INDEX

CASE NAME PAGE NO

JAYA BACHCHAN V. UNION OF INDIA 1-5
RAMAKRISHNA HEDGE V. STATE OF 5-10
KARNATKA
CONSUMER EDUCATION AND 11-15
RESEARCH SOCIETY V UNION OF
INDIA
RAJ BALA V. STATE OF HARYANA 15-19
SATRUCHARLA CHANDRASEKHAR 19-26
RAJU V. VYRICHERLA PRADEEP
KUMAR DEV
UNDERSTANDING 26-29

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 JAYA BACHCHAN vs UNION OF INDIA
FACTS

1. Jaya Bachchan was member of Rajya Sabha.

2. On 14.7.2004 the Government of Uttar Pradesh, by an Official Memorandum, appointed
petitioner as the Chairperson of Uttar Pradesh Film Development Council and sanctioned
to her the rank of a Cabinet Minister.
3. To which the Petitioner filed a Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

ISSUES

Whether the Disqualification of the Petitioner under Article 102(1) (a) of the Constitution of
India was Valid or Not?

ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER- The post of Chairperson of the Council, and the

conferment of the rank of Cabinet Minister, were only "decorative"; that she did not receive
any remuneration or monetary benefit from the State Government; that she did not seek
residential accommodation, nor used telephone of medical facilities; that though she travelled
several times in connection with her work as Chairperson, she never claimed any
reimbursement; and that she had accepted the Chairpersonship of the Council honorarily and
did not use any of the facilities mentioned in the O.M. dated 22.3.1991. The petitioner
contends that in the absence of any finding by the Election Commission that she had received
any payment or monetary consideration from the State Government, she could not be said to
hold any office of profit under the State Government and, therefore, her disqualification was
invalid.

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT- Now considering Article 102 (1) (a) of the Constitution
of India which is as follows-

Article 102-
(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House
of Parliament

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(a) If he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any
State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder.

Also the petitioner got certain facilities and benefits after being appointed as Chairman of Uttar
Pradesh Film Development Council that are-

(i) Honorarium of Rs. 5,000/- per month;

(ii) Daily allowance @ Rs. 600 per day within the State and Rs.750/- outside the State.
(iii) Rs. 10,000/- per month towards entertainment, expenditure.
(iv) Staff car with driver, telephones at office and residence, one P.S., one P.A. and two
class IV employees.
(v) Body Guard and night escort.
(vi) Free accommodation and medical treatment facilities to her and family members.
(vii) Free accommodation in government circuit houses/guest houses and hospitality while
on tour.
An office of profit is an office which is capable of yielding a profit or pecuniary gain. Holding an
office under the Central or State Government, to which some pay, salary, remuneration or non-
compensatory allowance is attached, is 'holding an office of profit'.

Payment of honorarium, in addition to daily allowances in the nature of compensatory

allowances, rent free accommodation and chauffeur driven car at State expense, is clearly in the
nature of remuneration and a source of pecuniary gain and hence constitute profit.

For deciding the question as to whether one is holding an office of profit or not, what is
relevant is whether the office is capable of yielding a profit or pecuniary gain and not
whether the person actually obtained a monetary gain. If the "pecuniary gain" is "receivable"
in connection with the office then it becomes an office of profit, irrespective of whether such
pecuniary gain is actually received or not. If the office carries with it, or entitles the holder to,
any pecuniary gain other than reimbursement of out of pocket/actual expenses, then the
office will be an office of profit for the purpose of Article 102(1)(a).

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 JUDGMENT INCLUDING RATIO, OBITER, AND ORDER RELEVANT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ------

RATIO DECIDENDI - The office carried with it a monthly honorarium of Rs. 5000,
entertainment expenditure of Rs. 10,000., staff car with driver., telephones at office and
residence, free accommodation and medical treatment facilities to self and family members,
apart from other allowances etc. That these are pecuniary gains, cannot be denied. The fact
that the petitioner is affluent or was not interested in the benefits/facilities given by the State
Government or did not, in fact, receive such benefits till date, are not relevant to the issue.

OBITER DICTA - Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to Biharilal Dobrav v.
Roshanlal Dobrav, [1984] 1 SCC 551 and contended that citing Divya Prakash (supra), with
approval, it was held that when a candidate is appointed in an honorary capacity without any
remuneration even though post carried remuneration, he cannot be said to be holding an office of
profit and thus was not disqualified under Article 191 (1)(a) of the Constitution. In Biharilal
Dobray's Case (supra) it was held that respondent was holding an office of profit under the State
Government and his nomination was rightly rejected by the Returning Office. In that case, the
only question was whether the post the respondent was holding was one under State Government
or not. The observations made with reference to Divya Prakash's case were clearly obiter.
Further, an error seems to have been made while noticing Divya Prakash's case. In Divya
Prakash it was held that the post did not carry with it any remuneration but in Biharilal Dobrey it
was said that the post carried remuneration.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER RELEVANT TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- In this case, as

noticed the office carried with it a monthly honorarium of Rs. 5000, entertainment expenditure
of Rs. 10,000., staff car with driver., telephones at office and residence, free accommodation and
medical treatment facilities to self and family members, apart from other allowances etc. That
these are pecuniary gains, cannot be denied. The fact that the petitioner is affluent or was not
interested in the benefits/facilities given by the State Government or did not, in fact, receive such
benefits till date, are not relevant to the issue.

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. In this view, the question whether petitioner actually received any pecuniary gain or not is of no
consequence. There is no merit in the writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

RAMAKRISHNA HEDGE V. STATE OF KARNATKA

FACTS

The petitioner was elected as a Member of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly from
Basavanagudi Constituency, Bangalore City on 27th November, 1989. He was offered the post
of Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission in the rank of a Cabinet Minister. Since he was
aware that acceptance of an 'office of profit' under the Government of India would be a
disqualification for being a Member of the Legislative Assembly, he was not inclined to accept
the offer. Accordingly, he conveyed his views to Government of India. When consulted the Law
Ministry advised the Government of India that in view of the provisions of Karnataka Legislature
(Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1956 (for short the 'Act') there would be no bar on the
petitioner holding the post of the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and to continue
as Member in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly so long as he does not receive any
remuneration other than the compensatory allowance for holding the post of Deputy Chairman of
the Planning Commission. Thereafter, the petitioner accepted the post of the Deputy Chairman of
the Planning Commission. In the order of appointment of the petitioner to the said post, it is
specifically stated that the petitioner would not draw any salary; he would be entitled only to the
travelling allowance/daily allowance; conveyance allowance or a chauffer- driven car and house
rent allowance or rent free furnished accommodation including free supply of electricity and
water. Having accepted the said appointment on the terms and conditions mentioned in the
appointment order -Annexure-A, the petitioner held the said post till 6-7-1990, on which date he
tendered his resignation to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. In the
meanwhile, he continued as a Member of the Legislative Assembly.

The third respondent filed a Petition dated 30-12-1989 under Article 192 of the Constitution of
India to His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka contending that the post of Deputy Chairman
of the Planning Commission has the status of a Cabinet Minister of Union of India; the
incumbent of the said post is entitled to receive all benefits of a Cabinet Minister; therefore the
said office was capable of yielding the pecuniary gain and it is an office of profit

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attracting Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India; hence action is to be taken as the
petitioner has incurred disqualification under the said Article. The Governor of Karnataka
referred the complaint of the third respondent under Article 192(2) of the Constitution to the
second respondent -Chief Election Commission to obtain opinion on the question as to
disqualification of the petitioner. The petitioner received a notice from the second respondent to
answer the complaint. He replied to the said notice raising various objections. He has specifically
stated in the reply that so long as the incumbent of the office of the Deputy Chairman of the
Planning Commission did not draw any salary other than the compensatory allowance he will not
incur disqualification under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. He has specifically stated that
as per the terms of the appointment order - Annexure A, he could draw no salary; therefore there
was no question of the petitioner holding office of profit and that the petitioner as a matter of fact
also did not draw any salary. It was further pointed out that in view of the provisions of the Act
the office held by the petitioner as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission on the terms
mentioned did not attract disqualification under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Since the second respondent did not proceed with the complaint for some time the third
respondent filed W.P.No. 17666/90 before this Court seeking a Writ of Mandamus to the second
respondent to furnish its opinion. In the said Writ Petition the petitioner was the second
respondent. The learned Single Judge rejected the Writ Petition by his order dated 29-8-1990
holding that the provisions of Article 191 prima facie were not attracted to the facts of the case in
view of the fact that the petitioner had ceased to be the Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the third respondent took
up the matter in W.A.No. 1963/90. The Division Bench of this Court disposed of the said Writ
Appeal on 13-3-1991 directing the second respondent to dispose of the matter expeditiously and
at the same time set aside the order of the learned Single Judge without hearing the petitioner as
he was deleted from the array of the respondents in the said Writ Appeal at the instance of the
third respondent. Thereafter the second respondent having heard the parties and their Counsel
tendered its opinion to the Governor of Karnataka under Article 192(2) of the Constitution in
Reference Case No. 1790 dated 24-7-1991. On the basis of the said opinion rendered by the
second respondent the Governor of Karnataka by his order dated 6th August 1991 -Annexure-J
has disqualified the petitioner from the Membership of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly with

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effect from 5-12-1989. Hence, this Writ Petition is filed seeking a Writ in the nature of Certiorari
quashing the order Annexure-J dated 6.8-1991.

ISSUE

. Whether the Petitioner had subjected to disqualification under Article 191(1) of the Constitution
and The Writ Petition is filed seeking a writ, in the nature of Certiorari quashing the order will be
allowed?

ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER--- The Argument from the side of petitioner was that:

(1) As per the appointment order - Annexure-A under which the petitioner was appointed as the
Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, he was not entitled to draw salary except the
allowances mentioned therein. Hence, the second respondent ought to have held that the
petitioner was not holding any 'office of profit'.

(2) The second respondent has failed to see that the provisions of the Act clearly protected the
Membership of the petitioner in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly despite the fact that the
petitioner held the post of Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India. Further, any
disqualification, if incurred by the petitioner, the same was removed under Section 3 of the Act.

(3) The impugned order - Annexure-J was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice
inasmuch as the second respondent has relied on certain office files, contents of which were not
disclosed either to the petitioner or to his Counsel. Even the impugned order - Annexure-J was
passed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner after receiving opinion from the second
respondent.

(4) The Writ Petition is maintainable on the facts of the present case. In view of Article 361 of
the Constitution Governor could not have been impleaded in the Writ Petition. The impugned
order - Annexure-J although was passed by the Governor of Karnataka it was passed according
to the opinion- Annexure-H given by the second respondent - the Election Commission of India,
Under Article 192(2) of the Constitution the order has to be passed according to the opinion

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given by the Election Commission. There was no choice or discretion left to the Governor under
Article 192(2) of the Constitution. Since the Governor has acted according to the opinion given
by the second respondent, which opinion was effective and material, the petitioner has impleaded
the Election Commission as the second respondent besides State of Karnataka represented by the
Chief Secretary, Thus, the Writ Petition is perfectly maintainable.

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT--- Respondent No. 1 is represented by the learned Advocate

General. Respondent No. 2 though served has remained unrepresented. The respondent No. 3
having entered appearance has filed the Statement of Objections stating that the petitioner cannot
maintain the Writ Petition and he is not entitled for any relief. The order passed by the Governor
of Karnataka cannot be called in question in view of the embargo placed under Article 361 of the
Constitution. In the Writ Petition the Governor is not made party because of the Constitutional
prohibition. The impugned order was passed by the Governor in his exclusive power without the
aid and advise of the State Cabinet or the State Government. As such the State of Karnataka
cannot have any say in the matter. Hence, the impugned order is not justiciable and the Writ
Petition is not at all maintainable.

It is further contended in the Statement of Objections that after the impugned order was passed
the petitioner convened a Press Conference, attributed mala fides to respondents 1 and 2 and
described the order impugned as absurd, vindictive, motivated, etc. The statement of the
petitioner received wide publicity through the medias. Further the order passed by the Governor
of any State or the President of India is not open to challenge under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India except on the grounds that the order was passed:

(a) on collateral considerations;

(b) in contravention of the rules of natural justice;

(c) on no evidence; or

(d) on the advise of the executive or other authority, who was not entitled to advise the Governor
in the matter of exercising the quasi-judicial functions.

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In this Writ Petition the petitioner has not raised any of these grounds, but only states that the
order of disqualification is bad in law because he had not received any salary as the Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission. The petitioner was aware that the office of the Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission was an 'office of profit' and therefore an arrangement was
made that he should not receive the salary attached to the office. He has adopted a clever
mechanism to avoid disqualification. The opinion of the Law Ministry that in view of the
provisions of the Act there would be no bar to the petitioner holding the office of the Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission does not help the petitioner at all. Thus, respondent No. 3
prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition.

JUDGMENT INCLUDING RATIO, OBITER, ORDER RELATED TO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---

RATIO DECIDENI -- The aspects to be considered is whether the petitioner as a matter of fact
profited himself by holding the office so as to call it a pecuniary gain. No material was placed
either before the second respondent or before this Court to show that the petitioner had a
pecuniary gain by receiving allowances which were above the actual expenditure so as to make
profit as observed by the Supreme Court in Karbhari Bhimaji Rohamare's case. Yet again, as laid
down by the Supreme Court in the said case each case has to be considered reasonably and
taking into consideration the person involved so as to say that he has made profit by holding the
office. In the instant case the petitioner has received allowances which come within the meaning
of 'compensatory Allowance' as a Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission (Committee for
the purpose of the Act ). Whether a person holds an office of profit should be interpreted
reasonably taking into consideration the class of person at the relevant time. Merely because the
petitioner had some privileges as a State Guest or a rank of a Cabinet Minister, it cannot be said
that he had pecuniary gain. In the instant case, no evidence was placed before the second
respondent to show that the office of the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission really
carried any profit. The petitioner looking to the order of appointment-Annexure-A could not
have sued or otherwise claimed any salary. Judged by the test indicated by the Supreme Court in
the case of Divya Prakash v. Kultar Chand Rana, AIR 1975 SC 1067 it cannot be said that the
petitioner held an office of profit. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the
aforementioned cases of Umrao Singh and Divya Prakash and keeping in view the facts of the

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case on hand I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner did not hold the 'office of profit' as
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.

. The third respondent, in view of the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in K. S.
Haja Sherriff v. His Excellency the Governor of Tamil Nadu, Madras, AIR 1985 Madras 55
urged that a writ petition could be entertained under Art. 226 by a High Court questioning a
decision pronounced under Art. 192, but the petitioner could secure relief only by establishing
vitiating factors, namely, that order was passed by the Governor (i) on collateral considerations
or (ii) the rules of natural justice were not observed or (iii) the Governor's judgement was
coloured by the advice or representation made by the Executive, (iv) it was founded on no
evidence.

OBITER DICTA- No Obiter dicta is present in this case.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER RELATED TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - IN the instant

case, as stated above no evidence was placed before the second respondent to show that the
petitioner had pecuniary gain or profit by holding the office. Further, as stated in the aforesaid
decision if a Constitutional functionary, whom power had been conferred to take a decision
which has the seal of finality, wrongly interprets the Constitutional provisions, then the decision
so arrived at will have to be set aside by issue of a writ of certiorari, because it would not be a valid
order in the eye of law.

. IN this view of the matter, the impugned order-Annexure-J dated 6-8-1991 is liable to be
quashed holding that the petitioner had not subjected to disqualification under Art. 191 (1) of the
Constitution.
. IN the result, for the reasons stated, this Writ Petition is entitled to succeed. Hence, the
following order : (1) The Writ Petition is allowed. (2) The impugned order dated 6-8-1991
passed in Case No. GS 620 PC 1989-Annexure-J is quashed. (3) No costs. Petition allowed.

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 CONSUMER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH SOCIETY vs UNION OF
INDIA

FACTS

The Consumer Education and Research Center filed several writ petitions against the State of
India under Article 32 (obligation to promote social justice and welfare of the people) of the
Indian Constitution regarding the protection of workers against the occupational health hazards
and diseases associated with asbestos exposure. The petitioner applied for remedial measures to
fill in legislative gaps, to require mandatory compensation for occupational hazards and diseases
or death to employees who did not qualify for such coverage under the existing Acts (Employees
State Insurance Act and the Workmen Compensation Act), to provide adequate mechanisms for
diagnosing and controlling asbestosis (such as mandatory mechanisms to measure levels of
asbestos in workplaces coupled with expert panels to established permissible levels of asbestos),
to establish a committee to recommend whether the dry process can be completed replaced by
the wet, to keep health records of each workman for requisite minimum periods, to provide
compulsory health insurance for employees, and finally to award compensation to those
suffering from asbestos.

ISSUE

. Whether the dry process can be completed replaced by the wet, to keep health records of each
workman for requisite minimum periods, to provide compulsory health insurance for employees,
and finally to award compensation to those suffering from asbestos.

ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER - The workman affected by asbestosis are suffering from

lung cancer and related ailments and they were not properly diagnosed. They be sent to national
institute and such of those found suffering from diseases developed due to asbestos, proper
compensation paid. It is needless to reiterate that they need to be re-examined and cause for the
disease and the nature of the disease diagnosed. Thereon each one of them whether entitled to
damages, The employer is vicariously liable to pay damages is unquestionable. The award of

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compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 is a remedy available in public law. In
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, 1983(3) SCR 508, it was held that this Court under Article 32 can
grant compensation for the deprivation of personal liberty, though ordinary process of court, may
be available to enforce the right and money claim could be granted by this Court. Accordingly
compensation was awarded. This view was reiterated in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa,
(1993) 2 SCC 746 and awarded monetary com- pensation for custodial death lifting the State
immunity from the purview of public law. It is, therefore, settled law that in public law claim for
compensation is a remedy available under Article 32 or 226 for the enforcement and protection
of fundamental and human rights. The defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable and alien
to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights. Them is no question of de fence being
available for constitutional remedy. It is a practical and inexpensive mode of redress available
for the contravention made by the State, its servants, it instrumentalities, a company or a person
in the purported exercise of their powers and enforcement of the rights claimed either under the
statutes or licence issued under the statute or for the enforcement of any right or duty under the
constitution or the law.

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT - The Government of India issued model Rule 123-A

under the Factories Act for adoption. Under the directions issued by this Court from time to time,
all the State governments have by now amended their respective rules and adopted the same as
part of it but still there are yearning gaps in their effective implementation in that behalf. It is,
therefore, necessary to issue appropriate directions. In the light of the rules "All Safety in the Use
of Asbestos" issued by the I.L.O., the same shall be binding on all the industries. As a fact, the
13th respondent-Ferodo Ltd admitted in its written submissions that all the major industries in
India have formed an association called the "Asbestos Information Centre" (AIC) affiliated to the
As- bestos International Association(AIA), London. The AIA has been publishing a code of
conduct for its members in accor- dance with the international practice and all the members of
AIC have been following the same. In view of that admission, they are bound by the directions
issued by the ILO referred to in the body of the judgment. In that view, it is not necessary to
issue any direction to Union or State Governments to constitute a committee to convert the dry
process of manufacturing into wet process but they are bound by the rules not only specifically
referred to in the judg- ment but all the rules in that behalf in the above I.L.O. rules. The

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Employees State Insurance Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act provide for payment of
mandatory compensation for the injury or death caused to the workman while in employment.
Since the Act does not provide for payment of compensation after cessation of employment, it
becomes necessary to protect such persons from the respective dates of cessation of their
employment till date. Liquidated damages by way of compensation are accepted principles of
compensation. In the light of the law above laid down and also on the doctrine of tortuous
liability, the respective factories or companies shall be bound to compensate the workmen for the
health hazards which is the cause for the disease with which the workmen are suffering from or
had suffered pending the writ petitions. Therefore, the factory or establishment shall be
responsible to pay liquidated damages to the concerned workmen.

JUDGMENT INCLUDING RATIO, OBITER, ORDER RELATED TO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--------

RATIO-- The preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution of India the supreme law, envisions
social justice as its arch to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity… Social
justice, equality and dignity of person are corner stones of social democracy. The concept ’social
justice’ which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists of diverse principles essential for the
orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. "Social justice" is thus an
integral part of "justice" in generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its
species."

.“ The expression ’life’ assured in Art.21 of the Constitution does not connote mere animal
existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider meaning which includes right
to livelihood, better standard of life, hygienic conditions in work place and leisure. In Olga Tellis
v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985(3) SCC 545, this Court held that no person can live
without the means of living i.e. means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a
part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life
would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation
would not only denude the life of its effective content of meaningfulness but it would make life
impossible to live, leave aside what makes life liveable."

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." The workers, therefore, have a special place in a socialist pattern of society. They are not mere
vendors of toil, they are not a marketable commodity to be purchased by the owners of capital.
They are producers of wealth as much as capital and very much more. They supply labour
without which capital would be impotent and they are, at the least, equal partners with capital in
the enterprise. Our constitution has shown profound concern for the workers and given them a
pride of place in the new socioeconomic order envisaged in the Preamble and the Directive
Principles of State Policy."

OBITER--- No Obiter Dicta is present in the Present case.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER RELEVANT TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The writ petition is allowed. All the industries are directed (1) To maintain and keep maintaining
the health record of every worker up to a minimum period of 40 years from the beginning of the
employment or 15 years after retirement or cessation of the employment whichever is later; (2)
The Membrane Filter test, to detect asbestos fibre should be adopted by all the factories or
establish- ments at par with the Metalliferrous Mines Regulations, 1961; and Vienna Convention
and Rules issued thereunder; (3) All the factories whether covered by the Employees State
Insurance Act or Workmen's Compensation Act or otherwise are directed to compulsorily insure
health coverage to every worker; (4) The Union and the State Governments are directed to
review the standards of permissible exposure limit value of fibre/cc in tune with the international
standards reducing the permissible content as prayed in the writ petition referred to at the
beginning. The review shall be continued after every 10 yews and also as an when the I.L.O.
gives directions in this behalf consistent with its recommendations or any Conventions; (5) The
Union and all the State Governments are directed to consider inclusion of such of those small
scale factory or factories or industries to protect health hazards of the worker engaged in the
manufacture of asbestos or its ancillary produce; (6) The appropriate Inspector of Factories in
particular of the State of Gujarat, is directed to send all the workers, examined by the concerned
ESI hospital, for re-examination by the National Institute of Occupational Health to detect
whether all or any of them are suffering from asbestosis. In case of the positive Ending that all or
any of them ant suffering from the occupational health hazards, each such worker shall be
entitled to compensation in a sum of rupees one lakh payable by the concerned factory or

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industry or establishment within a period of three months from the date of certification by the
National Institute of Occupational Health. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs.

RAJ BALA vs STATE OF HARYANA

FACTS

Article 40 of the Constitution mandates state legislatures to set up panchayats and enable their
functioning as units of self government. Composition of panchayats was to be determined by
State’s legislature taking into account various situations , such as reservation of seats . Section
175 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 stated that persons suffering from any of the
disqualifications mentioned therein were neither eligible to contest the election to any of the
offices under the Act, 1994 nor continue in office falling foul of any of the disqualifications. The
categories included adjudicated insolvency, unsoundness of mind, holding on office of profit in
the panchayat, and more. Act 2015 added to the list five further stipulations: 1) Persons against
whom charges are framed in criminal cases for offences punishable with imprisonment for not
less than ten years , 2) Persons who fail to pay arrears, if any , owed by them to either a Primary
Agricultural Rural Development Bank, 3) Persons who have arrears of electricity bills, 4)
Persons who do not possess the specified educational qualification and lastly 5) Persons not
having a functional toilet at their place of residence. Hence the present petition.

ISSUE

.Whether Disqualifications given under Section 175 of The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act,
2015( Act 8 of 2015) violate The Right to Equality of the Petitioner granted under Article 14 of
the Indian Constitution, and the Writ petition will be allowed?

ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER— 1) There is no rational nexus between the object

of the elections and classification based on educational qualifications.
2) The object of the elections is not to select the most competent candidate but to select
the person based on the democratic will of the electorate.

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 3) The legislation is arbitrary as it treats equally the persons who are unequally
circumstanced

4) The legislation is anomalous with regard to article 243.

. Article 14 of the Indian constitution provides “the state shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India”. Similarly,
“Equality before law implies the absence of any special privilege by reason of birth, creed or
the like, in favour of individual and the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law,-
Equal protection of laws implies the right to equality of treatment in equal circumstances1”.
. The Haryana government amended Section 175 of the Haryana Panchayati raj act, 1994 in
the year 2015 to include disqualifications for participation in panchayat elections on the basis
of educational status, defaulting on loans, and having functional toilet facilities at home.
Setting up these disqualifications, in grass root elections is arbitrary, discriminatory, and
unreasonable to the petitioners. Further, it fails various constitutionality tests like object nexus,
arbitrariness propounded by the court to verify the validity of a legislation under article 14.

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT-- It is submitted on behalf of respondents that the

submission of the petitioner is without any factual basis. According to statistical data available
with the State, there are approximately 8.5 lakhs house holders classified as families falling
below poverty line (BPL) in the State of Haryana. It is further submitted that right from the year
1985 there have been schemes in vogue to provide financial assistance to families desirous of
constructing a toilet at their residence . In the initial days of such a scheme Rs.650/- was given
by the State and from time to time the amount was revised and at present Rs.12000/- is provided
by the State to any person desirous of constructing a toilet. As per the data available with the
State, of the abovementioned 8.5 lakhs households, classified to be below the poverty line,
approximately 7.2 lakhs households had availed the benefit of the above scheme. Therefore,
according to the respondents if any person in the State of Haryana is not having a functioning
toilet at his residence it is not because that he cannot afford to have a toilet but because he has no
intention of having such facility at his residence. It is very forcefully submitted by the learned
Attorney General that a salutary provision designed as a step for eliminating the unhealthy
practice of rural India of defecating in public, ought not to be invalidated.
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JUDGMENT INCLUDING RATIO, OBITER, ORDER RELATED TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--------

RATIO DECIDENDI --- There are no grounds, much less sustainable grounds, available to the
petitioners to question the validity of this provision. This provision in my view is enacted
essentially in the larger public interest and is indeed the need of the hour to ensure its application
all over the country and not confining it to a particular State. Moreover, the State having
provided adequate financial assistance to those who do not have toilet facility for construction of
toilet, there arises no ground to challenge this provision as being unreasonable in any manner.

. No doubt that rural India, particularly people in the agricultural sector suffer the problem of
indebtedness. The reasons are many and it is beyond the scope of this judgment to enquire into
the reasons. It is also a fact that there have been cases in various parts of the country where
people reportedly commit suicides unable to escape the debt trap. But, it is the submission of the
respondents that such incidents are very negligible in the State of Haryana as the agricultural
sector of Haryana is relatively more prosperous compared to certain other parts of the country.
We do not wish to examine the statistical data in this regard nor much of it is available on record.
In our view, such an enquiry is irrelevant for deciding the constitutionality of the impugned
provision. We are also not very sure as to how many of such people who are so deeply indebted
would be genuinely interested in contesting elections whether at PANCHAYAT level or
otherwise. We can certainly take judicial notice of the fact that elections at any level in this
country are expensive affairs. For that matter, not only in this country, in any other country as
well they are expensive affairs. In such a case the possibility of a deeply indebted person seeking
to contest elections should normally be rare as it would be beyond the economic capacity of such
persons. In our opinion, the challenge is more theoretical than real. Assuming for the sake of
argument that somebody who is so indebted falling within the prescription of clauses

(t) and (v) of Section 175(1) of the Act is still interested in contesting the PANCHAYAT
elections, nothing in law stops such an aspirant from making an appropriate arrangement for
clearance of the arrears and contest elections. At this stage, an incidental submission is required
to be examined. It is submitted that there could be a genuine dispute regarding the liability
falling under the clauses (t) and (v) and therefore it would be unjust to exclude such persons

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from the electoral process even before an appropriate adjudication. Justness of such a situation is
once again in the realm of the wisdom of the legislation. We do not sit in the judgment over the
same. But we must make it clear nothing in law prevents an aspirant to contest an election to the
PANCHAYAT to make payments under protest of the amounts claimed to be due from him and
seek adjudication of the legality of the dues by an appropriate forum. We do not see any
substance in the challenge to clauses (t) and (v) of Section 175(1) of the Act.

. Clause (w) disqualifies a person from contesting an election to the Panchayat if such a person
has no functional toilet at his place of residence. Once again the submission on behalf of the
petitioners is that a large number of rural population simply cannot afford to have a toilet at their
residence as it is beyond their economic means. To render them disqualified for contesting
elections to the PANCHAYATS would be to make an unreasonable classification of otherwise
eligible persons to contest elections to PANCHAYAT and, therefore, discriminatory.

OBITER DICTA ---- There is no Obiter dicta present in the Present case though there is a lot of
precedent.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER RELATED TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-- . It is a notorious

fact that the Indian population for a long time had this unhealthy practice of defecating in public.
The Father of the Nation wrote copiously on this aspect on various occasions. He took up with a
missionary zeal the cause to eradicate this unhealthy practice. At some point of time, he even
declared that the priority of this country should be to get rid of such unhealthy practice than to
fight for independence. It is unfortunate that almost a hundred years after Gandhiji started such a
movement, India is still not completely rid of such practice. The reasons are many. Poverty is
one of them. However, this unhealthy practice is not exclusive to poorer sections of rural India.
In a bid to discourage this unhealthy practice, the State has evolved schemes to provide financial
assistance to those who are economically not in a position to construct a toilet. As rightly pointed
by the respondents, if people still do not have a toilet it is not because of their poverty but
because of their lacking the requisite will. One of the primary duties of any civic body is to
maintain sanitation within its jurisdiction. Those who aspire to get elected to those civic bodies
and administer them must set an example for others. To the said end if the legislature stipulates
that those who are not following basic norms of hygiene are ineligible to become administrators

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of the civic body and disqualifies them as a class from seeking election to the civic body, such a
policy, in our view, can neither be said to create a class based on unintelligible criteria nor can
such classification be said to be unconnected with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.

. It was held that there was no merit in this writ petition, and the same is dismissed and the
Disqualifications given under Section 175 of The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 2015( Act 8 of
2015) does not violate The Right to Equality of the Petitioner, granted under Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution.

SATRUCHARLA CHANDRASEKHAR RAJU VS VYRICHERLA

PRADEEP KUMAR DEV

FACTS

.This is an appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 preferred
against the order of the High Court setting aside the election of the appellant who was elected as
a member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly from No. 8 Naguru (ST) constituency on
the ground that he was holding an office of profit under the State Government at the relevant
time and was thus disqualified under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India for being
chosen as a member of the Assembly.

. The appellant was appointed as a Single Teacher in a primary school run by the Integrated
Tribal Development Agency ("ITDA" for short) by its Project Officer. He joined duty in January
1988 and was working in a school in Jiyyammavalasa Mandal in Vizianagaram district. On
2.8.88 the Tribal Welfare Officer inspected the said school and is alleged to have noticed some
irregularities and he kept the appellant under suspension pending enquiry by an order dated
23.8.88. The appellant questioned the same before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal
by filing a petition but the same was rejected. Thereafter by a letter dated 26.10.1989 the
appellant submitted his resignation to the Project Officer who was the appointing authority.
However, the Project Officer made an endorsement on the said letter that his resignation cannot
be accepted in view of the pending enquiry. Subsequently the election programme for the
Legislative Assembly was announced and the appellant filed his nomination and contested

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election from the above-mentioned constituency on 22.11.89 Counting took place on 26.11.89
and on 27.11.89 the appellant was declared duly elected. The respondent No. 1, who was one of
the contesting candidates and who lost the election, filed an election petition challenging the
election of the appellant on the ground that the appellant was disqualified as he was holding an
office of profit not only on the date of filing the nomination but also subsequently in view of the
fact that his resignation was not accepted in view of the pending enquiry and therefore he shall
be deemed to be holding an office of profit under the Government. The respondent also stated in
his election petition that he was not aware of the appellant's disqualification at the time of the
scrutiny of the nomination papers. The appellant filed a written submission contesting the
election petition inter alia contending that the ITDA under which he is deemed to be holding an
office as a teacher was only a registered society under the Societies Registration Act and the said
society cannot said to be the Government nor is a part of the Government and that it is an
independent body. It is also stated that since he has tendered his resignation on 26.10.89 it shall
be deemed to have come into effect from that date.

ISSUE

. The only issue that came up for consideration before the High Court in the election petition
was whether the first respondent i.e. appellant herein was holding an office of profit under the
Government of Andhra Pradesh on the date of his nomination and was disqualified to contest for
the same, And whether the appeal will be allowed.

ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES

ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT--- The main contention of the appellant was that the ITDA
was only a registered society and even assuming that the Government has some control over the
sanction of posts and composition of the governing body of the ITDA it cannot be said to be the
Government or part of it or to be an instrumentality of the Government. Therefore the appellant
cannot be said to have been holding an office of profit and the mere fact that he was appointed as
a teacher by the Project Officer of the Society he cannot be deemed to have been appointed by
the Government. The learned Judge after referring to the relevant clauses of memorandum of
association of the Society held that (i) Although the Society appears to be independent of the

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State Government but in substance its activities are controlled by the officers of the Government
who are ex-officio members of the governing body. The Chairman as well as the Project Officer
are the officers of the State Government. A majority of the members of the governing body are
the officers holding posts in the Government by virtue of which they became the ex-officio
members of the governing body. Thus for all practical purposes it is the officers of the
Government who control the activities of the society: (ii) though the Project Officer is the
appointing authority of the appellant but he is only a Secretary of the Society by virtue of his
being an officer in the Government; (iii) the Government sanctions the number of posts of
teacher, fixes their scales of pay; (iv) although the rules provide to have funds of its own by way
of recurring and non-recurring grants made by the Government of India but it is the Government
who sanctions the funds: (v) since the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
of the State Government are being applied to the teachers of the Society, they must be deemed to
have been treated as the employees of the Government. The State has to provide free and
compulsory education to all the children and primary education is also the responsibility of the
State Government and it is meeting expenditures out of its funds. Therefore the function of
appointment of the teachers in the Society by the Project Officer is one of the Governmental
functions and thus the State Government exercises almost full control. For the aforesaid reasons
the High Court held that the appellant was holding an office of profit and thus incurred the
disqualification.

. Learned Counsel for the appellant before us contended that the reasons given by the High Court
by themselves, even if accepted to be correct, are, not enough to conclude that the appellant was
holding an office of profit and that one of the main tests is whether the Government has got
power to appoint and to dismiss the appellant from service and that admittedly the Government
has not the authority to dismiss him and this coupled with the fact that the Society is a registered
society would clinch that the Society is not the Government or a part of the Government and that
the appellant was not holding an office of profit under the Government. The learned Counsel also
submitted that some of the reasons given by the High Court are not conclusive for holding that
the Society is the Government or a part of the Government.

. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even assuming that the Government has
control over the ITDA because of several factors like sanctioning of posts and funds, the

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appellant was only appointed by the Project Officer and he alone has the power to revoke his
appointment. According to the learned Counsel, in a case of this nature, the decisive test is
whether the Government has power to appoint a person or to revoke his appointment and that
learned Judge of the High Court has not kept the same in view while holding that the appellant
was holding an office of profit under the Government." Learned Counsel further submitted that
the office held by the appellant under ITDA does not in any manner come into conflict with his
duties as a legislator as he does not have any direct obligations with the Government. Therefore,
it cannot be said that he was holding an office of profit under the Government since he is neither
appointed by the Government nor his appointment can be revoked by the Government.

ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT-- Before we proceed further one aspect namely that the
appellant ceased to be a teacher before he filed his nomination to contest the assembly election
by virtue of the fact that he sent a letter of resignation to the post, has to be considered.
Admittedly the resignation was not accepted by the day of his election and he was kept under
suspension pending enquiry w.e.f. 23.8.88 and he was being paid the subsistence allowance in
accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.
The learned Judge of the High Court has also mentioned in the judgment that the appellant did
not persist on framing an issue in this regard and hence no specific issue was framed as to
whether the resignation of the appellant was effective from the date he submitted his resignation
and -therefore he ceased to be a teacher. It appears that the said plea was not pressed at the time
of hearing of the election petititon. Therefore it follows that the appellant was holding the said
post at the time of his nomination and election. The only question therefore to be considered is
whether the first respondent was holding an office of profit under the State Government.

Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India which imposes the disqualifications is as follows:

Disqualifications for membership-(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for
being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State-(a) if he holds
any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in
the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to
disqualify its holder.

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JUDGMENT INCLUDING RATIO, OBITER, ORDER RELATED TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTA -- We may refer to Biharilal Dobray's case on
which the learned Counsel for the respondents placed considerable reliance. That was a case
where the elected candidate was originally employed as an Assistant Teacher in a Basic Primary
School run by the Zila Parishad in U.P. On coming into force of the U.P. Basic Education Act,
1972 he became an employee of the Board of Basic Education under Section 9(1) of the Act.
While holding the post of the Assistant Teacher he filed his nomination. He was elected and his
election was questioned by the unsuccessful candidate. The High Court dismissed the election
petition and in appeal before this Court, it was contended that the elected candidate at the time of
filing his nomination was holding an office of profit. The rules framed under the Act lay down
that the appellate authorities in case of disciplinary proceedings are the State Government or the
officers of the Government depending upon the nature of the posts. This Court after referring to
the provisions of the Act and the rules held thus:

It is seen that all officers mentioned in column 3 and column 4 of the above Schedule are either
the State Government or officers appointed by the State Government. The said officers are all
officers of the Government Department who hold the posts in the Board ex officio, that is, by
virtue of the corresponding post held by them under the Government. The rules provide for the
procedure to be followed in disciplinary proceedings and the punishments that may be imposed
when an employee is found guilty of any act of misconduct. Rule 5 of the said rules provides for
an appeal against any order imposing punishment to the prescribed authority. The procedure laid
down in Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as applicable to servants of
the Uttar Pradesh Government is required to be followed as far as possible in the case of the
employees of the U.P. Board of Basic Education. The funds of the Board mainly come from the
contribution made by the state Government. The school in question is not a privately sponsored
institution which is recognised by the Board. The Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to
the Bill which was passed as the Act clearly says that the Act was passed in order to enable the
State Government to take over the administration of schools imparting primary education which
were being run by the local authorities into its own hands. Even though the representatives of
local authorities are associated in the administration of such schools after the Act was passed, the

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final control of the schools is vested in the Government and such control is exercised by it
through the Director and Deputy Director of Basic Education (Member Secretary) and other
District Basic Education Officers appointed by the Government.

On the basis of these findings this Court held that the Government had direct control and that
subordination of the Board and its employees to the Government is writ large on the face of the
Act and the rules made there under. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the facts
in the instant case also are similar. We do not agree. The facts in Biharilal Dobray's case are
distinguishable. There, the appointing authority of the teachers is the District Education Officer
and the State Government frames rules prescribing the conditions of service, tenure of service,
remuneration and other terms including disciplinary action and removal of teachers and other
employees who are thus appointed. This Court, however, taking these aspects into consideration
held that under the Act, the Government took over all the Basic Schools with the object of
providing compulsory education to the children and that every employee of the Board is in fact
holding the office under the Government. As a matter of fact in a later decision i.e. in Ashok
Kumar Bhattacharyya's case this Court distinguished Biharilal Dobray's case and held thus:

The measure of control by the Government over a local authority should be judged in order to
eliminate the possibility of conflict between duty and interest and to maintain the purity of the
elected bodies. After reviewing various cases, and the provisions of the various sections of the
U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 especially in view of Section 13 of the Act, this Court held in the
last mentioned case that the measure of control was such that U.P. Education Board was an
authority which was not truly independent of the Government and every employee of the Board
was in fact holding an office of profit under the State Government. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 and Sections 4, 6, 7, 13 and 19 all of which have
been set out in extenso in that decision make that conclusion irresistible.

(emphasis supplied) Therefore Biharilal Dobray's case is not of much assistance to the
respondents. As a matter of fad, a' already observed in Biharilal Dobray's case as well as Ashok
Kumar Bhattacharyya's case the emphasis was also on the nature of the post held and the
possibility of conflict between duty and interest of an elected member and to appreciate the same

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the test is whether the Government has power to appoint or dismiss the employee who is being
chosen as a legislator.

.It is also necessary to bear in mind that the Government is undertaking several projects and
activities including commercial activities through the corporations and local bodies exercising
some control over such corporations or bodies. In that view of the matter they may come within
the meaning of the "State" envisaged in Article 12 but that may not be a decisive factor in
deciding the issue. As a matter of fact Section 10 of the Representation of People Act as well as
Article 58(2) of the Constitution of India do indicate that all persons employed in such
undertakings, corporations or local bodies cannot be deemed to suffer disqualification for
contesting the elections except to the extent indicated therein. This aspect also has been
considered in some of the above-mentioned decisions. If a strict and narrow construction is to be
applied that amounts to shutting off many prominent and other eligible persons to contest the
elections which forms the fundamental basis for the democratic set-up. Therefore several factors
as indicated above depending upon the facts of each case have to be taken into consideration in
deciding whether a particular person is disqualified by virtue of his holding an office of profit
before concluding that such an office is under the Government. In Madhuker G.E. Pankakar's
case, as to what should be the approach, it was observed thus:

After all, all law is a means to an end. What is the legislative end here in disqualifying holders of
'offices of profit under government'? Obviously, to avoid a conflict between duty and interest, to
cut out the misuse of official position to advance private benefit and to avert the likelihood of
influencing government to promote personal advantage. So this is the mischief to be suppressed.
At the same time we have to bear in mind that our Constitution mandates the State to undertake
multiform public welfare and socio-economic activites involving technical persons, welfare
workers, and lay people on a massive scale so that participatory government may prove a
progressive reality. In such an expanding situation, can we keep out from elective posts at
various levels many doctors, lawyers, engineers and scientists, not to speak of an army of other
non-officials who are wanted in various fields, not as full-time government servants but as part-
time participants in people's projects sponsored by government? For instance, if a National Legal
Services Authority funded largely by the State comes into being, a large segment of the legal
profession may be employed part-time in the ennobling occupation of legal aid to the poor.

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Doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists and other experts may have to be invited into local bodies,
legislatures and like political and administrative organs based on election if these vital limbs of
representative government are not to be the monopoly of populist politicians or lay members but
sprinkled with technicians in an age which belongs to technology. So, an interpretation of 'office
of profit' to cast the net so wide that all our citizens with specialities and know-how are inhibited
from entering elected organs of public administration and offering semi-voluntary services in
para-official, statutory or like projects run or directed by Government or Corporation controlled
by the State may be detrimental to democracy itself. Even athletes may hesitate to come into
Sports Councils if some fee for services is paid and that proves their funeral if elected to a
Panchayat A balanced view even if it involves judicious irreverence to vintage precedents, is the
wiser desideratum.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER RELATED TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-- From the above

reasons it was emerged that the Government has some control over the ITDA(Integrated Tribal
Development Agency) which is set up as a project, since it provides funds and sanctions the
posts: the District Collector is appointed as Project Officer and some officers are ex-officio
members of the ITDA which carries out the object of providing the compulsory education in
tribal areas. But the ITDA is a registered Society having its own constitution. Though the Project
Officer is the District Collector, he acts as a different entity. The power to appoint or to remove
teachers is not with the Government but with the Project Officer. The Government may have
control over the appointing authority but has no direct control over the teachers. The small post
that appellant holds in ITDA is only that of a Teacher who is directly under the control of the
Project Officer. In such a situation the question of any conflict between his duties and interests as
an elected member does not arise since it cannot be said that he, as a teacher, can be subjected to
any kind of pressure by the Government which has neither the power to appoint him nor to
remove him from service. Taking a practical view of the substance of these factors into
consideration, the appellant cannot be held to be holding an office of profit under the
Government. Accordingly the Order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
Parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.

UNDERSTANDING—I have done research on the 5 cases which is 1) Jaya Bachchan vs Union
of India 2) Ramakrishna vs State of Karnataka 3) Consumer Education and Research Society vs

26 | P a g e
Union of India 4) Raj Bala vs State of Haryana 5) Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju vs Vyricherla
Pradeep Kumar Dev.

Case laws are very important because it is equivalent to performing practical, hence case laws
are needed in every court, in order to validate your legal point and to be considered by the court
of law. Law is all about interpreting the statues with the circumstantial evidences. From the
above case analysis I go through the facts, issues, arguments and judgments along with ratio and
obiter in the cases.

In Jaya Bchchan case it was understood about the validity of disqualification under Article 102
(1) (a) Constitution of India, about the office of profit for the purpose of Article 102(1) (a)

In this case, as noticed the office carried with it a monthly honorarium of Rs. 5000,
entertainment expenditure of Rs. 10,000., staff car with driver., telephones at office and
residence, free accommodation and medical treatment facilities to self and family members, apart
from other allowances etc. That these are pecuniary gains, cannot be denied. The fact that the
petitioner is affluent or was not interested in the benefits/facilities given by the State Government
or did not, in fact, receive such benefits till date, are not relevant to the issue.

. In this view, the question whether petitioner actually received any pecuniary gain or not is of no
consequence. There is no merit in the writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

In Ramakrishna case it was understood about the various grounds and required conditions for
the Disqualification under the Article 191(1) of the Indian Constitution.

- IN this case, no evidence was placed before the second respondent to show that the petitioner
had pecuniary gain or profit by holding the office. And further if a Constitutional functionary,
whom power had been conferred to take a decision which has the seal of finality, wrongly
interprets the Constitutional provisions, then the decision so arrived at will have to be set aside
by issue of a writ of certiorari, because it would not be a valid order in the eye of law.
. IN this view of the matter, the impugned order is liable to be quashed holding that the petitioner
had not subjected to disqualification under Art. 191 (1) of the Constitution.

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. IN the result, for the reasons stated, this Writ Petition is entitled to succeed. Hence, the passed
is quashed. (3) No costs. Petition allowed

In Consumer Education and Research Society case it was understood about,Whether the dry
process can be completed replaced by the wet, to keep health records of each workman for
requisite minimum periods, to provide compulsory health insurance for employees, and finally to
award compensation to those suffering from asbestos, about Employees State Insurance Act or
Workmen’s Compensation Act ,

In case of the positive Ending that all or any of them ant suffering from the occupational health
hazards, each such worker shall be entitled to compensation in a sum of rupees one lakh payable
by the concerned factory or industry or establishment within a period of three months from the
date of certification by the National Institute of Occupational Health. The writ petitions are
accordingly allowed, And awarded compensation to those sufferings.

In Raj Bala vs State of Haryana case, it was understood about ,Whether Disqualifications
given under Section 175 of The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 2015( Act 8 of 2015) violate The
Right to Equality of the Petitioner granted under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, and the
Writ petition will be allowed. It was also understood about the The Haryana government
amended Section 175 of the Haryana Panchayati raj act, 1994 in the year 2015 to include
disqualifications for participation in panchayat elections on the basis of educational status,
defaulting on loans, and having functional toilet facilities at home. Setting up these
disqualifications, in grass root elections is arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable to the
petitioners. Further, it fails various constitutionality tests like object nexus, arbitrariness
propounded by the court to verify the validity of a legislation under article 14.

It was also understood that in this case It was held that there was no merit in this writ petition,
and the same is dismissed and the Disqualifications given under Section 175 of The Haryana
Panchayati Raj Act, 2015( Act 8 of 2015) does not violate The Right to Equality of the
Petitioner, granted under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

In Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju case It was understood that in this case The only issue
that came up for consideration before the High Court in the election petition was whether the

28 | P a g e
first respondent i.e. appellant herein was holding an office of profit under the Government of
Andhra Pradesh on the date of his nomination and was disqualified to contest for the same, And
whether the appeal will be allowed.

It was also understood about the control of Government on Integrated Tribal Development
Agency (ITDA). It was understood that in this case the appellant cannot be held to be holding an
office of profit under the Government. Accordingly the Order of the High Court is set aside and
the appeal is allowed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout

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.

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