RULES ON CONSTRUCTION
accused filed before Us the present petition. On January
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983
BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL
OF RIZAL, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to
enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. from
promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Bernardino
Marcelino, and for release from detention of petitioner,
the accused in said case, on the ground of loss of
jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for
failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90]
days from submission thereof.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII. Trial was
conducted and the same was concluded when the
accused rested his case on August 4, 1975. On the
same date, however, the attorneys for both parties
moved for time within which to submit their respective
memoranda. The trial court granted the motion as
follows:
Upon joint motion, the parties are given
thirty [30] days to submit their respective
memoranda, simultaneously, and
thereafter the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision of the Court.
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due
time, but no memorandum was filed by the People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the
Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for
promulgation. The decision was also dated November
28, 1975. 1
A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by
Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the Grace Park Post
Office 2to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980
and 011981, addressed to Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango
Road, Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining witness,
and Atty, Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg.,
Intramuros, Manila, counsel for the accused,
respectively, were posted in said office on December 4,
1975. These notices were received by the respective
addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975. 3
Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of
Pasig and to the Provincial Warden of Pasig, Rizal, who
both received them on December 2,1975, 4
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel
for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first
time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
failure to decide the case within 90 days from
submission thereof for decision. Acceding to counsel's
request that he be given time to consider the proper
remedial measure to take, the respondent judge reset
the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976 at
8:30 A. M.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew
for the resetting of the promulgation of decision.
Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the
promulgation to January 26, 1976.
Page 1 of 82
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the
16, 1976, this Court issued an Order temporarily
restraining respondent judge from promulgating the
decision in Criminal Case No, C-5910.
Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month
period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the
1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is
mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof
results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the
unresolved case.
We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November
28, 1975, or eighty- five [851 days from September 4,
1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for
decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of
court the decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had
thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within
the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution.
In Comia v. Nicolas,  5 Ago v. Court of
Appeals   and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance 7 this
6
Court ruled that the rendition of the judgment in trial
courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the
clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional
provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of
judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is
this date that should be considered in determining
whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case
within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of
promulgation of a decision could not serve as the
reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at
at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent
to the accused as well as to the other parties involved,
an event which is beyond the control of the judge. As
pointed out in People v. Court of Appeals 8, the
promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not
necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the
judge of the clerk of court.
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides
in full, to wit:
SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this
Constitution, the maximum period within
which a case or matter shall be decided
or resolved from the date of its
submission, shall be eighteen months
for the Supreme court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all inferior collegiate courts,
and three months for all other inferior
courts.
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-
quoted provision has been rendered by this Court. Thus,
in approaching this novel question, We now tread upon
what Mr. Cooley characterizes as "very dangerous
ground when they [referring to the courts] venture to
apply rules which distinguish directory and mandatory
statutes to the provisions of a constitution." 9
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are
to be construed as mandatory, unless by express
provision or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest." 10 "The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often determined
on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less
injury results to the general public by disregarding than
by enforcing the letter of the law." 11
In Trapp v. McCormick, 12 a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty
[30] days within which a decree may be entered without
the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory
proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode
or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim
and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
essential act. " Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
On this view, authorities are one in saying that:
Statutes requiring the rendition of
judgment forthwith or immediately after
the trial or verdict have been held by
some courts to be merely directory so
that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment, on the theory
that if the statute had intended such
result it would clearly have indicated it."
[American Tupe Founders Co. v.
Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac.
742; Heillen v. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26
Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App.
39, State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585, 5 Ann.
Cas. 1000, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023, 92
S.W. 484; Wissman v. Meagher, 115
Mo. App. 82, 91 S.W. 448; Pohle v.
Dickmann, 67 Mo. App. 381; Herwick v.
Koken Barber Supply Co., 61 Mo. App.
454].
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional
provision under consideration. In Mikell v. School Dis. of
Philadelphia, 13 it was ruled that "the legal distinction
between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to
fundamental as it is to statutory laws."
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in
question indicates that it falls within the exception rather
than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by
the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period
prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court
in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of
Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
... " And there can be no doubt that said provision,
having been incorporated for reasons of expediency,
relates merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil &
Gas Co. v. Morris, 14 declares that constitutional
provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they
refer to matters merely procedural.
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with
respect to this provision. This Court had at various times,
upon proper application and for meritorious reasons,
allowed judges of inferior courts additional time beyond
the three-month period within which to decide cases
submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from
said provision would result in less injury to the general
public than would its strict application. To hold that non-
compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision
would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the
courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very
instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason
merely of having failed to render a decision within the
alloted term. Such an absurd situation could not have
been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.
As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his
Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 15 the
constitutional provision in question should be held
merely as directory. "Thus, where the contrary
construction) would lead to absurd, impossible or
mischievous consequences, it should not be followed. "
One last point, Notwithstanding Our conclusion that
courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to
decide a case within the ninety-day period, We here
emphasize the rule, for the guidance of the judges
manning our courts, that cases pending before their
salas must be decided within the aforementioned period.
Page 2 of 82
Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In
fact a certificate to this certificate is required before
judges are allowed Lo draw their salaries.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the
Restraining Order dated January 16, 1976 issued by this
Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz,
Jr. is already deceased, his successor is hereby ordered
to decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of the
record thereof within ninety [90] days from the time the
case is raffled to him.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92             July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, 
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03             July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, 
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for
respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue
before us is whether or not, in making that
determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of
the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989,
found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by
the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the
issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members.
(See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction
of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168
SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is
original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
(Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p.
162). The exercise of power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has
been described as "intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in
the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant
of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete;
(Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the Legislature and the
Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25
SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the
Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on
a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this
Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even
affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral
Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780
[1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of
the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only
"in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429
[1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of
due process." The Court does not venture into the
perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government, It comes in
Page 3 of 82
only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no
less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has
been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
review the decisions of the other branches and agencies
of the government to determine whether or not they have
acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article
VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of
a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the
HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary
power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in
the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the
exercise of their functions independent organs —
independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The
power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional
and careful regard for the balance of powers, must
permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain
where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso
v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil.
886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of
the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it
exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided
political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that
makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions
any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention
should not be made to depend on how many legislative
members of the HRET belong to this party or that party.
The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his
residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan
was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity.
As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural
born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic
faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the
private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from
this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable.
As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In
the meantime, the father of the private respondent,
unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955
as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private
respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private
respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's
family constructed another one in place of their ruined
house. Again, there is no showing other than that
Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the
family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in
Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building,
two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and
thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila,
the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in
the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.
Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of
his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely
amending the article on this subject.
Page 4 of 82
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang,
Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named
Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several
years in the management of their family business
decided to be of greater service to his province and ran
for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in
1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the
second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.
Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than
7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article
IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the
Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship
before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an
unfair position which discriminates against Filipino
women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of
section 4, would this refer only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover
those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who
elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the
election was done before or after January 17,
1973. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill
of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born
citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have
 elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr.
Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in
the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book,
he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and
that the definition on natural-born has no
retroactive effect. Now it seems that the
Reverend Father Bernas is going against this
intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there
has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very
important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to
run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that
and for that reason we will leave it to the body to
approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the
provision because it strikes me as unfair that the
Filipino citizen who was born a day before
January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or
a natural-born citizen. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to
remedy an inequitable
situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973
when we were under the 1935 Constitution,
those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers
were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born
of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have
to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and if they do elect, they
become Filipino citizens but not natural-born
Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the
framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation
resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts
are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of
its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must
prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the
latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v.
Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to
give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision
which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v.
LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated.
Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be
construed narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase
Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas
Page 5 of 82
having their essence in their form but are
organic living institutions, the significance of
which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was
not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born"
cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of
time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of
essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted,
that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore
curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct
the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would
have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial
to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article
IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not
have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him
to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen
since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was
nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we
held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise
his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of
Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization
when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman
Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated
in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in
the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine
customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of
alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his
natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They
should know him better than any member of this Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming
numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only
to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that
the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on
the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how
Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose
Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of
the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its
benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by
declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was
not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
death and at this very late date just so we can go after
the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In
our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
(See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would
Page 6 of 82
run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong
Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be
given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man
cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong
Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond where
his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this
matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino
when he came of age. At that time and up to the present,
both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless
he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor
of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of
his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the
HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of
discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship
has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa
convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the
respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural
born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the
Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and
the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call
the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's
declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day
of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the
status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish
subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those
who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother,
even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained
naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have
acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
(Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his
habitual residence. This domicile, once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until
a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40,
Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768
[1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident
of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue
of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p.
3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued
until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the
19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up
his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te
falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17
of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he,
nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The
fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact
that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become
a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having
established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of
Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one
who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has
a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II)
A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under
the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in
concluding that the private respondent was a natural-
born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that
document presented to prove it were not in compliance
with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege
that the private respondent failed to present the original
of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and
of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private
respondent fall under the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET
that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the
minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be
found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant
Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty.
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention;
and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P
Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before
the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental
agency which is the official custodian of the records of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December
12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989,
pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty.
Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify
to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET
was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente,
Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to
produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to
be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown
that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot
be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil.
817 [1918])
Page 7 of 82
Since the execution of the document and the inability to
produce were adequately established, the contents of
the questioned documents can be proven by a copy
thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the
documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report,
the former member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a
witness in the hearing of the protest against the private
respondent, categorically stated that he saw the
disputed documents presented during the hearing of the
election protest against the brother of the private
respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-
president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he
was presiding officer of the plenary session which
deliberated on the report on the election protest against
Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice
Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could
have presented any one of the long list of delegates to
refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born
citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private
respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the
qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body.
The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is
the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be
a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at
length on the controversies over which they were sole
judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties
wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with
their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as
committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of
respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence"
under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been
understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof,
that is, in the district, for a period of not less than
one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the
gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that a provision
in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted
by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July
22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier
definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how
long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. In other words, domicile is characterized
by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147
[1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which
was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the
HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that
gutted their house in 1961, another one was
constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed
their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built
by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their
family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November
18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private
respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is
misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the
name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the
demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became
the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the
fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not
own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the
case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935])
held that it is not required that a person should have a
house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It
is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a
rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in
order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution
only requires that the candidate meet the age,
Page 8 of 82
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere
is it required by the Constitution that the candidate
should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
(see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as
a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in
Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later
to practice his profession, There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home
province reveal that he always had
the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it
has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution.
Throughout our history, there has been a continuing
influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese,
Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity
gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded
nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To
mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese,
the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part
Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon
Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of
whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than
the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest
wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must
forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of
citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our
antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer
the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and
often corrupt process of clearances by minor
bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome
so many technical traps of the judicial process were able
to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law
to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and
meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be
a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less
technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED.
Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION
G.R. No. L-58289 July 24, 1982
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE; respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition filed by the Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi,
incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,
praying that this Court declare Presidential Decree 1840 8. That the Respondents are intending
"granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and in fact implementing the provisions
and liabilities and some other purposes" unconstitutional. of the questioned decree and the same
tends to affect all taxpayers in the
The petition contains the following allegations:
Philippines including herein Petitioner;
5. That said decree was issued by the that he is now in a quandary on whether
President under supposed legislative to take advantage of the benefits of said
powers granted him under Amendment decree since the same is of doubtful
No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in constitutionality leaving him no
full force and effect as of October 27, protection as guaranteed by the decree
1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595 and thus subject him to prosecution for
and which is quoted as follows: violation of which otherwise would have
held him immune under said decree;
Whenever in the
Judgment of the 9. That as a member of the Batasang
President, there exists a Pambansa he knows that the subject of
grave emergency or a the questioned decree has not been
threat or imminence brought to the attention of the Batasang
thereof, or whenever Pambansa requiring immediate
the interim Batasang attention, the fact being that the original
Pambansa or the tax amnesty decree which the
regular National questioned decree amended or modified
Assembly fails or is has long been effective and
unable to act implemented by the Respondents while
adequately on any the Batasang Pambansa was in
matter for any reason session;
that in his judgment
10. That Presidential Decree No. 1840
requires immediate
is patently null and void having been
action, he may in order
passed without the concurrence of the
to meet the exigency,
Batasang Pambansa and it is likewise of
issue the necessary
public interest and of the nation that the
decrees, orders, or
question of whether the President
letters of instruction,
retained his legislative power after lifting
which shall form part of
Martial Law and after the Constitution
the law of the land.
was amended on April 7, 1981 be
6. That said decree was promulgated resolved;
despite the fact that under the
11. That the questioned decree being
Constitution "(T)he legislative power
the first dated after the lifting of Martial
shall be vested in a Batasang
Law and the April 7 amendments brings
Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the
to test the validity of the exercise of
President may grant amnesty only with
standby emergency powers invoked in
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa
Amendment No. 6. (Pp. 3-6, record.)
(Sec. 11, Art. VII);
As the petitioner himself puts it in his memorandum, the
7. That Amendment No. 6 is not one of
issue is: Whether the 1973 Constitution as amended by
the powers granted the President by the
Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the same
Constitution as amended in the
amendments, more particularly Amendment No. 6, after
plebiscite of April 7, 1981; that while
it was again amended in the Plebiscite held on April 7,
Section 16 of Art. VII of the Constitution
1981?
provides:
On the issue thus formulated by petitioner, it is
All powers vested in the
maintained that "Amendment No. 6 is rendered
President of the
inoperable, deleted and/or repealed by the amendments
Philippines under the
of April 7, 1981". Opening his discussion of this
1935 Constitution and
proposition thus:
the laws of the land
which are not herein Amendment No. 6 as originally
provided for on submitted to the people for ratification
conferred upon any under Pres. Dec. No. 1033, and
official shall be deemed thereafter approved reads as follows:
and are hereby vested
Whenever in the
in the President unless
judgment of the
the Batasang
President (Prime
Pambansa provides
Minister), there exists a
otherwise.
grave emergency or a
such re-confirmation of existing powers threat or imminence
did not mean to include the President's thereof, or whenever
legislative powers under Amendment the Interim Batasang
No. 6: by "the laws of the land which are Pambansa or the
not herein provided for or conferred regular National
upon any official" only those laws that Assembly fails or is
have been passed by the existing and/or unable to act
prior legislature are intended; adequately on any
matter for any reason
that in his judgment

Page 9 of 82
 requires immediate "incumbent President" in the
action, he may, in order amendment of 1976. While it is true that
to meet the exigency, Amendment No. 6 fails to distinguish
issue the necessary between "incumbent" and "regular" all
decrees, orders, or provisions with reference to the powers
letters of instruction, of the Presidency is deemed foreclosed
which shall form part of by Article VII of the newly amended
the law of the land. Constitution. Article VII enumerates
presidential powers. To construe that
Whether the matter or that there was an
the 1976 Amendments are still
exigency which required immediate
applicable, other than that referring to
action let it be conceded that in the
the Interim Batasang Pambansa would
judgment of the President such facts do
be an incompatibility to the application
exist. (Emphasis ours)
of the present constitutional provisions.
It is to be observed that the original text
Generally taken, the 1976 amendments
mentions President (Prime Minister).
are amendments to the transitory
This is so because under No. 3 of the
provisions of the Constitution. Insofar as
same amendment,
the office of the President or the Prime
... The incumbent Minister is concerned they have ceased
President of the to be governed by the transitory
Philippines shall be the provisions but under the newly amended
Prime Minister and he Constitution.
shall continue to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 125 called for the
exercise all his powers
election of a President under the newly
even after the interim
amended Constitution. President
Batasang Pambansa is
Marcos ran as candidate and was
organized and ready to
proclaimed the duly elected President of
discharge its functions,
the Philippines by resolution no. 2 of the
and likewise he shall
Batasang Pambansa dated June 21,
continue to exercise his
1981. He took his oath of office as the
powers and
duly elected President. The Prime
prerogatives under the
Minister, the Members of the Cabinet
1935 Constitution and
and the Executive Committee took their
the powers vested in
oaths after having been appointed and
the President and the
are now exercising their functions
Prime Minister under
pursuant to the new provisions. We
this Constitution.
even consider ourselves the Fourth
Parenthetically, the term "Incumbent Republic because of a new system of
President" employed in the transitory government. What particular part of the
provisions could only refer to President newly amended Constitution would
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Aquino vs. Amendment No. 6 fit in?
Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA
President Ferdinand E. Marcos ceased
275).
to be the incumbent resident referred to
After the April 7 amendments there in the transitory provisions or in the
exists no longer "a President (Prime 1976 amendments. The Solicitor
Minister)" but "A President"and "A Prime General argued that Amendment No. 6
Minister." They are now two different provided for the contingency that the
offices which cannot be held by a single office would be separated consisting of
person — not a transitory one but a a ceremonial President and a Prime
regular one provided for and governed Minister who will be he executive. Yet,
by the main provisions of the newly without express constitutional grant the
amended Constitution. Subsequent President now assumes a power
events accept the reality that we are no intended to be that of the Prime
longer governed by the transitory Minister. The intent of the 1981
provisions of the Constitution. (Pp. 27- amendments could not be interpreted
28, Record.) any other way except that after the
amendment it would no longer be proper
petitioner rationalizes his affirmative to exercise those reposed upon the
position thereon this wise: Prime Minister. Powers previously
Is Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 reposed upon the Prime Minister were
Constitution as approved in 1976 expressly removed from him and given
reproduced or unaffected by the April 7, to the President. Amendment No. 6 is
1981 amendment? Or, is it considered not one of those.
repealed by Omission? The proposed amendments under
The Constitutional provisions of the Batasan . No. 104 became Question No.
Presidency do not restate the provisions 1 in the ballot of April 7, 1981 plebiscite
of Amendment No. 6 which grants the to which the voter was asked (B.P. Blg.
President (Prime Minister) limited 122):
powers to legislate. This is tantamount Do you vote for the
to a withdrawal or deletion of such grant. approval of an
There is no way by which the incumbent amendment to the
President be referred to anymore as the Constitution and to

Page 10 of 82
 Amendment No. 2, as
proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa in
Resolution No. 2, which,
in substance, calls for
the establishment of a
modified parliamentary
system, amending for
this purpose Articles VII,
VIII and IX of the
Constitution, with the
following principal
features: ...
Nowhere in feature (1) was it submitted
that the President would enjoy
conditional or qualified legislative
powers as modified parliamentary
system.
The original intent to set out the original
act or section as amended is most
commonly indicated by a statement in
the amendatory act that the original law
is amended to "read as follows." The
new statute is a substitute for the
original act or section. Only those
provisions of the original act or section
repeated in the amendment are retained
(Paras vs. Land Registration
Commission, July 26, 1960, L-16011).
That "The Legislative power shall be
vested in the Batasang Pambansa" is an
old provision which has been retained.
This in essence was Question No. 1 in
the April 7 Plebiscite as to who exercise
legislative powers and who are to
execute. Nowhere in the approved
Amendment can it be hinted that the
hybrid-type of government also includes
a one-man legislature. The intent to
repose legislation only upon the
Batasan is very apparent. The adoption
of the new Constitution repeals and
supersedes all the provisions of the
older one not continued in force by the
new instrument (16 C.J.S. 88). (Pp. 30-
33, Record.)
After mature study and deliberation and considering the
peculiar circumstances that dictated the formulation of
Amendment No. 6, the Court's conclusion is, that
Assemblyman-Petitioners posture lacks, to say the least,
sufficient merit.
Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of
the words of the Charter. The ancient and familiar rule of
constitutional construction that has consistently
maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that
the meaning and understanding conveyed by the
language, albeit plain, of any of its provisions do not only
portray the influence of current events and
developments but likewise the inescapable imperative
considerations rooted in the historical background and
environment at the time of its adoption and thereby
caused their being written as part and parcel thereof. As
long as this Court adheres closest to this perspective in
viewing any attack against any part of the Constitution,
to the end of determining what it actually encompasses
and how it should be understood, no one can say We
have misguided Ourselves. None can reasonably
contend We are treading the wrong way.
True enough Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Philippine
Constitution as amended in 1981 explicitly ordains that
"(T)he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa". Section 2, however, readily reveals that the
Page 11 of 82
Batasang Pambansa contemplated in that Section 1 is
the regular assembly (formerly referred to as National
Assembly, now as Batasang Pambansa — evidently to
indigenize the nomenclature, which, incidentally should
have been done also with the Pangulo and Pangunang
Ministro), to be elected in May 1984, per Sec. 5(1) of the
same Article. Thus, to begin with, in the instant case, We
must keep in mind that at least for the present and until
1984, what can be properly discussed here are only the
legislative powers of the interim Batasang Pambansa as
such.
Without intending any reflection on any of those
responsible for the Idea, it may be that it is for non-
essential reasons that the current legislative assembly is
being referred to generally simply as the Batasang
Pambansa. For in legal truth and in actual fact, and as
expressly admitted by petitioner, it is inherently no more
no less than the same interim. Batasang Pambansa
created by Amendment No. 2 by virtue of the
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16-17, 1976. And, in
this connection, it may be observed that indubitably, and
as a necessary and logical consequence, the
amendment of Amendment No. 2 in 1981 carried with it
the corresponding appropriate adjustments literal and
otherwise of Amendment Nos. 3 and 4, although these
latter two were not specifically mentioned in the proposal
pursuant to BP-CA Resolution No. 4 of the Batasan,
acting as a constituent body nor in the Plebiscite
Referendum Act itself, much less in the ballots
presented to and used by the voters. This is because it
cannot be denied that Amendments 3 and 4 are by their
very nature inseparable parts of amendment No. 2.
But examining closely how the 1981 amendments
altered Amendment No. 2, it will be readily seen that the
only change consisted of the non-inclusion of the
"incumbent President" as member of the assembly in
pursuance of the fundamental objective to separate the
Presidency from the regular legislative body and thereby
establish in our country a modified form of parliamentary
government more appropriate for and suitable to the
peculiar conditions of our political development and the
idiosyncrasies of our people, and at the same time
introduce into it features that would strengthen its
structure so as to enable the government to cope with
emergencies or abnormal situations, not only like those
that presently exist but even those that might arise in the
future. Thus, it is characterized with a presidency more
powerful than the idea of a strong President desired by
President Quezon and actually embodied in the 1935
Constitution.
It is, therefore, evident that the reference to Amendment
No. 2 in the amendments of 1981 was not intended at all
to convert or upgrade the present existing assembly into
the regular Batasang Pambansa. To repeat, what we
have now is still the  interim Batasang Pambansa
created in 1976. Importantly, it must be said that had the
present Batasan, acting as a constituent body, ever
thought of making itself the regular National Assembly,
the very odious spectacle that the people rejected when
in the referendum of January 10-15, 1973 they repulsed
and repudiated theinterim National Assembly provided
for in Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1973 Constitution whereby the
members of the old Congress of the Philippines made
themselves automatically members of
the interim  assembly would have resuscitated, and we
can readily imagine how the reaction of our people
would have been exactly the same as in 1973 and for
sure the 1981 proposed constitutional amendment
affecting the Batasang would again have been denied
sanction by our people.
Having arrived at the ineludible that the present Batasan
is still interim, it also ineluctably follows that its legislative
authority cannot be more exclusive now after 1981
amendments than when it was originally created in 1976.
Thus even as the interim Batasan which came into being
"in lieu of the Interim National Assembly" by virtue of
Amendment No. 2 consequently acquired "the same
powers and its Members — the same functions,
responsibilities, rights and privileges, and
disqualifications as the regular National Assembly and
the members thereof", there can be no question that
coeval with the creation of the interim Batasan,
Amendment No. 6 came into force and effect. And
Amendment No. 6 mandates in unequivocal and
unambiguous terms the grant of concurrent legislative
authority to an official (the President [Prime Minister])
who is not in the Batasan itself.
In brief, the inexorable logic of the events that brought
forth the present Batasan leads to no other conclusion
than that the legislative authority vested in it by
Amendment No. 2, read together with Section 1, Article
XVII and Section 1, of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, is subject to the external concurrent
legislative prerogative that Amendment No. 6 vests on
the "President (Prime Minister)."
Actually, the insistence of petitioner that Amendment No.
6 has been repealed by the 1981 amendments springs
from another point of view. It is fundamentally based on
analysis and ratiocination related to the language and
tenor thereof. Petitioner maintains that said amendments
vested extraordinary legislative powers on "the President
(Prime Minister)" and on nobody else, and since there is
no one who is President (Prime Minister) under our
present governmental set-up pursuant to 1981
amendments, no one in the existing government can
exercise said powers.
The persuasive force of such theory is more apparent
than real. As We have said earlier, the Constitution is not
merely a literal document to be always read according to
the plain and ordinary signification of its words. Beneath
and beyond the literal terms of the Charter, like a mine of
incalculably immense treasures, are elements and
factors radiating from political and economic
developments of the situation prevailing at the time of
the inclusion of any particular provision thereof or
amendment thereto. It is only from the light of the
implications of such elements and factors that the real
essence and significance of the words of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny can be properly
and adequately seen and comprehended.
With reference to Amendment No. 6, it is of decisive
importance that anyone who would try to decipher its
true import should be acquainted with its ration d'tre, i.e.,
the whys and the wherefores thereof. Contrary to the
imputations of petitioner, this amendment is not rooted in
the authoritarian, much less dictatorial tendencies or
inclinations of anyone. Any tinge or tint of
authoritarianism in it is not there for the sake of the
Ideology of dictatorship or authoritarian itself. Such hue
of a one-man authoritarianism it somehow connotes is
there only because it is so dictated by paramount
considerations that are needed in order to safeguard the
very existence and integrity of the nation and all that it
stands for. Perhaps the truism—almost a dogma—well
recognized by constitutionalists and political scientists of
all persuasions as a convenient pragmatic rule for
survival of nations, namely, that in an emergency, the
best form of government is a dictatorship, might have
been in the mind of those who formulated it, but it is
quite obvious, as will be explained anon, that other
fundamental factors must have been taken into account
in order precisely to minimize the rigors and generally
feared oppressiveness of a dictatorship in an
unrestricted martial regime, its being dubbed as martial
law "Philippine style" notwithstanding.
Page 12 of 82
At this juncture, it must be emphatically made clear that
explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon
the "President (Prime Minister)" are to be exercised only
on two specified occasions, namely, (1) "when in (his
judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat
or imminence thereof" and (2) "whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
(now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to
act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action." The power is to
"issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction
which shall form part of the law of the land." As the tenor
of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be
exercised even when the Batasan is in session.
Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of
the other Powers which the Constitution directly confers
upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by
the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.
Indeed, it is but fitting and proper that in framing the
fundamental law of the land which sets up a form of
government and defines and delimits the powers thereof
and its officers, reserving as they must plenary
sovereignty to themselves, the people should prudently
provide what powers may and should be exercised by
the government and/or its officials in times of crises and
emergencies that could jeopardize the very life and/or
territorial integrity of the country. Even as individual
rights and liberties are valued and enshrined as
inviolable, the people, as they write their Charter thru a
convention or other legitimate means, cannot ignore that
in the event of war, insurrection, rebellion or invasion,
including any other critical situation, any one of which
cannot but affect the regular course of normal
constitutional processes and institutions as well as the
prerogatives and freedoms of individual citizens of and
inhabitants within the country, appropriate protective,
defensive and rehabilitative measures must be provided
therein and may be made to function or operate.
Accordingly, both in the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines and in that of 1973, the following provisions
were precisely intended to operate during such perilous
situations:
1. In times of war or other national emergency, the
Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang Pambansa,
such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. The
1935 version of this provision differs from it in that what
was granted to the President was not the broad authority
"to exercise such powers necessary and proper" but only
to issue rules and regulations purported to accomplish
the same objective.
2. Section 10(2) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution
provided thus:
... (2) The President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and, whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, when the
public safety requires it, he may
suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under the martial
law...
Under Section 12 of Article IX of the 1973 Constitution,
exactly the same powers were conferred on the Prime
Minister.
However, what is now Section 9 of Article VIII under the
1981 amendments transferred all said powers to the
President.
As can be seen, as authorized by the Commander-in-
Chief clause of all our Constitutions, there have been as
there still are three other measures that may be resorted
to during an emergency, namely:
(1) Call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, when public
safety requires it;
(2) Suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and
(3) Place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.
It appears, therefore, that within the four corners of the
Constitution itself, whether that of 1935 or that of 1973,
there were four constitutionally designed ways of coping
with abnormal situations in the country, namely: (1) the
so-called emergency powers delegated by the assembly
to the President; (2) the calling of the armed forces; (3)
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and (4) the placing of the country or any part
thereof under martial law. Understandably, it is to be
supposed that these measures are to be resorted to one
after the other according to the degree of gravity of the
situation.
A backward glance at our past experiences since the
implantation of American sovereignty in our country at
the turn of the century should remind us that at one time
or another all of these four measures have been
resorted to, albeit martial law proclamations in the long
past were limited in area and duration because of the
localized nature of the disturbances they were meant to
remedy.
Bearing all the foregoing considerations in mind, the
question that naturally arises at this juncture is what
need is there for the power contemplated in Amendment
No. 6? Why does the country have to have a one-man
legislating authority concurrent with the Batasang
Pambansa? Are the above-discussed safeguards not
enough?
At this point, it must be noted that Amendment No. 6
does not refer only to the interim Batasang Pambansa
but also to the regular "National Assembly" (now
Batasang Pambansa), a consideration which lends force
to the conclusion that the 1981 amendments could not
have been intended nor understood to do away with it.
What, indeed, is the fundamental ration d'tre of
Amendment No. 6?
It is to be recalled that the said amendment was
formulated in October 1976, more than fully four years
after the whole Philippines was first placed under martial
law pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21,
1972. True, without loss of time, President Marcos made
it clear that there was no military take-over of the
government, and that much less was there being
established a revolutionary government, even as he
declared that said martial law was of a double-barrelled
typed, unfamiliar to traditional constitutionalists and
political scientists — for two basic and transcendental
objectives were intended by it: (1) the quelling of
nationwide subversive activities characteristic not only of
a rebellion but of a state of war fanned by a foreign
power of a different Ideology from ours, and not
Page 13 of 82
excluding the stopping effectively of a brewing, if not a
strong separatist movement in Mindanao, and (2) the
establishment of a New Society by the institution of
disciplinary measures designed to eradicate the deep-
rooted causes of the rebellion and elevate the standards
of living education and culture of our people, and most of
an the social amelioration of the poor and
underprivileged in the farms and in the barrios, to the
end that hopefully insurgency may not rear its head in
this country again.
The immediate reaction of some sectors of the nation
was of astonishment and dismay, for even if everyone
knew that the gravity of the disorder, lawlessness, social
injustice, youth and student activism and other disturbing
movements had reached a point of peril, they felt that
martial law over the whole country was not yet
warranted. Worse, political motivations were ascribed to
be behind the proclamation, what with the then
constitutionally unextendible term of President Marcos
about to expire, and this suspicion became more
credible when opposition leaders and outspoken anti-
administration media people who did not hesitate to
resort even to libel were immediately placed under
indefinite detention in military camps and other unusual
restrictions were imposed on travel, communication,
freedom of speech and of the press, etc. In a word, the
martial law regime was anathema to no small portion of
the populace. Criticisms or objections thereto were, of
course, mostly covert, but there were even instances of
open resistance.
Truth to tell, martial law is generally unwelcome
anywhere in the world. And when it is prolonged without
anyone knowing when it would be lifted, the feeling of
discontent grows and spreads. Indeed, it is difficult to
describe fully in an opinion like this all that many
consider obnoxious in martial law. Suffice it to say that
the New Society that came out of it did have its laudatory
features appreciated by large segments of the people,
but with many cases of abuses of the military marring
such receptive attitude, the clamor for the early lifting of
martial law became more and more audible.
We can definitely say that no one more than President
Marcos was aware of those feelings and sentiments and,
in fact, even of the undercurrents of resistance. And as
We visualize the situation he found himself in, he was
faced with no less than a dilemma. He was convinced of
the advantages, not personally to him, but to general
welfare of martial law, but at the same time he was also
conscious that martial law, in any form — call it
Philippine style, smiling, benign or with any other
euphemistic adjective — was growing to be more and
more distasteful. Even the New Society it was supposed
to bring about was slowly losing its splendor. Backsliding
was creeping in some ways, discipline was loosening.
But over and above all such adverse developments, the
perils to national security and public order still remained,
if in a slightly lesser degree.
It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a
means of solving the dilemma aforementioned that the
concept embodied in Amendment No. 6 was born. In
brief, the central Idea that emerged was that martial law
may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our country and
people against any abrupt dangerous situation which
would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian
powers, the latter must be constitutionally allowed,
thereby to obviate the need to proclaim martial law and
its concomitants, principally the assertion by the military
of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the
civilian authorities below the President. In other words,
the problem was what may be needed for national
survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a
crisis or an emergency should be reconciled with the
popular mentality and attitude of the people against
martial law.
We have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-
in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To
reiterate, they are: (a) emergency powers expressly
delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the armed forces,
who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks; (c)
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike
martial law most and would, if possible, do away with it
in the Constitution. And the President who first
conceived of what is now Amendment No. 6 knew this.
Thus, Our understanding of the development of events
and attitudes that led to the adoption of Amendment No.
6 is that in addition to the four measures authorized in
the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to
be a fifth one purportedly designed to make it practically
unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances
of actual surface warfare or rebellious activities or very
sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be
adequately met without martial law itself. Very evidently,
the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines
be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest
extreme situations should ever demand it.
To recapitulate, the amendments of October 1976 were
deliberately designed against martial law. The creation
thereby of the  interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of
the interim  National Assembly which never came into
being because of vehement and justified popular
repudiation thereof was definitely an indispensable step
towards the lifting of martial law. Everyone can
understand that martial law could not be lifted without a
legislative body to make the laws. The legislative
authority could not be left in the hands of the President
(Prime Minister). It would have been anachronistic to lift
martial law and still leave the law-making authority with
the President (Prime Minister) alone.
Relatedly but more importantly, the vesting of the
legislative authority to the  interim Batasang Pambansa,
without more or exclusively, would have maintained the
safeguards of national security only to the four traditional
constitutional measures repeatedly discussed above,
including martial law. The framers of the amendment
realized only too well they had to look for a remedy
thereto, the dislike of the people, justified or not, of
martial law. And so, to make the proclamation of martial
law remotest, but nevertheless enable the government to
meet emergencies effectively, they conceived the Idea of
granting to the President (Prime Minister) the power
endowed to him by Amendment No. 6.
Skeptics and hardcore critics of the administration there
must be who would sarcastically allude to Amendment
No. 6 as martial law just the same but only like a dog
with merely another collar. A word of explanation is thus
called for of the vital differences between one and the
other.
The attitude of those who are opposed to Amendment
No. 6 must be due to lack of sufficient acquaintance with
the real essence of the various constitutionally
authorized emergency measures imperatively needed to
safeguard the national security and integrity already
discussed above. The delegation of legislative power
thru the issuance of rules and regulations to carry out a
national policy declared by the Batasan has its own
virtues as a restrained way of conferring law-making
authority to the Executive during an emergency. It is
limited, restricted, subject to conditions and temporary. It
is obviously the simplest remedy to cope with an
abnormal situation resulting in the least violence to
revered democratic republican processes constitutionally
established.
Page 14 of 82
But being purely a political and legislative remedy, it
cannot be adequate when lawless violence becomes
generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the
need to call out the armed forces. And when such
situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the
preventive incarceration or detention of certain leaders
or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Should matters really go out of hand even after the
putting into effect of the measures aforementioned,
under the constitution. without Amendment No. 6, the
only recourse would be to proclaim martial law. But
inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure that
carries with it repressive and restrictive elements
unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded
sectors of the country, it is but natural to think of it only
as a very last resort.
Well, it is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the
proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was
conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos himself,
martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion
and an active and direct role in the government by the
military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that
such undesirable features of martial law do not have to
accompany the exercise of the power thereby conferred
on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the
armed forces and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial
law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the
President acts by virtue of such power. It is, therefore,
evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that
Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than disguised
martial law.
Apparently conceding, at least in gratia argumenti, the
truth and the logic of all the foregoing discussion and
conclusions, petitioner raises the question of how can
Amendment No. 6 fit into the new set up under the 1981
amendments, which abolished the dual position of
President Marcos of President-Prime Minister mandated
by the 1976 Amendment No. 3. According to petitioner,
President Marcos is President now (no longer President-
Prime Minister) pursuant to the 1981 amendments and
by virtue of his election as such as proclaimed by the
Batasan on June 21, 1981. Not without a bit of sarcasm,
petitioner even refers to the reference to the status of
our government after the inauguration of President
Marcos as the Fourth Republic. How then, petitioner
asks, can the President of the Fourth Philippine Republic
exercise powers granted to the President-Prime Minister
of the provisional government established by the
Transitory Provisions and conferred upon him only by
Amendment No. 6 of October 1976?
If We go solely by the rules of literature, a considerable
degree of plausibility, as We have intimated earlier in
this opinion, may be conceded to the pose of petitioner.
It indeed seems that since the positions of President and
Prime Minister have been separated by the 1981
amendments and the same do not state to whom the
power under Amendment No. 6 would appertain, neither
the present President nor the present Prime Minister can
exercise such power. But again, We hold that petitioner
is laboring under a misconception of facts and of the
principles of constitutional construction.
Earlier hereinabove, We discoursed on the inevitability of
the conclusion that the current Batasan, being
merelyinterim  "in lieu of the interim National Assembly"
established under Section 1 of the Transitory Provisions,
it is subject to the provisions of Amendment No. 6 which
was approved and ratified together with the creation of
the Batasan. We have also made a rather extensive
exposition of the whys and wherefores behind
Amendment No. 6. As may be noted, the ultimate thrust
of Our discussion is to establish as a legal proposition
that behind and beneath the words of the amendment,
the literal reference to "the President (Prime Minister)" in
Amendment No. 6 was the intention to make such
reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested
the totality of the executive power under the system of
government established thereby. For as a matter of
general principle in constitutional law, belonging as he
does to the political department of the government, it is
only with such official that, the high prerogative of policy
determination can be shared. And in this connection, it is
very important to note that the amendment does not
speak of the "incumbent President" only, as in the other
amendments, like Nos. 1, 3 and 5, but of the President,
meaning to include all future presidents. More,
Amendment No. 6 makes mention not only of
the interim Batasan but also of the regular one. All these
unmistakably imply that the power conferred upon the
President thereby was not for President Marcos alone
but for whoever might be President of the Philippines in
the future.
As to the parenthetical mention therein of the Prime
Minister, We are of the considered view that it was
necessary to do so because under the governmental
system then, which was markedly Prime Ministerial, the
substantive executive powers were vested in the Prime
Minister, the President being merely the symbolical and
ceremonial head of state, and the two positions were
being held by one and the same person. In other words,
the power was contemplated to be conferred upon
whomsoever was vested the executive power, and that
is as it should be, for, to reiterate, from the very nature of
the power itself, the authority to legislate should be
allowed, if at all, to be shared only with one in the
political department, directly deriving power from the
vote of the people.
Withal, as the Solicitor General aptly posits, it is neither
sound nor in consonance with well and long settled
principles of constitutional construction to recognize
amendments or repeals of constitutional provisions by
implications, specially in regard to a transcendental
matter as that herein under discussion. Indeed, the fact
that Amendment No. 6 was not in any way or sense
mentioned in the amendments submitted to the people
for ratification in 1981 and there being nothing in the
latter intrinsically inconsistent with the former, it is safe to
conclude that it would be deceiving the people
themselves and depriving them of something they had
decided in 1976 to be part of the fundamental law of the
land to now eliminate the power conferred by them upon
the Executive of sharing legislative authority with the
Batasan on appropriate occasions of emergency and
urgency.
Anent petitioner's claim that the President may not
constitutionally grant the amnesty provided for in P.D.
1840, to Our mind, the following well taken brief answer
of the Solicitor General, with whom We fully agree, is
more than sufficient to dispose of the same adversely to
petitioner's stance:
Petitioner argues that Presidential
Decree 1840 is likewise invalid for it did
not enjoy the concurrence of the
Batasan. He relies on Article VII,
Section 11 of the Constitution which
provides that —
The President may,
except in cases of
impeachment, grant
reprieves,
commutations and
pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures and with the
Page 15 of 82
concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa,
grant amnesty.
Again, we beg to disagree. Article VII,
sec. 11, applies only when the President
is exercising his power of executive
clemency. In the case at bar,
Presidential Decree 1840 was issued
pursuant to his power to legislate under
Amendment No. 6. It ought to be
indubitable that when the President acts
as legislator as in the case at bar, he
does not need the concurrence of the
Batasan. Rather, he exercises
concurrent authority vested by the
Constitution.
We cannot close this opinion without underscoring the
patent tendency and unrelenting effort of the leadership
of the country to make our government and our way of
life indigenously Filipino as much as it is possible to
make them so. It has, of course, tried its utmost to see
what is good in other lands, but it has chosen generally
to bring out what is best in our own traditions, usages,
customs and systems that have proven efficacious and
beneficial during the times of our forebears. The
sanggunians and barangays, which have inherited from
the Filipinos of the past and that have been
institutionalized in Constitutional Amendment No. 7 of
1976 have, as everyone can see, proven to be
unshakable bedrocks for the foundation of duly
constituted governmental authority with firm nationwide
mass base. Our present government, if in some ways
similar to any foreign one, is in truth a product of our own
genius in political science and matters of government.
Nowhere else in the world but in the Philippines are
martial law decrees and acts subject to the judicial
scrutiny of the Supreme Court. Amendment No. 6 is of
the same strain. It is our native and indigenous way of
coping with crucial situations.
We are Filipinos, so much so that the writer of this
opinion has purposely avoided reference to, much less
lifted quotations from alien jurisprudence and authorities.
If only in this particular case, it is but appropriate to use
language and style of our own.
All the above premises taken into account. Our
considered conclusion and judgment is that Amendment
No. 6 of October 1976 of the Constitution of 1973 has
not been in anyway altered or modified, much less
repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at
bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the
First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC,
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground
that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the
Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F.
Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously
opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. We gave
due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it
involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria,
the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,
and reapportionment. Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to
reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and
total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts.1
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the
inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
meetings with the incumbent representatives of the
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of province and other interested parties. On December 29,
Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among
Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Tabontabon, and Tunga. Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the
Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The
The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of composition of the First District which includes the
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth
Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, District were not disturbed. After the movement of
Tabango, and Villaba. municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the districts appeared as follows:
municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, First District: Population
Merida, and Palompon. Registered
The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Voters
Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, (1990) (1994)
Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom. 1. Tacloban City, 137,190
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its 81,679
sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.7 3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities 5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, 6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and 7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
Naval and all the territories comprised therein." 8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took ———— ————
effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Biliran became a regular province. It provides: Second District:
Existing sub-provinces Population Registered
are hereby converted Voters
into regular provinces (1990) (1994)
upon approval by a 1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
majority of the votes 2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
cast in a plebiscite to be 3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
held in the sub- 4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
provinces and the 5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
original provinces 6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
directly affected. The 7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
plebiscite shall be 8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
conducted by the 9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
COMELEC 10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
simultaneously with the 11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
national elections 12. Tabontabon, and 7,183
following the effectivity 4,419
of this code. The new 13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
legislative districts ———— ————
created as a result of TOTAL 272,167 156,462
such conversion shall
continue to be Third District:
represented in Population Registered
Congress by the duly- Voters
elected representatives (1990) (1994)
of the original districts 1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
out of which said new 2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
provinces or districts 3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
were created until their 4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
own representatives 5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
shall have been elected 6. Capoocan, and 23,687
in the next regular 13,595
congressional elections 7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
and qualified. ———— ————
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was TOTAL 214,499 125,763
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite Fourth District:
held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the Population Registered
conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District

Page 16 of 82
 Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474
———— ————
TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District: Population
Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247
———— ————
TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration
calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among
others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and
voters between the First and Second Districts. He
alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered
voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered
voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To
diminish the difference, he proposed that the
municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be
transferred from the First to the Second District. The
motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that:
(1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least
disruption of the territorial composition of each district;
and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional
requirement that each legislative district shall comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of
Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of
representation ordained in the Constitution.
Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that respondent
COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as
much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's." The
Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the
views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however,
opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736;
and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in
accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC
filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue,
our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional power of
the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another legislative district
in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent
COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election
laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c),
Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent
COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the
source of its  power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. The
Page 17 of 82
Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in
Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area."
Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of
Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of
the Philippines under the Constitution
proposed by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and subsequent elections,
and until otherwise provided by law, the
Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is
hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment
herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter
be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to
at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants
and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI
of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because
Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, abolished the Batasang
Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution.12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a
distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal
that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve
several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first
congressional elections under the 1987 Constitution.
Among the vital issues were: whether the members of
the House of Representatives would be elected by
district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how  the
apportionment should be made.14Commissioner Davide,
Jr. offered three (3) options for the Commission to
consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the
apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to
make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission
exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the
options were discussed by Commissioners Davide,
Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the
debates in extenso, viz.:16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very
simple motion by way of amendment by
substitution and this was, I believe, a
prior or a proposed amendment. Also,
the chairman of the Committee on the
Legislative said that he was proposing a
vote first by the Chamber on the
concept of whether the election is by
province and cities on the one hand, or
by legislative districts on the other. So I
propose this simple formulation which
reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE
APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman
will accept the proposed amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or
less, the same insofar as the
apportionment is concerned, but the
Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would
also provide for a mandate for the
apportionment later, meaning after the
first election, which will in effect embody
what the Commission had approved,
reading as follows: "Within three years
following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request
for a suspension of the session, so that
all the proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a
compromise, I wonder if the
Commission will allow this. We will just
delete the proposed subparagraph (4)
and all the capitalized words in
paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5),
what would be left would only be the
following: "Within three years following
the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance
appended to the new Constitution
indicating specifically the following:
"FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION
OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE
1986 CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT
Page 18 of 82
ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE
PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE
ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG
THE PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS
FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation
of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to
the provinces and to the cities, without
indicating the municipalities comprising
each of the districts. Then, under
Section 2, we will mandate the
COMELEC to make the actual
apportionment on the basis of the
number of seats provided for and
allocated to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the
provision which will give mandate to
COMELEC to do the redistricting.
Redistricting is vitally linked to the
baneful practices of cutting up areas or
spheres of influence; in other words,
gerrymandering. This Commission,
being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical
deliberative body, is in the best possible
situation under the circumstances to
undertake that responsibility. We are not
wanting in expertise and in time
because in the first place, the
Committee on the Legislative has
prepared the report on the basis of the
recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the
position taken by Commissioner Aquino
in this respect. We know that the
reapportionment of provinces and cities
for the purpose of redistricting is
generally inherent in the constituent
power or in the legislative power. And I
would feel very uncertain about
delegating this to a quasi-judicial body
even if it is one of the constitutional
offices created under this Constitution.
We have the assurance of
Commissioner Davide, as chairman of
the Committee on the Legislative, that
even given the very short time
remaining in the life of this Commission,
there is no reason why we cannot
complete the work of reapportionment
on the basis of the COMELEC plan
which the committee has already
thoroughly studied and which remains
available to the Constitutional
Commission.
So, I support the position taken by
Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding
Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most
reasonable, and the most workable
approach that is available to this
Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
What does Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether
this body will make the apportionment
itself or whether we will leave it to the
COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore,
a prejudicial question for the body to
decide. I would propose that the
Commission should now decide what
body should make the apportionment.
Should it be the Commission or should it
be the COMELEC? And the Committee
on the Legislative will act accordingly on
the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I
would like to inform the body that I
believe the Committee on the
Legislative has precisely worked on this
matter and they are ready with a list of
apportionment. They have, in fact,
apportioned the whole country into
various districts based on the
recommendation of the COMELEC. So
they are ready with the list and if this
body would wish to apportion the whole
country by district itself, then I believe
we have the time to do it because the
Committee on the Legislative is ready
with that particular report which need
only to be appended to the Constitution.
So if this body is ready to accept the
work of the Committee on the
Legislative we would have no problem. I
just would like to give that information so
that the people here would be guided
accordingly when they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir)
Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask
Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Davide may yield if he so
desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment
which we are considering apply only to
the first election after the enactment of
the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the
Padilla proposal, it will be for the first
election; on the basis of the Sarmiento
proposal, it will only apply to the first
election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that,
Congress will have the power to
reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to
the Constitution — the reapportionment
based on the COMELEC study and
between the approval of the Constitution
and the first election — the COMELEC
Page 19 of 82
no longer has the power to change that
even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir)
Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a
clarificatory question to Commissioner
Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the
Commissioner's proposed
apportionment and considering the fact
that there will be a corresponding
reduction to 183 seats, would there be
instances representation of under non-
representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding
Officer. I can assure the Commission
that there will be no case of inequitable
distribution. It will come out to be one for
every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be
within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation
is that there was a motion by
Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate
COMELEC to do the redistricting. This
was also almost the same motion by
Commissioner Padilla and I think we
have had some kind of meeting of
minds. On the other hand, there seems
to be a prejudicial question, an
amendment to the amendment as
suggested by Commissioner Aquino,
that instead of the COMELEC, it should
be this Commission that shall make the
redistricting. So may I ask
Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on
that idea, to please formulate it into a
motion so we can vote on that first as an
amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is
recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this
Commission to undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts
instead of the proposal that COMELEC
be given the mandate to undertake the
responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified,
Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or
the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the
approval of this proposed amendment
which we substitute for paragraphs 4
and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it
should be treated merely as a motion to
be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4
because that should not really appear
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to
as a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise,
the
it will appear very ugly in the
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2
Constitution where we mandate a
of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
Commission that will become functus
make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein
officio  to have the authority. As a matter
made." The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments
of fact, we cannot exercise that authority
was again clarified in the debates 17 of the
until after the ratification of the new
Commission, viz.:
Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
What does Commissioner Sarmiento
say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr.
Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the
approval of this proposed amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-
thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt
that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the
motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir)
The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this
Commission do the reapportionment
legislative districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
What is the pleasure of Commissioner
Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again
on the motion. Is Commissioner
Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my
motion? Would it not be right for him to
move that the COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the
amendment. It is already the
Commission that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has
accepted the amendment the
amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this
Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise
their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)
Page 20 of 82
As many as are against, please raise
their hand. (No Member raised his
hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and
none against; the motion is approved.
COMELEC the major power of legislative
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just
clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In
Section 2, the Commission on Elections
is empowered to make minor
adjustments on the apportionment made
here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any
time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time
limit unless during the period of
amendments a proposal is made. The
authority conferred would be on minor
corrections or amendments, meaning to
say, for instance, that we may have
forgotten an intervening municipality in
the enumeration, which ought to be
included in one district. That we shall
consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the
meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be
possible that one municipality in a
district be transferred to another district
and call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done,
Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning,
that there should be no change in the
allocations per district. However, it may
happen that we have forgotten a
municipality in between which is still in
the territory of one assigned district, or
there may be an error in the correct
name of a particular
municipality because of changes made
by the interim Batasang Pambansa and
the Regular Batasang Pambansa. There
were many batas pambansa enacted by
both the interim and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa changing the
names of municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor
adjustment may be made only if one of
the municipalities is not mentioned in
the ordinance appended to, and it will be
up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to
put such municipality to a certain district.
 MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer. For instance, we may not have
the data regarding a division of a
municipality by the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the Regular Batasang
Pambansa into two municipalities,
meaning, a mother municipality and the
new municipality, but still actually these
are within the geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor
adjustment which the COMELEC cannot
do is that, if, for example, my
municipality is in the First District of
Laguna, they cannot put that in any
other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor
correction.  It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also
give the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the
respondent COMELEC is to adjust  the number
of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created. . .
."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth
District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-
province to a regular province brought about an
imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in
the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte.
This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue
a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at
this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case
at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a
problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and
petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4),
Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives
Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three
(3) years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section."
In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the validity of a
legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But
while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by
directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736
insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of
the province of Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-543             August 31, 1946
Page 21 of 82
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners, 
vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Vicente J. Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for
respondents.
J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus
curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article
X), the Commission on elections submitted, last May, to
the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its
report on the national elections held the preceding
month, and, among other things, stated that, by reason
of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and
Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will.
When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it
proceeded with the selection of its officers. Thereafter, in
the course of the session, a resolution was approved
referring to the report and ordering that, pending the
termination of the protest lodged against their election,
the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and
Jose E. Romero — who had been included among the
sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest
number of votes, proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections — shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members
of the chamber.
Pertinent parts of the resolution — called Pendatun —
are these:
WHEREAS the Commission on Elections,
charged under the Constitution with the duty of
insuring free, orderly, and honest elections in the
Philippines, reported to the President of the
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that
". . . Reports also reached this
Commission to the effect that in the
Provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy of
the ballot was actually violated; the
armed bands saw to it that their
candidates were voted for; and that the
great majority of the voters, thus
coerced or intimadated, suffered from a
paralysis of judgement in the matter of
exercising the right of suffrage;
considering all those acts of terrorism,
violence and intimidation in connection
with elections which are more or less
general in the Provinces of Pampanga,
Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this
Commission believes that the election in
the provinces aforesaid did not reflect
the true and free expression of the
popular will. It should be stated,
however, that the Commission is without
jurisdiction, to determine whether or not
the votes cast in the said provinces
which, according to these reports have
been cast under the influence of threats
or violence, are valid or invalid. . . ."
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon.
Vicente de Vera, member of the Commission on
Elections, says among other things, that "we
know that as a result of this chaotic condition,
many residents of the four provinces have
voluntarily banished themselves from their home
towns in order not to be subjected to the
prevailing oppression and to avoid being
 victimized or losing their lives"; and that after the
election dead bodies had been found with notes
attached to their necks, reading, "Bomoto kami
kay Roxas" (we voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS the same Judge De Vera says in his
minority report that in the four Provinces of
Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija,
the worst terrorism reigned during and after the
election, and that if the elections held in the
aforesaid provinces were annulled as demanded
by the circumstances mentioned in the report of
the Commission, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno,
and Jose Romero, would not and could not have
been declared elected;
xxx     xxx     xxx
WHEREAS the terrorism resorted to by the
lawless elements in the four provinces
mentioned above in order to insure the election
of the candidates of the Conservative wing of
the Nationalist Party is of public knowledge and
that such terrorism continues to this day; that
before the elections Jose O. Vera himself
declared as campaign Manager of the Osmeña
faction that he was sorry if Presidential
Candidate Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign
in the Huk provinces because his life would be
endangered; and that because of the constant
murders of his candidates and leaders,
Presidential Candidate Roxas found it necessary
to appeal to American High Commissioner Paul
V. McNutt for protection, which appeal American
High Commissioner personallyreferred to
President Sergio Osme_¤_a for appropriate
action, and the Presidentin turn ordered the
Secretary of the existence and reign of such
terrorism;
WHEREAS the Philippines, a Republic State,
embracing the principles ofdemocracy, must
condem all acts that seek to defeat the popular
will;
WHEREAS it is essential, in order to maintain
alive the respect fordemocratic institutions
among our people, that no man or group of men
be permitted to profit from the results of an
election held under coercion, in violation of law,
and contrary to the principle of freedom of
choice which should underlie all elections under
the Constitution;
WHEREAS protests against the election of Jose
O. Vega, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero,
have been filed with the electoral Tribunal of the
Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the
findings of the Commission on Elections above
quoted;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the
Senate of the Philippines in session assembled,
as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose Romero, pending the hearing
and decision on the protests lodged against their
elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the
report of the Commission on Elections and in the
report of the Provost Marshal constitutes the
ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their
colleagues responsible for the resolution. They pray for
an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to
permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise their
senatorial prerogatives.
Page 22 of 82
In their pleadings, respondents traverse the jurisdiction
of this court, and assert the validity of the Pendatun
Resolution.
The issues, few and clear-cut, were thoroughly
discussed at the extended oral argument and in
comprehensive memoranda submitted by both sides.
A.—NO JURISDICTION
Way back in 1924, Senator Jose Alejandrino assaulted a
fellow-member in the Philippine Senate. That body, after
investigation, adopted a resolution, suspending him from
office for one year. He applied here for mandamus and
injunction to nullify the suspension and to require his
colleagues to reinstate him. This court believed the
suspension was legally wrong, because, as senator
appointed by the Governor-General, he could not be
disciplined by the Philippine Senate; but it denied the
prayer for relief, mainly upon the theory of the separation
of the three powers, Executive, Legislative and Judicial.
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 81.) Said the decision:
. . . Mandamus  will not lie against the legislative
body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertain to their
legislative functions and over which they have
exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate
action in this respect without a gross usurpation
of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to
issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
(Code of civil Procedure, section 222, 515; 18
R.C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146
Cal; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex
parte  Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs.
Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House
of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235;
Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt
[1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Crammer vs.
Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., ex rel. Bruce vs.
Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La
Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1;
Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.) (Supra,
pp. 88, 89.)
. . . Under our form of government the judicial
department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to
that department by the constitution. (Supra, p.
93)
No court has ever held and we apprehend no
court will ever hold that it possesses the power
to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature
or a branch thereof to take any particular action.
If a court should ever be so rash as to thus
trench on the domain of either of the other
departments, it will be the end of popular
government as we know it in democracies.
(Supra, p. 94.)
Conceding therefore that the power of the
Senate to punish its members for disorderly
behavior does not authorize it to suspend an
appointive member from the exercise of his
office for one year, conceding what has been so
well stated by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the
writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-
conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does
not possess the power of coercion to make the
 Philippine Senate take any particular action. . . .
(Supra, p. 97.)
The same hands-off policy had been previously followed
in Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board
of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366) and Abueva vs.
Wood (45 Phil., 612)
At this point we could pretend to erudition by tracing the
origin, development and various applications of theory of
separation of powers, transcribing herein whole
paragraphs from adjudicated cases to swell the pages of
judicial output. Yet the temptation must be resisted, and
the parties spared a stiff dose of juris prudential lore
about a principle, which, after all, is the first fundamental
imparted to every student of Constitutional Law.
Not that a passable excuse would be lacking for such a
dissertation. The advent of the Republic, and the
consequent finality of our views on constitutional issues,
may call for a definition of concepts and attitudes. But
surely, there will be time enough, as cases come up for
adjudication.
Returning to the instant litigation, it presents no more
than the questions, whether the Alejandro doctrine still
obtains, and whether the admitted facts disclose any
features justifying departure therefrom.
When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in
1935, the existence of three coordinate, co-equal and
co-important branches of the government was ratified
and confirmed. That Organic Act contained some
innovations which established additional exceptions to
the well-known separation of powers; for instance, the
creation of the Electoral Tribunal wherein Justices of the
Supreme Court participate in the decision of
congressional election protests, the grant of rule-making
power to the Supreme Court, etc.; but in the main, the
independence of one power from the other was
maintained. And the Convention — composed mostly of
lawyers (143 out of a total of 202 members), fully
acquainted with the Abueva, Alejandrino and Severino
precedents — did not choose to modify their
constitutional doctrine, even as it altered some
fundamental tenets theretofore well established.1
However, it is alleged that, in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil., 139), modified the aforesaid
ruling. We do not agree. There is no pronouncement in
the latter decision, making specific reference to the
Alejandrino incident regarding our power — or lack of it
— to interfere with the functions of the Senate. And three
years later, in 1939, the same Justice Laurel, who had
penned it, cited Alejandrino vs. Quezon as a binding
authority of the separation of powers. (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil., 62.) It must be stressed that, in the Angara
controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant
before the court, and whatever obiter dicta, or general
expressions, may therein found can not change the
ultimate circumstance that no directive was issued
against a branch of the Legislature or any member
thereof.2 This Court, in that case, did not require the
National Assembly or any assemblyman to do any
particular act. It only found it "has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission." (Supra, 63 Phil., 161.)
That this court in the Angara litigation made
declarations, nullifying a resolution of the National
Assembly, is not decisive. In proper cases this court may
annul any Legislative enactment that fails to observe the
constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to
the judiciary since Chief Justice Marshall penned
Marbury vs. Madison in 1803. Its foundation is explained
by Justice Sutherland in the Minimum Wage Case (261
U. S., 544).Said the Court:
Page 23 of 82
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the
supreme law of the land, emanating from the
people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty
under our form of government. A congressional
statute, on the other hand, is the act of an
agency of this sovereign authority, and if it
conflicts with the Constitution, must fall; for that
which is not supreme must yield to that which is.
To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain
exercise of the judicial power, — that power
vested in courts to enable them to administer
justice according to law. From the authority to
ascertain and determine the law in a given case
there necessa ruly results, in case of conflict, the
duty to declare and enforce the rule of the
supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of
legislation which, transcending the Constitution,
is no effect, and binding on no one. This is not
the exercise of a substantive power to review
and nullify acts of Congress, for such no
substantive power exists. It is simply a
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
dispose of a case or controversy properly before
the court, to the determination of which must be
brought the test and measure of the law.
And the power is now expressly recognized by our
Organic Act. (See  sections 2 and 10. Article VIII.)
But we must emphasize, the power is to be exercised
in  proper cases, with the appropriate parties.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief
executive performed within the limits of his
jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in
such cases. The rule is non-interference. But
from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an
inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when these are properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding. . . . In the present
case, the President is not a party to the
proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
restrained to actin a particular way. . . . This
court, therefore, has jurisdiction  over the instant
proceedings and will accordingly proceed to
determine the merits of the present controversy."
(Planas vs. Gil., 67 Phil., 62, 73, 74, 76.)
(Emphasis ours.) (See also Lopez vs. De los
Reyes, 55 Phil., 170.)
More about the Angara precedent: The defendant there
was only the Electoral Commission which was "not a
separate department of the Government" (Vol. 63,p.
160), and exercised powers "judicial in nature." (Supra,
p. 184) Hence, against our authority, there was no
objection based on the independence and separation of
the three co-equal departments  of Government.
Besides, this court said no more than that, there being a
conflict of  jurisdiction between two constitutional bodies,
it could not decline to take cognizance of the controversy
to determine the "character, scope and extent" of their
respective constitutional spheres of action. Here, there is
actually no antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of
the Senate and the Senate itself, for it is not suggested
has adopted a rule contradicting the Pendatun
Resolution. Consequently, there is no occasion for our
intervention. Such conflict of jurisdiction, plus the
participation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are
essential ingredients to make the facts of this case fit the
mold of the Angara doctrine.
Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino
case, may this petition be entertained? The answer must
naturally be in the negative. Granting that the
postponement of the administration of the oath amounts
to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and
conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the
power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as
the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil.,
83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained
in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch
of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do
so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to
upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely
woven into our institutional setup.
Adherence to established principle should generally be
our guiding criterion, if we are to escape the criticism
voiced once by Bryce in American Commonwealth thus:
The Supreme Court has changed its color i. e.,
its temper and tendencies, from time to time
according to the political proclivities of the men
who composed it. . . . Their action flowed
naturally from the habits of thought they had
formed before their accession to the bench and
from the sympathy they could not feel for the
doctrine on whose behalf they had contended.
(The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50.)
Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case
should, according to the rules, be enforceable by
contempt proceedings. If the respondents should
disobey our order, can we punish them for contempt? If
we do, are we not thereby destroying the independence,
and the equal importance to which legislative bodies are
entitled under the Constitution?
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every
wrong there is are medy, and that the judiciary should
stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many
wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance,
those involving  political questions. Numerous decisions
are quoted and summarized under this heading in 16
Corpus Juris Secundum, section 145.
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that
the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political
and social ills. We should not forget that the Constitution
had judiciously allocated the powers of government to
three distinct and separate compartments; and that
judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of
the dependence of the three, and a zealous regard of
the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not
the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-
doing, each may be brought to account, either by
impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.
The extreme case has been described wherein a
legislative chamber, without any reason whatsoever,
decrees by resolution the incarceration, for years, of a
citizen. And the rhetorical question is confidently
formulated. Will this man be denied relief by the courts?
Of course not: He may successfully apply for habeas
corpus, alleging the nullity of the resolution and claiming
for release. But then, the defendant shall be the officer
or person, holding him in custody, and the question
therein will be the validity or invalidity of resolution. That
was done in Lopez vs. De los Reyes, supra. (See
also Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168; 26 Law. ed.,
377, p. 391.) Courts will interfere, because the question
is not a political one, the "liberty of citizen" being
involved (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra) and the act will
clearly beyond the bounds of the legislative power,
amounting to usurpation of the privileges of the courts,
the usurpation being clear, palpable and oppressive and
the infringement of the Constitution truly real. (See  16
C.J.S., p. 44.)
Nevertheless, suppose for the moment that we have
jurisdiction:
Page 24 of 82
B.—PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law,
prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, exercising
functions  judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2,
Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise
such kind of functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear
the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special
remedy.
C.—SENATE HAS NOT EXCEEDED POWERS
Again let us suppose the question lies within the limits of
prohibition and of our jurisdiction.
Before the organization of the Commonwealth and the
promulgation of the Constitution, each House of the
Philippine Legislature exercised the power to defer oath-
taking of any member against whom a protest had been
lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension was
necessary, before the final decision of the contest. The
cases of Senator Fuentebella and Representative Rafols
are known instances of such suspension. The
discussions in the constitutional Convention showed that
instead of transferring to the Electoral Commission all
the  powers of the House or Senate as "the sole judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly," it was given only jurisdiction
over "all contests" relating to the election, etc. (Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p.
271.) The proceedings in the Constitutional Convention
on this subject are illuminating:
It became gradually apparent in the course of
the debates that the Convention was evenly
divided on the proposition of creating the
Electoral Commission with the membership and
powers set forth in the draft. It was growing
evident, too, that the opposition to the Electoral
Commission was due to rather inclusive power
of that body to judge not only of cases
contesting the election of the members of the
National Assembly, but also of their elections,
returns, and qualifications.
Many of the delegates wanted to be definitely informed
of the scope of the powers of the Electoral Commission
as defined in the draft before determining their final
decision; for if the draft meant to confer upon the
Electoral Commission the inclusive power to pass upon
the elections, returns, and qualifications — contested or
not — of the members of the National Assembly, they
were more inclined to vote against the Electoral
Commission. In an attempt to seek this clarification, the
following interpretations took place:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Delegate Labrador.—Does not the gentleman
from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the assembly, the assembly on its
own motion does not have the right to contest
the election and qualification of its members?
Delegate Roxas.—I have no doubt that the
gentleman is right. If this right is retained, as it
is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that
a member has not the qualifications provided by
law, they cannot remove him from that reason.
xxx     xxx     xxx
In the course of the heated debates, with the
growing restlessness on the part of the
Convention, President Recto suspended the
session in order to find out if it was possible to
arrive at a compromise plan to meet the
objection.
When the session was resumed, a compromise
plan was submitted in the form of an
amendment presented by Delegates Francisco,
Ventura, Lim, Vinzons, Rafols, Mumar, and
others, limiting the power of the Electoral
Commission to the judging of all cases
contesting elections, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
Explaining the difference between the
amendment thus proposed and the provision of
the draft, Delegate Roxas, upon the request of
President Recto, said:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in
obviating the objection pointed out by various
delegates to the effect that the first clause of the
draft which states "The election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly" seems to give to the Electoral
commission the power to determine also the
election of the members who have not been
protested. And in order to obviate that difficulty,
we believe that the amendment is right in that
sense . . . that is, if we amend the draft so that it
should read as follows: "All cases contesting the
election, etc.", so that the judges of the Electoral
Commission will limit themselves only to cases
in which there has been a protest against the
returns.
The limitation to the powers of the Electoral
Commission proposed in the compromise
amendment did much to win in favor of the
Electoral Commission many of its opponents; so
that when the amendment presented by
Delegate Labrador and others to retain in the
Constitution the power of the lawmaking body to
be the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members was put to a
nominal vote, it was defeated by 98 negative
votes against 56 affirmative votes.
With the defeat of the Labrador amendment, the
provision of the draft creating the Electoral
Commission, as modified by the compromise
amendment, was consequently approved.
"All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an electoral
commission, composed of three members
elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices."
In the special committee on style, the provision
was amended so that the Chairman of the
Commission should be the senior Justice in the
Commission, and so that the Commission
was to be the sole judge of the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. As it was then amended, the
provision read:
"There shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices
of the Supreme court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three
of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall
Page 25 of 82
be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications
of the Members of the National
Assembly."
The report of the special committee on style on
the power of the Commission was opposed on
the floor of the Convention by Delegate
Confesor, who insisted that the Electoral
Commission should limit itself to judging only of
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. The draft was amended accordingly
by the Convention.
As it was finally adopted by the Convention, the
provision read:
There shall be an Electoral Commission . . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of
all contests  relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly. (Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 267, 269, 270,
271 and 272.).
Delegate Roxas rightly opined that "if this draft is
retained" the Assembly would have no power over
election and qualifications of its members; because all
the powers are by the draft vested in the Commission.
The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the
latter's authority to "contests" relating to the election, etc.
altered the draft. The Convention did not intend to give
it all the functions of the Assembly on the subject of
election and qualifications of its members. The
distinction is not without a difference. "As used in
constitutional provisions", election contest "relates only
to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not
only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself
inducted into the office."(Laurel on Elections, Second
Edition, p. 250; 20 C.J., 58.)
One concrete example will serve to illustrate the
remaining power in either House of Congress: A man is
elected by a congressional district who had previously
served ten years in Bilibid Prison for estafa. As he had
no opponent, no protest is filed. And the Electoral
Tribunal has no jurisdiction, because there is no election
contest. (20 C.J., 58, supra.) When informed of the fact,
may not the House, motu propio  postpone his induction?
May not the House suspend, investigate and thereafter
exclude him?3 It must be observed that when a member
of the House raises a question as to the qualifications of
another, an "election contest" does not thereby ensue,
because the former does not seek to be substituted for
the latter.
So that, if not all  the powers regarding the election,
returns, and qualifications of members was withdrawn by
the Constitution from the Congress; and if, as admitted
by petitioners themselves at the oral argument, the
power to defer the oath-taking, until the contests is
adjudged, does not belong to the corresponding
Electoral Tribunal, then it must be held that the House or
Senate still retains such authority, for it has not been
transferred to, nor assumed by, the Electoral Tribunal.
And this result flows, whether we believe that such
power (to delay induction) stemmed from the (former)
privilege of either House to be judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members thereof, or
whether we hold it to be inherent to every legislative
body as a measure of self-preservation.
It is customary that when a number of persons come
together to form a legislative body, ". . . the first
organization must be temporary, and if the law does not
designate the person who shall preside over such
temporary organization, the persons assembled and
claiming to be members may select one of their number
for that purpose. The next step is to ascertain in some
convenient way the names of the person who are, by
reason of holding the proper credentials, prima
facie  entitled to seats, and therefore entitled to take part
in permanent organization of the body. In the absence of
any statutory or other regulation upon this subject, a
committee on credentials is usually appointed, to whom
all credentials to be entitled to seats. . . . (Laurel on
Elections, Second Edition, pp. 356, 357, quoting
McCrary on Elections.)
Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory
grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the
power to inquire into the credentials of any member and
the latter's right to participate in its deliberations. As we
have seen, the assignment by the constitution of the
Electoral Tribunal does not actually negative that power
— provided the Senate does not cross the boundary
line, deciding an election contest against the member.
Which the respondents at bar never attempted to do.
Precisely, their resolution recognized, and did not impair,
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to decide the
contest. To test whether the resolution trenched on the
territory of the last named agency let ask the question:
May the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate order that Body
to defer the admission of any member whose election
has been contested? Obviously not. Then it must be
conceded that the passage of the disputed resolution
meant no invasion of the former's realm.
At this juncture the error will be shown of the contention
that the Senate has not this privilege "as a residuary
power". Such contention is premised on the proposition
that the Houses of the Philippine Congress possess only
such powers  as are expressly or impliedly granted by
the Constitution. And an American decision is quoted on
the powers of the United States Congress. The mistake
is due to the failure to differentiate between the nature of
legislative power under the Constitution of the United
States, and legislative power under the State
Constitutions and the Constitution of the Commonwealth
(now the Republic). It must be observed that the
Constitution of the United States contains only a grant or
delegation of legislative powers  to the Federal
Government, whereas, the other Constitutions, like the
Constitution of the Commonwealth (now the
Republic), are limits upon the plenary powers of
legislation of the Government. The legislative power of
the United States Congress is confined to the subject on
which it is permitted to act by the Federal constitution.
(Dorr vs. United States, 195 U. S., 140; Martin vs.
Hunter, 1 Wheat., 326; McCullock vs. Maryland, 4
Wheat., 405; United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.,
551.) The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power, deemed
to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere.
Another line of approach. The Senate, as a branch of the
legislative department, had the constitutional power to
adopt rules for its proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI
of the Constitution), and by legislative practice it is
conceded the power to promulgate such orders as may
be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its
dignity.4 We are advised by the respondents that, after
weighing the propriety or impropriety of the step, the
Senate, in the exercise of its authority and discretion and
of its inherent power of self-preservation, resolved to
defer the administration of oath and the sitting of the
petitioners pending determination of the contest. It is not
clear that the measure had no reasonable connection
Page 26 of 82
with the ends in view, and neither does it palpably
transcend the powers of the public deliverative body. On
the contrary, there are reasons to believe it was
prompted by the dictates of ordinary caution, or of public
policy. For, if, as reported by the corresponding
constitutional agency, concededly well-posted on the
matter by reason of its official duties, the elections held
in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and
Nueva Ecija were so tainted with acts of violence and
intimidation, that the result was not the legitimate
expression of the voters' choice, the Senate made no
grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon
proof of such widespread lawlessness, the Electoral
Tribunal would annull the returns in that region
(see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel,
Elections [2d ed.], p. 488 et seq.), and declare herein
petitioners not entitled to seats in the Senate.
Consequently, to avoid the undesirable result flowing
from the participation of disqualified members in its
deliberations, it was prudent for it to defer the sitting of
the respondents. True, they may have no direct
connection with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes
may be annulled just the same, and if that happens,
petitioners would not among the sixteen senators
elected. Nor was it far-fetched for the Senate to consider
that "in order to maintain alive the respect for democratic
institutions among our people, no man or group of men
(should) be permitted to profit from the results of an
election held under coercion, in violation of law and
contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which
should underlie all elections under the Constitution."
(Exhibit A of petitioners' complaint.)
a. Justices in the Electoral Tribunals
During our deliberations, it was remarked that several
justices subscribing the majority opinion, belong to the
electoral tribunals wherein protests connected with the
Central Luzon polls await investigation. Mulling over this,
we experience no qualmish feelings about the
coincidence. Their designation to the electoral tribunals
deducted not a whit from their functions as members of
this Supreme Court, and did not disqualify them in this
litigation. Nor will their deliverances here at on a given
question operate to prevent them from voting in the
electoral forum on identical questions; because the
Constitution, establishing no incompatibility between the
two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want,
justices opining one way here, and thereafter holding
otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral tribunals, or vice-
versa.
Anyhow, these should be no diversity of thought in a
democratic country, at least, on the legal effects of the
alleged rampant lawlessness, root and basis of the
Pendatun Resolution.
However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is
no definite pronouncement that terrorism and
violence actually prevailed in the district to such extent
that the result was not the expression of the free will of
the electorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by
protestants and protestees at the hearing of the
respective contests.
b. Doubt and presumption.
After all is said or written, the most that may be
conceded to the industry of petitioners' counsel is that
the Senate power, or lack of power, to approve the
resolution is not entirely clear. We should, therefore,
indulge the presumption that official duty has been
performed regularly, (Rule 123, section 69, Rule of
Court), and in the right manner:
 It is a general principle to presume that public
officers act correctly until the contrary is shown.
United States vs. Weed, 5 Wall., 62.
It will be presumed, unless the contrary be
shown, that a public officer acted in accordance
with the law and his instructions. Moral y
Gonzales vs. Ross (Gonzales vs. Ross), 120
U.S., 605; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 705.
Officers charged with the performance of a
public duty are presumed to perform it correctly.
Quinlan vs. Greene Country, 205 U.S., 410; 27
Sup. Ct. Rep., 505. (United State Supreme
Court Reports Digest, Vol. 5, p. 3188.)
It is presumed that the legislature has acted
within its constitutional powers. (See cases cited
at p. 257, 16 C.J.S., note 1.)
And should there be further doubt, by all the maxims of
prudence, left alone comity, we should heed the off-limits
sign at the Congressional Hall, and check the impulse to
rush in to set matters aright — firm in the belief that if a
political fraud has been accomplished, as petitioners
aver, the sovereign people, ultimately the offended party,
will render the fitting verdict — at the polling precints.
c. Membership in the Constitutional Convention
The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that
the dissenting members of this Court who were
delegates to the Constitutional Convention and were "co-
authors of the Constitution" "are in a better position to
interpret" that same Constitution in this particular
litigation.
There is no doubt that their properly recorded utterances
during the debates and proceedings of the Convention
deserve weight, like those of any other delegate therein.
Note, however, that the proceedings of the Convention
"are less conclusive of the power construction of the
instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper
construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we
are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the
people  through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives. (Willoughby on the Constitution, Vol. I,
pp. 54, 55.)
Their writings (of the delegates) commenting or
explaining that instrument, published shortly thereafter,
may, like those of Hamilton, Madison and Jayin The
Federalist — here in the Philippines, the book of
Delegate Aruego, supra, and of others — have
persuasive force. (Op. cit., p. 55.)
But their personal opinion on the matter at issue
expressed during our deliberations stand on a different
footing: If based on a "fact" known to them, but not duly
established or judicially cognizable, it is immaterial, and
their brethren are not expected to take their word for it,
to the prejudice of the party adversely affected, who had
no chance of rebuttal. If on a matter of legal
hermeneutics, their conclusions may not, simply on
account of membership in the Convention, be a shade
better, in the eyes of the law. There is the word
"deference" to be sure. But deference is a compliment
spontaneously to be paid — never a tribute to be
demanded.
And if we should (without intending any disparagement)
compare the Constitution's enactment to a drama on the
stage or in actual life, we would realize that intelligent
spectators or readres often know as much, if not more,
about the real meanings, effects or tendency is of the
event, or incidents thereof, as some of the actors
themselves, who sometimes become so absorbed in
fulfilling their emotional roles that they fail to watch the
Page 27 of 82
other scenes or to meditate on the larger aspects of the
whole performance, or what is worse, become so
infatuated with their lines as to construe the entire story
according to their prejudices or frustrations. Perspective
and disinterestedness help certainly a lot in examining
actions and occurrences.
Come to think of it, under the theory thus proposed,
Marshall and Holmes (names venerated by those who
have devoted a sizable portion of their professionals
lives to analyzing or solving constitutional problems and
developments) were not so authoritative after all in
expounding the United States Constitution — because
they were not members of the Federal Convention that
framed it!
D.—ALLEGED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS
Quoting section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725,
counsel for petitioners assert that it was respondents'
duty legally inescapable, to permit petitioners to assume
office and take part in the current regular session. The
section reads partly:
The candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives and those for Senators who
have been proclaimed elected by the respective
Board of Canvassers and the Commission on
Elections shall assume office and shall hold
regular session for the year nineteen hundred
and forty-six on May twenty-five, nineteen
hundred and forty-six. (Section 12,
Commonwealth Act. No. 725.)
We have carefully considered the argument. We opine
that, as contended by the Solicitor-General, this
provision is addressed to the individual member of
Congress, imposing on him the obligation to come to
Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session.
However, it does not imply that if, for any reason, he is
disqualified, the House is powerless to postpone his
admission. Suppose that after elections a member is
finally convicted of treason. May not the House refuse
him outright admission, pending an investigation (by it or
the Electoral Tribunal as the case may be) as to his
privilege to sit there? Granting the right to admission as
the counterpart of the duty to assume office by virtue of
said section 12; we must nevertheless allow that such
rights would not be peremptory whenever it contacts
other rights of equal or superior force. To illustrate: if the
law provided that all children, seven years or more "shall
go to school", it can not reasonably be inferred that
school authorities are bound to accept every seven-year
boy, even if he refuses to pay fees, or to present the
certificates required by school regulations.
Furthermore, it would not be erroneous to maintain that
any right spelled out of section 12 must logically be
limited to those candidates whose proclamation is clear,
unconditional and unclouded, and that such standard is
not met by the petitioners, because in the very document
attesting to their election one member of the
Commission on Elections demurred to the non-exclusion
of the votes in Central Luzon, calling attention to the
reported reign of terror and violence in that region, and
virtually objecting to the certification of herein petitioners.
To be sure, it was the beclouded condition of petitioner's
credential (certificate of canvass) that partly prompted
the Senate to enact the precautionary measure herein
complained of. And finding no phrase or sentence in the
Constitution expressly or impliedly outlawing the step
taken by that legislative body, we should be, and we are,
reluctant to intervene.
Indeed, had the Senate been officially informed that the
inclusion of petitioners' name in the Commission's
certificate had been made at the point of a gangster's
automatic, none will deny the appositeness of the
postponement of their induction, pending an inquiry by
the corresponding authorities. Yet the difference
between such situation and the instant litigation is one of
degree, broad and wide perhaps, but not altering the
dominant legal principle.
In answer to the suggestions as to abuse of the power it
should be stated that the mere possibility of abuse is no
conclusive argument against the existence of the power,
of the power, for the simple reason that every official
authority is susceptible of misuse. And everybody knows
that when any people will discover the methods to curb
it.
Perhaps it is necessary to explain that this decision goes
no further than to recognize the existence of
Congressional power. It is settled that the point whether
such power has been wisely or correctly exercised, is
usually beyond the ken of judicial determination.
E.—PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
invaded the constitutional privileges and
prerogatives of the Senate of the United States
and of three Senators; and was without
jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are
directed to make no appearance in response
thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account
for their votes in approving the Pendatum Resolution.
Having sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must
enforce the constitutional directive. We must not
question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here
in connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, supra.)
Case dismissed. No costs. Moran, C J., Paras, Pablo, 
G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010

One final consideration. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 

vs.
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
any speech or debate" in congress, Senators and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -
congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other ARROYO, Respondents.
place." The Supreme Court of the United States has
interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a vote or x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
the presentation of a resolution. G.R. No. 191032
. . . It would be a narrow view of the JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, 
constitutional provision to limit it towards spoken vs.
in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
its application to written reports presented in that
body by its committees, to resolutions offered, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
which, though in writing, must be reproduced in G.R. No. 191057
speech, and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn
vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
p. 391.) (PHILCONSA), Petitioner, 
vs.
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
questions put to him by the House of Representatives of
the United States Congress, concerning the business of x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
a real estate partnership, was imprisoned for contempt A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
by resolution of the house. He sued to recover damages
from the sergeant at arms and the congressional IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII
members of the committee, who had caused him to be OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO
brought before the house, where he was adjudged to be THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
in contempt. The Supreme Court of the United States x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
found that the resolution of the House was void for want
of jurisdiction in that body, but the action was dismissed G.R. No. 191149
as to the members of the committee  upon the strength JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, 
of the herein above-mentioned congressional immunity. vs.
The court cited with approval the following excerpts from JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
Massachusetts: LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF
These privileges are thus secured, not with the PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO;
intention of protecting the members against INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate
the rights of the people, by enabling their Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and
representatives to execute the functions of their the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER
office without fear of prosecutions, civil or of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L.
criminal. I, therefore, think that the article ought BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN)
not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN
full design of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S., SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.;
203.) (Emphasis ours.) CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE;
relates apparently as controlling, the following incident: KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
In 1910, several Members of Congress having (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA
been served with a writ of mandamus in a civil ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
action brought against them as members of the KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA
Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN
refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA
the furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved that CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY
LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF

Page 28 of 82
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador
CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342),
EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as
CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian
(SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang
GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.;
P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines
ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and
by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et
ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO- al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator
MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention
GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, was allowed.
JR.;Intervenors.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven
order:
G.R. No. 191342
Soriano
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-
Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING 1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or
(IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,  addressed the issue of whether or not the power
vs. to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. Supreme Court en banc.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 2. The Mendoza petition should have been
dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory
G.R. No. 191420
judgment and did not involve a justiciable
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,  controversy.
vs.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER
the next deliberations. The mere fact that the
EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC
ARROYO, Respondents.
should not prevail over the more compelling
RESOLUTION state interest for him to participate as a Member
of the Court.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Tolentino and Inting
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision,
holding: 1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does
not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
WHEREFORE, the Court: appointments from the express ban on midnight
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and appointments.
mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the
191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. Court has made distinctions and has created
No. 191057 for being premature; exemptions when none exists.
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. 3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed
No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits
merit; and an executive, not a judicial, power.
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC 4. Resort to the deliberations of the
and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is
Council: powerless to vary the terms of the clear
(a) To resume its proceedings for the prohibition.
nomination of candidates to fill the 5. The Court has given too much credit to the
vacancy to be created by the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby,
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice the Court has raised the Constitution to the level
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; of a venerated text whose intent can only be
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees divined by its framers as to be outside the realm
for the position of Chief Justice; of understanding by the sovereign people that
ratified it.
(c) To submit to the incumbent
President the short list of nominees for 6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
the position of Chief Justice on or before 7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers,
May 17, 2010; and have the clear legal standing to question the
(d) To continue its proceedings for the illegal composition of the JBC.
nomination of candidates to fill other Philippine Bar Association
vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to
the President the short list of nominees 1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the
corresponding thereto in accordance Constitution violates the basic principle that the
with this decision. Court should not formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than what is required
SO ORDERED. by the precise facts of the case.
Motions for Reconsideration 2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is
clear and straightforward, the only duty of the

Page 29 of 82
 Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and
clearly provides a general limitation on the
appointing power of the President in prohibiting
the appointment of any person to any position in
the Government without any qualification and
distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally
ignoring the constitutional safeguard against
midnight appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two
constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition
against midnight appointments, and the creation
of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the
Court to prefer one over the other, for the
Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they
are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the
basic principles of statutory construction in
interpreting the Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the
title, chapter or section headings, despite
precedents on statutory construction holding that
such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule
on midnight appointments, and the only
exception is that on temporary appointments to
executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to
resume the proceedings for the nomination of
the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created
by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Puno with a view to submitting the list of
nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo
on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution
grants the Court only the power of supervision
over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the
JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it,
especially in the absence of a real and
justiciable case assailing any specific action or
inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an
advisory opinion and has indulged in
speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments
being already in effect, the Court’s directing the
JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a
culpable violation of the Constitution and the
commission of an election offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a
secondary authority a doctrine unanimously
formulated by the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior
Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the
incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment
of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently
necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on
midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt
to prolong the outgoing President’s powers by
means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent
President to appoint the next Chief Justice is
undeniably intended to perpetuate her power
beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution applies to
appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent
Page 30 of 82
reason exists to warrant the reversal of the
Valenzuela pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides for presidential appointments to the
Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation
on the appointing power of the President
extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus,
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of Article
VII apply to all presidential appointments in the
Executive and Judicial Branches of the
Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the
Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief
Justice in all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that
warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII
applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Court and to other appointments to the
Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the
removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of
Article VII against midnight appointments in the
Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the
Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on
midnight appointments is based on an
interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal
language of the Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight
appointments is to cover appointments in both
the Executive and Judicial Departments. The
application of the principle of verba legis
(ordinary meaning) would have obviated
dwelling on the organization and arrangement of
the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any
ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent
behind the provision, which is to prevent political
partisanship in all branches of the Government,
should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and
strained interpretation based on
compartmentalization and physical arrangement,
especially considering that the Constitution must
be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal
interpretation of the framers of the Constitution
should yield to the plain and unequivocal
language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing
Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in
accord with the Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not
present a justiciable controversy. The issues it
raised were not yet ripe for adjudication,
considering that the office of the Chief Justice
was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has
yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of
nominees to the President.
 2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is 1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
more important and compelling than the opinion the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief
of Justice Regalado. Justice to the President on or before May 17,
2010, and to continue its proceedings for the
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in
nomination of the candidates, because it granted
conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court
a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a
has violated the principle of ut magis valeat
deadline not provided by law or the Constitution;
quam pereat (which mandates that the
exercised control instead of mere supervision
Constitution should be interpreted as a whole,
over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to
such that any conflicting provisions are to be
reverse Valenzuela.
harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is
no conflict between the provisions; they 2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the
complement each other. Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory
construction to the effect that the literal meaning
4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s
of the law must be applied when it is clear and
titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship
unambiguous; and that we should not
carry little weight in statutory construction. The
distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
clear and plain language of Section 15, Article
VII precludes interpretation. 3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief
Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of
Tan, Jr.
1948 already provides that the power and duties
1. The factual antecedents do not present an of the office devolve on the most senior
actual case or controversy. The clash of legal Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the
rights and interests in the present case are office of the Chief Justice.
merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with
Ubano
certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the
Chief Justice has yet occurred. 1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being
clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not
apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary 2. The Constitution must be construed in its
runs in conflict with long standing principles and entirety, not by resort to the organization and
doctrines of statutory construction. The provision arrangement of its provisions.
admits only one exception, temporary
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant,
appointments in the Executive Department.
because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent
Thus, the Court should not distinguish, because
records of the Constitutional Commission are
the law itself makes no distinction.
clear and unambiguous.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
submit the list of nominees to the President by
ban on midnight appointments to cover the
May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no specific
members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more
law requires the JBC to submit the list of
weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to
nominees even before the vacancy has
reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was
occurred.
unwarranted.
Boiser
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with
Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to 1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only
fill any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a exemption from the ban on midnight
month and a half after the end of the ban. The appointments is the temporary appointment to
next President has roughly the same time of 45 an executive position. The limitation is in
days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) keeping with the clear intent of the framers of
within which to scrutinize and study the the Constitution to place a restriction on the
qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make
JBC has more than enough opportunity to appointments.
examine the nominees without haste and
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief
political uncertainty.1avvphi1
Justice from the ban on midnight appointments
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing
90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is Chief Executive, and compromises the
suspended. independence of the Chief Justice by having the
outgoing President be continually influential.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit
the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. 3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without
The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable stating the sufficient reason violates the principle
violation of the Constitution and constitutes an of stare decisis.
election offense.
Bello, et al.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as
appointment of a Chief Justice, because the
to the type of appointments an outgoing
Court sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole
President is prohibited from making within the
judge of all contests relative to the election,
prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the
returns and qualifications of the President and
records of the Constitutional Commission
Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the
support the view that the ban on midnight
Court can validly comprise the Presidential
appointments extends to judicial appointments.
Electoral Tribunal.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves
WTLOP
oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight
must first act not in accord with prescribed rules

Page 31 of 82
 before the act can be redone to conform to the
prescribed rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not
present a justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must
be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the
general intent of the Constitution as a limitation
to the powers of Government and as a bastion
for the protection of the rights of the people.
Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting
provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation
should always be one that protects the citizenry
from an ever expanding grant of authority to its
representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional
powers of the President in a manner totally
repugnant to republican constitutional
democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial
amendment of the Constitution without proper
authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC
separately represent in their respective comments, thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the
President a short list of its nominees for the
position of Chief Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to
appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the
Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction
favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the
ban on midnight appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and
resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as
other related matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been
dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has
not yet decided at the time the petitions were
filed whether the incumbent President has the
power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and
because the JBC, having yet to interview the
candidates, has not submitted a short list to the
President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a
doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary
for the President to appoint a Chief Justice
should be struck down as bereft of constitutional
and legal basis. The statement undermines the
independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the
Court, but in accord with its constitutional
mandate and its implementing rules and
regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-
2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the
JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so.
He states that the motions for reconsideration were
directed at the administrative matter he initiated and
which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
Page 32 of 82
1. The grounds of the motions for
reconsideration were already resolved by the
decision and the separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked
the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC
as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, as distinguished from the Court’s
adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII.
In the former, the requisites for judicial review
are not required, which was why Valenzuela was
docketed as an administrative matter.
Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a
position on when to submit the short list to the
proper appointing authority, it has effectively
solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of
supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1)
and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the
Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent
of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of
the motions for reconsideration do not refer to
either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1),
Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on
nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of
merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and
argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the
decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters
only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of
stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the
Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning
Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim
stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to
precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It
simply means that a principle underlying the decision in
one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling
the decisions of like cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until
the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a
court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon
as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be
appealed to higher courts and for that reason are
probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid
down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a
statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations,
not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also
of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the
higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-
ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one
highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be
guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the
Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged
to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines,
after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-
law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make
law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed
as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its
reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in
the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification
to be applicable to the case. The application of the
precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to
be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its
wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this
case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation.
They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution
itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en
banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law
laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the
public by their insistence that the Constitutional
Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in
Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio
Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article
VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13,
Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges
and justices related to the President within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons
whom the President might not appoint during his or her
tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr.
withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section
13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such
that the final version of the second paragraph of Section
13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to
the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not
during his tenure be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding
that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court
either ignored or refused to apply many principles of
statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are
themselves apparently contravening their avowed
reliance on the principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from
Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the
ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban
applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba
legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating
willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both
of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under
Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein,
despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet,
construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so
would generally constitute an encroachment upon the
field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section
Page 33 of 82
4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that
their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be
interpolated in them.9Interpolation of words is
unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail
to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In
other words, the addition of new words may alter the
thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the
meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or
without the omitted word or words, interpolation is
improper, because the primary source of the legislative
intent is in the language of the law itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly
observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be
stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the
purposes of any quarter.
Final Word
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant
to the controversy we are resolving that because all the
Members of the present Court were appointed by the
incumbent President, a majority of them are now
granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of
the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their
conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the
contrary proceeds from malice and condescension.
Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members
of the Court had arranged the current situation to
happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of
the Court could have prevented the Members composing
the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a
decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and
tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is
now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to
fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable
retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her
official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who
are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are
denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. RENATO C.
CARPIO CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 usurp legislative function; he mentions that in
CONCHITA CARPIO PRESBITERO J. 1966, Lord Chancellor Gardiner announced in a
MORALES VELASCO, JR. Practice Statement a kind of general
Associate Justice Associate Justice memorandum from the court that while: "Their
Lordships regard the use of precedent as an
indispensable foundation upon which to decide
ANTONIO TERESITA J.
what is the law," they "nevertheless recognize
EDUARDO B. LEONARDO-DE
that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead
NACHURA CASTRO
to injustice in a particular case and also unduly
Associate Justice Associate Justice
restrict the proper development of the law. They
propose, therefore, to modify their present
DIOSDADO M. practice and, while treating former decisions of
ARTURO D. BRION this House as normally binding, to depart from a
PERALTA
Associate Justice previous decision when it appears right to do
Associate Justice
so." (Calabresi cites Leach, Revisionism in the
House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare
MARIANO C. DEL Decisis Falls, 80 Harvard Law Review, 797
ROBERTO A. ABAD (1967).
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 7
 Section 4 (2), Article VIII, provides:
xxx
MARTIN S. JOSE PORTUGAL
VILLARAMA, JR. PEREZ (3) Cases or matters heard by a division
Associate Justice Associate Justice shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA deliberations on the issues in the case
Associate Justice and voted thereon, and in no case,
CERTIFICATION without the concurrence of at least three
of such Members. When the required
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it number is not obtained, the case shall
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above be decided en banc; Provided, that no
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the doctrine or principle of law laid down by
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the the court in a decision rendered en banc
Court. or in division may be modified or
REYNATO S. PUNO reversed except by the court sitting en
Chief Justice banc.
8
 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 2, July 31, 1986, RCC No. 44. pp. 542-543.
9
Footnotes  Smith v. State, 66 Md. 215, 7 Atl. 49.
10
1
 In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of  State ex rel Everding v. Simon, 20 Ore. 365,
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. 26 Pac. 170.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Cabanatuan City, respectively, A.M. No. 98-5-
01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.
2
 Price & Bitner, Effective Legal Research, Little,
Brown & Co., New York (1962), § 9.7.
3
 Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar, No. L-19650,
DISSENTING OPINION
September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247
4 CARPIO MORALES, J.:
 E.g., Dias, Jurisprudence, Butterworths,
London, 1985, Fifth Edition, p. 127. No compelling reason exists for the Court to deny a
5 reconsideration of the assailed Decision. The various
 Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of
motions for reconsideration raise hollering substantial
Appeals, G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996,
arguments and legitimately nagging questions which the
261 SCRA 464.
Court must meet head on.
6
 See Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of
If this Court is to deserve or preserve its revered place
Statutes, Harvard University Press, p. 4 (1982)
not just in the hierarchy but also in history, passion for
and endnote 12 of the page, which essentially
reason demands the issuance of an extended and
recounts that the strict application of the doctrine
extensive resolution that confronts the ramifications and
of stare decisis is true only in a common-law
repercussions of its assailed Decision. Only then can it
jurisdiction like England (citing Wise, The
offer an illumination that any self-respecting student of
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 Wayne Law
the law clamors and any adherent of the law deserves.
Review, 1043, 1046-1047 (1975). Calabresi
Otherwise, it takes the risk of reeking of an objectionable
recalls that the English House of Lords decided
air of supreme judicial arrogance.
in 1898 (London Tramways Co. v. London
County Council, A.C. 375) that they could not It is thus imperative to settle the following issues and
alter precedents laid down by the House of concerns:
Lords acting as the supreme court in previous
Whether the incumbent President is constitutionally
cases, but that such precedents could only be
proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief
altered by an Act of Parliament, for to do
Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May
otherwise would mean that the courts would

Page 34 of 82
17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30,
2010
1. In interpreting the subject constitutional
provisions, the Decision disregarded established
canons of statutory construction. Without
explaining the inapplicability of each of the
relevant rules, the Decision immediately placed
premium on the arrangement and ordering of
provisions, one of the weakest tools of
construction, to arrive at its conclusion.
2. In reversing Valenzuela, the Decision held
that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on
ConCom deliberations, yet it did not offer to cite
a material ConCom deliberation. It instead opted
to rely on the memory of Justice Florenz
Regalado which incidentally mentioned only the
"Court of Appeals." The Decision’s conclusion
must rest on the strength of its own favorable
Concom deliberation, none of which to date has
been cited.
3. Instead of choosing which constitutional
provision carves out an exception from the other
provision, the most legally feasible interpretation
(in the limited cases of temporary physical or
legal impossibility of compliance, as expounded
in my Dissenting Opinion) is to consider the
appointments ban or other substantial obstacle
as a temporary impossibility which excuses or
releases the constitutional obligation of the
Office of the President for the duration of the
ban or obstacle.
In view of the temporary nature of the circumstance
causing the impossibility of performance, the outgoing
President is released from non-fulfillment of the
obligation to appoint, and the duty devolves upon the
new President. The delay in the fulfillment of the
obligation becomes excusable, since the law cannot
exact compliance with what is impossible. The 90-day
period within which to appoint a member of the Court is
thus suspended and the period could only start or
resume to run when the temporary obstacle disappears
(i.e., after the period of the appointments ban; when
there is already a quorum in the JBC; or when there is
already at least three applicants).
Whether the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to
submit to the President the shortlist of nominees for
the position of Chief Justice (or Justice of this
Court) on or before the occurrence of the vacancy.
1. The ruling in the Decision that obligates the
JBC to submit the shortlist to the President on or
before the occurrence of the vacancy in the
Court runs counter to the Concom
deliberations which explain that the 90-day
period is allotted for both the nomination by the
JBC and the appointment by the President. In
the move to increase the period to 90 days,
Commissioner Romulo stated that "[t]he sense
of the Committee is that 60 days is awfully short
and that the [Judicial and Bar] Council, as well
as the President, may have difficulties with that."
2. To require the JBC to submit to the President
a shortlist of nominees on or before the
occurrence of vacancy in the Court leads to
preposterous results. It bears reiterating that the
requirement is absurd when, inter alia, the
vacancy is occasioned by the death of a
member of the Court, in which case the JBC
could never anticipate the death of a Justice,
and could never submit a list to the President on
or before the occurrence of vacancy.
Page 35 of 82
3. The express allowance in the Constitution of a
90-day period of vacancy in the membership of
the Court rebuts any public policy argument on
avoiding a vacuum of even a single day without
a duly appointed Chief Justice. Moreover, as
pointed out in my Dissenting Opinion, the
practice of having an acting Chief Justice in the
interregnum is provided for by law, confirmed by
tradition, and settled by jurisprudence to be an
internal matter.
The Resolution of the majority, in denying the present
Motions for Reconsideration, failed to rebut the foregoing
crucial matters.
I, therefore, maintain my dissent and vote to GRANT the
Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision of March 17,
2010 insofar as it holds that the incumbent President is
not constitutionally proscribed from appointing the
successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his
retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00
noon of June 30, 2010 and that the Judicial and Bar
Council is obliged to submit to the President the shortlist
of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before
May 17, 2010.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The Motions for Reconsideration
After sifting through the motions for reconsideration, I
found that the arguments are largely the same
arguments that we have passed upon, in one form or
another, in the various petitions. Essentially, the issues
boil down to justiciability; the conflict of constitutional
provisions; the merits of the cited constitutional
deliberations; and the status and effect of the
Valenzuela1 ruling. Even the motion for reconsideration
of the Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420),
whose petition I did not expressly touch upon in my
Separate Opinion, basically dwells on these issues.
I have addressed most, if not all, of these issues and I
submit my Separate Opinion2 as my basic response to
the motions for reconsideration, supplemented by the
discussions below.
As I reflected in my Separate Opinion (which three other
Justices joined),3 the election appointment ban under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution should not
apply to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court whose period for appointment is separately
provided for under Article VIII, Section 4(1). I shared this
conclusion with the Court’s Decision although our
reasons differed on some points.
I diverged fully from the Decision on the question of
whether we should maintain or reverse our ruling in
Valenzuela. I maintained that it is still good law; no
reason exists to touch the ruling as its main focus – the
application of the election ban on the appointment of
lower court judges under Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution – is not even an issue in the present case
and was discussed only because the petitions incorrectly
cited the ruling as authority on the issue of the Chief
Justice’s appointment. The Decision proposed to reverse
Valenzuela but only secured the support of five (5)
votes, while my Separate Opinion in support of
Valenzuela had four (4) votes. Thus, on the whole, the
Decision did not prevail in reversing Valenzuela, as it
only had five (5) votes in a field of 12 participating
Members of the Court. Valenzuela should therefore
remain, as of the filing of this Opinion, as a valid
precedent.
Acting on the present motions for reconsideration, I join
the majority in denying the motions with respect to the
Chief Justice issue, although we differ in some respects
on the reasons supporting the denial. I dissent from the
conclusion that the Valenzuela ruling should be
reversed. My divergence from the majority’s reasons and
conclusions compels me to write this Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion.
The Basic Requisites / Justiciability
One marked difference between the Decision and my
Separate Opinion is our approach on the basic
requisites/justiciability issues. The Decision apparently
glossed over this aspect of the case, while I fully
explained why the De Castro4 and Peralta5 petitions
should be dismissed outright. In my view, these petitions
violated the most basic requirements of their chosen
medium for review – a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The petitions commonly failed to allege that the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) performs judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, an allegation that the petitions could not really
make, since the JBC does not really undertake these
functions and, for this reason, cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari; hence, the petitions should be
dismissed outright. They likewise failed to facially show
any failure or refusal by the JBC to undertake a
constitutional duty to justify the issuance of a writ of
mandamus; they invoked judicial notice that we could
not give because there was, and is, no JBC refusal to
act.6 Thus, the mandamus aspects of these petitions
should have also been dismissed outright. The
ponencia, unfortunately, failed to fully discuss these
legal infirmities.
The motions for reconsideration lay major emphasis on
the alleged lack of an actual case or controversy that
made the Chief Justice’s appointment a justiciable issue.
They claim that the Court cannot exercise the power of
judicial review where there is no clash of legal rights and
interests or where this clash is merely anticipated,
although the anticipated event shall come with certainty.7
What the movants apparently forgot, focused as they
were on their respective petitions, is that the present
case is not a single-petition case that rises or falls on the
strength of that single petition. The present case
involves various petitions and interventions,8 not
necessarily pulling towards the same direction, although
each one is focused on the issue of whether the election
appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the
Constitution should apply to the appointment of the next
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Among the petitions filed were those of Tolentino (G.R.
No. 191342), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Mendoza
(A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC). The first two are petitions for
prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.9 While they commonly share this medium of
review, they differ in their supporting reasons. The
Mendoza petition, on the other hand, is totally different –
it is a petition presented as an administrative matter
(A.M.) in the manner that the Valenzuela case was an
A.M. case. As I pointed out in the Separate Opinion, the
Court uses the A.M. docket designation on matters
relating to its exercise of supervision over all courts and
their personnel.10 I failed to note then, but I make of
record now, that court rules and regulations – the
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outputs in the Court’s rulemaking function – are also
docketed as A.M. cases.
That an actual case or controversy involving a clash of
rights and interests exists is immediately and patently
obvious in the Tolentino and Soriano petitions. At the
time the petitions were filed, the JBC had started its six-
phase nomination process that would culminate in the
submission of a list of nominees to the President of the
Philippines for appointive action. Tolentino and Soriano
– lawyers and citizens with interest in the strict
observance of the election ban – sought to prohibit the
JBC from continuing with this process. The JBC had
started to act, without any prodding from the Court,
because of its duty to start the nomination process but
was hampered by the petitions filed and the legal
questions raised that only the Supreme Court can settle
with finality.11 Thus, a clash of interests based on law
existed between the petitioners and the JBC. To state
the obvious, a decision in favor of Tolentino or Soriano
would result in a writ of prohibition that would direct the
JBC not to proceed with the nomination process.
The Mendoza petition cited the effect of a complete
election ban on judicial appointments (in view of the
already high level of vacancies and the backlog of
cases) as basis, and submitted the question as an
administrative matter that the Court, in the exercise of its
supervisory authority over the Judiciary and the JBC
itself, should act upon. At the same time, it cited the
"public discourse and controversy" now taking place
because of the application of the election ban on the
appointment of the Chief Justice, pointing in this regard
to the very same reasons mentioned in Valenzuela
about the need to resolve the issue and avoid the
recurrence of conflict between the Executive and the
Judiciary, and the need to "avoid polemics concerning
the matter."12
I recognized in the Separate Opinion that, unlike in
Valenzuela where an outright defiance of the election
ban took place, no such obvious triggering event
transpired in the Mendoza petition.13 Rather, the
Mendoza petition looked to the supervisory power of the
Court over judicial personnel and over the JBC as basis
to secure a resolution of the election ban issue. The
JBC, at that time, had indicated its intent to look up to
the Court’s supervisory power and role as the final
interpreter of the Constitution to guide it in responding to
the challenges it confronts.14 To me, this was "a point no
less critical, from the point of view of supervision, than
the appointment of the two judges during the election
ban period in Valenzuela."15
In making this conclusion, I pointed out in my Separate
Opinion the unavoidable surrounding realities evident
from the confluence of events, namely: (1) an election to
be held on May 10, 2010; (2) the retirement of the Chief
Justice on May 17, 2010; (3) the lapse of the terms of
the elective officials from the President to the
congressmen on June 30, 2010; (4) the delay before the
Congress can organize and send its JBC
representatives; and (5) the expiration of the term of a
non-elective JBC member in July 2010.16 All these –
juxtaposed with the Court’s supervision over the JBC,
the latter’s need for guidance, and the existence of an
actual controversy on the same issues bedeviling the
JBC – in my view, were sufficient to save the Mendoza
petition from being a mere request for opinion or a
petition for declaratory relief that falls under the
jurisdiction of the lower court. This recognition is beyond
the level of what this Court can do in handling a moot
and academic case – usually, one that no longer
presents a judiciable controversy but one that can still be
ruled upon at the discretion of the court when the
constitutional issue is of paramount public interest and
controlling principles are needed to guide the bench, the
bar and the public.17
To be sure, this approach in recognizing when a petition
is actionable is novel. An overriding reason for this
approach can be traced to the nature of the petition, as it
rests on the Court’s supervisory authority and relates to
the exercise of the Court’s administrative rather than its
judicial functions (other than these two functions, the
Court also has its rulemaking function under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the Constitution). Strictly speaking, the
Mendoza petition calls for directions from the Court in
the exercise of its power of supervision over the
JBC,18 not on the basis of the power of judicial
review.19 In this sense, it does not need the actual clash
of interests of the type that a judicial adjudication
requires. All that must be shown is the active need for
supervision to justify the Court’s intervention as
supervising authority.
Under these circumstances, the Court’s recognition of
the Mendoza petition was not an undue stretch of its
constitutional powers. If the recognition is unusual at all,
it is so only because of its novelty; to my knowledge, this
is the first time ever in Philippine jurisprudence that the
supervisory authority of the Court over an attached
agency has been highlighted in this manner. Novelty, per
se, however, is not a ground for objection nor a mark of
infirmity for as long as the novel move is founded in law.
In this case, as in the case of the writ of amparo and
habeas data that were then novel and avowedly activist
in character, sufficient legal basis exists to actively
invoke the Court’s supervisory authority – granted under
the Constitution, no less – as basis for action.
To partly quote the wording of the Constitution, Article
VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) provide that "A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court… It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."
Supervision, as a legal concept, more often than not, is
defined in relation with the concept of control.20 In Social
Justice Society v. Atienza,21 we defined "supervision" as
follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the
JBC the results of its assigned task, i.e., who to
recommend or what standards to use to determine who
to recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how
and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of
supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties,"
if the duties are not being performed because of JBC’s
fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors
affecting performance. Note in this regard that,
constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other
functions and duties – a power that suggests authority
beyond what is purely supervisory.
Where the JBC itself is at a loss on how to proceed in
light of disputed constitutional provisions that require
interpretation,22 the Court is not legally out of line – as
the final authority on the interpretation of the Constitution
and as the entity constitutionally-tasked to supervise the
JBC – in exercising its oversight function by clarifying the
interpretation of the disputed constitutional provision to
guide the JBC. In doing this, the Court is not simply
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rendering a general legal advisory; it is providing
concrete and specific legal guidance to the JBC in the
exercise of its supervisory authority, after the latter has
asked for assistance in this regard. That the Court does
this while concretely resolving actual controversies (the
Tolentino and Soriano petitions) on the same issue
immeasurably strengthens the intrinsic correctness of
the Court’s action.
It may be asked: why does the Court have to recognize
the Mendoza petition when it can resolve the conflict
between Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section
4(1) through the Tolentino and Soriano petitions?
The answer is fairly simple and can be read between the
lines of the above explanation on the relationship
between the Court and the JBC. First, administrative is
different from judicial function and providing guidance to
the JBC can only be appropriate in the discharge of the
Court’s administrative function. Second, the resolution of
the Tolentino and Soriano petitions will lead to rulings
directly related to the underlying facts of these petitions,
without clear guidelines to the JBC on the proper
parameters to observe vis-à-vis the constitutional
dispute along the lines the JBC needs. In fact, concrete
guidelines addressed to the JBC in the resolution of the
Tolentino/Soriano petitions may even lead to
accusations that the Court’s resolution is broader than is
required by the facts of the petitions. The Mendoza
petition, because it pertains directly to the performance
of the JBC’s duty and the Court’s supervisory authority,
allows the issuance of precise guidelines that will enable
the JBC to fully and seasonably comply with its
constitutional mandate.
I hasten to add that the JBC’s constitutional task is not
as simple as some people think it to be. The process of
preparing and submitting a list of nominees is an
arduous and time-consuming task that cannot be done
overnight. It is a six-step process lined with standards
requiring the JBC to attract the best available
candidates, to examine and investigate them, to exhibit
transparency in all its actions while ensuring that these
actions conform to constitutional and statutory standards
(such as the election ban on appointments), to submit
the required list of nominees on time, and to ensure as
well that all these acts are politically neutral. On the time
element, the JBC list for the Supreme Court has to be
submitted on or before the vacancy occurs given the 90-
day deadline that the appointing President is given in
making the appointment. The list will be submitted, not to
the President as an outgoing President, nor to the
election winner as an incoming President, but to the
President of the Philippines whoever he or she may be.
If the incumbent President does not act on the JBC list
within the time left in her term, the same list shall be
available to the new President for him to act upon. In all
these, the Supreme Court bears the burden of
overseeing that the JBC’s duty is done, unerringly and
with utmost dispatch; the Court cannot undertake this
supervision in a manner consistent with the
Constitution’s expectation from the JBC unless it adopts
a pro-active stance within the limits of its supervisory
authority.
The Disputed Provisions
The movants present their arguments on the main issue
at several levels. Some argue that the disputed
constitutional provisions – Article VII, Section 15 and
Article VIII, Section 4(1) – are clear and speak for
themselves on what the Constitution covers in banning
appointments during the election period.23 One even
posits that there is no conflict because both provisions
can be given effect without one detracting against the full
effectiveness of the other,24 although the effect is to deny
the sitting President the option to appoint in favor of a
deferment for the incoming President’s action. Still
others, repeating their original arguments, appeal to the
principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove
their point.25
In my discussions in the Separate Opinion, I stated
upfront my views on how the disputed provisions interact
with each other. Read singly and in isolation, they
appear clear (this reading applies the "plain meaning
rule" that Tolentino advocates in his motion for
reconsideration, as explained below). Arrayed side by
side with each other and considered in relation with the
other provisions of the Constitution, particularly its
structure and underlying intents, the conflict however
becomes obvious and unavoidable.
Section 15 on its face disallows any appointment in clear
negative terms ("shall not make") without specifying the
appointments covered by the prohibition.26 From this
literal and isolated reading springs the argument that no
exception is provided (except that found in Section 15
itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the ban on
appointments.
On the other hand, Section 4(1) is likewise very clear
and categorical in its terms: any vacancy in the Court
shall be filled within 90 days from its occurrence.27 In the
way of Section 15, Section 4(1) is also clear and
categorical and provides no exception; the appointment
refers solely to the Members of the Supreme Court and
does not mention any period that would interrupt, hold or
postpone the 90-day requirement.
From this perspective, the view that no conflict exists
cannot be seriously made, unless with the mindset that
one provision controls and the other should yield. Many
of the petitions in fact advocate this kind of reading,
some of them openly stating that the power of
appointment should be reserved for the incoming
President.28 The question, however, is whether – from
the viewpoint of strict law and devoid of the
emotionalism and political partisanship that permeate
the present Philippine political environment – this kind of
mindset can really be adopted in reading and applying
the Constitution.
In my view, this kind of mindset and the conclusion it
inevitably leads to cannot be adopted; the provisions of
the Constitution cannot be read in isolation from what
the whole contains. To be exact, the Constitution must
be read and understood as a whole, reconciling and
harmonizing apparently conflicting provisions so that all
of them can be given full force and effect,29 unless the
Constitution itself expressly states otherwise.30
Not to be forgotten in reading and understanding the
Constitution are the many established underlying
constitutional principles that we have to observe and
respect if we are to be true to the Constitution. These
principles – among them the principles of checks and
balances and separation of powers – are not always
expressly stated in the Constitution, but no one who
believes in and who has studied the Constitution can
deny that they are there and deserve utmost attention,
respect, and even priority consideration.
In establishing the structures of government, the ideal
that the Constitution seeks to achieve is one of balance
among the three great departments of government – the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary, with each
department undertaking its constitutionally-assigned task
as a check against the exercise of power by the others,
while all three departments move forward in working for
the progress of the nation. Thus, the Legislature makes
the laws and is supreme in this regard, in the way that
the Executive is supreme in enforcing and administering
the law, while the Judiciary interprets both the
Constitution and the law. Any provision in each of the
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Articles on these three departments31 that intrudes into
the other must be closely examined if the provision
affects and upsets the desired balance.
Under the division of powers, the President as Chief
Executive is given the prerogative of making
appointments, subject only to the legal qualification
standards, to the checks provided by the Legislature’s
Commission on Appointments (when applicable) and by
the JBC for appointments in the Judiciary, and to the
Constitution’s own limitations. Conflict comes in when
the Constitution laid down Article VII, Section 15 limiting
the President’s appointing power during the election
period. This limitation of power would have been all-
encompassing and would, thus, have extended to all
government positions the President can fill, had the
Constitution not inserted a provision, also on
appointments, in the Article on the Judiciary with respect
to appointments to the Supreme Court. This conflict
gives rise to the questions: which provision should
prevail, or should both be given effect? Or should both
provisions yield to a higher concern – the need to
maintain the integrity of our elections?
A holistic reading of the Constitution – a must in
constitutional interpretation – dictates as a general rule
that the tasks assigned to each department and their
limitations should be given full effect to fulfill the
constitutional purposes under the check and balance
principle, unless the Constitution itself expressly
indicates its preference for one task, concern or
standard over the others,32 or unless this Court, in its
role as interpreter of the Constitution, has spoken on the
appropriate interpretation that should be made.33
In considering the interests of the Executive and the
Judiciary, a holistic approach starts from the premise
that the constitutional scheme is to grant the President
the power of appointment, subject to the limitation
provided under Article VII, Section 15. At the same time,
the Judiciary is assured, without qualifications under
Article VIII, Section 4(1), of the immediate appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, i.e., within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy. If both provisions
would be allowed to take effect, as I believe they should,
the limitation on the appointment power of the President
under Article VII, Section 15 should itself be limited by
the appointment of Members of the Court pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4(1), so that the provision applicable
to the Judiciary can be given full effect without detriment
to the President’s appointing authority. This
harmonization will result in restoring to the President the
full authority to appoint Members of the Supreme Court
pursuant to the combined operation of Article VII,
Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1).
Viewed in this light, there is essentially no conflict, in
terms of the authority to appoint, between the Executive
and Judiciary; the President would effectively be allowed
to exercise the Executive’s traditional presidential power
of appointment while respecting the Judiciary’s own
prerogative. In other words, the President retains full
powers to appoint Members of the Court during the
election period, and the Judiciary is assured of a full
membership within the time frame given.
Interestingly, the objection to the full application of Article
VIII, Section 4(1) comes, not from the current President,
but mainly from petitioners echoing the present
presidential candidates, one of whom shall soon be the
incoming President. They do not, of course, cite reasons
of power and the loss of the opportunity to appoint the
Chief Justice; many of the petitioners/intervenors oppose
the full application of Article VIII, Section 4(1) based on
the need to maintain the integrity of the elections through
the avoidance of a "midnight appointment."
This "integrity" reason is a given in a democracy and can
hardly be opposed on the theoretical plane, as the
integrity of the elections must indeed prevail in a true
democracy. The statement, however, begs a lot of
questions, among them the question of whether the
appointment of a full Court under the terms of Article
VIII, Section 4(1) will adversely affect or enhance the
integrity of the elections.
In my Separate Opinion, I concluded that the
appointment of a Member of the Court even during the
election period per se implies no adverse effect on the
integrity of the election; a full Court is ideal during this
period in light of the Court’s unique role during elections.
I maintain this view and fully concur in this regard with
the majority.
During the election period, the court is not only the
interpreter of the Constitution and the election laws;
other than the Commission on Elections and the lower
courts to a limited extent, the Court is likewise the
highest impartial recourse available to decisively
address any problem or dispute arising from the election.
It is the leader and the highest court in the Judiciary, the
only one of the three departments of government directly
unaffected by the election. The Court is likewise the
entity entrusted by the Constitution, no less, with the
gravest election-related responsibilities. In particular, it is
the sole judge of all contests in the election of the
President and the Vice-President, with leadership and
participation as well in the election tribunals that directly
address Senate and House of Representatives electoral
disputes. With this grant of responsibilities, the
Constitution itself has spoken on the trust it reposes on
the Court on election matters. This reposed trust, to my
mind, renders academic any question of whether an
appointment during the election period will adversely
affect the integrity of the elections – it will not, as the
maintenance of a full Court in fact contributes to the
enforcement of the constitutional scheme to foster a free
and orderly election.
In reading the motions for reconsideration against the
backdrop of the partisan political noise of the coming
elections, one cannot avoid hearing echoes from some
of the arguments that the objection is related, more than
anything else, to their lack of trust in an appointment to
be made by the incumbent President who will soon be
bowing out of office. They label the incumbent
President’s act as a "midnight appointment" – a term that
has acquired a pejorative meaning in contemporary
society.
As I intimated in my Separate Opinion, the imputation of
distrust can be made against any appointing authority,
whether outgoing or incoming. The incoming President
himself will be before this Court if an election contest
arises; any President, past or future, would also naturally
wish favorable outcomes in legal problems that the Court
would resolve. These possibilities and the potential for
continuing influence in the Court, however, cannot be
active considerations in resolving the election ban issue
as they are, in their present form and presentation, all
speculative. If past record is to be the measure, the
record of past Chief Justices and of this Court speaks for
itself with respect to the Justices’ relationship with, and
deferral to, the appointing authority in their decisions.
What should not be forgotten in examining the records of
the Court, from the prism of problems an electoral
exercise may bring, is the Court’s unique and proven
capacity to intervene and diffuse situations that are
potentially explosive for the nation. EDSA II particularly
comes to mind in this regard (although it was an event
that was not rooted in election problems) as it is a
perfect example of the potential for damage to the nation
that the Court can address and has addressed. When
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acting in this role, a vacancy in the Court is not only a
vote less, but a significant contribution less in the Court’s
deliberations and capacity for action, especially if the
missing voice is the voice of the Chief Justice.
Be it remembered that if any EDSA-type situation arises
in the coming elections, it will be compounded by the
lack of leaders because of the lapse of the President’s
term by June 30, 2010; by a possible failure of
succession if for some reason the election of the new
leadership becomes problematic; and by the similar
absence of congressional leadership because Congress
has not yet convened to organize itself.34 In this
scenario, only the Judiciary of the three great
departments of government stands unaffected by the
election and should at least therefore be complete to
enable it to discharge its constitutional role to its fullest
potential and capacity. To state the obvious, leaving the
Judiciary without any permanent leader in this scenario
may immeasurably complicate the problem, as all three
departments of government will then be leaderless.
To stress what I mentioned on this point in my Separate
Opinion, the absence of a Chief Justice will make a lot of
difference in the effectiveness of the Court as he or she
heads the Judiciary, sits as Chair of the JBC and of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, presides over
impeachment proceedings, and provides the moral
suasion and leadership that only the permanent mantle
of the Chief Justice can bestow. EDSA II is just one of
the many lessons from the past when the weightiest of
issues were tackled and promptly resolved by the Court.
Unseen by the general public in all these was the
leadership that was there to ensure that the Court would
act as one, in the spirit of harmony and stability although
divergent in their individual views, as the Justices
individually make their contributions to the collegial
result. To some, this leadership may only be symbolic,
as the Court has fully functioned in the past even with an
incomplete membership or under an Acting Chief
Justice. But as I said before, an incomplete Court "is not
a whole Supreme Court; it will only be a Court with 14
members who would act and vote on all matters before
it." To fully recall what I have said on this matter:
The importance of the presence of one Member of the
Court can and should never be underestimated,
particularly on issues that may gravely affect the nation.
Many a case has been won or lost on the basis of one
vote. On an issue of the constitutionality of a law, treaty
or statute, a tie vote – which is possible in a 14 member
court – means that the constitutionality is upheld. This
was our lesson in Isagani Cruz v. DENR Secretary.
More than the vote, Court deliberation is the core of the
decision-making process and one voice is less is not
only a vote less but a contributed opinion, an
observation, or a cautionary word less for the Court. One
voice can be a big difference if the missing voice is that
of the Chief Justice.
Without meaning to demean the capability of an Acting
Chief Justice, the ascendancy in the Court of a
permanent sitting Chief Justice cannot be equaled. He is
the first among equals – a primus inter pares – who sets
the tone for the Court and the Judiciary, and who is
looked up to on all matters, whether administrative or
judicial. To the world outside the Judiciary, he is the
personification of the Court and the whole Judiciary. And
this is not surprising since, as Chief Justice, he not only
chairs the Court en banc, but chairs as well the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal that sits in judgment over
election disputes affecting the President and the Vice-
President. Outside of his immediate Court duties, he sits
as Chair of the Judicial and Bar Council, the Philippine
Judicial Academy and, by constitutional command,
presides over the impeachment of the President. To be
sure, the Acting Chief Justice may be the ablest, but he
is not the Chief Justice without the mantle and
permanent title of the Office, and even his presence as
Acting Chief Justice leaves the Court with one member
less. Sadly, this member is the Chief Justice; even with
an Acting Chief Justice, the Judiciary and the Court
remains headless. 35
Given these views, I see no point in re-discussing the
finer points of technical interpretation and their
supporting latin maxims that I have addressed in my
Separate Opinion and now feel need no further
elaboration; maxims can be found to serve a pleader’s
every need and in any case are the last interpretative
tools in constitutional interpretation. Nor do I see any
point in discussing arguments based on the intent of the
framers of the Constitution now cited by the parties in
the contexts that would serve their own ends. As may be
evident in these discussions, other than the texts of the
disputed provisions, I prefer to examine their purposes
and the consequences of their application, understood
within the context of democratic values. Past precedents
are equally invaluable for the lead, order, and stability
they contribute, but only if they are in point, certain, and
still alive to current realities, while the history of
provisions, including the intents behind them, are
primarily important to ascertain the purposes the
provisions serve.
From these perspectives and without denigrating the
framers’ historical contributions, I say that it is the
Constitution that now primarily speaks to us in this case
and what we hear are its direct words, not merely the
recorded isolated debates reflecting the personal intents
of the constitutional commissioners as cited by the
parties to fit their respective theories. The voice
speaking the words of the Constitution is our best guide,
as these words will unalterably be there for us to read in
the context of their purposes and the nation’s needs and
circumstances. This Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
hears and listens to that voice.
The Valenzuela Decision
The ponencia’s ruling reversing Valenzuela, in my view,
is out of place in the present case, since at issue here is
the appointment of the Chief Justice during the period of
the election ban, not the appointment of lower court
judges that Valenzuela resolved. To be perfectly clear,
the conflict in the constitutional provisions is not confined
to Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1)
with respect to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court; even before the Valenzuela ruling, the
conflict already existed between Article VII, Section 15
and Article VIII, Section 9 – the provision on the
appointment of the justices and judges of courts lower
than the Supreme Court. After this Court’s ruling in
Valenzuela, no amount of hairsplitting can result in the
conclusion that Article VII, Section 15 applied the
election ban over the whole Judiciary, including the
Supreme Court, as the facts and the fallo of Valenzuela
plainly spoke of the objectionable appointment of two
Regional Trial Court judges. To reiterate, Valenzuela
only resolved the conflict between Article VII, Section 15
and appointments to the Judiciary under Article VIII,
Section 9.
If Valenzuela did prominently figure at all in the present
case, the prominence can be attributed to the petitioners’
mistaken reading that this case is primary authority for
the dictum that Article VII, Section 15 completely bans all
appointments to the Judiciary, including appointments to
the Supreme Court, during the election period up to the
end of the incumbent President’s term.
In reality, this mistaken reading is an obiter dictum in
Valenzuela, and hence, cannot be cited for its primary
precedential value. This legal situation still holds true as
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Valenzuela was not doctrinally reversed as its proposed
reversal was supported only by five (5) out of the 12
participating Members of the Court. In other words, this
ruling on how Article VII, Section 15 is to be interpreted
in relation with Article VIII, Section 9, should continue to
stand unless otherwise expressly reversed by this Court.
But separately from the mistaken use of an obiter ruling
as primary authority, I believe that I should sound the
alarm bell about the Valenzuela ruling in light of a recent
vacancy in the position of Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan resulting from Presiding Justice
Norberto Geraldez’s death soon after we issued the
decision in the present case. Reversing the Valenzuela
ruling now, in the absence of a properly filed case
addressing an appointment at this time to the
Sandiganbayan or to any other vacancy in the lower
courts, will be an irregular ruling of the first magnitude by
this Court, as it will effectively be a shortcut that lifts the
election ban on appointments to the lower courts without
the benefit of a case whose facts and arguments would
directly confront the continued validity of the Valenzuela
ruling. This is especially so after we have placed the
Court on notice that a reversal of Valenzuela is uncalled
for because its ruling is not the litigated issue in this
case.
In any case, let me repeat what I stressed in my
Separate Opinion about Valenzuela which rests on the
reasoning that the evils Section 15 seeks to remedy –
vote buying, midnight appointments and partisan
reasons to influence the elections – exist, thus justifying
an election appointment ban. In particular, the "midnight
appointment" justification, while fully applicable to the
more numerous vacancies at the lower echelons of the
Judiciary (with an alleged current lower court vacancy
level of 537 or a 24.5% vacancy rate), should not apply
to the Supreme Court which has only a total of 15
positions that are not even vacated at the same time.
The most number of vacancies for any one year
occurred only last year (2009) when seven (7) positions
were vacated by retirement, but this vacancy rate is not
expected to be replicated at any time within the next
decade. Thus "midnight appointments" to the extent that
they were understood in Aytona36 will not occur in the
vacancies of this Court as nominations to its vacancies
are all processed through the JBC under the public’s
close scrutiny. As already discussed above, the
institutional integrity of the Court is hardly an issue. If at
all, only objections personal to the individual Members of
the Court or against the individual applicants can be
made, but these are matters addressed in the first place
by the JBC before nominees are submitted. There, too,
are specific reasons, likewise discussed above,
explaining why the election ban should not apply to the
Supreme Court. These exempting reasons, of course,
have yet to be shown to apply to the lower courts. Thus,
on the whole, the reasons justifying the election ban in
Valenzuela still obtain in so far as the lower courts are
concerned, and have yet to be proven otherwise in a
properly filed case. Until then, Valenzuela, except to the
extent that it mentioned Section 4(1), should remain an
authoritative ruling of this Court.
CONCLUSION
In light of these considerations, a writ of prohibition
cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its
principal function, under the Constitution, of
recommending nominees for the position of Chief
Justice. Thus, I vote to deny with finality the Tolentino
and Soriano motions for reconsideration.
The other motions for reconsideration in so far as they
challenge the conclusion that the President can appoint
the Chief Justice even during the election period are
likewise denied with finality for lack of merit, but are
granted in so far as they support the continued validity of
the ruling of this Court in In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998.
My opinion on the Mendoza petition stands.
SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS
[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE
COSETENG, as members of the Philippine
Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO
ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as
members of the House of Representatives
and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers;
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-
KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN
NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as
non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO
ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO,
RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES,
ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO
MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA,
RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and
FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective
capacities as members of the Philippine
Senate who concurred in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in
her capacity as National Treasurer;
RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO
SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World
Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto
of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized
international business and economic relations amongst
states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards
trade liberalization and economic
globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation
and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are
ushering in a new borderless world of business by
sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national
economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas,
quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best
in specific industries in a market-driven and export-
oriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-
thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and
inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In
Page 41 of 82
the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management
guru, Increased participation in the world economy has
become the key to domestic economic growth and
prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation
wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired
by that grand political body, the United Nations -- were
discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to
address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-
ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal
with currency problems; and the third, the International
Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and
predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral
protectionist policies that invite challenge, even
retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of
reasons, including its non-ratification by the United
States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took
off. What remained was only GATT -- the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection
of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering
the agreements or dependable system of dispute
settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of
negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo
Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave
birth to that administering body -- the World Trade
Organization -- with the signing of the Final Act in
Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the
Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the
goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two
letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction
of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x,
and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly
mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of
special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from
the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial
adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2)
Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were
settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were
arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining
strengths, and where naturally, weak and
underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the
Philippines to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or
impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and
the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court
assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution
prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it General Agreement on Tariffs
prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy and Trade 1994
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are
Agreement on Agriculture
the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Agreement on the Application of
Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional Sanitary and
grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
Phytosanitary Measures
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Agreement on Textiles and
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition Clothing
of its implementation and enforcement through the
release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of Agreement on Technical Barriers
public officials and employees, as well as the use of to Trade
government properties and resources by respondent- Agreement on Trade-Related
heads of various executive offices concerned Investment Measures
therewith.This concurrence is embodied in Senate
Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994. Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General
The Facts Agreement on Tariffs and
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, Trade 1994
then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry Agreement on Implementation of
(Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Article VII of the General
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Agreement on Pre-Shipment
Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity). Inspection

By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on Agreement on Rules of Origin

behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for
the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the
President of the Philippines,[3] stating among others that
the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which
stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act,
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the
Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in
the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate
adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.[6] The text of the WTO Agreement is
written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and
collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements,
for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
Agreement on Imports Licensing
Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and
Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and
Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the
Philippines signed[7] the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V.
RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
after having seen and considered the aforementioned
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and the agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at
Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify
and confirm the same and every Article and Clause
thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by
Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned)
but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions
and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the
Solicitor General describes these two latter documents
as follows:

Page 42 of 82
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-
five declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed
countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute
settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or
limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing
non-conforming measures, market access, national
treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of
financial services, commercial presence and new
financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was
filed. After careful deliberation on respondents comment
and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on
December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition,
and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable
Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to
submit a paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper,
[9]
 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and
(2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996,
the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee
Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript
of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to
file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the
Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of
the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents
mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court
said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996,
the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October
24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or multilateral
treaties or international instruments involving derogation
of Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand,
submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on
January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996,
petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is
otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate
who participated in the deliberations and voting
leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization or of
the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power
which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Page 43 of 82
Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted
for concurrence in the ratification of the
constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they
concurred only in the ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential
submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel
for respondents synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following:[10]
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included
in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the
seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has
effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition
presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate
(Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are
estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the
respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave
abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in
the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing
notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these
three issues thus:
(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental
and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very
jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case --
was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled
upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because
this defense is waivable and the respondents have
effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their
pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents favor, will not cause the petitions dismissal
as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who
are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an
integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised
by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court
noted that the respondents did not question the locus
standi  of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to
have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably
realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of
public funds and serious international commitments of
the nation are involved here, and that transcendental
public interest requires that the substantive issues be
met head on and decided on the merits, rather than
skirted or deflected by procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon
shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A
JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE
STATED, DOES THE PETITION
INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION
OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19,
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR
OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE
OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT
IN PROMULGATING RULES ON
EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE
SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT
AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT
AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND
DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction
Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.[12] Once a
controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the
matters[14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution,[15] as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
Page 44 of 82
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government including Congress. It is an innovation in
our political law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion,[17] the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.This is not only a judicial power but
a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized
in many cases,[18] it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion
and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no
hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be
given due course and the vital questions raised therein
ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no
equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take
jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the
Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule
on the propriety of the governments economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will
only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether
or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three
annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic
Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the
petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit
and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity
provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments
in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions
referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as
follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional
principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum:[19]
a) In the area of investment measures related to
trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and
obligations under GATT 1994. no Member
shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent
with the provisions of Article III or Article XI
of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are
inconsistent with the obligations of general
elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this
Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121,
emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the
obligation of national treatment provided for
in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994
include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with
which is necessary to obtain an advantage,
and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of
products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source, whether specified in
terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of
proportion of volume or value of its local
production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of
imported products be limited to an amount
related to the volume or value of local
products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations
of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT
Page 45 of 82
1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which
restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products
used in or related to the local production
that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products
used in or related to its local production by
restricting its access to foreign exchange
inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified
in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of
a preparation of volume or value of its local
production. (Annex to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol.
27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents,
p.22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is
quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. the provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based
exclusively on the economic operation of the means of
transport and not on the nationality of the
product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the
Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14
September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to
paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments
p.177, emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual
Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and
subject to any conditions and qualifications
set out therein, each Member shall accord to
services and service suppliers of any other
Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of
paragraph I by according to services and
service suppliers of any other Member,
either formally identical treatment or formally
different treatment to that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different
treatment shall be considered to be less
favourable if it modifies the conditions of
 completion in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like
services or service suppliers of any other
Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay
Round Legal Instruments, p.22610
emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue that these
provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the
role exports play in national development and negate the
preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the
Solicitor General counter (1) that such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set
out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions
of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be
read in isolation but should be related to other relevant
provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof;
(3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not
conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO
Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution[21] is
called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean
Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato,[24]  the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of
Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in
the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs.
Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement them, thus:
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates
Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role
of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of
Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that
these are merely statements of principles and
policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly
define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the
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legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the article, the available remedy
was not judicial but political. The electorate could
express their displeasure with the failure of the executive
and the legislature through the language of the
ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an
alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles
are sourced from basic considerations of due process
and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,
[26]
 explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a right cast
in language of a significantly lower order of generality
than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court
can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a
balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments -- the
legislative and executive departments -- must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced
Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII,
apart from merely laying down general principles relating
to the national economy and patrimony, should be read
and understood in relation to the other sections in said
article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy
and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays
down the basic goals of national economic development,
as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then
ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony[27] and in the use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures
that help make them competitive;[28] and (3) by requiring
the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.[29] In
similar language, the Constitution takes into account the
realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of
a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity;[30] and speaks of industries
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets as well as of the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince
Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,
[31]
 this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
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se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional
provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to
the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect
of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather
than the rule. The issue here is not whether this
paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or
not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are
enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow
the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the
WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair.[32] In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the
WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak
and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major
states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the
basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote
equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO
equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible,
otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the
votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member
which would require three fourths vote. Amendments
would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to
MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will
require assent of all members. Any member may
withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six
months from the date of notice of withdrawals.[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through
one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more
decisively than outside the Organization. This is not
merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating
strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles
underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to share in the
growth in international trade commensurate with the
needs of their economic development. These basic
principles are found in the preamble[34] of the WTO
Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts
designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more
viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and
all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to
further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading
system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing
Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that
pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing
countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic
industries some protection from the rush of foreign
competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general,
preferential treatment is given to developing countries in
terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period
within which the reduction is to be spread
out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff
reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within a period of six (6) years while developing
countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to
effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT
requires developed countries to reduce domestic support
to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as
compared to only 13% for developing countries to be
effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products,
GATT requires developed countries to reduce their
budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export
volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period
of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the
reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for
developed countries and a longer period of ten (10)
years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in
protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by
unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of
these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for
the statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary,
the weaker situations of developing nations like the
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there
would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the
respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True,
they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state
into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But
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such decision cannot be set aside on the ground ofgrave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it
or simply because we believe only in other economic
policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction
of this case will not pass upon the advantages and
disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of
determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse
of discretion.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-
reliant and independent national economy[35] does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its
most basic needs.  It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from
undue foreign control of the national economy,
especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.[36]
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national
treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules
of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
on equality and reciprocity,[37] the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino
managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability
and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers
in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a
policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or
Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any
unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise,
nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that
Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, re
spondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available
to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services
obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable
prices. Consequently, the question boils down to
whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the
public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of
favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos
general welfare because it will -- as promised by its
promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate
more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment,
purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
 The responses to these questions involve judgment
calls by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral
exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are
not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave
abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and
Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in
existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified
in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is
necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not
have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
business. By the same token, the United Nations was
not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became
effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then
Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of
the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines
signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the
decisions of various UN organs like the Security
Council?
It is not difficult to answer this
question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only
the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As
one eminent political law writer and respected
jurist[38] explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than
superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but
the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time
develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and
finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution
cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure
by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the
society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of
history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far
from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative
Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed Agreements.[39] Petitioners
maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and
impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative
power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of
the Philippines because this means that Congress could
not pass legislation that will be good for our national
interest and general welfare if such legislation will not
conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only
relates to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of
investments and money x x x as well as to a whole slew
of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said
WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the Constitution
allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
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dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is
subject to specified limits and x x x such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may provide,[42] as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and
Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and
passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on
this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally
been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the
rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and
State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations."[43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the country
is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws.[44] One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda  --
international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation
but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x
x. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or
restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of
their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After
all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used
to record agreements between States concerning such
widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the
termination of war, the regulation of conduct of
hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying
down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations.[46] The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter
into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very
nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by
John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The
age of interdependence is here.[47]
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United
Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented
to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of the
UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United Nations
every assistance in any action it takes in accordance
with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations
is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such
assistance includes payment of its corresponding share
not merely in administrative expenses but also in
expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the
International Court of Justice held that money used by
the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East
and in the Congo were expenses of the United Nations
under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter.Hence,
all its members must bear their corresponding share in
such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is
restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-
keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of
the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting
again the exercise of sovereignty of members within
their own territory. Another example: although sovereign
equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members are set
forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security under
Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article
103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligation under the
present charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably
denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign
power to make a choice as to which of conflicting
obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has
entered into many other international pacts -- both
bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on
Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the
Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24,
1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States
regarding taxes on income, where the
Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt
from tax, income received in the Philippines
by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank
of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of
the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United
States. Likewise, in said convention, wages,
salaries and similar remunerations paid by the
United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as
employees or officials of the United States are
exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing,
among others, for the avoidance of double
taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of
Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for
the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea
where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all
customs duties, inspection fees and other
duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the
regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan,
where the Philippines agreed to exempt from
customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees
and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel,
lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment,
stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on
Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium
where the Philippines granted Belgian air
carriers the same privileges as those granted to
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Japanese and Korean air carriers under
separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of
transit and visitor visas where the Philippines
exempted Israeli nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas
for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding
59 days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting
French nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn
not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions,
where the Philippines agreed that premises of
Special Missions in the Philippines are
inviolable and its agents can not enter said
premises without consent of the Head of
Mission concerned. Special Missions are also
exempted from customs duties, taxes and
related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of
Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines
agreed to be governed by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines
accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. The International
Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal
disputes concerning the interpretation of a
treaty, any question of international law, the
existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of international
obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has
effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police
power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of
the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials
and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the
Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear
disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of
the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But
unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as
an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits
of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs
associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade
treaties that structure relations by reference to durable,
well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger
countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller
countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of
legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically
stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that
liberalization will provide access to a larger set of
potential new trading relationship than in case of the
larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller
countrys market.[48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing
treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with
all nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial
Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)[49]intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34,
TRIPS,[51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect
of the infringement of the rights of the owner
referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the
subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining
a product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the
process to obtain an identical product is different
from the patented process. Therefore, Members
shall provide, in at least one of the following
circumstances, that any identical product when
produced without the consent of the patent owner
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
deemed to have been obtained by the patented
process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is
new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the process
and the owner of the patent has been
unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the
burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on
the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to
in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the
condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the
legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken
into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to
provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the
absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a
product shown to be identical to one produced with the
use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been
obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented
process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made with the
use of the said patented process but the owner of the
patent could not determine the exact process used in
obtaining such identical product. Hence, the burden of
proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to
overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly
understood, actually refers to the burden of
evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the
producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that
his product was produced without the use of the
patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner
still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34,
such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it
is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented
process and the fact of newness of the genuine product
Page 51 of 82
or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise
known as the Patent Law, provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patented design
or utility model, thus:
SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design
patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility
model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or
product and in the making, using or selling of the article
or product copying the patented design or utility
model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented
design or utility model shall constitute evidence of
copying. (underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of
Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies
only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process
is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the process and the
process owner has not been able through reasonable
effort to determine the process used. Where either of
these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own
internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection
with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of
legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue
also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more
than justifies such intrusion, if any actually
exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.[52]
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO
Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained
in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in
the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services --
is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse
of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the
WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the
document signed by Secretary Navarro, in
representation of the Republic upon authority of the
President. They contend that the second letter of the
President to the Senate[53] which enumerated what
constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of
concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is
an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference.[54] It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years. The text
of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in
just one page[55] in Vol. I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of their respective
competent authorities with a view to seeking
approval of the Agreement in accordance with
their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the
WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were
deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of
GATT which provides that representatives of the
members can meet to give effect to those provisions of
this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally
with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the
objectives of this Agreement.[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to
the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members
which have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer
and processing of information, and national treatment
with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and
refinancing available in the normal course of business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts,[58] as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among
its Members in matters to the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in the
Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3
(hereinafter referred to as Multilateral Agreements)
are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all
Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter
referred to as Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are
also part of this Agreement for those Members that
have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do
not create either obligation or rights for Members
that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred
to as GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30
October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at
the conclusion of the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, as
subsequently rectified, amended or modified
(hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware
of what it was concurring in as shown by the members
Page 52 of 82
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter
of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,[59] the
senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the
Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity
of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this
Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by
Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate
was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade
Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round
which is not the same as the agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator
Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he
agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his
suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was
acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the
proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of
briefings for Senators until the question of the
submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President
submitting a new... is he making a new submission
which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is
clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it
was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later
on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that
raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now
clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate
for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
but rather the Agreement on the World Trade
Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in
Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new
submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we
hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator
Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the
new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the
draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the
provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act
itself. The Constitution does not require us to ratify the
Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is
now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what
is going to be submitted to with the governments of the
participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives
agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to
be submitted to the governments for ratification or
acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures
may provide but it is the World Trade Organization
Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted
now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the
Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I
call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this
matter are already a matter of record. And they had
been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays
session and I dont see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex
abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator
Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any
comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation
just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating
the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to
make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine
ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein
via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ
of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may
be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[62] Failure on the part of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in
the dismissal of the petition.[63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets
that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two
sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to
great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional
body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions
are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless
convincing proof and persuasive arguments are
presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court
will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing
well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and
the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave
abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power
of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec.
21 of Article VII of the Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad
constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while
serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of
a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
Page 53 of 82
equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said
treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in
the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy
of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of
the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or
despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in
such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree
with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No.
97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the
exercise of our own judicial power and duty.Ineludably,
what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry
and review. That is a matter between the elected policy
makers and the people. As to whether the nation should
join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people
should determine in electing their policy makers. After
all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the
best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance[65] where the East will become the dominant
region of the world economically, politically and culturally
in the next century. He refers to the free market
espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian
ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections
against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the
WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. The alternative to WTO is
isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-
destruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed
with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles
the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the
people, through their duly authorized elected officers,
make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO,  J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony
covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual
strategic partner, is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared
by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS
WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions
set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November
3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer
the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with
the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase
and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC
not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent
GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent
a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-
three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
Page 54 of 82
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was
accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it
by the First Division. The case was then set for oral
arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.  It
is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos
who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.[6]Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the
shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent
GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51%
of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by
the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila
Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not
a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to
operate, there must be existing laws to lay down
conditions under which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-
executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the
term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and
all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who
have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of
the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of
the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner
should have questioned it right from the beginning and
not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar.
J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission
by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave
abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS
did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical
manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it
demands and respondents do not have an imperative
duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.
[11]
 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or
by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without
any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline
of government providing for the different departments of
the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
Page 55 of 82
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing
x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them
entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing,
as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am
asking this question as the Chairman of
the Committee on Style. If the wording of
PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So,
why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of
Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove
the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that
is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws or
prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of
other financial structures, et
cetera (underscoring supplied by
respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so
long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and
add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does
not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing
nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The
argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are
not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language
require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that
certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-
executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20]speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the
sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in
nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and
the values of education.[25] Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social
justice and human rights[27] and on education.
[28]
 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions
on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of
family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-
building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation
and development.[33] A reading of these provisions
indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines
for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest
that they are only principles upon which legislations must
be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
Page 56 of 82
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that  [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to our
rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. Therefore, we should develop not only
our lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty
of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the  Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of
the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the
book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.
[37]
 During World War II the hotel was converted by the
Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places
for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and
1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities,
playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970
the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In
1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where
an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President
of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has
bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and request Commissioner Nolledo to please
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the restate his amendment so that I can ask a
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the question.
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
which the building stands.[38]
FILIPINOS.
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment,
Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
Filipino enterprise still be given a
1986 Constitutional Commission -
preference?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
recognized.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an
some aspects than the Filipino enterprise,
amendment to the Nolledo
will the Filipino still be preferred?
amendment. And the amendment would
consist in substituting the words MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following:
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS Expounding further on the Filipino First
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING Policy  provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS. MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President.
Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE
xxxx STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently
the so-called Filipino First policy. That
the proponent is agreeable, but we have
means that Filipinos should be given
to raise a question. Suppose it is a
preference in the grant of concessions,
corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do
privileges and rights covering the national
we not give it preference?
patrimony.[42]
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would
The exchange of views in the sessions of the
refer to an individual Filipino. What about
Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
a corporation wholly owned by Filipino
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
citizens?
Nolledo[43] -
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-
President.
Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention? as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we
would be limiting it if we say that the The term qualified Filipinos simply means that
preference should only be 100-percent preference shall be given to those citizens who can
Filipino. make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations
refer only to individuals and not to juridical
that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
personalities or entities.
indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. and inimical to the common good.
[39]
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
xxxx concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request
be chosen over the former.
that the amendment be read again.
Lastly, the word qualified is also
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN
determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES
respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
inference here is that petitioner has been found to be
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel
FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here,
industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
as intended by the proponents, will
hotel company, or it has an overall management and
include not only individual Filipinos but
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
also Filipino-controlled entities or entities
Hotel.[44]
fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was
the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is
explained thus -
not self-executory and requires implementing legislation

Page 57 of 82
is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision - by the government itself - is
only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is
to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing
legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to
enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable
legal standards for executive action. When the executive
acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation
every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government
operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional
provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only
be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this
fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents
GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is
a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make
the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when
the government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51%
of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers
not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed
of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3)
branches of government. It is undeniable that in this
case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed
among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving
its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder
shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid
is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under
obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
Page 58 of 82
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must
conform with the fundamental law of the land.Those
which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides
that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
[47]
 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to
the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a strongerreason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give
life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules,
the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that
this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood
to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing
into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered
by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner
had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then
to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier
bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent
GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a
cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the
constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel
to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in
the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This
Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the
duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it
is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not
the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much
less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far
from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution.The position of the Court on
this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its
function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme
Court has not been spared criticism for decisions
perceived as obstacles to economic progress and
development x x x x in connection with a temporary
injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its
partner, certain statements were published in a major
daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates
that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle
to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is
no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the
kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to
make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the
laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how
buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of
enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should
not take precedence over non-material values. A
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not
be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler
non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer
to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free
society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review
when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the
Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from
whom all government authority emanates. In
Page 59 of 82
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional
provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection
of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the
MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not
talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic
that has hosted many of the most important events in the
short history of the Philippines as a nation.We are talking
about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be
housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak
the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has
played and continues to play a significant role as an
authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part
in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from
the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of
this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands
cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul
for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What
advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a
qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila
Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-
Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be
preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified,  zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning
of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
OPOSA V FACTORAN
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts
of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to
"prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77
which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital
Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that
the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land
area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may
be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological
and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%)
for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as
a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000)
cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
Page 60 of 82
communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals
and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in
marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings
of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion
peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which
has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise
known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the
foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the
Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's
land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal
that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's
land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a
mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8%
of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the
defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the
corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays included — the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after
the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being
felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by
defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will
work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who
may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as
the  parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in
the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated
March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and
refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to
the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by
defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated
in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conductive
to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued
refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
Page 61 of 82
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth."
(Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to
the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have
no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable
question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order
granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the
complaint states no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in
this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept
of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation
per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's
right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas
for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the
said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as  parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to
the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is
not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity,
the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing,
to have violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements
of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the
present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest not just to several, but
to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if
not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
Page 62 of 82
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers 
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect
evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific
legal right they are seeking to enforce
and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress
(Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In
fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of
action in its Complaint against the
herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes
that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of
the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that
the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health
which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section
mandate the State to
provide sanctions
against all forms of
pollution — air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President.
The right to healthful
(sic) environment
necessarily carries with
Page 63 of 82
it the correlative duty of
not impairing the same
and, therefore,
sanctions may be
provided for impairment
of environmental
balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning
the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof
makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is
hereby declared the policy of the State
to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal,
and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the
quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the
development and the use of the
country's natural resources, not only for
the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy
of the state to recognize and apply a
true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative
to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title
XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The
State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making
the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different
 segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize
and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2
of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks
of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher
authority, be in charge of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy)
and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were
issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b)
to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its
goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation
as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should
be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or
Page 64 of 82
omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts
to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show,  prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said
to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents
the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second
part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in
the judiciary, and particularly the
 Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking
for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the
jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. Article VII, Section
1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . .
.
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing
the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo  declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and
the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national
interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to
Page 65 of 82
the end that public welfare is promoted.
A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can
be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege
to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr.
& Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation
of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe
vs. Foster Wheeler 
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our
system of government, is not meant to
be absolute. The same is understood to
be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of
 public health, moral, safety and welfare.
In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs.
New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use
of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is
that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in
the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how
the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to
the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order
of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil
Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners
may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
. members of the said homeowners association paid to
STARE DECISIS, RES JUDICATA, LAW OF THE
CASE
[G.R. No. 148126. November 10, 2003]
GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA,
AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C.
FERNANDEZ, and their Respective
Spouses, petitioners, vs. Spouses ANTONIO
C. CHAVEZ and NOEMI MARCOS-CHAVEZ
and CARLITA C. CHAVEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Stare  decisis  simply means that a judgment
reached in one case should be applied to successive
ones in which the facts are substantially identical, even
though the parties may be different. Like cases ought to
be decided alike.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 9, 2001
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 58329. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
Page 66 of 82
WHEREFORE,  the judgment dated March 29, 2000 of
Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles City is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
judgment entered in favor of the petitioners, ordering the
respondents and all persons claiming rights under them
to vacate from the subject lots and to remove their
houses and/or any other structures or constructions
thereon.[3]
The overturned Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 56,[4] affirmed in toto the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City, Branch II.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in
this wise:
In a Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages filed on
October 15, 1998, the [respondents] alleged that they
are the owners of four (4) parcels of land designated as
Lot Nos. 164, 165, 166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey
of Angeles City, and covered, respectively, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 83247, 83246, 83248 and
83249, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Angeles
City. These four (4) parcels of land have been
consolidated and subdivided into several blocks and lots,
and are now collectively designated
as Bagong Silang Phase III-C. By mere permission and
tolerance of the [respondents], the [petitioners] have
occupied and erected their homes on four (4) of the said
lots, as follows:
George T. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 14
Carlos N. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 13
Aurora M. Bondoc and husband = Block 2, Lot 4
Ronnie C. Hernandez and wife = Block 3, Lot 5
All the [petitioners] are members of
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners
Association, Inc., with office address
at Cutud, Angeles City. The [respondents] allowed the
[petitioners] and other members of the said homeowners
association to continue occupying the subject lots and
ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots occupied, in
consideration of a certain amount to be paid to the
[respondents] as equity.
The [respondents] further alleged that the other
the [respondents] their respective equity for their right to
continue occupying and ultimately acquiring ownership
of the occupied lots. However, notwithstanding repeated
demands made upon the [petitioners], they have refused
and failed without any justifiable ground to pay their
respective equity. In view of such failure to pay, the
[petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue
occupying the lots in question. Formal demand letters
were then sent by registered mail to the [petitioners],
wherein they were given a period of thirty (30) days from
receipt within which to vacate and remove their houses
from the subject lots. The period given to the [petitioners]
lapsed on April 11, 1998, but up to the present time, the
[petitioners] refused and failed without any justifiable
reason or ground to vacate and remove their houses
from the said lots.
The [respondents] then prayed in their Complaint that
the [petitioners] be ordered to vacate and remove their
houses from the lots currently occupied; that each of the
[petitioners] be ordered to pay the [respondents]
P1,000.00 a month as reasonable rental for the use and
occupation of the lots starting from April 11, 1998 until
they have finally vacated and removed their houses from
said lots; and that the [petitioners] jointly and severally
pay the [respondents] P25,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P2,000.00 as appearance fee
per hearing, exemplary damages, and the costs of the
suit.
In their answer with compulsory counter-claim filed
on November 3, 1998, the [petitioners] countered that
the [respondents] have no cause of action to institute the
present action, considering that the properties in
question are under the community mortgage program
implemented by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation. Moreover, the [petitioners] claimed that
they are lawful tenants of the premises, and that they
have been paying their equity to their originator,
the Urban Land and Development Foundation[,] Inc.
However, they were not issued the corresponding
receipts evidencing payment and a copy of their
contract. The [petitioners] further averred that they were
willing to continue paying their equity until the same shall
have been fully paid, but their originator, without
justifiable reason, refused to accept the tender of
payment made by them. The [petitioners] subsequently
agreed with their originator that the payment of equity
should be continued only upon the release of a
Purchase Commitment Line (PCL).
In addition, the [petitioners] alleged that they are
qualified beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992; hence, they cannot be summarily
evicted and their dwelling houses demolished unless
and until they have been relocated. According to the
[petitioners], they are also builders in good faith and
should be indemnified for the improvements they
constructed on the properties in question.
The [petitioners] prayed in their answer that the
complaint be dismissed; that they be declared lawful
tenants and qualified beneficiaries under R.A. 7279; that
the [respondents] be ordered to sell the lots in question
to them, and to pay attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
After the pre-trial conference, both parties submitted
their position papers. On September 15, 1999, MTC
Branch II of Angeles City rendered a decision dismissing
both the [respondents] complaint and the [petitioners]
counter-claim, on the ground that the filing of
an ejectment case based on the alleged violation of the
parties agreement which has not yet been rescinded is
premature, and that it is beyond the competence of the
said court to act on the case, as rescission or specific
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of the said court.
The [respondents] appealed such adverse judgment to
the RTC of Angeles City, which appeal was raffled to
Branch 56 of the said court. On March 29, 2000, RTC
Branch 56 of Angeles City rendered a decision affirming
in toto the MTC judgment.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the right of petitioners to continue
occupying the subject properties hinged on their
continued payment of the agreed amount as equity.
[7]
 Even after formal letters of demand to vacate the
premises had been sent to them, however, they still did
not make any effort to pay their equity to protect their
right to continue occupying those lots. Thus, the
appellate court ruled that their failure to pay made their
occupancy unlawful, in consequence of which they
became subject to an ejectment suit.
The CA rejected the contention of petitioners that
they were protected by RA 7279. According to the
appellate court, there was no express declaration by the
local government unit that the parcels of land owned by
respondents were to be used for socialized housing.
Neither was there proof of the allegation that they had
applied therefor under the Community Mortgage
Program of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Page 67 of 82
Corporation under Section 31 of RA 7279. Besides, even
granting that petitioners were protected under RA 7279,
they were still liable to pay amortization or face eviction.
Likewise debunked was the allegation of petitioners
that respondents were not the real parties in interest.
Being the owners of the lots occupied by the former, the
latter had a material interest in the suit and stood to be
benefited or injured by any judgment affecting those
parcels of land.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside
the Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II and
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 both of Angeles
City[;]
II. Whether or not the Honorable Municipal Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the case;
III. Whether or not the non-inclusion of
the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association Inc., is fatal
to respondents[] cause of action[;]
IV. Whether or not ejectment is proper in the case at bar;
V. Whether or not the absence of contractual relation[s]
between the respondents and the petitioners bar[s] the
filing of any action by the respondents against the
petitioner.[9]
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether
unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve this
case. If it is, then the MTC indeed had jurisdiction over
the case, and the CA was correct in overturning
the RTCs ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the case.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Unlawful  Detainer
The CA ruled that petitioners possession or
occupancy of the subject premises was by mere
tolerance of respondents. Hence, once petitioners failed
to pay the agreed amount as equity, their right to
continue occupying the lots was lost.
We disagree. Contradictory were the statements of
the appellate court that, on the one hand, there was no
contract between the parties; and yet, on the other, that
petitioners failed to pay the agreed  equity. The fact that
the CA found that there was failure to pay the equity was
an indication of an agreement. To be sure, petitioners
possession of the subject premises was not by mere
tolerance of respondents.
In the Complaint[10] of respondents, filed before
Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,
they themselves alleged the presence of an agreement
between the parties as follows:
10. That in consideration of a certain amount to be paid
to the [respondents] by each of the [petitioners] as equity
for their right to continue occupying and ultimately
acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy, the said
homeowners association has made arrangements with
the [respondents] to allow the [petitioners] and other
members of the said homeowners association to
continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy[.][11]
 Further, in the Special Power of
Attorney[12] annexed to their Complaint, they constituted
and appointed Teodorico B. Sanchez and/or Arturo
M. Yadan as their attorneys-in-fact to do, among others,
the following:
1. To collect and receive any amount or amounts as
equity for the sale thereof to them from the occupants or
any other interested buyer or buyers of any portion or
portions of the following-described parcels of land:
xxx xxx xxx
of which we are the absolute and exclusive owners, and
which comprise the parcels of land being acquired by the
members or beneficiaries of the BAGONG SILANG
PHASE III-C HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
at Brgy. Cutud, Angeles City[.][13]
Based on the admissions of respondents
themselves, they entered into an agreement with
petitioners. Necessarily, the latters occupancy of the lots
in question was not based merely on
the formers tolerance or permission. Thus, petitioners
were not necessarily bound by an implied promise to
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action
for ejectment would have become proper.
The MTCs findings of fact on this point are
instructive:
About the only thing that the parties have met on a
common ground is that: [Respondents] have entered into
an arrangement/agreement
with Bagong Silang Homeowners Association, Inc. that
called for the payment of certain amounts as equity for
[petitioners] right to continue occupying the lots with the
end in view of eventually becoming the owners thereof,
that pursuant to such agreement [petitioners] have paid
certain amounts as acquisition fees or as equity but later
discontinued making payments in view of the non-
issuance of the so-called purchase commitment
line/loan, and as a consequence, [respondents] are now
accusing [petitioners] for violating the agreement and on
the basis of such breach of the agreement by
[petitioners], demands for the latter to vacate the lots
were made by [respondents].[14]
When respondents alleged that
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners Association
made arrangements with them to allow petitioners and
other members of the association to continue to occupy
and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots in
question, respondents explicitly admitted that a contract
had indeed been entered into. The eventual transfer of
ownership of real property evidenced that obligation.
What is clear is that in their Complaint, respondents
alleged that petitioners had violated the stipulations of
their agreement as follows:
11. That the other members of
the Ba[g]ong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners
Association, Inc., paid to the [respondents] their
respective equity for their right to continue occupying
and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they
occupy, but notwithstanding repeated demands made on
them, up to the present time, the [petitioners] have
refused and failed without any justifiable ground or
reason to pay their respective equity to the
[respondents], and, in view of such refusal and failure,
the [petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue
occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots
that they occupy[.][15]
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied any breach
on their part and argued that the principal issue was one
of interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the
contract. Under these circumstances, proof of violation
of the provisions of the contract is a condition precedent
Page 68 of 82
to resolution or rescission.[16] The contract can be
declared rescinded only when its nature has been
clarified and the eventual violation thereof, if any, has
been established. Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges
a pronouncement that the possession of the realty has
become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not
possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or
rescission of the contract -- a matter that is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to hear and
determine.
An allegation of a violation of a contract or
agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the
presentation of competent evidence, upon which an
MTC judge might make a finding to that effect. But
certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the
contract is rescinded, as such power is vested in the
RTC.[17]
The rescission of the contract is the basis of, and
therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of a
partys possession of a piece of realty.[18] Without judicial
intervention and determination, even a stipulation
entitling one party to take possession of the land and
building in case the other party violates the contract
cannot confer upon the former the right to take
possession thereof, if that move is objected to.[19]
To be sure, the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint.[20] Thus, in
ascertaining whether or not an action is one for
unlawful detainer falling within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought should be examined.
Also, as correctly pleaded by petitioners, a similar
case had been decided by the CA in CA-GR SP No.
58679, in which it ruled that the proper action should
have been a complaint for rescission or specific
performance, not for illegal detainer. In that case, the
same plaintiffs filed the same charges against a different
but similarly situated set of defendants.
The appellate court ruled therein that there was an
existing agreement or contract that determined the
nature of the parties relationship.[21] Thus, it held that the
proper action should have been for rescission of contract
or specific performance, not unlawful detainer.[22] When
the CA Decision was elevated, this Court denied the
appeal for failure to show that a reversible error had
been committed by the appellate court. Thereafter, the
Decision became final and executory on April 23, 2002.
[23]
Said the appellate court in the previous case:
Inasmuch as the relationship existing between the
parties is not a lessor-lessee relationship but one that
emanated from the agreement between appellants and
the Urban Land and Development Foundation, Inc., the
so-called originator of the Bagong Silang Homeowners
Association, Inc., the relief being sought then by
appellants appears to be improper. If ever there was no
payment of equity as provided for under the said
agreement, the same cannot be considered as non-
payment of rentals. Thus, it cannot be a sufficient basis
for filing an ejectment case against appellees, the proper
remedy being an action for rescission of contract or
specific performance.[24]
We stress that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same.
[25]
 Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
the same, even though the parties may be different.[26] It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent
any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike.[27]
Having ruled that the MTC had indeed no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case in the first
place, we see no more need to address the other issues
raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is OVERTURNED. Consequently, the
Decisions of the MTC and the RTC of Angeles City
are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 116680. August 28, 1996]
NICOLAS VELOSO, JR., CONCEPCION VELOSO
PATALINGHUG, EDUARDO VELOSO,
LIGAYA VELOSO ROA, RAFAEL VELOSO,
EMERENCIANA VELOSO CABIGON,
DOMINGO VELOSO and EMMANUEL
VELOSO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 14,
BAYBAY, LEYTE, CORSINI MIRAFLOR
AVELLANA, AUREO PEALOSA MIRAFLOR,
EDDIE PEALOSA MIRAFLOR and DOUGLAS
PEALOSA MIRAFLOR, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari through
which petitioners seek a reversal of the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dismissing their petition to
annul judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. B-1043, for
lack of merit. Petitioners claim that the questioned
decision of the trial court is inherently flawed because
the issues raised therein had already been resolved
earlier in another case involving the same parties and
subject matter, and that a trial court has no power to
countermand a decision of a co-equal court.
There is however much more to their pious avowals
than meets the eye.
On 12 September 1988 respondents Corsini
Miraflor Avellana, Aureo Pealosa Miraflor, Eddie Pealosa
Miraflor and Douglas Pealosa Miraflor filed a complaint
for quieting of title with damages against Nicolas Veloso,
Sr. and petitioners Nicolas Veloso, Jr., Concepcion
Veloso Patalinghug, Eduardo Veloso, Ligaya Veloso
Roa, Rafael Veloso, Emerenciana Veloso Cabigon,
Domingo Veloso and Emmanuel Veloso before the
Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, docketed as Civil
Case No. B-1043.[1] The subject matter of the complaint
was Lot No. 8422-F covered by TCT No. 22393 in the
name of Crispina Pealosa Miraflor, deceased mother of
respondents.
On 31 August 1990 the trial court rendered
judgment (a) finding TCT No. T-22393 authentic, valid,
indefeasible and entitled to all faith and credence under
Act 496; (b) declaring respondents absolute co-owners
in fee simple of Lot No. 8422-F; (c) directing petitioners
or anyone of them in possession of Lot No. 8422-F to
deliver to respondents the physical and material
possession thereof together with all the improvements
thereon; and, (d) ordering petitioners in solidum to pay
respondents P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and P2,000.00
as reimbursement for litigation expenses.[2]
Page 69 of 82
Petitioners elevated the case to respondent Court
of Appeals which on 28 May 1992 affirmed the decision
of the trial court.[3]
Petitioners then came to us.[4] On 12 October 1992
however we denied the petition as the issues raised
therein were essentially factual. There was no showing
that the findings of fact of respondent court were not
supported by substantial evidence and that it committed
any reversible error in its judgment.[5] On 15 March 1993
an order for the entry of judgment was issued.[6]
On 20 September 1993 petitioners, undaunted by
their reverses, sought annulment of the decision of the
trial court before respondent Court of Appeals.
On 29 July 1994 respondent court likewise ruled
against petitioners as it found that the controversy had
already been settled by this Court and that the
contention that the trial court did not have any power or
authority to amend, alter or modify the decision of a co-
equal court, the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Br.
III and Br. VIII, should have been raised in the previous
proceedings.[7]
The main issue is whether respondent court erred
in refusing to declare the decision of the trial court void
for having been rendered allegedly in violation of the
doctrines of resjudicata and the law of the case.
Petitioners rely on the decision of 9 January 1951 in
Civil Case No. R-205[8] which has already become final
and executory for lack of appeal by any of the parties,
and on the decision of 29 July 1969 in Civil Case No. B-
122[9] which was affirmed by respondent court on 11
November 1974[10] and executed on 9 July 1975. They
allege that those decisions upheld their possession and
ownership and of their parents Nicolas Veloso, Sr. and
Emerenciana Pealosa over 3/5 portion of Lot No. 8422,
including the 1/5 portion representing the share of
Crispina Pealosa Miraflor (Lot No. 8422-F) which she
transferred to her parents by virtue of a deed of sale
executed on 4 May 1948. Petitioners thus claim that the
trial court had absolutely no jurisdiction to amend, alter
or modify those final and executed decisions.
But we find no reversible error committed by
respondent court.
In Civil Case No. R-205, the plaintiff therein as
administrator of the estate of Filomena Bermoy, great
grandmother of respondents, sought recovery of Lot No.
8422 from the children of spouses Pedro de Veyra and
Leopolda Valenzona. The trial court however dismissed
the complaint on the basis of its finding that Lot No. 8422
no longer formed part of the estate of Bermoy. Prior to
her death, Filomena Bermoy sold the land in question to
a certain Gonzalo Varron who in turn disposed of it in
favor of spouses Pedro de Veyra and Leopolda
Valenzona, so that on 2 March 1936 OCT No. 16752
was issued in their name. Lot No. 8422 was later
involved in Civil Case No. R-5 for partition among their
children. In the decision rendered in that case,
Emerenciana P. Veloso, Lourdes P. Bibas, Proculo
Pealosa and Crispina P. Miraflor were declared absolute
owners thereof. The trial court however observed that on
4 May 1948 Crispina P. Miraflor disposed of her share
and interest in the property in favor of her sister,
Emerenciana P. Veloso, and the latters husband,
Nicolas Veloso, Sr.
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. B-122 Nicolas
Veloso, et al., filed a complaint for reconveyance of a
portion of Lot No. 8422 with partition and damages
against Proculo Pealosa and Lourdes P. Bibas. The trial
court rendered judgment thereon against Proculo
Pealosa. But the trial court also observed in passing that
the share of Crispina P. Miraflor was already purchased
by the Veloso spouses in 1948.
Both decisions were brought by petitioners to the
attention of the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1043 which
resolved the controversy thus
Upon the totality of the evidence, the plaintiffs and the
defendants, indicating that what was sold by Crispina P.
Miraflor in May 1948 were/was not her share in Lot
8422, denominated as sub-lot 8422-F, are
these firstly, her Deed of Sale in 1948 does not
specifically state that what she was alienating was her
ideal share in Lot 8422; on the other hand, it
specified/specifies that the subject of her share was her
share in the estate of Leopolda Valenzona, her mother,
and her share in the estate of Filomena Bermoy, her
aunt (grandmother), located in Barrio Caridad, Baybay,
Leyte; secondly, in Civil Case R-205, where the Court-
appointed administrator of the estate of Filomena
Bermoy sought inclusion of Lot 8422 in the estate of the
latter, the Court decided that Lot 8422 is not part of said
estate, hereat showing that Lot 8422 is different,
separate and distinct from said estate of Filomena
Bermoy and what was sold by Crispina P. Miraflor
belonged to this separate estate; thirdly, the subdivision
survey of Lot 8422, which gave way to the delineation of
the share of Cristina P. Miraflor as sub-lot 8422-F was
not performed in deceit but as a matter of right on the
part of a co-owner, at this instance co-owner Crispina
Pealosa Miraflor; fourthly, much as the spouses Nicolas
Veloso, Sr. and Emerenciana Pealosa resided in Barrio
Caridad, Baybay, Leyte or environs, no protest was
raised against the subdivision survey, it here stressed
that licensed surveyors, as Engineer Besavilla was/is, as
a professional has not only his professional ethics but
the presumption that he satisfied the requirements of law
in the premises when the subdivision survey was
performed by him; fifthly, in Civil Case No. 122-R (B-
122) which sought the recovery by the plaintiffs Veloso
spouses of certain portions of Lot 8422 as a
consequence of the subdivision survey, only co-owners
Proculo Pealosa and Lourdes Pealosa Bibas were
impleaded as defendants; conversely, Crispina Pealosa
Miraflor was not made a defendant, such that the
decision was only against Proculo Pealosa, and did not
even include co-defendant Lourdes Pealosa Bibas, and
recovered from Proculo Pealosa was only some 5,455.4
square meters of Lot 8422; sixthly, plaintiffs evidence,
that before the death in 1975 of Crispina P. Miraflor her
sister Emerenciana and the latters husband Nicolas
Veloso, Sr. rendered shares of the produce of her
(Crispinas) share in Lot 8422, is buttressed (Exhibits T,
T-1-a-1, T-1-a-2, T-1-b, U, U-1, V, V-1-a), and these are
not adequately rebutted by the defendants;
and, seventhly, in actions for quieting of title, the
plaintiff(s) need not be in possession of the property
involved (Article 477, Civil Code) if plaintiffs are not in
possession of Lot 8422-F even only constructively.[11]
As aforestated, the above ruling of the trial court
was affirmed both by respondent court and this Court.
Now under the guise of a petition for annulment of
judgment, petitioners in effect are seeking a second
cycle of review regarding a subject matter which has
already been fully and fairly adjudicated. That cannot be
allowed.
Contrary to the circuitous assertion of petitioners
that the rulings in Civil Cases Nos. R-205 and B-122
constitute res judicata or the law of the case to Civil
Case No. B-1043, it is the holding in the latter case
which is now a bar to the present proceeding under the
same doctrines invoked by them. Material facts or
questions which were in issue in a former action and
were there admitted or judicially determined are
Page 70 of 82
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein and
that such facts or questions become res judicata and
may not again be litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies, regardless of
the form the issue may take in the subsequent action,
whether the subsequent action involves the same or a
different form of proceeding, or whether the second
action is upon the same or a different cause of action,
subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. In
such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions are
based on different grounds, or tried on different theories,
or instituted for different purposes, and seek different
reliefs.[12] By the same token, whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle
or decision continues to be the law of the case between
the same parties in the same case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case before the court.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 29 July
1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107846. April 18, 1997]
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and FILINVEST FINANCE
CORP., respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
24684[1] which affirmed the order of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40, Manila, in Civil Case No. 84804.[2]
The dispute stemmed from an unpaid promissory
note dated October 28, 1970, executed by petitioner
Leovillo C. Agustin in favor of ERM Commercial for the
amount of P43,480.80.The note was payable in monthly
installments[3] and secured by a chattel mortgage over
an Isuzu diesel truck,[4] both of which were subsequently
assigned to private respondent Filinvest Finance
Corporation.[5] When petitioner defaulted in paying the
installments, private respondent demanded from him the
payment of the entire balance or, in lieu thereof, the
possession of the mortgaged vehicle. Neither payment
nor surrender was made. Aggrieved, private respondent
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26 (RTC Branch 26) against petitioner praying
for the issuance of a writ of replevin or, in the alternative,
for the payment of P32,723.97 plus interest at the rate of
14% per annum from due date until fully paid.[6] Trial
ensued and, thereafter, a writ of replevin was issued by
RTC Branch 26. By virtue thereof, private respondent
acquired possession of the vehicle. Upon repossession,
the latter discovered that the vehicle was no longer in
running condition and that several parts were missing
which private respondent replaced. The vehicle was then
foreclosed and sold at public auction.
Private respondent subsequently filed a
supplemental complaint claiming additional
reimbursement worth P8,852.76 as value of replacement
parts[7] and for expenses incurred in transporting the
mortgaged vehicle from Cagayan to Manila. In response,
petitioner moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint
arguing that RTC Branch 26 had already lost jurisdiction
over the case because of the earlier extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. The lower court granted the
motion and the case was dismissed.[8] Private
respondent elevated the matter to the appellate court,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 56718-R, which set aside the
order of dismissal and ruled that repossession expenses
incurred by private respondent should be reimbursed.
[9]
 This decision became final and executory, hence the
case was accordingly remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 40 (RTC Branch 40) for
reception of evidence to determine the amount due from
petitioner.[10] After trial, RTC Branch 40 found petitioner
liable for the repossession expenses, attorney's fees,
liquidated damages, bonding fees and other expenses in
the seizure of the vehicle in the aggregate sum
of P18,547.38. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Acting thereon, RTC Branch 40 modified its decision by
lowering the monetary award to P8,852.76, the amount
originally prayed for in the supplemental complaint.
[11]
 Private respondent appealed the case with respect to
the reduction of the amount awarded. Petitioner,
likewise, appealed impugning the trial courts order for
him to pay private respondent P8,852.76, an amount
over and above the value received from the foreclosure
sale. Both appeals were consolidated and in CA- G.R.
No. 24684, the modified order of RTC Branch 40 was
affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
to no avail[12] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the award of repossession
expenses to private respondent as mortgagee is
"contrary to the letter, intent and spirit of Article
1484[13] of the Civil Code".[14] He asserts that private
respondents repossession expenses have been amply
covered by the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage,
hence he could no longer be held liable. The arguments
are devoid of merit.
Petitioners contentions, we note, were previously
rejected by respondent court in its decision in CA-G.R.
No. 56718-R the dispositive portion of which provides as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the order dismissing the case is hereby
set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for
reception of evidence of `expenses properly incurred in
effecting seizure of the chattel (and) of recoverable
attorney's fees in prosecuting the action for replevin' as
`repossession expenses' prayed for in the supplemental
complaint, without pronouncement as to costs."[15]
which ruling has long acquired finality. It is clear,
therefore, that the appellate court had already settled the
propriety of awarding repossession expenses in favor of
private respondent.The remand of the case to RTC
Branch 40 was for the sole purpose of threshing out the
correct amount of expenses and not for relitigating the
accuracy of the award. Thus, the findings of RTC Branch
40, as affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
24684, was confined to the appreciation of evidence
relative to the repossession expenses for the query or
issuepassed upon by the respondent court in CA-G.R.
No. 56718-R (propriety of the award for repossession
expenses) has become the law of the case. This
principle is defined as a term applied to an established
rule that when an appellate court passes on a question
and remands the cause to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law
of the case upon subsequent appeal.[16] Having exactly
the same parties and issues, the decision in the former
appeal (CA-G.R. No. 56718-R) is now the established
and controlling rule. Petitioner may not therefore be
allowed in a subsequent appeal (CA-G.R. No. 24684)
and in this petition to resuscitate and revive formerly
settled issues. Judgment of courts should attain finality
at some point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there
will be no end to litigation.
At any rate, even if we were to brush aside the law
of the case doctrine we find the award for repossession
expenses still proper. In Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation v. Ridad,[17] the Court recognized an
Page 71 of 82
exception to the rule stated under Article 1484(3) upon
which petitioner relies. Thus:
x x x Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the
chattel subject of the mortgage upon his failure to pay
two or more installments, or if he conceals the chattel to
place it beyond the reach of the mortgagee, what then is
the mortgagee expected to do? x x x It logically follows
as a matter of common sense, that the necessary
expenses incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee
of the action for replevin so that he can regain
possession of the chattel, should be borne by the
mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would, in our view,
include expenses properly incurred in effecting seizure
of the chattel and reasonable attorneys fees in
prosecuting the action for replevin.[18]
Anent the denial of the award for attorneys fees, we
find the same in order. The trial court, as well as
respondent court, found no evidence to support the
claim for attorney's fees which factual finding is binding
on us.[19] We find no compelling reason, and none was
presented, to set aside this ruling.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 153063-70. August 19, 2005]
AMELIA D. DE MESA, ARACELI ADATO, RODRIGO
ALVARAN, AIDA CASTRO, BALTAZAR
ESTRELLES, ANTONIO A. FERRER, DANILO
GARCIA, JULIO M. GONZALES, MARRIETA
A. JOSE, PEPITA JUNTADO, EDUARDO U.
LAGO, NESTOR RODA, JAIME SANCHEZ
and JUANITA
SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PEPSI COLA
PRODUCTS PHILS., INC. and PEPSICO
INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Order,[1] dated April
18, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142 in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421. In
the said Order, the RTC granted herein respondents
motion to dismiss the complaints filed by petitioners
herein based on the principle of stare decisis.
The instant case arose from the same set of facts
as (1) Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.,
et al., G.R. No. 153183 promulgated on July 24,
2002[2] affirming the Court of Appeals Decision, dated
April 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860;[3] and
(2) Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and
Pepsico, Inc., G.R. No. 149411, dated October 1, 2001,
which also affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision of
May 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62837.[4]
The facts are culled from the
aforesaid Decisions of the Court of Appeals as affirmed
by this Court.
Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps
bearing the number 349, allegedly a winning
combination in a contest sponsored by respondents
Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PCPPI) and PEPSICO,
Inc. (PI).
Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporation
engaged in the production, bottling, and distribution of
carbonated drinks, while respondent PI is a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines
and is the major stockholder of PCPPI.
 D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that leave[16] to (1) adopt the previous testimonial and
handled similar promotions in other countries, was documentary evidence in
tasked to randomly pre-select the winning numbers and the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases; or (2) archive the case
send to respondents a list of the 60 winning numbers until final resolution of the said two cases, which were
with their corresponding security codes. The process of then pending with the Court of Appeals. The RTC
selecting the winning numbers was implemented with granted the said motion on January 8, 2001 and the
the approval of the Department of Trade and Industry case was accordingly archived.[17]
(DTI).
Meantime, the Rodrigo case became final and
During the initial promotion period, from February executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of
17 to May 8, 1992, respondents seeded 1000 numbers, therein petitioners petition for review on certiorari and
60 of which were winning numbers, 510 non-winning motion for reconsideration.
numbers, while the remaining 430 were unused. To
Hence, on February 20, 2002, herein respondents
ensure that the winning numbers would not be
filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss [18] the complaints
tampered, the DTI required respondents to submit the
filed by petitioners herein invoking the principle of stare
list of winning numbers including their security codes
decisis. The RTC, in its assailed Order,[19] granted the
which was then deposited in a safety deposit box in a
motion to dismiss ratiocinating as follows:
bank.[5]
The Court finds the instant motion meritorious under the
Owing to the promotional campaigns success,
principle of stare decisis. The said doctrine embodies the
respondents extended the Number Fever by five more
legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has
weeks, from May 10 to June 12, 1992. Pepsi again
been established by the decision of a court of controlling
tapped D.G. Consultores to predetermine the 25
jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving
additional winning numbers from the list of unused
similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
numbers.
securing certainty and stability in the law and does not
On May 25, 1992, respondents announced 349 as require identity or privy of parties. This is explicitly
the winning number for the May 26 draw. Later the same ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides
night, Quintin Gomez, Jr., then PCPPIs Marketing that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Services Manager called DTI Director Madarang Constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such
informing her that due to some security code problems a decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself
mistake had been made in the announcement of number and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
349 as the winning number.[6] become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of
Numerous holders of the supposedly winning 349
those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in
crowns were not honored and paid by respondents,
duty bound to enforce obedience thereto (Kilosbayan,
which led these rejected crown holders to file separate
Inc. et al. vs. Manuel Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17,
complaints for specific performance and damages.
1995).
Civil Case No. 93-68351 was originally filed before
In the instant cases as well as in Civil Case No. 93-
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, but the
68351 (the Mendoza case), not only are the legal rights
plaintiffs in the said case withdrew their complaint,
and relations of the parties substantially the same as
leaving Gerson Mendoza as the sole plaintiff in Gerson
those passed upon in Civil Case No. 94-71403 (the
M. Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. and
Rodrigo case), but the facts, the applicable laws, the
Pepsico, Inc.[7] The other plaintiffs re-filed their
causes of action, the issues, and the testimonial and
complaints before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in
Branch 50, entitled Romulo Rodrigo, et al. v. Pepsi Cola
one case, i.e. the Rodrigo case in Civil Case No. 94-
Products Philippines, Inc., et al., docketed as Civil Case
71403, under the rule of stare decisis, is a bar to any
No. 94-71403.[8]
attempt to relitigate the same issue.[20]
For their part, petitioners herein filed their separate
Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review
complaints, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-
claiming that (1) the principle of res judicata does not
2421, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
apply; and (2) the dismissal of the complaint was
142.
premature as petitioners motion to archive the case and
In the Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the the grant thereof was based on the condition that there
complaint filed against herein respondents for specific be a final resolution in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.
[21]
performance and damages in connection with the
Number Fever fiasco.[9]Mendoza appealed to the Court
Simply put, the sole issue is whether the present
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860, which was
case is barred by this Courts ruling in
dismissed for lack of merit.[10] Unfazed, Mendoza filed
the Mendoza and Rodrigo  cases.
with this Court a petition for review, which was denied for
failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals Petitioners contend that res judicata  does not apply
committed any reversible error.[11] as there is no identity of parties to begin with. Moreover,
they argue that stare decisis is not a hard and fast rule.
In the Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed
They insist another review should be taken on the cause
the complaint against herein respondents for specific
of action in this case because the Court of Appeals, in
performance and damages arising from the said
the Mendoza and Rodrigo  cases, erred in ruling that the
promotion.[12] On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
security code determines the real winning crowns. They
62837, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
[13] claim that the trial courts dismissal of their complaint was
 A petition for review was subsequently filed with this
premature. Lastly, petitioners posit that there was a
Court, which was denied for failure to show that a
breached contract between the parties; therefore,
reversible error was committed by the appellate court.
respondents should be made to perform their contractual
The motion for reconsideration was also denied with
obligation.
finality[14] and entry of judgment was made.[15]
For their part, respondents counter that the RTC
However, prior to the resolution of
correctly dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, herein petitioners filed
of res judicata. Respondents contend that, like
with the RTC, on December 11, 2000, a motion for

Page 72 of 82
the Mendoza and Rodrigocases, the civil cases filed by
petitioners arose from the conduct of respondents
Number Fever promotion. Petitioners causes of action,
testimonial and documentary evidence, are the same as
those in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases. Lastly,
respondents point out that the findings of fact in the said
two cases are also the same, i.e.: (i) Respondents did
not breach any contract since the 349 crowns with
security code L-2560-FQ are not winning crowns; and (ii)
Respondents were not negligent in the conduct of their
promotion and they exerted efforts to ensure the integrity
and smooth conduct of the same.
The instant petition must be denied.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere[22] is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires our courts to follow a rule already established in
a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[23]
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of
the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of
action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the
same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza  and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to
be argued. The issue has been settled and this Courts
final decision in the said cases must be respected. This
Courts hands are now tied by the finality of the said
judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 142, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414
to 94-2421, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO DECIDENDI , OBITER DICTUM
[G.R. No. 149375. November 26, 2002]
MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores,
Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen,
was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538
or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,  as amended, for
which he and his co-accused were sentenced to a prison
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of  reclusion
temporal  as maximum.[1]
The case before us concerns only the petition for
review of accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his
conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having
increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a
prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this
Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was
Page 73 of 82
already reclusion perpetua,  pursuant to the last
paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,[2] of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead
with the Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule
124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when
the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua  or higher as
a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at
least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by
the appellate court on the accused was clearly in
accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,[3] which is not
considered reclusion perpetua  for purposes of Sec. 13,
Rule 124.[4]
The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution
relied on People v. Omotoy[5]  where the Regional Trial
Court found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced
him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor  maximum, as minimum, to reclusion
perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic
appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed -
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the
reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua  is
involved, albeit joined to prision mayor  in its maximum
period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court
of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty
imposed is reclusion  perpetua  or higher (Sec. 5[2](d),
Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at  least
reclusion  perpetua  (or life imprisonment, in special
offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to
delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua  having in fact been
imposed on the accused, and causes no prejudice
whatsoever to any party.
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of
Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering
that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua  shall be from twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the
thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion
perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty
which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty
(30)-year period for reclusion perpetua  is only for
purposes of successive service of sentence under Art.
70 of The Revised Penal Code.[6]
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner
is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The
Revised Penal Code.  Unless otherwise specified, if the
special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to
designate it with terms provided for in The Revised
Penal Code since those terms apply only to the
penalties imposed by the Penal Code,  and not to the
penalty in special penal laws.[7] This is because
generally, special laws provide their own specific
penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties
are not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised
Penal Code.[8]
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of
the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such
technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not
similarly used or applied to the penalty for carnapping.
Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstance of violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e.,
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30)
years, does not correspond to that in The Revised Penal
Code.[9] But it is different when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof,
since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death.
[10]
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the
penalty of x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal
as maximum.[11]  For these reasons the use of the
term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its
decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the
trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12)
years and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum
penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying on
a Footnote  in Omotoy[12]  to affirm the conviction of the
accused. The substance of the Footnote  may not be
the ratio decidendi  of the case, but it still constitutes an
important part of the decision since it enunciates a
fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals.
That this rule is stated in a Footnote  to a decision is of
no consequence as it is merely a matter of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy  is not on all fours
with the instant case since the former involves an appeal
from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court
while the case at bar is an appeal from the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. As enunciated
in Omotoy,  the Supreme Court entertains appeals in
criminal cases only where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua  or higher. The basis for this
doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers this
Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court  may provide,
final judgments of lower courts in all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.[13]
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the
imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on
appeal is at least reclusion perpetua,  death or life
imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty,
refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case
and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.
[14]
 This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-
wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this Court
and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will
acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception
and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which
has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do
justice in the case.[15]
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals
imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua,  a
review of the case may be had only by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45[16] where only errors or
questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue
of whether there was indeed a violation of The Anti-
Carnapping Act.  This issue is factual, as we shall find
hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani
parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at
No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila.
The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was
used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint
venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was
nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its
Page 74 of 82
disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-
Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately issued
an Alarm Sheet.[17]
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman
Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from his
daughter, a common-law wife of accused Michael
Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark
Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins
himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarezs daughter
however refused to issue any statement regarding the
incident.[18]
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 Miling Flores
brought to his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques,
Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining
witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques,
Bertumen and Flores admitted that they took the vehicle
and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio.
[19]
 They claimed however that it was with the knowledge
and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night
they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them
in their outing to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined,
they asked him instead if they could borrow the Isuzu
Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even turned
over the keys to them.[20]
Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during
that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 Miling Flores but
his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.[21]
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but
increased the penalty imposed on the four (4) accused
from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal  as maximum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.[22]
Petitioner insists that the accused were more
motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the Isuzu
Trooper, and that they merely took the vehicle for a
joyride with no intention of stealing it. If they were really
thieves, according to petitioner, they would have sold the
vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in
Baguio.[23]
Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a
petition for review on certiorari where only questions of
law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue
before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and
the evidence may not be entertained in this appeal.
Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court.[24] This rule may be disregarded only when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there is no
ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This
Court will not assess all over again the evidence
adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case
the findings of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals completely coincide.[25]
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on
its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538
imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The
evidence in this case shows that the accused broke a
quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it,
thus demonstrating that force was used upon the
vehicle; nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit
the imposition of the full penalty. With the application
of The Indeterminate Sentence Law,  the penalty to be
imposed may be reduced to an indeterminate prison
term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
twenty-two (22) years.
 WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals denying the Motion and Manifestation of
petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
imposed is reduced to an indeterminate prison term of
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two
(22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142947. March 19, 2002]
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE
VILLADORES, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 2000
in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235 reversing the two (2) Orders
dated August 27, 1998[2] and December 4, 1998[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 which denied respondent
Roque Villadoress motion for disqualification of Rico and
Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner Francisco
N. Villanueva, Jr., and the motion for reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the
amended informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
138744 and 94-138745 entitled, People of the
Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores,
Alberto Adriano and Rolando Advincula, for Falsification
of Public Document before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41.
It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties,
among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter[4] ruled in
favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[5] As an
appeal bond, IBC 13 filed Surety Bond No. G (16) 00136
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. (BF)
with the Confirmation Letter dated September 20, 1993
supposedly issued by BFs Vice-President. However,
both documents were subsequently found to be falsified.
Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of
public document were filed before the Manila City
Prosecutors Office. The charges against respondent
Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III were dismissed by
the City Prosecutors Office which, however, found
probable cause against the other respondents.
Nonetheless, on a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the latter affirmed the
dismissal against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of
respondent Villadores as an accused in the two (2)
criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations
were amended to include respondent Villadores among
those charged.
Following the arraignment of respondent Villadores,
the private prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed anew a
Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging
damages sustained by private complainant, herein
petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the crimes
committed by the accused. The incident was referred to
the City Prosecutors Office by the trial court. In
compliance, the fiscals office submitted a Motion to
Admit Amended Informations with the following
amendment: to the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva,
Jr., and of public interest and in violation of public faith
and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
The Motion was granted by the trial court and the
amended informations were admitted in an Order dated
October 10, 1997. Respondent Villadores subsequently
Page 75 of 82
filed a Manifestation and/or Motion for Reconsideration
but the same was denied in an Order dated October 24,
1997.
Thus, respondent Villadores interposed on
November 26, 1997 a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. Said petition, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103, sought to annul the Order of the trial
court dated October 10, 1997 which admitted the second
amended informations, as well as the Order dated
October 24, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof.[6]
In a Decision dated June 22, 1998, the appellate
court, acting thru its Eleventh Division, found that the
trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the amended informations and dismissed the
petition of respondent Villadores.[7] The decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103 became final and executory on July
18, 1998.[8]
Subsequently, before Branch 41 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, respondent Villadores moved for
the disqualification of Rico and Associates as private
prosecutor for petitioner Villanueva, Jr.,[9]in line with the
following pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103, to wit:[10]
Incidentally, We are one with the petitioner when it
argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the
offended party in these cases. It must be underscored
that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond
for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed.
We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained
damages as a result of the falsification of the surety
appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could
have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal
would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.
Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the ground
that the above-quoted pronouncement of the appellate
court is a mere obiter dictum.[11]
In an Order[12] dated August 27, 1998 the trial court
denied the motion for disqualification ratiocinating, thus:
A reading of the aforecited decision of the Court of
Appeals clearly shows that the aforecited reason for the
motion is a mere obiter dictum. As held by the Supreme
Court, an obiter dictum lacks force of adjudication. It is
merely an expression of an opinion with no binding force
for purposes of res judicata (City of Manila vs. Entote,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA, 508-509). What is controlling
is the dispositive portion of the subject decision of the
Court of Appeals which denied due course and ordered
dismissed the petition of the movant questioning the
Order of this Court granting the Motion to Admit
Informations and admitting the Amended Informations
that include the name of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as
the private offended party, which in effect upheld and/or
affirmed the questioned Order of this Court admitting the
amended informations.
Reconsideration[13] was sought by respondent Villadores
but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated December 4, 1998.[14]
Thus, on January 7, 1999, respondent Villadores
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 50235, seeking the
annulment of the trial courts Order dated August 27,
1998 denying the Motion for Disqualification as well as
its subsequent Order dated December 4, 1998 denying
reconsideration.[15]
 On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered its
now challenged decision which reversed and set aside
the two (2) Orders of the trial court dated August 27,
1998 and December 4, 1998. The appellate court
directed that the name of petitioner Villanueva, Jr.,
appearing as the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos.
94-138744-45 be stricken out from the records.[16]
Hence, this petition anchored on the following
grounds:[17]
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN ENJOINING RICO & ASSOCIATES FROM
APPEARING AS PRIVATE PROSECUTOR AND/OR AS
COUNSEL FOR FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., IN
CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-138744-45.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE MATTER OF
WHETHER OR NOT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR.
IS AN OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
94-138744-45 HAD BEEN RESOLVED WITH FINALITY
IN THE AFFIRMATIVE IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103
WHERE THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD
THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATIONS IN SAID
CASES TO STATE THAT THE CRIMES WERE
COMMITTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR., AND PURSUANT TO THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA, THE SAME COULD
NO LONGER BE RELITIGATED IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
50235.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PRONOUNCEMENT
IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103 THAT FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR. IS NOT AN OFFENDED PARTY, AS
A MERE OBITER DICTUM.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR., WAS IN FACT AN AGGRIEVED
PARTY.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN ORDERING THE NAME OF FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUVEVA, JR., APPEARING AS THE OFFENDED
PARTY BE STRICKEN FROM THE RECORDS,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103,
IT UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATIONS SO AS TO STATE THAT THE
CRIMES CHARGED WERE COMMITTED TO THE
PREJUDICE OF FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR.
All the foregoing issues boil down to the issue of
whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 to the effect that petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-138744-45 is obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion
expressed by a court upon some question of law which
is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is
a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, by the way, that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding
as precedent.[18]
Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by
respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the
admission of the Amended Informations. Among the
issues upon which the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46103 was anchored, was whether Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. is the offended party.[19] Argument on
whether petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was the offended party
Page 76 of 82
was, thus, clearly raised by respondent Villadores. The
body of the decision contains discussion on that point
and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
It has been held that an adjudication on any point
within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all
pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved,
which are presented and decided in the regular course
of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which
the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because
the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made
on some other ground, or even though, by reason of
other points in the case, the result reached might have
been the same if the court had held, on the particular
point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case
could have turned on is not regarded as obiter
dictummerely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another
question, nor can an additional reason in a decision,
brought forward after the case has been disposed of on
one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a
case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which
is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case as an
authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and
none of such points can be regarded as having the
status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied
authority merely because another point was more dwelt
on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the
court regarding other propositions dicta.[20]
The decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46103 allegedly show a conflict between the
pronouncements in the body of the decision and the
dispositive portion thereof. However, when that decision
is carefully and thoroughly read, such conflict is revealed
to be more illusory than real. In denying the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, the appellate
court had this to say:
At the centerfold of this controversy is Section 14 of Rule
110, 1st paragraph, which is quoted hereunder:
SEC. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused pleads, and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
Needless to state, amendment of a criminal charge
sheet depends much on the time when the change is
requested. If before arraignment it is a matter of right, no
leave of court is necessary and the prosecution is free to
do so even in matters of substance and in form. On the
other hand, the more complicated situation involves an
amendment sought after the accused had already been
arraigned. This time amendment can only be made by a
prior leave and at the discretion of the court, only as to
matters of form when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused [Draculan vs.
Donato; 140 SCRA 425 (1985); Teehankee vs.
Madayag, 207 SCRA 134 (1992)].
Relative to the second instance, the primary
consideration is whether the intended amendment is
only as to matter of form and same could be done
without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Substantial amendment as a consequence is proscribed.
In essence, substantial matters in the complaint or
information is the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
All other matters are merely of form [Almeda vs. Villaluz,
66 SCRA 38 (1975); Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
In other words, even if the amendment is only as to
matter of form, one other criteria must accompany it for
its admission, which is, that it should not be prejudicial to
the accused. Conformably, the test as to when the rights
of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is, when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended
[People vs. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 (1988);
Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
Given the above aphorisms, the inclusion of the name of
Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as the prejudiced
complainant in the cases appears to be not substantial.
It did not change, alter or modify the crime charged nor
any possible defense. Likewise, any evidence the
accused might have under his defense in the original
informations is still very much available to him and
applicable to the amended informations. In sum,
accused petitioner is not in any way prejudiced in his
rights with such amendment which, in Our considered
opinion, is only a matter of form under the standards laid
down in the cases above-cited.
What seems to be more crucial here is the fact that the
crime charged in the two informations is falsification of
public document committed by a private individual
defined and penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1, of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the evil sought to
be punished and sanctioned by the offense of
falsification of public document is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the trust as therein
solemnly proclaimed [People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil 48,
citing Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
December 23, 1886; People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324, Po
Giok To, 96 Phil. 913; see Revised Penal Code, Luis B.
Reyes, 13th Division, p. 211 and Aquino, 1976 ed., Vol.
2, p. 984]. Apropos, the crime of falsification of public
document does not require for its essential elements
damage or intent to cause damage. In the final analysis.
the inclusion of the name of Francisco N. Villanueva. Jr.
would then be merely a superfluity in the information, a
meaningless surplusage therein. In fact. it is even highly
doubted if civil damages may be awarded in such
transgression of the law.
Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in
admitting the second amended informations albeit such
amendment is totally irrelevant and unnecessary to the
crime charged. The mere fact that the court decides the
question wrongly is utterly immaterial to the question of
jurisdiction [Estrada vs. Sto Domingo, 28 SCRA 891
(1969)]. And writs of certiorari are issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
It cannot be legally used for any other purpose [Silverio
vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527 (1986)].
Incidentally, We are in one with the petitioner when it
argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the
offended party in these cases. It must be underscored
that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond
for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed.
We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained
damages as a result of the falsification of the surety
appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could
have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal
Page 77 of 82
would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.[21]
Clearly then, while the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103 admitted that the addition of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. as an offended party is not
necessary, it held that the admission of the amended
informations due to the amendment to include petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. did not by itself amount to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, there is an error of judgment but such
did not amount to an error of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari, which was
availed of respondent Villadores, is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors
of judgment. When a court exercised its jurisdiction an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. Thus, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special
civil action of certiorari.[22] In effect, the appellate court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 merely held that respondent
Villadores chose the wrong remedy.
It is significant to mention that the intervention of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as an
offended party is apparently predicated[23] on the
reduction by the NLRC, in IBCs appeal of the illegal
dismissal case, of the monetary award to which he is
entitled, despite finding the appeal as not perfected due
to the posting of the spurious appeal bond.[24] However,
such alleged error should have been brought by
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. to the appropriate forum,[25] and
not raised in criminal cases before the trial court as a
ground for his inclusion as a prejudiced party.
In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition,
being devoid of merit, must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEDESMA V CA
DECISION
 
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and
set aside the decision[1] dated August 28, 2003 and the
resolution[2] dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 which affirmed with
modification public respondents (1) Joint Resolution
dated January 22, 1999, which ordered, among other
things, petitioners suspension for one (1) year for
conduct prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order dated
February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum dated
March 17, 2000, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration but reduced his suspension to nine (9)
months without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the
above issuances by further reducing petitioners
suspension from nine (9) months to six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay.[4]
 
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of
the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a
letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of
the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on
alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the
Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign
nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7)
other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar
irregularities.
As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed
before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against
herein petitioner. Also charged administratively were
Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board
Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in
petitioners division. With respect to petitioner, the
complaint was treated as both a criminal and an
administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214
(criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification
of public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038
(administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public
Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
for lack of sufficient
evidence.
SO RESOLVED.[6]
Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was
approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on
December 29, 1999.[7]
In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent
Ombudsman approved a Resolution[8] dated June 22,
1999 of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-
Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.[9]
 
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[10] in
the administrative case alleging that the BOC which
reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved
the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner argued that it
effectively declared the applications for extension regular
and in order and waived any infirmity thereon.
 

  In an Order[11] dated February 8, 2000, Graft Officer

The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang
alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly granting
TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using
recycled or photocopied applications for a TRV
extension without the applicants affixing their signatures
anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
information previously stated therein. Specifically,
petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission
(BOC) of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV
extension of several aliens whose papers were
questionable.
 
Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration which was approved by respondent
Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the period
of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months
without pay.
 
On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, which included a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order
to enjoin public respondents from implementing the
order of suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the
TRO on April 19, 2000.

In a Joint Resolution[5] dated January 22, 1999, Graft  

Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court of
the administrative cases filed against petitioner, Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but reduced the
Caronongan and Ang, as follows: period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one
  (1) day without pay.[12]

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
is respectfully recommended that: petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the
following grounds:
 
 
1. Respondent ATTY.
RONALDO P. I.
LEDESMA be  
SUSPENDED from the
service for one (1) year IN PROMULGATING ITS
for Conduct Prejudicial ASSAILED DECISION, RESPONDENT
to the Interest of the COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
Service; OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING
RELEVANT FACTS AND MATTERS
2. The instant case against WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
ATTY. ARTHEL B. WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A
CARONONGAN be DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN FAVOR
DISMISSED, the same OF PETITIONER:
having been rendered
moot and academic;  
and ...
3. The instant case against
respondent MA. ELENA
P. ANG be DISMISSED
 

Page 78 of 82
 II.
 
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE FINDING OF THE
OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY
ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY TO
THE PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT.
 
III.
 
RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ALSO FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE OMBUDSMANS
RESOLUTION FINDING PETITIONER
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT
ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER
OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
OVER IMMIGRATION MATTERS.[13]
 
The petition lacks merit.
 
Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the
questioned applications for the extension of the TRVs.
He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into
approving these applications and argues that the BOC
effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct
when it approved the subject applications. Petitioner
adds that he acted in good faith and the government did
not suffer any damage as a result of his alleged
administrative lapse.
We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape liability,
petitioner undermines his position in the BID and his role
in the processing of the subject applications. But by his
own admission,[14] it appears that the BSI not only
transmits the applications for TRV extension and its
supporting documents, but more importantly, it
interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers
before making a recommendation to the BOC. The BSI
reviews the applications and when it finds them in order,
it executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC
certifying to the regularity and propriety of the
applications.
 
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[15] we stated that all
heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the
conduct of government business dictate that the gritty
details be sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the
final approving authority. In the case at bar, it is not
unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and
recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be expected to
review every detail of each application transmitted for its
approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First
Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its
proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good
faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension
applications are so patently clear on its face. He is
principally accountable for certifying the regularity and
propriety of the applications which he knew were
defective.
Page 79 of 82
 
Petitioner could not validly claim that he was
singled out for prosecution. It is of record that
administrative cases were also filed against Caronongan
and Ang, but extraneous circumstances rendered the
case against Caronongan moot while the case against
Ang was dismissed because it was proven that she
merely implemented the approved decision of the BOC.
 
Equally untenable is the contention that the BOCs
approval of the defective applications for TRV extension
cured any infirmities therein and effectively absolved
petitioners administrative lapse. The instant
administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as
Chairman of the First Division of the BSI in processing
nine (9) defective applications, independent of and
without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It does
not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to
encroach upon the authority of the BID on immigration
matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine
whether petitioner committed any misconduct,
nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the
performance of his duties.
 
Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner
essentially puts in issue the import of the Ombudsmans
findings. Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals
pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman
may not be said to be merely recommendatory upon the
Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to uphold the
appellate courts ruling expands the authority granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and
runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,
particularly Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.
[16]
 Petitioner submits that the Ombudsmans findings that
the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an indirect
interference by the Ombudsman into the powers of the
BOC over immigration matters.
We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution.[17] The Ombudsman and his deputies, as
protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
[18]
 Foremost among its powers is the authority to
investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers
and employees, thus:
 
Section 13. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
 
(1) Investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
 
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and
functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.
RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies
not only to act promptly on complaints but also to
enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of
government officers and employees in every case where
the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.[19]
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations as in the present case is
settled.[20] Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative
Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act
on all complaints relating, but not limited
to acts or omissions which:
 
(1)               Are contrary to law
or regulation;
(2)               Are unreasonable,
unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3)               Are inconsistent
with the general course of an agencys
functions, though in accordance with
law;
(4)               Proceed from a
mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
(5)               Are in the exercise
of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or
(6)               Are otherwise
irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
The point of contention is the binding power of
any decision or order that emanates from the Office of
the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation.
Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, it is provided:
 
Section 13. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
 
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a
public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance
therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Petitioner insists that the word recommend be
given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans
action is only advisory in nature rather than one having
any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman,[21] thus:
 
Page 80 of 82
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that
petitioner were administratively liable,
the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly
from his position in the BID. Under
Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend the
removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the
public official concerned.[22]
For their part, the Solicitor General and the
Office of the Ombudsman argue that the
word recommend  must be taken in conjunction with the
phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper
interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should
be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine
the administrative liability of a public official or employee
at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In
other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of
the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.
 
We agree with the ratiocination of public
respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal
interpretation of the subject constitutional provision.
Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the
main point of the case was the failure of the complainant
therein to present substantial evidence to prove the
charges of the administrative case. The statement that
made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at
best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported
by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this
case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration
of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
The provisions of RA 6770 support public
respondents theory. Section 15 is substantially the same
as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which
provides for the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3, to
wit:
 
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions
and Duties.  The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
...
 
(3) Direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate action against a
public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge
a duty required by law, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That
the refusal by any officer without just
cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee who is at fault or
 who neglects to perform an act or powers to the Ombudsman; we
discharge a duty required by law shall want to give the concept of a
be a ground for disciplinary action pure Ombudsman a chance
against said officer; (Emphasis supplied) under the Constitution.
   
We note that the proviso above qualifies the MR. RODRIGO:
order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
 
prosecute an officer or employee akin to the questioned
issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without Madam President, what I am
just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of worried about is if we create a
the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or constitutional body which has
employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong neither punitive nor prosecutory
indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not powers but only persuasive
merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory powers, we might be raising the
within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted hopes of our people too much
as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the and then disappoint them.
head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been
 
settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public MR. MONSOD:
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.  
[23]
 By stating therefore that the Ombudsman I agree with the Commissioner.
recommends the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution  
and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this
case would be the head of the BID.
 
 
MR. RODRIGO:
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the  
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can Anyway, since we state that the
effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the powers of the Ombudsman can
people against inept and corrupt government officers later on be implemented by the
and employees. The Office was granted the power to legislature, why not leave this to
punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of the legislature?[28]
Court.[24] It was given disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the  
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and MR. MONSOD:
agencies (with the exception only of impeachable
officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary).  
[25]
 Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its
Yes, because we want to avoid
authority pending an investigation when the case so
what happened in 1973. I read
warrants.[26]
the committee report which
  recommended the approval of
the 27 resolutions for the
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with creation of the office of the
the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of Ombudsman, but
the Ombudsman. The records of the deliberations of the notwithstanding the explicit
Constitutional Commission[27] reveal the following: purpose enunciated in that
  report, the implementing law the
last one, P.D. No. 1630did not
MR. MONSOD: follow the main thrust; instead it
  created the Tanodbayan, ...
Madam President, perhaps it might be  
helpful if we give the spirit and ...
intendment of the Committee.
What we wanted to avoid is the  
situation where it deteriorates MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements
into a prosecution arm. We of Commissioner Blas Ople):
wanted to give the idea of the
Ombudsman a chance, with  
prestige and persuasive powers,
May we just state that perhaps
and also a chance to really
the honorable Commissioner
function as a champion of the
has looked at it in too much of
citizen.
an absolutist position, The
  Ombudsman is seen as a civil
advocate or a champion of the
However, we do not want to foreclose citizens against the
the possibility that in the future, bureaucracy, not against the
The Assembly, as it may see fit, President. On one hand, we are
may have to give additional told he has no teeth and he

Page 81 of 82
 lacks other things. On the other dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
hand, there is the interpretation G.R. SP No. 58264 are AFFIRMED.
that he is a competitor to the
 SO ORDERED.
President, as if he is being
brought up to the same level as
the President.
 
With respect to the argument
that he is a toothless animal, we
would like to say that we are
promoting the concept in its
form at the present, but we are
also saying that he can exercise
such powers and functions as
may be provided by law in
accordance with the direction of
the thinking of Commissioner
Rodrigo. We did not think that at
this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to
Congress at some future time if
it feels that it may need to
designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that
he be more effective. This is not
foreclosed.
 
So, his is a reversible disability,
unlike that of a eunuch; it is not
an irreversible disability.
(Emphasis supplied)[29]
 
It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution
intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of
political influences and vested with powers that are not
merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional
Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did
when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,[30] it was held:
 
Clearly, the Philippine
Ombudsman departs from the classical
Ombudsman model whose function is
merely to receive and process the
peoples complaints against corrupt and
abusive government personnel. The
Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of
the people, is armed with the power to
prosecute erring public officers and
employees, giving him an active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft
and corrupt practices and such other
offenses that may be committed by such
officers and employees. The legislature
has vested him with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own
actions. ...[31]
 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error in finding the petitioner
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service
and reducing petitioners period of suspension to six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay, taking into account
the education and length of service of petitioner.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated August 28, 2003 and the Resolution

Page 82 of 82