II. JURISDICTION custody of the law and, necessarily, the jurisdiction of the trial court.
and, necessarily, the jurisdiction of the trial court.—In the case of herein petitioner, it
G. REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
B: JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTY
2. Custody of Law vs. Jurisdiction over the Person
G.R. No. 115407. August 28, 1995.
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Words and Phrases; Bail, Defined; As bail is intended to obtain or
secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been
acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.—Section 1 of Rule
114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under
the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to
obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has
been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court
has put it in a case, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”
Same; Same; The rationale for the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor.—The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with
the requirements therefor. Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., where the petitioner who had
been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly
thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial,
the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
Same; Same; Instances where a person is considered to be in custody of the law.—On the
other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under
Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b)
when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities.
Same; Same; In the instant case, even as petitioner filed his motion for admission to bail before
he was actually and physically placed under arrest, he may, however, under the peculiar circumstances
which attended the filing of the bail application, namely, that he was then confined in the hospital, for
purposes of the hearing thereof, he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and
physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar
circumstances which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the
hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law
and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact,
an arrest is made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called “house
arrest” or, in the case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military
camp area. It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally
appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute
costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and
the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never
lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused.—Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail,
except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is
strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in
custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which
may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed
in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon
whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Where bail is a matter of right, upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail.—Thus, the general rule is that prior to
conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail
as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged
with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114.
Same; Same; Where the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is
required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution,
to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.—
On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court
under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly
notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
Same; Same; Due Process; Procedure to be followed when the grant of bail is a matter of
judicial discretion.—Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to
introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due
process. If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due
process, as a consequence of which the court’s order in respect of the motion or petition is void. At the
hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or
refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The court, though, cannot rely on mere
affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence,
and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires.
Same; Same; Same; There is no irregularity that could be attributed to the trial court in regard
to the grant of bail to petitioner where it exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the
waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution and the omnibus order contained the requisite
summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them
did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.—No irregularity, in the
context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court here as regards its
order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its
resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals
scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court
exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the
prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner
could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to
the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
Same; Same; Actions; Certiorari; The indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed, one
hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, before the prosecution questioned through the special civil
action of certiorari the resolution and the omnibus order militates against the cause of the prosecution.
—What finally militates against the cause of the prosecution is the indubitably unreasonable period of
time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the omnibus
order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the
delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable
due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against
petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial
on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution
lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The definitive rule now is that the special civil action for certiorari
should not be instituted beyond a period of three months.—At any rate, the definitive rule now is that
the special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of three months, the same
to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the commission of the
acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said
petitioner’s right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a
co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag
family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The
original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,
had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspects, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard
Doe, as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and
Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion,
was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The
others have remained at large up to the present.
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo (“Ely”) Roxas was implicated in the crime. In
an amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein.
As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former’s services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind
the massacre of the Bucag family.
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case
per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said
prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes
of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant
to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally
charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated
October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this
Court in G.R. No. 96080, entitled “Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon,
Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan.”
In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the
second amended information against him.
Under this backdrop, the trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an
arrest warrant for petitioner’s apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner,
through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court
which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of
the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office,
and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner’s counsel appeared in court but
only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office appeared
for the prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
“acute costochondritis,” his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the
person of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and that, for purposes of said hearing on his bail application, he be considered as being in
the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in
accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State Prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and
that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.
The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to
travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and
posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and, in the trial that
ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the
case.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later
on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon, who allegedly received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months
later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a
special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court
granting bail to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under
review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner’s application for
bail, he was not yet “in the custody of the law,” apparently because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further
noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail
was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was
doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded
an opportunity to oppose petitioner’s application for bail contrary to the requirements of due
process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, etc., et al., his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court
effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and
purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner’s words, the “invocation by the
accused of the court’s jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law.”
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such
strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution,
by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to
oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the
prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due
process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in
respondent court after an unjustifiable delay over an unreasonable length of time. On the
undisputed facts, the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this case, the
Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial.10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s
provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired
by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court
has put it in a case, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor.
Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the petitioner who had been charged
with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly
thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release
pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not
eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or otherwise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the
protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release
under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be
filed against him as it is available to “all persons” where the offense is bailable. This rule is,
of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.
 On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the
revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. In this light, the
ruling vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner, who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
“Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond.” Said petitioner was at the time
confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a
major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave “that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings.” On the basis of said ex parte  motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtained in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a
cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of
her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she
questioned the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on
the ground that “she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside
from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared
before said court.” In rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the
urgent ex parte motion for bail, she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by
actually posting a cash bail bond which was accepted by the court, she had effectively
submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court
took pains to reiterate that the basic rule is that the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which
attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as
prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee or
merely by his submission to the custody  of the person making the arrest. The latter mode
may be exemplified by the so-called “house arrest” or, in the case of military offenders, by
being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly
served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in
the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under
medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement
or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the
trial court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when
it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never
made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission of his application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on
account of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily
verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the
authority of the trial court, petitioner’s counsel readily informed the court that they were
surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter. In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for
the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for being
derogatory of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano.
There was here no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be
able to avoid arrest should the application therefor be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua  when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4
of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction
by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be
waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is
placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every
accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
 Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of
guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a
hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with
Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a
hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want
to introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the
accused to due process. If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a
denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court’s order in respect of
the motion or petition is void. At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. When,
eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The court, though, cannot rely on mere
affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law
requires.
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural
due process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the
Regional State Prosecutor’s Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor
expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only on
the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that
Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in
opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the
trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded “reasonable time” to
oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor
acted as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal
Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de
Leon which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to
be continuing until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then
withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was
done after one Rebecca Bucag-Tan questioned the authority of Regional State Prosecutor
Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as
collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. It was in fact by virtue of this
arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutors in the previous hearings in said case.
Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for
bail, the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly
represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar
with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional
State Prosecutor’s Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its
copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly
instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to
its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular
posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the
court a quo  sought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by
Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
“PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
      I was informed to appear in this case just now,
Your Honor.
COURT:
  Where is your Chief of Office? Your Office received
a copy of the motion as early as October 28. There
is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
  I am not aware of that, Your Honor. I was only
informed just now. The one assigned here is State
Prosecutor Perseverando Arana, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick
son. I do not know about this but before I came I
received an instruction from our Chief to relay to
this court the stand of the office regarding the
motion to admit bail. That office is neither
supporting nor opposing it and we are submitting to
the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
  Place that manifestation on record. For the record,
Fiscal
      Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
 appearance in this matter? No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript
  Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the
of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus
Regional State Prosecutor’s Office represented by
order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT: summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince
  By that manifestation do you want the Court to itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and
is dispensing with the presentation of evidence to the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could
show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and
denial . . .
up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
  I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
As to the contention that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its
COURT:
  Final inquiry. Is the prosecution willing to submit evidence within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that
the incident covered by this particular motion for the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on
resolution by this court? the very same day that it was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: said date up to the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than
  Yes, Your Honor. one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in
COURT: opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than
  Without presenting any further evidence?
reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional
  Yes, Your Honor.”
State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People.

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecution is the indubitably
State Prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were “neither supporting nor
the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for
opposing” the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was
certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6)months, or one
“submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.” By that, it could not
hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties
be any clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra
which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the
and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the
certiorari proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits
mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the
of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution
position of the prosecution.
lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now is that the
special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of three months,
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, it was stressed that where the trial court
the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired from
has reasons to believe that the justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or
the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the
a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of justice, must inquire from the prosecutor
same.
concerned as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in
the very recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City
32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5,
Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, the Court, citing Tucay vs.
1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
Domagas, etc., held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the
de Oro City, as well as said respondent court’s resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there
motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail
aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trial Court granting bail to petitioner
application.
Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

——o0o——
G.R. No. 158763. March 31, 2006.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,
petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, respondent.
Criminal Law; Bails; Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.—Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
Same; Same; A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
has no right to invoke the processes of that court.—The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215
SCRA 421 (1992), cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that
case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The
entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: A person applying for admission to bail must be
in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should
have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over
the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. While we stand by our above
pronouncement in Picoinsofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the
aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Same; Courts; Jurisdictions; Filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance and consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court, Exceptions.—
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of
the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction
of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The
first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of
the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion
to quash a warrant of arrest.
Criminal Procedure; Warrants of Arrest; Even if the petition for review of the resolution of the
assistant prosecutor was filed with the Secretary of Justice before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is
not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.—After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, “x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment
of the proceedings is but proper.” Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable
to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants
of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant
prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of
the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Abuse of Discretion; Records and supporting evidence show that Judge
Anghad gravely abused his discretion.—After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.—It is important to note that an
exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of
probable cause. As we held in Webb: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than
“bare suspicion,” it requires “less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction.” A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. x x x
Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Same; Judgments; A decision acquitting the accused of a crime cannot be the basis of the
dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime.—A decision, even of this
Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case
against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced
by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not
even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an
eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent
Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Same; Same; The declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings.—Whether the Court of Appeals
ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of
arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy
whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the mer-its, especially in this case where
the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals
had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad
void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the
warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed
unquashed.
Same; Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy; Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the
accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.—
The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was
upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
18 December 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12
June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1.The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21,
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14,
2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and
36- 3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2.Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED
in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela; and
3.Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE
forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose
“Pempe” Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and
accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.”
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao,
son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was
appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the
accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he
executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B.
Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the
persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence
of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard
by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo
T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but
the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
 On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October
2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad “deliberately and willfully committed contempt of
court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing
the informations for murder.” On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting
the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago
City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and
setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal
cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines,
and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against
herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and
executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’
ruling that:
“[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when
the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke
the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-
764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the
law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.”
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon
and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their “Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest.
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act
on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
“Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright
dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of
probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of
arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack
of probable cause.”

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:
“The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.”
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought
by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On
the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention. The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court
of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the
application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
“A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.”
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that “[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of law.’ ” The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2)
in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking
the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the
custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various
reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed
their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1.In Allado v. Diokno, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from
further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2.In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that
they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to
defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
 3.In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we
directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court
even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.”
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for
bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail
to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford
the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the
offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of
arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge
who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution
in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he
really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant
continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any
day and at any time of the day and night. Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy
a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due
process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad.
Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the
petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal
cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing
so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, “x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity,
a deferment of the proceedings is but proper.”
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of
arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon, we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as
premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in
order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
‘In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule
112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this
query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its]
regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose
“Pempe” Miranda.’
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
“In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners
is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination
of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity
 could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscal’s certification.”
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that
he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:
“Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded
to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x
x.”
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix and People v.
Inting. The supporting documents are the following:
1.Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2.Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3.Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4.Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de
la Cruz;
5.Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6.Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7.Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8.Information dated 22 June 2001;
9.Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10.Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on
the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find
probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a
“politically charged scenario where “Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other.”
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb
the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not
within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb:
“A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause
demands more than “bare suspicion,” it requires “less than evidence which would justify
x x x conviction.” A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in
a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.”
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case
with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary
of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution,
Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the
basis of the following explanation:
“Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC,
Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda
—the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators,
the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder,
certainly makes his sworn Statements a “narration of falsehood and lies” and that
because of the decision acquitting said officers “who were likewise falsely linked by said
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value.” This Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what
use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s
evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is
supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October
18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of
the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo
Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding
all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.”
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision
and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of
the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting
the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We
never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on
circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of
the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The
accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño,
“it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value.” On the contrary, if we are to
permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt
actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two
days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order
prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity
date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days
after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions
about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall
or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge
Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. According to the petitioners, it was an
error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable
cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of
arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should
not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the
other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of
Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the
warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings
conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should
be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of
arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible
for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the
Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals
and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the
certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of
Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we
had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the
decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory.
According to petitioners:
“It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private
respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned
by private respondent, to wit:
1.)Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.)Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.)Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.)Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which
ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the
list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have
passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.”
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent
Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad “deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder.” On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt
places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of
Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more
serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on
15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing
as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of
indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent, the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of
said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has
not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in
his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow
the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño, by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
5)The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on
said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6)Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of
arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—A person is considered to be in the custody of the law: (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. (Paderanga vs. Court of
Appeals, 247 SCRA 741[1995])
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the
determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. (People vs.
Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 475 [1999])
The discharge of an accused to become state witness has the effect of acquittal, and a recall of
that discharge may place the said accused in double jeopardy. The fact that not all the requisites for the
discharge of a state witness are present is not a ground to recall the discharge order. (People vs.
Larrañaga, 421 SCRA 530 [2004])
——o0o——

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled
in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1)Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the
City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within
ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2)The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from
transfer of these cases;
3)The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal
cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4)The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said
compliance; and