TRAIN COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS)

Development of Train Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) has been taken up by

RDSO of Indian Railways as an indigenous Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
system. As observed world-wide, due to increase in Train Speeds and Traffic
Density– Train Drivers tend to commit mistakes in optimum and safe application of
brakes resulting in increase in number of train accidents. “Automatic Train Protection
(ATP)” systems act as an aid to the train drivers in such situations by automatic
application of braking in case it is missed by Train Driver.

ATP systems with Cab signalling like TCAS are needed in such situations of high
speed & foggy weather to provide aid & confidence to driver in lack of which train
operations also get affected.
Salient Features:
• Suitable for specific requirement & conditions Indian Railways
• Prevention of Signal Passing at Danger (SPAD) :
(SPAD is second-most safety concern after accidents at LC Gates)
• Speed Supervision
• Cab Signalling
• User Friendly monitor for Train Drivers
• Helpful in Foggy Weather
• Centralized monitoring of real-time train movement.
• Multiple vendors due to open interface architecture - Free from monopoly
• Adherence to high international standards
• Indigenous, cost effective system
• Future prospects for Export
Status of TCAS Development:
• The Proof of Concept to demonstrate the technology was made through Field Trials in
October – November 2012.
• Development work of interoperable & operationally deployable version of TCAS
encompassing 250 km section & 40 Locomotives was distributed among three
different indigenous firms.
• As initial phase, field trials of key test scenarios including interoperability carried out
over 32 km Section and 4 Locomotives with operationally deployable versions of
prototypes from two firms. Third firm also off late commenced field trials in the way
for development of interoperable product.
• Presently, fabrication of material, their testing and Site execution activities such as
Towers etc. for Full-fledged field trial encompassing 250 km section with 40
Locomotives to be taken up in Feb – Mar’2015 are in progress.
Outcome:
• Increased Safety
• Aid to Loco Drivers for convenience in operations, foggy weather.

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 1. Introduction of Field Demonstration:
(a) TCAS is for assistance and shall not normally apply the brakes if the
operating rules are followed and the speeds are within limit.
(b) It shall take action of braking only when the movements and speeds
are not in accordance with operating rules.
(c) Therefore, for testing and demonstration of its capabilities, staff would
be asked to deliberately violate certain rules such as the driver to
increase speed even when the signal is red etc. However, these
activities will be performed after ensuring that other requisite conditions
for safety are fulfilled.

2. Schematic arrangement

Apart from Station & Loco Units, there are RFID tags installed on track. RFID tags
provide static information related to section such as Location, Speed information etc.
Loco Unit is an embedded system with peripherals like Brake Interface, RFID
Reader, Driver Machine Interface, Radio Communication etc. Stationary (Stations,
IB, mid-section interlocked LC Gates) Units have Radio Communication, Interface to
Interlocking and networking. They have all static information in its database, signal
related dynamic information, dynamic information of various locomotives in its
territory and intelligence to guide various Locomotives. Proper functioning of System
to assist Loco Pilot is obtained through coordination of Loco & Stationary Equipment.

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 3. Comparison of functional features of TCAS with ETCS

Feature ETCS ETCS TCAS

Level-1 Level-2 (IR-ATP)
Cab Signalling Yes Yes Yes
Line side signal Required Optional Required
Continuous supervision Yes Yes Yes
Continuous update of Movement Authority No Yes Yes
Suitable for Auto signalling Yes Yes Not implemented
presently, but work in
progress with scheme
planned
Networked Remote Display of Real-time No Yes Yes
Train Movement in Control Office
Collision prevention (without help of No No Yes
Signalling, with the help of absolute
location)
SOS feature No No Yes
SIL-4 Yes Yes Yes
Invulnerability to theft (No costly trackside No Yes Yes
devices)
Easy to operate No No Yes
Cost High Very High Low

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4. (A) Field Trials / History for development of TCAS:
(a) Field Trials of May 2012: These basic Field Trials were done in Lucknow – Manak
Nagar - Amausi –Piparsand –Section to ascertain feasibility of components like Radio,
RFID & GPS.

(b) Field Concept Trials of Oct-Nov’2012 : Following Lab testing in 2012, Field Concept
Trials made in Oct – Nov’ 2012 to demonstrate the technology in association with
HBL, Hyderabad. However, improvements were to be made in that model to make it
operationally deployable keeping multi-vendor interoperability also under
consideration. This Field Trial was witnessed by Chairman Railway Board, Member
Electrical, Additional Member (Signal), General Manager /SC Railway, Divisional
Railway Manager and other officials.

(c) Preliminary Field Trials of Aug-Sept’2013 : Detailed studies of components such as

RFID, Radio was made under dynamic conditions. Demonstration of prototype without
need of static database of section onboard was made.

(d) Field Trials of Sept’2013 : multi-vendor interoperability was commenced at

preliminary stage.

(e) Field Trials of Dec’2013 - Jan’2014 - Feb’2014 – Sept’2014 – Till date : This phase of
trials included testing of various features involving Braking Unit interface such as
SPAD Prevention, Speed Supervision etc. The system with key features has been
demonstrated in field with multi-vendor interoperability.

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5. Development of Operationally deployable interoperable TCAS product :
Development of operationally deployable and multi-vendor interoperable product
was planned by placing order to 3 different firms from industry as under.

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6. Firm-wise TCAS installation:
Package-A Firm (Medha) : Tandur & Mantatti Stations
Electric Loco WAG-7 27854
Diesel Loco WDG 3A 13616

Package-B Firm (Kernex) : Nawandgi & Kurgunta Stations

Electric Loco WAG-7 28016
Diesel Loco WDG 3A 13414

Package-C Firm (HBL) : Electric Loco WAG-7 27831

7. Arrangements for Demonstration:

Stations equipped with TCAS:
Tandur, Mantatii, Nawandgi, Kurgunta (Consecutive Stations)

Electric Loco equipped with TCAS:

WAG-7 27854, WAG-7 27831 (Kazipet Electric Loco Shed)
WDG-3A 13414 (Kazipet Diesel Loco Shed)

8. Trains formations for Demonstration:

(A) RDSO Train Formation as following to be kept at Tandur on Up Line for further
movement to Mantatti. This would be TCAS equipped Main Train which shall take
Railway Board Team from Tandur to Kurgunta Common Loop.

Loco WAG-7 SLR GS GS GS SLR Loco WDG 3A

27854 07725 07412 12254 10436 12731 13414

(B) RDSO Light Engine 27831: This shall be kept at Down Loop Line of Nawandgi
ready to move towards Mantatti when Train Formation leaves from Tandur.

This Loco shall be left first in Nawandgi-Mantatti Block Section on Down Line and
later on Train Formation hauled by Loco 27854 shall be sent to Mantatti – Nawandgi
Block Section on UP Line. In Nawandgi – Mantatti Block Section on Down Line, it
shall be be stopped for 3 minutes at km 57.5 km. On clearance from Block Section, it
shall be immediately sent to Tandur for testing when the RDSO Train formation
returns from Kurgunta and Calling-on testing is done with this Loco 27831 on
berthing track & formation being received on Down Calling of Tandur.

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 Station TCAS Equipment
& its interfacing to
Relay Room

Station Tower &

Antennae

Page 7 of 36
 Radio
Modems

Braking Unit

Kernex Loco
Equipment

Electronic Module Electronic Module

(Braking Unit) (Logic Unit)

Radio Unit

Pneumatic Unit

Medha Loco
Equipment

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 RFID Reader on Loco

Antennae on Loco

RFID

Page 9 of 36
Frequently used terms
Movement Authority : Distance upto which permission to move is granted. In case of
Signal at Red ahead, it is the distance from current position of Locomotive to the Signal at
Red.

Distance Supervision : Train should not be allowed to move beyond the Movement
Authority. The Speed should reduce to zero when it reaches End of Movement Authority.
Brakes shall be applied by him, and if not by him, by TCAS to ensure so.

Speed Supervision: There may be need to follow speed limit within the Movement
Authority on account of PSR etc. For example, there may be situation when Movement
Authority available is adequate, say 10 km, but there is 75 kmph speed restriction 1 km ahead
of train. In such case, there shall be need to apply the brakes not on account of Movement
Authority but on account of Speed Restriction. Brakes shall be applied by him, and if not by
him, by TCAS to ensure so.

Target Speed : This is the lower permissible speed ahead.

Target Distance: It is the distance from current position of Locomotive to the spot where
from “Target Speed” is required to be observed.

Permitted Speed: Maximum Speed which should be observed to follow Movement

Authority (Distance Supervision) & Target Speed (Speed Supervision). In Normal case, it
shall be Maximum Permissible Speed of the section or Loco, whichever is less.

Driver Machine Interface (DMI) provides visual display and Audio alerts to the Loco Pilot. It
also receives inputs from the Loco Pilot through buttons and switches.

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Various Symbols:

Normal Mode

Staff Responsible (SR) Mode

Train Trip Mode

Post Trip Mode

Override Action Mode

On Sight Mode

Shunt Mode

Service Brake

Emergency Brake

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TCAS Field Demo : List of Scenarios (24.11.2014)
Test Scenarios Line
Tandur Station (Electric LocoWAG-7 27854 leading):
T-01 : Station Equipment Visit
T-02 : Real-time Display of Train Movement on Monitor
----
T-03 : Auto-health Test of TCAS Braking on Boot-up
T-04: Transition from Staff Responsible Mode to Normal Mode
T-05 : Various DMI Displays in Loco
Tandur – Mantatti Block Section: Up
T-06: Train Length Determination Main
T-07: Manual Brake Test
T-08: LC Gate 12 Approach Warning in Locomotive (km 67/24-26)
T-09: SPAD Prevention at Mantatti Up Home
Mantatti Station: Up
T-10 : Detection of entry to Wrong Line by placing other line RFID Tag on track Main
Mantatti – Nawandgi Block Section: 27854
T-11:Head-on Collision Prevention (Virtual) between LE 27831 and Formation 27854 on Up,
T-12: Loco generated SOS (involving LE 27831 & Formation hauled by 27854) 26831
T-13:Unusual Stoppage: Side Collision Msg (involving LE 27831 and Formation 27854) on
T-14: Permanent Speed Restriction PSR (75 kmph @ km 56.5 to 55.3) Down
Nawandgi Station: Up
T-15: Generation of Manual SoS from Station Main
Nawandgi – Kurgunta Block Section: Up
T-16: Stationary Communication Failure
Kurgunta Station (Now Diesel Loco WDG-3A 13414 leading): CMN
T-17: Transition from Staff Responsible Mode to Normal Mode Loop
T-18 : Override Common L/L Dn Starter Sig and On-sight Mode upto Dn Adv Starter
Kurgunta - Nawandgi Block Section: Down
T-19 :SPAD Prevention at Nawandgi Down Home Signal
Nawandgi Station: Down
T-20: IP based Real-time Train Movement Display on Tablet / Mobile Main
T-21: Control Table Testing – effect of Point Indication on Movement Authority
Nawandgi – Mantatti Block Section: Down
T-22 : Permanent Speed Restriction PSR (75 kmph @ km 55.3 to 56.5)
T-23: Continuous update of Movement Authority (delayed clearance of Home Signal)
Mantatti Station: Down
T-24: Put back Mainline Starter Signal – Trip, Post Trip Main
Mantatti – Tandur Block Section: Down
T-25: LC Gate 12 Approach Warning in Locomotive (km 67/24-26)
Tandur Station:
T-26: Reception on Calling-on Signal with Loco 27831 ahead on same berth. Track ----
T-27: Shunting Mode for Coupling

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13414 27854

27831

Tandur Mantatti Nawandgi Kurgunta

Page 13 of 36
Description of Various Scenarios
Station Visit at Tandur
Various stations have been connected on cable through which status
of trackside (signal aspects etc) and trains can be seen on monitored
on GUI Yard diagram. This system is interfaced with Station TCAS units
through wiring, thus it is able to display all the Signal aspects
irrespective of the fact whether its status is being transmitted on Air or
not.

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Information Displayed on TCAS DMI :
Most of the information displayed is in form of Analog Displays in form of Circular Gauges
(Arcs) and bars keeping ergonomics and convenience of Loco Pilots. Digital values have
also been additionally displayed. Audio prompts and warnings also are implemented.

Following information is provided by TCAS DMI for Loco Pilot :

• Movement Authority
• Mode of operation – Normal (Full Supervision), Override, Isolation, Staff
Responsible etc.
• Details of Signal on Approach: UP / DN, Type of Signal, Line Number, Signal
Aspect
• Target Speed
• Current Speed
• Permitted Speed
• Target Distance
• Absolute Location
• Locomotive ID
• Locomotive Modes
• RF Signal Indication
• Normal Format RFID Tag Read Indication
• Date & Time
• LC Gate Approach Warning
• Various Prompts, Messages such as Train Length Measurement etc.

TCAS DMI Screen Layout

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Page 16 of 36
Train Length Determination by TCAS

On Exit of Station, the Train Length shall be measured and displayed on

the DMI. This Train Length Measurement Logic is independent of Speed
and communication Delays.

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 Manual Brake Test

Manual Brake Test shall be done by pressing Button

utton on Driver Machine
Interface (DMI)) for assessment of its Braking Characteristics.

Real-time Display of Speed – Distance (Abs Loc) Curve : Display of MBT (Yellow)

Page 18 of 36
LC Gate Approach Warning

It provides warning on approach of LC Gates. Gates. First of all visual

warning appear followed by sounding a buzzer & whistle blow blow. This
methodology can be considered to automatically blow the
Locomotive Whistle. In order to demonstrate, the LC Gate Approach
Warningg has been arranged through TCAS for LC Gate no. 12 (mid (mid-
block section C-Class
Class Non-interlocked
N LC Gate in Tandur – Mantatti
Block Section)) at km 67/24-26
67/24 in both – UP & Down – directions.

a) Visual indication is generated at 600m from the LC gate ahead.

b) In continuation with Visual warning, Whistle shall be blown from

400m from the LC gate ahead.

Speed Supervision for Temporary Speed Restriction

There is actual 30 kmph TSR on Bridge no. 53 at km 65/3-1. This information is
communicated to Train by placing a TSR RFID tag on track approx. 1 km
before the TSR commencement. The TCAS equipped train carries out speed
supervision for TSR accordingly.

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SPAD Prevention at Mantatti Up Home / Down Nawandgi Signal

Home Signal shall be kept at ON with all other conditions such as route
setting, locking etc., fulfilled for taking it OFF. Loco Pilot is instructed to
approach the Home Signal at Red with maximum permissible speed for
testing purpose. It shall be observed whether TCAS applies the brakes
to stop Train before Home Signal at Red (Stop).

On instruction from RDSO team through VHF set, the Station Master shall
then clear the Up Home Signal.
Signal

Orange : FSB

Red : EB

Orange : FSB

TCAS preventing SPAD (FSB in Orange, TCAS EB in Red)

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Prevention of SPAD at Home Signal:

SPAD Prevention: Approaching

Home Signal at Red, Service
Brake Application by TCAS

SPAD Prevention: Crossed Distant Signal

& Approaching Inner Distant Signal with
Home Signal at Red

SPAD Prevention:
Train Stopped by
TCAS prior to
Mantatti Down Home
SPAD Prevention:
Outside view of Train
Stopped by TCAS at
Mantatti Down Home
Signal

SPAD Prevention : Train

stopped by TCAS before
Home Signal at Red in
Heavy Rains with wet
Rails

Page 21 of 36
Detection of Entry
ntry to Wrong Line
TCAS determines physical movement of train through traversal of RFID tags on track.
Normally it should match with the route set by conventional signal interlocking. However, in
case of mismatch, the Station shall generate SOS to stop the train moving on unexpected line.

A tag corresponding to other line is placed on the line on which the movement is taking place
to simulate wrong line entry. The Loco shall be stopped by command from Stationary TCAS
Unit.

After this demonstration, the actual position of train shall be restored by swiping RFID tags
corresponding to Common Loop Line.
Testing with Virtual Loco Simulation
Testing of numerous
rous conditions for conflicts in various Locomotive positions is practical
practically
not possible. These can, however, be tested through Loco Simulator.

After taking OFF Up Common Loop line Starter Signal, One “Virtual Loco” shall be placed
between this signal andd “Up Advanced Starter” Signal. Loco Equipment shall receive the
status (reduced Movement Authority, Red Signal Aspect) as if this Signal is not OFF
protecting “Virtual Loco”. On removal of “Virtual Loco”, Up Common Loop line Starter
Signal shall be restored to OFF.

Head-on
on Collision Prevention in Mantatti – Nawandgi B/S
• Both the RDSO Train Formation and Light Engine 27831, would move into the Block
Section in opposite directions physically on UP & DOWN lines (different
different lines
lines)
respectively. Down Light Engine shall be virtually shifted on “UP Line” heading
towards Mantatti Station by swiping UP Line RFID tags, creating virtual Head Head-on
collision situation.
• Since RFID Tags are installed throughout Block Section, if Light Engine is allowed to
move towards Mantatti, it shall again acquire status of being on Down Line. In order
to prevent this for testing demonstration, the Light Engine 27831 is restricted to
proceed further but continue to retain status of being on UP Line & heading towards
Mantatti. Loco Pilot lot of RDSO Train Formation shall increase speed to Maximum
Permissible Speed. It shall be observed that TCAS applies brakes when the trains
come closer to prevent virtual Head
Head-on Collision Prevention.

Virtual Position

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Speed Supervision at Permanent Speed Restriction:
Testing Permanent Speed Restriction of 75 kmph has been provided for TCAS testing
between Mantatti – Nawandgi on both – Up & Down lines.

Approaching PSR zone:

displaying Target Speed
& Target Distance
Loco Speed (86 kmph)
highly above permitted
speed (75 kmph) :
Emergency Brake
application by TCAS

Loco speed (70 kmph)

within Permitted Speed (75
kmph)

Loco speed (78 kmph) little

above Permitted Speed (75
kmph) : Warning to Loco
Pilot regarding overspeed

Loco Speed (81 kmph) substantially

above permitted speed (75 kmph) :
Service Brake application by TCAS

Page 23 of 36
Loco Simulator, Realtime Display of Train Movements
Through Loco Simulator and arrangement of realtime display of TCAS
network (including other stations), testing of various scenarios can be
easily made. An example is discussed here. This example is for
additional check being performed by TCAS over and above those by
Interlocking. The train formation shall be made to move on common
loopline in “Normal Mode”. Although not physically possible if
Interlocking is functioning alright, another “Virtual Train” is forced to
enter this loopline through Loco Simulator. Station TCAS unit shall detect
that both the trains are heading towards same portion of track; it shall
command braking to both the trains. Station is capable of detecting
such conflict even after a train has crossed the signal under legitimate
move and another train enters to same portion of track subsequently.

Page 24 of 36
 Loop-line Speed Control

DMI Displaying Application of brakes

Target Distance and as Loco Speed is
Target Speed for substantially above
Loopline at Up permitted speed
Home Signal of
Kurgunta for L-4

Display of Release Distance

Yellow : NSB

TCAS bringing the speed within allowed limit of 30kmph for loopline

Page 25 of 36
Shunt Mode:

Speed Control of Locomotive in Shunt

Mode. No control implemented from
station
Brake Isolation

Brake Isolation
Calling-ON Signal

Up Calling – On signal of
Nawandgi

Display of Nawandgi Up Home

Calling-on on DMI

15 kmph Speed
Control following Page 26 of 36
Calling - on
Continuous Update of Movement Authority : Distinct Advantage over ETCS L-1

Continuous Update of Movement

Authority: Initially MA is less as the
Signal is Red

Continuous update of MA : As MA is less due to Signal being

Red and Loco Speed being excessive, brakes are applied

Continuous update of MA : As the MA

increases on clearing the signal, the
brakes are released

Continuous Update of MA : Signal turned Green

subsequently

Page 27 of 36
Signal Put back to Red in face of fast moving approaching train

Mantatti Down Main Line

Starter Signal initially Green
15 kmph Speed Control following

Movement Authority: 3000m+.

Movement Authority sent from station was held for

some time (few cycles)

Movement Authority reduces when Loco

(80 kmph) was about to cross Starter Signal

Train Trip Message on crossing Starter

Signal

Page 28 of 36
 Advanced Starter Signal was kept at
Green

Tripped train stopped almost at Advanced Starter

Signal. Prompt for confirming “Post Trip”

Blinking indications for “P-TRP” and

“CNFM” buttons

Prompt for Staff Responsible Mode

Entering into Staff Responsible Mode on

pressing CNFM button

Page 29 of 36
SMS Alert on SPAD / crossing End of Authority

Page 30 of 36
Test Scenario: Override at Kurgunta Down Loop Line Starter Signal L-4 at Red

Override Mode Selected

On sight Mode on crossing

Kurgunta Down Loop Line
Starter Signal L-4 at Red
following Override

On sight Mode: Speed

Control up to Next Signal in
On-sight Mode

Page 31 of 36
Loco generated SOS
Manual SOS shall be initiated by Light Engine 27831. Brakes shall be applied in
RDSO Train Formation. The TCAS brakes shall be released once the SOS is
cancelled from Light Engine 27831.

Unusual Stoppage: Side Collision Message

Unusual Stoppage condition is generated by moving Light Engine 27831 a
little and stopping again without Acknowledgement by Driver. The “Unusual
Stoppage : Side Collision Message” will be received in Train Formation which
shall vanish when it is cancelled from Light Engine.

Station generated SOS:

Manual SOS would be generated from Nawandgi Station. It would be
received in RDSO Train Formation and brakes would be applied. On
cancellation of SOS from Station, the brakes shall be released and train shall
be allowed to move ahead.

Station Communication Failure:

After establishing Radio Communication from Kurgunta Station on approach
of Kurgunta Station, the Radio Transmission shall be deliberately switched OFF
to create Communication Failure situation. The Train shall enter into “Staff
Responsible” Mode and “Speed Restriction” shall be observed. On restoration
of Station Transmission, the Loco shall eventually enter into Normal Mode.

Exit from TCAS Territory

On exit from TCAS Territory, full-fledged protection by TCAS shall no
more be available. This fact is to be brought into cognizance of Loco
Pilot. Therefore, system displays the message on DMI prompting Loco
Pilot to acknowledge, In case Loco Pilot does not acknowledge within
stipulated time, brakes shall be applied by TCAS automatically. The
brake shall be released on acknowledgement by Loco Pilot. After that,
the Loco shall be run under Driver’s Responsibility (Staff Responsible
Mode).

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Dignitaries Visits - TCAS Field Demo

Lab Demo for TCAS Concept Trial (Sept’2012)

Media Address by the-then CRB after TCAS Field

Concept Demo (Oct’2012)

Inspection by Member Electrical (Jan’2014)

GM/SCR, Sr.ED/Signal/RDSO, DRM in background

Media Address by Member Electrical after TCAS Inspection (Jan’2014)

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Inspection by Member Mechanical (Feb’2014)

Field Demo to CRS, Secunderabad

Field Demo to Shri Vivek Sahai & others

(March’2014)

Lab Model demo to Director General & other RDSO Officers

(July’2014)

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 Demo of TCAS Lab Model to CRS, Lucknow(July’2014)

Lab Demo to CEO IRSE, London & Technical

Director, SNCF (Aug’2014)

Lab Demo of interoperable BTM / Balise stage development to

the-then AM(Signal) at IRISET (Sept’2014)

Page 35 of 36
TCAS Lab Demo at RDSO, Lucknow to Hon’ble Minister of States for Railways (Oct’2014)

Page 36 of 36