G.R. No. 128024. May 9, 2000.
— in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by
BEBIANO M. BAÑEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA and ORO MARKETING,
INC., Respondents.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER
DOCTRINE: By the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article 217
should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its
dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the
fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case. This is, of
course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the damages, claimed for
were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to
recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior
employment contract.
FACTS: Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in
Iligan City. The respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the NLRC in Iligan City. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have
been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
and of backwages and attorney’s fees.
On November 13, 1995, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Stating that the damages alleged is that there was a lost of
profits and earnings due to petitioner’s abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager,
having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and the
equivalent to the value of private respondent’s property and supplies which petitioner used in
conducting his "business".
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. He interposed in the court below that
the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the
Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. He accused private
respondent of splitting causes of action, stating that the latter could very well have included the
instant claim for damages in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter. He also pointed out that
the civil action of private respondent is an act of forum-shopping and was merely resorted to
after a failure to obtain a favorable decision with the NLRC.
The motion to dismiss was denied. The court has jurisdiction since the damages does not ask
for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages as redress
for defendant’s breach of his contractual obligation to plaintiff who was damaged and
prejudiced. The Court believes that there was a breach of a contractual obligation, which is
intrinsically a civil dispute.
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original
and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.
That a regular court may only have jurisdiction over cases involving torts, malicious
prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former
employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.
Having lost the right to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the decision in the labor case stands
as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant action for damages cannot take the place of
such lost appeal. Respondent court clearly do not have jurisdiction over private respondent’s
complaint for damages.
G.R. No. L-65377 May 28, 1984
MOLAVE MOTOR SALES, INC., petitioner/plantiff, vs. HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XLIV and PEDRO GEMENIANO,
respondents/defendant.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF REGULAR COURTS
DOCTRINE: that the regular court has jurisdiction over cases involving monies loaned, the cost of
repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him.
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in Dagupan
City. The respondent was, or is, the sales manager of petitioner.
Alleging that DEFENDANT was a former employee, PLAINTIFF had sued him for payment of
accounts. That during his incumbency the defendant caused and without authority from the
plaintiff incurred accounts with the remaining balances in the total sum of P33,890.38
excluding interests, arising from the purchases of vehicles and parts, repair jobs of his personal
cars, cash advances, and faithful reproductions of the Vehicle Invoice, Debit Memos, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes, Acknowledgement
Letter and Statement of Account.
At the pre-trial conference, the DEFENDANT raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court
stating that PLAINTIFF's complaint arose out of employer-employee relationship, and he
subsequently moved for dismissal. It was then when respondent Judge dismissed the case
finding that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee
relationship and that jurisdiction belonged to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days
after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that ( involve) WORKERS MAY FILE INVOLVING wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, and
maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. CASES ARISING FROM ANY VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 265 OF THIS CODE, INCLUDING
QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS.
6. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this
Code].
But, the plaintiff had sued for monies loaned to defendant, the cost of repair jobs made on his
personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have
no relevance to the Labor Code. The cause of action was one under the civil laws, and it does
not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of DEFENDANT.
Hence, the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, should have jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 141020 June 12, 2008
CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO
OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC) and PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (PSSC),
respondents.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF THE NLRC
DOCTRINE: Corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and not the Labor Department."
FACTS: The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition at bar started with
the consolidated cases filed by the petitioner labor union with the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction over the
respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine
Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC).
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc issued a Resolution dismissing the separate
appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over PAGCOR.
Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari. Third
Division of the Court dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality in a
Resolution. The Resolution states that, “…Any petitions brought against private companies will
have to be brought before the appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and
Employment.”
Based solely on that statement, petitioner filed a Manifestation/Motion with the NLRC praying
that the records of the consolidated cases be remanded to the Arbitration Branch for proper
prosecution and/or disposition thereof against private respondents Philippine Casino
Operators Corporation (PCOC) and Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC).
Acting on the Manifestation/Motion, the NLRC First Division granted the motion and ordered
that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.
Respondents PCOC and PSSC filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC First Division
granted the motion, set aside the Order for having been issued without legal basis, and denied
with finality the petitioner's Manifestation/Motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court asserting that the NLRC First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the mandate of G.R. No. 85922. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The resolution of the case at bar hinges on the intended meaning of the Third Division of
the Court when the Resolution in G.R. No. 85922, viz:
x x x Any petitions brought against private companies will have to be brought before the
appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and Employment.
Petitioner considers the foregoing statement as a legal mandate warranting the remand of the
consolidated labor cases to the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for further proceedings against
respondents PCOC and PSSC.
We do not agree.
P.D. 1869, Section 18, specifically prohibits formation of unions among casino employees and
exempts them from the coverage of Labor Code provisions. Under the new Constitution, they
may now form unions but subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and
corporations governed by the Civil Service Law.
Corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
and not the Labor Department." The Court stated further that P.D. 1869 exempts casino
employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and although the employees are
empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these are "subject to the laws passed to
regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law."
It is the Civil Service Commission, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the employer-
employee problems in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.
Hence, petitioner cannot merely view a portion of the Resolution in isolation for the purpose of
asserting its position. The Resolution already ruled on the NLRC's lack of jurisdiction over all
the respondents in the case - PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.
G.R. No. 162419 July 10, 2007
PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-
employee relationships.
FACTS: In 1998, Paul Santiago signed a new contract of employment with CF Sharp Crew
Mgmt., Inc., with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of
US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits. Santiago was to be deployed on board the "MSV
Seaspread". A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, CF
Sharp‘s Vice President, sent a fax to the captain of "MSV Seaspread telling the latter that he
received calls from various individuals about the possibility that Santiago may jump ship in
Canada like his brother did before him. Santiago was thus told that he would not be leaving for
Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some
future date.
Consequently, Santiago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees
against CF Sharp and its foreign principal. In defense, CF Sharp contends that there is no
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the POEA
Standard Contract, the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the
seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and
attorney‘s fees should be dismissed as the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the same.
LA RULING: The labor arbiter held respondent liable
NLRC RULING: (NLRC) ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondent because under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the
employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or
seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and
attorneys fees should be dismissed.
CA RULING: It agreed with the NLRCs finding that petitioners non-deployment was a valid
exercise of respondents management prerogative.
ISSUES: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: YES.
Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent,
the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of
labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10
of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for
overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
G.R. No. 176085 February 8, 2012
FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, ROLANDO E. PANDY, NOEL D. ROXAS, ALEXANDER ANGELES,
VERONICA GUTIERREZ, FERNANDO EMBAT, and NANETTE H. PINTO, Petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division), CHEMO-TECHNISCHE
MANUFACTURING, INC. and its responsible officials led by FRANKLIN R. DE LUZURIAGA,
and PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
TOPIC: CONTEMPT POWERS OF THE NLRC
DOCTRINE: Under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is
empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect
contempt.
FACTS: Petitioners were rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische
Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), the manufacturer and distributor of Wella products. They were
officers and members of the CTMI Employees Union-DFA (union). Sometime in the first
semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for certification election at CTMI.
On July 15, 1991, CTMI issued two memoranda, which were considered as union busting acts
constituting unfair labor practice by the union. Thus, the union asked for the withdrawal and
deferment of CTMIs directives. CTMI ignored the request. Instead, it issued on July 23, 1991 a
notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition of the sales driver
positions.
The union and its affected members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice, with a claim for damages, against private respondents CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other
CTMI officers. The union also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
The NLRC issued a TRO, directing CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives to cease
and desist from dismissing any member of the union and from implementing the July 23, 1991
memorandum terminating the services of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them
if the dismissals have been effected.
Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs August 23, 1991 resolution. They
instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for preliminary injunction.
The NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondents moved for
reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible
CTMI officers in contempt of court.

Private respondent De Luzuriaga argued that they were charged with indirect contempt which
may be initiated only in the appropriate regional trial court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. He posits that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over an indirect contempt
charge. He thus argues that the petitioners improperly brought the contempt charge before the
NLRC.
ISSUES: Whether the NLRC have contempt powers
HELD: YES.
Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending
party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with
law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or
amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The
Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect
contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect
contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no
law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the
labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or
parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought
the indirect contempt charges against the respondents before the NLRC.
G.R. No. 142244 November 18, 2002
ATLAS FARMS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME O.
DELA PEÑA and MARCIAL I. ABION, respondents.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER
DOCTRINE: Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage,
it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary
arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of the
employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.
FACTS: Private respondent Jaime O. dela Pea was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner.
He was among several employees terminated in July 1989. On July 8, 1989, he was re-hired by
petitioner and given the additional job of feedmill operator. He was instructed to train selected
workers to operate the feedmill.
In 1993, Pea was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended
for the purpose. The farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain
within 24 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Pea refused, however,
to receive the formal notice. He never bothered to explain. Thus, a notice of termination with
payment of his monetary benefits was sent to him.
Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance man whose
employment by petitioner. Allegedly, he caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting
in damages worth several hundred thousand pesos when he improperly disposed of the cut
grass and other waste materials into the ponds drainage system. Petitioner sent a written
notice to Abion, requiring him to explain what happened, otherwise, disciplinary action would
be taken against him. He refused to receive the notice and give an explanation, according to
petitioner. Consequently, the company terminated his services. He acknowledged receipt of a
written notice of dismissal, with his separation pay.
Pea and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both
claimed that their termination from service was due to petitioners suspicion that they were the
leaders in a plan to form a union to compete and replace the existing management-dominated
union.
LA RULING: The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance
machinery in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private
respondents availed of the grievance process, but later on refiled the case before the NLRC in
Region IV. They alleged lack of sympathy on petitioners part to engage in conciliation
proceedings.
NLRC RULING: NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s decision.
CA RULING: The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC resolution with
some modifications, thus: 1) The private respondents can not be reinstated, due to their
acceptance of the separation pay offered by the petitioner; 2) The private respondents are
entitled to their full back wages; and, 3) The amount of the separation pay received by private
respondents from petitioner shall not be deducted from their full back wages.
ISSUES: Whether the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES.
Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not comply with the
requirements of a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that: (1)
the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid
causes provided for by law. No evidence was shown that private respondents refused, as
alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents who were subsequently
dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the
grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases were effectively
removed from the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation
or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or
brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged
violation of the employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.
G.R. No. 197763, December 07, 2015
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA,
Petitioners, v. JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 197836
JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L.
NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA, Respondent.
TOPIC: REINSTATEMENT
DOCTRINE: Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
FACTS: Smart hired respondent Solidum as Department Head for Smart Buddy Activation.
Smart Buddy Activation is under the Product Marketing Group which is headed by Isla.
Isla gave Solidum a memorandum informing him of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to
explain why his employment should not be terminated, and placing him under preventive
suspension without pay for 30 days.
On Solidum submitted his written explanation in response to the notice. Isla gave Solidum a
memorandum informing him of a modified set of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to
explain why his employment should not be terminated, extending his preventive suspension by
10 days, and inviting him to an administrative investigation.
Isla gave Solidum a memorandum terminating his employment “for fraud or willful breach of
trust, falsification, misrepresentation, conflict of interest, serious misconduct and dishonesty-
related offenses.” Solidum filed against Smart a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, non-payment of salaries, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter found that Solidum’s preventive suspension and dismissal were illegal and
that he was entitled to full back wages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. LA
ordered Solidum’s reinstatement.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners
Solidum’s accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses. Said Labor Arbiter
issued seven other alias writs of execution ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners
Solidum’s accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.
On January 26, 2009, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and dismissed for lack of
merit Solidum’s complaint. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on May
29, 2009. Solidum filed with the Labor Arbiter an ex-parte motion praying that an alias writ of
execution be issued directing the sheriff to collect from petitioners Solidum’s accrued salaries,
allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.
LA RULING: LA denied the ex-parte motion because “the recent decision of the NLRC reversing
the Decision of this Office prevents any future issuance of any writ of execution on the
reinstatement aspect”
NLRC RULING: Reversed the LA ruling. Since Smart failed to reinstate Solidum, it held that
pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, relative to the reinstatement aspect of
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, respondents are obligated to pay complainant’s salaries and
benefits, computed from the date when respondents received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision which, among others, ordered the reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of
finality of the Commission’s resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
CA RULING: Upheld NLRC. Reaffirmed the prevailing principle that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court.
ISSUE: a) Whether Smart is obligated to pay Solidum’s salaries and benefits, computed from the
date when respondents received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision which ordered the
reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of finality of the Commission’s resolution
reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision?
b) When did the May 29, 2009 NLRC decision become Final and Executory?
HELD:
a) Yes. In Bago v. NLRC, the Court held that employees are entitled to their accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses until the NLRC’s reversal of the
labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the
entry of judgment.
b) August 10, 2009. Rule VII, Sec. 14 of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides: “The executive clerk or deputy executive clerk shall consider the decision ,
resolution or order as final and executory after sixty (60) days from date of mailing in
the absence of return cards, certifications from the post office, or other proof of
service to parties.” Since the May 29, 2009 Decision was mailed on 11 June 2009 and
in the absence of return cards, the decision became final and executory on 10 August
2009.
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
TOPIC: APPEAL
DOCTRINE: all petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
FACTS: Respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.
On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating
P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
LA RULING: in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC RULING: NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor
arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC. Thus, the
petitioner files a Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court may decide the case decided by the NLRC
HELD: Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of
appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been
provided for.
Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely
provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the
answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.
Now, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary
period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of
the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for
certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary
period under Rule 65.
Appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was
that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court
of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Important note from the SC:
We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this
Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 143813 July 7, 2003
KING INTEGRATED SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and/or MINA KING, petitioners, vs. GALO S.
GATAN, respondent.
TOPIC: WRIT OF EXECUTION
DOCTRINE: Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of
the court or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not appealable.
FACTS: Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal deduction and
underpayment of wages against petitioners.
LA RULING: Respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant herein his wage differential in
the total amount of P184,780.30.
NLRC RULING: Modifying the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by deleting the amount representing
respondent’s wage differential pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that
all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
Having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued an order directing the issuance of
a writ of execution. From this order, petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC, but it was
dismissed. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed with modification the Resolutions of the
NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
Despite the fact that what is being assailed is the NLRC Resolution ordering the issuance of a
writ of execution, still the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari and
evaluated the parties’ evidence. Clearly, the Court of Appeals overstepped its jurisdiction.
Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court
or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not appealable.
G.R. No. 193484 January 18, 2012
HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, Respondent.
TOPIC: QUITCLAIMS
DOCTRINE: Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties
and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.
FACTS: The petitioner started working for respondent Philcomsat as an accountant in the
latter's Finance Department. On August 15, 2001 or after thirty-four (34) years of service, the
petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was approved, effective
September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and
a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was
Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of ₱274,805.00.
The petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following his
receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of ₱9,439,327.91.
Almost three years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits,
claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is ₱14,015,055.00 and the ₱9,439,327.91
he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which
is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void.
LA RULING: Directed Philcomsat to pay him the amount of ₱4,575,727.09 and ₱274,805.00,
representing the balance of his retirement benefits and salary. That the consideration
supporting the subject quitclaim unconscionable.
NLRC RULING: NLRC granted Philcomsat’s appeal and reversed and set aside Labor Arbiter’s
Decision. The NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for unpaid retirement benefits and
salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed following his receipt
from Philcomsat of the amount of ₱9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full settlement of all his
claims against Philcomsat.
According to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to allege, much less, adduce evidence that
Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the quitclaim. The petitioner is well-
educated, a licensed accountant and was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President prior to his
retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim without understanding the
consequences and implications thereof.
Having willingly signed the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he is already estopped from
questioning the same.
ISSUE: Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby
foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.
HELD: While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their
legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's
claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the
petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court
finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and educated with a college
degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against his will. As no
proof was presented that the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception,
misrepresentation, the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning
the said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting the benefits thereunder. This Court will
never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations for the purpose of giving
imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his obligations under a valid and
binding release and waiver.
G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992
PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY.
ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL
CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND
WORKERS UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA
DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU),
Nominal Private Respondents, respondents.
TOPIC: CERTIFICATION ELECTION
DOCTRINE: The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on
the crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a
collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests.
FACTS: The collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers
and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other
unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were
already plotting their moves.
March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for
certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining
unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition. April 2, 1990, herein
petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention. Still
another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and
Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11,
1990, or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.
On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not
comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules,
quoted in part as follows: “In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise
where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a
verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order
the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of
the collective bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-
five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after
the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%)
requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be
dismissed.”
APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order
dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions.
PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the
Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the
petition for certification election. The principal petitioners did not appeal.
On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed
PWUP's appeal.
Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement,
which was concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a
majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and
subsequently registered with the DOLE.
ISSUES: Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of DOLE Undersecretary
HELD: YES. In line with the policy, the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous
submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election
should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of
the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it
seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only
a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election
within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a
certification election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable
period from such filing.
It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent
signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention.
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because
the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of
majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-
quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding
of a certification election.
The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the
crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a
collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential
that there be no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous management and a
union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of
labor be not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval
and support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the
workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the
suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that
will exalt procedure over substantial justice.
G.R. No. 211145
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD rep. by its President, ALFIE ALIPIO,
Petitioner vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND
CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (HHIC-PIDL.),, Respondents
TOPIC: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
DOCTRINE: Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association belongs to
workers themselves.
FACTS: Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard (Samahan) filed an application for
registration of its name with DOLE. Ncluded is the list of names of a total of 120 officers and
members, signatures of the attendees of the meeting, copy of their Constitution and by-laws.
The DOLE issued the corresponding certificate of registration.
Respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin) prayed for
the cancellation of registration of Samahan on the ground that its members do not fall under
any of the times of workers enumerated in Art 249.
Hanjin claimed that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had definite employers
and that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those without
definite employers may form a workers' association. Hanjin also claimed that Samahan
misrepresented itself when Samahan made it appear that its members where all qualified to
become members of the worker’s association. Samahan did not respond to the pleading hence
the DOLE Regional Director cancelled the certificate of registration.
The BLR granted Samahan’s appeal and reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. The ruling
made mention of the name of Samahan which uses the word “sa” rather than “ng” meaning
Hardin Shipyard was a location and do not pertain to the corporation.
On Motion for Reconsideration, the BLR affirmed its decision but instructed Samahan to
remove “Hanjin Shipyard” from the name.
On Appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the decision of BLR ruling that since 57/120 were
actually working in Hanjin, Samahan misrepresented itself in its preamble which created the
impression that all its members were employees of Hanjin. Butat any rate, removing “Hanjin
Shipyard” from the name would not prejudice or impair the right to self-organization because it
could adopt other appropriate names.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Samahan can form a worker’s association of employees.
(2) Whether Removing “Hanjin Shipyard” from the name by reason of the company’s property
right over the company name “Hanjin” is proper.
HELD: (1) More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers,
however, can also form and join a workers' association as well as labor-management councils.
Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of all workers to self-organization. This is
imbued in Section 3, Article XIII and Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and in
relation thereto to Article 3 of the Labor Code.
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective
bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a workers' association is an organization of
workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose
other than collective bargaining. Many associations or groups of employees, or even
combinations of only several persons, may qualify as a labor organization yet fall short of
constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor
organization is a labor union. The difference is one of organization, composition and operation.
The existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation of
workers' association.
Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association belongs to workers
themselves. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to
refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be
denied the exercise of a right granted by law and no one should be compelled to exercise such a
conferred right. There is no provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with
definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
Furthermore, the position that Samahan's members cannot form the association because they
are not covered by the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249) is incorrect. There is nothing
in the Article 243 which provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot form or join a
workers' association for mutual aid and protection. Thus, the Court agrees with Samahan's
argument that the right to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers. Furthermore, the Court concludes that misrepresentation,
to be a ground for the cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done maliciously
and deliberately.
(2) Yes it is proper. As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of the use of
name by a workers' association, the Court refers to the Corporation Code, which governs the
names of juridical persons. The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the
registration of a corporate name which is "identical or deceptively or confusingly similar" to
that of any existing corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or "patently confusing" or
"contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of fraud upon the public which would have
occasion to deal with the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the
reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations. For the same
reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its
name as it could give the wrong impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
Hence the SC reinstated the decision of BLR as modified by its November 28, 2011 Resolution
G.R. No. 152322 February 15, 2005
ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADOR G. BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE
LUMBAN, FELICITAS F. RAMOS, MIGUEL TEAÑO, JAIME BAUTISTA and FIDEL ACERO, as
Officers of the University of the East Employees’ Association, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E. DALUPAN, EFREN J.
DE OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR., ELIZABETH ALARCA, ELVIRA S. MANALO, and
RICARDO UY, respondents.
TOPIC: CONSENT ELECTION
DOCTRINE: An election should not be done if said election was perceptibly done to hinder any
resolution or decision that would be made by BLR-DOLE.
FACTS: Private respondents are members of the University of the East Employees’ Association
(UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging
them with spreading false rumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said
association. They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memorandum to submit
their Answer. Private respondents denied the allegations.
Failure to answer once again the Memorandum, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as president of
the association, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, et al., that their membership
in the association has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof.
Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committee’s finding of a prima facie case
against them.
On 01 December 1997, a complaint for illegal suspension, willful and unlawful violation of
UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal to render financial and other reports, deliberate refusal
to call general and special meetings, illegal holdover of terms and damages was filed by the
respondents against herein petitioners before the Department of Labor and Employment,
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR).
The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and
Employment. During the pendency of this appeal an election of officers was held by the UEEA.
The appeal, however, was dismissed for lack of merit
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners with the BLR-DOLE, but was denied.
A special civil action for certiorari was thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals citing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But, it was dismissed.
ISSUE: (a) Whether it is reversible error for the court of appeals to hold the election as invalid
and a nullity
HELD: This issue arose from the fact that the original decision of the DOLE-NCR ordering
petitioners, among other things, to "immediately hold/conduct an election of officers . . ."
Petitioners appealed from the DOLE-NCR decision to the BLR-DOLE. During the pendency of the
appeal, however, an election of officers was held. Subsequently, the BLR-DOLE affirmed the
decision of the DOLE-NCR, but with the pronouncement that ". . . the supposed election
conducted is null and void and cannot produce legal effects adverse to appellants."
We cannot hold the election valid as this would make us condone an iniquitous act. Said
election was perceptibly done to hinder any resolution or decision that would be made by BLR-
DOLE. The Regional Director indeed ordered the immediate holding of an election. The records
show that the petitioners questioned this order of the Regional Director before the BLR-DOLE
by way of appeal, and yet, they conducted the election, allegedly because it was due under
Republic Act No. 6715. Why this was done by the petitioners escapes us. But as rightfully
observed by the BLR-DOLE:
. . . Indeed, it is obvious that the general membership meeting and election of officers was done
purposely to pre-empt our resolution of this case and, more importantly, the participation of
appellees in the election. This cannot be tolerated
G.R. No. 186070 April 11, 2011
CLIENTLOGIC PHILPPINES, INC. (now known as SITEL), JOSEPH VELASQUEZ, IRENE ROA,
and RODNEY SPIRES, Petitioners, vs. BENEDICT CASTRO, Respondent.
TOPIC: MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
DOCTRINE: A "coach" is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints
which could not be dealt with by call center agents, and if a call center agent could not meet the
needs of a customer, he passes the customer’s call to the "coach." Clearly, (respondent) is not a
managerial employee as defined by law.
FACTS: Respondent was employed by petitioner as a call center agent for its Bell South
Account. After six months, he was promoted to the "Mentor" position, and thereafter to the
"Coach" position. A "Coach" is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer
complaints which cannot be resolved by call center agents. In June 2006, he was transferred to
the Dot Green Account.
During respondent’s stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent noticed that some of the call
center agents under him would often make excuses to leave their work stations. Their most
common excuse was that they would visit the company’s medical clinic. To verify that they
were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their work hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the
clinic’s personnel requesting for the details of the agents’ alleged medical consultation. His
request was denied on the ground that medical records of employees are highly confidential
and can only be disclosed in cases involving health issues, and not to be used to build any
disciplinary case against them.
Respondent received a notice requiring him to explain why he should not be penalized for: (1)
violating Green Dot Company’s Policy and Procedure for Direct Deposit Bank Info Request
when he accessed a customer’s online account and then gave the latter’s routing and reference
numbers for direct deposit; and (2) gravely abusing his discretion when he requested for the
medical records of his team members. Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed against
him.
On January 22, 2007, SITEL posted a notice of vacancy for respondent’s position, and on
February 12, 2007, he received a Notice of Termination. These events prompted him to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal; non-payment of overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay; full backwages; damages; and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter
against herein petitioners SITEL and its officers.
LA RULING: in favor of respondent by declaring him illegally dismissed and ordering
petitioners to pay his full backwages and, in lieu of reinstatement, his separation pay. The LA
further awarded respondent’s money claims upon finding that he was not occupying a
managerial position.
NLRC RULING: reversed and set aside the decision of the LA by dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit on the ground that respondent’s employment was terminated for a just cause. The
NLRC failed to discuss the money claims.
CA RULING: affirmed the NLRC’s finding that there was no illegal dismissal. Anent the money
claims, however, the CA concurred with the LA’s ruling
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is a member of managerial staff
HELD: Employees are considered occupying managerial positions if they meet all of the
following conditions, namely:
1) Their primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which they are employed
or of a department or subdivision thereof;
2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions
and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of
status of other employees are given particular weight.
They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if they perform the following
duties and responsibilities:
1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management of
policies of their employer;
2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty
consists of management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or
(ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring
special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special
assignment and tasks.
Respondent’s duties do not fall under any of the categories enumerated above. His work is not
directly related to management policies. Even the circumstances shown by the instant case
reveal that respondent does not regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.
Petitioners submitted a list of the responsibilities of "HR Manager/Supervisor" and "Division
Manager/Department Manager/Supervisors" but these do not pertain to respondent who does
not have any of the said positions. He was just a team Supervisor and not HR or Department
Supervisor.
As a coach or team supervisor, respondent’s main duty was to deal with customer complaints
which could not be handled or solved by call center agents. If the members of his team could
not meet the needs of a customer, they passed the customer’s call to respondent.
G.R. No. 160506 June 6, 2011
JOEB M. ALIVIADO, et. al, Petitioners, vs. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS., INC., and PROMM-
GEM INC., Respondents.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent from the time the compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
FACTS: Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G from various dates, allegedly starting as
early as 1982 or as late as June 1991, to either May 5, 1992 or March 11, 1993. They all
individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS for periods of more
or less five months at a time. They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets and stores
where they handled all the products of P&G. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or
SAPS. SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for
reasons such as habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice. P&G
is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and health
products, which it sells on a wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors.8 To
enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with
Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products.
In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint10 against P&G for regularization, service
incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint was later amended11 to
include the matter of their subsequent dismissal.
LA RULING: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and ruled that there was no employer-
employee relationship between petitioners and P&G. He found that the selection and
engagement of the petitioners, the payment of their wages, the power of dismissal and control
with respect to the means and methods by which their work was accomplished, were all done
and exercised by Promm-Gem/SAPS. He further found that Promm-Gem and SAPS were
legitimate independent job contractors.
NLRC RULING: The appeal of complainants is DISMISSED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the November 19,
1998 Resolution.
CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the NLRC
ISSUES: Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed
HELD: In order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an
employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act
or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important
and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. In the
instant case, petitioners-employees of Promm-Gem may have committed an error of judgment
in claiming to be employees of P&G, but it cannot be said that they were motivated by any
wrongful intent in doing so. As such, we find them guilty of only simple misconduct for assailing
the integrity of Promm-Gem as a legitimate and independent promotion firm. A misconduct
which is not serious or grave, as that existing in the instant case, cannot be a valid basis for
dismissing an employee.
Meanwhile, loss of trust and confidence, as a ground for dismissal, must be based on the willful
breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Ordinary breach will not suffice. A
breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable
excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
Loss of trust and confidence, as a cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact
that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As
such, he must be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as custody, handling or
care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. And, in order to constitute a just
cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and must show that the
employee is unfit to continue to work for the employer. In the instant case, the petitioners-
employees of Promm-Gem have not been shown to be occupying positions of responsibility or
of trust and confidence. Neither is there any evidence to show that they are unfit to continue to
work as merchandisers for Promm-Gem.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time the compensation
was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. Hence, all the petitioners, having been
illegally dismissed are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with full
back wages and other benefits from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time of their
actual reinstatement.
G.R. No. 128632 August 5, 1999
MSF TIRE AND RUBBER, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILTREAD TIRE
WORKERS' UNION, respondents.
TOPIC: INNOCENT BYSTANDER RULE
DOCTRINE: The corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation is used as a
mere alter-ego or business conduit, it is not these standards but those of the "innocent bystander"
rule.
FACTS: Respondent Union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB charging (Phildtread) with unfair
labor practice. Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtread’s plant.
Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration.
During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with Siam Tyre whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company, herein
petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land
on which the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be
owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.
Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant. As the
respondent Union refused petitioner’s request, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with
damages before the RTC. Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Petitioner asserts that its status as an “innocent bystander” with respect to the labor dispute
between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction
under the “innocent bystander” rule
HELD: In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the “innocent bystander” rule as follows:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be
curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as
an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize
the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including
those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial
connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or “innocent bystanders” if it appears that the
inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an
invasion of their rights.
Thus, an “innocent bystander,” who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court it is
entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and,
therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the dispute. We find
that the “negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction” between Philtread, as vendor,
and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of
petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was
not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets.
On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of
Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were subject plant
is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory;
similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment;
and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private
respondent’s personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an
injunctive writ.
G.R. No. 179652 6 March 2012
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) v. THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE
REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN
Velasco, Jr., J.:
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
DOCTRINE: If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that
there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter,
under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a
complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship,
the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment
of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. The DOLE Regional Director found
that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims.
When the matter was brought before the CA it was held that PBS was accorded due process as it
had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over
the matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the
power of the DOLE Secretary under Art. 128(b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic Act
No. (RA) 7730.
However, the SC found that there was no employer-employee relationship between PBS and
and private respo. It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the
visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA
7730. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This was the interpretation of
the Court of the clause in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists in Art.
128(b).
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of
Decision. The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. The DOLE also sought the same clarification.
ISSUE: Is the NLRC the sole body with jurisdiction to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship?
HELD: NO. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary
finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE
would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed,
the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine
whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or
not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended
by RA 7730.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be
respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730
would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing
the employer-employee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC.
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes
cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction
only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon
review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship need not necessarily result in an affirmative finding. The
DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee relationship exists, thus
divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach
its own conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by the SC.
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that
there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter,
under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a
complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship,
the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. Nos. 164302-03 January 24, 2007
SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V. SEBASTIAN, EULOGIO
G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE, MANOLO C. ZABALJAUREGUI, DIONISIO TENORIO,
EDWIN P. RELLORES, LUIS B. NATIVIDAD, MYRNA PETINGCO, FELICIANO TOLENTINO,
RODOLFO A. AMANTE, JR., CIPRIANO C. BELLO, RONALDO T. ESPINO, EFREN GALAN, and
JUN CARMELITO SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,
Respondent.
TOPIC: STRIKE
DOCTRINE: The fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
FACTS: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-
commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta.
Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its
terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company
discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from
the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA
meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their
work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa
were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of
the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse
ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a “Notice of
Strike” with the NCMB.
The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the
Company’s premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front
perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the
Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel
were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift.
All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5)
hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production
for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a “Petition to Declare Strike Illegal”
ISSUE: Whether the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.
HELD: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA,
the Court ruled that “the fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.”
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion.
The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the
company’s premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity
which already affected the company’s operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a
strike.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor
Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended
date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority
of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners
totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders
strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements
and embarked on their illegal strike.
CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR EDWIN CHUA v. BUKLOD
NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
TOPIC: ILLEGAL STRIKE
DOCTRINE: A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and a worker who
knowingly participates in the commission of an illegal strike are deemed to have lost their
employment status.
FACTS: Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation (the union), a
legitimate labor organization, is the recognized bargaining agent of Chuayuco Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (the corporation) of which its co-petitioner Edwin Chua is the
President.
In the election of the union officers, Camilo Lenizo (Lenizo) emerged as President. The
corporation however refused to recognize the newly elected officers for the reason that there is
an intra-union conflict between the factions of Lenizo and Romeo Ibanez, the former acting
union president.
The union staged a strike which causes illegal acts that intimidated and harassed the
corporation and non-striking employees. The strikers use physical violence and harass those
employees who are not on their side by shouting and threatening them not to go to work
anymore. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and thus, some of the members who
participated in the mass action lost their employment status.
ISSUE: Whether some of the employees who participated in the strike should be reinstated
without loss of seniority rights
HELD: Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.
Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his employment status if he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and in this case, the strike is declared illegal by the court because
the means employed by the union are illegal.
G.R. No. 114974 June 16, 2004
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), petitioner, vs.
The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, respondents.
TOPIC: BLUE SKY BARGAINING and INTERFERENCE
DOCTRINE: The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.
Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to
exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that
the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-
organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in
connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed.
FACTS: Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new CBA between the bank and
the Union, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Bank’s Human Resource Manager
and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded
from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno(head of the negotiating team
for the bank) suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National
Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded
from the Union’s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof. There
was deadlock in the negotiations. Both parties alleged ULP. Bank alleged that the Union violated
its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the
filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Union alleged
unfair labor practice when the bank allegedly interfered with the Union’s choice of negotiator.
It argued that, Diokno’s suggestion that the negotiation be limited as a “family affair” was
tantamount to suggesting that Federation President Jose Umali, Jr. be excluded from the Union’s
negotiating panel. It further argued that, damage or injury to the public interest need not be
present in order for unfair labor practice to prosper. The Union also contended that the Bank
merely went through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an
agreement.
ISSUE: (1) Whether there was interference;
(2) Whether the bank committed “surface bargaining”
HELD: (1) NONE. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when
an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes
the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its
negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the
Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects
on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the
employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is
committed.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence
is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at
bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude
Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel.
The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made
by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank
consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-
organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was
undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with
Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel. The
records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of
Umali in the Union’s negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was
made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the
arguments and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had
become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public
respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial
situations may be colored with unintended meanings. Such is what appears to have happened
in this case.
(2) NO. Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of negotiating” without any
legal intent to reach an agreement.” The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to
bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. It
alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of
reaching an agreement, as evident in the Bank’s counter-proposals. It explained that of the 34
economic provisions it made, the Bank only made 6 economic counterproposals. Further, as
borne by the minutes of the meetings, the Bank, after indicating the economic provisions it had
rejected, accepted, retained or were open for discussion, refused to make a list of items it
agreed to include in the economic package.
The minutes of meetings from March 12, 1993 to June 15, 1993 do not show that the Bank had
any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union. Records show that after the Union
sent its proposal to the Bank on February 17, 1993, the latter replied with a list of its counter-
proposals on February 24, 1993. Thereafter, meetings were set for the settlement of their
differences. The minutes of the meetings show that both the Bank and the Union exchanged
economic and non-economic proposals and counter-proposals. The Union has not been able to
show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to
show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences
between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain “does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” Hence, the parties’ failure to
agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.
G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997
NORMA MABEZA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER
NG/HOTEL SUPREME, respondents.
TOPIC: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
DOCTRINE: Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that
the employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with
the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme
constitutes unfair labor practice.
FACTS: Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that around the first week of May, 1991, she and
her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management
to sign an instrument attesting to the latter's compliance with minimum wage and other labor
standard provisions of law.
Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City Prosecutor's Office to swear to the
veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. The affidavit was
nevertheless submitted on the same day to the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment in Baguio City.
After she refused to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office petitioner avers that she was
ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove
her belongings from the hotel premises.
She thereafter reluctantly filed a leave of absence from her job which was denied by
management. When she attempted to return to work on May 10, 1991, the hotel's cashier
informed her that she should not report to work and, instead, continue with her unofficial leave
of absence. Consequently, on May 13, 1991, three days after her attempt to return to work,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission. In addition to her complaint for illegal dismissal, she alleged
underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay, night differential and other benefits.
Respondent alleged before Labor Arbiter that petitioner "surreptitiously left her job without
notice to the management” and that she actually abandoned her work. He maintained that there
was no basis for the money claims for underpayment and other benefits as these were paid in
the form of facilities to petitioner and the hotel's other employee. In a supplemental answer
submitted eleven months after the original complaint for illegal dismissal was filed, respondent
raised a new ground, loss of confidence, which was supported by a criminal complaint for
Qualified Theft he filed before the prosecutor's office of the City of Baguio against petitioner on
July 4, 1991.
LA RULING: Dismissed the petitioner's complaint on the ground of loss of confidence.
NLRC RULING: Affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter
Unsatisfied, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. The Solicitor General rejects private respondent's principal claims and
defenses and urges this Court to set aside the public respondent's assailed resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of petitioner constitutes unfair labor practice.

HELD: YES.
Unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has
exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employee's right
to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment.
Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the
employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with
the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme
constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers
to seek better terms and conditions of employment through concerted action.
Article 248 of the Labor Code paragraph (f) makes it an unfair labor practice "to dismiss,
discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being
about to give testimony."
For refusing to cooperate with the private respondent's scheme, petitioner was obviously held
up as an example to all of the hotel's employees, that they could only cause trouble to
management at great personal inconvenience. Implicit in the act of petitioner's termination and
the subsequent filing of charges against her was the warning that they would not only be
deprived of their means of livelihood, but also possibly, their personal liberty.
More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the
petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for
the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between
the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that
hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be available at various
odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such
as the private respondent's hotel.
G.R. No. 170287 February 14, 2008
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES UNION,
CHRISTOPHER PIZARRO, MICHAEL BRAZA, and NOLASCO CASTUERAS, respondents.
TOPIC: SECURITY CLAUSE
DOCTRINE: Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is
recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction.
FACTS: Petitioner Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Club) is a domestic non-profit corporation with
principal office at Country Club Drive, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Respondent Alabang
Country Club Independent Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
Club's rank-and-file employees.
In July 2001, an election was held and a new set of officers was elected. Soon thereafter, the
new officers conducted an audit of the Union funds. They discovered some irregularly recorded
entries, unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and uncollected loans from the Union funds.
The Union notified respondents of the audit results and asked them to explain the
discrepancies in writing.
On October 6, 2001, in a meeting called by the Union, respondents explained their side. Braza
denied any wrongdoing and instead asked that the investigation be addressed to Castueras,
who was the Union Treasurer at that time. With regard to his unpaid loans, Braza claimed he
had been paying through monthly salary deductions. With regard to the Union expenses which
were without receipts, Braza explained that these were legitimate expenses for which receipts
were not issued. He explained that though there were no receipts for these expenses, these
were supported by vouchers and itemized as expenses. Regarding his unpaid and unliquidated
cash advances amounting to almost PhP 20,000, Braza explained that these were not actual
cash advances but payments to a certain Ricardo Ricafrente who had loaned PhP 200,000 to the
Union. Pizarro claimed his salaries were regularly deducted to pay his loan and he did not know
why these remained unpaid in the records. Nonetheless, he likewise agreed to continuous
salary deductions until all his accountabilities were paid. Castueras also denied any
wrongdoing and claimed that the irregular entries in the records were unintentional and were
due to inadvertence because of his voluminous work load. He offered that his unpaid personal
loan of PhP 27,500 also be deducted from his salary until the loans were fully paid. Despite
their explanations, respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras were expelled from the Union
and were furnished individual letters of expulsion for malversation of Union funds.
On October 18, 2001, the Union, invoking the Security Clause of the CBA, demanded that the
Club should dismiss respondents in view of their expulsion from the Union. Respondents
Pizarro, their dismissal from the Club in an illegal dismissal complaint filed with the NLRC,
National Capital Region Arbitration Branch.
LA RULING: Ruled in favor of the Club, and found that there was justifiable cause in terminating
said respondents. He dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
NLRC RULING: Ruled that there was no justifiable cause for the termination of respondents
Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras. According to the NLRC, said respondents' expulsion from the
Union was illegal since the DOLE had not yet made any definitive ruling on their liability
regarding the administration of the Union's funds.
Aggrieved by the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC, the Club filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals.
CA RULING: Denied the petition and uphold the Decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed
HELD: NO. Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the following
grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under Art. 283; (3) termination
due to disease under Art. 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art.
285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the
union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on Union security contains the
provisions on the Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. There is union shop when
all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition
for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees
who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become
members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until
they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated.
Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is
recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union and prevents
disunity in the bargaining unit within the duration of the CBA.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the
employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the
union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the CBA's
union security provision.
The language of Art. II of the CBA that the Union members must maintain their membership in
good standing as a condition sine qua non for their continued employment with the Club is
unequivocal. It is also clear that upon demand by the Union and after due process, the Club shall
terminate the employment of a regular rank-and-file employee who may be found liable for a
number of offenses, one of which is malversation of Union funds.
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT
BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, respondents.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: In a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court.
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the issue of whether the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on
December 1-15, 1994. The Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January
18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been
filed by LDB.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the
Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
ISSUE: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-
judicial entities
HELD: It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a
panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
that matter. The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "the
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," while the
"decision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the
decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than
not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari in effect equating the
voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is
illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of
Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within
the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact
that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the
exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It
will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in
the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions
to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by
Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must
be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this
Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper
disposition.
G.R. No. 174316 June 23, 2009
TEODORICO S. MIRANDA, JR., Petitioner, vs. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. (ATI) and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
TOPIC: INTERNAL UNION DISPUTE
DOCTRINE: Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or
intra-union conflicts.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed by respondent ATI in 1991 as Checker I. He also became a
member of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union. The petitioner, who was then the
Vice President of the union, was appointed to the position of Shop Steward which is a union
position under the payroll of the company. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
union and ATI provided for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the
union members, upon the recommendation of the union president. The Shop Steward is a field
representative of both the company and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of
all complaints brought to his attention.
Roger P. Silva, the President of APCWU, wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding the recall of
his designation as the union Shop Steward. The union president explained that the petitioner
was recalled as union Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence in him, pursuant to the
“Agreement Amending the Marina Port Services, Inc.- APCWU CBA.” The letter further stated
that the petitioner refused to heed the union president’s reminders concerning his “chronic
absenteeism” that “is hurting the interest of the Union members as they are left with no
responsible union officer when summoned for investigation concerning alleged infractions of
company rules.”
Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the grievance committee issued its report
recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and for his reversion to his
former position of Checker I, in accordance with the CBA. The petitioner questioned his
recall as union Shop Steward, and the union president, Roger P. Silva, issued a letter
which reasoned that the petitioner’s recall as Shop Steward was pursuant to Section 13 of the
Agreement Amending the MPSI-APCWU CBA, amending Section 2, Article V of the MPSI-APCWU
CBA which required that the term of office of the Shop Steward shall be based on trust and
confidence and favorable recommendation of the duly elected president of the Union.
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to claim reinstatement as Shop Steward as well as the
payment of his backwages pending the respondent’s appeal. He further contends that the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing his consolidated petitions which prayed for the
enforcement of his reinstatement as Shop Steward for being moot and academic.
The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
relied on substantial evidence in arriving at their decision that the consolidated
petitions are already moot and academic in view of the previous reinstatement of the
petitioner to Checker I and his retrenchment and separation from ATI since October 31, 2001.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward
(2) Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the dispute
HELD: A cursory look at the responsibilities of a shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is
a position within the union, and not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the
union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with
negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the
employer. He is the representative of the union members in a building or other
workplace. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial
negotiations for the settlement of grievances. The shop steward is responsible for receiving
complaints and grievances of the employees and for bringing these complaints to the
immediate supervisor of the employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled
through the efforts of the shop steward, it is referred to the grievance committee.
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the
determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a
provision of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the
appropriate authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the
continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace
among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with
awesome responsibilities. Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy
surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the union.
An "Internal Union Dispute" or intra-union conflict refers to a conflict within or
inside a labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or
disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including
any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the
Code. Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations
and the Labor Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-
union conflicts.
The actions of the petitioner bolster the conclusion that his grievances were directed against
the union and not the respondent company, making the dispute an intra-union dispute. The
first Complaints filed by the petitioner were against the union and the Union President for
illegal recall of his designation as Shop Steward. A Complaint was then filed before the DOLE
Med-Arbiter praying for reinstatement to union Shop Steward and for the award of the salary
differential while he was allegedly illegally demoted. But the money claims could not be
brought before the union since the salaries of the petitioner were paid by the
respondent company; thus, a Complaint for illegal demotion amounting to constructive
dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter, against the union, union president and this time
including respondent company and the president of the company.
Notwithstanding the determination of the Med-Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Labor, that the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward,
which is binding on this Court, the petitioner could not be reinstated to the position of
Shop Steward because his eventual separation from respondent ATI made reinstatement
unfeasible. Employment with respondent ATI and membership in the union are required in
order to occupy the position of Shop Steward. But the petitioner is neither a member of the
union nor employed with respondent ATI. He was already retrenched from respondent ATI
since October 21, 2001, and his retrenchment was finally settled through the execution of a Quit
Claim and Release which was executed before the Second Division of the NLRC in NLRC CA No.
032809-02. The Quit Claim and Release provides that in consideration of the receipt ofP367,
500.00, the petitioner discharges respondent ATI and its officers from any claims arising from
his retrenchment, without prejudice to the present labor case filed by the petitioner.
It may seem that the outcome of this case provides no relief for the petitioner despite his
invalid removal from the position of union Shop Steward, but the reinstatement of the
petitioner could not be forced into the present circumstances because the petitioner is no
longer employed by the respondent company.
It is a fact that we cannot avoid and must consider in resolving this case. He was already
compensated for his retrenchment from ATI, and he released respondent ATI from any and all
claims or liability with respect to his separation from employment due to retrenchment. To
order the respondent company to reinstate the petitioner to his employment in ATI would
render the Quit Claim and Release nugatory. The events which have taken place during the
pendency of the case have rendered the present petition moot and academic.
G.R. No. 113907 February 28, 2000
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP) et.al.,
petitioners vs. HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
M. GREENFIELD (B), INC., SAUL TAWIL, CARLOS T. JAVELOSA, RENATO C. PUANGCO,
WINCEL LIGOT, MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR., GERVACIO CASILLANO,
LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY. GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO CABRERA, GAUDENCIO
RACHO, SANTIAGO IBANEZ, AND RODRIGO AGUILING, respondents.
TOPIC: NO STRKIKE, NO LOCK OUT PROVISION
DOCTRINE: A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in
nature
FACTS: The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an affiliate of the private respondent, United
Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as the "federation".
On September 12, 1986, a local union election was held under the auspices of the ULGWP
wherein the herein petitioner, Beda Magdalena Villanueva, and the other union officers were
proclaimed as winners. Minutes of the said election were duly filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations on September 29, 1986. On March 21, 1987, a Petition for Impeachment was filed
with the national federation ULGWP by the defeated candidates in the aforementioned election.
On June 16, 1987, the federation conducted an audit of the local union funds. The investigation
did not yield any unfavorable result and the local union officers were cleared of the charges of
anomaly in the custody, handling and disposition of the union funds. The 14 defeated
candidates filed a Petition for Impeachment/Expulsion of the local union officers with the
DOLE. However, the same was dismissed on March 2, 1988, by the Med-Arbiter for failure to
substantiate the charges and to present evidence in support of the allegations.
On April 17, 1988, the local union held a general membership meeting. Several union members
failed to attend the meeting, prompting the Executive Board to create a committee tasked to
investigate the non-attendance of several union members in the said assembly.
On June 27, 1988, the local union wrote respondent company a letter requesting it to deduct the
union fines from the wages/salaries of those union members who failed to attend the general
membership meeting. However, respondent company sent a reply to petitioner union's request
in a letter, stating that it cannot deduct fines from the employees' salary without going against
certain laws. The company suggested that the union refer the matter to the proper government
office for resolution in order to avoid placing the company in the middle of the issue.
The imposition of the fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement between the Federation
and the local union culminating to the latter’s declaration of general autonomy from the former.
The federation asked the company to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the
education funds. The company file a Complaint for Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the Med-Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment.
The federation called a meeting placing the local union under trusteeship and appointing an
administrator. Petitioner union officers received letters from the administrator requiring them
to explain why they should not be removed from the office and expelled from union
membership. The officers were expelled from the federation. The federation advised the
company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation pursuant to
the Union Security Clause in the CBA.
The Federation filed a notice of strike with the NCMB to compel the company to effect the
immediate termination of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a strike, the
company terminated the 30 union officers from employment. The petitioners filed a notice of
strike on the grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal of union officers and shop
stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation ; and union busting. The petitioners prayed for the
suspension of the effects of their termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it
was an intra-union matter. Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially declared a strike that
afternoon. The strike was attended by violence.
ISSUE: 1. Whether there was illegal dismissal.
2. Whether the strike was illegal.
3. Whether petitioners can be deemed to have abandoned their work.
HELD:
1. Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds from one main issue – the
termination of several employees upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the
union security clause. Although the union security clause may be validly enforced,
such must comply with due process. In this case, petitioner union officers were
expelled for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty to the federation. The company did
not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and merely relied upon the federation’s
allegations. The issue is not a purely intra-union matter as it was later on converted
into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work
without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. Although it started as an intra-
 union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR, to remand the same to the
BLR would intolerably delay the case and the Labor Arbiter could rule upon it. As to
the act of disaffiliation by the local union; it is settled that a local union has the right to
disaffiliate from its mother union in the absence of specific provisions in the
federation’s constitution prohibiting such. There was no such provision in federation
ULGWP’s constitution.
2. A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in
nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not
required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a
strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein
petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not
affect the strike. As to the violence, the parties agreed that the violence was not
attributed to the striking employees alone as the company itself hired men to pacify
the strikers. Such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike illegal.
3. Respondents failed to prove that there was a clear intention on the part of the striking
employees to sever their employer-employee relationship. Although admittedly the
company sent three return to work notices to them, it has not been substantially
proven that these notices were actually sent and received by the employees. As a
matter of fact, some employees deny that they ever received such notices. Others
alleged that they were refused entry to the company premises by the security guards
and were advised to secure a clearance from ULGWP and to sign a waiver. Some
employees who responded to the notice were allegedly told to wait for further notice
from respondent company as there was lack of work.
Furthermore, this Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay-
off cannot be said to have abandoned his work.
G.R. No. 100158 June 2, 1992
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-
EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU, respondents.
TOPIC: STRIKE
DOCTRINE: Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-
to-work order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status.
FACTS: The Union and College initiated negotiations for a first ever CBA which resulted in a
deadlock and prompted the union to file a notice of strike with the DOLE.
The union declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the College and public
respondent Sec. of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Instead of
returning to work, the union filed a motion for reconsideration of the return to work order.
The college sent individual letters to the striking employees requiring them to return to work.
In response union presented demands, the most important of which is the unconditional
acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were rejected.
The Secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration for his return to work order and
sternly warned striking employees to comply with its terms. Conciliation meetings were held
but this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any return to work
order should be unconditional.
The College manifested to respondent Secretary that the union continued to defy his return to
work order. The College sent termination letters to individual strikers and filed a complaint for
illegal strike against the union.
The union moved for the enforcement of the return to work order before the Secretary. The
Secretary issued an order directing reinstatement of striking union members and holding union
officers responsible for the violation of the return to work order and were correspondingly
terminated. Both parties moved for the partial consideration of the return to work order.
ISSUE: Whether the striking union members that has been terminated for abandonment of
work after failing to comply with the return to work order of Secretary of Labor be reinstated.
HELD: NO.
The Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily,
this authority to assume jurisdictional over the said labor dispute must include and extend to
all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter
has exclusive jurisdiction.
This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) Labor Code provides that if a strike
has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately
return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately
effective and executory.
There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national
interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution of higher learning with more or
less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students
and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all concerned. More important, it
is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual
and emotional well-being of the country’s youth.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately
comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides
that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may,
consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status.
There was willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that
the union consisted mainly of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-
informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the union in
this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some union officers
and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by
the college enjoining the union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990
presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the same terms and conditions
prior to the strike. Yet, the union decided to ignore the same. The college, correspondingly, had
every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the return-to-work orders
issued by respondent secretary in order to protect the interests of its students who form part of
the youth of the land.
G.R. Nos. 158190-91 June 21, 2006
NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and BAGONG NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTOR PHILIPPINES,
INC. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU), Respondents.
TOPIC: STRIKE
DOCTRINE: An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for
mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during
the strike.
FACTS: There was a labor dispute triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock between Nissan
Motor and the Union resulting in the filing of 4 notices of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB).
The first Notice of Strike- ground of alleged unfair labor practice, stemmed from the suspension
of about 140 company employees, following the disruptive protest action arising from the
employees’ demand for payment of the 2nd half of their 13th month pay; second strike-
deadlock in collective bargaining involving a mix of economic and non-economic issues.
The DOLE, upon Nissan Motor’s petition, issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the
dispute. DOLE Secretary expressly enjoined any strike or lockout and directed the parties to
cease and desist from committing any act that might exacerbate the situation, and for the Union
to refrain from any slowdown and other similar activities that may disrupt company operations
or bring its production to below its normal and usual levels. The Union filed a 3rd Notice of
Strike on the ground of illegal lockout, illegal suspension, union busting. The DOLE ordered the
3rd Notice of Strike be consolidated with the first two notice; Union filed a reiterative Urgent
Petition to Suspend the Effects of Termination of union officers and members, now numbering
43. The Company filed its Position Paper.
Union filed a 4th Notice of Strike on grounds of alleged illegal dismissal of 18 union officials,
illegal lockout on account of the forced leave, coercion/intimidation, union busting and non-
payment of salaries. The Acting DOLE Secretary ordered the 4th notice of strike to be
consolidate with the first 3 notices. Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure,
Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NMPI, alleging that despite the injunctions
against any slowdown and strike, the Union went on actual strike, picketed and blocked the
company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and obstructed all entrances and exits
points.
ISSUE: Whether the strike was illegal
HELD: YES.
As the Union itself alleges, there was normal, even high production [95% – 100% of production
plan in all lines] in the month of June 2001. In the month of July 2001, production at JIG Line 2
was 100% of plan from July 2 to 23 (covering only 5 working days), and at Metal Line,
production was from 88% to 142% of plan, for the first 3 weeks of July. But production fell by
at least 50% in the 4th week, the time when the CBA deadlock occurred and the 2nd strike
notice was filed. Neither is the Union’s claim that the forced leaves and suspension of workers
were responsible for the disruption of production true. On the contrary, it was the lack of work-
in progress due to slowdown and absenteeism which are responsible for the declaration of
forced leave. Thus, the Union’s excuses do not hold sway on this Office.
To be sure, the Union engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which they
were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the
subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in
illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary
The labor code provides that:
Article 264. Prohibited Activities. No strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Secretary or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for
the strike or lockout. xxx. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: While the employer is authorized to
declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment,
his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws
a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers.
An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the
strike. Except for the most serious causes affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws
frown upon dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an employee should not be
sanctioned with a consequence so severe. The members must be reinstated is because they
were merely following the orders of their leaders and they did not abandon their work; no
evidence was presented that they participated in illegal acts The responsibility of union
officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore,
limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in
order.
G.R. No. 215568, August 03, 2015
RICHARD N. RIVERA, Petitioner, v. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. AND RIZA A.
MOISES, Respondents.
TOPIC: JUST CAUSES
DOCTRINE: "humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in the rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated."
FACTS: Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. beginning June
2002 as a bus conductor, assigned to the Cubao-Baler, Aurora route. As part of the requisites for
his employment, he was required to post a cash bond of P6, 000.00.
Villaseran, on May 25, 2010, he conducted a "man to man" inspection on the tickets held by the
passengers on board Bus No. 8286 who had transferred from Bus No. 1820 in San Fernando,
Pampanga. (Bus No. 1820 broke down.) In the course of his inspection, he noticed that Ticket
No. 723374 VA had a written corrected amount of P394.00. However, the amount marked by
perforations made on the ticket, which was the amount originally indicated by the bus
conductor, was only P198.00. Upon inquiring with the passenger holding the ticket, Villaseran
found out that the passenger paid P500.00 to Rivera, who gave her change in the amount of
P106.00. Subsequently, Villaseran conducted verification works with the Ticket Section of
Genesis' Cubao Main Office. Per his inquiries, the duplicate ticket surrendered by Rivera to
Genesis indicated only the unconnected amount of P198.00. It was also found that Rivera
remitted only P198.00.
On July 20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his
case was set on July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were terminated
through a written notice dated July 30, 2010. Contending that this termination was arbitrary
and not based on just causes for terminating employment, he filed the Complaint for illegal
dismissal.
LA RULING: dismissed Rivera's Complaint
NLRC RULING: affirmed the Decision of Labor Arbiter denying the Rivera's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Thereafter, Rivera filed a Rule 65 Petition before the Court of Appeals.
CA RULING: sustained the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission. The Court of Appeals denied Rivera's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner's employment was terminated for just cause by respondent.
HELD:
Our laws on labor, foremost of which is the Labor Code, are pieces of social legislation. They
have been adopted pursuant to the constitutional recognition of "labor as a primary social
economic force" and to the constitutional mandates for the state to "protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare" and for Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, and reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities."
They are means for effecting social justice, i.e., the "humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in the rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated."
Bus conductors handle money. To this extent, their work may be analogous to that of tellers,
cashiers, and other similarly situated rank-and-file employees who occupy positions of trust
and confidence. However, even granting that the first requisite for termination of employment
on account of willful breach of trust has been satisfied, we find it improper to sustain the
validity of the termination of petitioner's employment.
The records are bereft of evidence showing a pattern of discrepancies chargeable against
petitioner. Seen in the context of his many years of service to his employer and in the absence
of clear proof showing otherwise, the presumption should be that he has performed his
functions faithfully and regularly. It can be assumed that he has issued the correct tickets and
given accurate amounts of change to the hundreds or even thousands of passengers that he
encountered throughout his tenure. It is more reasonable to assume that—except for a single
error costing a loss of only P196.00—the company would have earned the correct expected
margins per passenger, per trip, and per bus that it allowed to travel.
Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by petitioner can
hardly be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has acted in
a manner that runs afoul of his employer's trust. More so, petitioner cannot be taken to have
engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his employer. Terminating
his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust.
G.R. No. 164772 June 8, 2006
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION (now known as EQUITABLE-PCI BANK), petitioner,
vs. RICARDO SADAC, Respondent.
TOPIC: BACKWAGES
DOCTRINE: Backwages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or
employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal
FACTS: Respondent Sadac was appointed Vice President of the Legal Department of petitioner
Bank effective 1 August 1981, and subsequently General Counsel thereof on 8 December 1981.
On 26 June 1989, nine lawyers of petitioner Bank’s Legal Department, in a letter-petition to the
Chairman of the Board of Directors, accused respondent Sadac of abusive conduct, inter alia,
and ultimately, petitioned for a change in leadership of the department. On the ground of lack of
confidence in respondent Sadac, under the rules of client and lawyer relationship, petitioner
Bank instructed respondent Sadac to deliver all materials in his custody in all cases in which the
latter was appearing as its counsel of record. In reaction thereto, respondent Sadac requested
for a full hearing and formal investigation but the same remained unheeded. On 9 November
1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against petitioner
Bank and individual members of the Board of Directors thereof. After learning of the filing of
the complaint, petitioner Bank terminated the services of respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10
August 1989, respondent Sadac was removed from his office and ordered disentitled to any
compensation and other benefits.
In a Decision dated 2 October 1990, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr., dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC in its Resolution of 24 September 1991
reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared respondent Sadac’s dismissal as illegal.

Petitioner Bank file via a Special Civil Action for Certiorari. But it held that respondent Sadac’s
dismissal was illegal. That the existence of the employer-employee relationship between
petitioner Bank and respondent Sadac had been duly established bringing the case within the
coverage of the Labor Code. Respondent Sadac filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for
Execution. Likewise, petitioner Bank filed a Manifestation and Motion14 praying that the award
in favor of respondent Sadac be computed and that after payment is made, petitioner Bank be
ordered forever released from liability under said judgment.
ISSUES: Whether the periodic general increases in basic salary be included in computing full
backwages for illegally dismissed employees
HELD: NO. Backwages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or
employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal; it is not private compensation or damages but is
awarded in furtherance and effectuation of the public objective of the Code. Backwages to be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee should not as a general rule be diminished or
reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be inclusive of
allowance and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. The salary increase cannot be
interpreted as either as an allowance or a benefit. Salary increases are not akin to allowances or
benefits and cannot be confused with either. Allowances and benefits are granted to the
employee apart or separate from the wage or salary. In contrast, salary increases are amounts
which are added to the employee’s salary as an increment thereto for varied reasons deemed
appropriate by the employer.
An unqualified award of backwages means that the employee is paid at the wage rate at the
time of his dismissal. And the court has declared that the base figure to be used in the
computation of backwages due to the employee should include not just the basic salary, but
also the regular allowances that he had been receiving, such as the emergency living allowances
and the 13th month pay mandated under the law.
The term “backwages without qualification and deduction” means that the workers are to be
paid their backwages fixed as of the time of the dismissal or strike without deduction for their
earnings elsewhere during their layoff and without qualification of their wages as thus fixed;
unqualified by any wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by their co-
workers who are not dismissed or did not go on strike. Awards including salary differentials
are not allowed. The salary base properly used should, however, included not only the basic
salary but also the emergency cost of living allowance and also transportation allowances if the
workers are entitled thereto.
G.R. No. 167286 February 5, 2014
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MANILA AND/OR BRIAN McCAULEY, Petitioners, vs.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) AND MEMBERS
REPRESENTED BY RAQUEL DAVID CHING, PRESIDENT, EVANGELINE SANTOS, JOSELYN
RUCIO AND METHELYN FILLER, Respondents.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: Gross inefficiency falls within the purview of “other causes analogous to the
foregoing,” and constitutes therefore, just cause to terminate an employee.
FACTS: In 1978, Evangeline Santos was first hired as a full-time Spanish language teacher. She
was on leave of absence from 1992. Upon her return sometime in August 1993, only one class
of Spanish was available for her to teach. Thus, for the school year 1993-1994, she agreed to
teach one class of Spanish and four other classes of Filipino. Since it was Santos’s first time to
teach Filipino, the school’s administrators observed her classes for which the results will be
summarized in a Classroom Standards Evaluation Forms.
October of 1993, the Assistant Principal observed Santos’s Filipino II class. It was noted that she
needs improvement in the following criteria: (1) uses effective questioning techniques; (2)
punctual and time efficient; (3) states and enforces academic and classroom behavior
expectations in a positive manner; and (4) reinforces appropriate behavior.
For the school years 1994-1995 (4 classes of Filipino), 1995-1996 (5 classes of Filipino), 1996-
1997 (5 classes of Filipino), she indicated that she did not prefer a change of teaching
assignment. At certain times, the Assistant Principal would observe Santos’s classes which
resulted to more or less the same observations that she needed improvements on as with the
first observation. In 1996, her attention was called to the deficiencies in her planning and on
the same year she was required to undergo remediation phase of the evaluation process
through a Professional Growth Plan. Since the implementation, there was a noticeable
improvement it yielded to a positive effect on her performance. But not long after, May of 1996,
Santos was advised her Professional Growth Plan had been revised. Thereafter it seemed that
the positive reviews of her performance were gradually replaced by renewed concerns on her
planning.
A series of memorandums were sent calling Santos’s attention about the problem they
discovered and expressing frustration at her performance. As a result of which, a letter was
sent directing her to explain in writing why her employment should not be terminated for her
failure to meet the criteria for improvement and her substandard performance as a teacher. In
her reply, she said that the school forced her to teach Filipino, a subject which she had no
preparation for. Thereafter, she was informed the school considered her letter as explanation
and it will also set a formal administrative investigation. According to the Minutes of the
Administrative Investigation, what took place were clarifications as to the specific charge with
reference to the letter of explanation. The charge against Santos was gross inefficiency or
negligence in the performance of her assigned work. In consequence thereof, she was then told
that her employment would cease effective June 7, 1997. Thereafter, a complaint was filed
against the petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Evangeline Santos was illegally dismissed.
2. Whether she is entitled to reinstatement or separation pay with backwages.
HELD:
(1) The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expressly states that termination of employment
shall be in accordance with the Labor Code. Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate an employment for any of the ground mentioned in such section and
one of which is gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. Gross inefficiency falls
within the purview of “other causes analogous to the foregoing,” and constitutes therefore, just
cause to terminate an employee. “Gross inefficiency” is closely related to “gross neglect,” for
both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the
employer or to his business. As such, failure to prescribe such standards of work, or to fulfill
reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Thus,
the actuations of Santos complained of by the petitioners constituted gross and habitual neglect
of her duties.
For termination of employment based on just causes, the following are the requirements to
constitute due process: (i) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side; (ii) a hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him; (iii) a written notice of termination
served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination. As such, in the instant case, the school
complied with all the requirements. After a thorough evaluation of Santos’s performance, the
school held a series of conferences and meetings with Santos, in order to improve her
performance. On March 29, 1996, the school required Santos to undertake a Professional
Growth Plan. Thereafter, when the intervention of the school failed to yield any considerable
improvement on Santos, the Assistant Principal wrote her a letter on April 10, 1997, which
required her to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours why her employment should
not be terminated. On April 16, 1997, Santos was informed that the administrative investigation
would be conducted on April 23, 1997 where she would be given the opportunity to be heard.
On April 23, 1997, an administrative investigation was conducted wherein Santos appeared
with the assistance of ISAE President. In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the school informed
Santos of its decision to terminate her employment on the ground of her failure to meet the
standards of the school, which as discussed was tantamount to gross inefficiency. Thus, she was
validly dismissed.
(2) In view of the finding that Santos was validly dismissed from employment, she would not
ordinarily be entitled to separation pay. An exception to this rule is when the court finds
justification in applying the principle of social justice. In the instant case, the court finds
equitable and proper the award of separation pay in favor of Santos in view of the length of her
service with the school prior to the events that led to the termination of her employment. To
recall, she was first employed by the school in 1978 as a Spanish language teacher and no other
infraction or administrative case against her was filed by the school. Thus, an award of
separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service is awarded
in favor of Santos on grounds of equity and social justice.
G.R. No.179326 July 31, 2013
LUCIANO P. CANEDO,* Petitioner, vs. KAMPILAN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.
and RAMONCITO L. ARQUIZA, Respondents.
TOPIC: DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: A ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for security guards employed in security
agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with
third parties."
FACTS: Respondent agency hired petitioner as security guard on November 20, 1996 and
assigned him at the Naga Power Barge 102 of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Sigpit
Load Ends, Lutopan, Toledo City.
For not wearing proper uniform while on duty as per report of Allan Alfafara (Alfafara) of the
NPC, petitioner was suspended for a month effective May 8, 2003.
June 2, 2003, NPC informed respondent agency that it was no longer interested in petitioner’s
services and thus requested for his replacement.
On June 17, 2003, petitioner requested respondent Arquiza to issue a certification in
connection with his intended retirement effective that month. Thus, respondent Arquiza issued
the Certification11 dated June 25, 2003.
Five days later, petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against respondents.
Petitioner alleged that his suspension was without valid ground and effected without due
process, hence, illegal. He claimed that Alfafara’s report about his non-wearing of uniform was
fabricated and ill-motivated because he declined Alfafara’s invitation to convert to their
religion. In fact, the roving inspector who checked the attendance of guards on duty does not
have any report showing his commission of any infraction. Petitioner averred that he was
suspended without being given the chance to explain his side.
Petitioner narrated that when he reported back to work after his one-month suspension, he
was surprised to find out that he was already terminated from the service effective May 7, 2003
as shown by the June 25, 2003 Certification issued to him by respondent Arquiza. He then
claimed to have been underpaid for services rendered and that he is entitled to holiday pay,
rest day pay, night shift differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, retirement
benefits, damages and attorney’s fees.
LA RULING: Petitioner was illegally dismissed from the service. He also found petitioner’s prior
suspension illegal and granted him all his monetary claims except for underpayment of wages.
NLRC RULING: initially affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a
Resolution. Hence, he sought recourse to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari.
CA RULING: denied the Petition after it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC. CA concluded that petitioner was merely placed on temporary "off-detail" which is not
equivalent to dismissal.
The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was dismissed from the service
HELD: At the outset, the Court notes that this is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. In illegal dismissal cases, "while the employer
bears the burden x x x to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service." The
burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear,
positive and convincing.
Petitioner cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be
evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss.
Petitioner from that point onward is not considered dismissed but merely on a floating status.
"Such a ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for security guards employed in security
agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency
with third parties."
A floating status can ripen into constructive dismissal only when it goes beyond the six-month
maximum period allowed by law.
Petitioner was not dismissed from service.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOY C. CABILES,
Respondent.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: The Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of
workers, to wit: “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”
FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application
for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a
one year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$ 15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the
employment contract. Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. on June 26, 1997.
She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for
immediate repatriation." Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she
only earned a total of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for the
return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary
for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged
that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her
"failure to comply with the work requirements of her foreign employer."
LA RULING: dismissed Joy’s complaint that it was based on mere allegations.
NLRC RULING: declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. It reiterated the doctrine that the
burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the
employer. It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just
causes for termination. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating
respondent.
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration. Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency caused the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
CA RULING: affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to
the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months’ worth of
salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent has been illegally dismissed.
HELD: YES. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for
causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency. There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the
standards against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict
as to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was
not clear.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.
The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before
termination. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that
may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must "inform the employee of the employer’s
decision." Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity
to be heard."
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees
and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."
Illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less than one
year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts. Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a
year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of
their contracts.
G.R. No. 199554 February 18, 2015
ZENAIDA PAZ, Petitioner, vs. NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC., AND/OR ANGELO
ANG, Respondents.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and/or RETIREMENT BENEFITS
DOCTRINE: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more,
but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory... retirement age,
who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one... whole year.
FACTS: On May 18, 2003, Paz was 63 years old when NTRCI informed her that she was
considered retired under company policy. A year later, NTRCI told her she would receive P12,
000.00 as retirement pay.
Paz, with two other complainants, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against NTRCI on
March 4, 2004. She amended her Complaint on April 27, 2004 into a Complaint for payment of
retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees as P12, 000.00 seemed inadequate for her 29
years of service.
NTRCI countered that no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existed between NTRCI and
its workers. Thus, it computed the retirement pay of its seasonal workers based on Article 287
of the Labor Code. NTRCI raised the requirement of at least six months of service a year for that
year to be considered in the retirement pay computation.
LA RULING: Confirmed that the correct retirement pay of Zenaida M. Paz was Php12,487.50.
NLRC RULING: Modified the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It likewise denied reconsideration.
CA RULING: Dismissed the Petition and modified the National Labor Relations Commission's
Decision in that "financial assistance is awarded to Zenaida Paz in the amount of P60, 356. 25
Since the exact number of days petitioner Paz would have worked between May 18, 2003 until
she would turn 65 in 2005 could not be determined with specificity, this court thus awards full
backwages in the amount of P22,200.00 computed by multiplying P185.00 by 20 days, then by
three months, then by two years.
There was no showing that respondent NTRCI complied with these due process requisites.
Thus, consistent with jurisprudence, petitioner Paz should be awarded P30,000.00 as nominal
damages.
ISSUE: Whether an employee who was only 63 years old and was told that she was retired but
amended her complaint to include retirement can be considered as illegally dismissed from
service.
HELD: Petitioner Paz initially filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal seeking separation pay, but
later amended her Complaint into one for payment of retirement pay. Despite the amendment,
she maintained in her subsequent pleadings that she had been made to retire even before she
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 under Article 287, as amended.
Petitioner Paz alleged that respondent NTRCI required her to report on March 18, 2003 for the
2003 tobacco season, but she suffered a mild stroke sometime in April. Nevertheless,
respondent NTRCI extended her employment contract until May 18, 2003 when she was
informed that she was retired under company policy.
Since petitioner Paz was "unlearned and not knowledgeable in law, she just accepted such fact
and waited to be paid her separation/retirement benefit as promised by NTRCI." Unfortunately,
after a year of waiting, respondent NTRCI only offered her around ₱12,000.00 for all her
services since 1974.
Petitioner Paz’s amendment of her Complaint was not fatal to her cause of action for illegal
dismissal. First, petitioner Paz never abandoned her argument that she had not reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 pursuant to Article 287, as amended, when respondent NTRCI
made her retire on May 18, 2003. That the respondent NTRCI failed to prove a valid company
retirement policy, yet it required its workers to retire after they had reached the age of 60.
"Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his
or her employment with the former." Article 287, as amended, allows for optional retirement at
the age of at least 60 years old. Consequently, if "the intent to retire is not clearly established or
if the retirement is involuntary, it is to be treated as a discharge."
Paz never abandoned her argument of illegal dismissal despite the amendment of her
Complaint. This implied lack of intent to retire until she reached the compulsory age of 65.
Thus, she should be considered as illegally dismissed from May 18, 2003 until she reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 in 2005 and should be entitled to full backwages for this
period.
Since the exact number of days petitioner Paz would have worked between May 18, 2003 until
she would turn 65 in 2005 could not be determined with specificity, this court thus awards full
backwages in the amount of ₱22,200.00 computed by multiplying 185.00 by 20 days, then by
three months, then by two years.
G.R. No. 159371 July 29, 2013
D.M. CONSUNJI CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ROGELIO P. BELLO, Respondent.
TOPIC: VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION
DOCTRINE: We reiterate that it is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who interposes the
defense of voluntary resignation of the employee in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and that the employer
cannot rely on the weakness of the defense of the employee. The requirement rests on the need to
resolve any doubt in favor of the working man.
FACTS: DMCI had employed the respondent as a mason without any interruption from
February 1, 1990 until October 10, 1997 at an hourly rate of ₱25.081. That he had been a very
diligent and devoted worker and had served DMCI as best as he could and without any
complaints. He also never violated any company rules and that his job as a mason had been
necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of DMCI. He had been diagnosed to be
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, thereby necessitating his leave of absence and upon his
recovery, he had reported back to work, but DMCI had refused to accept him and had instead
handed to him a termination paper. He had been terminated due to "RSD" effective November
5, 1997 and he did not know the meaning of "RSD" as the cause of his termination. The cause
had not been explained to him and he has not been given prior notice of his termination. Also,
he had not been paid separation pay as mandated by law. That at that time of his dismissal,
DMCI’s projects had not yet been completed and that even if he had been terminated due to an
authorized cause, he should have been given at least one month pay or at least one-half month
pay for every year of service he had rendered, whichever was higher.
DMCI contended that Bello had only been a project employee, as borne out by his contract of
employment and appointment papers. That after his termination from employment, it had
complied with the reportorial requirements of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) pursuant to the mandates of Policy Instruction No. 20, as revised by Department Order
No. 19, series of 1993. His last project employment contract had been set to expire on October
7, 1997, he had tendered his voluntary resignation on October 4, 1997 for health reasons that
had rendered him incapable of performing his job, per his resignation letter.
LA RULING: That respondent company DM Consunji, Inc., guilty of illegal dismissal and it is
hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and to pay him full backwages reckoned from the time of his dismissal up to his actual
reinstatement which as of this date is in the amount of ₱232,648,81.
NLRC RULING: Dismissed Bello’s claim because records do show that complainant executed a
voluntary resignation.
Bello moved for a reconsideration, but the NLRC denied his motion. Bello then assailed the
dismissal of his complaint via petition for certiorari.
CA RULING: finds Bello to have acquired the status of a regular employee although he had
started as a project employee of DMCI by his having been employed as a mason who had
performed tasks that had been usually necessary and desirable in the business or trade of DMCI
continuously from February 1, 1990 to October 5, 1997; that his repeated re-hiring and the
continuing need for his services over a long span of time had undeniably made him a regular
employee; that DMCI’s compliance with the reportorial requirements under Policy Instruction
No. 20 could not preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee; that the cause of
his dismissal after he had acquired the status of a regular employee – the completion of the
phase of work – could not be considered as a valid cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code;
and that his supposedly voluntary resignation could not be accorded faith after the ELA had
concluded that the handwriting in the supposed resignation letter was "undeniably different
from that of complainant," a fact "not rebutted by herein respondents.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent was a regular employee; and Whether or not private
respondent was dismissed or voluntarily resigned.
HELD: A project employee is, therefore, one who is hired for a specific project or undertaking,
and the completion or termination of such project or undertaking has been determined at the
time of engagement of the employee. In the context of the law, Bello was a project employee of
DMCI at the beginning of their employer-employee relationship. The project employment
contract they then entered into clearly gave notice to him at the time of his engagement about
his employment being for a specific project or phase of work. He was also thereby notified of
the duration of the project, and the determinable completion date of the project.
However, the history of Bello’s appointment and employment showed that he performed his
tasks as a mason in DMCI’s various constructions projects. That Bello acquired in time the
status of a regular employee by virtue of his continuous work as a mason of DMCI. The work of
a mason like him – a skilled workman working with stone or similar material – was really
related to building or constructing, and was undoubtedly a function necessary and desirable to
the business or trade of one engaged in the construction industry like DMCI. His being hired as
a mason by DMCI in not one, but several of its projects revealed his necessity and desirability to
its construction business.
Lastly, DMCI claims that Bello voluntarily resigned from work. It presented his supposed
handwritten resignation letter to support the claim. However, Bello denied having resigned,
explaining that he had signed the letter because DMCI had made him believe that the letter was
for the purpose of extending his sick leave.
That the handwriting in the resignation letter was "undeniably different" from that of Bello
could not be ignored or shunted aside simply because she had no expertise to make such a
determination.
We reiterate that it is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who interposes the defense of
voluntary resignation of the employee in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear, positive
and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and that the employer cannot rely
on the weakness of the defense of the employee. The requirement rests on the need to resolve
any doubt in favor of the working man.
G.R. No. 152949 August 14, 2007
AKLAN COLLEGE, INCORPORATED and MSGR. ADOLFO P. DEPRA, petitioners, vs.
RODOLFO P. GUARINO, respondent.
TOPIC: SECURITY OF TENURE
DOCTRINE: Provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code are not applicable to the present case
especially with respect to the issue of respondent's acquisition of security of tenure. It is settled
that questions respecting a private school teacher’s entitlement to security of tenure are governed
by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code.
FACTS: In 1974, private respondent was appointed as Acting Dean of the Commerce and
Secretarial Department. On November 26, 1990, he was again appointed by the petitioner as
Acting Personnel Director, in addition to his duties as acting dean. His appointment as Acting
Personnel Director was in a temporary basis and until it is revoked by the President or Rector
of the College. A year after, private respondent went on leave for one year from November 4,
1991 up to November 4, 1992.
On October 20, 1992, private respondent wrote the petitioner through its Rector informing the
latter of his intention of reassuming his positions with the petitioner college. However, in
petitioner’s response, it informed private respondent that he cannot anymore reassume his
former position as Acting Dean of the Commerce and Secretarial Department because he is not
qualified for the position. Then, on November 10, 1992, petitioner formally informed private
respondent that the Board of Trustees of the petitioner college has decided not to allow him to
reassume his position as Acting Dean for the reason that he has not qualified to continue
holding the position and that the position of Acting Personnel director has already been filled
up by a regular incumbent.
Hence, on November 11, 1992, private respondent filed the instant case for illegal dismissal
against petitioner with the office of the Department of Labor in Kalibo, Aklan.
LA RULING: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
NLRC RULING: reversed the decision of LA. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay the
complainant separation pay for his discharge from the position of Dean of Commerce and
Secretarial Science, equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered one year. The respondents are further ordered to reinstate the
complainant in his position as personnel director with full backwages from the time his salaries
were withheld from him until his actual reinstatement, and as instructor without backwages.
The respondents are furthermore ordered to pay the complainant 10% of the monetary awards
as attorney’s fees. Other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the NLRC, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the CA.
CA RULING: denying the petition and affirming the assailed decision of the NLRC.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA. Petitioner file a
petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ISSUES: Whether the termination of respondent as Acting Personnel Director is valid whether
respondent is entitled to security of tenure
HELD: YES. It is not disputed that respondent was appointed as Acting Personnel Director on
November 26, 1990. He went on leave for one year from November 4, 1991 until November 4,
1992, after which he was no longer allowed to re-assume his administrative posts. Having
assumed the position of Personnel Director in an acting capacity, respondent could not
reasonably have expected that he had acquired security of tenure.
This Court has held that an acting appointment is merely temporary, or one which is good until
another appointment is made to take its place. And if another person is appointed, the
temporary appointee should step out and cannot even dispute the validity of his successor’s
appointment. The undisturbed unanimity of cases is that one who holds a temporary
appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated anytime at the
pleasure of the appointing power without need to show that it is for cause.
Moreover, the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code are not applicable to the present case
especially with respect to the issue of respondent's acquisition of security of tenure. It is settled
that questions respecting a private school teacher’s entitlement to security of tenure are
governed by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code.
As to respondent’s entitlement to separation pay, the settled rule is that separation pay is the
amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed
to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is seeking another
employment. In the present case, while respondent was no longer allowed to return to his
positions as Acting Dean and Acting Personnel Director he was, nonetheless, retained as an
instructor. Hence, he could not be deemed as separated from the service because his
employment as instructor remains.
G.R. No. 209499 January 28, 2015
MA. CHARITO C. GADIA, et.al, Petitioners, vs. SYKES ASIA, INC./ CHUCK SYKES/ MIKE
HINDS/ MICHAEL HENDERSON, Respondents.
TOPIC: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DOCTRINE: At the outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in
a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Sykes Asia is a corporation engaged in Business Process Outsourcing which provides
support to its international clients from various sectors by carrying on some of their
operations, governed by service contracts that it enters with them. On September 2, 2003, Alltel
Communications, Inc., a United States-based telecommunications firm, contracted Sykes Asia’s
services to accommodate the needs and demands of Alltel clients for its postpaid and prepaid
services. Thus, on different dates, Sykes Asia hired petitioners as customer service
representatives, team leaders, and trainers for the Alltel Project.
Services for the said project went on smoothly until Alltel sent two (2) letters to Sykes Asia
dated August 7, 200914 and September 9, 2009 informing the latter that it was terminating all
support services provided by Sykes Asia related to the Alltel Project. In view of this
development, Sykes Asia sent each of the petitioners end-of-life notices, informing them of their
dismissal from employment due to the termination of the Alltel Project.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against respondents
praying for reinstatement, backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift
differential, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. In their complaints, petitioners
alleged that their dismissal from service was unjust as the same was effected without
substantive and procedural due process.
LA RULING: LA ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly, dismissed petitioners’
complaints for lack of merit. It found that petitioners are merely project-based employees, as
their respective employment contracts indubitably provided for the duration and term of their
employment, as well as the specific project to which they were assigned. Dissatisfied,
petitioners appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC RULING: NLRC modified the LA Decision, ruling that petitioners are regular employees
but were validly terminated due to redundancy. NLRC found that petitioners could not be
properly characterized as project-based employees, ratiocinating that while it was made known
to petitioners that their employment would be co-terminus to the Alltel Project, it was neither
determined nor made known to petitioners, at the time of hiring, when the said project would
end, be terminated, or be completed.
CA RULING: CA annulled and set aside the ruling of the NLRC, and accordingly, reinstated that
of the LA. It held that a perusal of petitioners’ respective employment contracts readily shows
that they were hired exclusively for the Alltel Project and that it was specifically stated therein
that their employment would be project-based.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly granted respondents’ petition for certiorari and whether the
petitioners are project employees
HELD: The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised
in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be
considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its
findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This
requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly granted respondents’
certiorari petition before it, since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
petitioners were regular employees of Sykes Asia when the latter had established by
substantial evidence that they were merely project-based.
Article 294 (now, Article 195[280]) of the Labor Code provides that an employee is deemed
regular when he has been engaged to perform activities which are deemed usually necessary
and desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except (i) where the employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or (ii) where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment if for the duration of the
season.
Accordingly, the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly
characterized as project employees as distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or
not the employees were assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration
(and scope) of which were specified at the time they were engaged for that project. The project
could either be (i) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of
the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the
other undertakings of the company; or (ii) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the
regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the
arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent employees from attaining a regular status,
employers claiming that their workers are project-based employees should not only prove that
the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but
also, that there was indeed a project.
Thus, for an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show compliance
with two (2) requisites, namely that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time they
were engaged for such project.
In this case, the Court held that Sykes was able to prove both requisites.
As regards the first requisite, it held that Sykes adequately informed the petitioners of their
employment status at the time of their engagement. As was shown by their respective
employment contracts, they were hired for the Alltel Project and their positions were “project-
based and as such is co-terminus to the project.”
As regards the second requisite, it held that “the duration of the undertaking begins and ends at
determined or determinable times” which means capable of being determined or fixed. As such,
indicating in the contract that their employment is “co-termius with the project” is sufficient
compliance with this requisite.

G.R. Nos. 196280 & 196286 April 2, 2014
UNIVERSIDAD DE STA. ISABEL, Petitioner, vs. MARVIN-JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JR.,
Respondent.
TOPIC: PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL
DOCTRINE: NLRC shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limit itself to reviewing those issues which
are raised on appeal. As a consequence thereof, any other issues which were not included in the
appeal shall become final and executory.
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution in Naga City.
Petitioner hired Respondent as a full-time college faculty member with the rank of Assistant
Professor on probationary status, as evidenced by an Appointment Contract dated November 1,
2002, effective November 1, 2002 up to March 30, 2003. After the aforesaid contract expired,
petitioner continued to give teaching loads to respondent who remained a full-time faculty
member of the Department of Religious Education for the two semesters of school-year (SY)
2003-2004 (June 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004); and two semesters of SY 2004-2005 (June 2004
to March 31, 2005).
Sometime in June 2003, after respondent completed his course in Master of Arts in Education,
major in Guidance and Counseling, he submitted the corresponding Special Order from the
Commission on Higher Education, together with his credentials for the said master’s degree, to
the Human Resources Department of petitioner for the purpose of salary adjustment/increase.
Subsequently, respondent’s salary was increased, as reflected in his pay slips starting October
1-15, 2004. He was likewise re-ranked from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor.
In a letter dated October 15, 2004 addressed to the President of petitioner, respondent
vigorously argued that his salary increase should be made effective as of June 2003 and
demanded the payment of his salary differential.
The school administration replied by explaining its policy on re-ranking of faculty members.
Please be informed that teachers in the Universidad are not re-ranked during their probationary
period. The Faculty Manual as revised for school year 2002-2003 provides (page 38) "Re-ranking
is done every two years, hence the personnel hold their present rank for two years. Those
undergoing probationary period and those on part-time basis of employment are not covered by
this provision." This provision is found also in the 2000-2001 Operations Manual. Your personnel
file shows that you were hired as a probationary teacher in the second semester of school year
2002-2003. By October 2004, you will be completing four (4) semesters (two school years) of
service. Even permanent teachers are re-ranked only every two years, and you are not even a
permanent teacher. I am informed that you have been told several times and made to read the
Provision in the Faculty Manual by the personnel office that you cannot be re-ranked because you
are still a probationary teacher.
Respondent insisted on his demand for retroactive pay. On February 26, 2005, respondent
received his letter of termination
LA RULING: ruled that there was no just or authorized cause in the termination of respondent’s
probationary employment. Consequently, petitioner was found liable for illegal dismissal
NLRC RULING: affirming the Labor Arbiter and holding that respondent had acquired a
permanent status. The last paragraph of Article 281 of the Labor Code provides that "an
employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee." Based thereon, the complainant required permanent status on the first day of the
first semester of SY 2003-2004.
CA RULING: sustained the conclusion of the NLRC that respondent had already acquired
permanent status when he was allowed to continue teaching after the expiration of his first
appointment-contract on March 30, 2003.
ISSUES: Whether the NLRC correctly resolved an issue not raised in petitioners appeal
memorandum
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
NLRC revised rules of procedure
Section 4(d), Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which was in force at
the time petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters decision, expressly provided that, on appeal,
the NLRC shall limit itself only to the specific issues that were elevated for review, to wit:
Section 4. Requisites for perfection of appeal.
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 218 of the Labor Code, once the appeal is perfected in
accordance with these Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only
the specific issues that were elevated on appeal.
We have clarified that the clear import of the aforementioned procedural rule is that the NLRC
shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limit itself to reviewing those issues which are raised on
appeal. As a consequence thereof, any other issues which were not included in the appeal shall
become final and executory.
In reviewing the Labor Arbiters finding of illegal dismissal, the NLRC concluded that
respondent had already attained regular status after the expiration of his first appointment
contract as probationary employee. Such conclusion was but a logical result of the NLRCs own
interpretation of the law. Since petitioner elevated the questions of the validity of respondents
dismissal and the applicable probationary period under the aforesaid regulations, the NLRC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in fully resolving the said issues.
There is no merit to this contention. The records show that the petitioners elevated the issues
regarding the correctness of the award of damages, reinstatement with backpay, retirement
benefits and the cost-saving bonus to the respondent Commission in their appeal. This opened
the said issues for review and any action taken thereon by the Commission was well within the
parameters of its jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 195598 June 25, 2014
TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., TEEKA Y SHIPPING LIMITED and ALEX VERCHEZ,
Petitioners, vs. EXEQUIEL O. JARIN, Respondent.
TOPIC: SEAFERER BENEFITS

DOCTRINE: The provisions of POEA-SEC must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and
liberally in their favor because only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.
FACTS: After passing the standard Pre-Employment Medical Examination, the petitioners hired
Jarin as Chief Cook on July 6, 2006 for a period of eight months with a basic monthly salary of
US$722.40.3 Jarin was deployed on July 9, 2006 onboard M.T. Erik Spirit, a crude oil tanker.
During the third week of February 2007, M.T. Erik Spirit was in Canada when Jarin complained
of swelling in the joints of his two elbows. Jarin was taken to a Canadian hospital where he was
diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. Steroid-based medications were administered to him and
they caused him the side effects of puffiness of the face and edema. However, Jarin was able to
complete his employment contract. He was repatriated on March 24, 2007.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, Jarin immediately reported to the petitioners. On March
27,2007, he was referred to company-designated physician, Dr. Christine O. Bocek whose Post-
Medical Report showed that Jarin has "moon facies and bipedal edema secondary to steroid
intake, rheumatoid arthritis, resolving and upper respiratory tract infection." On April 12, 2007,
Jarin was referred to another company-designated physician at the Metropolitan Medical
Center.
After a series of medical management procedures, Dr. Dacanay opined in a medical report that
Jarin’s rheumatoid arthritis was not work-related because it is" an auto-immune disease in
which joints, usually those of hands and feet, are symmetrically affected, resulting in swelling,
pain and often eventual destruction of the joints interior." Jarin’s cushingnoid features was also
declared as not work-related since it is "secondary to prednisone intake as medical
management for his rheumatoid arthritis."
Without any knowledge of Dr. Balbon’s recommendation, Jarin received a call on September 10,
2007 fromTeekay Phils. Directing him to report at Pandiman Phils., Inc. at Intramuros, Manila.
On the following day, Jarin went to Pandiman where he was informed that his illness is not
work-related and that Teekay Phils. stopped paying for his medical treatments. Jarin asked for a
medical report supporting such conclusion but he was not furnished any.
Jarin filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) claiming US$60,000.00 as permanent total disability benefit, US$2,889.60
as sickness allowance for his incapacity to work for 120 days pursuant to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seafarers (POEA-
SEC), US$10,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages and ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary award as attorney’s fees.
LA RULING: The seafarer’s clearance issued to Jarin stating that he is "unfit and no longer
recommended for further sea duties" signifies his incapacity to work as a seaman. The
petitioners’ evidence was found inadequate to dispute the presumption that illnesses not listed
in Section 3227 of the POEA-SEC are work-related. Thus, Jarin’s money claims were granted
and he was awarded US$50,000.00 for suffering an illness categorized as Grade 1 Impediment
based on the Schedule of Disability Allowances of the POEA-SEC. He was also awarded
US$2,889.60 for failure of the petitioners to show payment of his 120-day sickness allowance.
NLRC RULING: The NLRC considered Jarin’s rheumatoid arthritis as the cause of his disability
while his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was disregarded for it has nothing to do with
his muscular discomforts. The NLRC stated that while rheumatoid arthritis is disputably
presumed work-related pursuant to Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, the petitioners,
however, were able to successfully overturn such presumption through the consistent medical
reports of its designated physicians that such illness is not work-related. Their medical
opinions bear greater evidentiary weight that the internet information presented by Jarin to
prove that his illness has reasonable connection to his work. The NLRC also noted Jarin’s failure
to seek medical opinion from a physician of his choice to counter the company-designated
physicians’ assessment.
Jarin elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
CA RULING: CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA’s ruling. The CA found the petitioners
liable for permanent and total disability benefits because Jarin was able to adduce substantial
evidence that the risk of contracting rheumatoid arthritis was increased by his exposure to the
working conditions in the vessel.
ISSUE: Whether Jarin’s disability or sickness is work related
HELD: Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, a work-related illness is "any sickness resulting to disability
or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions set
therein satisfied."
The Court has held, however, that the enumeration in Section 32-A does not preclude other
illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to
contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. Concomitant
with such presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence
that his working conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. It is
not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or
partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the
seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted."
In the case at bar, Jarin was able to prove that his rheumatoid arthritis was contracted out of his
daily duties as Chief Cook onboard M.T. Erik Spirit. The narration of facts in his position paper
detailed the nature of his work as Chief Cook and the daily working conditions on sea duty. It is
well to note that in resolving disputes on disability benefits, the fundamental consideration has
been that the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino
seamen in the pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-going vessels. As such, its provisions
must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor because only then
can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.
G.R. No. 207010 February 18, 2015
MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LIMITED, and JESUS
AGBAYANI, Petitioners, vs. TORIBIO C. A VESTRUZ,* Respondent.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: Telefax transmission purportedly executed and signed by a person on board the
vessel is insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the acts constituting the grounds for the
dismissal of two seafarers, being uncorroborated evidence.
FACTS: Petitioner Maersk, on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner A.P. Moller, hired
Avestruz as Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months,
with a basic monthly salary of US$698.00.6 Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4, 2011.
In the course of the weekly inspection of the vessel’s galley, Captain Woodward noticed that the
cover of the garbage bin in the kitchen near the washing area was oily. As part of Avestruz’s job
was to ensure the cleanliness of the galley, Captain Woodward called Avestruz and asked him to
stand near the garbage bin where the former took the latter’s right hand and swiped it on the
oily cover of the garbage bin, telling Avestruz to feel it. Shocked, Avestruz remarked, "Sir if you
are looking for dirt, you can find it, the ship is big. Tell us if you want to clean and we will clean
it." Captain Woodward replied by shoving Avestruz’s chest, to which the latter complained and
said, "Don’t touch me," causing an argument to ensue between them.
Later that afternoon, Captain Woodward summoned and required Avestruz to state in writing
what transpired in the galley that morning. Avestruz complied and submitted his written
statement on that same day. On the very same day, Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that
he would be dismissed from service and be disembarked in India. On July 3,2011, Avestruz was
disembarked in Colombo, Sri Lanka and arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 2011.
Subsequently, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of
his contract, damages, and attorney’s fees against Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Jesus Agbayani, an
officer of Maersk. He alleged that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he given
the chance to defend himself before he was dismissed, and that Captain Woodward failed to
observe the provisions under Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) on disciplinary
procedures. Also, he averred that he was not given any notice stating the ground for his
dismissal.
In their defense, Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Agbayani (petitioners) claimed that during his stint on
the vessel, Avestruz failed to attend to his tasks, specifically to maintain the cleanliness of the
galley, which prompted Captain Woodward to issue weekly reminders. Unfortunately, despite
the reminders, Avestruz still failed to perform his duties properly.
LA RULING: dismissed Avestruz’s complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that he failed to
perform his duty of maintaining cleanliness in the galley, and that he also repeatedly failed to
obey the directives of his superior, which was tantamount to insubordination.
NLRC RULING: sustained the validity of Avestruz’s dismissal but found that petitioners failed to
observe the procedures laid down in Section 17 of the POEA-SEC. Avestruz moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Dissatisfied, he elevated the matter to the CA via petition for
certiorari.
CA RULING: CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the NLRC and instead, found Avestruz to
have been illegally dismissed. Consequently, it directed petitioners to pay him, jointly and
severally, the full amount of his placement fee and deductions made, with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, as well as his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, and
attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award. All other money claims were denied for
lack of merit.
Petitioner then move for petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally dismissed
HELD: It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for
a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the
conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to
discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures.
Petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by Captain Woodward, both dated June 22,
2011, and time-stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40 a.m., respectively, which they claim chronicled
the relevant circumstances that eventually led to Avestruz’s dismissal.
The Court, however, finds these e-mails to be uncorroborated and self-serving, and therefore,
do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would sufficiently discharge the
burden of proving that Avestruz was legally dismissed. On the contrary, petitioners failed to
prove that he committed acts of insubordination which would warrant his dismissal.
Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence
of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.
In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward’s e-mails do not establish that Avestruz’s
conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The same
doctrine was enunciated in Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay, where the Court held that
the telefax transmission purportedly executed and signed by a person on board the vessel is
insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the acts constituting the grounds for the
dismissal of two seafarers, being uncorroborated evidence.
G.R. No. 128003 July 26, 2000
RUBBERWORLD [PHILS.], INC., and JULIE YAO ONG, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, AQUINO MAGSALIN, PEDRO MAÑIBO, RICARDO BORJA, ALICIA
M. SAN PEDRO AND FELOMENA B. TOLIN, respondents.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF NLRC
DOCTRINE: When NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension order, the NLRC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide cases. As a consequence, any
resolution, decision or order that it rendered or issued without jurisdiction is a nullity.
FACTS: Petitioner Rubberworld, a corporation established in 1965, was engaged in
manufacturing footwear, bags and garments. Aquilino Magsalin, Pedro Manibo, Ricardo Borja,
Benjamin Camitan, Alicia M. San Pedro, and Felomena Tolin were employed as dispatcher,
warehouseman, issue monitor, foreman, jacks cementer and outer sole attacher, respectively.
On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a notice
of temporary shutdown of operations to take effect on September 26, 1994. Before the
effectivity date, however, Rubberworld was forced to prematurely shut down its operations.
On November 11, 1994, private respondents filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation
pay.
On November 22, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
a petition for declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan.
LA RULING: Respondents are hereby declared guilty of ILLEGAL SHUTDOWN and that
respondents are ordered to pay complainants their separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
pay for every year of service. Considering the malicious act of closing the business precipitately
without due regard to the rights of complainants, moral damages and exemplary damage in the
sum of P 50,000.00 and P 30,000.00 respectively is hereby awarded for each of the
complainants. Finally 10 % of all sums owing to complainants is hereby adjudged as attorney's
fees.
Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) alleging abuse of
discretion and serious errors in the findings of facts of the labor arbiter.
NLRC RULING: affirmed the decision with modification deleting the award for moral and
exemplary damages.
NLRC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the Department of Labor and Employment, the Labor Arbiter and the National
Labor Relations Commission may legally act on the claims of respondents despite the order of
the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending all actions against a company under
rehabilitation by a management committee created by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
HELD: Presidential Decree No. 902-A is clear that "all actions for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court,
tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly." The law did not make any exception in
favor of labor claims.
"The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the
management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free
from any judicial or extra judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue'
of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of
the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would
be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its
restructuring and rehabilitation."
Thus, the labor case would defeat the purpose of an automatic stay. To rule otherwise would
open the floodgates to numerous claims and would defeat the rescue efforts of the management
committee. Besides, even if an award is given to private respondents, the ruling could not be
enforced as long as petitioner is under management committee.
This finds ratiocination in that the power to hear and decide labor disputes is deemed
suspended when the Securities and Exchange Commission puts the corporation under
rehabilitation.
Thus, when NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension order, the NLRC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide cases. As a consequence, any
resolution, decision or order that it rendered or issued without jurisdiction is a nullity.
G.R. No. 191154 April 7, 2014
SPI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and LEA VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, vs. VICTORIA K. MAPUA,
Respondent.
TOPIC: DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs. Also, change in
the job title is not synonymous to a change in the functions. A position cannot be abolished by a
mere change of job title. In cases of redundancy, the management should adduce evidence and
prove that a position which was created in place of a previous one should pertain to functions
which are dissimilar and incongruous to the abolished office.
FACTS: Victoria K. Mapua alleged that she was hired in 2003 by SPI Technologies, Inc. and was
the Corporate Development’s Research/Business Intelligence Unit Head and Manager of the
company. Subsequently in August 2006, the then Vice President and Corporate Development
Head, Peter Maquera hired Elizabeth Nolan as Mapua’s supervisor. Sometime in October 2006,
the hard disk on Mapua’s laptop crashed, causing her to lose files and data.
Nolan informed Mapua that she was realigning Mapua’s position to become a subordinate of co-
manager Sameer Raina due to her missing a work deadline. Nolan also disclosed that Mapua’s
colleagues were demotivated because she was "taking things easy while they were working
very hard," and that she was "frequently absent, under timing, and coming in late every time
Maquera goes on leave or on vacation."
Mapua obtained a summary of her attendance for the last six months to prove that she did not
have frequent absences or under time when Maquera would be on leave or vacation. When
shown to Nolan, she was merely told not to give the matter any more importance and to just
move on. Mapua noticed that her colleagues began to ostracize and avoid her. Nolan and Raina
started giving out majority of her research work and other duties under Healthcare and Legal
Division to the rank-and-file staff. Mapua lost about 95% of her work projects and job
responsibilities.
Mapua consulted these work problems with SPI’s Human Resource Director, Lea Villanueva
(Villanueva), and asked if she can be transferred to another department within SPI.
Subsequently, Villanueva informed Mapua that there is an intra-office opening and that she
would schedule an exploratory interview for her. However, due to postponements not made by
Mapua, the interview did not materialize. Mapua allegedly saw the new table of organization of
the Corporate Development Division which would be renamed as the Marketing Division. The
new structure showed that Mapua’s level will be again downgraded because a new manager
will be hired and positioned between her rank and Raina’s.
Raina informed Mapua over the phone that her position was considered redundant and that she
is terminated from employment effective immediately. Villanueva notified Mapua that she
should cease reporting for work the next day. Her laptop computer and company mobile phone
were taken right away and her office phone ceased to function.
Mapua filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming
reinstatement or if deemed impossible, for separation pay.
On the matter of separation pay, there is no question that SPI indeed offered separation pay to
Mapua, but the offer must be accompanied with good faith in the abolishment of the redundant
position and fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining the redundant position. It is
insignificant that the amount offered to Mapua is higher than what the law requires because the
Court has previously noted that "a job is more than the salary that it carries. There is a
psychological effect or a stigma in immediately finding one’s self laid off from work."
G.R. No. 189456 April 2, 2014
CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE and CARMELITA ESPINO, Petitioners, vs. ROSALINDA M.
TORRES, Respondent.
TOPIC: DISMISSAL/ CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL

The Labor arbiter rendered a decision stating that there was illegal dismissal. But the NLRC
reversed the said decision. While the CA on the other hand, reinstated LA’s decision and set
aside the NLRC’s decision. Thus, SPI filed a petition for certiorari regarding the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether Mapua was validly separated from service on the ground of redundancy?
DOCTRINE: Academic dishonesty is the worst offense a teacher can make because teachers
caught committing academic dishonesty lose their credibility as educators and cease to be
role models for their students. More so that under Chiang Kai Shek College Faculty Manual,
leaking and selling of test questions is classified as a grave offense punishable by
dismissal/termination.

FACTS: Petitioner Chiang Kai Shek College is a private educational institution that offers
HELD: NO. ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. – The employer
elementary to college education to the public. Individual petitioner Carmelita Espino is the
may also terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices,
Vice-President of the school. Respondent had been employed as a grade school teacher of the
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
school from July 1970 until 31 May 2003. The manner of her severance from employment is the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
matter at hand.
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination
Respondent was accused of leaking a copy of a special quiz given to Grade 5 students of
due to installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
HEKASI. Petitioners came to know about the leakage from one of the teachers of HEKASI 5,
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
Aileen Benabese. Ms. Benabese narrated that after giving a special quiz, she borrowed the book
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
of one of her students, Aileen Regine M. Anduyan, for the purpose of making an answer key.
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not
When she opened Aileen’s book, a piece of paper fell. Said paper turned out to be a copy of the
due to serious business losses and financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
same quiz she had just given and the same already contained answers.
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
Respondent had admitted to leaking a copy of the HEKASI 5 special quiz. She reluctantly made
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
the admission and apologized to Mrs. Koo when the latter confronted her. She admitted during
the 28 August 2002 hearing of executing two (2) contradictory statements. On 30 August 2002,
Anent the first requirement which is written notice served on both the employee and the DOLE
the Investigating Committee found respondent guilty of leaking a copy of the special quiz.
at least one month prior to the intended date of termination, SPI had discharged the burden of
According to petitioners, their Investigating Committee had actually decided to terminate
proving that it submitted a notice to the DOLE on March 21, 2007, stating therein that the
respondent and had in fact prepared a memorandum of termination, but respondent allegedly
effective date of termination is on April 21, 2007. It is, however, quite peculiar that two kinds of
pleaded for a change of punishment.
notices were served to Mapua. One termination letter stated that its date of effectivity is on the
same day, March 21, 2007. The other termination letter sent through mail to Mapua’s residence
Respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and illegal suspension with the Labor
stated that the effective date of her termination is on April 21, 2007.
Arbiter. She also sought payment of unpaid salary, backwages, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, damages and attorney’s fees.
Explaining the discrepancy, SPI alleged that the company served a notice to Mapua on March
21, 2007, which stated that the effective date of termination is on April 21, 2007. However she
LA RULING: dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter deemed
refused to acknowledge or accept the letter. Later on, Mapua requested for a copy of the said
respondent’s suspension coupled with petitioner’s allowance of respondent’s resignation at the
letter but due to inadvertence and oversight, a draft of the termination letter bearing a wrong
end of the school year as generous acts considering the offense committed. The Labor Arbiter
effectivity date was given to her. To correct the oversight, a copy of the original letter was sent
held that there was no constructive dismissal because respondent was not coerced nor
to her through mail.
pressured to write her resignation letter.
NLRC RULING: affirming the Labor Arbiter’s findings but ordering petitioners to pay
respondent separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service
on the grounds of equity and social justice.
CA RULING: reversed the NLRC Decision and Resolution. That petitioner did not voluntarily
resign but was constructively dismissed. The appellate court also foreclosed any interpretation
that respondent was validly dismissed for a just cause because respondent was already meted
the penalty of suspension without pay and forfeiture of her bonuses. The appellate court found
it unjust to penalize respondent twice for the same offense.
ISSUE: Whether the school’s act of imposing the penalty of suspension instead of immediate
dismissal from service at the behest of the erring employee, in exchange for the employee’s
resignation at the end of the school year, constitutes constructive dismissal.
HELD: There is no constructive dismissal in this case. Resignation is the voluntary act of an
employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed
for the favor of employment, and opts to leave rather than stay employed. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the
overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation
must be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment.
As Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio emphasized, academic dishonesty is the worst offense a
teacher can make because teachers caught committing academic dishonesty lose their
credibility as educators and cease to be role models for their students. More so that under
Chiang Kai Shek College Faculty Manual, leaking and selling of test questions is classified as a
grave offense punishable by dismissal/termination.
There is constructive dismissal when there is cessation of work, because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion
in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may,
likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to
forego his continued employment.
There was here no discrimination committed by petitioners. While respondent did not tender
her resignation wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making did not give her any other
option. With due process, she was found to have committed the grave offense of leaking test
questions. Dismissal from employment was the justified equivalent penalty. Having realized
that, she asked for, and was granted, not just a deferred imposition of, but also an acceptable
cover for the penalty.
G.R. No. 83631. April 30, 1993.
NEW IMUS LUMBER and/or FERNANDO AMBIO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ZOSIMO SUNGA, CARLITO SAMBAT, respondents.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: It is to be borne in mind that in termination cases, the burden of proving just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result
in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
FACTS: New Imus Lumber, managed by Fernando Ambio, is a retail store dealing in lumber. It
employed Sambat on January 15, 1980 and Sunga on June 14, 1980. For the work they rendered
in the store for six and a half days a week, Sambat and Sunga were provided with board and
lodging for which reasonable amounts were deducted from their salaries. Sambat was paid
P50.00 a day while Sunga received P48.00 a day, inclusive of allowances.
Alleging that both employees had abandoned their jobs, Fernando Ambio, on September 4,
1984, reported to the Director of the Bureau of Working Conditions of the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) that Zosimo Sunga had not reported for work (AWOL) since
August 15, 1984. On June 13, 1986, Ambio made the same report stating that Sambat had also
been absent without leave starting May 13, 1986.
However, on June 26, 1986, Sambat and Sunga filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in
Manila a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of the
emergency cost of living allowance and the 13th month pay.
LA RULING: finds that the New Imus Lumber had illegally dismissed Sunga and Sambat and
ordering said employer to reinstate Sunga and Sambat with backwages "corresponding to six
(6) months without deduction and qualifications" and to pay their wage differential for the
years 1980, 1981 and 1982, and dismissing for lack of merit the rest of the money claims raised
by Sunga and Sambat.
The New Imus Lumber appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC RULING: Taking note of the fact that it took Sunga two years from his dismissal to file the
complaint, found that Sunga had abandoned his job. It also held that the said two-year period
indicated Sunga's lack of intention to resume his employment with the New Imus Lumber.
However, the NLRC ruled that Sunga should be given separation pay due to New Imus Lumber's
non-compliance with the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 prescribing a 30-day written
notice to the employee stating therein the grounds for his dismissal.
With regard to Sambat, the NLRC held that since he questioned his dismissal about two months
after he was reported by his employer as being AWOL, and there being no evidence of a clear
intent to relinquish his employment, the presumption of illegal dismissal should prevail.
Hence, New Imus Lumber instituted the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents has been illegally dismissed.
HELD: YES. Affirmed the decision of the NLRC only insofar as it orders the reinstatement
of Carlito Sambat and the dismissal for lack of merit of all other monetary claims of
private respondents.
It is to be borne in mind that in termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding
that the dismissal is unjustified.

The fact that private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of their
desire to return to work, thus negating the petitioner's charge of abandonment.

For lack of any other proof that private respondent Sunga did not intend to return to work, the
two-year period cannot be a gauge of such intention, much less is it indicative of laches. To
recall, a complaint founded on illegal dismissal is not an ordinary money claim but one for
reinstatement. Being in derogation of a worker's rights, the action may be brought within four
(4) years from dismissal pursuant to Art. 1146 of the Civil Code.