Bixler v. Scientology: Danny Masterson's Demurrer To FAC

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 04/30/2020 02:29 PM Sherri R.
Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Soto,Deputy Clerk
1 ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO. 262928)

MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND (BAR NO. 322629)
2 LAVELY & SINGER
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
3 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906
4 Telephone: (310) 556-3501
Facsimile: (310) 556-3615
5 Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
mhirshland@lavelysinger.com
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Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON
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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT
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11 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
12 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, [Hon. Steven J. Kleifield – Dept. 57]
13 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON’S

NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND
14 v. DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT;
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE (Declaration of Andrew B. Brettler; [Proposed]
17 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; Order; Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1 – 25, Filed Concurrently Herewith)
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Defendants.
19 Reservation No. 070750198339
20 Date: September 4, 2020
Time: 8:30 a.m.
21 Dept: 57
22 Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019

FAC Filed: February 28, 2020
23 Trial Date: None
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3697-9 DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMEDNED COMPLAINT

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 4, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
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this matter may be heard, in Department 57 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 North Hill
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Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Defendant Daniel Masterson (“Masterson”) will, and hereby does,
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demur to Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, Marie Bobette
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Riales, and Jane Doe #2’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) in
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its entirety, including causes of action One through Five.
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As set forth in the concurrently-filed Declaration of Andrew B. Brettler (“Brettler Decl.”),
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Plaintiffs’ counsel failed and/or refused to meet and confer as required by California Code of Civil
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Procedure section 430.41(a)(1)-(3) regarding the Demurrer before the original response deadline.
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Accordingly, on March 30, 2020, Martin F. Hirshland filed a declaration regarding the meet and
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confer obligations, thereby extending, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
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430.41(a)(2), Masterson’s deadline to respond to the Complaint to Friday, May 1, 2020.
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On March 31, 2020, as also set forth in the Brettler Decl., counsel for the parties attempted
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to meet and confer telephonically, as required by the Code. Notwithstanding Masterson’s counsel’s
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efforts to address Plaintiffs’ pleading deficiencies in the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ counsel refused to
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engage in a substantive discussion of those issues and prematurely terminated the meet and confer
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conference, thereby necessitating this filing.
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This Demurrer is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10(b),
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430.10(d) and 430.10(e), upon the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 lack
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legal capacity to bring their causes of action as anonymous “Jane Doe” parties; (2) there is a defect,
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or misjoinder, of parties and claims, causing prejudice to Masterson; and (3) all Plaintiffs’ claims
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fail to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action against Masterson.
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3697-9 DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 The Demurrer is based on this Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, the attached Memorandum
2 of Points and Authorities, the concurrently-filed Brettler Decl., all pleadings and papers on file in
3 this action, and any further evidence or argument that may be presented to the Court at the hearing.
5 Dated: April 30, 2020 LAVELY & SINGER P. C.

ANDREW B. BRETTLER
6 MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND
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8 By: s/ Andrew B Brettler

ANDREW B. BRETTLER
9 Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON
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DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 DEMURRER1
2 Defendant Daniel Masterson (“Masterson”) demurs generally to Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell
3 Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, Marie Bobette Riales, and Jane Doe #2’s (collectively,
4 “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) in its entirety, including causes of action
5 One through Five, on the following grounds:
6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action

7 1. The First Cause of Action for Stalking in Violation of Civil Code section 1708.7
8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
9 430.10(d).
10 2. The First Cause of Action for Stalking in Violation of Civil Code section 1708.7 fails
11 to state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of
12 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action

14 3. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
15 Code section 1708.8 mis-joins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil
16 Procedure section 430.10(d).
17 4. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
18 Code section 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to
19 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action

21 5. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
22 Code section 1708.8 mis-joins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil
23 Procedure section 430.10(d).
24 6. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Civil
25 Code section 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to
26 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
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In addition to this Demurrer, Masterson has filed a Motion to Strike irrelevant, immaterial and
28 prejudicial allegations and unsupported portions of Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief from the Complaint.
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1 Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action
2 7. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress mis-joins
3 parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(d).
4 8. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails to
5 state a cause of action against Masterson and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of
6 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
7 Demurrer to Fifth Cause of Action

8 9. The Fifth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium mis-joins parties and is therefore
9 subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(d).
10 10. The Fifth Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium fails to state a cause of action
11 against Masterson and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
12 430.10(e).
13 Special Demurrer to All Causes of Action

14 There are no circumstances justifying plaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and/or Jane Doe #2’s use of a
15 fictitious name, and therefore those individuals lack legal capacity to bring their causes of action as
16 “Jane Doe” parties. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 430.10(b); Doe v. Lincoln Unified Sch. Dist., 188 Cal. App.
17 4th 758, 767 (2010).
18 WHEREFORE, Masterson respectfully requests that the Demurrer to the Complaint be

19 sustained as follows:
20 1. The demurrer to all causes of action be sustained without leave to amend;
21 2. The Complaint be dismissed, with prejudice;
22 3. Judgment be entered in favor of Masterson;
23 4. Fees and costs be awarded to Masterson; and
24 5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem to be just and appropriate.

ANDREW B. BRETTLER
26 MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND
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By: s/ Andrew B. Brettler
28 ANDREW B. BRETTLER
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page(s)
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4 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................. 1

5 II. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 3
6 III. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 5
7 A. The Doe Plaintiffs Must Be Forced To Proceed Using Their Legal Names, if
They Want To Pursue Their Claims in This Court. ................................................ 5
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B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Without Leave To Amend Because
9 Plaintiffs Fail To State a Viable Cause of Action Against Masterson
Personally. ............................................................................................................... 6
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1. All of the claims fail because Plaintiffs do not allege facts
11 demonstrating Masterson engaged in any conduct – let alone
misconduct. ................................................................................................. 6
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2. Plaintiffs’ first claim fails because Plaintiffs do no allege facts
13 demonstrating the essential elements of stalking. ....................................... 9
14 3. Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating the essential elements of a
claim for physical invasion of privacy. ....................................................... 9
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4. Plaintiffs fail to plead a cause of action for constructive ..............................
16 invasion of privacy. ................................................................................... 11
17 5. Plaintiffs do not allege the nature or extent of the emotional distress
they allegedly suffered. ............................................................................. 12
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6. Bixler-Zavala’s claim for loss of consortium fails because his wife has
19 not alleged a cause of action. .................................................................... 13
20 C. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer, with Prejudice, Because Plaintiffs’
Claims Are Improperly Joined. ............................................................................. 14
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IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15
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3697-9 DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4 Angie M. v. Super. Ct.,
5 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (1995) ................................................................................................. 12, 13
6 Blain v. Doctor’s Co.,

222 Cal. App. 3d 1048 (1990) ...................................................................................................... 13
7
Blank v. Kirwan,
8 39 Cal.3d 311 (1985) ...................................................................................................................... 3
9 Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co.,
164 Cal. App. 3d 602 (1985) ........................................................................................................ 13
10
11 C&H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,

163 Cal. App. 3d, 1055, 1062 (1984) ............................................................................................. 3
12
Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc.,
13 175 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1959) .................................................................................................... 4, 15
14 Connor v. Flake,
No. CV 16-3542 PA (JCX), 2017 WL 1908154 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) .................................... 9
15
16 Doe v. City of Los Angeles,

42 Cal. 4th 531 (2007)................................................................................................................ 7, 8
17
Doe v. Lincoln Unified Sch. Dist.,
18 188 Cal. App. 4th 758 (2010) ......................................................................................................... 4
19 Doe v. Saenz,
140 Cal. App. 4th 960 (2006) ......................................................................................................... 5
20
Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. NAK Sealing Techs. Corp.,
21
148 Cal. App. 4th 937 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 8
22
Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
23 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (2011) ....................................................................................................... 7
24 Goodman v. Kennedy,
18 Cal. 3d 335 (1976) ..................................................................................................................... 3
25
Hahn v. Mirda,
26 147 Cal. App. 4th 740 (2007) ....................................................................................................... 13
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Hooper v. Deukmejian,
28 122 Cal. App. 3d 987 (1981) .......................................................................................................... 5
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1 Jane Doe 8015 v. Super. Ct.,
148 Cal. App. 4th 489 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 5
2
Johnson v. Super. Ct.,
3 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050 (2000) ......................................................................................................... 5
4
Moe v. Anderson,
5 207 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2012) ................................................................................................... 4, 15
6 People v. Gionis,
9 Cal. 4th 1196 (1995).............................................................................................................. 4, 15
7
People v. Sánchez,
8 63 Cal. 4th 411 (2016).................................................................................................................. 15
9 Pitman v. City of Oakland,
10 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037 (1988) ...................................................................................................... 13
11 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Srvc.,

81 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2000) ................................................................................................. 6, 11, 12
12
Rules and Statutes
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Cal. Rules of Court 2.550(c) ................................................................................................................ 4
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 ....................................................................................................................... 9
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16 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 ..................................................................................................................... 12
17 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) ....................................................................................................... 9, 10, 11
18 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) .......................................................................................................... 11, 12

19 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5) ...................................................................................................... 11, 12
20 Cal. Civ. Code § 2295 .......................................................................................................................... 8
21 Other Authorities
22 Judge Kimberly A. Gaab & Sara Church Reese, California Practice Guide: Civil
23 Procedure Before Trial Claims & Defenses §2:906.2 (2019) ................................................ 11, 12
24 Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group
2011), § 2:136.5 ......................................................................................................................... 4, 5
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
3 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”), their second attempt to rope Danny
4 Masterson into this bogus lawsuit against the Church of Scientology, fares no better than the first.
5 Unfortunately, while the world has stopped to contain the spread of coronavirus, Plaintiffs plow
6 ahead with their specious, unsupported and half-baked claims, wasting valuable judicial resources in
7 a shameful ploy for salacious media attention. This lawsuit is nothing more than a publicity stunt
8 orchestrated by Mr. Masterson’s ex-girlfriends, some of whom seek to proceed anonymously, while
9 very publicly accusing Mr. Masterson and other named defendants of wrongdoing. The impropriety
10 of Plaintiffs’ claims is made even more evident by the fact that Plaintiffs withdrew their original
11 Complaint, after Mr. Masterson and the other Defendants filed separate demurrers identifying the
12 numerous pleading deficiencies in the original complaint, and have now attempted to re-plead their
13 claims without actually remedying any of the inherent defects previously identified by Defendants.
14 In particular, the Jane Doe plaintiffs want to use fake names in this lawsuit to avoid public
15 scrutiny of their claims and prevent others from questioning their allegations and/or speaking out
16 against them personally. Mr. Masterson and the other defendants have a right to confront their
17 accusers, and if these anonymous plaintiffs want to use the public courts to try to get money from
18 Mr. Masterson and the other defendants, they need to play by the rules and sue in their real names.
19 Only after their wild and previously rejected allegations of sexual assault against Mr.
20 Masterson rightfully fell on deaf ears, several of Mr. Masterson’s ex-girlfriends – some from nearly
21 twenty ago – participated in an anti-Scientology television series. At the time, they insisted this
22 “wasn’t about money,” yet after their criminal complaints went nowhere, they filed this fantastical
23 lawsuit against Mr. Masterson and the Church of Scientology hoping to recover many millions of
24 dollars. This lawsuit is not about justice, as Mr. Masterson’s exes disingenuously claim. It remains a
25 shameful money grab; plain and simple. The transparency of Plaintiffs’ conduct is evident on the
26 face of both the original Complaint and now the First Amended Complaint, which fail to allege a
27 single instance of wrongdoing at the hands of Mr. Masterson.
28 In what can only be characterized as paranoid delusions, Mr. Masterson’s ex-girlfriends and
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1 one of their jealous husbands banded together to concoct these preposterous and bigoted allegations
2 aimed largely against the Church of Scientology and its related entities. Plaintiffs added Mr.
3 Masterson as a defendant in this discriminatory lawsuit to insure that the media would cover it. For
4 that reason, Plaintiffs needlessly, but intentionally and in salacious detail, rehash their decades-old
5 false and defamatory allegations against Mr. Masterson – none of which have anything to do with
6 the causes of action actually asserted in this action. Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler, her husband
7 Cedric Bixler-Zavala, Marie Bobette Riales, and two of Mr. Masterson’s old flames, who now seek
8 to hide behind a cloak of anonymity, have very publicly accused Mr. Masterson of unthinkable
9 crimes despite that fact that their allegations were thoroughly investigated and rejected years ago.
10 Their stories, however, have morphed into fairytales demonstrating their religious intolerance
11 and prejudice. Recognizing that their original claims arising out of their prior, consensual
12 relationships with Mr. Masterson are not only time-barred under the law but also entirely meritless,
13 they turned this case into one about alleged stalking and harassment. Plaintiffs have seemingly
14 convinced themselves that every day inconveniences that are commonplace in all large cities, such
15 as having their trashcans go missing, finding their car doors unlocked, or the death of a pet are part
16 of a large conspiracy against them by the Church of Scientology at the direction of one of their
17 parishioners. Lawsuits do not get much more far-fetched, or anti-religious than this one.
18 Although the lawsuit is filled with patently false allegations related to Mr. Masterson’s
19 alleged “crimes,” it fails mention that the Plaintiffs all had well-documented relationships with Mr.
20 Masterson – in some cases for years after these women now claim Mr. Masterson abused them.
21 Indeed, Ms. Bixler, for one, sent Mr. Masterson love letters begging him to get back together with
22 her after he ended their relationship due to her own instability and substance abuse issues. Plaintiffs
23 have unnecessarily dragged Mr. Masterson into this litigation to garner media interest in their suit–-a
24 shameless ploy for attention which is amplified by the fact that Plaintiffs do not allege that Mr.
25 Masterson personally committed – or instructed others to commit – any of the allegedly wrongful
26 conduct outlined in the Complaint.
27 In fact, the lawsuit contains no allegation, on personal knowledge, that any defendant
28 committed any act that forms the basis of a legal claim. Instead, in conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs
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1 allege “upon information and belief” that the material acts as alleged in the Complaint were
2 performed at the direction of Mr. Masterson, yet they fail to cite a single fact supporting this
3 purported “belief.” Such bald allegations are insufficient to survive a demurrer. Plaintiffs’ claims
4 fail as a matter of law because the essential elements of each cause of action have not been met, or
5 even properly pleaded.
6 But the Complaint’s lack of supporting facts and law is not even its biggest defect. The
7 lawsuit is a mishmash of bigotry and allegations asserted by various individuals who have very little
8 in common with one another and do not belong in the same case together. The individual claims are
9 premised on entirely distinct and separate acts – allegedly occurring at different times and in
10 different locations. Because the claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of events,
11 they cannot be pleaded jointly. As a result of this improper joinder, the Complaint cannot be cured
12 by amendment and must be dismissed with prejudice.
13 For all of the foregoing reasons, as further explained herein, the Court should sustain Mr.
14 Masterson’s Demurrer to the Complaint without leave to amend and award Mr. Masterson the relief
15 requested herein.
16 II. LEGAL STANDARD

17 The California Code of Civil Procedure requires that a demurrer be sustained where a
18 plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue, where a complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
19 cause of action, or where there is a defect or misjoinder of parties. Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 430.10, 430.30.
20 A demurrer may be used to challenge defects that appear on the face of the complaint, or for matters
21 outside the complaint that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (1985);
22 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 430.30(a). “[C]ontentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the
23 complaint are not considered in judging its sufficiency.” C&H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163
24 Cal. App. 3d, 1055, 1062 (1984). Moreover, unless the pleading party demonstrates how the
25 complaint can be amended, leave to amend is properly denied. See Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d
26 335, 349 (1976) (it is the pleading party’s burden to “show in what manner he can amend his
27 complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading”).
28 Further, absent “exceptional circumstances,” a plaintiff in California is not permitted to file a
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1 complaint using a fictitious name. Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial
2 (The Rutter Group 2011), § 2:136.5. Such “exceptional circumstances” may exist where: (1)
3 matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature are at issue; (2) there is a real danger of physical or
4 mental harm to a plaintiff if her identity is revealed; or (3) the injuries sought to be avoided by a
5 plaintiff would be incurred by disclosure of her identity. Id.; Doe v. Lincoln Unified Sch. Dist., 188
6 Cal. App. 4th 758, 767 (2010). No such “exceptional circumstances” are present here, and therefore
7 the Doe Plaintiffs are not permitted to proceed anonymously. See, e.g. Cal. Rules of Court 2.550(c)
8 (“Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open”).
9 Lastly, a demurrer must be sustained where “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.”
10 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 430.10(d). Plaintiffs are properly joined in one action only if their claims “aris[e]
11 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
12 of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1)
13 (emphasis added). Separate and distinct acts occurring at separate and distinct times do not “arise
14 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions,” and therefore joinder is not
15 proper. Moe v. Anderson, 207 Cal. App. 4th 826, 833 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Twin Coast
16 Newspapers, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 2d 650, 653 (1959)). An allegation that defendants “conspired” to
17 commit acts against the plaintiffs is insufficient to demonstrate proper joinder where the allegations
18 consist of separate acts committed against different plaintiffs at different times and locations.
19 Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.2 Plaintiffs’ misjoinder of claims and parties is highly prejudicial
20 to Masterson, as unfounded allegations that Masterson is the mastermind of an alleged coordinated
21 harassment campaign “evoke[s] an emotional bias against [him] as an individual . . . . which has
22 very little effect on the issues.” People v. Gionis, 9 Cal. 4th 1196, 1214 (1995). This misjoinder is
23 especially prejudicial in light of the fact that nowhere in the Complaint do any of the Plaintiffs allege
24 Masterson himself committed any wrongful act entitling Plaintiffs to relief. In short, Plaintiffs’
25 attempt to conflate conduct allegedly committed at different times and different places by different
26 people, who presumably are not even named as defendants in this lawsuit, is improper and cannot
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In Coleman, the court explained that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate “a right to relief arising out the same transaction
or series of transactions” where, as here, multiple “separate and distinct plaintiffs are suing to recover damages for
28 alleged [misconduct] on separate and distinct premises” at separate and distinct times. Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.
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1 withstand demurrer.
2 III. ARGUMENT
3 A. The Doe Plaintiffs Must Be Forced To Proceed Using Their Legal Names, if They
4 Want To Pursue Their Claims in This Court.
5 This case is about alleged harassment and stalking. It is not about sexual assault, as Plaintiffs
6 would like the Court and the media to believe. Absent “exceptional circumstances,” a plaintiff in
7 California is not permitted to file a complaint under a fictitious name. Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac.
8 Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011), § 2:136.5. Here, Plaintiffs contend
9 that good cause exists for the Doe Plaintiffs “to use a pseudonym due to the harmful effect of the
10 public disclosure of her identity and the harm inflicted by the Defendants.” Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6.
11 However, this conclusory statement does not support the “exceptional circumstances” required under
12 the law to file a complaint anonymously. See, e.g. Doe v. Saenz, 140 Cal. App. 4th 960, 977-980
13 (2006) (plaintiffs with prior criminal history at issue in lawsuit allowed to sue under fictitious
14 names); Hooper v. Deukmejian, 122 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993 (1981) (convicted narcotics seller
15 allowed to sue under fictitious name in suit regarding marijuana legislation); Jane Doe 8015 v.
16 Super. Ct., 148 Cal. App. 4th 489, 492 (2007) (HIV-infected patient of a clinical laboratory allowed
17 to sue the laboratory under fictitious name); Johnson v. Super. Ct., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1072
18 (2000) (“John Doe” designation appropriate to protect an anonymous sperm donor’s identity).
19 There’s no exception for suing anonymously just because you do not want your name to appear in a
20 court pleading.
21 The Doe Plaintiffs’ claim that disclosure of their identities would lead to harm is belied by
22 the fact that there are other named Plaintiffs in the lawsuit already and the fact that one of the two
23 “Jane Does” has shown up, in person, for at least two court hearings in this case. For at least two
24 reasons, allowing the Doe Plaintiffs to assert their outrageous and bigoted allegations under the
25 cloak of anonymity actually prejudices Masterson. First, it is much more likely that the Doe
26 Plaintiffs will exaggerate their claims if they are not required to identify themselves in publicly filed
27 pleadings. Second, additional witnesses are more likely to come forward to testify about the alleged
28 incident as well as about the Doe Plaintiffs’ credibility if their names become a matter of public
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1 record. Just because the Doe Plaintiffs want to remain anonymous does not mean that they are
2 entitled to do so at the expense of and prejudice to Masterson. See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced
3 Textile Corp., 214 F. 3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a party may preserve his or her anonymity in
4 judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs
5 prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party's identity”) (emphasis
6 added).
7 Because there are no “exceptional circumstances” justifying the use of a fictitious name here,
8 Doe Plaintiffs lack legal capacity to file their Complaint anonymously. The Court should therefore
9 sustain Masterson’s special demurrer to all causes of action on this ground alone. So long as the
10 Doe Plaintiffs continue to proceed anonymously, leave to amend is futile and should be denied.
11 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Without Leave To Amend Because
12 Plaintiffs Fail To State a Viable Cause of Action Against Masterson Personally.
13 “Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show the
14 complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action.” Rakestraw v.
15 Cal. Physicians’ Srvc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 42-43 (2000). Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden here.
16 1. All of the claims fail because Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating
17 Masterson engaged in any conduct – let alone misconduct.
18 The gravamen of each of Plaintiffs’ claims is the alleged acts of harassment and unlawful
19 surveillance supposedly perpetrated against each Plaintiff. Specifically:
20  Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for stalking is based on “Defendants” allegedly following
21 Plaintiffs “online” and in person “thus placing Plaintiffs under surveillance with the intent to
22 alarm, threaten, and harass Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 264.)
23  Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for physical invasion of privacy is based on “Defendants”
24 allegedly “trespass[ing] on [Plaintiffs’] property to take photos, look[ing] in Plaintiffs’
25 windows, and electronically compromis[ing] their security systems, and/or phones, and/or
26 computers, and/or other digital devices.” (Id. ¶ 276.)
27  Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for constructive invasion of privacy is based on

28 “Defendants” allegedly “us[ing] devices to capture image and sound recordings or other
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1 physical impressions which, because of such device’s use, allowed Defendants to avoid
2 trespassing on Plaintiffs’ land while still being able to capture such recordings and
3 impressions.” (Id. ¶ 282.)
4  Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on
5 “Defendants trespass[ing] on Plaintiffs’ personal property, look[ing] in windows, follow[ing]
6 and stalk[ing], hack[ing] personal online accounts and emails, engag[ing] in surveillance of
7 and interference with Plaintiffs’ daily lives, and/or call[ing], and/or text[ing], and/or
8 otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly.” (Id. ¶ 288.)
9  Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala’s Fifth Cause of Action for loss of consortium is based on his
10 claim that “[t]he losses suffered by Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala were proximately caused
11 by Defendants’ tortious conduct, as described herein, through which his wife was tortuously
12 injured.” (Id. ¶ 296.)
13 Nowhere in these allegations is Masterson’s name even mentioned. Nor is it even suggested
14 that Masterson engaged in any such misconduct himself. Indeed, the Complaint contains no
15 allegation that any Defendant committed any act in furtherance of a claim. Instead, Plaintiffs merely
16 allege “[u]pon information and belief, all the [purported] acts of harassment, surveillance, and/or
17 stalking were carried out by or at the direction of Defendants’ employees, agents, and/or
18 representatives.” (Compl. ¶¶ 93, 172, 217, 249.) This self-serving statement is a conclusion—not an
19 allegation sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
20 “A plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within [her]
21 personal knowledge, if [s]he has information leading [her] to believe that the allegations are true.”
22 Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1158 (2011) (quoting Doe v. City
23 of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550 (2007)) (emphasis added). A pleading made on information
24 and belief is not sufficient if it “merely assert[s] the facts so alleged without alleging such
25 information that leads the plaintiff to believe that the allegations are true.” Doe, 42 Cal. 4th at 551,
26 n.5. The Complaint alleges that the acts in question were committed by numerous individuals, most
27 of whom are unnamed and unidentified. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99-103, 107, 112-
28 115, 118-120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 172, 173, 178, 185-188, 195-200, 217-226, 249-254.) As to the
7
1 alleged acts of these unnamed and unidentified people, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that support their
2 collective belief that these individuals were acting at the “direction of Defendants and/or their
3 employees, agents, and/or representatives.” (Compl. ¶¶ 93, 217, 249.) These are no more than
4 accusations of culpability without a shred of support that is required at the initial pleading stage.
5 The Complaint does identify certain individuals by name who supposedly engaged in limited
6 acts of purported harassment: Steve Miller, Heather Seidler, Virginia Macgregor, Kathy Gold,
7 Taryn Rinder, and Michelle Miskovich. (Id. ¶¶ 108, 109, 110, 111, 116, 175, 190, 227, 256.) Yet,
8 none of those individuals are named as defendants in the case. The Complaint fails to allege
9 sufficient information that “leads the plaintiff[s] to believe” the individuals were acting at the
10 direction of Masterson, or any other Defendant for that matter. Doe, 42 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5. The
11 Complaint also describes Plaintiffs’ alleged interactions with Masterson’s “friend,” “publicist,”
12 “business partner,” and “attorney,” however none of these alleged interactions support any of
13 Plaintiffs’ causes of action for stalking, harassment, etc…….. (Compl. ¶¶ 79, 88, 104, 118, 143,
14 166, 177, 184, 255.)
15 Further, Plaintiffs invoke California Civil Code section 2295 to argue that because Masterson
16 is a Scientologist, he is an “agent” of all Scientologists, and all Scientologists are agents of his.
17 Compl. ¶ 63. That notion is preposterous and could not be said about all Catholics, Jews, Muslims,
18 Hindus, or any other group of believers. Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts to indicate that the Church
19 of Scientology “controls” the actions of Masterson, or that Masterson “controls” the actions of any
20 individual scientologists, nor could they. See Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. NAK Sealing Techs.
21 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 4th 937, 964 (2007) (Agency relationship requires that “a principal has the
22 right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.”). Plainly, that a
23 person is a member of a religion does not establish that all actions performed by that person were at
24 the direction of the religious institution or any of its parishioners such as Masterson. (Compl. ¶¶ 93,
25 217, 249.)
26 Because the Complaint merely asserts facts “on information and belief,” without alleging the
27 information that leads the plaintiffs to believe that the allegations are true, it is insufficient. Doe, 42
28 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5. For this additional reason, the Demurrer should be sustained as to all of
8
1 Plaintiffs’ causes of action.
2 2. Plaintiffs’ first claim fails because Plaintiffs do no allege facts

3 demonstrating the essential elements of stalking.
4 To allege a cause of action for stalking under California Civil Code section 1708.7, a plaintiff
5 must allege: (1) the defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow,
6 alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff; (2) as a result of that pattern of conduct,
7 either (A) the plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety or (B) the plaintiff suffered substantial
8 emotional distress; and (3) one of the following: (A) The defendant made a credible threat with
9 either (i) the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of an
10 immediate family member, or (ii) reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff or that of an
11 immediate family member (if plaintiff demanded defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of
12 conduct and the defendant persisted) or (B) The defendant violated a restraining order. Cal. Civ.
13 Code § 1708.7. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege any of these requisite elements.
14 Specifically, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Masterson personally engaged in any conduct, much
15 less conduct with the intent “to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff,” or
16 that Masterson made a “credible threat” (or any threat at all) to Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs do not
17 assert these “most basic” allegations, their first cause of action fails as a matter of law. Connor v.
18 Flake, No. CV 16-3542 PA (JCX), 2017 WL 1908154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (granting
19 motion to dismiss stalking claim because “Plaintiff does not even allege that Defendant is the person
20 who broke into her home or followed her”).
21 3. Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating the essential elements

22 of a claim for physical invasion of privacy.
23 Under the Civil Code “[a] person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person
24 knowingly enters onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without
25 permission or otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any type of visual image, sound
26 recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial
27 activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.” Cal. Civ. Code
28 § 1708.8(a). Accordingly, to allege physical invasion of privacy against Masterson, Plaintiffs must
9
1 allege facts showing, among other things: (1) he physically trespassed; (2) with the intent to record
2 or photograph Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs have not done so – nor can they because it is simply untrue
3 that Masterson ever engaged in such conduct at any time.
4 Jane Doe #2, for instance, never alleges any instance of being photographed or recorded, or
5 that any events occurred on her property, or near her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 248-258.) She alleges
6 “vandalism of her car,” but does not indicate the location of her car, or that Masterson was the
7 individual who allegedly caused the property damage. (Compl. ¶ 252.)
8 Although the Bixler Plaintiffs seemingly allege facts detailing instances where they were
9 supposedly photographed or recorded, they admit those instances occurred in public, and therefore,
10 do not satisfy the trespass requirement of section 1708.8(a). (Compl. ¶¶ 98, 101, 116). The Bixler
11 Plaintiffs also allege that various events occurred near their home, but they do not allege that any of
12 these purported incidents occurred at their home or on their property – and therefore do not
13 constitute a legal physical trespass. (Compl. ¶ 95 (alleging individuals “loitering outside their home”
14 and “vans parking outside their home and filming their home and their family”), ¶ 121 (alleging
15 activity on “adjacent property”), ¶ 123 (alleging a man was “loitering around their property and
16 looking into windows”).) Even if these vague allegations constituted physical trespasses (they do
17 not), the Bixler Plaintiffs fail to allege any recording or photography efforts in connection with these
18 ostensible trespass events. (Compl. ¶ 94 (alleging car doors discovered open without alleging the
19 location of the parked cars), ¶ 112 (alleging front door lock was broken), ¶ 124 (alleging trash
20 stolen without alleging location of the trash).)
21 Jane Doe #1 similarly fails to allege any physical trespass on her property, with intent to
22 record or photograph her. Rather, Jane Doe #1 alleges she was supposedly surveilled in public at a
23 Best Buy. (Compl. ¶ 175.) She also alleges that individuals stood near her property – but outside
24 the property line. (Compl. ¶ 178 (SUV sitting “outside of her home”), ¶ 189 (woman surveilling her
25 from “outside the curtilage”), ¶ 193 (alleging activity “from the neighboring property”).) Like the
26 Bixler Plaintiffs, Jane Doe #1 alleges certain events that might constitute physical trespass, but fails
27 to allege any recording activity in connection with these events. (Compl. ¶ 181 (alleging trash stolen
28 without alleging location of the trash).
10
1 The same is true with respect to Riales, who allegedly lives and works in Indiana. (Compl.
2 ¶ 5). She alleges being photographed or surveilled but not by individuals on her property. (Compl.
3 ¶¶ 226, 228.) She also alleges instances that might constitute trespass, but without any alleged
4 recording activity. (Compl. ¶ 218 (alleging trash was stolen without alleging location of the trash),
5 ¶ 192 (alleging a window to her home was shattered).) Riales also alleges two instances of
6 individuals standing on her property and taking photographs; however, in neither instance does she
7 allege they were taking or attempting to take photographs of her “engaging in a private, personal, or
8 familial activity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a). Instead, she alleges these individuals took pictures
9 “of her home” and of her “food truck, car, license plates, and home,” and not of any activity or any
10 person in or around her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 221, 223.) She does not allege that these events took
11 place in California, evidencing a jurisdictional defect in her claims as the law does not apply to any
12 alleged recording “taken or captured outside of California.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5).
13 Because no Plaintiff has alleged an instance of legal trespass on their property with the intent
14 to photograph or record a private, personal, or familial activity, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against
15 Masterson for physical invasion of privacy in violation of section 1708.8(a). See Rakestraw, 81 Cal.
16 App. 4th at 43 (plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action).
17 4. Plaintiffs fail to plead a cause of action for constructive

18 invasion of privacy.
19 “A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to capture,
20 in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or
21 other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, familial activity, through
22 the use of any device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound
23 recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
24 device was used.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b). This statute is sometimes referred to as
25 “technological trespass” and applies when technology “enabled [a] defendant to secure an image or
26 recording that – but for the device – could not have been achieved without a trespass.” Judge
27 Kimberly A. Gaab & Sara Church Reese, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial
28 Claims & Defenses §2:906.2 (2019) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b)). The treatise further
11
1 explains that this provision “might apply, for example, if a defendant used a powerful telephoto lens
2 to capture an image from the public street, because otherwise it would be impossible to capture the
3 image without physically trespassing onto plaintiff’s property.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege
4 facts showing any instance of technological trespass, and certainly not one by Masterson at all.
5 For one thing, Jane Doe #2 alleges no instances of being photographed or recorded at all.
6 (Compl. ¶¶ 251-258.) The Bixler Plaintiffs allege they “observed vans parking outside their home
7 and filming their home and family.” (Compl. ¶ 95.) Yet, they do not allege the purported device
8 somehow enhanced or enabled the unspecified transgressors to record of film the Bixlers, as required
9 by Civil Code Section 1708.8(b). (Compl. ¶ 95.)
10 Jane Doe #1 alleges a driver of an SUV sat outside her home and “photograph[ed] her with
11 his cell phone.” (Compl. ¶ 178.) Yet, she does not allege the “image, sound recording, or other
12 physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used.”
13 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b). While Jane Doe #1 also alleges that a woman supposedly stood “outside
14 the curtilage” of Jane Doe #1’s home at night “surveilling her home,” she does not allege this
15 woman recorded her. (Compl. ¶ 189.)
16 Riales too alleges being photographed from a “nearby balcony” while on vacation in
17 Rehoboth Beach, Delaware in July 2018 (Compl. ¶ 226), but again California Civil Code section
18 1708.8 does not apply to any alleged recording “taken or captured outside of California.” Cal. Civ.
19 Code § 1708.8(f)(5). Because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting the elements of a claim for
20 constructive invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 1708.8(b), the Demurrer to their Third
21 Claim should be sustained. See Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43.
22 5. Plaintiffs do not allege the nature or extent of the emotional distress they
23 allegedly suffered.
24 “Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) ‘outrageous’ conduct by the
25 defendant, (2) that the defendant intended to cause (or recklessly disregarded the probability of
26 causing) emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) causation.” Angie M. v. Super.
27 Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1225-26 (1995). “[T]he mere allegation that the plaintiffs suffered
28 severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering
12
1 incurred as a result of defendant’s alleged outrageous conduct, fail[s] to state a cause of action for
2 intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037,
3 1047 (1988) (citing Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 617 (1985)).
4 Here, Plaintiffs allege only in conclusory fashion “[t]he aforesaid outrageous conduct caused
5 Plaintiffs severe emotional distress, suffering, anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and shame.” (Compl.
6 ¶ 291.) Plaintiffs provide no facts “indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering,” and
7 therefore, have failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
8 Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be
9 sustained.3 Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227 (affirming sustaining of demurrer on intentional
10 infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff failed to allege “specific facts sufficient to show
11 the severity of [plaintiff’s] alleged emotional distress”); Bogard, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 617-18
12 (affirming sustaining of demurrer on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where
13 plaintiffs “failed to set forth any facts which indicate the nature or extent of any mental suffering
14 incurred as a result of [defendant’s] alleged outrageous conduct”).
15 6. Bixler-Zavala’s claim for loss of consortium fails because his wife has not
16 alleged a cause of action.
17 “A cause of action for loss of consortium is, by its nature, dependent on the existence of a
18 cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse.” Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 746 (2007).
19 A cause of action for loss of consortium “stands or falls based on whether the spouse of the party
20 alleging loss of consortium has suffered an actionable tortious injury.” Id.
21 Here, Chrissie Bixler fails to allege any tort claim against Masterson, and fails to allege any
22 facts which indicate that Masterson was personally responsible for any alleged harm to her husband,
23 Cedric Bixler-Zavala other than the bare-bones and legally insufficient assertion that random
24 individuals were “agents” of Masterson. Therefore, Plaintiff Bixler-Zavala’s Fifth Claim for loss of
25 consortium based on “Defendants’ above-described tortious conduct” fails. (See Compl. ¶ 296);
26 Blain v. Doctor’s Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 1067 (1990) (affirming sustaining of demurrer
27 3
Further, any allegations which would constitute outrageous conduct on the part of Masterson are
irrelevant, immaterial and subject to a concurrently filed a Motion to Strike.
28
13
1 without leave to amend and noting “[s]ince [plaintiff] has no cause of action in tort [,] his spouse has
2 no cause of action for loss of consortium”).
3 C. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer, with Prejudice, Because Plaintiffs’
4 Claims Are Improperly Joined.
5 The Complaint amounts to a recitation of discrete events that each Plaintiff experienced
6 separately at different times and at different places. There is not a single alleged act that all of the
7 Plaintiffs experienced or suffered together. By way of example and without limitation, the following
8 allegations only apply to Bixler:
9  Compl. ¶ 98 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was filmed on a public street), ¶ 101 (alleging Plaintiff
10 Bixler was “harassed and photographed” at a nail salon), ¶ 119 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was
11 “run off the road by a vehicle that was following her”).
12 The following allegations only apply to Jane Doe#1:
13  ¶ 175 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was followed in a Best Buy store), ¶ 191 (alleging
14 Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was “accosted” at an accountant’s parking lot), ¶ 192 (alleging Plaintiff
15 Jane Doe #1 was “followed into a grocery store”).
16 The following allegations only apply to Riales:
17  ¶ 224 (alleging Plaintiff Riales was harassed in a restaurant), ¶ 226 (alleging Plaintiff Riales
18 was photographed on vacation in Delaware); and
19 ¶255 only applies to Jane Doe #2, alleging she was harassed at a grocery store. Most notably,
20 Plaintiffs claim that events occurred at their separate homes, which are not alleged to be in the same
21 neighborhood, let alone the same state. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 94-100, 108, 112 (allegations regarding
22 events occurring at or near Plaintiff Bixler’s home); id. ¶¶ 178, 185-189, 193, 195 (allegations
23 regarding events occurring at or near Plaintiff Jane Doe #1’s home); id. ¶¶ 221-223, 225, 228-231
24 (allegations regarding events occurring at or near Plaintiff Riales’ home); id. ¶ 254 (allegation
25 regarding event occurring at or near Plaintiff Jane Doe #2’s home).) Further, none of the allegations
26 indicates Masterson was involved.
27 Each of Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the occurrence of distinct events at different places
28 and during different times requires unique evidence to prove their veracity. Each plaintiff must bear
14
1 their own burden of proof with respect to their claims, and cannot trade off one another’s alleged
2 harm. For instance, Bixler showing that she was “harassed” at a hair salon does not absolve Jane
3 Doe #2 of her burden to show she was “harassed” at a grocery store. Id. ¶¶ 101, 192. Yet these
4 distinct and separate acts form the basis of Plaintiffs’ jointly-pleaded claims. Because Plaintiffs’
5 claims are premised on different acts that occurred at different times and in different locations, and
6 have very little if no overlap, they do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions.
7 See Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834; Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.
8 Further, Plaintiffs’ improper misjoinder of claims and parties is highly prejudicial to
9 Masterson. Without providing any factual basis for their claims, Plaintiffs allege that Masterson is
10 the mastermind of an alleged coordinated harassment campaign, a strategy which by design would
11 cause any jury to “evoke[s] an emotional bias against [Masterson] as an individual,” an emotional
12 response “which has very little effect on the issues,” especially given that Plaintiffs do not, and
13 cannot, allege any facts to support their claim that Masterson directly or indirectly participated in or
14 controlled any of the wrongful conduct complained of. People v. Gionis, at 1214 (1995). Plaintiffs’
15 Complaint is prejudicial on its face, since it attempts to implicate Masterson in the alleged wrongful
16 conduct complained of by association, without alleging any facts to support the claim that Masterson
17 was directly or indirectly involved. See People v. Sánchez, 63 Cal. 4th 411, 464 (2016) (In the
18 criminal context, “[p]rejudicial association might exist if the characteristics or culpability of one or
19 more defendants is such that the jury will find the remaining defendants guilty simply because of
20 their association with a reprehensible person, rather than assessing each defendant's individual guilt
21 of the crimes at issue.”). Therefore, joinder is not appropriate, and the demurrer should be sustained
22 without leave to amend. See Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 378(a)(1), 430.10(d); Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834;
23 Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654.
24 IV. CONCLUSION
25 For the foregoing reasons, Masterson respectfully requests the Court sustain the Demurrer
26 without leave to amend.

By: s/ Andrew B. Brettler
28 ANDREW B. BRETTLER
15
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) C.C.P. Revised 5/1/88
2
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
4 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400,
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906.
5
On the date set forth below, I served the foregoing document described as:
6
DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
7 PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
8
on the interested parties in this action as follows:
9
10 PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

11
[X] BY ELECTRONICALLY FILING with the Court and electronically serving true and
12 correct copies of the document on counsel of record listed below through ASAP Legal.
13 [X] BY MAIL: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal
14 service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the
ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is
15 presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after
date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
16
17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct. Executed April 30, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.
18
19
20
21
Noelia Echesabal
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
1 SERVICE LIST
2 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler; Cedric Bixler-Zavala; Jane Doe #1; Marie
Bobette Riales; and Jane Doe #2:
3
Robert W. Thompson, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice Admissions Pending)
Kristen A. Vierhaus, Esq.
4 THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C. Brian D. Kent, Esq.
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160 Gaetano D'Andrea, Esq.
5 Burlingame, CA 94010-1931 M. Stewart Ryan, Esq.
Tel: (650) 513-6111 / Fax: (650) 513-6071 Helen L. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
6 Emails: bobby@tlopc.com Lauren Stram, Esq.
kris@tlopc.com LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
7 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
8 Tel: (215) 399-9255 / Fax: (215) 241-8700
9 Jeffrey P. Fritz, Esq.

SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P.C.
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
10 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Tel: (215) 732-2260 / Fax: (215) 732-2289
11
Marci Hamilton, Esq.
12 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Fox-Fels Building
13 3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
14 Tel: (215) 353-8984 / Fax: (215) 493-1094
15 Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid, Esq.

Lea P. Bucciero, Esq.
PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
16 One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
Miami, FL 33131
17 Tel: (305) 358-2800 / Fax: (305) 358-2382
18 Attorneys for Defendants Church of Attorneys for Defendant Religious
Scientology International and Church of Technology Center:
19 Scientology Celebrity Centre International:
Robert E. Mangels, Esq.
20 William H. Foreman, Esq. Matthew D. Hinks, Esq.
David C. Scheper, Esq. Iman G. Wilson, Esq.
21 Margaret E. Dayton, Esq. JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP MITCHELL LLP
22 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2701 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308
Tel: (213) 613-4655 / Fax: (213) 613-4656' Tel: (310) 203-8080 / Fax: (310) 203-0567
23 Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
Emails: wforman@scheperkim.com
dscheper@scheperkim.com mhinks@jmbm.com
24 pdayton@scheperkim.com iwilson@jmbm.com
25 Specially-Appearing Attorneys for Defendant David Miscavige:
26 Jeffrey K. Riffer, Esq.

ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP
27 10345 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064
28 Tel: (310) 746-4400 / Fax: (310) 746-4499
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
Court Reservation Receipt | Journal Technologies Court Portal Page 1 of 1
Journal Technologies Court Portal
Court Reservation Receipt

Reservation
Reservation ID: Status:
070750198339 RESERVED
Reservation Type: Number of Motions:
Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) 1
Case Title:
Case Number: CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER, et al. vs CHURCH
19STCV29458 OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, et al.
Filing Party: Location:
Daniel Masterson (Defendant) Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 57
Date/Time: Confirmation Code:
June 19th 2020, 8:30AM CR-I99CEC7VFE6GN93NL
Fees
Description Fee Qty Amount
Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) 120.00 1 120.00
Credit Card Percentage Fee (2.75%) 3.30 1 3.30
TOTAL $123.30
Payment
Amount: Type:
$123.30 Visa
Account Number: Authorization:
XXXX9918 093924
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Bixler v. Scientology: Danny Masterson's Demurrer To FAC

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Bixler v. Scientology: Danny Masterson's Demurrer To FAC

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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 04/30/2020 02:29 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Soto,Deputy Clerk

1 ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO. 262928)

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

11 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

13 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON’S

22 Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019

3697-9 DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMEDNED COMPLAINT

5 Dated: April 30, 2020 LAVELY & SINGER P. C.

8 By: s/ Andrew B Brettler

5 One through Five, on the following grounds:

6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action

12 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action

16 Procedure section 430.10(d).

20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action

23 Procedure section 430.10(d).

26 demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

6 Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

7 Demurrer to Fifth Cause of Action

9 subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(d).

13 Special Demurrer to All Causes of Action

17 4th 758, 767 (2010).

18 WHEREFORE, Masterson respectfully requests that the Demurrer to the Complaint be

20 1. The demurrer to all causes of action be sustained without leave to amend;

21 2. The Complaint be dismissed, with prejudice;

22 3. Judgment be entered in favor of Masterson;

23 4. Fees and costs be awarded to Masterson; and

25 Dated: April 30, 2020 LAVELY & SINGER P. C.

4 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................. 1

4 Angie M. v. Super. Ct.,

5 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (1995) ................................................................................................. 12, 13

6 Blain v. Doctor’s Co.,

11 C&H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,

16 Doe v. City of Los Angeles,

10 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037 (1988) ...................................................................................................... 13

11 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Srvc.,

16 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 ..................................................................................................................... 12

17 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) ....................................................................................................... 9, 10, 11

18 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) .......................................................................................................... 11, 12

20 Cal. Civ. Code § 2295 .......................................................................................................................... 8

27 single instance of wrongdoing at the hands of Mr. Masterson.

26 conduct outlined in the Complaint.

5 even properly pleaded.

12 by amendment and must be dismissed with prejudice.

16 II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 Further, absent “exceptional circumstances,” a plaintiff in California is not permitted to file a

8 (“Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open”).

9 Lastly, a demurrer must be sustained where “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.”

20 to Masterson, as unfounded allegations that Masterson is the mastermind of an alleged coordinated

22 alarm, threaten, and harass Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 264.)

26 computers, and/or other digital devices.” (Id. ¶ 276.)

27  Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for constructive invasion of privacy is based on

3 impressions.” (Id. ¶ 282.)

8 otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly.” (Id. ¶ 288.)

12 injured.” (Id. ¶ 296.)

14 166, 177, 184, 255.)

2 2. Plaintiffs’ first claim fails because Plaintiffs do no allege facts

20 who broke into her home or followed her”).

21 3. Plaintiffs do not allege facts demonstrating the essential elements

3 that Masterson ever engaged in such conduct at any time.

7 individual who allegedly caused the property damage. (Compl. ¶ 252.)