-reclosing pressure relief device designed to function by the melting of a plug of suitable
material at a predetermined temperature allowing release of the vessel's contents.
2.11 Rupture/Buckling Pin Device

2.11.1 A rupture/buckling pin device is “a non-reclosing pressure relief device actuated by inlet static pressure and
designed to function by the buckling of a pin axially loaded in compression” (ASME Code Case #2091-3).
Unlike “breaking pin devices” (below), ASME code does allow buckling pin devices to be used as the sole
pressure relieving devices on a vessel. The requirements are laid out in ASME Code Case #2091-3.
2.12 Breaking Pin Device

2.12.1 A breaking pin device is “a nonreclosing pressure relief device actuated by inlet static pressure and designed
to function by the breakage of a load-carrying section of a pin which supports a pressure containing member.”
(ASME Code, Sec VIII, Div 1, UG-127(b)) Unlike “rupture / buckling pin devices” (above), ASME code
explicitly disallows the use of a breaking pin device as the sole pressure relieving device.
2.13 Atmospheric Tank

2.13.1 An atmospheric tank is a storage tank that has been designed to operate at pressures from atmospheric
through 1.0 psig measured at the top of the tank.
2.14 Low-Pressure Tank

2.14.1 A low-pressure tank is a storage tank designed to withstand an internal pressure above 1.0 psig but not more
than 15 psig measured at the top of the tank.
2.15 Deflagration
2.15.1 Deflagration is a flame front propagating through a flammable gas or vapor at a velocity less than the speed of
sound in that gas or vapor. Typical velocities for the flame front are 10-100 m/s. A maximum pressure rise of 8-
12 times the initial pressure can be expected. Compared to detonations the pressures/velocities involved are
mild.
2.16 Confined Deflagration

2.16.1 Confined deflagration is a deflagration propagating in a location where the expanding combustion products are
confined (e.g. a flame traveling within a pipe). Confined deflagrations can evolve into a detonation due to flow-
induced turbulence and pressure piling of combustion gases ahead of the flame front.
2.17 Unconfined Deflagration

2.17.1 An unconfined deflagration is a deflagration propagating in a location where the expanding combustion
products are not confined (e.g. a vapor cloud ignited in the open atmosphere).
2.18 Detonation (Stable Detonation)

2.18.1 Detonation is a flame font propagating through a flammable gas or vapor at a velocity greater than the speed
of sound in that gas or vapor. Typically this velocity is in excess of 100 m/s and the expected shock wave can
be 50 to 100 times the initial pressure.
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2.19 Overdriven Detonation

2.19.1 An unstable flame front that propagating through a flammable gas or vapor at a velocity in excess of the speed
of sound in that gas or vapor. This condition can occur when a confined deflagration is transitioning to a
detonation.
2.20 End-of-Line Flame Arrester

2.20.1 A flame arrester that is mounted at the end of a pipe and which vents directly to the atmosphere. This
arrangement is designed to stop unconfined deflagrations.
2.21 In-Line Flame Arrester

2.21.1 A flame arrester that is mounted in a piping system normally upstream of a pressure/vacuum relief vent. This
arrester is suitable for stopping a confined deflagration that has propagated through a pipe for some specified
maximum distance. Generally, an in-line flame arrester is not suitable for piping systems in excess of 20 ft of
straight pipe on the unprotected side. Any elbows, valves, or other flow obstructions can drastically decrease
this effective length in the unprotected piping system. Detonation arresters should be used when doubt exists
as to if a flame arrester is suitable.
2.22 Detonation Arrester

2.22.1 An arrester designed to prevent the propagation of confined deflagrations and detonations. A detonation
arrester is designed to withstand the severe pressure wave expected during a detonation at a velocity greater
than the speed of sound.
2.23 Arrester Element

2.23.1 The operational heart of a flame / detonation arrester. Generally consists of an array of small tubes or
passages through which the vapor must pass. The hydraulic diameter and length of these passages
determines the effectiveness of the arrester.
3. SCOPE
This work is designed to provide general guidelines for the design, selection, and specification of various
pressure safety relief devices. It deals with the pressure relief requirements of unfired pressure vessels,
storage tanks, and other related process equipment. Several scenarios of over pressuring a process system,
evaluation of the criteria and the selection of a specific criterion for sizing the relief device are described in the
ensuing sections of this work. Criteria in deciding between a relief valve and a rupture disk are reviewed.
Guidelines for vacuum protection of the vessels are also provided. A brief discussion is also included on fired
vessels.
These guidelines are meant for BASF use only.
4. PROCEDURE
4.1 Pressure Safety Relief Devices
4.1.1 Introduction
Pressure safety relief devices are used to protect equipment against failure from overpressure. These devices
may be pressure safety valves, non-reclosing pressure relief devices, or vacuum relief valves. These devices
can be used singularly or in combination.
Examples of non-reclosing pressure relief devices are rupture discs, breaking pins, explosion hatches, liquid
seals and open vents.
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Rupture discs are the most widely used non-reclosing devices. Breaking pin devices shall not be used as
single devices but only in combination with a safety or safety relief valve. This is an ASME Code requirement.
Vacuum relief valves as well as explosion hatches, liquid seals and open vents are generally used for
protection of low pressure and atmospheric storage tanks.
4.1.2 Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valves
Pressure safety relief valves are all spring-loaded valves. The inlet flange of the valve houses a conical nozzle
whose small-diameter end serves as the valve seat on which a spring-loaded disk rests.
There are two major types of spring-loaded valves: conventional and balanced bellows.
Conventional
Conventional relief valves are generally used where the discharge from the valve is through a short pipe that
vents to the atmosphere or through a low-pressure manifold system for disposal.
Backpressure affects the valve performance. This type of valve is acceptable only when backpressures are
minimal because the set pressure increases as the backpressure increases. Therefore, the impact of
downstream pressure when one or more valves discharge into a common manifold should be determined.
Variable backpressure is limited to 10% of the set pressure. The variable backpressure can be greater than
10% as long as the increase in backpressure is used in determining the capacity of the installed valve.
Balanced Bellows
The balanced bellows relief valve is used in systems where backpressure is high or variable.
Variable backpressure is limited to 40% of the set pressure. Care must be taken that backpressure developed
does not exceed the mechanical limit of the bellows at higher set pressures.
There are two types of balanced relief valves: bellows and piston.
Bellows valves can be used in corrosive services as the bellows protects the spring from the process fluid.
Bellows valves are more costly than conventional valves and require special maintenance and inspection to
ensure the integrity of the bellows.
4.1.3 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves
There are two basic types of pilot operated pressure relief valves: piston type and diaphragm type.
The valve consists of a main valve with a piston or diaphragm-operated disk and a pilot. Process pressure is
used to keep the valve closed. The pilot is a spring-loaded valve that senses the process pressure and opens
the main valve.
Pilot-operated relief valves are used where the required set pressure is very close to normal operating
pressure. This allows a lower design pressure to be specified for high pressure services, thus reducing the
vessel costs. They are also used where a large relief area at high set pressures is required. These are
commonly used in clean, high pressure services.
Performance of these valves at very low set pressures is very good. However, these valves cannot be used in
viscous and dirty services. These valves are also not recommended for polymerizing type services unless
there is a provision to purge the pilot. Winterization should be evaluated.
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Backpressure has no effect on these valves when the pilot discharges to atmosphere or is balanced. If the
discharge side of the valve is connected to a header system, backpressure could cause the main valve to open
if this pressure is greater than the process pressure. A back flow prevention device can be used to alleviate
this problem.
4.1.4 Rupture Disks
A rupture disk is a thin diaphragm designed to burst at a designated pressure and temperature. Rupture disks
operate on differential pressure. They can be used as primary relief devices in a system or as a secondary
relief devices in combination with pressure relief valves. They can be used either in parallel or in series with the
pressure relief valve to minimize fugitive emissions or corrosion of the valve.
4.1.4.1 Types of Rupture Disks

Rupture disks fall into three major categories, tension type, reverse acting compression type and graphite
shear loaded.
Figures 4.1.4.1-1A and 1B Tension Type Rupture Disks
Tension Type rupture disks are oriented in a system with the process media pressure against the concave
side of the rupture disk (Figure 1A, 30° Seat; Figure 1B, Flat Seat). As the process pressure increases beyond
the allowable operating pressure, the rupture disk starts to grow. This growth will continue as the pressure
increases, until the tensile strength of the material is reached and rupture occurs. There are several different
types of tension rupture disks.
Figure 4.1.4.1-2 Solid Metal Rupture Disk

(Consolidated Disk Corporation)
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Solid metal rupture disks can provide service up to 70% of the marked burst pressure of the disk (Figure 2).
A support is used if the disk is to be used in vacuum service. These disks burst in a random pattern and can
generate fragments. This type of disk is not to be used upstream of a pressure relief valve. This type of disk
can be used in liquid or gas service.
Figure 4.1.4.1-3 Scored Rupture Disk

A scored rupture disk is designed to burst along pre-scored lines in the surface of the disk (Figure 3). Some
of these disks can operate at 85% to 90% of the marked burst pressure. Most of these disks can be used in
vacuum service without using a support. Since the disks are designed to burst along the score lines they can
be made not to fragment. The nonfragmenting disks can be used upstream of a relief valve. The disks are
manufactured of thicker material than solid metal disks and can better withstand corrosion and mechanical
damage. This type of disk can be used for liquid or gas service.
Figure 4.1.4.1-4 Composite Rupture Disk

Composite rupture disks are constructed of several layers (Figure 4). The top layer is generally metallic, the
second layer is a metallic or non-metallic seal layer and the bottom layer is an optional vacuum support. They
may be either flat or preformed bulged. These disks are typically designed to operate at up to 80% of the
marked burst pressure. This design works well in low pressure applications. Some of these disks, with a non-
metallic seal, are designed not to fragment, so they can be used upstream of a pressure relief valve. This type
of disk can be used for gaseous or liquid service.
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Figure 4.1.4.1-5 Reverse Acting Rupture Disk
Reverse Acting rupture disks are oriented in a system with the process media pressure against the convex
side of the disk, placing the rupture disk in compression (Figure 5). As the burst pressure rating of the disk is
reached, the compression loading on the rupture disk causes it to reverse, snapping through the neutral
position and causing it to open by a predetermined scoring pattern or by knife blade penetration (Figures 6 and
7). For disks with knife blades, the proper operation of this type of disk is based on the conditions of the
blades. If these blades are corroded, for example, the rupture disk may burst at a pressure higher than
originally designed, posing an unsafe situation. These disks should be used only for gaseous system.
They do not perform well in liquid systems because the incompressible nature of liquids does not allow the disk
to move far enough to rupture at the desired burst pressure.
Figure 4.1.4.1-6 Reverse Acting Rupture Disk

Figure 4.1.4.1-7 Reverse Acting Rupture Disk with Knives

A reverse acting rupture disk provides some advantages, as compared to tension type rupture disks, which
may warrant consideration when selecting a rupture disk. A “zero” manufacturing range allows the rupture disk
to operate to 90% of its stamped burst pressure. Full vacuum capabilities are available without the need of an
additional support member. There is longer service life under cyclic or pulsating conditions. These disks are
constructed using thicker materials providing greater corrosion resistance.
Graphite rupture disks are made of graphite impregnated with a binder (Figure 8). A pressure differential
across the disk creates a shear stress on the disk causing the disk to burst. When the disk bursts it creates
fragments so this type of disk is not suitable for use upstream of a pressure relief valve. These disks may be
used up to 80% of its marked burst pressure.
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Figure 4.1.4.1-8 Graphite Rupture Disk

The proper selection of the type of rupture disk is based on an understanding of how these different types
operate along with the knowledge of process conditions and the type of fluid involved.
4.1.4.2 Materials of Construction
The most common disk materials are aluminum, nickel, 316 stainless steel, Monel alloy and Inconel alloy. Also,
the metal disks can be lined or coated with resins for corrosion protection. The disk material must be
compatible with the contacting fluid.
4.1.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages:
1. Relatively inexpensive
2. Require relatively little or no maintenance
3. Offer the fastest response time for rapid pressure rises
4. Suitable for use with gases and with liquids of all viscosities
5. Allow pressure ratings to be quickly and easily changed by replacing the disk
6. Have no moving parts
7. Allow little or no leakage
8. Offer corrosion resistance at a low cost
9. Greater ease of replacement
10. Adaptable to hermetically sealed systems
11. Permits the use of an inexpensive safety valve when used in series with the valve in corrosive
applications
Disadvantages:
1. Requires greater spread between operating and set pressures
2. Needs to be replaced periodically
3. Prone to corrosion
4. Cannot be tested
5. Disk fragments may damage a downstream safety relief valves
6. When used alone, once burst the system is left open and not resealed
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4.1.4.4 Rupture Disk Guidelines
4.1.4.4.1 Burst Pressure
Just like the set pressure of a relief valve, the marked burst pressure of a single rupture disk cannot be greater
than the MAWP (ASME Code, Maximum Allowable Working Pressure) of the lowest design pressure vessel
protected by the rupture disk.
The ASME Code requires that every rupture disk have a marked burst pressure within a manufacturing design
range at a specified temperature. The manufacturer will test disks from each batch and stamp the disk with the
average at which they burst. The ASME Code requires the disk to burst within ±2 psi of the stamped pressure
(burst tolerance) for marked burst pressures of up to and including 40 psig and ±5% for marked burst
pressures above 40 psig. Since there is a manufacturing design range for rupture disks, the specified burst
pressure will not necessarily be the marked burst pressure. It is the marked burst pressure that must not
exceed the vessel MAWP.
For an additional cost, tighter manufacturing tolerances can be specified. A "zero" tolerance disk will be
stamped at the specified burst pressure, but still has a burst tolerance (±2 psi less than or equal to 40 psig; 5%
above 40 psig).
4.1.4.4.2 Operating Pressure
Each style of disk has an operating ratio which is the percentage of the minimum marked burst pressure that
gives the maximum operating pressure at which the process can be run. Operation above that pressure will
cause the rupture disk to flex and fatigue and fail with a premature burst.
Operating
Ratio
Conventional Tension Loaded Disk 70%
Composite Disk 80%
Pre-scored Tension Loaded Disk 80-85%
Reverse Buckling Disk 90%
Pre-scored Reverse Buckling 90%
If the marked burst pressure is greater than or equal to 40 psig, then the maximum operating pressure is
calculated as the percent operating ratio of the minimum burst pressure for the specified disk. If the marked
burst pressure is below 40 psig, then the burst tolerance (2 psig) is subtracted from the marked burst pressure
before being multiplied by the operating ratio to calculate the maximum operating pressure. The burst
tolerance is the certified deviation from the stamped set pressure within which the rupture disc is guaranteed to
open.
For example, a rupture disk with a specified burst pressure of 100 psig, manufacturing range of +8/-4%, a burst
tolerance of ±5% and a 70% operating ratio, will have a maximum process operating pressure of 67.2 psig.
That is, 96 psig minimum marked burst pressure (100 psig - %manufacturing range) times 70%. For a “zero”
tolerance disk with the same operating ratio, the maximum process operating pressure would be 70 psig. The
manufacturing range is the range of pressures where the stamped set pressure must fall. See the figure
below.
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Figure 4.1.4.4.2-1 Rupture Disc Definitions
4.1.4.4.3 Operating Temperature

The operating temperature must be the temperature when the disk is expected to burst. This may be different
than the normal fluid operating temperature and may be difficult to predict. The temperature of the disk will
typically depend on the process operating temperature, the ambient temperature and heat losses in any
interconnecting piping. The burst pressure of rupture disks is sensitive to the temperature. The effect of
temperature on the burst pressure depends on the style of the rupture disk and the materials of construction.
Typically the burst pressure decreases as the temperature increases so, if the burst temperature cannot be
estimated, the specified temperature should be selected as the lowest value between the ambient temperature
and the normal process temperature.
4.1.4.4.4 Interchangeability and PRV Combinations

Disks and disk holders must be from the same manufacturer. If you change disk suppliers, also change the
rupture disk holders. For certain applications a rupture disk can be installed directly between flanges without a
holder.
For rupture disks in series with a relief valve there is a combination factor that derates the relief valve. Many
combinations of valves and rupture disks have been tested and are listed in the manufacturer’s catalog or can
be found in the National Board of Boiler Inspectors and Pressure Vessel Inspectors “Red Book”
(www.nationalboard.org). If the combination factor for a particualar valve and rupture disk is not available then
the valve must be derated by a factor of 0.9.
You must have a pressure indication between a rupture disk and relief valve if they are in series. If the rupture
disk is pinholed and that space pressures up then the disk will not blow because it has pressure behind it. The
relief valve will "simmer" and pass the leakage without fully opening. More details on installation requirements
for relief valve / rupture disc combinations can be found in section 4.3.7 of this guideline.
Typically, the PRV and rupture disk are set at the same pressure so that they both relieve in order to blow the
disk cleanly and completely.
When to use both a rupture disk and PRV:
1. Where required to meet fugitive emissions requirements. The fugitive emissions for a rupture disk
are only those of a flange, the fugitive emissions from a PSV can be significant. The rupture disk
gives the complete seal, the relief device provides shutoff after an incident.
2. Similar to the above, where seepage is unacceptable (environmental, downstream corrosion,
safety).
3. In dirty services. Often solids that buildup on the PRV almost certainly prevent it from reseating
after it opens. With a rupture disk, the PRV remains clean but still runs a risk of closing onto solids
or disk fragments and not reseating properly.
4. With exotic metallurgy where reclosure is needed. The rupture disk is manufactured in the exotic
metallurgy and the PRV is in a less expensive metallurgy that can withstand short term exposure.
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This is especially the case when the PRV is not offered in the required material or has a long
delivery time in the required metal.
4.1.5 Specialty Relief Devices
4.1.5.1 Tank Cars
There are several classes of tank cars to transport different materials that include liquids, cryogenic liquids, etc.
Each tank must be equipped to relieve pressure and vacuum conditions to prevent from rupturing due to
overpressurization or vacuum resulting from loading, unloading, or from heating and cooling of cargo material.
Each tank car must be provided with a primary pressure relief system consisting of one or more reclosing
pressure relief valves.
Non-reclosing pressure relief devices are not allowed in any tank except when in series with a reclosing
pressure relief device.
The pressure relief system must be mounted, shielded, and drainable so as to minimize the accumulation of
material that could impair the operation or discharge capability of the system by freezing, corrosion or
blockage.
For general relief system guidelines on tank cars, see reference 6.1.12.
4.1.5.2 Fusible Plug
A common application of fusible plugs is the emergency venting of portable shipping containers, or “totes”.
Here a fusible plug is permitted when the contents of the tank can plug a pressure-actuated device. See
reference 6.1.6.
Other uses of fusible plugs for overpressure protection are limited to applications where a fixed relationship
exists between temperature and pressure (as in a saturated steam boiler) or to protect against an external
condition such as a fire.
In other cases where a fusible plug is employed, additional relief protection which responds directly to pressure
is also installed.
4.1.5.3 Breaking Pin
In addition to the more common relief devices (relief valve, conservation vent, and rupture discs) there is an
alternative technology called rupture or buckling pin devices.
These devices usually consist of a piston or plunger on a seat which is restrained from movement by a slender
round pin. The pin is designed to buckle at a set pressure by the axial force caused by the system pressure.
A rupture pin is a nonreclosing pressure relief device which opens when a restraining pin is bent (buckled) by
the axial force caused by the system pressure (see figure xx).
The amount of axial force required to buckle the pin (and thus the pressure set-point) is determined by the pin
length, the pin diameter, and the modulus of elasticity of the pin material. The modulus of elasticity is
temperature dependent, but the pin material can be selected such that the variability is very small over the
ambient temperature range which the pin will experience.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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Rupture pin resists the

Rupture pin buckles under
force of the system
axial load caused by
pressure acting on the
system pressure at a
piston area
predetermined set point
allows piston to open
Piston on which system
pressure acts
Closed Open
Figure 4.1.5.3-1 Typical Rupture Pin Device

Source: Reference 6.1.13
4.1.5.3.1 Rupture Pin Applications
Most often, rupture pin devices are used in lieu of a rupture disc. They offer some advantages over rupture
discs as well as some drawbacks.
Advantages of rupture pins over rupture discs:

- the device can be reset and the pin can be replaced without exposure to the process.
- rupture pin devices can handle constant or variable backpressure.
- rupture pins are not subject to fatigue failure.
- set pressure can be changed without breaking into the process.
- rupture pins do not fragment.
- maximum operating pressure to 95% of setpoint
Disadvantages of rupture pins over rupture discs:

- higher initial cost
- mechanically more complicated
- potential for leak-by at seat/piston interface
Specific situations to consider rupture pins: processes with highly hazardous material where breaking into the
process is dangerous, processes where the pressure cycles/surges and rupture discs may suffer high fatigue
failure rates.
There are also, in some special situations, times when rupture pin devices will be considered in lieu of a
spring-loaded safety relief valve.
Advantages of rupture pins over relief valves:

- set pressure can be changed without breaking into the process.
- maximum operating pressure to 95% of setpoint, zero leakage to setpoint
- can operate reliably at set point pressures below 15 psig.
- can reach full capacity at 0% overpressure.
Disadvantages of rupture pins over relief valves:

- rupture pin devices do not re-seal
- somewhat higher initial cost
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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- specialized rupture pin device can be hard to replace
One particular scenario where a rupture pin may be considered is where a rupture disc under a relief valve is
being considered. Depending on the application two devices maybe replaced with one rupture pin device.
Many variations on the basic rupture pin concept are available. For example, rupture pin devices are available
in the following services:
- low-pressure to atmosphere
- vacuum relief
- differential pressure sensing
- downstream pressure balanced (inlet pressure sensing only)
- emergency shut-off
- quarter-turn valve actuator
- back-up pilot on piloted relief valves
Good engineering judgment is required to select between rupture pin technology and more conventional
options. The advantages/disadvantages discussed above should be kept in mind during this selection process.
4.1.5.3.2 Rupture Pin Specifications / Sizing
In general, the design sizing of rupture pins uses vendor provided capacity curves plotted against pressure
drop. Alternatively, a flow resistance coefficient might be specified (e.g. KRG for gas service, KRL for liquid
service, or KRGL for two-phase flow). Contact the vendor for information on a particular device.
If the rupture pin is to be used below a relief valve then the relief device capacity should be de-rated by a factor
of 0.9 provided that: the rupture pin has the same or greater capacity than the valve, and the resistance
coefficient of the device is less than 6.0. (ASME Code Case #2091-3).
To correctly specify a rupture pin device, the vendor should be provided with the following information:
Geometry
- body geometry required (e.g. in-line or angle)
- body orientation (vertical/horizontal)
- body connections (inlet/outlet size, flange class)
Service
- max operating (normal) pressure
- desired set pressure
- service fluid (type, name, state)
- process temp (max, normal)
- backpressure (constant, variable)
- allowable overpressure
- required relieving capacity
Physical Properties of Fluid

- density
- viscosity
- molecular weight (if gas)
- compressibility (if gas and non-ideal conditions)
- ratio of specific heats (if gas)
Materials of Construction
- body (standard: CS, SS)
- seat (standard: SS)
- piston (standard: SS)
- gland bushings (standard: SS)
- seals (standard: viton, buna, EDPM)
- pin material (standard: SS, Inconel, Inco)
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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Any special options

- proximity switch to detect raised piston
- special paint
- downstream pressure balancing
4.2 Causes of Overpressure
4.2.1 Relief System Philosophy
Overpressure is the result of an unbalance or disruption of the normal flows of material and energy that causes
the material or energy, or both, to build up in some part of the system. Despite many safety precautions taken
within a chemical process unit, equipment failures or operator errors may cause increases in process
pressures beyond safe levels. If the pressures rise too high, they may exceed the maximum strength of the
equipment and pipelines. This can result in rupturing of process equipment, causing major releases of toxic or
flammable chemicals.
Pressure-relief systems provide the means for protecting personnel and equipment from abnormal operation of
a process.
The relief system is composed of the relief device and the associated downstream process equipment to safely
handle the material relieved. A pressure relief device is intended to prevent the pressure in a vessel or system
from exceeding a predetermined value.
The critical steps in the development of overpressure protection system are as follows:
A. Develop scenarios(or contingencies) describing the various ways in which overpressure can occur.
B. Screen the various fluids that are in the process at different times. Cleaning fluids should also be
considered.
C. Collect data on the relief process, including physical properties on the relieved material and size the
relief.
D. Specify where relief devices must be installed.
E. Select the appropriate relief device type. The type depends on the nature of the material relieved and
the relief
characteristics required.
F. Select the worst case scenario and design the final relief system.
The principal causes of overpressure and the general design guidelines to minimize the effects of these
causes are described in this section. These basic guidelines are only suggestive and they are unique for each
process system. In addition to the ones listed, the process designer should consider any circumstance that
reasonably constitutes a hazard under the prevailing conditions for a system in the relief design.
4.2.2 Basic Design Considerations
In the overpressure protection system design, all scenarios which may result in equipment overpressure shall
be considered. If an overpressure protection system were to be designed to handle all scenarios acting
simultaneously, its cost would be prohibitive. The simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated
contingencies (referred to as double contingency or risk) is unlikely and very seldom used as a basis for over-
pressure protection system design.
Causes of overpressure are often evaluated in a PHA. If a relief device is listed as a protective measure in a
PHA, the corresponding scenario should be evaluated in the design.
Automatic start-up of standby equipment should not be taken into account to eliminate or to mitigate the effects
of a contingency. For example, consider two cooling water pumps in parallel service: one pump is driven
electrically and provides the full flow of cooling water, while the other, in standby service, is steam driven and
equipped with controls for automatic start-up if the electric pump fails. During failure of the first pump (for
example, to power loss), no credit can be taken for the second pump, since it is standby equipment and is not
considered reliable.
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For contingencies such as runaway reactions or explosions, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to provide
adequate over-pressure protection with pressure relief devices. In such cases, it is, therefore, necessary to rely
upon control devices and/or trip systems in order to prevent all the possible causes of the contingencies. When
such systems are employed, their required reliability (SIL level) depends on risk ranking, which is determined
by the BASF risk matrix. These systems are referred to as "Safety Instrumented Systems" (SIS).
The BASF Risk Matrix should be used to determine when relief devices, SIS or monitoring devices should be
used. See Reference 6.1.11.
4.2.3 Utility Failure
Failure of the utility supplies (i.e., cooling water, electric power, steam, instrument air, fuel, inert gas) may
result in emergency situations with potential for overpressuring equipment. Utility failures need to be
considered on a partial basis (e.g., loss of electric power to a pump motor) and on a total basis (e.g., loss of
electric power to all the units that are sharing a common pressure relief closed disposal system).
Utilities failures are normally considered on a single contingency basis. Care, however, should be taken in
determining the effect of one utility supply over another. For example, in a unit where the instrument air is
generated by an electric-driven compressor, the effects of electric power and instrument air loss need to be
considered as acting simultaneously.
4.2.3.1 Electric Power
The following cases should be considered as possible causes of overpressure:
A. Total power failure, if this situation can be the result of a single contingency, in which all consuming
equipment will be affected simultaneously.
B. Partial electric power failure, where electric power is lost at one distribution center, one motor control
center, or one buss bar.
C. Individual failure of electric power supply to any one piece of consuming equipment.
Pieces of equipment affected by electric power failure are normally pumps, agitators, compressors, fans,
refrigeration units and instrumentation.
It requires extensive study and analysis to determine the effects of partial and total power failure.
No credit should be taken for automatic start up of standby equipment.
4.2.3.2 Steam
A. Total steam failure, if this situation can be the result of a single contingency case.
B. Failure of any offsite main header that can be blocked off.
C. Individual failure (or combination of individual failures that can be the result of a single contingency) of
any one steam generator.
D. Individual failure of steam supply to any one consuming piece of equipment. This type of equipment
generally includes: Turbine drivers, ejectors, strippers & reboilers.
To calculate the relief capacity, the steam distribution system should be evaluated for the above situations.
4.2.3.3 Cooling Water
Total loss of cooling water should be considered as a single contingency case of overpressure, if one of the
following conditions apply:
A. Loss of all cooling water pumps can be the result of a single contingency failure in the utility
system supplying or controlling the pump drivers.
B. Loss of all fans on the cooling tower can be the result of a single contingency failure in the
utility system supplying or controlling the fan drivers.
C. Loss of cooling water can result from the blockage of a manual or control valve in the cooling
water main header.
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If none of the above conditions apply, then the effects of any single contingency which could result in a
reduced cooling capacity of the cooling water system needs to be evaluated.
Loss of cooling water results in loss of vapor condensation or equipment failure if heat is not removed.
Relieving capacity is determined by means of heat and material balances on the system at relieving pressure.
In a distillation column:
A. For total condensation, relieving capacity is the total vapor rate to the overhead condenser
B. For partial condensation, relieving capacity is the incoming vapor minus the outgoing vapor rate
4.2.3.4 Instrument Air
A. Total instrument air failure, due to the result of a single contingency case.
B. Failure of any offsite main header, if this can be blocked or shut down as a result of a leakage.
C. Individual failure of any instrument air header, which is supplying the process from the offsite.
D. Individual failure (or combination of individual failures resulting from a single contingency) of any
source of compressed instrument air.
E. Individual failure of any instrument, or any other piece of equipment, supplied by compressed
instrument air.
When an instrument failure occurs, it is assumed that all control valves affected by the failure will fully close or
open (depending on fail position) simultaneously.
The fail action of all control devices should be selected in order to minimize the effects of a total instrument
failure (instrument air failure if the control devices are pneumatically-actuated, or electric power failure if they
are electrically actuated).
This is generally achieved by applying the following rules:
A. Feed streams, product streams and source of heat stream control valves should be fail close.
B. Cooling streams control valves (e.g., cooling water, reflux, pumparounds, etc.) should be fail open.
The intent of these criteria is to "box" the unit in during the total instrument failure. This is based on the
assumption that the overpressure protection system is capable of handling relieving rates and that it is
considered safer in comparison to the possibility of "exporting" the contingency to other units or storage
facilities.
The relieving capacity is calculated by evaluating fail-safe condition of each control valve. The limiting factor of
control valve capacity needs to be considered also.
4.2.3.5 Fuel
Failure of fuel supply control systems to boilers, vaporizers, engine drivers, gas turbine, furnaces, etc., needs
to be investigated as a possible cause of overpressure.
4.2.3.6 Other Utilities
Failure of other utility supply control systems, such as inert gas or process air, should be investigated as a
possible cause of overpressure. Inert gas failure can cause overpressure due to loss of purging in instruments
and equipment.
Criteria similar to that used for previously described utility losses (total failure if single contingency, main supply
header failure, laterals supply header failure, etc.) can be used to determine possible contingency.
4.2.4 Closed Outlets

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Inadvertent closure of a block valve or control valve at the outlet of process equipment can expose the
equipment to a pressure that exceeds the maximum allowable working pressure. A pressure relief device may
be required if the valve is not locked in the open position. Simply car sealing a valve open is not normally
considered to adequately protect against blocked flow. Similarly, having a fail open control valve on the outlet
is not a guarantee of an open flow path as the controller itself can also fail independently.
Some of the applications subject to overpressure caused by blocked outlet are pumps, compressors, steam
turbines, and pressure vessels.
4.2.4.1 Pumps
A pressure relief valve is required in the discharge line of a pump when the shutoff pressure of the pump
exceeds the design pressure of the pump casing, discharge piping or downstream equipment.
In almost all cases positive displacement pumps require pressure relief valves, while centrifugal pumps
normally do not. (Blocked in centrifugal pumps can however generate significant temperature increases over
time. When dealing with temperature sensitive material, this requires high temperature shut off protection.)
When a pressure relief valve is required in a positive displacement pump discharge, its capacity should be at
least equal to the capacity of the pump. Many manufacturers of positive displacement pumps provide internal
relief valves on their equipment. It is recommended that these relief devices not be relied upon for pressure
protection unless they are listed on the official plant relief device list and are hence subject to the regular
inspection procedures that this requires. If the vendor supplied relief device is not on the plant relief device
inspection list, the recommendation is that a separate relief device be placed on the outlet of the pump.
4.2.4.2 Compressors
Pressure Relief valves are required when the compressor maximum discharge pressure can exceed the
design pressure of the compressor casing, discharge piping and or downstream equipment. Positive
displacement compressors almost always require such protection.
Pressure relief valves are often used for centrifugal compressors as well. They can be a reliable and
economical means of preventing surge conditions. The casing design pressure of a centrifugal compressor is
usually lower, for economical reasons, than the maximum discharge pressure. Hence, overpressure protection
must be provided by installing pressure relief valves in the compressor discharge.
Set pressure and capacity of the pressure relief valves are selected to avoid surge conditions.
4.2.4.3 Pressure Vessels
Overpressure in a pressure vessel can occur if all outlets are blocked.
The relief capacity should be determined at the relieving conditions. For liquid relief, the capacity is the
maximum pump-in rate. For vapor relief, the capacity is the total incoming vapor, steam, any additional vapor
generated and flashing of the feed. In the case of distillation towers, this scenario can often be a more severe
case than external fire.
4.2.5 External Fire
Fire is the most prevalent danger and most devastating hazard in chemical plants. If equipment containing
liquid is exposed to fire, then it is possible for the heat from the fire to vaporize the liquid. The pressure
developed in the vessel will be a function of the temperature and composition of the liquid-vapor state. This
equipment can be subjected to pressures beyond the rupture point, if adequate pressure relief is not provided.
The calculated relief rate in a fire is frequently the ruling contingency for the sizing of the relief valve. For
pressure vessels, the heat absorbed by a vessel engulfed in fire can be calculated using the formulas in API-
521 or NPFA 30. (Heat absorbed from a fire by low pressure storage tanks should be calculated using the API-
2000 formulas, which are very similar to those of NFPA-30, and are detailed in section 4.7.2 of this guideline.)
4.2.5.1 API-521 Fire Exposure Calculation

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When adequate fire fighting and drainage exist, the basic formula for heat absorption is:
Q = 21000FA0.82
In cases where adequate fire fighting is not available or there is insufficient drainage, the heat absorption is
given by:
Q = 35000FA0.82
where
Q = Total heat input to the wetted surface, Btu/hr
A = Total wetted surface, ft2
F = Environmental factor
API-521 does not define the requirements for 'adequate drainage'. It is recommended that good engineering
judgment be used in making this determination. A good guideline is NFPA-30, which defines adequate
drainage into a remote impounding area as:
A. A slope of not less than 1 percent away from the tank shall be provided for at least 15 m (50 ft) toward
the impounding area.
B. The impounding area shall have a capacity not less than that of the largest tank that can drain into it.
In determining the wetted surface area, API 521 recommends that the maximum height of flame impingement
is 25 feet above the surface. Some individual BASF Corp. plants may use more conservative flame height
requirements, which can be done at the discretion of the engineer. This guideline however accepts the API-521
maximum height of 25 ft. as reasonable.
In the case of a distillation column (trays and packed bed), the wetted area is calculated from the normal level
of liquid in the base of the column plus the liquid holdup from all trays or packing dumped to the column
bottom. If the reboiler is an integral part of the column, then the liquid level in the reboiler is also to be
included. In each case, the effective area is the area within the maximum flame impingement reach from
ground level.
For API-521, the environmental factor F is determined primarily by insulation (note that unlike API 2000 or
NFPA 30, the drainage and fire fighting credit is implicitly taken into account by the different formulas).
This credit can only be used if the insulation meets the following conditions:
• Remain in place under fire exposure conditions.

• Withstand dislodgment when subjected to hose stream impingement
• Maintain a maximum conductance of 4.0 Btu/hr/ft2/°F when the outer insulation jacket or cover is at a
temperature of 1660°F and when the mean temperature of the insulation is 1000°F.
As noted in section 4.6.2 of this guideline, most standard reactor and tank insulation installations do not meet
the requirements above. Indeed, the temperature requirements imply that aluminum sheathing is inadequate
for 'fire-rated insulation', and must be stainless steel or better. Good engineering judgment must be used in
determining whether or not to take this credit. For insulated vessels, the environmental factor F can be
calculated using the following equation published in API-521:
k (1600 − T f )
F=
21,000t
where
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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F = Environmental factor
k = Thermal conductivity of insulation at the mean temperature, Btu-in/hr-ft2-oF
Tf = Temperature of vessel contents at relieving conditions, oF
t = Thickness of insulation, in
4.2.5.2 NPFA-30 Fire Exposure Calculation
The NFPA formula for heat absorption is:
QF = Fα A β
where α and β are determined by the same table used in section 4.7.2.D for the API 2000 code.
Wetted Surface Area Design Pressure α β

ft2 Psig
< 200 All 20,000 1
> 200 and < 1000 All 199,300 0.566
> 1000 and < 2800 All 963,400 0.338
> 2800 >1 21,000 0.82
>2800 <1 14,090,000 0
Table 4.2.5.2-1 Coefficients for Calculation of Heat Flux from External Fire
For a discussion of the NFPA-30 environmental credit factors and their use, see section 4.7.2.F of this
guideline. It should be noted that in the determination of the wetted surface area exposed to external fire,
NFPA-30 code requires consideration of the first 30 ft above the flame surface, as opposed to 25 ft with API-
521. When using the 'PSV-Calc' spreadsheet for relief valve design or rating, the various code flame height
requirements can be over-ridden by manually entering a wetted surface area in the 'Equipment Data'
worksheet.
The graph below shows a comparison of the calculated rate of heat absorption using API-521 (with and without
the assumption of adequate fire fighting and drainage) and NFPA-30. It can be seen that the choice of model
and particularly the credit factors applied make a large difference in the heat absorption calculations.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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Heat Absorption Formulas
30000000
25000000
Heat Absorption, Btu/hr

API-521 Adequate fire
fighting & drainage
20000000
API-521 Inadequate fire
fighting or drainage
15000000
NFPA-30
10000000
NFPA-30 With Drainage
5000000
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Wetted surface area, ft2
Figure 4.2.5.2-1 Heat of Absorption Comparison using API-521 and NFPA-30
4.2.5.3 Liquid Filled Vessels - Relief for Vaporization
When a liquid containing vessel is exposed to external fire, the relief device is most often sized to handle the
vapor generated by the boiling liquid. (In the case of vessels that have no vapor disengagement space, two
phase flow should be considered during the initial relief phase. Consult the two phase flow guideline for further
details.)
The rate of vapor generated is given by:
Q
W=
λ
where
Q = rate of heat input by the external fire, Btu/hr
λ = the enthalpy change on vaporization of the liquid, Btu/lb
W = the calculated vapor generation rate, lb/hr
The heat of vaporization is taken at the pressure and temperature corresponding to the accumulated pressure
at which the relief device discharges.
Example:
Unreacted cyclohexane is flashed in a packed distillation column shown in the figure below. Determine the
required relieving rate for the scenario of external fire using API-521 code, where adequate fire fighting and
drainage is available. Relief device will be sized for a set pressure of 50 psig with 21% overpressure
allowance. The vessel is insulated with fiberglass sheathed with aluminum.
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T-100
4' 10" OD X 70' T/T
ASME F&D heads
Packing: 4 X 12' beds of Koch
Flexipac 2Y Structured packing
Maximum liquid height limited by

LSH
level switch = 4'
E-100
Tangent line Size: 2' 4" O.D. x 16'-0" T-T with
ASME F&D heads
Tubes: 0.75" O.D., 16' long, 14 BWG,

300 tubes
15'
25' of 8" recirculation
piping
Grade
Solution:
E-100 wetted surface area =

πDL + 0.931D2 (Note that the top head is neglected for this vertical vessel) =
π*2.333*16 + 0.931*(2.333)2 =
122.4 ft2
T-100 wetted surface area:
To determine this area, it is necessary to specify the liquid level in the bottom of the column. API-521 specifies
that this is determined by adding the normal bottoms level to any liquid holdup in the packing. As the 'normal'
liquid level is quite often a floating variable that can be adjusted by merely updating a level control set point, it
is recommended that the maximum liquid level, as dictated by a level-switch activated interlock, be used.
As shown in the sketch, the level switch is 4 ft. above the tangent line. For the installed packing, the liquid
holdup is conservatively estimated as 10% of the packing volume.
Holdup = 0.1 * (4 * (πD2/4 * 12)) = 0.1 * (4 * (π(4.833)2/4 * 12)) = 88.1 ft3.
Liquid height increase when holdup drops to column bottom = 88.1ft3 / (πD2/4) = 4.8 ft
Total straight side liquid height = 8.8 ft.
As the bottom tangent line is 15 ft above grade, the top liquid level is 23.8 ft above grade, which is within the
25 ft limit specified by API-521.
Wetted surface area = πDL + 0.931D2 =
π*4.833*8.8 + 0.931*(4.833)2 =
155.4 ft2
Piping wetted surface:

As the piping as well as the reboiler is integral to the column, this surface area is also included. 25' of 8" pipe
contributes π*(8.625/12)*25 =
56.5 ft2.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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Total wetted surface area = 334.2 ft2
No environmental credit is taken for the insulation, as it is not fire rated (aluminum sheathing not adequate)
Heat absorption from external fire = 21000FA0.82 = 21000*1.0*(334.2)0.82 =
2,465,358 Btu/hr.
Latent heat of cyclohexane at 60.5 psig (set pressure + overpressure) = 131.2 Btu/lb.
Hence, required relieving rate for external fire scenario = 2,465,358 / 131.2 = 18791 lb/hr.
4.2.5.4 Gas Filled Vessels
For a vessel that does not contain any liquid, the relief rate in a fire situation depends entirely on the thermal
expansion of the gas.
API-521 gives a method for calculating the effective discharge area of the safety valve as follows:
F ' A'
A=
P1
where:
A = effective discharge area of the valve, square inches
A' = exposed surface area of the vessel, square feet
F' = relief valve factor
P1 = relieving pressure, psia
F' can be determined either from the following relationships (taken from API-521, Section 3.15.2.1.2) or from
the curve given below.
0.1406 ⎛ (Tw − T1 ) ⎞
1.25
F'= ⎜ ⎟
CK d ⎜⎝ T10.6506 ⎟
⎠
k +1
⎛ 2 ⎞ k −1
C = 520 k ⎜ ⎟
⎝ k + 1⎠
where
k = Cp / Cv, specific heat ratio of gas or vapor
Kd = coefficient of discharge of relief device
Tw = vessel wall temperature (degrees Rankine)**
T1 = gas temperature (degress Rankine) at the upstream relieving pressure, determined from the
following relationship:
⎛P⎞
T1 = ⎜⎜ 1 ⎟⎟Tn
⎝ Pn ⎠
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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where
Pn = normal operating gas pressure (psia)
Tn = normal operating gas temperature (degrees Rankine)
** Recommended maximum wall temperature for carbon steel plate materials is 1100 F. Value of Tw should be
adjusted appropriately when vessels are fabricated from different alloy materials.
Relief valve factors
0.06
0.05
F' (Tw=1100F, Kd=0.975)
0.04
k = 1.4
0.03 k = 1.2
k = 1.001
0.02
0.01
0
0 200 400 600 800
Gas temperature, F
Figure 4.2.5.4-1 Relief Valve Factors

Example:
Vent gas is fed to a horizontal knockout drum before the gas is sent to an incinerator. Any carryover liquids are
separated in this drum and pumped away before any significant liquid accumulation occurs. The vent stream
contains mostly nitrogen. A relief valve is located in the drum's overhead piping.
The process conditions are:
Normal operating pressure 160 psig

Normal operating temperature 68 F
Vent gas flowrate 21000 lb/hr
Drum size 7'-0" x 20'-0" T-T
Heads ASME F&D
Relief valve set pressure 220 psig
Determine the relieving rate for an external fire.
Solution:
The total vessel surface exposed to fire is,

As = π*D*L + 2(head area)
= π(7)(20.0) + 2(45.6)
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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= 530.8 ft2
Relieving pressure, P1 = 220(1.21) + 14.7 = 281 psia
Gas temperature at upstream relieving pressure = T1 = (P1/Pn)*Tn = (281/174.7)*528 = 849.3 oR

The discharge area for safety valve on gas-containing vessel exposed to open fire is determined by:
F ' A'
A=
P1
where
A = effective discharge area of the valve, in2
F' = operating factor = 0.0185
As = exposed surface area of vessel, ft2
P1 = upstream relieving pressure, psia
Therefore,
0.0185 * 530.8
A= = 0.59 in 2
281
4.2.5.5 Vapor-Depressuring Systems
When an unwetted vessel surface is exposed to fire, where only vapor is present to absorb heat internally, the
wall temperature can rise quite rapidly. This may soon lead to vessel rupture. Pressure relief valves may
provide protection for only a short period. Hence, other devices would be required to prevent vessel rupture.
By reducing the pressure in a vessel exposed to fire, the stress on the metal can be reduced and the danger of
the vessel bursting can be removed. The American Petroleum Institute recommends that the depressuring
valve should be sized so that the equipment pressure reduces to 50% of the vessel's design gauge pressure
within 15 minutes. This criteria is based on the vessel wall temperature versus stress to rupture.
The vessels may be depressured using the following:
A. Through existing pipe lines installed for process purposes.

B. Installing depressuring valves, operated remotely by electric or pneumatic power.
C. Installing a relief valve bypass.
It is not necessary to provide depressuring facilities on every vessel. If a group of vessels are normally
connected together, they can be depressured as a whole. Depressuring systems should not replace PSVs.
NOTE: For calculation of vapor loads for a system to be depressured, Section 3.19 of API 521, Fourth Edition,
March 1997, is to be referred.
4.2.6 Thermal Expansion
If any system is completely filled with a fluid and then heated, its internal pressure will rise. When the fluid is
gas or vapor, the pressure rise is proportional to the temperature rise. When the fluid is liquid and there is no
room for expansion or escape, very high pressures can be generated as the liquid tries to expand against fixed
boundaries.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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This scenario can occur when liquid is blocked in between 2 valves and heat is input from heat exchangers,
fire, sunlight or ambient warming. A typical situation is a blocked in cooling jacket on a process vessel which is
heated when a warm liquid is put into the vessel.
When figuring the requirement for thermal relief, the following criteria needs to be considered:
A. The source of heat and the rate of heat input (process heat from a heater, heat tracing, solar radiation,
etc.)
B. Character of the liquid (cryogenic liquids, low boiling point liquids, volatile liquids, flammable liquids,
etc.)
C. Likelihood of blocking-in (batch operation, systems frequently switched from running to stationary, etc.)
D. Other means of thermal relief or liquid escape
A rigorous calculation of the thermal relief requirement for process equipment is not practical because of the
lack of data and the many assumptions involved. However, the required relief capacity for thermal expansion is
usually small. A 3/4" x 1" nominal pipe size relief valve is commonly used.
The relief requirement for thermal expansion can be calculated using the method given in Section 3.14 of
Reference 6.1.3.
Liquid expansion rates for thermal expansion of trapped liquids can be approximated using the following
formula:
βQ
gpm =
500GC p
where
gpm = flow rate at the flowing temperature, gpm
β = cubical expansion coefficient per degree Fahrenheit for the liquid at the expected temperature
Q = total heat transfer rate, btu/hr. For heat exchangers, this can be taken as the maximum
exchanger duty during operation.
G = specific gravity referred to water
Cp = specific heat of the trapped liquid, btu/(lb)(°F)
Increase in temperature and volume can also be calculated using a procedure in Reference 6.2.12.
500 ft or greater of untraced piping is an unofficial rule of thumb for determining if thermal relief is required.
Also, consider thermal relief on shorter lengths of piping where heat tracing exists and there is a potential to
block the line.
In the case of a pipe where the source of heat is solar radiation, the heat input can be conservatively estimated
by
π d
Q = 400 L
2 12
where
Q = total solar radiation heat input rate, Btu/hr

N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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d = pipe external diameter, inches
L = exposed pipe length, feet
This simplified formula is based on a ground level solar radiation rate of 400 Btu/hr-ft2 impacting on 50% of the
exposed pipe surface with none being reflected.
A significantly more detailed analysis of heat input from solar radiation has been developed by ACCE, which
takes into account the various modes of heat transfer (direct radiation, diffuse radiation, reflected radiation,
convective and conductive heat transfer). A spreadsheet with these calculations is available on the Process
Technical Resources (PTR) website.
4.2.7 Mechanical Equipment Failure
The failure of mechanical equipment that provides cooling or condensation in process streams can cause
overpressure in process vessels. The equipment failures can be classified as failures of rotating equipment or
failures of heat exchangers and fired heaters.
The typical failures of equipment are:
A. Heat transfer equipment

B. Plant cooling water system
C. Fractionating column reflux pumps
Pumps can fail through mechanical breakdown or loss of power. Since exchanger tubes occasionally split,
consideration should be given to the effect of high-pressure fluid on the low-pressure side.
The relieving capacity requirements for these cases are discussed in this and other sections.
4.2.7.1 Heat Transfer Equipment
In shell-and-tube heat exchangers, the tubes are subject to failure from a number of causes, such as thermal
shock, vibration and corrosion. This will result in the high-pressure stream overpressuring equipment in the
low-pressure side of the exchanger, permitting mixing of streams with resultant vapor generation of the cold
fluid.
It is necessary to install a pressure relief valve on the low pressure side when the design pressure of the low
pressure side is less than three-quarters (75%) of the design pressure of the high pressure side. On evaluation
by the PHA team, the requirement for pressure relief on the low pressure side can be removed if (a) the low
pressure side piping has sufficient capacity for the over-pressure scenario, (b) any isolation valves on the low
pressure side piping are car sealed open and (c) there is no hazard associated with mixing of the high and low
pressure side fluids.
If the high pressure side of the exchanger operates at 1000 psig or more and contains a vapor or a liquid that
can flash or it vaporizes liquid on the low pressure side, complete tube failure should be considered regardless
of the pressure differential.
There are basically four different scenarios of fluid in the high pressure side flowing through a sharp break to
the low pressure side.
A. Vapor flowing through break without phase change

B. Liquid flowing through break without phase change
C. Liquid flowing through break with phase change
D. Two-phase(vapor and liquid) flowing through break
The following flowchart from Section 4.2 of reference 6.1.11 summarizes BASF's assumptions on the selection
of reasonable leak sizes for piping and equipment:
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Remark: The diamond “Designed for leakage before rupture“ includes suitable selection of gaskets as well as
all mechanical stress factors, i.e. the avoidance of stress due to vibration, thermal shock or mechanical forces.
The design conditions must ensure that a leak develops before full rupture occurs. Timely leak detection is
usually not feasible within heat exchangers.
Fans on air-cooled heat exchangers or cooling towers can occasionally be lost due to a loss of power or a
mechanical breakdown, resulting in overpressuring the process system. Because of natural convection effects,
credit for partial condensing capacity of 20-30 percent of normal duty is often used unless these effects at
relieving conditions are determined to be significantly different. The capacity of the relief valve is then based on
the remaining 70-80%.
4.2.7.2 Check Valve Malfunction
Pneumatically-assisted, stub-shaft check valves with models that have a blow-out resistant design are
susceptible to failure in light hydrocarbon service. Rapid release and ignition of these gases can blowout the
shaft.
Operational factors that can contribute to check valve failure include high cyclic loads, and low or unsteady
flow conditions.
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4.2.8 Failure of Automatic Controls
Malfunction of automatic control devices due to the loss of either instrument air or electric power, or both,
causes overpressure in the process system.
The automatic control devices are used at inlets or outlets of vessels or systems. When the transmission signal
or operating medium to a final control element (such as a valve operator) fails, the control devices should
assume either a fully open or a fully closed position.
The fail action of all control devices should be selected in order to minimize the effects of a total instrument
failure. This is generally achieved by applying the following rules.
4.2.8.1 Inlet Control Devices
For applications involving inlet control devices that fail in the closed position, overpressure-relieving devices
may not be required.
For applications involving inlet control devices that fail in the open position, pressure-relieving devices may be
required to prevent overpressure. The required relief capacity is the difference between the maximum inlet flow
and the normal outflow at relieving conditions, assuming that the other valves in the system are still in normal
operating position.
If one or more of the outlet valves are closed by the same failure that caused the inlet valve to open, the
required relief capacity is the difference between the maximum inlet flow and the maximum flow from the outlet
valves that remain open. All flows should be calculated at relieving conditions.
4.2.8.2 Outlet Control Devices
For applications involving single outlets with control devices that fail in the open position on those outlets,
overpressure-relieving devices may not be required.
If one or more of the inlet valves are opened by the same failure that caused the outlet valve to open,
pressure-relieving devices may be required to prevent overpressure. The required relief capacity is the
difference between the maximum inlet and maximum outlet flows.
For applications involving single outlets with control devices that fail in the closed position on those outlets,
pressure-relieving devices may be required. The required relief capacity is equal to the maximum inlet flow at
relieving conditions.
For applications involving more than one outlet and a control device that fails in the closed position on an
individual outlet, the required relief capacity is the difference between the maximum inlet flow and the normal
flow at relieving conditions through the remaining outlets, assuming that the other valves in the system remain
in their normal operating position.
4.2.9 Abnormal Heat Input
If the temperature control system malfunctions, additional heat input will cause vapor generation that can
exceed the process system's ability to condense or otherwise absorb the buildup of pressure. This will result in
overpressuring the process equipment.
The required relieving capacity is the estimated maximum rate of vapor generation at relieving conditions
including noncondensibles produced from overheating. The heat input must include any built in overcapacity
of the system.
Heat input should be calculated on the basis of clean, rather than foul, conditions.
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4.2.10 Water Hammer
Water hammer is pressure waves transmitting back and forth in a liquid-filled system. The rapid shut-off of a
valve in a liquid line or the shut-off of a pump may induce water hammer in piping. Sometimes this oscillating
peak pressures can rise to the point at which they can very easily rupture piping or equipment.
Water hammer is a type of overpressure that cannot be reasonably controlled by pressure relief valves, since
the response time of these valves is normally too slow. Where water hammer can occur, the use of pulsation
dampeners or gas traps in the line should be considered. It can also be minimized by proper piping design.
4.2.11 Steam Hammer
Steam hammer is caused by the action of quick-closing valves in the system that contains compressible fluids.
The possible pressure rise due to the oscillating peak pressure can cause vibration and violent movement of
piping and possible rupture of equipment.
Pressure relief valves cannot be used effectively as a protective device because of their slow response time.
Avoidance of the use of quick-closing valves may prevent steam hammer.
4.2.12 Loss of Reflux
The loss of reflux as a result of pump or instrument failure or to loss of cooling water can cause overpressure
in a distillation column because of condenser flooding. The column is overheated without the reflux, which acts
as a coolant under normal operating conditions.
For total condensing, the relief requirement is the total incoming vapor at relieving conditions and that
generated due to the heat input prevailing at the time of relief. Credit can be taken for the amount of vapor
condensed by sidestream reflux. For a partial condenser, the relief requirement is the difference between the
incoming vapor rate and the outgoing vapor rate at relieving conditions.
Side stream reflux failure causes condenser flooding, if a condenser is in the system, or changes in vapor
properties resulting from changes in composition. The relief requirement is the vaporization rate caused by the
amount of heat normally removed from the system by this side stream reflux.
4.2.13 Operator Error
Overpressure in the system can be caused by operator errors. Mainly these errors are confined to valve
operations. For example, an operator might inadvertently close the block valves on the cold side of the heat
exchanger and open the block valves on the hot side. The operator might shut off the block valves on the
steam coil containing water, while continuing to fire the heater. The operator might manually close the
discharge valves on the compressor and pump. Inadvertent valve closure on the inlet of a vessel or opening a
valve on the outlet can create a vacuum within the vessel.
Other types of operator error include the addition of wrong material to a reactor or an overcharge of a material
to a reactor. Typically, the overcharge considered is the addition of a full container instead of a partial
container. Another type of error is the mistiming of an intermittent operation such as blowdown or
regeneration.
Bypass valves around control valves can also be inadvertently left open. In some cases, the maximum Cv of
the bypass valve may be greater than the control valve, and the maximum bypass valve flow should be used in
sizing the relief device.
4.2.14 Internal Explosion
General rules for accurate sizing of relieving devices for internal explosion are very difficult due to the
complexity of thermodynamics involved for the gaseous mixtures.
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Generally, rupture disks are used rather than relief valves for protection from internal explosion because the
disks react more rapidly than relief valves to the instantaneous buildup of pressure.
This subject is outside the scope of the pressure relief guidelines.
4.3 Sizing of Pressure Safety Relief Devices
4.3.1 Basis of Pressure Safety Relief Device Sizing
Several factors need to be considered when sizing a relief device. These include:
• Relief capacity based on the worst case scenario,

• Type of fluid being relieved (liquid, gas, two phase),
• Type of relief device,
• Physical properties of the fluid being relieved,
• Vessel maximum allowable working pressure,
• Relief device set pressure,
• Inlet and vent line size,
• Backpressure,
• And allowable overpressure.
Of primary importance in sizing a relief device is determining the relieving scenarios and the selection of the
worst case scenario. It is the responsibility of the design engineer to carefully evaluate the process and use
good engineering judgment when choosing the relieving scenarios.
4.3.2 Helpful Suggestions
Utilizing some of the following suggestions can reduce the calculated size of a relief device. These suggestions
can be useful when checking the sizing for existing relief valves.
• If the set pressure is below the maximum allowable working pressure(MAWP) of the equipment, raise
the set pressure up to MAWP. The revised set pressure should not exceed MAWP of any connected
vessel. Remember that raising the set pressure to the MAWP can at times cause other problems such
as increasing the relief temperature. This is important especially if reactive decompositions are the
relieving scenario, and it may be advantageous to use lower setpoints to start venting at lower reaction
rates.
• A conservative assumption widely used in relief sizing is to use a value of 1.0 for the compressibility of
the relieving gas. If this is the case, use the exact value by calculating the factor at relief temperature
and pressure.
• Use the certified KR of the installed rupture disc rather than the default value of 1.5.
• Use the certified capacity of installed rupture disc / relief valve arrangement if available.
• If a default value of 1.001 is used for the gas heat capacity ratio Cp/Cv, replace it with the exact value
at relief temperature and pressure.
4.3.3 Available Sizing Software
Relief Valves:
BASF PSV-Calc
Consolidated SRVS
Aspen Available in engineering suite
Chemcad Available in engineering suite
Anderson-Greenwood SafetySize
Farris Size Master
GROTH Cal-Q-Size (conservation vents)
Protectoseal Pro-Flo II (conservation vents)
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Rupture Discs :
BASF PSV-Calc
Aspen Available in engineering suite
Chemcad Available in engineering suite
BS&B SizSaf
FIKE Discalc
4.3.4 Physical Properties
4.3.4.1 Relieving Pressure
This is the sum of the set pressure and the allowed overpressure (accumulation). For unfired pressure vessels
with a maximum allowable working pressure greater than or equal to 15 psig, a single relief device set
pressure cannot be set higher than the vessel maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). For multiple
valves the set pressure of the additional valves can be set at 105% of the MAWP [ref. 6.1.5, Section VIII]. For
steam boilers a single relief device set pressure cannot be set higher than the MAWP. For multiple valves the
set pressure of the additional valves cannot exceed the MAWP by more than 3%. In addition the complete
range of pressure settings of all the saturated steam safety valves cannot exceed 10% of the highest set
pressure to which any valve is set [ref. 6.1.5, Section I]. For low pressure or atmospheric vessels see Section
4.6. The allowed overpressure depends on the relieving scenario and the number of relief devices on the
vessel as shown in Table 4.3.4-1.
Condition Overpressure (accumulation) (% of set pressure)

Normal (non-fire)
Single Valve Greater of either 10% or 3 psi
Multiple Valves 16%
Fire 21%
Steam Boiler 6%
Table 4.3.4-1 Allowable Overpressure for Vessels with MAWP Greater Than or Equal to 15 psig
4.3.4.2 Relieving Temperature
For the fire case, boiling liquid or vapors from boiling liquids, the relieving temperature corresponds to the
boiling point of the material at the relieving pressure. It can be calculated from the vapor pressures of the
materials and the appropriate vapor-liquid equilibrium model for mixtures. For a non-boiling liquid or a vapor
not from a boiling liquid, the relieving temperature is the temperature of the relieving fluid.
4.3.4.3 Compressibility Factor
The compressibility factor corrects the ideal gas law for the behavior of real gases at the relieving pressure and
temperature.
4.3.4.4 Heat Capacity Ratio
The ideal gas heat capacity ratio (Cp/Cv) of the relieving mixture.
4.3.4.5 Molecular Weight
The molecular weight of the relieving mixture.

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4.3.5 Sizing of Pressure Safety Relief Valves
This section does not cover relief valves used in service for either fired or unfired steam boilers or low pressure
or atmospheric vessels. For steam boilers see section 4.4.6. For low pressure or atmospheric vessels see
section 4.4.7.
4.3.5.1 Selecting the Relief Valve
Selecting the relief valve for a given relieving scenario is done in two parts. The first part consists of a
preliminary design of the relieving system. Calculating the effective size of the relief valve is done using the
equations in sections 4.4.3.2 to 4.4.3.6. After the effective area is calculated, a manufacturer for the relief valve
is selected and the actual area and discharge coefficient for the selected valve are obtained. The rated flow
through the relieving system is then calculated using the same equations only using the actual area and the
rated discharge coefficient. This will confirm that the relieving system will be adequate for the selected relieving
scenario.
4.3.5.1.1 Effective Area and Effective Discharge Coefficient
The areas calculated using the equations in sections 4.3.5.2 to 4.3.5.6 are the effective areas and are
independent of the manufacturer of the valve when using the effective discharge coefficients (0.975 for vapor
and 0.65 for liquids). The orifice size of a relief valve is given by a letter designation from “D”, the smallest, to
“T”, the largest, that corresponds to an effective area (API area). These areas and discharge coefficients are to
be used only for preliminary sizing of the relief valve. They are not to be used when calculating the capacity of
a relieving system.
4.3.5.1.2 Actual Area and Rated Discharge Coefficient
The manufacturer of a relief valve, if the valve is certified by the ASME, will have a measured actual area and a
rated coefficient of discharge for the valve. The actual area will be larger than the effective area and the rated
coefficient will generally be lower than the effective discharge coefficient. In most cases, this will result in the
rated flow capacity of a valve to be equal to or greater than the required capacity for the given the relieving
scenario. This flow capacity needs to be confirmed. The actual area and rated coefficient of discharge are to
be used with the equations in the following sections to calculate the rated relieving capacity. Under no
circumstances should the effective area and the effective discharge coefficient be used together or in
combination with the actual area and the rated discharge coefficient to calculate the rated relieving capacity.
For example, a series 1900, 3” x 4” L orifice valve by Dresser Industries has an API area of 2.853 in² and an
API Kd of 0.975. The ASME actual area is 3.317 in² and the certified rated coefficient, Kd, is 0.855. Do not
calculate flows using the ASME area of 3.317 in² with the API Kd of 0.975 or the API area of 2.853 in² with the
certified Kd of 0.855.
4.3.5.2 Sizing for Gas or Vapor
The flow through a relief device will be either critical or subcritical flow. Critical flow occurs when, for a given
set of upstream conditions, the velocity of the flowing fluid reaches the velocity of sound in the flowing fluid.
This flow rate is the critical flow rate and cannot be exceeded. The ratio of the pressure at the relief device exit
at critical flow to the inlet pressure is the critical pressure ratio. At critical flow conditions the pressure at the
exit of the relief device cannot drop below the critical flow pressure. If the actual backpressure on the relief
device is lower than the critical flow pressure, there is a sudden expansion to the downstream pressure. The
critical flow pressure can be calculated using the following equation:
k /( k −1)
⎡ 2 ⎤
Pcf = P0 ⎢
⎣ k + 1⎥⎦
where
Pcf = critical flow pressure, psia

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k = ratio to specific heats (Cp/Cv) for an ideal gas
If the pressure downstream of the relief device is less than or equal to the critical flow pressure then critical
flow exists and calculations for critical flow described below should be used. When the downstream pressure
is greater than the critical flow pressure then the calculations for subcritical flow should be used.
4.3.5.2.1 Sizing for Critical Flow
The following equation is used to calculate the discharge area necessary to reach the required flow rate
through the relief device for critical flow:
W TZ
A=
CK d P0 K b K c M
where
A = required discharge area, in²
W = required flow rate through the relief device, lb/hr
C = coefficient calculated from the ratio of specific heats (k=Cp/Cv) of the gas or vapor at the inlet
relieving conditions. It can be determined from Figure 4.4.3.2.1-1 or calculated from the
following equation:
( k +1) /( k −1)
⎛ 2 ⎞
C = 520 k ⎜ ⎟
⎝ k + 1⎠
when k is unknown, API 520 suggests a value of 315 be used for C. The units for C are
lbm × lbmole × ° R /(lb f × hr ) .
Kd = coefficient of discharge for the relief device. This should be obtained from the manufacturer.
An extensive list of discharge coefficients may be found in the “Red Book” published by the
National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (www.nationalboard.org). This
resource is updated monthly. When this is unknown, API 520 suggests using a value of 0.975.
This value should only be used for preliminary sizing not for calculating a flow rate. See
section 4.4.3.1.2 for further information.
Kb = backpressure correction factor. This applies only to balanced bellows valves only. For
conventional valves the value is 1.0. This correction factor should be obtained from the valve
manufacturer. If unknown Figure 4.4.3.2.1-2 can be used.
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400
380
360
Coefficient C
340
320
300
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Specific Heat Ratio, k=Cp/Cv
Figure 4.3.5.2.1-1 – Curve for Evaluating Coefficient C in the Flow Equation from the Specific Heat
Ratio, Assuming Ideal Gas Behavior
(Adapted from Ref 6.1.2, Figure 32)
Kc = combination correction factor when a rupture disk is installed upstream of the relief device.
These values may be found in the “Red Book.” When a published value cannot be found then
a value of 0.9 should be used. If a rupture disk is not installed a value of 1.0 is to be used.
T = the relieving temperature, °R
Z = the compressibility factor at the inlet relieving conditions
M = the molecular weight of the relieving gas or vapor
4.3.5.2.2 Sizing for Subcritical Flow
When the backpressure exceeds the critical flow pressure, then the flow through the relief device is subcritical.
The following equation may be used to calculate the required flow area of the relief device:
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1.00
0.95
16% Overpressure
0.90
0.85
Backpressure Correction Factor, K b
10% Overpressure
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Percent of Gauge Pressure = (PB/PS)*100
PB = back pressure, in psig.

PS = set pressure, in psig.
Notes:
1. The curves above represent a compromise of the values recommended by a number of relief valve manufacturers and
may be used when the make of the valve or the critical flow pressure point for the vapor or gas is unknown. When the
make of the valve is known, the manufacturer should be consulted for the correction factor. These curves are for set
pressures of 50 psig and above. They are limited to back pressure below critical flow pressure for a given set pressure. For
set pressures below 50 psig or for subcritical flow, the manufacturer must be consulted for vales of Kb.
2. For 21% overpressure, Kb, equals 1.0 up to PB/PS = 50%.
Figure 4.3.5.2.2-1 – Back Pressure Correction factor, Kb, for Balanced-Bellows Pressure Relief
Valve (Vapors and Gases)
(Adapted from ref. 6.1.2, Figure 30)
W ZT
A=
735 × F2 K d K c MPo ( P0 − Pb )
where
W = required flow through the relief device, lb/hr
F2 = coefficient of subcritical flow. It can be found in figure 4.3.5.2.2-2 or calculated from the
following formula:
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1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
F2
0.75
k = 1.8 Critical flow line

1.6
0.70
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.65
0.60
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
r = P2 / P0
Figure 4.3.5.2.2-2 Values of F2 for Subcritical Flow

⎛ k ⎞ 2 / k ⎡1 − r ⎤
( k −1) / k
F2 = ⎜ ⎟(r ) ⎢ ⎥
⎝ k −1⎠ ⎣ 1− r ⎦
k = ratio of the specific heats, Cp/Cv
r = ratio of the back pressure to the relieving pressure, Pb/P0, psia/psia
Kd = effective coefficient of discharge. Obtain this value from the manufacturer. For preliminary
sizing the following values may be used per API 520:
0.975 for a relief device with or without a rupture disk for the API area
0.62 for a rupture disk under very restricted conditions. See section 4.4.1.A in these guidelines
for details.
Kc = the combination correction factor when the relief device has a rupture disk installed upstream
of the device. This factor should be obtained from the manufacturer. The “Red Book” also
contains a substantial number of these values. The following values may be used per API 520:
1.0 when there is no rupture disk installed upstream of the relief device
0.9 when a rupture disk is installed upstream of the relief device but there is no published
value for the combination factor
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Z = the compressibility factor for the relieving vapor mixture at the relieving conditions
T = the temperature at the relieving conditions, °R
M = the molecular weight of the relieving mixture, lb/lbmole
P0 = the upstream relieving pressure, psia
Pb = the back pressure, psia
4.3.5.3 Sizing for Steam Relief
The following equation may be used to calculate the effective discharge area for relief devices that operate
with steam at critical flow conditions:
W
A=
51.5 × P0 K d K b K c K N K SH
where
W = required flow through the relief device, lb/hr
P0 = the upstream relieving pressure, psia
Kd = effective coefficient of discharge. Obtain from the manufacturer. For preliminary sizing the
following values may be used per API 520:
0.975 for a relief device with or without a rupture disk for the API area
0.62 for a rupture disk under very restricted conditions. See section 4.4.4.1.A in these
guidelines for details.
of the device. This factor should be obtained from the manufacturer. The following values may
be used per API 520:
KN = Napier equation correction factor

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= 1 where P0 ≤ 1500 psia
0.1906 × P0 − 1000
= where P0 > 1500 psia and ≤ 3200 psia
0.2292 × P0 − 1061
KSH = the steam superheat correction factor. Values for this factor are in Table 4.3.3-1. For saturated
steam at any pressure, KSH = 1.0.
4.3.5.4 Sizing for Liquid Relief
4.3.5.5 ASME Code Certified Relief Valves
Valves designed for Section VIII, Division 1 of the ASME Code can be sized using the following equation:
Q G
A=
38 K d K w K c K v P0 − Pb
where
Q = required flow rate through the relief device, gpm
0.65 for a relief device with or without a rupture disk
0.62 for a rupture disk under very restricted conditions. See section 4.4.4.1.A in these
guidelines for details
Kw = back pressure correction factor. If the back pressure is atmospheric, API 520 suggests using a
value of 1.0. For conventional and pilot operated valves use a value of 1.0. Balanced bellows
valves will require the use of the correction factor from Figure 4.4.3.4.1-1.
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Table 4.3.5.5-1 Superheat Correction Factors, KSH

(From Ref 6.1.2, Table 9)
Set Pressure Temperature (degrees Fahrenheit)

(psig)
300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
15 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70
20 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70
40 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70
60 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
80 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
100 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
120 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
140 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
160 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
180 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
200 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
220 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
240 - 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
260 - 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
280 - 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
300 - 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
350 - 1.00 0.96 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
400 - 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70
500 - 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.70
600 - 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.70
800 - - 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.70
1000 - - 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.71
1250 - - 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.71
1500 - - - 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.71
1750 - - - 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.70
2000 - - - 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.69
2500 - - - 1.00 0.95 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.66
3000 - - - - 1.00 0.82 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.62
Kv = viscosity correction factor from Figure 4.4.3.4.1-2 or calculated using the following equation:
−1.0
⎛ 2.878 342.75 ⎞
K v = ⎜ 0.9935 + 0.5 + ⎟
⎝ R R1.5 ⎠
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1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
Kw
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent of Gauge Backpressure = (P b /P s ) x 100
Kw = correction factor due to back pressure.

Pb = back pressure, in psig.
Ps = set pressure, in psig.
Note: The curve above represents values recommended by various manufacturers. This curve may be used when the
manufacturer is not known. Otherwise, the manufacturer should be consulted for the applicable correction factor.
Figure 4.3.5.5-1 Capacity Correction Factor, Kw, Due to Back Pressure on Balanced-Bellows
Pressure Relief Valves in Liquid Service
(Adapted from API 520, 7th edition, 2000, Figure 31)
Q(2800 × G )
R = Reynold’s number =
μ A
G = specific gravity of the relieving liquid relative to water at 60°F
μ = viscosity of the relieving liquid at the relieving temperature, centipoise
P0 = the upstream relieving pressure, psig
Pb = the back pressure, psig

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1.0
0.9
0.8
K v Viscosity Correction Factor
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
10 100 1000 10000 100000
R = Reynold's Number
Figure 4.3.5.5-2 Capacity Correction Factor, Kv, Due to Viscosity

The viscosity correction factor is a function of the relief device orifice area and an iterative calculation is
required to get the correct value. For low viscosity fluids such as water, the correction factor is almost always
almost equal to one. The PSV-Calc spreadsheet performs this iterative calculation automatically.
4.3.5.6 Non-ASME Certified Valves
When capacity certification of a relief device is not required or is unknown, the following equation may be used
to calculate the required relief area:
Q G
A=
38 K d K w K c K v K p 1.25 p − pb
where
Q = required flow rate through the relief device, gpm

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1.1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Correction Factor, K p
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
10 20 30 40 50
Percent Overpressure
Note: The curve above shows that up to and including 25% overpressure, capacity is affected by
the change in lift, the change in the orifice discharge coefficient, and the change in overpressure.
Noncertified valves operating at low overpressure tend to chatter, therefore, overpressures of less
than 10% should be avoided.
Figure 4.3.5.6-1 Capacity Correction Factors Due to Overpressure for

Noncertified Pressure Relief Valves in Liquid Service.
(Adapted from Ref 6.1.2, Figure 37.)
0.65 for a relief device with or without a rupture disk
0.62 for a rupture disk under very restricted conditions. See section 4.4.1.A in these guidelines
for details.
Kw = back pressure correction factor. If the back pressure is atmospheric, API 520 suggests using a
value of 1.0. For conventional and pilot operated valves use a value of 1.0. Balanced bellows
valves will require the use of the correction factor from Figure 4.3.5.6-1.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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Kv = viscosity correction factor from Figure 4.3.5.6-2 or calculated using the following equation:
−1.0
⎛ 2.878 342.75 ⎞
K v = ⎜ 0.9935 + 0.5 + ⎟
⎝ R R1.5 ⎠
Q(2800 × G )
R = Reynold’s number =
μ A
G = specific gravity of the relieving liquid relative to water at 60°F
μ = viscosity of the relieving liquid at the relieving temperature, centipoise
Kp = overpressure correction factor. For an overpressure of 25%, Kp is equal to one. For other
overpressures, Kp can be found from Figure 4.4.3.4.2-1.
p = the set pressure, psig
pb = the total back pressure, psig
The viscosity correction factor is a function of the relief device orifice area and an iterative calculation is
required to get the correct value. For low viscosity fluids such as water, the correction factor is almost always
almost equal to one.
4.3.5.7 Vent and Inlet Pressure Drops
See Sections 4.4.4.1.B and 4.4.4.2.B of these guidelines for calculation methods.
To maintain the proper performance of the relief valves and prevent chatter, API 520 recommends that the inlet
line pressure losses at the rated flow rate be kept below 3% of the set pressure and the increase in pressure at
the outlet of the relief device due to the rated flow through the vent line be kept below 10% of the set pressure.
The outlet pressure losses can exceed 10% as long as the increase in backpressure is accounted for in
determining the capacity of the installed valve.
4.3.6 Sizing for Rupture Discs
4.3.6.1 Gas
When sizing a rupture disc for gas or vapor flow, it is necessary to consider the venting capacity of the relief
piping as a whole, including any rupture disc(s), entrance and exit losses, elbows, tees, etc. When the rupture
disc is in a short pipe that discharges directly to atmosphere (see section 4.4.4.1.A) the rupture disc can be
sized using the same equations used for relief valves along with a discharge coefficient, Kd, of 0.62. Otherwise,
the methods indicated in section 4.4.4.1.B should be used.
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4.3.6.1.1 Gas Flow - Short Pipe
If the rupture disc is installed such that it is:
A. Less than 8 pipe diameters from vessel nozzle entry, and

B. Discharge pipe length is less than 5 pipe diameters, and
C. Discharges directly to atmosphere, then
the standard relief sizing equations can be used with a discharge coefficient of 0.62.
To determine if the gas / vapor flow through the short pipe rupture disc is choked, the critical downstream
pressure is calculated in the same manner as for relief valves,
k /( k −1)
⎡ 2 ⎤
PC = P0 ⎢
⎣ k + 1⎥⎦
where again, k = Cp/Cv and P0 is the maximum relieving pressure, i.e. set pressure + over-pressure. When the
value of k is unknown, API 520 recommends using a conservative value of 1.001 to calculate this. (More
precisely, taking the limit of PC / P0 as k Æ 1, it can be seen that when k is unknown, a conservative
assumption is
PC = P0 exp(−0.5) = 0.6065P0
The required rupture disc area can then be calculated using the following three equations:
0.5
⎡ ⎛ 2 ⎞ ( k +1) /( k −1) ⎤
X = 520 ⎢k ⎜ ⎟ ⎥
⎣⎢ ⎝ k + 1 ⎠ ⎦⎥
0.5
⎡⎛ k ⎞ ⎛ P ⎞
2/k
⎛ 1 − ( Pb / P0 ) ( k −1) / k ⎞⎤
F2 = ⎢⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ b ⎟⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎥
⎜ 1 − (P / P ) ⎟
⎢⎣⎝ k − 1 ⎠ ⎝ P0 ⎠ ⎝ b 0 ⎠⎥⎦
⎧ W ⎛ T0 Z ⎞
0.5
⎫
⎪ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ , critical flow ⎪
⎪ X K d K b P0 ⎝ M w ⎠ ⎪
A=⎨ 0.5 ⎬
⎪ W ⎛ T0 Z ⎞ ⎪
⎪ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ , sub - critical flow ⎪
⎩ 735 F2 K d ⎝ M w P0 (P0 − Pb ) ⎠ ⎭
where
F2 = coefficient of sub-critical flow
K = Cp / Cv
Kb = back-pressure coefficient
Kd = discharge coefficient
Mw = molecular weight of vapor
P0 = set pressure + overpressure, psia
Pb = back pressure, psia

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Pc = critical pressare, psia
T0 = inlet gas temperature, R
Z = compressibility factor
4.3.6.1.2 Gas Flow - Long Pipe
Where the rupture disc relief piping does not meet the conditions of section 4.4.4.1.A above, the capacity of the
relief system should be determined by calculating the total resistance to flow using accepted engineering
practices. Both API 520 and ASME VIII recommend that this calculated value be multiplied by a factor of 0.9 to
allow for uncertainties in these methods.
The flow resistance of a certified rupture disc, KR, can usually be obtained from the manufacturer. Otherwise, a
value of 1.5 should be used.
Normally, the pipe flow is assumed to be isothermal (a more conservative assumption than adiabatic flow). A
number of methods exist to calculate this flow. These include the Lapple chart, and the Crane 410 A-22 Chart
Method. Appendix E of API 520 (7th edition, January 2000) also presents a curve fit of the Crane 410 A-22
chart. An alternative to using the graphical methods is to simultaneously solve the three equations for
isothermal compressible flow given below:
kg c M w
G = Ma0 P0
Rg T
Pc = P0 Ma0 k
⎧ ⎫
⎪2 ln P − G 2 R T (P0 − P1 ) + d = 0
P0 g c M w 2 2
4 fLeq
subsonic flow⎪
⎪ 1 g ⎪
⎨ ⎬
⎪ln⎛⎜ 1 ⎞⎟ − ⎛⎜ 1 − 1⎞⎟ + 4 fLeq = 0 critical flow ⎪
⎪ ⎜ kMa 2 ⎟ ⎜ kMa 2 ⎟ ⎪
⎩ ⎝ 0 ⎠ ⎝ 0 ⎠ d ⎭
where
d = diameter of tailpipe
f = Fanning friction factor
G = mass flux
Leq = equivalent length (4fLeq / d = 4fL/d + ΣK )
Mw = molecular weight
Ma0 = Mach # at inlet
P0 = Pressure at inlet
PC = Critical pressure
P1 = Discharge pressure
Rg = gas constant
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T = Temperature
It should be noted that the BASF spreadsheet, 'PSV-Calc' completes the equivalent of the calculation above
automatically when gas flow with a rupture disc and vent pipe is specified.
Gas Flow - Example
Figure 4.3.6.1.A shows a sample vessel and rupture disc arrangement.
90 degree standard
elbows 10'
23'
15'
6" Sch. 40 pipe
6" Rupture Disc set at

150 psig
2'
Figure 4.3.6.1.A Sample Vessel and Rupture Disc Arrangement
Data:
Ps = set pressure = 150 psig
P0 = relieving pressure = 150 psig + 10% = 165 psig
T = relieving temperature = 375 F
P1 = back pressure = 0 psig
k = Cp/Cv = 1.4
f = Fanning friction factor = 0.00375
Mw = molecular weight = 30.0
Z = compressibility = 1.0
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As the equivalent length of the discharge pipe of this rupture disc is considerably in excess of 5 pipe diameters,
the rupture disc cannot be sized using nozzle equations. A capacity determination is required.
First, the K values of the fittings are determined;
Fitting K
Slightly rounded entrance 0.5
Rupture Disc 1.5
50' of 6" CS pipe 1.484
2 X Standard elbows 0.9
Exit (sharp-edged) 1
Total 5.384
Using trial and error, a solution to the set of equations in Section 4.4.1.B above finds that
Ma0 = Inlet Mach number = 0.2894

Pc = 61.5 psia. (Hence, flow is critical)
G = Mass flux = 241.85 lb/ft2-sec
De-rating the above mass flux by a factor of 0.9 as required by ASME and API 520, the mass flowrate capacity
of the above relief system
W = 0.9GA = 157,213 lb/hr
For the same problem above, PSV-Calc, Rev 7.18a obtains an essentially identical value of 157,350 lb/hr.
4.3.6.2 Liquids
As with gas flow through a rupture disc, both ASME and API code allow the rupture disc to be rated using
nozzle flow methods or overall system capacity determination. The use of nozzle flow equations to rate the
rupture disc is subject to the same restrictions as gas flow. I.e. Allowed when the installed rupture disc;
A. Is less than 8 pipe diameters from vessel nozzle entry, and

B. Discharge pipe length is less than 5 pipe diameters, and
C. Discharges directly to atmosphere.
Otherwise, the relief system capacity should be determined by calculating the total resistance to flow in the
relief system using accepted engineering methods. As with gas flow, this calculated value should be de-rated
by a value of 0.9 to allow uncertainties in the methods.
4.3.6.2.1 Liquid Flow - Short Pipe
When conditions A - C in 4.3.6.2 above are met, the relationship between rupture disc area and flowrate can
be determined by the nozzle equation as given in API 520 for certified devices;
Q s.g .
A=
38 K d K v P0 − P1
−1.0
⎛ 2.878 342.75 ⎞
K v = ⎜ 0.9935 + 0.5 + ⎟
⎝ R R 1.5 ⎠
where
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A = required relief area, in2
s.g. = specific gravity (water = 1.0 at 70 F)
Kd = valve discharge coefficient (= 0.62)
Kv = viscosity correction factor
Q = liquid flowrate (gpm)
R = Reynolds number
As the two equations are coupled, it is necessary to solve them simultaneously. Normally, this can be achieved
by a two or three point iteration between flow and Kv, with a starting point of Kv = 1.0
4.3.6.2.2 Liquid Flow - Long Pipe
When a capacity determination is required for liquid flow, the pressure drop across the relief system of
constant pipe diameter is related to the pipe velocity by the standard equation;
⎛ 4 fL ⎞ ρv
2
P0 − P1 = ⎜ + ∑ Ki ⎟ + ρgΔz
⎝ d ⎠ 2gc
f = fcn(Re)
where
d = diameter of tailpipe
f = Fanning friction factor (= function of Re #)
L = pipe length (4fLeq / d = 4fL/d + ΣK )
P0 = Pressure at inlet
P1 = Discharge pressure
V = Liquid velocity
ρ = Liquid density
Δz = Total change in height from entrance to exit
Liquid Flow - Example
Using the same rupture disc arrangement as in section 4.3.6.1 above (Figure 4.3.6.1.A), and the following
data;
Specific gravity = 1.2

Viscosity = 5.5 cP
Relieving temperature = 100 F
Pipe roughness = 0.00015 ft
Dz = 27 ft.
L = 50 ft
ΣK = 3.9 (5.384 when include 50' of pipe)
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Again a trial and error procedure is required between the friction factor and the calculated flowrate. In this
case, we used the conservative assumption of a rough pipe, and hence the Von Karman equation is valid for
the Fanning friction factor;
1 ⎛ ε ⎞
= −4 log⎜ ⎟
f ⎝ 3.7 D ⎠
Results;
v = 3504 ft / min
Re = 534,535
f = 0.0037
DP = 165 psi
De-rating the calculated velocity by 0.9, the capacity of the relief system is determined to be 4733 gpm.
For the same problem above, PSV-Calc, Rev 7.18a obtains an essentially identical value of 4714 gpm.
4.3.7 Combination of Pressure Safety Relief Valves and Rupture Discs
Series combinations of relief valves and rupture discs are installed on occasion. For example, a rupture disc
can be installed underneath a pressure relief valve to isolate the valve from corrosive process fluids. A less
common installation is the placement of a rupture disc downstream of a relief valve to prevent seepage of
corrosive or toxic materials to the vent system.
In both of the above cases, ASME and API code (ASME VIII, Div. 1 & API 520, Part II) require the installation
of a pressure gauge, try cock, free vent or suitable 'tell-tale' device between the relief devices, to indicate if
leak by or primary device rupture has occurred. The PHA team should determine the frequency of monitoring
of the pressure between the relief devices and if continuous monitoring via a pressure transmitter is required.
In the event that the sum of the set pressures of the rupture disc and relief valve is less than the MAWP of the
protected equipment, monitoring of the pressure may not be required.
For the case of a rupture disc upstream of a pressure relief device, the disc should be a non-fragmenting type.
The rupture disc should be big enough that it will allow a flow equal to the capacity of the valve, and as a
minimum should provide an opening larger than the inlet of the relief valve.
To determine the capacity of the rupture disc / relief valve arrangement, ASME code allows for (a) using the
certified capacity of the relief valve multiplied by a 'derating' factor of 0.9 or (b) using a certified capacity of the
particular rupture disc / relief valve arrangement.
As there are a very large amount of potential disc / valve arrangements, the capacity is normally determined
using (a) above.
For the case of a rupture disc installed downstream of a relief valve, the code requires that the relief valve not
fail to open at its pressure setting regardless of any back pressure that can accumulate between the relief
valve and the rupture disc. The set pressure of the rupture disc in this arrangement should be such that the
disc set pressure + piping back pressure is less than both the MAWP of the protected vessel and the set
pressure of the relief valve.
The rupture disc downstream of the relief valve should be large enough to allow the rated flow of the relief
valve. The rupture disc itself should not create piping obstructions from fragmentation. ASME code also
requires that the contents of a vessel protected by this relief valve / rupture disc arrangement be clean and free
from gumming or clogging matter, and also that the bonnet of the pressure relief valve be vented.
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4.3.8 Sizing for Specialty Devices
There are no specific sizing equations available for the specialty devices. However, the equipment
manufacturers usually supply the pressure relief valves for tank cars, steam turbine, compressor casings and
positive displacement pumps. The vendors can be consulted for their sizing criteria or just accept the sizing as
adequate. It is usually difficult to get the sizing information from these equipment manufacturers. In some
cases it may be desirable to install a separate BASF relief device that duplicates the function of the vendor
valve to facilitate routine inspection of the device. For PSM processes, allowing the vendor to size the relief
devices without a review of the calculations and documentation is not recommended.
4.4 Installation of Pressure Safety Relief Devices
Note: Please refer to Reference 6.1.2 Part II for a more comprehensive discussion of PSV installation
and piping design.
4.4.1 Inlet Piping Helpful Suggestions
• The preferred installation for the pressure relief device is to mount directly on the pressure
vessel or pipe it protects. However, this is not always possible or in some cases desirable
due to process or mechanical considerations.
• A safety valve should be installed in the vertical position with bottom inlet and side outlet.
• When a rupture disk is used in combination with a safety relief valve, API 520 Part II
requires a pressure gauge or a suitable telltale indicator be provided to permit detection of
disk rupture or leakage.
• The pressure drop from the protected equipment to the inlet of the relief valve should not
exceed 3% of the set pressure.
• Where the pressure drop exceeds this amount, rapid opening and closing of the relief
valve, known as "chattering" may result. This will cause lower capacity and damage to the
seating surfaces. The pressure drop should be calculated using the maximum rated
capacity of the pressure relief valve.
• The nominal size of the inlet piping must be the same as or larger than the nominal size of
the valve inlet flange.
• The inlet piping should be predominantly vertical, so that it is self-draining back to the
vessel.
• The inlet piping should be as short as possible.
• The inlet piping and supports should put minimum stress on the flanges of the relief
device. Engineering judgment should be used to determine if pipe stress calculations are
required.
4.4.2 Discharge Piping Helpful Suggestions
• For conventional (non-balanced) safety valves, built-up (variable) back pressure should be
limited to 10% of the set pressure. If variable back pressure exceeds 10% of the set
pressure, the increase in back pressure must be accounted for in determining the capacity
of the installed valve.
• For balanced valves, built-up (variable) back pressure should be limited to 30-50% of the
set pressure for balanced valves.
• The nominal discharge pipe should be as large as or larger than the nominal size of the
pressure relief valve outlet flange.
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• The discharge side of all pressure protection devices shall be so piped as to avoid
endangering personnel or release of any hazardous fluid into an operating area.
• Hazardous/Flammable gas vents normally should discharge at least 10 feet above any
platform within a 30-50 foot radius (depending on the material) and sufficiently high that
any flammable cloud formed will not extend to any probable source of accidental ignition.
If the safety of the discharge location is in doubt, a dispersion calculation should be
considered.
• Discharge lines shall be designed to facilitate drainage or shall be fitted with drains to
prevent liquid from accumulating in the discharge side of the safety device. Low point traps
without drain holes are not allowable.
• Atmospheric discharges shall be provided with an adequate drain hole (i.e. ¼ in ID) at the
low point. Pipe the drain to a safe location, as required.
• The overall length and the number of bends and elbows should be minimized.
• Discharge piping must be adequately supported to handle reactive forces caused by the
opening of the safety device. Good engineering judgment is required to determine if piping
stress calculations are required.
• For a common header into which multiple relief devices discharge, the maximum
discharge rate must be determined from the combined discharges of the relief devices
feeding this header, taking into account the simultaneous opening of several devices due
to one contingency. For complex systems, expert assistance should be sought.
• If you need more than one safety relief valve in parallel, stagger the set pressures to avoid
chattering in partial load situations.
4.5 Pressure Safety Relief Valves for Steam Generation
Note: Please refer to Ref 6.1.5 Section 1, Part PG, Paragraph 67 & 68 for details on the design and
installation of relief devices for steam generation equipment.
Each state’s Boiler Code should also be reviewed for any additional requirements.
• Each boiler shall have at least one safety valve. If the bare tube surface is more than 500 sq. ft. or if the
electric heater power input is more than 1,100 kW than it shall have two or more safety valves. For a boiler
with combined bare tube and extended (fined) area of more than 500 sq. ft. two safety valves are required
only if the design steam generating capacity exceeds 4,000 lb/hr
• The allowable overpressure is 6% above the MAWP of the boiler. The safety valves should be sized such
that the maximum pressure reached is no more than 6% above the highest set pressure.
• The valve capacity of the safety valves shall not be less than the maximum designed steaming capacity at
the MAWP of the boiler.
• Any economizer that may be shutoff from the boiler shall have one or more safety relief valves with a total
discharge capacity in lbs/hr of the maximum expected absorption rate in BTU/hr divided by 1,000.
• One or more safety valves on the boiler proper shall be set at or below the MAWP. If additional valves are
used the highest set pressure shall be no more than 3% above the MAWP. The complete range of set
pressures for all safety valves shall not exceed 10% of the highest set pressure.
• Special requirements apply to a forced-flow steam generator with no fixed steam and waterline. See
ASME, Section 1, Part PG, Paragraph 67.4
• Attached superheaters shall have one or more safety valves in the steam flow path between the
superheater outlet and the first valve.
• Safety valves on the superheater may be included in determining the number and size of the safety valves
on the boiler, provided there are no intervening valves and that the safety valve or valves on the boiler
proper are at least 75% of the aggregate capacity required.
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• The capacity of superheated steam through a relief valve shall be calculated by multiplying the saturated
steam capacity by the superheated correction factor from ASME, Section 1, Table PG-68.7
4.6 Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks
4.6.1 Normal Venting

Normal venting requirements are derived from:
• Inbreathing due to maximum outflow of liquid from the tank.
• Inbreathing due to contraction of vapors caused by maximum decrease in atmospheric temperature.
• Outbreathing due to maximum inflow of liquid into the tank.
• Outbreathing due to expansion and evaporation caused by maximum increase in atmospheric temperature
(thermal breathing).
4.6.1.1 Inbreathing
a) Inbreathing due to liquid movement:
The venting capacity requirement is 560 standard cubic feet of free air per hour for each 100 barrels (4200
gallons) per hour of maximum emptying rate.
b) Inbreathing due to contraction of vapors
The venting capacity requirement for thermal inbreathing is given in Ref 6.1.4,Table 1.
Note that this table does not account for any condensation that may occur in the vapor space. Additional
inbreathing capacity should be allowed for if any condensation is expected.
4.6.1.2 Outbreathing
a) Outbreathing due to liquid movement.
The venting capacity requirement is 600 standard cubic feet of free air per hour for each 100 barrels per hour
of maximum filling rate for liquid with a flash point of 100°F and above.
For liquids with a flash point below 100°F or a normal boiling point less than 300°F, venting capacity is 1200
standard cubic feet of free air per hour for each 100 barrels per hour of maximum filling rate.
Note: This venting rate of 1200 SCFH air per 100 barrels per hour of liquid charge rate was calculated based
on an assumed evaporation rate of 0.5%. In the case of liquids being charged to the storage tank at or near the
boiling point, evaporation rates can be substantially higher than this and should be accounted for in
determining the required vent capacity.
b) Out breathing due to vapor expansion.
The venting capacity requirement for thermal outbreathing is given in Ref 6.1.4 Table 1.
4.6.2 Emergency Venting

When storage tanks are exposed to fire, the venting rate may exceed the rate resulting from a combination of
normal thermal effects and the movement of liquid. For these cases, the construction of the tank will determine
whether additional venting capacity must be provided.
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It should be noted that NFPA 30 requires that all aboveground storage tanks have some form of construction
or device that will relieve excessive pressure caused by external fire. This requirement applies to each
compartment of a compartmented tank, the interstitial space (annulus) of a secondary containment-type tank,
and the enclosed space of tanks of closed-top dike construction.
The one exemption allowed by NFPA 30 to the above requirement is for tanks that satisfy the following;
• Closed cup Flash point of stored liquid greater than 200 F
• Storage capacity greater than 11,970 gallons
• Storage tank not within the diked area or drainage path of any liquid with a flash point less than 140
F.
4.6.2.1 Tanks With Weak Roof-to-Shell Attachment

If large tank has a weak roof-to-shell attachment, as described in the "Roof Design" section of API Standard
650, "Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage"(i.e. a single fillet weld less than 3/16" wide, and limitations on the
roof slope at the top angle attachment, as well as limits on the compression ring details and cross-sectional
area of the shell-roof junction), the weld will fracture under emergency conditions. The whole roof of the tank
will then lift to relieve the overpressure.
These types of tanks satisfy the requirements of the construction referred to in NFPA 30, an emergency vent is
not required.
4.6.2.2 Tanks Without Weak Roof-to-Shell Attachment
For tanks designed for pressures of 1 psig or below, the venting requirements are given in Ref 6.1.6 Table
4.2.5.2.3. For these design pressures, no additional venting is required for tanks with more than 2800 square
feet of wetted surface area.
For tanks designed for pressures over 1 psig, the total rate of venting is given in Ref 6.1.6 Tables 4.2.5.2.3. &
4.2.5.2.4. The venting requirements for the tanks that have wetted surface area greater than 2800 square feet
are given in Table 4.2.5.2.4. These are determined from the following formula:
CFH = 1107 A0.82
where
CFH = Venting requirement, in cubic feet of free air per hour

A = Exposed wetted surface, in square feet
4.6.2.3 Venting Requirements for Specific Liquids
The total requirements from the Tables referenced above are based on the assumption that the stored liquid
will have the characteristics of hexane. This will provide results within an acceptable degree of accuracy for
most liquids. For some specific liquids, these may be quite conservative. The standard values may be readily
corrected for the properties of any specific liquid as follows:
T
1337
Cubic feet of free air per hour = V 520
L M
where
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V = cubic feet of free air per hour from Table 4.2.5.2.3

L = latent heat of vaporization of the specific liquid, Btu/lb
M = molecular weight of the specific liquid
T = temperature of the relief vapor, °R
4.6.3 Alternative Vent Requirement Determination for External Fire
As an alternative to the tables and methods described in sections 4.6.2.2 & 4.6.2.3 above, the required venting
capacity for a storage tank subjected to external fire can be determined by the methods indicated in API 2000
as follows:
A. Calculate fire heat flux as a function of wetted area:
QF = Fα A β
where
QF = Heat flux due to fire (Btu/hr)
F = Environmental credit factor (see section 4.7.1.3 below)
A = Wetted surface area (ft2) (see section 4.7.1.2.5 below)
α, β = Coefficients given in Table 4.6.3-1 below
Wetted Surface Area Design Pressure α β

ft2 Psig
< 200 All 20,000 1
> 200 and < 1000 All 199,300 0.566
> 1000 and < 2800 All 963,400 0.338
> 2800 >1 21,000 0.82
>2800 <1 14,090,000 0
Table 4.6.3-1 Coefficients for Calculation of Heat Flux from External Fire
B. Determine the required vent capacity:
QF
qm =
λ
where
qm = Required vent rate of vapor, lb/hr

λ = Heat of vaporization of stored liquid, Btu/lb
C. Finally, convert the required vent capacity above to SCFH of air:
⎛ q ⎞ ⎛ M ⎞⎛ T ⎞
SCFH air = ⎜ 379.52 m ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ M ⎠ ⎝ 28.8 ⎠⎝ 520 ⎠
where
qm = Required vent rate of vapor calculated in 4.7.1.2.4(b), lb/hr

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M = Molecular weight of vapor

T = Relieving temperature of vapor, degree R
D. Wetted Surface Area
To determine the wetted surface area of a tank for calculating heat input from fire exposure, the following
guidelines should be followed:
For a sphere or spheroid, the wetted surface area is equal to 55% of the total surface area or the surface area
to a height of 30 ft above grade, whichever is greater.
For a horizontal tank, the wetter area is equal to 75% of the total surface area to a height of 30 ft above grade,
whichever is greater.
For a vertical storage tank, the wetted area is equal to the total surface area of the vertical shell to a height of
30 ft above grade. For a vertical tank setting on the ground, the area of the bottom plates need not be included.
For a vertical tank supported above grade, the area of the bottom is to be included as wetted surface area.
4.6.4 Credit Factors
When additional protection is provided, a reduction in the emergency relief size can be obtained by multiplying
the required air flowrate by the appropriate factor. Only one factor may be used for any tank.
A. 0.5 for adequate drainage facilities if all of the following conditions are met:
• The area has at least 1% slope away from the tank for about 50 feet toward the impounding area
• Wetted surface area of tank is greater than 200 ft2
• Capacity of impounding area is greater than the capacity of the largest tank which can drain into it
B. 0.3 for approved insulation exposure if all the following conditions are met:
• Remain in place under fire exposure conditions
• Withstand dislodgment when subjected to hose stream impingement
• Maintain a maximum conductance of 4.0 Btu/hr/ft2/°F when the outer insulation jacket or cover is at a
temperature of 1660°F and when the mean temperature of the insulation is 1000°F
It should be noted that many standard tank insulation materials do not meet these guidelines. Sound
engineering judgment should be used before applying this credit.
A. 0.3 for approved water spray installations per NFPA 15 and adequate drainage as specified in 7.1.3(a)
above
B. 0.15 for approved water spray with insulation and adequate drainage
At BASF facilities, however, no credit factor is taken for water spray due to the unreliability of water supply in
emergency conditions unless reliability of the water supply is specifically evaluated and documented by the
PHA team.
4.6.5 Maximum Allowable Pressure While Venting
To determine the maximum allowable pressure during a vent excursion (which can also affect the required size
of the vent), the code to which the storage tank is designed should be first consulted. Two cases, API 650 and
API 620 are discussed here.
API 650 Storage Tanks (Pressure)

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For tanks designed for internal pressure according to Appendix F of API 650, the maximum pressure during
venting cannot exceed the design pressure of the vessel. This generally means that, unlike ASME pressure
vessels, the set pressure of the venting device needs to be lower than the design pressure of the tank.
API 650 Storage Tanks (Vacuum)
The API 650 standard does not contain provisions for tanks subject to internal vacuum. However, tanks
designed to this standard can be subjected to a partial vacuum of 1" H2O.
As environmental standards have dictated that in certain cases, conservation vents be placed on tanks that
were originally designed to be free breathing, this minimum pressure has to be considered. In cases where this
minimum vacuum of 1" H2O is not feasible, a qualified re-rating of the tank per API 653 can be applied.
API 620 Storage Tanks (Pressure)
For non fire cases, the maximum allowable overpressure for tanks designed to the API 620 guidelines is 10%
of set pressure.
For external fire scenario, the maximum allowable overpressure is 20% of set pressure.
API 620 Storage Tanks (Vacuum)
For tanks with vacuum ratings assigned per API 620, the setting of any vacuum relief needs to be such that the
partial vacuum attained in the tank at the maximum inflow rate does not exceed the partial vacuum rating of the
tank. (i.e. no overvacuum allowed)
Example
A non-insulated vertical storage tank of diameter 30' and height 40' contains o-xylene. The tank is designed
per API 620 and has a design pressure of 5 psig and a design vacuum of 6" H2O. Tank is set on the ground
with flat bottom head and toriospherical top head.
The maximum rate at which o-xylene can be charged to the tank is 1000 gpm, and the maximum pump rate
out of the tank is 850 gpm. What is the required capacity in SCFH of air of the tank conservation vent for (a)
Normal outbreathing and inbreathing, (b) External Fire?
Outbreathing:
The flash point of o-xylene is 90oF, and hence the required capacity for liquid movement is 1200 SCFH of air
per 100 barrels per hour charge rate.
Maximum charge rate = 1000 gpm
Therefore, liquid movement requires 1200 * (1000*60 / (42*100)) = 17143 SCFH air
The capacity of the tank (including top head) is 227,872 gallons. Hence, interpolating from the Outbreathing
Table gives a required outbreathing rate of 5425 SCFH air.
Hence, required vent capacity for outbreathing is 22,568 SCFH of air.
Inbreathing:
The maximum pump out rate from the storage tank is 850 gpm. The required inbreathing rate due to liquid
movement is 560 SCFH per 100 barrels per hour pump out.
Therefore, liquid movement requires 560 * (850 * 60 / (42 * 100)) = 6800 SCFH air.
The capacity of the tank is 227,872 gallons. Interpolating from Inbreathing Table again, gives the required
thermal inbreathing capacity of 5425 SCFH air.
Hence, required vent capacity for inbreathing is 12,225 SCFH of air.
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External Fire:
As the tank is set on the ground, the area of the bottom surface is not included in calculation of the wetted
surface area.. Using the height for flame impingement of 30 ft., the wetted surface area is π * 30 * 30 = 2827
ft2.
From Table 4, noting that A > 2800 ft2 and design pressure > 1 psig, α = 21000 and β = 0.82.
No environmental credit is taken, and hence F = 1.0.
Therefore QF = 21000 * 28270.82 = 14.2 x 106 Btu/hr.
Heat of vaporization of 0-xylene at 6 psig (MAWP of 5 psig + 20% over-pressure) = 145.2 Btu/lb, and hence
required vent rate due to external fire = 14.2 x 106 / 145.2 = 97,796 lb/hr.
Finally, from equation in section 7.1.2.4 (c),
SCFH air = 379.52 * (97796 / 106.17) * Sqrt((106.17 / 28.8) * (775.56 / 520)) = 819,719 SCFH air
4.7 Flame / Detonation Arresters
A flame arrester is a device that prevents the transmission of a flame through a flammable gas/air mixture by
quenching the flame on the surfaces of an array of small passages. The outlet gases are sufficiently cooled to
prevent ignition on the protected side. Flame arresters are generally used in stand-alone tank applications to
protect a single tank from an external flame traveling back through the tank’s atmospheric vent and igniting a
flammable vapor-air mixture inside the vapor space.
A flame arrester can only be expected to provide protection when it is properly applied. Extra care should be
taken during the design phase whenever a flame arrester is used in a closed venting system. Generally
speaking, a detonation arrester is required for closed, complex venting systems.
A detonation arrester is similar to a flame arrester in that it prevents the transmission of a flame front. The
difference is that a detonation arrester is designed to withstand the extreme pressures encountered during a
detonation. Detonation arresters are generally used in manifold vent systems where several vents are tied
together.
4.7.1 Applications
Flame / detonation arresters should be applied to situations where a potential ignition source should be
isolated from a potential fuel source. The fuel source is generally an atmospheric storage tank. Other
applications could be protecting a piping system from a ignition source (e.g. flare, thermal oxidizer) and
protecting pressure vessels during PSV releases. Two atmospheric tank systems are discussed below:
4.7.1.1 Stand Alone Tank System
In a stand alone tank system the vents from the tank are isolated from other vents and are vented directly to
the atmosphere. This type of tank system can be protected against external ignition sources by a conservation
vent and/or a flame arrester. The intended function of either device is to prevent the ‘”flash back” of an
unconfined, external deflagration into the tank vapor space.
API standards allow the use of conservation vents (PVRV) without flame arresters on the basis that the high
vapor velocity in the narrow gap between pressure pallet and valve body will prevent flashback. Of course, a
missing or stuck open pallet will remove this protection.
The use of an in-line arrester used together with a conservation vent is generally unnecessary and not
recommended. Using both devices in series should be carefully considered. The advantage of the flame
arrestor is protection in the event of a highly unlikely ignition source (lightning strike) occurring at the same
time as a conservation vent malfunction. The disadvantage is the potential for the flame arrester to become
plugged which could compromise the venting system.
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Stand Alone Stand Alone Stand Alone

Stand Alone
Tank System Tank System Tank System
Tank System
Protected with Protected with Protected with In-
Unprotected
End-of-Line Conservation Line Flame Arrester
Flame Arrester Vent and Conservation
Vent in Series
(Not Recommended)
Figure 4.7.1-1 Stand Alone Tank System
4.7.1.2 Closed or Manifold Tank System

In a closed vapor collection system, all vapors are collected and diverted to some other process area
(scrubber, flare, etc.). Manifold systems are closed systems with multiple tanks connected together with
common piping.
The piping of a closed system is generally longer and more complex than with a stand alone system. This
creates the potential for detonations because in a relatively short distance within a pipe, a confined deflagration
can accelerate into a detonation. For this reason, Detonation arresters are almost always required in a
closed or manifold tank system. Detonation arresters are typically used in conjunction with other measures
to decrease the risk of flame propagation. For example, the collected vapors are often enriched, diluted, or
inerted to prevent an explosive atmosphere.
Using in-line flame (or deflagration) arresters in a closed or manifold system is only possible in very limited,
specific circumstances where it is impossible for the gas/vapor mixture to create a detonation. Generally, such
an application requires assistance from an expert and very good flammability/detonation data.
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Pipeline to Destruction Unit
Destruction Unit
Closed, Manifold System (scrubber, flare,
Unprotected thermal oxidizer, etc.)
Pipeline to Destruction Unit
Destruction Unit
(scrubber, flare,
Closed, Manifold System thermal oxidizer, etc.)
Protected with
Detonation Arresters
Figure 4.7.1.2-1 Closed, Manifold System
4.7.2 Sizing Criteria for Flame / Detonation Arresters
Some preliminary considerations for arrester selection and placement:
A. Identify the at-risk equipment and the potential ignition sources in the system to determine where
arresters should be placed and what general type (flame or detonation) are needed.
B. Determine the gas mixture composition, flowrates (worst-case), system pressure, permissible pressure
drop, and fouling potential of the material. This information is important when selecting the element (or
internals) of the arrester. This information should be clearly communicated to the arrester vendor.
Consider all upset conditions. These include excursions of explosive mixture composition as well as
pressure, temperature, and flowrate.
C. The possibility of a stationary flame residing on the arrester element surface (known as an “endurance
burn”) should be evaluated. The need for additional safeguards should also be evaluated. (see
Instrumentation below).
D. Consider any material of construction limitations due to reactive or corrosive stream components.
E. Consider the type and location of the arrester with respect to ease of maintenance, particularly for
large arresters.
4.7.2.1 Element Selection
Typically the arrester vendor will be best able to properly select the element design. It is important to provide
them with a list of components that could be present in the stream and the range of possible concentrations.
The element length and size of openings are determined by the maximum experimental safe gap (MESG*) of
the worst-case mixture. The National Electrical Code (NEC) Groupings can be used as a qualitative ranking of
MESGs. Group A chemicals have the shortest MESGs, and systems with these chemicals are the most difficult
to protect for flame / detonation propagation. Flame / detonation arresters are typically tested and rated for a
particular Group. Group C and D detonation arresters are readily available. Higher groups may require
additional testing and expert advice.
*The MESG is the maximum clearance permissible, between flanges of a standardized test apparatus,
that still prevents the propagation of an explosion from within the apparatus to the outside atmosphere.
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Group A
Acetylene
Group B
Butadiene
Ethylene oxide
Hydrogen
(or gases containing >30% hydrogen by vol)
Propylene oxide
Group C
Acetaldehyde
Cyclopropane
Diethyl ether
Ethylene
Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine
Group D
Acetone
Acrylonitrile
Benzene
Butane
1-butyl alcohol
2-butyl alcohol
ethane
ethanol
ethyl acetate
ethylene dichloride
gasoline
heptanes
hexanes
isoprene
methane (natural gas)
methanol
3-methyl-1-butanol
methyl isobutyl ketone
2-methyl-1-propanol
2-methyl-2-propanol
petroleum naptha
octanes
pentanes
1-pentanol
propane
1-propanol
2-propanol
propylene
styrene
toluene
vinyl acetate
vinyl chloride
xylenes
Table 4.7.2.1-1 Partial List of NEC Chemical Groups
4.7.2.2 Arrester Flow / Pressure Drop Sizing
A flame / detonation arrester must be sized properly for the allowable pressure drop and required flowrates of
the system. The manufacturer should have certified curves available plotting flow capacity vs. pressure drop
for different size/type arresters. It is generally good practice to provide at least a 20% fouling factor in capacity
for a stream where the presence of liquids, frozen solids, particulates, or polymers is possible.
If using a flame arrester in series with a conservation vent, the devices’ capacity should be derated by a certain
percentage.
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4.7.2.3 Instrumentation
In systems with a fouling potential it is good practice to provide a pressure differential indicator with alarm
function (field or DCS). In any system, a field pressure differential indicator can be a useful troubleshooting
tool.
In systems where a deflagration or detonation is likely (e.g. a system where an explosive atmosphere is known
to be present), it is good practice to provide a temperature indicator with alarm function to monitor the
unprotected side of the arrester. An emergency quench or inerting system tied to this temperature may also be
required. In many explosive systems a phenomenon known as an “endurance burn” is possible. This occurs
when a flame front becomes stable on the face of the arrester element, and given sufficient time the flame will
propagate through the arrester (and possibly damage the element). The temperature indicator/alarm should
provide a warning that this is occurring and allow corrective action to be taken.
4.7.2.4 Piping Design
To ensure that a detonation is not possible, an In-line flame arrester should typically be no more than 20 ft of
straight pipe from end-of-line. Any fittings, valves, or other flow obstructions will significantly decrease this
effective length. Given the uncertainty involved in predicting the safe length, an end-of-line arrester is generally
preferred unless the outlet pipe is extremely short (2-3 ft).
A detonation arrester should be placed as close as feasible to the equipment it is protecting. Consideration
should be given to providing arresters to protect long piping systems and destruction units.
The arrester should be accessible for maintenance and easy to de-install. BASF Policy requires a regular
inspection program including a visual inspection of the element. Provisions for drainage of liquids away from
the arrester should also be considered.
Sources: Perry’s Chemical Engineers’ Handbook. 7th Edition, 1997. Protectoseal Flame & Detonation
Arresters Bulletin No. V-350, 1991. BASF Process Safety Fundamental Seminar Materials, 2003
4.8 PSV – Calc Program

The template is designed to provide a standard format for calculating and presenting the emergency relief
device calculations. It applies to unfired pressure vessels and storage tanks that have a maximum allowable
working pressure of 15 psig or greater. It can also calculate the vent relief rate for low pressure or atmospheric
storage tanks. This template is meant to address problems of a general nature. While it does a thorough job
in covering common relief scenarios, be reminded that it can’t cover all possible scenarios, such as
unexpected mistakes or changes in the operating procedure. Designers are encouraged to use their judgment
in evaluating the process.
This template is meant for BASF use only. Users need to be thoroughly familiar with (1) the process
equipment design, (2) the operating procedures, (3) the particular materials and (4) relief system design
principles. It is only as good as the data that is input into it, therefore, carefully determine the scenario inputs.
The relief device sizing methods comply with NFPA-30 (1990), OSHA 1910-106, API-520 (2000) and API-2000
(1992). The equations for sizing the relief area are from API-520. The heat flux for a fire case is from API-520
or NFPA-30.
The spreadsheet is meant for single vessels with a single PSV or PSE, or a combination PSV/PSE.
4.8.1 Key Items
• For proper values of the coefficient of discharge (Kd), refer to valve manufacturer's sizing instructions.
Typically, Kd is 0.975 for vapors and gases and 0.65 for liquids.
• This version of the spreadsheet does not calculate the backpressure correction factor, Kb, for balanced
bellows relief valves but uses a Kb equal to one. This is the same as for conventional valves. For high
built-up backpressures, the Kb can be included as part of the Kd value to perform the calculations (Kd value
entered = Kd*Kb). The correction factor "Kb" should be obtained from the manufacturer. The spreadsheet
also does not include the capacity correction factor, Kw, for balanced bellows valves in liquid service. The
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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value of Kw obtained from a manufacturer can be included in the Kd value to perform the calculations (Kd
value entered = Kd*Kw).
• Pilot operated valves are not handled with this spreadsheet.
• When you need to do more than one scenario of the same case (e.g. several fire case calculations for
different materials), a new workbook for that particular scenario calculation will have to be created for each
case.
• The relief valve set pressure is typically less than or equal to the vessel's MAWP. The set pressure can be
greater than the MAWP when additional valves are installed. (See API-520 section 4.) Multiple relief
devices are not handled with this spreadsheet.
• Macros are used to help with hiding unused calculation sheets, inputting default values and running
iterative calculations.
4.8.2 How to Use the Template
The cells that are a shaded a light green are where data can be entered. Cells that are colored light yellow are
calculated values and are locked. All other cells are also locked to avoid inadvertent changes. You can make
changes to these protected parts of the workbook, since a password is not required to unprotect the
worksheets or the workbook. All input information is located on the first page of each sheet, and there is a
comment section at the bottom of the first page of each sheet. The detailed calculations appear after the
comments on the first sheet. The important results are returned on the "Summary" or "Additional Scenarios"
worksheets.
It is suggested that data is entered first on the "Equipment Data," "Safety Device Data," and the "Vent & Inlet
Pipe Data" sheets. This general data is used for all scenarios. The "Title" sheet can then be filled out with the
Project No., Project Title and Location information. Next the "Revision History" can be updated. Once this
information is complete then the desired scenarios can be selected from the "Summary" and "Additional
Scenarios" sheets.
The template is made up of the four types of pages, as shown below.
I. Calculation Summaries (2 pages)

Summary
Additional Scenarios
II. Input Pages:
Equipment Data
Safety Device Data
Vent & Inlet Pipe Data
III. Scenario Assumptions and Calculations:
Case #1:· Fire Case
Case #2:· Overfill/Blocked Equipment Case
Case #3:· Water Coil Failure Case
Case #4:· Regulator or Valve Failure Case
Case #5:· Thermal Expansion Case
Case #6:· Conservation Vent
Case #7:· Steam Coil Failure Case
Case #8:· Unwetted Fire Case
Case #9:· Custom Calculations
IV. Backup Information:
Title/Review
Revision History
Sizing Methodology
Kv Sizing Factors
Superheat Correction Factor
PRV Orifice Letters
Roughness Coefficient
OSHA Table H-10
Orifice Flow Factor
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Glossary
Template Instructions
4.8.2.1 Description of Worksheets
The "Summary" and "Additional Scenarios" sheets contain results of the important calculations performed
on the individual scenario sheets. Also summarized are the valve and equipment specifications.
The “Summary” worksheet summarizes the main calculations, showing the highlights of each relieving
scenario. General information is shown at the top of the page. Other worksheets are hidden until selected to
be displayed on the "Summary" worksheet.
The “Additional Scenarios” page is for any additional comments or discussion, and documents any other
scenarios such as the "Unwetted Fire Case."
The “Equipment Data” page shows the geometry and design specifications of the equipment. If the
equipment is a vessel, then additional information is needed to perform the calculations for the fire cases and
the conservation vent case. The MAWP is required input for all equipment.
In the "Safety Device Data" worksheet, relief valve and rupture disk data is entered.
The set pressure of the relief device is required to perform the calculations. It cannot exceed the
MAWP for the equipment for a single relief device.
"PSE Derating Factor" or the combination factor Kc is 0.90 by default. Derating factors of 0.95-0.98
are common when the rupture disk manufacturer has tested the disk with the particular relief valve.
Combination factors for several different valves and rupture disks can be found in the National Board
of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors Red Book (NB-18).
(www.nationalboard.org/Redbook/redbook.html)
The relieving pressure (accumulated pressure) can be calculated based upon the MAWP, the set
pressure or input directly by the user. This pressure cannot be more than the maximum allowable
relieving pressure that is based on the MAWP of the vessel. The relieving pressure is the pressure
that is used to perform the sizing and rating calculations.
When calculating the required relief area, the coefficient of discharge is can be obtained from valve
manufacturer, or you can use API-520's standard values, which are as follows: 0.975 for air, steam,
vapors & gases; and 0.65 for liquids. The National Board "Red Book" also contains certified discharge
coefficients for many valves.
For rupture disks, a flow resistance coefficient is used to calculate the maximum flow through the
rupture disk and the associated vent piping. The rupture disk flow resistance, KR, may be obtained
from the disk manufacturer or you can use the API-520 standard value of 1.5. The KR may also be
obtained from the National Board "Red Book." The sizing calculations are not performed when a
rupture disk only system (PSE only) is selected.
If the area of the installed device is left blank, then all calculations based on the installed device are
disabled.
The "Vent&Inlet Pipe Data" worksheet is used for inputting the information on the size and type of piping and
fittings on the inlet and vent piping for the PRD. A diameter of the piping is required to perform pressure drop
calculations. Selecting a pipe type of "N/A" will disable all pressure drop calculations for that pipe. At this time
only one size of pipe is allowed. If calculations for a PSE (rupture disk) are to be made, then only the vent pipe
information is unlocked and the rupture disk is considered part of the vent line. An exit pipe "fitting" should only
be used for a liquid discharging below the surface of a liquid in a tank or reservoir. It should not be entered for
any gas or liquid discharging into the atmosphere or a very large pipe above a liquid surface.
4.8.2.2 Description of Scenarios

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The "Fire" scenario uses the dimensions from the "Equipment Data" worksheet to calculate the wetted area
or the value may be input directly by the user. A user input value overrides the calculated value. The required
input is the molecular weight of the vapor, the temperature at the relieving pressure, the heat of vaporization at
the relieving pressure, the ratio of the specific heats (Cp/Cv), the vapor viscosity and the compressibility factor
at the relieving conditions.
The equation for calculating the heat input through the vessel wall changes, depending on the size of
the wetted area. When the API-520 equation is chosen for calculating heat input, one of two equations
is used, depending on whether there is adequate drainage and fire-fighting equipment. (See the table
titled "The Equation for Heat Absorbed by Vessel" at the bottom of the calculations.")
Note: 21% is the standard over pressure percentage for the fire case.
When the fire case is done for low pressure storage tanks, API-2000 is used to calculate the venting
requirements based on an equivalent amount of air. Use the low pressure storage tank option when a
conservation vent type of relief device has been specified. This will not require a Kd value for the relief
device.
When the process fluid is steam, the general API-520 equation for steam is used, shown as equation 3
in the calculations.
The "Overfill/Blocked" scenario is used when a liquid is filling a vessel and the vent line is blocked or if the
discharge of a pump is blocked. For gases use the "Regulator or Valve Failure" scenario. The required input is
the flow rate (GPM), the specific gravity and the viscosity.
In the two scenarios, "Water Coil Failure" and "Steam Coil Failure" , the flow rate through a hole in a coil is
calculated. The required input is the diameter of the pipe and the diameter of the hole in the pipe. The
resistance coefficient "C" for flow through an orifice from the Crane handbook is also required input. If the hole
and pipe diameters are the same then use a "C" value of 1. The pressure in the coil and the temperature of the
water also need to be input. The case with steam through coil failure requires the input of a "Net expansion
factor for compressible flow", which can be looked up in the "Orifice Flow Factor" worksheet. Note there are
two graphs; one for a ratio of heat capacities of 1.3 and the other for a ratio of 1.4. Note: The "Steam Coil
Failure" worksheet is not currently active.
The "Regulator or Valve Failure" scenario provides for several types of flow equations and fluids. After
selecting the type of fluid and flow coefficients to be used, macros disable cells not requiring data.
Since different vendors typically have different equations for estimating the flow rate through their valves or
regulators, instead of calculating the flow rate using the equations in the worksheet, a flow rate can be
specified in the inputs. The regulator or valve flow equations included in the spreadsheet include:
• an equation for critical flow through the regulator or valve, not the relief valve, using a Cg value,
• an equation for subcritical flow through the regulator or valve using a Cv value,
• an equation for critical saturated steam flow through the regulator or valve using a Cs value,
• the Fisher universal gas flow equation using Cg and C1 (=Cg/Cv),
• the Fisher universal gas flow equation for saturated steam using Cs and C1 (=Cg/Cv),
• the ISA compressible fluid equation using Cv and xT,
• an equation for liquid flow using Cv.
Of these equations, the ISA compressible fluid equation is recommended since it uses the compressibility
factor, Z, at the regulator or valve upstream conditions for any compressible fluid and the xT factor correctly
accounts for critical flow in the particular valve.
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The Fisher universal gas flow equation is meant for ideal gases. At high pressure drop ratios (ΔP/Pin > 0.6),
this equation gives almost the same results as the critical flow equation with only Cg. The pressure drop ratio
must be less than 0.02 for the subcritical equation with Cv to give the same results as the Fisher equation. The
Fisher steam equation is to be used only for saturated steam.
When using a flow equation the upstream and downstream pressures are required. For the downstream
pressure use the relieving pressure unless you calculate the pressure drop in the line connecting the valve to
the vessel and adjust the valve downstream pressure accordingly.
The "Thermal Expansion" scenario is an overpressure when liquid is blocked in between two valves and heat
input is from heat exchangers, fire or ambient warming. The relieving temperature is not the temperature of the
material if the relieving pressure is assumed to be the vapor pressure. Since most liquids are rather
incompressible, the relieving or overflow temperature will typically be less than 100°F above the normal
operating temperature. In most cases for thermal relief the required relief area is little changed depending on
the relieving temperature. According to ASME Section VIII part UG-128, any liquid relief valves must be at
least NPS ½ and therefore the actual orifice area is typically 10 to 100 times larger than what is required.
Extensive calculations to determine an exact relieving temperature based on liquid compressibility are usually
not required. The cubical expansion coefficient can be estimated given two specific gravity values near the
relieving temperature. (Adapted from API RP-520 Part 1 - Design.)
The "Conservation Vent" scenario calculates the breathing requirements of a storage tank based on thermal
inbreathing/outbreathing and pumping fluids or gases into and out of the tank. This is based on API-2000.
The "Unwetted Fire Case" scenario calculates the venting requirements of an empty tank under fire
conditions. The tank dimensions are entered on the "Equipment Data" sheet. The normal operating
temperature and pressure of the empty tank are also required. The wall temperature of the vessel under fire
conditions is another input value. For carbon steel a value of 1100°F is recommended.
4.8.2.3 Description of Data Sheets
Equipment Data
This sheet contains information on the equipment being protected. The only required input for all scenarios is
the MAWP for the equipment. If this is a vessel then information on the size and orientation of the vessel is
also required. This additional information is only used for the fire cases and the conservation vent case.
Safety Device Data

The relief device set pressure is required. It cannot exceed the equipment MAWP. The relieving pressure can
be entered or based on the vessel MAWP or the device set pressure. The default value is based on the
MAWP. For the fire case, the maximum allowable overpressure is 21% of the MAWP. For all other cases it is
10% of the MAWP. The user entered relieving pressure cannot exceed this value.
The PSE derating factor or the combination factor is the loss of capacity of the relief valve if a rupture disk is
located at the entrance to the relief valve. The default value is 0.9. The National Board of Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Inspectors (NB) have published a "Red Book" that contains measured derating factors for many
different combinations of rupture disks and valves. These values should be used when they are available.
The type of valve can be selected from a list. For a conservation vent, only the flow rate is calculated. Sizing
calculations are suppressed. At this time balanced bellow valves are not handled with this spreadsheet. For
only a PSE, the maximum flow rate through the existing device is calculated.
If a value for an existing relief device area is entered, then besides relief valve sizing calculations, the
maximum flow rate through the device is calculated. If an existing device exists, then the discharge coefficient,
Kd, for gas and/or liquid service should be entered from the manufacturers value. For a PSE, the KR value
should be entered. The pressure drop for a PSE is based on this value on the "Vent & Inlet Pipe Data"
spreadsheet. The National Board "Red Book" contains an extensive list of Kd and KR factors.
Correction Factors
A. Viscosity Correction Factors
The correction factor due to viscosity (Kv) is calculated from a formula in API-520 (7th. ed.).
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 70
B. Expansion Factors for Nozzles & Orifices

The expansion factors (Y) for calculating the pressure drop of fluids through an nozzle or orifice are shown in
two graphs, for specific heat ratios (k) of 1.3 and 1.4.
C. Pipe Roughness
The pipe roughness values are used to calculate the pressure drop through the inlet and vent piping.
Standard Excel Features

Printing Calculations
The normal printing function works as expected. When you want to print a select number of sheets in the
workbook, hold down the <Ctrl> key, select the desired worksheets, and then print.
Attaching a File
To attach a file, pull down the 'Insert' menu and select 'Object...'. Then select 'Create as File' tab and click the
box labeled 'Display as Icon'. Then highlight the desired file and press the 'OK' button.
OSHA Air Capacity Requirements
For the fire case, OSHA 1910.106 requires relief valves have a minimum capacity of air flow, based on the
wetted area of the tank. The worksheet titled "OSHA Table H-10" shows these valve capacity requirements.
4.9 Guidelines for Two-Phase Flow Through Relief Devices

The purpose of these guidelines is to aid the design engineer in identifying relief devices that should be
evaluated for two-phase flow and to describe the general methods used to do so. It is not intended as a
comprehensive 'how-to' manual, and it is generally recommended that the appropriate safety experts be
consulted for the final design of devices intended to relieve two-phase flow.
4.9.1 Background & Models

Two-phase mixtures are used to refer to mixtures of liquid and gas (condensable or non-condensable) only.
The impact of suspended solids is not considered, although it should be noted that there is some experimental
evidence (McIntosh & Waldram, 2003) that the presence of suspended solids have little influence on the rates
of depressurization as long as the particle sizes involved are sufficiently small that vent blockage is not an
issue.
The two-phase relieving mixture can be made up of sub-cooled, saturated or superheated liquid, along with
condensable or non-condensable gas. The design basis for any relief device is that the rate of volume
generation must be less than the rate of volume vented at the maximum relieving pressure. The designer then
must answer the following questions:
• Is the system classified as reactive or non-reactive?

• What is the rate of volume generation?
• What is the composition of the gas and liquid in the vessel and at the entrance to the vent?
• Given the composition of the fluid entering the vent, what is the maximum volumetric rate of
venting?
4.9.2 Reactive or Non-Reactive Systems

This determination is of primary importance in the safety review of any chemical process. When evaluating all
possible upset scenarios for a process change or new process, the review team must determine if the scenario
has the potential to generate pressure due to chemical reaction. If this is the case, an approved testing group
must check the scenario experimentally.1 If the screening test, usually done with a calorimeter such as the
1
Approved testing groups within BASF include ACCE in North America and GCT/S in LU.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 71
DSC, DTA or RSST2, indicates that a reactive pressure generation scenario is credible, follow up testing in an
adiabatic calorimeter is required to determine the kinetics of the reaction. This kinetic data, along with the
physical properties of the mixture can then be used to calculate the maximum rate of volume generation due to
vaporization and/or gas generation.
The screening and design of a process for reactive hazards is a relatively complex subject and is outside the
scope of this guideline. However, it is a subject that everyone involved in safety reviews should be familiar
with. An excellent review can be found in " Guidelines for Chemical Reactivity Evaluation and Application to
Process Design" by CCPS, which can also be viewed at http://www.knovel.com.
4.9.3 Rate of volume generation

For non-reactive systems, the BASF Corp. Pressure Relief Guideline details the methods to determine the
worst case rate of volume generation. For example, the volumetric rate of vaporization due to an external fire is
given by,
• QF
V = (4.9.1)
ρvλ
For reactive systems, the rate of volume generation is determined from adiabatic calorimetery. To extract this
rate from the calorimeter data, the system has to first be classified as either:
• A vapor (or tempered) system, where there is no non-condensable gas formed by the reaction, and all
the heat generated by the reaction is removed by vaporization of a volatile liquid.
• A gassy system, where the liquid has negligible vapor pressure at relieving conditions, and all the
pressure generation comes from the non-condensable gas formed by the decomposition reaction.
• A hybrid system, where there is there is volume generation by both the vaporization of volatile liquids
and non-condensable gas formation.
For tempered systems with Arrhenius type kinetics of decomposition, there is an obvious advantage to having
a lower set pressure of the relief device, as the rate of reaction is explicitly determined by the saturation
temperature of the volatile liquid at the maximum relieving pressure,
• mq rxn
V = (4.9.2)
ρvλ
A recognized simplification (Leung, 1986), (Fisher, 1992), for tempered systems is to take the rate of reaction
as the linear average between the rate at the relief set point and the rate at the maximum relieving pressure,
1 ⎡⎛ dT ⎞ ⎛ dT ⎞ ⎤
q rxn = C v ⎢⎜ ⎟ +⎜ ⎟ ⎥ (4.9.3)
2 ⎣⎝ dt ⎠ s ⎝ dt ⎠ m ⎦
This simplification is only necessary for what the DIERS group refers to as analytical solutions to the two-
phase flow equations, and is not necessary if computer code is used to solve the full set of differential
equations representing the heat and mass balances.
For gassy systems, the rate of mass generation of non-condensable gas is simply scaled up from the adiabatic
calorimeter measurements,
2
Differential Screening Calorimeter, Differential Thermal Analyzer or Reactive System Screening Tool.
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
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• Vc M wg ⎛ dP ⎞
mg = ⎜ ⎟ / mt (4.9.4)
RT ⎝ dt ⎠ meas
Finally, for hybrid systems, the total volume generation is determined from combining equations (4.9.2) and
(4.9.4). The key in doing so is a priori knowledge of the vapor pressure curve of the system, so that the
condensable and non-condensable gas contributions to the pressure generation can be isolated.
4.9.4 Composition at Vent Entrance

Two phase flow through a relief device will occur when the bubbles formed from the relief scenario accumulate
in the liquid in a sufficient amount to cause the liquid to swell to the vent outlet. The mass fraction of liquid
reaching the vent is a function of the void fraction available in the vessel and the vapor disengagement that
can occur.
The extent that the vapor disengages from the liquid is quantified by applying standard drift-flux models. The
DIERS group recommends three different models, the choice of which is a function of the volume generation
scenario and the physical properties of the fluids. These are, in terms of increasing conservatism, the Churn-
Turbulent Vessel model, the Bubbly Vessel model and the Homogeneous Vessel model.
4.9.4.1 Churn-Turbulent Vessel Model

This model assumes uniform vapor generation throughout the liquid with significant vapor-liquid
disengagement in the vessel. The liquid phase is continuous with coalesced vapor regions of relatively large
size. The void fraction in the swelled liquid, α , is related to the dimensionless superficial velocity as follows;
j g∞ 2α
= (4.9.5)
U∞ 1 − C0 α
where U∞ is the characteristic bubble rise velocity, and is given by,
⎡ σg (ρ f − ρ g )⎤
0.25
U ∞ = 1.53⎢ ⎥ (4.9.6)
⎢⎣ ρ 2f ⎥⎦
The coefficient C0 is set to 1.5 for best fit to DIERS data and 1.0 for conservative designs.
4.9.4.2 Bubbly Vessel Model

This model assumes uniform vapor generation throughout the liquid, but with only limited vapor-liquid
disengagement in the vessel. The liquid phase is continuous with discrete bubbles. The void fraction in the
swelled liquid, α , is related to the dimensionless superficial velocity as follows,
j g∞ (
α 1−α )2
U∞
=
(1 − α )(1 − C α )
3
0
(4.9.7)
with the characteristic bubble rise velocity being given by,
⎡ σg (ρ f − ρ g )⎤
0.25
U ∞ = 1.18⎢ ⎥ (4.9.8)
⎣⎢ ρ 2f ⎦⎥
The coefficient C0 is set to 1.2 for best fit to DIERS data and 1.0 for conservative designs.
Both the Churn-turbulent and Bubbly vessel models then predict some two-phase flow if the void fraction in the
vessel, α (= 1 – Vliq / Vvessel) is greater than α.
The superficial gas velocity at the liquid surface, jg∞, is calculated as,
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 73
•
V
j g∞ = (4.9.9)
Ax
For vertical cylindrical vessels, the cross sectional area is simply πd2/4. For other geometric configurations, the
recommended similarity rules (CCPS, 1998), (Grolmes, 1995) are,
• Horizontal cylinder: Ax = πdL / 4
• Sphere: Ax = πd2/6
4.9.4.3 Homogeneous Vessel Model

This model assumes no vapor-liquid disengagement in the vessel, and hence is the most conservative of the
three as far as vent size is concerned, and the lack of assumed vapor-liquid disengagement implies that the
mass fraction of liquid entering the vent is the same as the mass fraction of liquid in the vessel.
4.9.4.4 Model Choice

There has been considerable debate as to what disengagement model to apply in different scenarios. This
guideline will address and make recommendations for some commonly encountered scenarios in subsequent
sections below.
The DIERS group used liquid viscosity and foaming tendency as the two variables to define system
boundaries, as summarized in Table 4.9.4.4-1.
Model Viscosity Tendency to foam

Churn-Turbulent < 100 cP NO
Bubbly > 100 cP NO
Homogeneous --- YES
Table 4.9.4.4-1 DIERS Recommendations for Disengagement Models
1.2
1
0.8 Churn-Turbulent C0=1.5
alpha
Churn-Turbulent C0=1.0
0.6 Bubbly C0=1.2
0.4 Bubbly C0=1.0
0.2
0
0.001 0.1 10 1000
j_g infin / U_infin
Figure 4.9.4.4-1: Two-Phase Flow Predicted Below Each Model Curve
4.9.4.5 Maximum Venting Rate

There are numerous calculation methods for two-phase flow in relief systems. This guideline recommends the
‘omega’ methods of Leung (1986, 1987, 1992) for this purpose. Those interested in an overview of the
methods available can find a good summary by Darby et al. (2001).
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 74
4.9.5 External Fire - Non-Reactive Liquid in Pressure Vessel

If a pressure vessel (MAWP >= 15 psig) containing non-reactive liquids is exposed to external fire for a
sufficient amount of time that the emergency relief device activates, there will quite likely be some two-phase
flow through the vent.
However, this guideline recommends that sizing the relief device for single phase vapor flow will provide
sufficient over-pressure protection for non-reactive systems in pressure vessels exposed to external fire.
This recommendation is consistent with the current consensus of the relief community. Theoretical
justifications (Simpson (2003) for example) are based on the fact that if a relief device is fully open at 10%
above the MAWP and the initial fill percentage of the vessel is such that two-phase flow will occur, that by the
time the pressure in the vessel reaches 121% of MAWP, a sufficient amount of liquid has been relieved that full
vapor disengagement will occur from that point forward, irregardless of the disengagement model.
However, it is also recommended that while the vent itself be designed for single phase vapor flow, that the
layout and design of the relief effluent system consider the consequences of initial two-phase flow for
environmental and safety impact.
4.9.6 External Fire - Non-Reactive Liquid in Low Pressure Storage Tank

This guideline’s recommendations for low pressure storage tanks exposed to external fire is similar to that for
pressure vessels, with one important caveat:
When the material in a low-pressure storage tank is known to be ‘non-foamy’, the required size of a relief
device for external fire should be based on all vapor flow using standard techniques as outlined in API 2000.
An analysis of the boundary layer, circulation velocities, vapor carry-under effect and measured liquid swell by
Fauske et al. (1986) presents a theoretical argument for the same conclusion above.
If the designer is unsure if the liquid can be categorized as non-foamy, it should be tested by the safety group
with an appropriate instrument such as a dual thermocouple ARSST or a VSP2 in blow-down configuration.
For low pressure storage tanks with liquids that fall into the ‘foamy’ category, the emergency vent should be
sized to accommodate two-phase flow, using for example the bubbly vessel model above with C0 = 1 for vapor-
liquid disengagement along with an appropriate vent flow model.
4.9.7 Reactive Decomposition / Runaway Reaction

If screening tests and adiabatic calorimetery identify a credible reactive relief scenario, it is recommended that
the relief device be sized for two-phase flow using the homogeneous vessel model and the HEM vent flow
model. If the runaway reaction at maximum rates can be shown to be non-foamy, the relief device can be sized
for vapor flow only if the minimum required disengagement height is maintained with a safety interlock.
For tempered systems, the venting reaction rate should be determined using equation (4.9.3) above.
For gassy systems, the assumption of homogeneous two-phase flow as soon as the relief device activates can
at times be non-conservative. Hence, the relief device should be sized for vapor only flow until the maximum
reaction rate is achieved and two-phase homogeneous flow from that point forward. In practice, this is
achieved by determining the gas generation rate using equation (4.9.4) above, using with the maximum
measured value of (dP/dt).
For hybrid systems, there is the same concern about assuming two-phase flow as soon as the relief device
activates, and therefore the device should also be sized assuming single-phase flow until the maximum rate is
achieved, and two-phase flow from that point forward. The primary difference in the two calculation methods is
that in some cases, the reaction rate for hybrid systems is at a maximum when the ‘tempering’ temperature is
reached. This ‘tempering’ temperature is the point at which evaporative heat removal becomes equal to the
reaction heat release (Leung, 1992), and can be determined by solving the following two equations
simultaneously;
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 75
⎛ • ⎞ ⎡
Pg ⎜ λm g ⎟ M wv ⎤
=⎜ ⎟ ⎢M ⎥ (4.9.10)
Pv ⎜ q rxn ⎟ ⎢⎣ wg ⎥⎦
⎝ ⎠T
Ps
Pv (T ) = (4.9.11)
Pg
1+
Pv
4.9.8 Long Term Storage Materials Prone to Decomposition

It is not uncommon to store materials, such as peroxides, that can decompose at elevated temperatures. In the
event that there are insufficient protective measures in place to prevent decomposition reaching runaway rates,
it is recommended that the vent and effluent handling system be designed for two-phase homogeneous flow.
The question then arises as to what is the minimum safe distance from the thermal onset temperature, T0. The
answer to this lies in the kinetics of the decomposition reaction and the available heat removal capability of the
storage system. Generally recommended is an adiabatic induction time of over 24 hours, which will allow a
potential runaway reaction to be detected and counter-measures taken.
The thermal explosion models of Semenov (1928), Frank-Kamenetskii (1969) and Fisher (1993) can be used
to determine the safe radius, critical temperature and self-accelerating decomposition temperature (or SADT),
of material in a storage vessel. These models are used in the ASTM E-1231 standard.
It is important to note that determining a maximum safe storage temperature using the methods referred to
above is not valid in the case of auto-catalytic or self-accelerating materials. Grewer (1994) has developed
some models for these materials, but the safety experts should deal them with on a case-by-case basis.
4.9.9 Two-Phase Flow Nomenclature
Ax cross sectional area for vapor disengagement, m2

(dT/dt)m rate of temperature rise at relieving pressure, K/s
(dT/dt)s rate of temperature rise at set pressure, K/s
Cv constant volume specific heat, J/kg-K
g gravitational constant, m/s2
jg∞ superficial vapor velocity, m/s
m mass of reactant, kg
mt mass of test sample, kg
Mwg molecular weight of gas
Mwv molecular weight of vapor
Pg partial pressure of gas, N/m2
Pv partial pressure of vapor, N/m2
Ps set pressure of relief device, N/m2
QF heat transfer due to external fire, W
qrxn specific reaction heat, W/kg
R gas constant
U∞ characteristic bubble rise velocity, m/s
•
V volume generation rate, m3/s
Vc freeboard volume in test apparatus, m3
α void fraction in swelled liquid
λ enthalpy of vaporization, J/kg
ρf density of liquid, kg/m3
ρv density of vapor, kg/m3
σ liquid surface tension, N/m
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 76
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
6. REFERENCES
6.1 Documents from other sources

Technical Standard, Pressure Protection System and Devices (not available at this time).
API - RP 520, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries, Part I and Part II.
API - RP 521, Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems.
API - Standard 2000, Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks.
ASME - Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section I and Section VIII.
NFPA 30, "Flammable and Combustible Liquids".
Industrial Risk Insurers(IRI) Information.
Code of Federal Regulations(OSHA) - Part 1910.
ANSI K61.1, "Safety Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia".
Anderson, Greenwood & Co.'s Pressure Relief Valve Seminar Handbook.
BASF Group Directive – SHE, Appendix 1 General Requirements, Part 1 Process Safety Strategy.
Bureau of Explosives Tariff No. BOE-6000-M,"Hazardous Materials Regulations of the Department of Transportation",
April, 1993
Rupture Pin Technology website, www.rupturepin.com
ASTM E-1231, "Standard Practice for Calculation of Hazard Potential Figures-of-Merit for Thermally Unstable
Materials', Am. Soc. for Testing & Materials.
CCPS, “Guidelines for Chemical Reactivity Evaluation and Application to Process Design.” Center for Chemical
Process Safety/AIChE, (1995).
CCPS, “Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems.” Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE,
(1998).
Darby, R., P.R. Meiller and J.R. Stockton, “Select the Best Model for Two-Phase Relief Sizing”, CEP, pp. 56-64, May
(2001).
Fauske, H.K., M. Epstein, M.A. Grolmes and J.C. Leung, “Emergency Relief Vent Sizing for Fire Emergencies Involving
Liquid-Filled Atmospheric Storage Tanks”, Plant/Operations Progress, 5, 4, pp. 205-208 (1986).
Fisher, H.G. et al., “Emergency Relief Design Using DIERS Technology”, The Design Institute for Emergency Relief
Systems (DIERS) Project Manual, ”, The Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems of the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers (1992).
Fisher, H.G. and D.D. Goetz, "Determination of self-accelerating decomposition temperatures for self-reactive
substances", J. of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol 6 (3), 183-19 (1993).
Frank-Kamenetskii, "Diffusion and Heat Transfer in Chemical Kinetics", 2nd ed., (1969).
Grewer, T., "Thermal Hazards of Chemical Reactions", Elsevier, (1994).
Grolmes, M.A., “Some Further Notes on the Subject of Vent Design for Liquid-Full Non-Reacting Systems”, DIERS
Users Group Meeting, Orlando, February (1995).
Leung, J.C., “Simplified Vent Sizing Equations for Emergency Relief Requirements in Reactors and Storage Vessels”,
AIChE. J., 32, 10, pp. 1622-1634 (1986).
Leung, J.C., “Overpressure During Emergency Relief Venting in Bubbly and Churn-Turbulent Flows"” AIChE. J., 33, 6,
pp. 952-958 (1987).
Leung, J.C., “Venting of Runaway Reactions with Gas Generation” AIChE. J., 38, 5, pp. 723-732 (1992).
McIntosh, D. & S. Waldram, "Reactor pressure relief of fluids containing suspended solids". Research Report 085,
Health and Safety Executive. (2003).
N-G-HE 200 Aug 2006
Page 77
Semenov, N.N., Zhur. Physik, 48, 571, (1928)

Simpson, L.L, “Fire exposure of liquid-filled vessels”, Process Safety Progress, 22, 1, pp. 27-32 (2003)
6.2 Further documents for information

Emergency Relief Systems Design using DIERS Technology - The Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems of
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Relief Systems Handbook By C.F. Parry, Institution of Chemical Engineers (United Kingdom).
J.A. Bonilla, "Estimate Safe Flare-Headers Quickly", Chemical Engineering, April, 1978.
M. Bradford and D.G. Durrett, "Distillation Safety Valves", Chemical Engineering, July, 1984.
J. Conison, "Designing Vapor Relief Systems", ISA Journal, June, 1964.
G.W. Harmon and W.W. Stuper, "Sizing Emergency Relief Systems on Vessels Containing Monomers", Chemical
Engineering Progress, March 1984.
M. Isaacs, "Pressure-Relief Systems", Chemical Engineering, February, 1971.
J.H. Jenkins, P.E. Kelly and C.B. Cobb, "Design for Better Safety Relief", Hydrocarbon Processing, August 1977.
A.D. Little and R. Levine, "Guidelines for Safe Storage and Handling of High Toxic Hazard Materials", AIChE.
A. Mukerji, "How to Size Relief Valves", Chemical Engineering, June 1980.
R.S. Sonti, "Practical Design and Operation of Vapor-Depressuring Systems", Chemical Engineering, January 1984.
W.Y. Wong, "Safer Relief Valve Sizing", Chemical Engineering, May 1989.
Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems, CCPS, 1998
W.Y. Wong, “Protect Plants against overpressure, Chemical Engineering, June 2001.
V. Carrillo, “Specify the Right Size of Relief Valve, Chemical Engineering, April 1999.
Author Pressure Relief Committee Date August 2006

Owner NAFTA Process COE
Approved By Florian Geissler, Svcs Dir Tech Engineering, (signature on file) Date August 2006

N-G-HE - 200 - EN Pressure Safety Relief

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1. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS

4.1 Pressure Safety Relief Devices

4.1.4 Rupture Discs

Published: Intranet Extranet For internal use only

4.9.4.4 Model Choice

1. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS

2.1 Pressure Safety Relief Valve (PSV)

2.2 Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP)

2.3 Set Pressure

2.4 Burst Pressure

2.5 Back Pressure

2.8 Operating Pressure

2.9 Rupture Disk

2.10 Fusible Plug

2.11 Rupture/Buckling Pin Device

2.12 Breaking Pin Device

2.13 Atmospheric Tank

2.14 Low-Pressure Tank

2.16 Confined Deflagration

2.17 Unconfined Deflagration

2.18 Detonation (Stable Detonation)

2.19 Overdriven Detonation

2.20 End-of-Line Flame Arrester

2.21 In-Line Flame Arrester

2.22 Detonation Arrester

2.23 Arrester Element

These guidelines are meant for BASF use only.

4.1 Pressure Safety Relief Devices

4.1.2 Spring-Loaded Pressure Relief Valves

4.1.3 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves

4.1.4 Rupture Disks

4.1.4.1 Types of Rupture Disks

Figures 4.1.4.1-1A and 1B Tension Type Rupture Disks

Figure 4.1.4.1-2 Solid Metal Rupture Disk

Figure 4.1.4.1-3 Scored Rupture Disk

Figure 4.1.4.1-4 Composite Rupture Disk

Figure 4.1.4.1-5 Reverse Acting Rupture Disk

Figure 4.1.4.1-6 Reverse Acting Rupture Disk

Figure 4.1.4.1-7 Reverse Acting Rupture Disk with Knives

Figure 4.1.4.1-8 Graphite Rupture Disk

4.1.4.2 Materials of Construction

4.1.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages

4.1.4.4 Rupture Disk Guidelines

4.1.4.4.1 Burst Pressure

4.1.4.4.2 Operating Pressure

Figure 4.1.4.4.2-1 Rupture Disc Definitions

4.1.4.4.3 Operating Temperature

4.1.4.4.4 Interchangeability and PRV Combinations

4.1.5 Specialty Relief Devices

4.1.5.1 Tank Cars

4.1.5.2 Fusible Plug

4.1.5.3 Breaking Pin

Rupture pin resists the

Figure 4.1.5.3-1 Typical Rupture Pin Device

4.1.5.3.1 Rupture Pin Applications

Advantages of rupture pins over rupture discs:

Disadvantages of rupture pins over rupture discs:

Advantages of rupture pins over relief valves:

Disadvantages of rupture pins over relief valves:

- specialized rupture pin device can be hard to replace

4.1.5.3.2 Rupture Pin Specifications / Sizing

Physical Properties of Fluid

Gas temperature at upstream relieving pressure = T1 = (P1/Pn)Tn = (281/174.7)528 = 849.3 oR