Crim Pro Fourth Set Cases

[G.R. Nos. 133448-53. October 6, 2000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROSELINDO CUTAMORA and ALLAN CUTAMORA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
This is an appeal interposed from the decision of the Agusan del Sur
Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 646, 647, 648, 649, 650 and 651
finding Roselindo Cutamora and Allan Cutamora guilty of raping Virginia
Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Cutamora Tampos. Appellants assailed
the sufficiency of the information for its failure to state the dates of the alleged
commission of rape. Likewise, they questioned the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
An information is sufficient as long as its states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting the same. It is likewise
sufficient if the time averred is near the actual date as the information of the
prosecuting officer will permit. Since that was done in this case, the defense
could not have been substantially prejudiced. As to the trial court's
assessment on the credibility of the witnesses, the Court found the same
binding and conclusive, there being no tinge of arbitrariness or oversight. It is
simply improbable for the victims, all minors, naive and innocent to the ways
of the world, to concoct and weave such sordid details of sexual assaults as
can be told only by those who have been personally subjected to it.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; MUST BE

COMPLETE TO ENABLE ACCUSED TO PREPARE DEFENSE. — It is thus
imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be complete to the
end that the accused may suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates
the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS OF A SUFFICIENT INFORMATION. — An
information is sufficient as long as it states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constituting the same. It is likewise
sufficient if the time averred is near the actual date as the information of the
prosecuting officer will permit, and since that was done in this case, it was not
shown that the time proved did not surprise or substantially prejudice the
defense.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; PRECISE TIME THE RAPE WAS COMMITTED,
NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME AND HENCE, NEED NOT BE
ACCURATELY STATED. — Rape victims do not cherish in their memories an
accurate account of the dates, number of times and manner they were
violated. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential
element in the crime of rape and therefore need not be accurately stated.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; OBJECTIONS
THERETO NOT RAISED PRIOR TO ARRAIGNMENT, DEEMED WAIVED. — More
importantly, it is too late at this stage for the accused-appellants to raise the
issue of sufficiency or insufficiency of the informations filed against them. They
should have raised this issue prior to their arraignment. The records bear out
that accused-appellants did not offer any objection in this regard before they
entered their plea during the arraignment. Consequently, they are deemed to
have waived any objection on this ground pursuant to Sec. 8 of Rule 117. The
defense should have moved for a bill of particulars granting that the time of
the commission of the offense was not sufficiently and definitely alleged.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; EVALUATION THEREOF
MADE BY TRIAL COURT ENTITLED TO RESPECT. — Evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its
assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONIES OF CHILD-VICTIMS, GIVEN FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDIT. — It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERING THAT COMPLAINTS WERE FILED
AGAINST THEIR OWN KIN, COMPLAINANTS' LACK OF ILL-MOTIVE,
BELIEVABLE. — The complainants' lack of ill-motive to file the rape charges is
even more believable considering that their complaints were filed against their
own kin. TEDHaA
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE TESTIMONIES.
— In the absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail
over the positive testimonies of the victim, who had no improper motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Accused-brothers Roselindo and Allan Cutamora were each charged with

three (3) counts of rape committed against their nieces Virginia Cutamora,
Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Cutamora Tampos. The Informations read:
Crim. Case No. 647:
"The undersigned Prosecutor III, as Officer-in-Charge, Office
of the Provincial Prosecution, Agusan del Sur, upon sworn
complaint originally filed by the offended party, accuses
ROSELINDO CUTAMORA of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows:
That sometime in the year 1989 up to May, 1993, inside the
house of Uldarico Cutamora, at Kalaitan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge repeatedly with his niece one
Virginia Cutamora when she was seven (7) years old until she
became eleven (11) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code)
Government Center, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, Philippines,
September 8, 1993."
Crim. Case No. 651:
of the Provincial Prosecution, Agusan del Sur, upon a sworn
complaint originally filed by the offended party, accuses ALLAN
CUTAMORA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That sometime in the year 1989 up to 1993, inside the house
of Uldarico Cutamora, at Kalaitan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
Virginia Cutamora when she was seven (7) years old until she
became eleven (11) years old against her will.
September 8, 1993."
Crim. Case No. 648:
follows:
Gina Cutamora when she was six (6) years old until she became
eight (8) years old, against her will.
September 8, 1993."
Crim. Case No. 649:
"The undersigned Prosecutor III, as Officer-in-Charge, Officer
Gina Cutamora when she was six (6) years old until she became
eight (8) years old, against her will.
September 8, 1993."
Crim. Case No. 646:
follows:
Beatriz Tampos y Cutamora when she was ten (10) years old until
she became thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
September 8, 1993."
Crim. Case No. 650:
of the Provincial Prosecution, Agusan del Sur, upon sworn
That sometime in the year 1990 up to 1993, at Kalaitan,
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
repeatedly with his niece one Beatriz Tampos y Cutamora when
she was ten (10) years old until she became thirteen (13) years
old, against her will.
September 8, 1993."
Accused-brothers entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges. Trial
on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution satisfactorily established that the complaining witnesses,
Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora, and Beatriz Tampos y Cutamora were all
staying at the house of their grandparents Uldarico and Cedra Cutamora at
Kalaitan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. Also residing with them were their uncles,
accused Roselindo and Allan Cutamora.
Virginia Cutamora was first sexually assaulted by her uncle Roselindo
Cutamora when she was only seven (7) years old. She was ordered to bow
down her head after which accused Roselindo, having removed his pants and
briefs, inserted his penis into her anus. She felt excruciating pain but could not
do otherwise. Having satisfied himself, Roselindo warned Virginia not to tell on
him or she would be hurt.
The following day, Virginia suffered the same fate at the hands of
accused Allan Cutamora. While inside the room, Virginia was made to lie down.
Allan took off his clothes, mounted her and made push and pull movements.
The accused then warned her not to tell on him else she would be killed.
Roselindo and Allan repeatedly performed those bestial acts on Virginia
until she became eleven (11) years old.
In 1991, Gina Cutamora was then six (6) years old. At such a tender age,
she already suffered at the hands of her uncles Roselindo and Allan Cutamora.
It was daytime when she was first ravished by accused Allan inside the house
of her grandparents. Gina was made to lie down while accused Allan positioned
himself on top of her and made push and pull movements.
Roselindo took his turn the following day. After all the other members of
the household have left for the farm, he molested Gina inside their kitchen.
Beatriz was only ten (10) years old when she was subjected to the lustful
desires of Roselindo. Her ordeal at the hands of Roselindo lasted until she was
thirteen (13) years old. Everytime she was raped, it was always at knife point.
Roselindo warned her not to tell on him else she would be killed.
Accused Allan likewise did not spare Beatriz. Beatriz's first sexual assault
at the hands of Allan happened inside their kitchen. Beatriz could not recall
how may times she was assaulted. She did not divulge to anybody her ordeal
because she feared for her life.
Accused-appellants denied the charges filed against them. They averred
that the accusations thrown against them are devoid of any basis and are
utterly meritless. They maintained that they were at their farm at the time of
the supposed incidents.
After an exhaustive assessment of the evidence presented by both
parties, the trial court found the two accused guilty as charged and accordingly
sentenced them, thus:
"In Crim. Cases Nos. 646, 647 and 648, accused Roselindo
Cutamora is sentenced to:
1] Three separate penalties of reclusion perpetua;
2] Indemnify Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz
Tampos the amount of P50,000.00 each;
3] Pay Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos
P20,000.00 each representing moral damages; and
Tampos P30,000.00 each for exemplary damages.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 649, 650 and 651, accused Allan
Cutamora is sentenced to:
1] Three separate penalties of Reclusion Perpetua;
2] Indemnify victims Gina Cutamora, Virginia Cutamora and
Beatriz Tampos the sum of P50,000.00 each;
3] Pay Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos
P20,000.00 each for moral damages; and
Tampos P30,000.00 each representing exemplary damages.
With costs. 1
In the instant appeal, accused-appellants impute the following errors on
the part of the lower court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
INFORMATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION FOR ITS FAILURE TO STATE THE DATES OF THE
ALLEGED COMMISSION OF SIX COUNTS OF RAPE, IT BEING
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INFORMATIONS ARE
SUFFICIENT, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S (sic) GUILT HAVE
(sic) BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 2
Accused-appellants submit that the date and time of the alleged
commission of the rape incidents as stated in the six (6) informations were
"vague and ambiguous" and "too indefinite to give herein appellants an
opportunity to prepare their defense". 3
This Court is not persuaded. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all
of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (Italics
supplied)
The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. Elaborating on the accused's right to be
informed, this Court held in Pecho v. People (262 SCRA 518) that the
objectives of this right are:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against further prosecution for the same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if
one should be had.
It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be
complete to the end that the accused may suitably prepare his defense.
Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of
a crime which delineates the nature and cause of the accusation against the
accused. 4 An information is sufficient as long as it states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting the
same. 5 It is likewise sufficient if the time averred is near the actual date as
the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and since that was done
in this case, it was not shown that the time proved did not surprise or
substantially prejudice the defense. 6
The Constitution specifically provides that the accused must "be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, in order for him to
prepare his defense." In People v. Manalili, this Court held:
"The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in
the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint
or information would be violative of this constitutional right.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
infomation filed against him." 7
The allegations in the informations filed in the instant case against all the
accused are sufficient and complete. The names of accused Roselindo and
Allan Cutamora were mentioned. The crime of rape was specially designated.
The acts constituting the crime of rape were enumerated, i.e., that the
accused-appellants had carnal knowledge with their nieces without their
consent and against their will. Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz
Tampos y Cutamora were named as the offended parties. The approximate
time of the commission of the offense was stated to be sometime "in the year
1990 up to 1993." The offense was committed at Kalaitan, Bayugan, Agusan
del Sur.
The dates of the commission of the crimes are not "vague and
ambiguous" or "too indefinite" as to deprive accused-appellants of their right
to be informed of the charges filed against them. It should be noted that the
victims continuously endured their ordeal at the hands of the accused-
appellants from 1990 until 1993. Moreover, the victims were minors and, as
such, are not expected to closely monitor the dates of their defilement.
Besides, each of the accused-appellants was convicted only of one count of
rape committed against Virginia, Gina and Beatriz.
A rape victim is not and cannot be expected to keep an accurate account
of her traumatic experience. A court cannot expect a rape victim to remember
every ugly detail of the appalling outrage especially so since she might in fact
have been trying not to remember them. Rape victims do not cherish in their
memories an accurate account of the dates, number of times and manner they
were violated. 8 The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an
essential element in the crime of rape 9 and therefore need not be accurately
stated. 10
More importantly, it is too late at this stage for the accused-appellants to
raise the issue of sufficiency or insufficiency of the informations filed against
them. They should have raised this issue prior to their arraignment. The
records bear out that accused-appellants did not offer any objection in this
regard before they entered their plea during the arraignment. Consequently,
they are deemed to have waived any objection on this ground pursuant to Sec.
8 of Rule 117. The defense should have moved for a bill of particulars granting
that the time of the commission of the offense was not sufficiently and
definitely alleged.
Accused-appellants next claim that the trial court erred in finding their
guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds otherwise. The issue
on this score really boils down to credibility. Ordinarily, this Court will not
disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witness as it
has a better vantage point in observing his candor and behavior on the witness
stand. 11 Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially
under cross-examination. 12 Its assessment is respected unless certain facts
of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. 13
In the case at bar, this Court finds the assessment of the trial court as to
the credibility of the witnesses binding and conclusive, there being no tinge of
arbitrariness or oversight. Besides, and more importantly, this Court finds it
improbable for Virginia, Gina and Beatriz, who were all minors, naive and
innocent to the ways of the world, to concoct and weave such sordid details of
sexual assaults as can be told only by those who have been personally
subjected to it. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of
child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. 14
Moreover, victims' testimonies of their respective defilement were
substantially corroborated by the results of the medical examination conducted
on them by a medico-legal officer. The medical findings uniformly revealed
that the victims had hymenal lacerations resulting from vulvar coitus. 15
In addition, the defense failed to prove that the complaining witnesses
were impelled by ill-motive as to file serious charges against them. The
complainants' lack of ill-motive to file the rape charges is even more believable
considering that their complaints were filed against their own kin. There is
considerable receptivity on the part of this Tribunal to lend credence to
complainants' vision of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a gruelling
experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what
perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did expose them to. This is not to say
that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that
skepticism should be kept under control. 16
Lastly, accused-appellants' denial and alibi are inherently weak and
unreliable. 17 It becomes more suspect as accused-appellants themselves
were not consistent as to the exact distance of the farm from their house.
Accused-appellant Roselindo averred that the farm was 10 kilometers away
from their house. On the other hand, accused-appellant Allan maintained that
it was 500 meters away from their residence. Both accused-appellants failed to
prove that they were at the farm or that it was physically impossible for them
to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In the absence of strong
and convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail over the positive testimonies
of the victim, who had no improper motive to testify falsely against accused-
appellants. 18
The trial court correctly sentenced each of the accused-appellants to
three (3) separate penalties of reclusion perpetua considering that at the time
of the commission of the offense, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. ATcEDS
Also, the trial court was correct in ordering each of the accused-
appellants to pay Virginia, Gina and Beatriz P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. 19 However, the award of P20,000.00 to each of the victims
representing moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00 in line with
recent jurisprudence. 20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused-appellants Roselindo
Cutamora and Allan Cutamora are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of rape. Accordingly, each is sentenced to three (3) separate
penalties of reclusion perpetua; to pay Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora, and
Beatriz Tampos y Cutamora P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity; to pay
Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora, and Beatriz Tampos y Cutamora
P50,000.00 each as moral damages.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Cutamora, G.R. Nos. 133448-53, [October 6, 2000], 396 PHIL
405-418)
[G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Orlando B. Consigna for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES;

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — Time and again, we have ruled
that when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the
accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are
generally not disturbed on appeal, unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or
the significance of which has been misinterpreted. . . . After a careful
examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or
disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when
they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting
of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES OF THE ACCUSED, ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. — As
between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make.
For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater
weight than his bare denial and explanation.
3.ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; WHERE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WERE ACTUATED BY IMPROPER MOTIVE, THE
PRESUMPTION WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT SO ACTUATED AND THEIR
TESTIMONIES ARE ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. — There is no
evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of
any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would
testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-
settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate,
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
4.CRIMINAL LAW; ACCUSED'S UNDISPUTED ACT OF FIRING THE GUN,
EQUIVALENT TO CRIMINAL INTENT. — Even assuming that he lacked
criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of
Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of
firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the
consequences it might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.
5.ID.; DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE v. PAMA PEOPLE
v. LAWAS AND PEOPLE v. PINEDA, NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT
BENCH. — We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single
penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court's
holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that
the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous" does not hold
water. . . . The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In
said case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there
was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie
of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act
produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. . . . The trial court also
misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a
definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is
relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case because the
Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed
by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that
the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes." . . . Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on
the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said
case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths
caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are
attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
6.ID.; THE FIRING OF SEVERAL BULLETS BY THE ACCUSED
ALTHOUGH RESULTING FROM ONE CONTINUOUS BURST OF GUNFIRE
CONSTITUTES SEVERAL ACTS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A COMPLEX
CRIME; CASES, OF PEOPLE v. DESIERTO AND PEOPLE v. PARDO APPLIED
IN THE CASE AT BENCH. — What is on all fours with the case at bench is
the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. The accused in that case killed
five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm
which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein: "In
the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable
because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant
and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons
injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one
simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several
successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the
factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused
or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable
for as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced
the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses
successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person
injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of
homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of
homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively
during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would
connect one of them with its companion offenses." In Desierto, although the
burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person
firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing, the trigger which should
produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them. . . . The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although
resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts.
Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of
murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the
bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and
distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo we held that: "Where the death
of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different
shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are
committed." . . . Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a
burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate
crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and
every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences
of reclusion perpetua.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J p:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four

counts of Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case
No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo
Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims,
the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of
Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a
gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several
wounds which caused his death.
Contrary to Law." 1
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following
information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for
shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito
Raquepo:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of
Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a
gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt.
Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies,
which wounds sustained by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution
(with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would have
produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of his own will." 2
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court,
is as follows:
"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at
Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a
cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit
Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms
were assigned as guards to maintain peace and order at the
cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P.
Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana,
INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian
clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding
Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and assist in
the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his
M-14 issued firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1)
Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived
with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio
Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3)
Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed,
arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4)
Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6)
CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the
group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived
at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2)
Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them
including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north
western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1)
the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton,
who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan.
The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench
situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three
(3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the
place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th
row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection
conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than three
(3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario
Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly without
warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his
M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire,
resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt.
Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton,
although the latter managed to run passing through the western
gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco.
Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo
Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the
Co's canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the cockpit
arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and
neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to
pacify Tabaco telling him 'what is that that happened again Mario.'
Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those
assigned to maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit
arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5)
successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a
little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the
cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — 'Mario relax ka
lang' — 'Mario keep calm.' They stood face to face holding their
rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat.
Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco,
and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also
the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban
died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs
due to adequate medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1)
Antonio Chan — injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano —
injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3)
Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did
not file their complaints." 3
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the
Brief for the Accused-appellant is as follows:
"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC
Company to assist in the maintenance of peace and order at the
Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on
March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-
14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon
Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a
superior officer arriving thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more
or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to make some
observations and found out that there were several persons inside
the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short
and some long, and were seen in different places and/or corners of
the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said
persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his
impressions that if they did not have the authority, the guards of
the main gate of the cockpit would surely have confiscated the
same from them. It was his belief then that they may have come
from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus
seated himself at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted
bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987,
while accused was seated at the lowermost seat of the slanted
bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report
fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his
presence must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the
gun report was to fire a warning shot in the air and directed to the
ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a
warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire
coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which
reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle
with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed
towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and
Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax
lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito
Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the
gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said
persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing,
Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards
and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by
Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo
and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident,
accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and
the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The
following morning, accused surrendered to the police authorities of
Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of the
death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito
Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he
surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and
the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo." 4
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991,
found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence
to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found
that:
"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the
prosecution and defense cannot agree on what actually transpired
that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena,
Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject
victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the
accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists
that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or others, since the
accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the
cockpit arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of
credibility versions. 'Where there are directly conflicting versions of
the same incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce
has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be used as
valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a
testimony for after all, the element of probability is always
involved in weighing testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries,
Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980,
97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485,
November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People
vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3)
eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and
Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the
deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution
presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt.
Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death
of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the
prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres
Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as
corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well
stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses
Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused
Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in
port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the
late Mayor Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper portion of
the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that
felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo
Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by
prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then
ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not far,
considering that the cockpit arena was well-lighted at that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic
fire, the accused was seen coming out rushing from inside the
cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo,
the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco,
telling — 'what is that happened again Mario,' while the latter told
him — 'Mario relax ka lang keep calm.' After which Mariano
Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt.
Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the
gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as
corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of
disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting
the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo." 5
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to
the cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his
possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was
already empty.
The court a quo said further:
"ATTY. VILLENA:
Q:When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if
it had a magazine that time?
A:Yes, sir with magazine.
Q:Do you have the magazine now?
A:It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q:After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the
rifle?
A:Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q:Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A:No live bullets, sir." (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp.
44-45, March 26, 1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q:You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when
you surrendered this gun, M-14, and this magazine, there
were no live ammunitions in the magazine?
A:There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q:How many bullets in all?
A:Twenty, sir.
Q:You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A:Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct
examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session,
Stenographer L. Tamayo).
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were
found inside the cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158,
record).
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q:Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A:Picture of spent shells.
Q:How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?
A:The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose
Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L.
Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as
adverse against the accused, is the fact that he was really arrested
and not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP
Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S',
p. 188, record).
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco,
has still a pending case for murder before Branch 6, of this Court.
(Exh. 'T', p. 187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three
prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario
Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their
versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and
convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario
Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim.
Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259),
Pat. Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late
Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the
testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano
Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena
holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive
and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have
not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog,
Rigunan and Regunton), yet their corroborative testimonies
constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as to
produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs.
Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714),
even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to the
conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147
SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of
all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his
innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that
moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan,
150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very
nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed
in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly
probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases
result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper protection of
society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and
the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt,
that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged
and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced
in this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's
brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies,
are entitled to the settled rule that they have regularly performed
their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised Rules of
Court).
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put
up by the accused, even as it does not inspire confidence, hence,
the same deserves no credence.
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up
towards the roof, and that he could have not shot the four (4)
deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering
the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the
cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row,
in much lower elevation. The accused further contends that he
could not have shot aforesaid victims, as maybe gleaned from the
testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon
the body of the late Mayor Arreola.
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3)
eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman
Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up
from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-
Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented
seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the
distance of meters, as it could have been around 5 meters from
where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the group
of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with
the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of
Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of
the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead
front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple;
Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and
Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound
No. 1, is on the left side of his head above the hairline; Wound No.
2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base
through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen
and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative
position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with
Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher than
the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim Arreola,
probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where
the group of the late Mayor stayed were all cemented including
their back rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused
must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the
cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of
the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito
Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of
the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the lower
and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the
possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially
as in this case, when the accused stood up from his seat and fired
at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on
his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris
of the said cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much
dispute as the evidence adduced is overwhelming and even the
defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds —
inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh.
'K'). cdt
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, there being no competent evidence
presented for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is
no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and positively
identified.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused
Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the shooting to death of the
deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan
and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and
the wounding of Benito Raquepo." 6
The dispositive part of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified
by the balm of clear judicial conscience, the Court finds the
accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the
crimes charged against him:
1.In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No.
10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-
317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but
declared to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same
being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the
accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of
the deceased victims — Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of
P150,00.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the
appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No.
10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of
P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability, subject to the lien
herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case
of successful collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
2.In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated
Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1)
day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4)
months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and
to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of
P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt.
Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to
the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees
in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3.The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti,
presently deposited with 117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is
hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the
Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is
peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of
Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper
disposition in accordance with law and the rules.
4.The accused to pay the costs.
5.In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the
full length of time, he underwent preventive imprisonment (March
23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof.
(Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs.
Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
SO ORDERED." 7 (Emphasis ours)
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused
still interposed the present appeal on the following grounds:
(1)The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of
murder in connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
(2)The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide
on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by
Benito Raquepo.
(3)The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of
accused-appellant Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and
again, we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of
witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with
respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of
People vs. de Guzman, 10 thus:
"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on
the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to obscene them on the stand,
the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading
of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will
not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose
the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record
will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in
confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to
distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in
anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on
the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict." 11
After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or
reason to set aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of
the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the
assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions.
1.Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with
the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989,
categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively
identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-
mayor and his companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
"COURT:
Q:You heard gun report, what can you say?
A:I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q:Who was that 'he' you are referring to?
A:Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q:Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom
those gun reports come from?
A:Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q:What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A:I had to seek shelter, sir.
Q:What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A:He was hit, sir.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q:You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of
weapon did he use if you know?
A:M-14, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what
happened to Regunton?
A:I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q:Was that all you gathered?
A:Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:How many shots did you hear?
A:Three (3) shots, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or
automatic?
A:Successive, sir.
Q:You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was
seated on his right side?
A:None, sir.
Q:All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?
A:Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun
when you first heard gun shot, will you please describe the
stands (position) of the accused?
A:Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was
standing on a forth [port] arm position).
xxx xxx xxx
Q:What did he do with the gun when you saw him?
A:He fired the gun, sir.
Q:To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A:To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q:You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and
returned, when you returned, what did you see?
A:I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q:Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
A:The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q:How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?
A:Less than a meter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the
person passing as you mentioned?
A:They have similarity, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of
Arreola, you and your companions?
A:We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q:Where were you facing?
A:We were facing south the arena.
Q:Where did the first gun shot came from?
A:It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q:From what direction?
A:Infront of us, sir.
Q:Where was he, was he in your front?
A:He was in the first row of seats.
Q:After the first gun shot, what happened?
A:Somebody was killed, sir.
Q:Who was that?
A:Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q:How many gun shot reports did you hear?
A:Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q:You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature,
was there in succession or automatic?
A:Automatic, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:Can you tell us your previous occupation?
A:An army man, sir.
Q:How long have you been employed with the army?
A:Five (5) years, sir.
Q:Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun
shot?
A:I was outside the cockpit, sir." 12
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin
testified, thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q:You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco
was on the first seat downward, is it not?
A:Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun,
sir.
Q:Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A:It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you
went to hide yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that
correct?
A:After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q:And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single
successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?
A:Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior
to the first gun report, did you notice if he had a gun with
him?
A:He passed by our back, sir.
Q:And that person according to you was still there when the late
Mayor Arreola was shot?
A:He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made,
sir.
Q:You mean to say the first gun report?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A:The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir." 13
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q:Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you
go with Mayor Arreola?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What part of the cockpit?
A:We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q:Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the
cockpit?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:How were they arranged?
A:In rows, step by step, sir.
COURT:
Q:How many rows?
A:Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q:And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A:The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step,
sir.
Q:And how about you?
A:We stood at their back west of them, sir.
Q:By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective
position of the place where you stayed?
A:The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of
the fourth step, sir.
Q:And how about you, where did you stay also?
A:I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q:And how about Romeo Regunton?
A:He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:While you were in that position together with your companions,
do you remember if there was untoward incident that
happened?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What was that untoward incident that happened?
A:That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor
Arreola, sir.
Q:Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late
Arreola?
A:Yes, sir.

Q:What kind of firearm?
A:M-14, sir.
Q:And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco
shot him?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A:Because I saw it, sir.
Q:What did you do also?
A:When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I
was also wounded.
Q:Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:What happened to him?
A:When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q:What did you tell when he told you that?
A:I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q:How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
A:He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon
the person of Mayor Arreola?
A:Probably more than 3 meters, sir." 14
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q:When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit
arena did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?
A:Before the shooting, sir.
Q:And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see
Mario Tabaco for the first time prior to the shooting incident?
A:Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
Q:And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the
accused herein Mario Tabaco?
A:He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q:And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the
cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A:He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
COURT:
Q:How far?
A:Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q:A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on
the western part o the cockpit?
A:A little to the west, sir.
Q:And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the
western part of the cockpit?
A:We were on the northwest.
Q:Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not
directly in front of you?
A:A little bit west of us, sir.
Q:It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your
position with the late Arreola on the northwest when you
according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what
you mean?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he
allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that
what you mean?
A:Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q:So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction
where you were together with the late Mayor Arreola still
Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?
A:Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q:And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the
accused Mario Tabaco considering that you were right behind
the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct
examination you immediately sought cover?
A:I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired
three (3) shots.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to
know that Mayor Arreola was dead already?
A:Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was
already dead.
Q:And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards
Mayor Arreola?
A:Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q:To whom the 3rd shot directed?
A:In our place, sir.
Q:No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A:That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me
and told me that he was also hit.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q:You don't know the person who shot him?
A:It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q:You do not know the person who shot him?
A:It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir." 15
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-
appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his
companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another
eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident
is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx xxx xxx
Q:How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that
gun?
A:More or less ten (10) meters, sir.
Q:Where was he at that specific time and place?
A:Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q:Where were you also?
A:I was at the stairs, sir.
Q:When you saw him what happened if any?
A:When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that
was the time when I got down, sir.
Q:Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
A:It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q:How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A:More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench
between them, sir.
Q:Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A:With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the
time I got down to hide myself, sir." 16
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q:So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you
heard gunfire?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside
the cockpit arena?
A:When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the
Mayor and the gun went off and that's the time I took cover,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the
cockpit arena?
A:When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside." 17
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial
declaration of the abovenamed eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the
accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As between the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the
bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled
rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused
as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial
and explanation. 18
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced
by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against accused-appellant
in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no
evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption was that
they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit. 19
2.Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra
were not telling the truth when they testified that it was accused-appellant
who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-
Mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-
Mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the Ex-Mayor, and
the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher
level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states
that he was seated at the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor
and his companions were seated at the fourth row which was the highest.
This contention, however, is untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was
at the first row of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when
he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor
Arreola and his companions and fired at them. 20
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot
wounds found on the cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been
inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot
wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of
exit because he must have already been lying down when his wound was
inflicted. 21
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-
appellant's liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal
wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt.
Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified
that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was
taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of
the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside
the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw
the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the
accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at
him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near
Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when
the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his
left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters
away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the
other hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified
that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the
canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out
from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun
report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away
from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is
acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the
cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that
distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He
also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he
saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to horizontal
position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the
gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on
both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the
grapple and was able to take away the gun from accused-appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical
assistance but Siriban was not as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill
Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired
in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to
grab the gun from him, are without merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant
because the latter changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal
position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm
Sgt. Raquepo. 22
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the
killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of
innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which
is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce,
is equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts,
even if he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance
with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. cdasia
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder
charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on
him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained
the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:
"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and
317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito
Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been
prosecuted under only one Information.
The law provides:
Art. 48.Penalty for complex crimes.
'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. (as amended by Act. No. 400 n). (Art. 48, Revised
Penal Code).'
Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of
crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the
single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies
(delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily
means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex
proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4)
separate Informations of murder, which should have been
otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should
have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4)
murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by
one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires,
meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four
murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of
shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies
(delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama,
CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs.
Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court,
we say — as the deaths of Oscar Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito
Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270,
284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the
accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the
penalty — is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The
more serious offense is murder, the killing have been attended by
TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by
surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario
Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum
degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death
penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a
single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders.
(People vs. Herson Magbanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15,
1989).
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with
Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge
Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one
single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the
penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious
offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of
reclusion temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20
years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed,
and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4
months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus
P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito
Raquepo.
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN
No. 1492932, 'K-2' — magazine of M-14 and Exh. 'L' — Memo
Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is
admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an
M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate
even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this
was proven when, according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the
bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the
lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing
wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we
have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-1')." 23
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single
penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court
holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that
the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis
ours)" 24 does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the
doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited
by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said
case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was
only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of
complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces
two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was
more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four
victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered
the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the
weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously.
When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already
empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the
crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied.
On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid
down in People vs. Desierto 29 . The accused in that case killed five
persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which,
like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who
were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon
each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by
said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were
fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which
must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or
physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct
and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself
criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every
single act that produced the same. Although apparently he
perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him
became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide
or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of
homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed
successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is
nothing that would connect one of them with its companion
offenses." (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act
of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its
special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger
with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of
pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the
number of bullets which actually produced them. 30
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of
Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is
not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said
case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several
homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it
would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply
rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the
applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court
further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there
must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is
not written into the law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several
bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of
a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile
passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is
thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held
that:
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a
single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and
not a complex crime, are committed."
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People
vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only
applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire
cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The
accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he
has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial
court in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and
one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment appealed
from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed. cdt
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-100385, [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL
771-804)
[G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999.]
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and RAMON SUA, respondents.
Tanopo & Serafica for petitioner.

Hermogenes S. Decano for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
On several occasions, petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store

owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain grocery items and paid for them
with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the
back by petitioner. When presented for payment the checks were dishonored
because the drawer's account was already closed. Private respondent Ramon
Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both
failed to pay the value of the checks. Consequently, four charges of estafa
were filed against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted petitioner of all the charges of estafa but
did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she
indorsed to private respondent. In a petition for mandamus filed by private
respondent, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding petitioner liable
for the value of the checks. SEcAIC
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court ruled that the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner
did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of
evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which
the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may
nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence
so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the
checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CIVIL LIABILITY NOT

EXTINGUISHED BY ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED. — Section 2, par. (b), of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides: "Extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of
the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil
liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted. TIcEDC
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The dismissal of the criminal cases
against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to
insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the
fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted
of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by
the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for. the
unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale behind the award of civil
indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is sufficient to
sustain the award was explained by the Code Commission in connection with
Art. 29 of the Civil Code, to wit: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused
in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from
the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear
line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other private
rights. One is for punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party . . . It is just and
proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable
by the criminal law.
4. MERCANTILE LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS; PERSON DEEMED AN
INDORSER WHEN SHE SIGNED BACK OF CHECK WITHOUT INDICATION AS TO
HOW SHE SHOULD BE BOUND THEREBY. — It is undisputed that the four (4)
checks issued by de Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any
indication as to how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is
deemed to be an indorser thereof. TcSHaD
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA appeals to us through this petition for review

the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which acquitted her of the crime of
estafa but held her liable nonetheless for the value of the checks she indorsed
in favor of private respondent Ramon Sua. cdrep
On several occasions petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store
owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes,
and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman: (a) PCIB
Check No. 157059 dated 26 February 1987 for P140,000.00; (b) PCIB
Check No. 157073 dated 26 February 1987 for P28,000.00; (c) PCIB
Check No. 157057 dated 27 February 1987 for P42,150.00; and, d) Metrobank
Check No. DAG — 045104758 PA dated 2 March 1987 for P125,000.00. These
checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for payment the
checks were dishonored because the drawer's account was already closed.
Private respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner
about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four
(4) charges of estafa were filed against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and
D-8731. Arturo de Guzman was charged with two (2) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. D-8733 and D-8734. These
cases against petitioner and de Guzman were consolidated and tried jointly.
On 27 December 1989 the court a quo 2 acquitted petitioner of all the
charges of estafa but did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for
the checks she indorsed to private respondent. The trial court found Arturo de
Guzman guilty of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on two (2) counts and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day in each of the
cases, and to pay private respondent P167,150.00 as civil indemnity.
Private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the trial court with regard
to the civil aspect but the court refused to give due course to the appeal on
the ground that the acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Private respondent
then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
GR SP No. 24626, praying that the court a quo be ordered to give due course
to the appeal on the civil aspect of the decision. The Court of Appeals granted
the petition and ruled that private respondent could appeal with respect to the
civil aspect the judgment of acquittal by the trial court. prcd
On 22 January 1996, the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 36376
rendered the assailed Decision insofar as it sustained the appeal of private
respondent on the civil aspect and ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent P335,000.00 representing the aggregate face value of the four (4)
checks indorsed by petitioner plus legal interest from the notice of dishonor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. On 19 March
1997 the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution noting the admission of both
parties that private respondent had already collected the amount of
P125,000.00 from Arturo de Guzman with regard to his civil liability in Crim.
Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734. The appellate court noted that private respondent
was the same offended party in the criminal cases against petitioner and
against de Guzman. Criminal Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734 against De Guzman,
and Crim. Cases Nos. 8730 and 8729 against petitioner, involved the same
checks, to wit: PCIB Checks Nos. 157057 for P42,150.00 and Metrobank
Check No. DAG-045104758 PA for P125,000.00.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent could not
recover twice on the same checks. Since he had collected P125,000.00 as civil
indemnity in Crim. Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734, this amount should be
deducted from the sum total of the civil indemnity due him arising from the
estafa cases against petitioner. The appellate court then corrected its previous
award, which was erroneously placed at P335,000.00, to P335,150.00 as the
sum total of the amounts of the four (4) checks involved. Deducting the
amount of P125,000.00 already collected by private respondent, petitioner was
adjudged to pay P210,150.00 as civil liability to private respondent. Hence,
this petition alleging that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her acquittal by the trial
court from charges of estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. D-8728, D-8729, D-8730 and
D-8731 was absolute, the trial court having declared in its decision that the
fact from which the civil liability might have arisen did not exist.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The issue is whether respondent Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in requiring petitioner to pay civil
indemnity to private respondent after the trial court had acquitted her of the
criminal charges. Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, specifically provides: "Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or
based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. 3 Thus, under Art.
29 of the Civil Code —
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious. dctai
In a criminal case where the judgment of acquittal is based
upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence
of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not acquittal is due to that ground.
An examination of the decision in the criminal cases reveals these
findings of the trial court —
Evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on various
occasions, Remedios Nota Sapiera purchased from Monrico Mart
grocery items (mostly cigarettes) which purchases were paid with
checks issued by Arturo de Guzman; that those purchases and
payments with checks were as follows:
(a) Sales Invoice No. 20104 dated February 26, 1987 in the
amount of P28,000.00; that said items purchased were paid
with PCIBank Check No. 157073 dated February 26, 1987;
(b) Sales Invoice No. 20108 dated February 26, 1987 in the
amount of P140,000.00; that said items purchased were paid
with PCIBank No. 157059 dated February 26, 1987;
(c) Sales Invoice No. 20120 dated February 27, 1987 in the
amount of P42,150.00; that said items were paid with
PCIBank Check No. 157057 dated February 27, 1987;
(d) Sales Invoice No. 20148 and 20149 both dated March 2, 1987
in the amount of P120,103.75; said items were paid with
Metrobank Check No. 045104758 dated March 2, 1987 in the
amount of P125,000.00.
That all these checks were deposited with the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, Dagupan Branch, for collection from the
drawee bank;
That when presented for payment by the collecting bank to
the drawee bank, said checks were dishonored due to account
closed, as evidenced by check return slips; . . . .
From the evidence, the Court finds that accused Remedios
Nota Sapiera is the owner of a sari-sari store inside the public
market; that she sells can(ned) goods, candies and assorted
grocery items; that she knows accused Arturo De Guzman, a
customer since February 1987; that de Guzman purchases from
her grocery items including cigarettes; that she knows Ramon
Sua; that she has business dealings with him for 5 years; that her
purchase orders were in clean sheets of paper; that she never
pays in check; that Ramon Sua asked her to sign subject checks
as identification of the signature of Arturo de Guzman; that she
pays in cash; sometimes delayed by several days; that she signed
the four (4) checks on the reverse side; that she did not know the
subject invoices; that de Guzman made the purchases and he
issued the checks; that the goods were delivered to de Guzman;
that she was not informed of dishonored checks; and that counsel
for Ramon Sua informed de Guzman and told him to
pay . . . . LLjur
In the case of accused Remedios Nota Sapiera, the
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.
Based on the above findings of the trial court, the exoneration of
petitioner of the charges of estafa was based on the failure of the prosecution
to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and the other
accused Arturo de Guzman in defrauding private respondent. However, by her
own testimony, petitioner admitted having signed the four (4) checks in
question on the reverse side. The evidence of the prosecution shows that
petitioner purchased goods from the grocery store of private respondent as
shown by the sales invoices issued by private respondent; that these
purchases were paid with the four (4) subject checks issued by de Guzman;
that petitioner signed the same checks on the reverse side; and when
presented for payment, the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank due
to the closure of the drawer's account; and, petitioner was informed of the
dishonor.
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that despite the conflicting
versions of the parties, it is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by de
Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how
she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser
thereof. The Negotiable Instruments Law clearly provides —
SECTION 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. —
Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are
admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: . . . .
(f) Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is
not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to
sign, he is deemed an indorser. . .
SECTION 63. When person deemed indorser. — A person
placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker,
drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser unless he clearly
indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some
other capacity.
SECTION 66. Liability of general indorser. — Every indorser
who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent
holders in due course: (a) The matters and things mentioned in
subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the next preceding section; and (b)
That the instrument is, at the time of the indorsement, valid and
subsisting;
And, in addition, he engages that, on due presentment, it
shall be accepted or paid or both, as the case may be, according to
its tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary
proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount
thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be
compelled to pay it. cdtai
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her
civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not
from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action
might arise did not exist. 4 An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant.
The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks
signed by her in favor of the complainant. 5
The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of
acquittal when evidence is sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the
Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of the Civil Code, to wit:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party . . . . It is
just and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act
is also punishable by the criminal law? 6
Finally, with regard to the computation of the civil liability of petitioner,
the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is civilly liable for the
aggregate value of the unpaid four (4) checks subject of the criminal cases in
the sum of P335,150.00, less the amount of P125,000.00 already collected by
private respondent pending appeal, resulting in the amount of P210,150.00
still due private respondent, is a factual matter which is binding and conclusive
upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 22 January 1996 as amended by its Resolution dated 19 March
1997 ordering petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera to pay private respondent
Ramon Sua the remaining amount of P210,150.00 as civil liability, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Cdpr
||| (Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, [September 14, 1999], 373
PHIL 148-157)

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[G.R. Nos. 133448-53. October 6, 2000.

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