Gideon v. Wainright Amendment of the Constitution clearly Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged Receipt No.
lant Frisco Holgado was charged Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted
Citation. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 1963 U.S. LEXIS
1942, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 258, 93 A.L.R.2d 733
(U.S. Mar. 18, 1963)
Brief Fact Summary. Gideon was charged
with a felony in Florida state court. He
appeared before the state Court, informing
the Court he was indigent and requested
that the Court appoint him an attorney. The
Court declined to appoint Gideon an
attorney, stating that under Florida law, the
only time an indigent defendant is entitled to
appointed counsel is when he is charged with
a capital offense.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case overruled
Betts and held that the right of an indigent
defendant to appointed counsel is a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.
Failure to provide an indigent defendant with
an attorney is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution (“Constitution”).
Facts. Gideon was charged in a Florida state
court with breaking and entering into a
poolroom with the intent to commit a
misdemeanor. Such an offense was a felony
under Florida law. When Gideon appeared
before the state Court he informed the court
that he was indigent and requested the
Court appoint him an attorney, asserting that
“the United States Supreme Court says I am
entitled to be represented by counsel.” The
se Court informed Gideon that under Florida
law only indigent clients charged with capital
offenses are entitled to court appointed
counsel.
Gideon proceeded to a jury trial; made an
opening statement, cross-examined the
State’s witnesses, called his own witnesses,
declined to testify himself; and made a
closing argument. The jury returned a guilty
verdict and Gideon was sentenced to serve
five years in state prison. While serving his
sentence, Gideon filed a petition for habeas
corpus attacking his conviction and sentence
on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to
appoint counsel denied his constitutional
rights and rights guaranteed him under the
Bill of Rights. The Florida State Supreme
Court denied relief. Because the problem of a
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel in
state court continued to be source of
controversy since Betts v. Brady, the United
States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”)
granted certiorari to again review the issue.
Issue. Whether the Sixth Amendment
constitutional requirement that indigent
defendants be appointed counsel is so
fundamental and essential to a fair trial that
it is made obligatory on the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. The right to counsel is a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial and due process
of law.
Concurrence. Justice Tom Clark (“J. Clark”)
concurred and recognized that the Sixth
required appointment of counsel in “all
criminal prosecutions” and that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
requires appointment of counsel in all
prosecutions for capital crimes. The instant
decision does no more than erase an illogical
distinction. J. Clark further concludes that the
Constitution makes no distinction between
capital and non capital cases. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires due process of law for
the deprivation of liberty just as equally as it
does for deprival of life. Accordingly, there
cannot be a constitutional distinction in the
quality of the process based merely upon the
sanction to be imposed.
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”): Agrees that
Betts v. Brady should be overruled, but
argues that Betts recognized that there might
be special circumstances in non capital cases
requiring the appointment of counsel. In non
capital cases the special circumstances
continued to exist, but have been
substantially and steadily eroded,
culminating in the instant decision. J. Harlan
clarified his view that he does not believe
that the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution incorporates the entire Sixth
Amendment resulting in all federal law
applies to all the States. J. Harlan still wants
to preserve to the States their independence
to make law and procedures consistent with
the divergent problems and legitimate
interests that the States face that are
difference from each other and different
from the Federal Government.
Discussion. The Supreme Court, in reaching
its conclusion that the right to counsel is a
fundamental right imposed upon the states
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution, engages in an analysis of its
previous decisions holding that other
provisions of the Bill of Rights are
fundamental rights made obligatory on the
States. The Supreme Court accepts the Betts
v. Brady assumption that a provision of the
Bill of Rights which is fundamental and
essential to a fair trial is made obligatory on
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution. The Supreme Court
diverges from Betts in concluding that the
right to assistance of counsel is a
fundamental right. The Supreme Court found
that the Betts Court’s conclusion that
assistance of counsel is not a fundamental
right was an abrupt break from its own well-
considered precedent. The Supreme Court
further reasons that the right to be heard at
trial would be, in many cases, of little avail
without the assistance of counsel who is
familiar with the rules of court, the rules of
evidence and the general procedure of the
court system. Without the assistance of
counsel “though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence.”
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-
in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to
the information, being a private person, he
did "feloniously and without justifiable
motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said
Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He
pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said
that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo,
which no evidence was presented to indict
the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any
irregularity in the proceedings in the trial
court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that :
“If the defendant appears without attorney,
he must be informed by the court that it is
his right to have attorney being arraigned.,
and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must
be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was
violated. Moreso the guarantees of our
Constitution that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law", and that all accused "shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given the
opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true
import of the qualified plea of accused. The
record does not show whether the supposed
instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and
whether it had reference to the commission
of the offense or to the making of the plea
guilty. No investigation was opened by the
court on this matter in the presence of the
accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate
the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with
the fiscal's information that he had
investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such
attitude of the court was wrong for the
simple reason that a mere statement of the
fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all,
the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel especially
because of the qualified plea given by him
and the seriousness of the offense found to
be capital by the court.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
SHEALA P. MATRIDO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
Petitioner Sheala Matrido is a credit and
collection assistant of Empire East Land
Holdings, Inc. (private complainant),
petitioner was tasked to collect payments
from buyers of its real estate properties
Petitioner received payment from Amante
dela Torre in the amount of P22,470.66 as
evidenced by the owner’s copy of Official
only P4,470.66 to private complainant as
reflected in the treasury department’s copy
of Official Receipt No. 36547 submitted to
private complainant, both copies of which
bear the signature of petitioner and reflect a
difference of P18,000.
Private complainant then filed an estafa
complaint against Petitioner before the
Makati Prosecutor's Office. The Makati PO
dismissed the case for estafa for insufficiency
of evidence but found probable cause to
indict petitioner for qualified theft under an
Information which reads:
That on or about the 10th day of June 1999,
in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then a Credit
and Collection Assistant employed by
complainant, EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS,
INC., herein represented by Leilani N.
Cabuloy, and as such had access to the
payments made by complainant’s clients,
with grave abuse of confidence, intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent
of the said complainant company, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away the amount of
P18,000.00 received from Amante Dela
Torre, a buyer of a house and lot being
marketed by complainant company, to the
damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the aforementioned amount
of P18,000.00.
The Makati RTC subsequently found the
petiitoner guilty for qualified theft.
Issue: W/N the conviction for qualified theft
is valid despite the fact that the prosecution
tried to prove during the trial the crime of
estafa thus denying the petitioner the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against petitioner.
Ruling: Yes
It is the allegations in the Information that
determine the nature of the offense, not the
technical name given by the public
prosecutor in the preamble of the
Information.
As alleged in the Information, petitioner
took, intending to gain therefrom and
without the use of force upon things or
violence against or intimidation of persons, a
personal property consisting of money in the
amount P18,000 belonging to private
complainant, without its knowledge and
consent, thereby gravely abusing the
confidence reposed on her as credit and
collection assistant who had access to
payments from private complainant’s clients.
Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain, but without violence against,
or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take the personal property of
another without the latter’s consent. If
committed with grave abuse of confidence,
the crime of theft becomes qualified.
The elements of qualified theft are as
follows:
There was a taking of personal property.
The said property belongs to another.
The taking was done without the consent of
the owner.
The taking was done with intent to gain.
The taking was accomplished without
violence or intimidation against person, or
force upon things.
The taking was done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of
the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
In the present case, there is testimonial
admission by petitioner of unlawfully taking
the fund belonging to private complainant
and of paying a certain sum to exculpate
herself from liability. That the money, taken
by petitioner without authority and consent,
belongs to private complainant, and that the
taking was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor
force upon things, there is no issue.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an
internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing
subject of asportation. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain.
The taking was also clearly done with grave
abuse of confidence. As a credit and
collection assistant of private complainant,
petitioner made use of her position to obtain
the amount due to private complainant. Her
position entailed a high degree of confidence
reposed by private complainant as she had
been granted access to funds collectible from
clients, which trust was abused when she
failed to remit the entrusted amount.
The Court finds no rhyme or reason in
petitioner’s contention that what the
prosecution tried to prove during trial was
estafa through misappropriation under
Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC.
The principal distinction between the two
crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while
in estafa the accused receives the property
and converts it to his own use or benefit. If
he was entrusted only with the material or
physical (natural) or de facto possession of
the thing, his misappropriation of the same
constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.
Conversion of personal property in the case
of an employee having material possession
of the said property constitutes theft,
whereas in the case of an agent to whom
both material and juridical possession have
been transferred, misappropriation of the
same property constitutes estafa.
That petitioner did not have juridical
possession over the amount or, in other
words, she did not have a right over the thing
which she may set up even against private
complainant is clear.
Petitioner’s view that there could be no
element of taking since private complainant
had no actual possession of the money fails.
The argument proceeds from the flawed
premise that there could be no theft if the
accused has possession of the property.
A sum of money received by an employee in
behalf of an employer is considered to be
only in the material possession of the
employee. The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the juridical
possession of the employer. So long as the
juridical possession of the thing appropriated
did not pass to the employee-perpetrator,
the offense committed remains to be theft.
PEOPLE V. FELIX ANTIDO
The 2 accused were convicted of murder.
Defense questions adequacy of evidence and
finding of treachery.
HELD:
One of the witnesses is a victim himself
having been stabbed by the appellant. As
such, his testimony, standing alone, can be
made the basis of accused’s prosecution and
conviction, if such testimony meets the test
of credibility. The matter of accuracy of the
identification by the victim of the offenders is
a factual issue resolved by the trial court
which should be given weight on appeal,
unless there are convincing indications that
certain facts or circumstances of weight and
significance have been overlooked. An
unexpected and sudden attack under
circumstances which render the victim
unable and unprepared to defend himself by
reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack constitutes alevosia and the fact that
the act was frontal does not preclude the
presence of treachery.
People v. Flores, Jr. – GR No. 128823-24
Topic: Cause of the Accusation
Facts: After trial, the court found accused-
appellant PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS
PESIONG guilty of Statutory Rape and
sentenced him to death in both cases. The
complaints against accused-appellant filed
on February 3, 1997 read as follows:
Criminal Case No. U-9184:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11
years old, grade three pupil and a resident of
Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby
accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES for the
crime of "RAPE", committed as follows:
That on the 9th day of December 1996, in
the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy.
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of
Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein
complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO,
11 years old, all against her will.
Criminal Case No. U-9185:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11
years old, grade three pupil and a resident of
Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby
accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS
"PESYONG", committed as follows:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in
the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy
Nancamaliran West, Municipality of
Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously sexually abuse the herein
complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11
years old and daughter of the herein accused
with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon
and all against her will.
Issue: Whether or not the informations are
null and void for being violative of the
constitutional right of accused-appellant
Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong," for
Rape, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
Ruling: The Court declared the informations
in both criminal cases null and void. It is at
once apparent, from a reading of the above-
quoted complaints, that accused-appellant
was denied the constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. This right has the
following objectives:
1. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if
one should be had.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged
in said information do not constitute an
offense. The information does not cite which
among the numerous sections or subsections
of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by
accused-appellant. Moreover, it does not
state the acts and omissions constituting the
offense, or any special or aggravating
circumstances attending the same, as
required under the rules of criminal
procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof
provides:
Designation of the offense.—The complaint
or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statue, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.
The allegation in the information that
accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse on his
daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her
or committing acts of lasciviousness on her"
is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under
Section 8, for these are conclusions of law,
not facts. The information in Criminal Case
No. 15368-R is therefore void for being
violative of the accused-appellant’s
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
As held by this Court in People v. Cruz, the
allegation in the information that the therein
accused-appellant sexually abused the
therein private complainant by either raping
or committing acts of lasciviousness on her
"is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under
Section 8 of Rule 110, for these are
conclusions of law, not facts." Nothing less
can be said of the criminal complaints in the
cases at bar. They are void for being violative
of the accused-appellant’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
Guerrero vs CA
Francisco Guerrero is a pilot who allegedly
through his negligence causes the improper
emergency landing which resulted to the
instant death of 3 passengers. The incident
happened May 1969, due to several
postponement, all filed by the petitioner the
petitioner was able to finally able to start
presenting its evidence on sept. 1972 and he
pleaded not guilty.
On January 1979 Judge Pardo ordered to file
their memorandum; however the petitioner
filed his memorandum December 1979.
March 1990, the case was re-raffled to judge
Aquino and ordered the parties to complete
transcript of stenographic notes but the
same was found incomplete and needs
retaking of testimonies. On Nov 1990 filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that his
right to speedy trial was violated.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to speedy trial of
the accused was violated?
Held:
The right to speedy trial is violated only
where there is unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay without the participation or
fault of the accused or when the unjustified
postponements are sought which prolong
the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.
In the present case, there is no question that
the petitioner raised the violation against his
own right to speedy disposition only when
the respondent trial judge reset the case for
rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would
have just continued to sleep on his right-
asituation amounting to laches-had the RJ
not taken the initiative of determining the
non-completion of the records and of
ordering the remedy precisely so he could
dispose the case.