1.) U.S. v.

Gacutan, 28 Phil 100 (1914)

MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan convicting the
accused of the crime of bribery, as defined in articles 385 and 389 of the Penal Code, and
sentencing him to one year and one day of imprisonment, to pay a fine of P160, together with the
costs of the proceeding to suffer subsidiary imprisonment as prescribed by law, and to suffer
temporary special disqualification for a period of six years and one day, and declaring the
carabao forfeited to the Government of the Philippines Islands.
From the evidence in the case as introduced by the prosecution it appears that Domingo Pascua,
about July 20, 1912, filed in appellant's court, he being the justice of the peace in and for the
municipality of Solana in the Province of Cagayan, a complaint against one Elias Pagulayan for
the said case was decided, Pascua, at the request of appellant made several weeks before the trial
o said case, gave to appellant a female carabao worth about P80, in consideration of which
appellant agreed to decide said action adversely to Pagulayan; that the carabao was delivered to
appellant; and that thereafter, August 12, 1912, the accused decided the case against Pagulayan,
convicting him of larceny and sentencing him to six months' imprisonment, to pay the costs of
the trial, and to indemnify Pascua in the sum of P50.
On the other hand, the appellant claims to have proved by his witnesses and by Pascua's
declarations that Pascua borrowed P20 from the appellant and promised, in case of his failure to
repay the sum loaned, that he would give the appellant a carabao in settlement thereof, and that
said carabao in question was delivered to appellant in pursuance of said agreement.
Having examined the record with care, we do not hesitate in concluding that from the evidence
remains no doubt of the guilt of the accused of the crime of bribery.
From the judgment of conviction and sentence this court is unable to say under what section of
the Penal Code the accused was tried or convicted or what was the character of punishment
imposed. We have held in the case of United States vs. Mariano (27 Phil. Rep., 132 ) that in
every criminal case the court should not only make a statement of the facts upon which the
judgment of conviction was founded, but should also refer to the section of the Penal Code or of
the statute under which the accused was convicted and sentenced and the kind of punishment
imposed. In other words, the sentence should specifically show whether the defendant was
sentenced to presidio correccional or presidio mayor or arresto mayor and in what degree. A
sentence for one year and one day is not complete sentence according to the practice of the
courts. It should be one year and one day of presidio correccional and should state whether it is
the minimum, medium, or maximum degree thereof.
The Solicitor-General found himself in the difficulty to which we have just referred when he
attempted to sustain the judgment and sentence of the trial court. He says:
Having in mind the penalty imposed by the lower court upon the defendant and appellant, "one
year and one day of imprisonment, a fine of P160 or subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, payment of the costs, and disqualification for a period of six years and one day under
article 385 of the Penal Code, and confiscation of the carabao in accordance with article 389 of
the same code," it seems that the court convicted the accused under article 382 of the Penal
Code.
This discloses the manner in which the Solicitor-General, as well as this court, has arrived at the
article of the Penal Code on which the conviction is founded.
Counsel for the accused was also uncertain as to the article under which the accused was
convicted. He says:
The judgment appears to be based on articles 381 or 382 of the Penal Code.
We are of the opinion that the accused should have been convicted under article 382 of the Penal
Code, which provides that:
Any public officer who shall agree to commit any act of injustice not constituting a crime in
connection with the exercise of the powers of his office, in consideration of any offer or promise
or of any gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another,
shall, if the act of injustice be committed, suffer the penalty of presidio correccional in its
medium and minimum degrees and pay a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more
than three times such value; if the act of injustice shall not have been committed, a penalty
ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to presidio correccional in its maximum
degree and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than double such value shall
be imposed.
It certainly is an act injustice to convict a person charged with a crime without regard to what the
evidence in the case may be. The accused promised Pascua to convict Pagulayan regardless of
the evidence in the case and apparently carried out his promise. In consideration thereof he was
to receive and did receive a carabao worth P80. It is an act of injustice for a judicial officer to
decide a case pending before him regardless of what the evidence may show. ( U. S. vs. Alban, 4
Phil. Rep., 363.)
The act of injustice having been committed, the defendant should have been punished with
presidio correccional in its medium and minimum degrees and sentenced to pay a fine of not less
than the value of the gift and not more than three times its value. The gift itself should also have
been confiscated, under article 389 of the Penal Code.
The case does not fall within article 381 of the Penal Code for the reason that, in order to be
within that article, the act which the accused agrees to commit must be criminal. The act with he
agreed to perform inn the case before us was to convict the accused. This was not a criminal act.
Nor does the act fall within the provisions of article 347 of the Penal Code, which provides that
"any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust decision against the defendant, etc.," shall be
punished as therein provided. We do not know whether the decision was a just one or an unjust
one. There is nothing in the record to determine that fact. We may say, therefore, without
determining what effect, if any, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Alzua vs. Johnson (231 U. S., 106) has upon the provisions of Chapter I of Title VII of
the Penal Code, that there is no evidence upon which we may determine that the judgment to be
rendered was an unjust judgment.
There appearing in the case neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, the penalty
should be imposed in the medium degree. The court should have imposed a penalty of one year
eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, a fine of P160, confiscation of the
carabao, the costs of the trial, and eight years and one day of temporary special disqualification.
As so amended, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
2.) De Vera v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281 (2000)
PARDO, J.:
"It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool
for a client." In Re: Joaquin Borromeo 241 SCRA 408 (1995)
The case is a petition for certiorari and mandamus1 assailing the Evaluation Report of the
Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, dated October 2, 1998 referring
petitioners complaint to the Supreme Court and its Memorandum, dated January 4, 1999,2
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
We state the relevant facts.
Petitioner is not a member of the bar. Possessing some awareness of legal principles and
procedures, he represents himself in this petition.
On August 28, 1996, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City a special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the municipal trial court from
proceeding with a complaint for ejectment against petitioner.3 When the Judge originally
assigned to the case inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benjamin V.
Pelayo.
On July 9, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners application for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The court denied the same on September 1, 1998.
On September 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-
complaint6 against Judge Pelayo, accusing him of violating Articles 2067 and 2078 of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019.
On October 2, 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer, Erlinda S. Rojas submitted an
Evaluation Report recommending referral of petitioners complaint to the Supreme Court.
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Apotadera approved the recommendation.10 We quote the
decretal portion of the report:
"FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in accordance with the ruling in Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221
SCRA 464, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action. The same is hereby considered CLOSED and TERMINATED
insofar as this Office is concerned."
On October 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court Administrator,
Supreme Court.
On November 6, 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Evaluation Report.
On January 4, 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The issue is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed
against a judge of the regional trial court in connection with his handling of cases before the
court.
Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence15 cited by the Office of the Ombudsman as erroneous and
not applicable to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge
against a judge, it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve
whether a crime was committed and the judge prosecuted therefor.
The petition can not succeed.
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman did not
exercise his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility.16 There was no evasion of positive duty. Neither was there a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of
discretion warranting the writs prayed for.18 The issues have been settled in the case of In Re:
Joaquin Borromeo.19 There, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal action against a
judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can
be entertained, there must first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision
or order in question is indeed "unjust." The pronouncement may result from either:
(a).....an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the
judgment; or
(b).....an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order.
Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the
case is also an exclusive judicial function.
"To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation
service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision -- whether final and executory or not -- and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay
the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
That prerogative belongs to the courts alone (underscoring ours)."
This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence when he referred the cases against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Evaluation
Report of the Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman dated October 2,
1998 and its memorandum, dated January 4, 1999, in toto.
3.) Gallardo v. People, 456 SCRA 494 (2005)
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan1 (Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 25092 denying petitioners’ Motion To
Quash.
The records show that the above-numbered case originated from a sworn letter-complaint filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao by Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the
Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, charging herein petitioners Mayor
Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches, Sangguniang Bayan members Allan
B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina
delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P.
Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional, all public officers of the Municipality
of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their
alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the complaining
PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.2
On 08 January 1999, herein public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
Resolution dated 26 November 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding probable cause to indict petitioners of the
crime alleged.3
On 13 January 1999, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan which reads:
That sometime in or about January, 1998, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao del
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Mayor Arturo
A. Gallardo with salary grade 27, Vice-mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches with salary grade 25,
Sangguniang Bayan Members with salary grade 24 Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano,
Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin,
Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget Officer
Ofelia Nacional all public officers of the Local Government Unit of Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
committing the offense while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of
their public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, did there and
then, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, cause undue injury to the Public Health Workers
(PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, to wit: by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to
perform their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for the payment of the
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs
in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in the aggregate amount of
P3,833,798.10 Philippine currency, thus causing undue damage and injury to the complaining
PHWs thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties.4
On 24 February 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.5 The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion in a resolution dated 27 April 1999 and ordered the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation.6 In a resolution dated 26 July 1999, Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr.,
recommended the dismissal of the case, which recommendation was approved by Prosecution
Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and
concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.7 This recommendation, however, was
disapproved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who stated in his own handwriting "[l]et the
court determine if indeed the evidence cannot stand the judicial scrutiny."8
On 15 November 1999, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information anchored on the
following grounds: 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; 2) the accused are denied
due process; and 3) the accused are not accorded the equal protection of laws.9
On 06 January 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion. It ruled that the averments in
the Information sufficiently charged the offense, and that the mere fact that cases similar to this
case were dismissed by the Ombudsman does not mean due process or equal protection of the
law clause was denied the petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the reinvestigation conducted by Ombudsman Special Prosecutor II Jose
O. Montero, Jr., showed that insufficient funds were the reason for petitioners’ failure to
appropriate the money to meet the magna carta benefits of PHWs and that petitioners acted in
good faith when they failed to enact the required appropriation ordinance. The Sandiganbayan
should have duly considered such findings and the evidence adduced supporting the same,
irrespective of the opinion of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. They conclude that the
Sandiganbayan erred when it totally failed to consider the findings and recommendations of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
Petitioners likewise argue that the one-sentence disapproval by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
of the recommendations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious for he failed to explain how such action was arrived at, thereby depriving petitioners
of their rights to be informed of the facts and the law on which the denial was based.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners’ choice of remedy is clearly erroneous.
It is basic that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgment or final orders.10 A
final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined.11 The resolution of the Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set aside is not in
any sense judgment or a final order, but an interlocutory order.12 An order is interlocutory if it
does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits.13 The
order of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash filed by petitioners is interlocutory in
nature because it leaves something more to be done by the Sandiganbayan, by way of resolving
the case on the merits. The denial of petitioners’ motion to quash allows the same petitioners to
enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on their part to present the special defenses they
invoked in their motion and if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom via appeal by certiorari.14
Even if we consider the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find
that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’
motion to quash.
Petitioners fault the Sandiganbayan for not taking into account the findings and
recommendations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor which found no probable cause to
charge them. Allied to this assignment of error is petitioners’ allegation that the Ombudsman
failed to accord them due process of law and equal protection of the law. They claimed they were
denied due process because Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation
of Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., by simply writing a one-line note. The disapproval
allegedly deprived them of their right to be informed of the facts and law on which the said
disapproval was based. It is further asseverated that they were deprived the equal protection of
law since the Ombudsman, in sixteen (16) previous cases which were similar to the case at bar,
dismissed the same.
These arguments are specious. Petitioners’ submission that they were deprived of due process
hinges on the erroneous assumption that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider
the evidence presented by petitioners when he disapproved the recommendation by the
investigating prosecutor to dismiss the case, and that his ruling was not supported by evidence on
record.
The truth of the matter is that petitioners were not denied due process of law. The order of the
Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is not a case of a total absence of factual
and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. It may appear that the
Ombudsman’s one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary grounds as it did not set forth the
same. The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsman’s note stems from his review of the
findings of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor.15 The Ombudsman, contrary to the
investigating prosecutor’s conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty
of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew.16 He is
merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the investigating
prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact
of the latter. He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely with the investigating
prosecutor. Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to
disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his
discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate.17 Generally, courts should not interfere
in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at hand.18 Such initiative and independence are
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and
preserver of the integrity of the public service.19
The fact that the Ombudsman merely wrote his recommendation for the filing of the information
against petitioners in a one-line note is not a sufficient basis for this Court to attribute
arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent. As held in Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan:20
The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a marginal
note is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of the respondent special
prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely abused their discretion in disapproving the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the case against
petitioner. Neither are these notes tainted with or indicative of vindictiveness or arbitrariness as
imputed by petitioner. Public respondents disapproved the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutors because they sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused.
The contention that petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law has been transgressed is
equally untenable. The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.21 It
allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial
differences, one class may be treated differently from another.22 Simply because the respondent
Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute
arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion
in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there
were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he
recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample
grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based
upon the constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise, the circumstances obtaining in
the numerous cases previously dismissed by the Ombudsman are entirely divergent from those
here existing.
In the same vein, respondent Sandiganbayan could not be blamed for not considering the
findings of the special prosecutor because the rule is that in case of conflict in the conclusions of
the Ombudsman and the special prosecutor, it is the former’s decision that shall prevail since the
Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.23
Moreover, once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution,
which has full control of the case, so much so that the information may grant or deny it, in the
faithful exercise of judicial discretion.24 The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it.25 In the instant case, respondent court is convinced that there is adequate
evidence against the petitioners. Absence of proof that it gravely abused its discretion, the
conclusion arrived at by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed resolution, will not be disturbed.
Besides, petitioners’ argument that they could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 as they acted in good faith when they failed to appropriate funds for the
unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits due the private complainants, is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense, which could be raised in a full-blown trial on the merits.26 As
aptly held in Deloso v. Desierto:27
Public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the person charged. They merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors believe
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Soriano v. Marcelo, 577 SCRA 312 (2009)
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Hilario P. Soriano (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Resolution dated 29 July 2002,1 which dismissed the complaint against
Assistant City Prosecutor Celedenio P. Balasbas (Balasbas), and the Order dated 14 July 2003,2
which denied the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-C-02-0246-E.
The Antecedent Facts
On 1 June 2001, petitioner filed an affidavit-complaint against Mely S. Palad (Palad), a bank
examiner of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for Falsification of Public Documents and Use of
Falsified Document punishable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and was docketed as I.S. No. 01-F-22547.
Acting on the complaint, Balasbas issued a Resolution on 27 August 2001 recommending that
Palad be charged in court with Falsification of Public Documents and that the charge of Use of
Falsified Document be dropped for lack of merit.
The Resolution of 27 August 2001 was forwarded to 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia R.
Dimagiba (Dimagiba) who recommended the filing of the information. This Resolution was
forwarded to the City Prosecutor for approval.
Meanwhile, on 25 January 2002, Palad filed a Motion to Re-Open Case on the ground that she
was not given a copy of the subpoena or any notice regarding the complaint filed against her.
On 27 February 2002, Dimagiba recommended the reopening of the case. City Prosecutor
Ramon R. Garcia (City Prosecutor) approved the recommendation. Thus, on 26 March 2002,
Balasbas issued a subpoena to the parties setting the case for investigation.
The reopening of the case prompted petitioner to file on 18 April 2002 with the Office of the
Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (RA 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner
alleged that in the reopening of I.S. No. 01-F-22547, Palad received an unwarranted advantage or
preference, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence,
causing undue injury to petitioner.
In the Resolution dated 29 July 2002, Graft Investigation Officer Charity Grace A. Rico of the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for want of
sufficient basis. This recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo. The
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order of 14 July 2003,3 for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint
against Balasbas.
The Court’s Ruling
The instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy meant to correct only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Petitioner assails the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing the criminal case against Balasbas. Petitioner claims that the
subordinates were not supposed to blindly follow illegal orders of their superiors. He insists that
Balasbas is still liable for the reopening of the case without lawful reasons, for no law gives his
superiors the right to indiscriminately order the reopening of a case. Petitioner argues that
Balasbas could have opted not to issue a subpoena knowing that the directive of the City
Prosecutor to reopen the case of Palad was not warranted. Thus, for giving unwarranted
advantage or preference to Palad that caused undue injury to petitioner, Balasbas must be held
liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The arguments raised by petitioner are not errors involving jurisdiction but one of judgment,
which is beyond the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. As we have ruled in First
Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,4 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence
of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re- examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact
of the court a quo.1avvphi1
This notwithstanding, may this Court review the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman? The
general rule has been that the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor or the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of his investigative power, to determine the specificity and
adequacy of the averments of the offense charged.5 As we have explained in Esquivel v.
Ombudsman:6
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to
file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the
Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said
exercise of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the court will not interfere in its
exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,7 we discussed the value of the
Ombudsman’s independence, thus:
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts
and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance, or he may proceed with the
investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. We have
consistently refrained from interfering with the constitutionally mandated investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman. Thus, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment,
finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless the exercise of such
discretionary powers is tainted by grave abuse of discretion.
The Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when
there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise
of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.8 An examination of the records would show that
the Office of the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint against Balasbas.
Balasbas, as Assistant City Prosecutor, was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides, thus:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, are as follows:
1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.9
In Albert v. Sandiganbayan,10 we discussed the second element, to wit:
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad
judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity
or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or
ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
And, as we explained in Collantes v. Marcelo,11
Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations
of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the
fountain of good conscience. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good
faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to
bad faith. "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-
interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.
The law also requires that the public officer’s action caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. x x x
Petitioner failed to show that Balasbas acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence in issuing the subpoena. As further pointed out by the Office of the
Ombudsman in its Resolution of 29 July 2002, there was no undue injury because petitioner "had
suffered no actual damage."
Although Balasbas initially recommended the filing of a criminal case against Palad, this
recommendation was still subject to the approval of his superiors, Dimagiba and the City
Prosecutor. Balasbas, as investigating prosecutor, had no power or control over the final
disposition of Palad’s motion to reopen the case. Conducting a preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining whether there exists probable cause to prosecute a person for the
commission of a crime, including the determination of whether to conclude, reopen or dismiss
the criminal complaint subject of the preliminary investigation, is a matter that rests within the
sound discretion of the provincial or city prosecutor. This is clear from the provision of Section
4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which specifically states that no
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior
written authority of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or
his deputy, thus:
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. If the investigating prosecutor
finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He
shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized
officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against
him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of
offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall
act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform
the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or
the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by
himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or
motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or
move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule
shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
Palad filed a motion to reopen the case because she was not given any notice or subpoena
relative to the criminal case filed against her, invoking her basic constitutional right to due
process of law. When asked to comment on Palad’s motion to reopen, Balasbas even objected to
the reopening of the case as this would "only result to the delay in the final disposition of the
case."12 It was Dimagiba, his superior, who recommended that the motion to reopen be granted
"in the interest of justice and considering that only 1 subpoena containing 2 scheduled dates was
sent to respondent, and there being no return thereof, attached to the records." Dimagiba’s
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor.13 Consonant with Section 4, Rule 112,
Balasbas had no other recourse but to follow the recommendation of his superior. The subpoena
he issued to the parties setting the case for investigation was in pursuance to that
recommendation which was finally approved by the City Prosecutor.
As regards petitioner’s claim that Balasbas "blindly followed the illegal orders of his superiors,"
it is worthy to note that petitioner filed a similar case for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as
amended, this time against Dimagiba involving the same Resolution dated 27 August 2001
submitted by Balasbas. This Court, in Soriano v. Marcelo,14 dismissed that petition for lack of
merit and held that petitioner was not able to show that Dimagiba was motivated by self-interest
or ill-will in reopening the preliminary investigation stage of Palad’s case. The Court further
ruled that Dimagiba acted in good faith, as he believed that a denial of the motion to reopen the
preliminary investigation due to the accused’s failure to submit her counter-affidavit would only
lead to more delays.
We reiterate the ruling in Collantes,15 thus:
Agencies tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes should never forget
that the purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect one from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless
and expensive trials. It is, therefore, imperative upon such agencies to relieve any person from
the trauma of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused.
We find that the Office of the Ombudsman, acting within the bounds of its constitutionally
mandated duty, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against
Balasbas.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution dated 29 July 2002 and
the Order dated 14 July 2003 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-02-0246-E. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
1.) U.S. v. Mendoza, 23 Phil 194 (1912)
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable
Julio Llorente, judge.
About 8 o’clock in the evening of August 1, 1910, Bernabe Mangunay, mounted on a carabao,
approached the house of Mateo del Rosario, situated in the barrio of Apulid, of the pueblo of
Panique, Tarlac, to ask for something to eat. As he was then carrying a papaya firebrand and got
too close to the house, the eaves thereof caught fire and its nipa roof immediately started to burn,
a large part of it being consumed. Thereupon Silveria Marcoleta, wife of the owner of the house,
Rosario, who was not in at the time but at a neighbor’s, called out for help and immediately left
the house to escape from the fire, taking her two children and little brother with her. Owing to
the prompt arrival of the husband and several neighbors, the fire was put out before it had burned
the whole house.
On the following day the owner of the house, Mateo del Rosario, reported the occurrence to
Vicente Mendoza, the lieutenant of the aforesaid barrio, and accused Bernabe Mangunay of
starting the fire. Mendoza thereupon ordered the junior lieutenant, Candido Yabut, to summon
the accused. But when the latter appeared, said Mendoza took no action, whatever, nor did he
even report the facts to the proper higher authority, but, on the contrary, permitted the incendiary
to return home.
For the foregoing reasons, and in view of the preliminary investigations made by the justice of
the peace of Paniqui, the provincial fiscal, on September 5, 1910, filed an information in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac, charging Vicente Mendoza as accessory after the fact in the
crime of arson. After due trial, judgment was rendered on May 22, 1911, whereby the defendant
was sentenced to the penalty of two years four months and one day of presidio correccional, to
the accessories, with allowance of one-half of the time of his detention, and to payment of the
costs; from which judgment he appealed.
Had the accused barrio-lieutenant incurred responsibility by his conduct, he should have been
charged with the crime of "prevaricacion" under article 355 of the Penal Code, for neglect of the
duties of his office by maliciously failing to move the prosecution and punishment of the
delinquent.
However, the present case was instituted through an information for concealment of crime, and
as it has been proved that the alleged incendiary, Bernabe Mangunay, was acquitted for lack of
evidence, by judgment rendered in Case No. 544 prosecuted against him in the same court of
Tarlac, so it remains to be determined whether, notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal act
in the crime, said complaint for concealment can be maintained, and the alleged accessory after
the fact convicted.
The responsibility of the accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal in a crime,
because the accessory’s participation therein is subsequent to its commission, and his guilt is
very directly related to the principal delinquent in the punishable act; for if the facts alleged are
not proven in the prosecution institutes, or do not constitute a crime, no legal grounds exist for
convicting a defendant as an accessory after the fact of a crime not perpetrated or of parties not
guilty. (U.S. v. Abison, 3 Phil. Rep., 191.)
In the case at bar there are indications that the fire was accidental and, if so, the acquittal of the
accused in the other case was perhaps due to the lack of proof of his guilt as an incendiary and to
the fact that the acts charged do not constitute a crime. Therefore, upon this hypothesis, and
because the alleged incendiary was acquitted, it is neither proper nor possible to convict the
defendant, Mendoza, as accessory after the fact, of Bernabe Mangunay, who was acquitted of the
said crime of arson.
Fore the foregoing reasons, with reversal of the judgment appealed from, it is proper to acquit, as
we do hereby, Vicente Mendoza, the lieutenant of the barrio of Apulid, Paniqui, with the costs of
both instances de oficio. Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., con
1.) Merencillo v. People, 521 SCRA 31 (2001)*
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review1 assails the June 18, 1999 decision2 of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case
Nos. 004-005 affirming3 the omnibus decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran
City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T. Merencillo guilty
of violating Section 3(b) of RA 30195 and Article 2106 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 in Criminal Case
No. 9482 read:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a public
official connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as its Group Supervising Examiner, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain, directly
demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in
exchange for the release of the certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land
purchased by the Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a transaction
wherein the aforesaid accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said Mrs.
Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed but upon prior consultation with the military
authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal Investigation Command [CIC] who
set up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of
receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus
(paper) monies, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in
particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be proved during the
trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019.7
On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483 charged:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a public
official connected with the performance of official duty as its Group Supervising Examiner, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal gain, demand,
extort and agree to perform an act constituting a crime, an act which is in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, that is – that the certification for payment of the capital gains
tax relative to the land purchased by the Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine
Corpus Enerio be released by him only upon payment of an additional under the table transaction
in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, which
Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed, but upon prior consultation with the
military authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal [Investigation] Command
(CIC) who set up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the
act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred pesos bills and the rest
all bogus (paper) monies, an act performed by the accused in his official capacity as Group
Supervising Examiner of the BIR, to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola
Cesar in particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be proved
during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.8
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the
cases were tried jointly.
The Facts Established By The Prosecution
In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the computation of taxes due on the sale of real
property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration
(CAR).9 At the BIR office, she was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who
computed the documentary stamp tax (₱37,500) and capital gains tax (₱125,000) due on the
transaction. The computation was approved by petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor.
Estillore paid the taxes in the bank and returned to apply for a CAR. She submitted the
application together with relevant documents to Fuentes for processing. Fuentes prepared the
revenue audit reports and submitted them together with the application for the CAR to petitioner
for preliminary approval. [The application was to be forwarded thereafter to the Revenue District
Officer (RDO) for final approval.] Fuentes advised Estillore that the CAR would be released
after seven days.
At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar10
(Cesar) received a call from Estillore. She was told that petitioner wanted to see her "for some
negotiation." She proceeded to petitioner’s office where the latter demanded ₱20,000 in
exchange for the approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to confer with her two
brothers who were her business associates.
The following day, on September 14, 1995, Cesar received a call from petitioner who was
following up his demand. Later that day, Cesar received another call from petitioner who told her
that she could get the CAR after four or five days.
Cesar was able to return to the BIR only on September 20, 1995. When petitioner saw her, he
repeated his demand for ₱20,000 although the CAR had in fact been signed by RDO Galahad
Balagon the day before, on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesar’s
inquiry, the releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she (Cabangon) was still
waiting for petitioner’s go signal to release the document.
On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and complained about petitioner’s refusal
to release the CAR unless his demand was met. RDO Balagon assured Cesar that he would look
into her complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing her that she
could get the CAR but reminded her of his demand. He told her that he was willing to accept a
lesser amount. It was at this point that Cesar decided to report the matter to the authorities. She
sought the help of the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol,
Senior Superintendent Dionaid Baraguer.
The following day, Sr. Supt. Baraguer referred Cesar’s complaint to the chief of police of
Tagbilaran City who coordinated with Cesar for the entrapment of petitioner. Cesar was
instructed to prepare two bundles of bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each
side of each of the two bundles to make it appear that the two bundles amounted to ₱10,000 each
or a total of ₱20,000. After the serial numbers of the four one-hundred peso bills were recorded,
the entrapment was set for September 28, 1995.
On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the release of the CAR as well as
for the reduction of petitioner’s demand. Petitioner cautiously told Cesar not to talk about the
matter on the phone and asked her to see him instead. Cesar went to petitioner’s office with the
two bundles of bogus money inside a white envelope.
Petitioner was entertaining a lady visitor when Cesar arrived. The members of the PNP
entrapment team were already in petitioner’s office posing as civilians. On seeing Cesar,
petitioner handed the CAR to her and, as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of
the CAR, he informed her that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this as a cue
for her to follow.
As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar to follow. On reaching the third floor
lobby, petitioner uttered "Here only." Cesar handed the envelope containing the two bundles of
marked money to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked "Why is this thick?" Before Cesar
could answer, a member of the PNP entrapment team photographed petitioner holding the
envelope. Petitioner panicked, hid the envelope behind his back and turned towards the window
at the back of the BIR building. On seeing that the window was closed, he turned around towards
the open window facing the street. He threw the envelope towards the window but it hit the
ceiling instead, bounced and fell to the first floor of the BIR building.11 The PNP entrapment
team then introduced themselves to petitioner and invited him to go with them to their
headquarters.
Charges were filed against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner’s evidence consisted of nothing
more than a general denial of the charges against him. He claimed that he never asked for money
and that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesar’s mind after she was told that
there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid. He was surprised
when policemen suddenly arrested him as soon as Cesar handed him a white envelope the
contents of which he suspected to be money.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation, defined and penalized by Section
3(b) of [RA] 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentences
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) month as
minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum, there being aggravating circumstances considered
under Section 3(e) and Section (f) of [RA] 3019 in relation to Article 14(1) and (11) of the [RPC]
in the sense that the offender have taken advantage of his public position, and that the crime was
committed in consideration of a price or promise, without any mitigating or extenuating
circumstances to neutralize or offset any of the aggravating circumstances, with perpetual
disqualification from public office, and the Court further finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation, for the crime of Direct Bribery defined and
penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum and a fine of Sixty Thousand (₱60,000.00) Pesos, all as mandated by law.
The accused Juanito T. Merencillo likewise is ordered to indemnify private complainant [Cesar]
to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of Five
Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos. Costs shall also be taxed against the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however,
denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification reducing the penalty of
imprisonment for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 to an indeterminate sentence of six years
and one month of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum.13
Thus, this petition.
Petitioner basically raises two points: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to believe his evidence
over that of the prosecution’s and (2) the Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize that he was
placed in double jeopardy.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for affirming the RTC decision and disregarding his
evidence. He claims that, had the RTC and the Sandiganbayan not ignored the inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses,14 he would have been acquitted. He also asserts
that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Section 3(b) of RA
3019 and for direct bribery.
Petitioner is wrong.
Trial Court’s Evaluation of Evidence Will Not Be Disturbed
Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses (that
petitioner demanded and received money from private complainant Cesar for the release of the
CAR) sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.
This notwithstanding, petitioner now asks this Court to review the entire evidence anew, re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and make another factual determination of the case – a
course of action clearly improper given the nature of the instant petition.15 Questions of fact
cannot generally be raised for the consideration of this Court.
The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court.16 Its
findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by this Court unless there is no evidence on record
to support them.17 In this case, however, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, affirming the
factual findings of the RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the conclusions therein were
not against the law and jurisprudence. There is no reason to disturb the congruent findings of the
trial and appellate courts.
Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the
respect of appellate courts because trial courts have the distinct advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify.18 In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court’s
findings and evaluation of evidence tending to show that it overlooked certain material facts and
circumstances, its findings and evaluation of evidence should be respected on review.19 The
presiding judge of the trial court had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses on the witness stand on direct examination by the prosecution, cross-
examination by the defense as well as during clarificatory questioning by the trial judge
himself.20 Between the trial judge and this Court, the former was concededly in a better position
to determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth.21 Based on the records, we find no
reason to disagree with the trial court’s assessment and to discredit the prosecution’s witnesses.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the RTC and the Sandiganbayan considered the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that
the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the truth of the
prosecution’s testimonial evidence. We agree.
Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in each and every detail.
Differences in the recollection of the event are inevitable and inconsequential variances are
commonly regarded as signs of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.22 In fact, such
minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized
falsities.23
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty.24 The test is whether the testimonies
agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially
coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole.25 Thus, inconsistencies
and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal.26
The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by
petitioner were neither material nor relevant to the elements of the offenses for which he was
charged. For instance, whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private
respondent was immaterial. The fact was that petitioner demanded and received money in
consideration for the issuance of the CAR.
Petitioner Was Not Placed In Double Jeopardy
Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following [acts] shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code.27 There is no double jeopardy if a person
is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised
Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.28 The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to
commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.29 An offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.30
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that
there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses.
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;
(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;
(4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government and
(5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a
contract or transaction has the right to intervene.31
On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do and
(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.32
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of
direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense
are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or
demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is
required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is
limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public
officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider
and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an
unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing
an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act
gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a
variance between the elements of the offenses charged.33 The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different
one.34
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the
Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
2.) Marisfosque v. People, 435 SCRA 332 (2004)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which assails the decision dated September 23, 2002 and the Resolution dated January 3, 2003 of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030 finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Petitioner was charged with direct bribery in an Information which
reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
That on or about October 13, 1990 in Legazpi City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused a public officer being a qualified member of the
Police Force of Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National Police, taking advantage of his
official/public position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to his office, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand, obtain and/or receive directly from Yu
Su Pong1 and Hian Hian Sy2 the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
PESOS (P5,800.00) Philippine Currency in consideration for his recovery from alleged robbers,
eighteen Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned
victims in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 cralawred
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Hian Hian Yu Sy and her husband, Arsenio
Sy, went to the office of Captain Alberto Salvo, Chief of the Intelligence and Operating Division
stationed at the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in Region 5, to report the robbery of
Shellane tanks at the gasoline station of her father, Yu So Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt
by petitioner, Police Sergeant Narciso Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of the lost items.
Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy prepared the
pay-off money in the amount of P4,800.00 and listed down the serial numbers of the bills. The
pay-off was scheduled at 7:00 in the evening of that day in Golden Grace Department Store
which was owned by Yu So Pong. At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his men arrived at the
target area and strategically positioned themselves outside the Golden Grace Department Store to
await the arrival of the suspect. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Marifosque arrived on board a
tricycle. He went inside the store and demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So
Pong. The latter handed to him the marked money, which was wrapped in a newspaper. When
petitioner stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged signal, whereupon the
arresting operatives swooped down upon the suspect and arrested him.
Hian Hian Yu Sy testified that petitioner demanded the amount of P7,200.00 but she bargained
for P4,800.00 only because that was all she had at the time. She proposed that petitioner return
the following morning to pick up the balance.
By way of defense, petitioner Marifosque testified that in the morning of October 13, 1990, a
police asset came to his house and reported that he witnessed a robbery at the gasoline station of
Yu So Pong. Petitioner went to the gasoline station of Yu So Pong and relayed to him the
information. Thereafter, petitioner and Yu So Pong proceeded to the police station to report the
robbery to the desk officer, PFC Jesus Fernandez, who then dispatched petitioner and a certain
Pat. Garcia to conduct an investigation. As they were leaving the police station, the asset
approached petitioner asking if he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as his reward. Petitioner
relayed the message to Yu So Pong, who said he was amenable if that [was] the only way to
recover the cylinders and to apprehend the robbers.4 Based on information furnished by the
asset, the police investigators proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo in San Roque Legazpi
City, where they found the stolen gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle.
Meanwhile, Arnaldo arrived. Petitioner did not arrest him at that time because he promised to
lead them to the other stolen cylinder tanks.5 The group returned to the police station where
petitioner made a written report of the recovery of the gas tanks.
Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police force and
occasionally received rewards from the police for any information of the criminal activities. On
October 13, 1990 at around 4:00 in the morning, he went out to buy bread and saw three
individuals stealing gas cylinder tanks in the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner
and reported to him the robbery. He went back to his house to feed the chickens. Sometime
thereafter, he dropped by the police station to discuss with petitioner the reward of P350.00 per
cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him 1,000.00 and told him to return at 6:00 p.m. for the
remainder.At 7:00 p.m., he and petitioner went to the store of Yu So Pong to collect the balance
of the reward money. Petitioner went inside the store and Arnaldo, who was left outside, saw a
woman giving him a folded newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so he
ran away.
On September 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct
bribery, the dispositive portion of which reads:6 cralawred
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering that the agreed act, which did not
constitute a crime, was executed, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused NAZARIO
MARIFOSQUE Y NUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery,
defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. The accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years 6
months and 5 days of Prision Correccional medium and maximum periods as the Minimum and
7 years, 8 months and 9 days of Prision Mayor minimum and medium periods as the Maximum
considering that there is no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance and a fine in the amount of
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). The accused shall also suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.7 cralawred
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposes the present appeal
raising the following issues:
I
THE ACT OF PETITIONER RECEIPT OF THE SUMS OF MONEY FOR DELIVERY TO
HIS ASSET DOES NOT CONSITUTE AN OFFENSE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 210 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF DIRECT BRIBERY.8 cralawred
In the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
do not demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of the alleged bribe money constitutes the act
punishable by the offense as defined by the Revised Penal Code. He draws attention to the
following findings of fact by the appellate court, namely: (1) that he was not the one who asked
for reward from private complainant Yu So Pong but the asset; and (2) that Hian Hian Yu Sy had
no direct knowledge of the alleged transaction, i.e., the demand for money in consideration of the
return/recovery of twenty-one Shellane gas tanks, between private complainant Yu So Pong and
the accused.
In the second assigned error, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt because there was no competent evidence to prove that the amount was
really intended for him and not for his asset. He anchors his defense on the fact that: (1) he
merely relayed to Yu So Pong the assets request for a reward money; and (2) Yu So Pong was
agreeable to the request. He further contends that the act of receiving money for the asset is not
one of those punishable under the law as direct bribery.
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt
and malicious intent.
First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his daughter at
the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave P1,000.00 to his asset, which
purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his
asset. When he was arrested and interrogated at Camp Ibalon, he made no attempt to present his
asset to explain and justify his receipt of the reward money. Instead, he accepted his arrest and
investigation with an air of resignation, which is characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-
handed. Captain Calvo, one of the arresting CIS officers, testified that petitioner attempted to
give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him.9 This was a clear
showing that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction. Had he been engaged in a
legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly
protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. Instead,
he meekly submitted to the indignity of arrest and went along the eventual investigation with the
docility of a man at a loss for a satisfactory explanation.
Second, petitioners solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident betrays
an intention not altogether altruistic. On the contrary, it denotes a corrupt desire on his part to
obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. At the time petitioner was notified by his
asset of the robbery incident, he was no longer on duty, having been assigned to the night shift
the day before. He was too overzealous to meet with Yu So Pong although the case was already
assigned to another police investigator. His justification that he wanted to encourage the victim
to pursue the case against the robbers rings hollow and untrue. It is clearly an afterthought. As
shown in the testimony of prosecution witness Hian Hian Yu Sy, petitioner met with Yu So Pong
for no apparent reason than to demand money. There was no mention of any attempt by him to
investigate, much less encourage the victims to file charges against the malefactors. More telling
is petitioners persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was
no longer complaining about the P1,000.00 he supposedly received earlier,
thus:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Pros. Agcaoili:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Since the asset was not complaining at the time, you should not have gone back anymore to Yu
So Pong?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Accused Marifosque:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Why would I not go back? My purpose was to encourage him to pursue the matter. If he would
not pursue this matter, then we would be the laughing stock of the thieves we arrested and then
we cannot charge them.
Q.So Mr. Witness, you went to Yu So Pong after you received the P1,000.00 without any
intention to receive additional amount for the asset, am I right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: No, maam. That was not the purpose. In fact, Yu So Pong had told me earlier to see him again
in order to prepare for the cash and to see if an additional amount would be needed for my
asset.10 cralawred
While petitioner supposedly supports the reward system, yet he denied that he previously gave
incentives to the assets for the recovery of stolen items, to wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
PJ:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Sometimes you would ask for reward for your assets?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: I myself voluntarily give them a reward.
Q: That is not the question. The question is, in the past when you would recover stolen articles,
would you ask the owner of the articles to give some incentive or tip to your assets?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: That has not happened, your Honor.
PJ:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Next question.
Pros. Agcaoili:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
And, in fact, Mr. Witness, you did not give any incentive to your asset on that incident that
happened in the house of Yu So Pong which is the subject matter of this case?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.For that particular case alone, Mr. Yu so Pong gave me something and I gave it to my asset.
xxx
Pros. Agcaoili
In fact, Mr. Witness, you said that these tips were just given as an incentive?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI would be the one to give the incentives to my asset. But in that particular instance, the
P1,000.00 which Mr. Yu So Pong gave me, I turned it over to my own asset.
QTo your own assessment, Mr. Witness, is P1,000.00 not enough to serve as an incentive to your
asset?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI do not know whether P1,000.00 is enough or not. The fact, is, that was the amount I got from
Yu So Pong which I gave to my asset.
PJ:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Was the asset complaining that was not enough?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.No, Your Honor.11 cralawred
Third, the conduct of the petitioner during the recovery of the stolen articles leaves much to be
desired. He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for investigation although the
cylinder tanks were found in his possession.His flimsy excuse that the latter promised to deliver
additional cylinder tanks is unworthy of credence considering that, as a police officer with years
of experience, he should have known that the proper action, under the circumstances, was to at
least invite him to the police precinct for investigation. Curiously, the prime suspect Edgardo
Arnaldo turned out to be the brother of petitioners police asset who, we recall, directed the police
officers to the location of the stashed articles. This strange coincidence may well indicate a
conspiracy between the petitioner and the thieves to steal from the victim and later cash in on the
recovery of the lost items.
In the final analysis, this case boils down to an issue of credibility. In this regard, the prosecution
witnesses gave clear and straightforward testimonies. The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving
full weight and credence to their version of the events. Petitioners conviction must be affirmed.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has
been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of Article 203
of the Revised Penal Code, which includes all persons who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its
branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class. At the
time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station.
He directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in
exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime
within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of receiving money was
connected with his duty as a police officer.
The instant case falls within the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is quoted hereunder:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Art. 210.Direct Bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not
less than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime
agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in
the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer
the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the
value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain
from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not less
than three times the value of the gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification.
While the Sandiganbayan imposed the correct prison term in applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the amount of the fine is erroneous.Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides that if the act does not constitute a crime,
the fine shall not be less than three times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that
petitioner received an aggregate amount of P5,800.00.12 He should therefore be ordered to pay a
fine not less than 3 times its value. Accordingly, a fine of P18,000.00 is deemed reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Direct Bribery and imposing upon him the indeterminate prison term of 3 years, 6
months, and 5 days of prision correccional,as minimum, to7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of
prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is increased
to P18,000.00.
In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.

1.) Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 508 SCRA 258 (2006)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
to set aside and nullify the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated 6 May 2002 which convicted
petitioner Timoteo A. Garcia of 56 counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Cases
Nos. 24042 to 24098 (except 24078), and its Resolution2 dated 2 October 2002 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda against petitioner, then
Regional Director, Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region X, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery
Tagupa, employees of the same office, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
for their alleged frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from Oro Asian Automotive Center
Corporation (Company). Finding probable cause for violation thereof, Graft Investigation Officer
II Gay Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery
Tagupa be indicted for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
On 14 August 1997, 57 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner,
Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. The Information in Criminal Case No. 24042 reads:
That on or about the period covering January 9, 1993 to January 10, 1993 or sometime prior
thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, GILBERT G. NABO and NERY TAGUPA, being then
public officers or employees of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Cagayan de Oro City,
taking advantage of their respective official positions, and conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another and with intent to gain personal use or benefit, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously borrow One (1) unit Asian Automotive Center's Service
Vehicle - Fiera Blue KBK-732, in good running condition, spare tire, tools from Oro Asian
Automotive Corporation, which is engaged in the business of vehicle assembly and dealership in
Cagayan de Oro City, knowing that said corporation regularly transacts with the accused's LTO
Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis
numbers as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report and other similar transactions
which require the prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused Regional Director and
employees and/or their said LTO office in Cagayan de Oro City, to the damage and prejudice of
and undue injury to said Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, including complainant Maria
Lourdes Miranda.3
The fifty-six other Informations are similarly worded except for the alleged dates of commission
of the offense, and the types/descriptions of the vehicles allegedly borrowed by them. The
pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:
CASE NUMBER DATE OF COMMISSION TYPE/DESCRIPTION OF
VEHICLE
24043 January 16, 1993 to January 17, 1993
One (1) unit FIERA BLUE
24044 January 23, 1993 to January 24, 1993
One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, service vehicle of Asian Automotive Center, in good
running condition with tools, spare tire
24045 February 6, 1993 to February 7, 1993
One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, in good running condition with tools
24046 February 13, 1993 to February 14, 1993
One (1) unit FIERA BLUE KBK-732, in good running condition
24047 March 13, 1993 to March 14, 1993
One (1) unit TOYOTA TAMARAW yellow, KBN-156, in good running condition, with tools
and spare tire
24048 Morning of March 20, 1993 to afternoon of March 20, 1993
One (1) unit TOYOTA HSPUR YELLOW KBN-156, with spare tools, in good condition
24049 Morning of March 27, 1993 to afternoon of March 27, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, yellow in color, KBN-156, in good condition, with spare tire,
with jack and tire wrench
24050 April 24, 1993 to April 25, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, Yellow in color, KBN-156, in good condition, with spare
tire, jack and tire wrench
24051 April 25, 1993 and have been returned after use
One (1) unit AERO D VAN KBN-865, maroon in color Asian Automotive Center's Vehicle, in
good running condition, with spare tire, tools, jack and tire wrench
24052 May 15, 1993 to May 16, 1993
One (1) unit TOYOTA Fierra, yellow in color, engine no. 4k-0907126, chassis no. CMCI-
109247-C, in good condition, jack, spare tire, tire wrench
24053 May 29, 1993 to May 30, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24054 June 5, 1993 to June 6, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24055 June 19, 1993 to June 20, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24056 June 26, 1993 to morning of June 26, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24057 July 17, 1993 to July 18, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24058 July 31, 1993 to August 1, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24059 July 24, 1993 to July 25, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24060 August 7, 1993 to August 8, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24061 August 14, 1993 to August 15, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24062 August 21, 1993 to August 22, 1993
One (1) unit TAMARAW HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in color, in good running condition, w/
spare tire, jack and tire wrench
24063 September 4, 1993 to September 5, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, white in color, with engine no. C190-484232, Chassis
no. SMM90-6787-C, in good running condition upholstered seats
24064 Morning of September 11, 1993 to evening of September 11, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, white in color, in good running condition, upholstered
seats, jack, tire wrench, spare tire
24065 September 18, 1993 to September 19, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, in good running condition, upholstered seats, side
view mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire wrench, seats
24066 September 25, 1993 to September 26, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good running condition, upholstered seats, side view
mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire wrench, seats
24067 October 23, 1993 to October 24, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good running condition, upholstered seats, side view
mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire wrench, seats
24068 October 30, 1993 to October 31, 1993
One (1) unit ISUZU, NNJ-917, white in color, in good running condition, side view mirror, jack
w/ tire wrench
24069 November 6, 1993 to November 7, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good running condition, upholstered seats, side view
mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire wrench, seats
24070 November 13, 1993 to November 14, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, good running condition, upholstered seats, side view
mirrors, rear view mirror, jack w/ handle, tire wrench, seats
24071 November 27, 1993 to November 28, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24072 December 4, 1993 to December 5, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24073 December 11, 1993 to December 12, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24074 December 18, 1993 to December 19, 1993
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24075 January 8, 1994 to January 9, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24076 Morning of January 15, 1994 to late afternoon of January 15, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition.
24077 January 29, 1994 to January 30, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, KBP-375, white in color, w/o plate number
24078 Withdrawn per Court Resolution dated July 3, 1998, p. 103 Crim. Case # 24042
24079 February 5, 1994 to February 6, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24080 February 12, 1994 to February 13, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, in good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24081 February 26, 1994 to February 27, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24082 March 4, 1994 to March 5, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24083 March 12, 1994 to March 13, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24084 March 19, 1994 to March 20, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, in good
running condition, with jack, tire wrench, spare tire.
24085 April 9, 1994 to April 10, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24086 April 30, 1994 to May 1, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24087 May 7, 1994 to May 8, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24088 May 14, 1994 to May 15, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24089 May 21, 1994 to May 22, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24090 June 4, 1994 to June 5, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, in good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24091 June 11, 1994 to June 12, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, in good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24092 June 17, 1994 to June 19, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D-II HSPUR, KBP-375, in good running condition, jack w/ handle, tire
wrench, spare tire
24093 July 2, 1994 to July 3, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24094 July 23, 1994 to July 24, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition
24095 August 25, 1994 to August 28, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D VAN with engine no. C190-542416, chassis no. SMM90-8370-C, full in
dash instrumentation, maroon in color with plate no. KBN-865, in good condition
24096 Morning of September 3, 1994 to afternoon of September 3, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack, tire
wrench, in good running condition
24097 September 17, 1994 to September 18, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, in good
running condition
24098 November 26, 1994 to November 27, 1994
One (1) unit AERO D HSPUR, white in color, KBP-375, full in dash instrumentation, jack w/
handle, tire wrench in good running condition4
On 22 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three accused5 and for
the holding of their departure from the country.6 On 6 October 1997, petitioner posted a
consolidated surety bond for his provisional liberty.7
In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. 24078
was granted.8
On 17 August 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by counsel de
parte, pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.9 Accused Nabo remains at large.
On 15 October 1998, pre-trial was concluded.10 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as follows:
ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed as
the driver and liaison officer of the Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (hereinafter, "the
Company"), an establishment engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles, during the period
covering the years 1991 to 1995. As such, Yungao had to officially report to the Land
Transportation Office ("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the engine and chassis numbers prior
to the assembly of any motor vehicle. In the process, the Company had to secure from the LTO a
Conduct Permit after a motor vehicle has been completely assembled, for purposes of carrying
out the necessary road testing of the vehicle concerned. After the said road testing and prior to its
eventual sale/disposition, the vehicle has to be first properly registered with the LTO. Accused
Garcia, in his capacity as the Director of the LTO of Cagayan de Oro City, during all times
relevant to the instant cases, was the approving authority on the aforesaid reportorial
requirements and the signatory of the said Conduct Permits.
By reason thereof, Yungao knew accused Garcia since January of 1991. Yungao would always
personally talk to accused Garcia regarding the issuance of the required Conduct Permit for any
newly assembled vehicle. Yungao would secure from accused Garcia as many as 30 to 40 of
such permits in a year.
In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him to
inform either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he (accused Garcia)
would borrow a motor vehicle for purposes of visiting his farm. When Yungao could not be
contacted, accused Garcia would personally call up the Company and talk to the owners thereof
to borrow the vehicle. Accused Garcia confided to Yungao that he could not utilize the assigned
government vehicle for his own personal use during Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this
reason that he had to borrow vehicles from the Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.
Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles from the
Chiongs during the period covering January of 1993 up to and until November of 1994. Accused
Garcia would always ask his representative to take the Company's vehicle on a Saturday
morning. However, Yungao never reported for work on Saturdays; thus, he was not the one who
actually released the borrowed motor vehicles to the representative of accused Garcia.
Nonetheless, Yungao would be aware of the fact that accused Garcia borrowed the vehicles
requested because, for every such instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued, which is
placed on top of his table for him to place in the Company's record files on the following
working day. The numerous delivery receipts would show and indicate the actual number of
times accused Garcia had borrowed vehicles from the Company.
Finally, Yungao identified the affidavit which he executed in connection with the subject cases.
On cross-examination, Yungao testified that it was his duty to keep the permits relating to the
road testing of the motor vehicles assembled by the Company. These permits were secured by
him from accused Garcia before the vehicles were eventually put on display or presented to
potential buyers. Although there was a Regulation Officer at the LTO before whom the request
for the issuance of a Conduct Permit is to be presented, Yungao was often told to go straight up
to the room of accused Garcia so that the latter could personally sign the said permit. It was only
when accused Garcia is absent or is not in office that the papers submitted to the LTO were
attended to by his assistant.
Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his request to borrow the Company's
motor vehicle verbally and on a Friday. However, Yungao admitted that he was not very familiar
with the signature of accused Garcia, and that the latter's signature did not appear in any of the
delivery receipts.
During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia failed to
approve the Company's request, and this was a request for an extension of the usual "5-day road
test" period granted to the Company. Nonetheless, the Company found the said disapproval to be
acceptable and proper.
On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the
persons who actually received the Company's vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery
receipts. However, Yungao does not recognize the signatures appearing on the said delivery
receipts, including those purportedly of accused Tagupa, because Yungao was not present when
the vehicles were taken.
The prosecution had intended to present another witness in the person of Ms. Ma. Lourdes V.
Miranda (hereinafter, "Miranda"), who was present at the time Yungao testified. Prior to her
presentation, however, the parties agreed to enter into stipulations and admissions. Thus, it was
stipulated that Miranda was the mother of a child named Jane, who was run over and killed in a
vehicular accident; that the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo; that Miranda,
thereafter, successfully traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of
numerous delivery receipts in the files and possession of the Company; and that said discovery
led to the institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. As a result of such
admissions and stipulations, the proposed testimony of Miranda was, thereafter, dispensed with.
AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President and
General Manager of the Company, a business establishment engaged in the assembly of motor
vehicles. In the process, the Company has to submit a Dealer's Report to the LTO prior to the
assembly of a motor vehicle. After the assembly is completed, the Company has to secure a
permit from the LTO for purposes of conducting the necessary road testing of the newly
assembled motor vehicle.
In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the LTO in Cagayan de Oro City. He was
the officer who approves the needed Conduction Permit of newly assembled motor vehicles. He
was also the LTO officer who approves and signs the Company's annual LTO Accreditation
Certificate.
Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle to transport
water thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a motor
vehicle, either by asking from Chiong directly through telephone calls or through Yungao, her
Liaison Officer. Everytime accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would
issue a delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom accused
Garcia would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Chiong was usually the company officer who
signed the delivery receipt for the release of the borrowed motor vehicle to the representative of
accused Garcia. When she was not in office, she would authorize her personnel to place [their]
initials on top of her name. On several occasions, Chiong had seen accused Nabo affixing his
signature on the delivery receipt before taking out the borrowed motor vehicles. Chiong was very
sure that the driver who picked up the motor vehicle from the Company was the personnel of
accused Garcia because the latter would always call her up first before sending his representative
to get a vehicle. Chiong was likewise very familiar with the voice of accused Garcia because she
had been dealing with him for a long period of time already, and all the while she had always
maintained a cordial relationship with him.
On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that accused Garcia would ask his driver
to get a vehicle on a Saturday at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning. He would return it in the
late afternoon of the same day. There was only one instance when accused Garcia returned the
motor vehicle on the day after, and this was the time when the said vehicle had figured in a
vehicular accident which resulted in the death of a certain Jane, the daughter of Miranda. Chiong
was not the complainant in the said vehicular accident case because she could not afford to
offend or antagonize accused Garcia, and she had always considered the lending of motor
vehicles to accused Garcia as a public relation thing.
Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused Garcia were
all company service cars and not newly assembled vehicles. Finally, she testified that she gets
irritated whenever accused Garcia would ask for a vehicle at a time when she herself would also
need it. However, under the circumstances, she had to give in to his request.11
For the defense, petitioner took the witness stand, while accused Tagupa did not present any
evidence.
Petitioner testified that he was the Regional Director of the 10th Regional Office of the LTO
from August, 1987 to December, 1994. He downright denied borrowing any motor vehicle from
the Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the Delivery Receipts12 submitted by
the prosecution.13 He admitted, though, that the Company has been continually transacting
business with his office properly and officially, and has not, even for a single instance, violated
any rules with respect to assembly of motor vehicles, and that there was no reason for the owners
of the Company to harbor any ill-feelings against him.14 He further admitted that he had known
Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, even before he
became Regional Director when he was still the Chief of the Operations Division.15 He added
that employees of the LTO are used to borrowing vehicles from their friends and that this
practice has been going on prior to his being Regional Director. He claimed he repeatedly
warned his subordinates about the illegality of the same but they merely turned a deaf ear.16
Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo, had, on several occasions, driven motor vehicles and
visited him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going home without allegedly knowing that
the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed from his (Nabo) friends.17
On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of
fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Accused
Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo, who remained at large, were
archived. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A GARCIA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of fifty-six (56) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, said accused
is hereby sentenced to: (i) in each case, suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a
period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) month,
as maximum; (ii) suffer all accessory penalties consequent thereto; and (iii) pay the costs.
With respect to accused NERY TAGUPA, by reason of the total lack of any evidence against
him, he is hereby ACQUITED.
As for accused Gilbert G. Nabo, considering that he remained at large and jurisdiction over his
person had yet to be acquired, let the case as against him be achieved.18
Petitioner is now before us assigning as errors the following:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 WERE PRESENT IN CRIM. CASES NOS.
24042 TO 24098 (EXCEPT 24078) AND IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY
OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION THEREOF;
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF FATALLY DEFECTIVE
INFORMATIONS WHEREIN THE FACTS CHARGED NEVER CONSTITUTED AN
OFFENSE;
3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS
INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT (EVEN FOR A SINGLE COUNT);
4. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND IN THE PROCESS VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN IT
SUPPLIED THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WITH
ASSUMPTIONS WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD;
5. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT OBSERVED DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF
JUSTICE BY ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER'S CO-ACCUSED TAGUPA AND
CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN THE SAME REASONING SHOULD
HAVE LED ALSO TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.
In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent.19 To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b)20 of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: (1)
the offender is a public officer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a
percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in connection with
a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official
capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.21
Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b) have been established by the
prosecution. Petitioner focuses primarily on the fourth element. He argues that the prosecution
failed to show the specific transactions of the Company with the LTO of Cagayan de Oro that
petitioner approved and/or intervened in so that he could borrow from, or be lent by, the
Company a vehicle. Inasmuch as he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of fifty-six counts of
violation of Section 3(b) for allegedly borrowing the Company's vehicle fifty-six times, the
Sandiganbayan, he stresses, should have at least pointed out what these transactions were. This,
petitioner claims, the Sandiganbayan failed to show with certainty in its decision. Petitioner adds
that the prosecution did not even attempt to introduce evidence to show what contract or
transaction was pending before the LTO over which petitioner had the right to intervene being
the Regional Director when, at the period stated in all the fifty-six informations, he borrowed a
vehicle.
We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the
fourth element.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
It is very clear from Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit must be in connection with "a contract or transaction"22 wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the
prosecution did not specify what transactions the Company had with the LTO that petitioner
intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the Company. It is insufficient that
petitioner admitted that the Company has continually transacted with his office. What is required
is that the transaction involved should at least be described with particularity and proven. To
establish the existence of the fourth element, the relation of the fact of requesting and/or
receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. This, the prosecution
failed to do. The prosecution's allegation that the Company regularly transacts with petitioner's
LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis
numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report, and other similar transactions,
will not suffice. This general statement failed to show the link between the 56 alleged
borrowings with their corresponding transactions.
Failing to prove one of the other elements of the crime charged, we find no need to discuss the
presence or absence of the elements.
The next question to be resolved is: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime (i.e., Direct
Bribery or Indirect Bribery) charged in the informations?cralawlibrary
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 21023 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has
been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.24 Thus, the acts constituting direct
bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official
duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to
refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in consideration
of any gift or promise.25
In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution
showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct bribery. The two
prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in
exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official
duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company,
testified that the Company complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any
intervention from petitioner or from anybody else from said office.26 From the evidence on
record, petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery.
Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery?cralawlibrary
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason
of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 21127 of the
Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material
consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able to show that petitioner indeed accepted
a gift from the Company? The alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company
can be considered as the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a
vehicle from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery
receipts28 allegedly signed by petitioner's representative whom the latter would send to pick up
the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and
received the vehicles subject matter of the 56 informations. The prosecution claims that
petitioner received the vehicles via his representatives to whom the vehicles were released. The
prosecution relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We, however, find that the delivery receipts
do not sufficiently prove that petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do
not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner's
representatives who picked up the vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa)
who allegedly received the vehicles from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the
identity of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain,
there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.
Factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are
premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.29 In the case before
us, we are constrained to apply the exception rather than the rule. We find that the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan that petitioners actually received the vehicles through his representatives is
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures, and not supported by evidence on
record. The certainty of petitioner's receipt of the vehicle for his alleged personal use was not
substantiated.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24077 and 24079 to 24098 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. For insufficiency of evidence, the petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged in the informations. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

1.) Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 521 SCRA 270 (2007)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Henry
T. Go seeking to nullify the Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry
T. Go, which denied his motion to quash. Likewise sought to be nullified is the Sandiganbayan
Resolution of March 24, 2006 denying petitioner Go’s motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On May 5, 2003, this Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),1 declaring as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement, the
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental Contracts entered
into between the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.

By the aforementioned contracts (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts), the Government
awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).2

The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a
qualified bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law.
Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for being contrary to public policy.
The penultimate paragraph of the Court’s Decision states thus:
CONCLUSION

In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the
Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the
contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.
Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial
amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement
into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession
Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under
Section 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession Agreement and
Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct government
guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA,
are likewise null and void.3

Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman by Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asia’s Emerging Dragon
Corporation (AEDC), charging several persons in connection with the NAIA IPT III project. The
AEDC was the original proponent thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO when it failed to
match the latter’s bid price.

After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with
the Sandiganbayan the Information dated January 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, as then
DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation of
Section 3(g)4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera,
Jr. and Henry T. Go. The Information reads:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with Violation
of Sec. 3 (g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows:

On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C.
RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy
with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter
into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was
awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957
as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the
liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c)
in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and
in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

On February 11, 2005, petitioner Go posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty.

On February 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order against Rivera and
petitioner Go.

On March 28, 2005, petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."

On May 26, 2005, Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or Re-Determination) of
Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner Go a period of ten
(10) days within which to file a comment thereon.

On June 20, 2005, petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Adopting the view
advanced by Rivera, petitioner Go harped on the alleged "missing documents," including
Pesayco’s amended affidavit-complaint and those others that were mentioned in the resolution of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause against Rivera and petitioner Go,
but which were not allegedly in the records. Petitioner Go maintained that apart from the bare
allegations contained in Pesayco’s affidavit-complaint, there was no supporting evidence for the
finding of the existence of probable cause against him and Rivera. Petitioner Go further alleged
that he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not a public officer
and neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government.
At least one of the important elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not
allegedly present in his case.

On June 21, 2005, petitioner Go filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute the Comment
with Motion to Quash, which the prosecution, through the Office of the Ombudsman, opposed.

On December 6, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying Rivera’s
Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss
and petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecution’s submission, it could still entertain
petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash even after his arraignment considering that it was based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash holding that, contrary to his claim, the allegations in the
Information actually make out the offense charged. More particularly, the allegations that
accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner Go, entered into the ARCA
with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government, are constitutive of the elements of the offense charged as defined under Section
3(g) of RA 3019.
The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Go’s contentions that he is not a public officer, he
did not conspire with Rivera in the execution of the ARCA and, in any case, the said agreement
cannot be said to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, could not be
properly considered for the purpose of quashing the Information on the ground relied upon by
him. According to the Sandiganbayan, these matters raised by petitioner Go have to be proved
during trial.

The decretal portion of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the "Motion for Determination (Re-Determination) of

Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss" and the "Motion to Quash," filed by accused Vicente C.
Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, respectively, are hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner Go filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan
in the Resolution dated March 24, 2006.

Petitioner Go now seeks recourse to the Court and, in support of his petitioner, alleges that:

A.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in not ruling that Section 3(g) does not embrace a private person within its
proviso.

B.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in not ruling that there is no probable cause to hold petitioner for trial.7

Petitioner Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even
enlarged by implication or intendment to bring within its limited scope private persons. The said
provision of law allegedly punishes only public officers as it penalizes the act of "entering, on
behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby." As
a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the government," there
being no showing of any agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of
the government.

Citing several cases,8 petitioner Go enumerates the following elements of Section 3(g) of RA
3019:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

He also cites Marcos v. Sandiganbayan9 where the Court acquitted then First Lady Imelda R.
Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as it found that she did not sign the
subject Lease Agreement, entered into between the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) and
Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), as a public officer, but in her capacity as
Chairman of the PGHFI, a private entity. As such, the Court held that the first element of the
offense charged, i.e., that the accused is a public officer, was wanting.

Petitioner Go claims that, in the same manner, the first element of the offense charged against
him is absent because he is not a public officer who is authorized by law to bind the government
through the act of "entering into a contract." He also points out that, similar to his case, in
Marcos, the Information also alleged that the former First Lady conspired with a public officer,
then Minister Jose P. Dans of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, in entering
into a contract. Nonetheless, the Court therein dismissed the allegation of conspiracy.

Petitioner Go maintains that by any of its definition,10 he cannot be considered a "public

officer." Further, only a public officer can enter into a

contract in representation of the government. He stresses that the first element of the offense, i.e.,
that the accused is a public officer, is an essential ingredient of the crime under Section 3(g) of
RA 3019. He likens it to the crime of parricide where the essential element is the relationship of
the offender to the victim and, citing a criminal law book author, a stranger who cooperates in
the execution of the offense is not allegedly guilty of this crime. The stranger is allegedly either
liable for homicide or murder but never by "conspiracy to commit parricide."11

By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the crime
penalized under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is that the offender must be a public officer. Since he is
not a public officer, one of the essential elements of the offense is lacking; hence, there is no
other recourse but to quash the Information.

Section 9 of RA 3019 was also cited which reads:

SEC. 9. Penalties for violation. –

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less
than six years and one month or fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained
wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

xxx

Petitioner Go posits that had it been the intention of the lawmakers to penalize private persons
who supposedly "conspired" with public officers in violation of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RA
3019, it could have easily used the conjunctive "and," not "or," between the terms "public
officer" and "private person" in Section 9 thereof.

Petitioner Go takes exception to the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement that even as a private

individual he is not excluded from the coverage of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not
being accused singly but as someone who conspired with a public officer in violating the said
law. According to petitioner Go, this proposition applies only to Section 3(e)12 of RA 3019, the
elements of which include that "the accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them."13 He stresses that, unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019, Section 3(g) thereof
penalizes only public officers as the operative phrase in the latter provision is "on behalf of the
government."

Petitioner Go vigorously asserts that there is no basis for the finding of probable cause against
him for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. In particular, he insists that the allegation of
conspiracy between Rivera and himself is not supported by any evidence. He makes an issue out
of those documents that were mentioned in the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman finding
probable cause against him but were not in the records of the Sandiganbayan. His mere signing
of the ARCA does not allegedly establish culpability for violation of RA 3019. Further, he faults
the Sandiganbayan for invoking the doctrine of non-interference by the courts in the
determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause. It is petitioner Go’s view
that the Sandiganbayan should have ordered the quashal of the Information for palpable want of
probable cause coupled with the absence of material documents.

The petition is bereft of merit.

For clarity, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is quoted below anew:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.14

Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public officer does
not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Go’s simplistic
syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(g)
of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in
Section 1 thereof:

SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the
principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella,15 the Court
had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and
private persons:

x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of
malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction
would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted,
which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.16

Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and private
persons with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to
both public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:

SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment
for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification
from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited
interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.
xxx

The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public
officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go,
are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense
thereunder.

The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan17 is instructive. In the said case, Gregorio Singian, Jr.,
a private person who was then Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI), together
with some officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), was charged with violation of Section
3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with the loan accommodations that the said bank extended
to ISI which were characterized as behest loans.

A total of eighteen Informations were filed against Singian and his co-accused by the Office of
the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan corresponding to the nine loan accommodations
granted to ISI. Each loan was subject of two Informations alleging violations of both Section 3(e)
and (g), respectively. In other words, nine Informations charged Singian and his co-accused with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and the other nine charged them with violation of paragraph
(g) of the same provision.

Singian filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for re-determination of existence of probable
cause but the same was dismissed. He then filed with the Court a petition for certiorari but it was
likewise dismissed as the Court held that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had not
committed grave abuse of discretion when they respectively found probable cause against
Singian for violations of both paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA 3019.

Singian thus illustrates that private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019. Another case, Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,18 may likewise be applied to this case by
analogy.

In the said case, Diosdado Garcia, proprietor of D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, together with
Jaime Domingo, then municipal mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, was charged with Section 3(h) of
RA 3019 as it appeared that he was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business
transaction with the municipality. Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law reads:

SEC.3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – x x x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having an interest.

The elements of this offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) he has a direct or
indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; (3) he either: (a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or (b) is
prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.19

Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of Garcia, a private
individual, as well as that of Domingo, who was then a municipal mayor, for violation of Section
3(h) of RA 3019. In so holding, the Court established that Domingo and Garcia acted in
conspiracy with one another in the commission of the offense. Domingo thus also serves to
debunk petitioner Go’s theory that where an offense has as one of its elements that the accused is
a public officer, it necessarily excludes private persons from the scope of such offense.

The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is applicable to
the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019,
including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law
to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.

Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan20 is not quite appropriate. To recall,

upon her motion for reconsideration, the Court therein acquitted former First Lady Imelda
Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 in its Resolution dated October 6,
1998. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement as a
private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first element, i.e., that the accused is a public
officer was wanting.

Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Court’s ruling in Marcos in its proper factual backdrop.
The acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Court’s Decision
dated January 29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v. People,21 which the former First Lady sought to
reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the Court’s Resolution in Marcos. In
Dans, the Information filed against the former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of
Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, alleged that they
were both public officers and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease
agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and
conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Lady’s conviction for violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated
earlier, upon the former First Lady’s motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed her
conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.

It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the former First
Lady’s conviction was based on the fact that it was later held that she signed the subject lease
agreement as a private person, not a public officer. However, this acquittal should also be taken
in conjunction with the fact that the public officer with whom she had supposedly conspired, her
co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In other words, the element that the accused is a
public officer, was totally wanting in the former First Lady’s case because Dans, the public
officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had
already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be convicted, on her own as a
private person, of the said offense.
In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his case
because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a public
officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary. The case against both of them is still
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Go’s case are, therefore, not
exactly on all fours as those of the former First Lady’s case as to warrant the application of the
Marcos ruling in his case.

Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the Information is
infirm as far as petitioner Go is concerned because it failed to mention with specificity his
participation in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. It opines that "aside from
the sweeping allegation of conspiracy, the Information failed to mention any act as to how
petitioner had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. Mere
allegation of conspiracy in the Information does not necessarily mean that the criminal acts
recited therein also pertain to petitioner." While it concedes that the Sandiganbayan may exercise
jurisdiction over private individuals, it submits that it may do so only "upon Information alleging
with specificity the precise violations of the private individual." By way of conclusion, the
dissenting opinion cites Sistoza v. Desierto22 where the Court stated that a signature appearing
on a document is not enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among officials and employees
charged with defrauding the government.

These asseverations, however, are unpersuasive. It is well established that the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.23 In the same manner, the absence (or
presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.24

Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera
in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner Go had taken part in
the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy need not be set forth in the Information as
these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be shown and proved during the trial on the
merits. Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which,
when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the
conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of
each of them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all."25

In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are complied with:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of
Rule 117 on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an Information is
whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
Information are not to be considered.26

As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if
admitted hypothetically, establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à-vis petitioner
Go:

ELEMENTS ALLEGATIONS

1a\^/phi1.net
1. The offender is a public officer
[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage
of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., xxx"

2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government

"[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., xxx in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO xxx
did then and there, willfully & unlawfully and feloniously entered into an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO x x x

3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government

"xxx which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718
(BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of
the latter’s default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of
the ARCA which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law and
manifestly grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines."27

Finally, in the assailed Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated thus:

The rule is that the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case. Such
official is vested with authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court
and the concomitant function of determining as well the persons to be prosecuted. Also, it must
not be lost sight of that the correctness of the exercise of such function is a matter that the trial
court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon, consistent with the policy of non-
interference by the courts in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable
cause.
Accordingly, upon the foregoing premises, we believe and so hold that any and all questions
relating to the finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman should be addressed to
the said office itself, then to the Court of Appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.

On the matter of the judicial determination of probable cause, we stand by our finding that the
same exists in this case, the said finding we arrived at upon a personal determination thereof
which we did for the purpose of and before the issuance of the warrant of arrest.1awphi1.nét
While it may indeed be true that the documents mentioned by accused-movant as being absent in
the records are missing, we nevertheless had for our perusal other documents assiduously listed
down by accused Rivera in his motion, including the information, which we found to constitute
sufficient basis for our determination of the existence of probable cause. It must be emphasized
that such determination is separate and distinct from that made by the Office of the Ombudsman
and which we did independently therefrom.28

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function of the

government prosecutor, which in this case is the Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not interfere
in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable cause, unless there are
compelling reasons.29 Mindful of this salutary rule, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made its
own determination on the basis of the records that were before it. It concluded that there was
sufficient evidence in the records for the finding of the existence of probable cause against
petitioner Go.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.30 Clearly, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed on the Sandiganbayan when it held that there exists
probable cause against petitioner Go.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated
December 6, 2005 and March 24, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 are
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

2.) Pozar v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 729 (1984)

GUERRERO,J

In an Information dated July 22, 1980 and filed with the City Court of Angeles City, Branch I,
docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. CAT-326, petitioner, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of the Philippines, was charged with the crime of Corruption of a Public
Official, allegedly committed as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
That on or about the 17th day of December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an applicant for
probation after he was convicted of an offense by a competent court, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation
Officer, the sum of P100.00 in a paper bill with Serial Nos. BC530309, under circumstances that
would make the said City Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo liable for bribery.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the said information and, after trial, the City
Court inits decision of May 15, 1981 found the petitioner guilty of the crime of corruption of a
public official, the dispositive portion of which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Gregory Pozar guilty of the offense of Corruption of
a Public Official as charged in the Information, and the Court pursuant to Article 212, in relation
to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused Gregory James Pozar to
an imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor, and hereby censures him
for his actuation in this matter, with costs against the accused.

The one hundred peso bill is hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals (now In termediate Appellate Court) and
subsequently, the appellate court affirmed the same in toto. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied on October 19, 1982 and on December 21, 1982, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review of the decision of the respondent court, relying on the constitutional
precept that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved." (Article IV, Sec. 19), and that the State, having the burden of establishing all
the elements of the crime with which the accused is charged, must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, has failed to present and establish the required quantum of proof
against the accused petitioner, hence he is entitled to an acquittal. .

The evidence for the prosecution are stated in the decision of the respondent court, thus: têñ.
£îhqwâ£

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mr. Ricardo Manalo, Mrs. Primitiva Francisco and
Mr. Danilo Ocampo. Upon the other hand, the defense placed on the witness stand appellant
himself and his counsel Atty. Reynaldo Suarez.

Ricardo Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that he started working
at the Probation Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know appellant because the latter had
gone to said office in connection with his application for probation; that at about noontime of
December 17, 1979, appellant came to the office looking for Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo
and since the latter was out at the time, appellant gave him a closed envelope bearing the name
of Ocampo for delivery to the latter; that two days later, he gave the envelope to Ocampo who
opened the same in his presence; that the envelope contained some official papers connected
with appellant's application for probation and attached thereto was a hundred peso bill; that
Ocampo then remarked: 'This s something bad that the opening of the envelope was done on
December 19, 1979; that Ocampo kept the envelope and its contents, including the one hundred
peso bill, but within a week's time gave them to him with instructions to give the same to
appellant but the latter never came to the office and so he returned them to Ocampo; that
although he later saw appellant about two weeks after December 17, 1979, when the latter came
to the office to sign some papers, he never mentioned to appellant the one hundred peso bill (pp.
2-16, t.s.n., September 16, 1980)

Manalo further declared that at the nine the envelope with the one hundred peso bill was given to
him by appellant for delivery to Ocampo, he already had an inkling or knowledge that the
Probation Office will recommend for the grant of appellant's application for probation because
he was the one who makes the final typing of a post, sentence investigation report and before
said final typing Ocampo usually talks to him, so that he knows whether the recommendation
was for a grant or denial of an application (pp. 16-19, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).

Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City Probation Office,
declared that she knows appellant because the latter was one of the applicants for probation in
1979 and she was the one assigned to investigate appellant's case; that as Assistant Probation
Officer in the Investigation of applications for probation and in the case of appellant, she
requested him to submit certain pertinent documents required by their office, such as barangay,
police and court clearances, residence certificate, etc.; that she prepared appellant's post-sentence
Investigation Report (Exhs. "B" to "B-5") that she first saw appellant on December 7, 1979,
when she interviewed him on his social and personal history and his version of the offense,
among others; that she gave the list of documents which are to be submitted to the office; that the
second time she saw appellant was on December 21, 1979 but appellant was out at the time and
when she saw that he was in his car that broke down in front of the Pampaguena she tried to can
him but the car left as she was about to reach the place (pp. 2-21, tsn, January 26, 1981).

Mrs. Francisco further declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21, 1979, the
latter was asking person to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk with Probation Officer,
Mr. Ocampo, anent the matter; that she then prepared a draft of the Post-Sentence Investigation
report and thereafter had a conference with Ocampo who told him not to delete the bribery
incident from the report; that it was first from Manalo and later from Ocampo that she became
aware of the bribery or more accurately corruption of a public official committed by appellant
(pp. 21-25, t.s.n., January 26, 1981).

The third prosecution witness was complaint himself Danilo Ocampo, who declared that he has
been the Probation Officer of an Angeles City, Probation Office since 1977 and that his
employees thereat were Ricardo Manalo, Primitiva Francisco and Ramon de Leon; that at about
9:00 o'clock in the morning of December 19, 1979, he received a closed letter envelope from his
clerk. Manalo, at the Probation Office at Merlan Building, Angeles City, Manalo informing him
that the same came from appellant; that he opened the envelope on the presence of Manalo and
found that the same contained xerox copies of the passport (Exh. "D") and visa (Exh. "D-1") of
appellant and inserted with said documents. was a hundred peso bill with Serial No. BC530309
(Exh. "A-l"); that the envelope given him by Manalo was addressed to him Mr. Danilo Ocampo,
Probation Officer, in handwritten for that he could not, however, produce said envelope the same
having been misplaced that he kept the one hundred peso bill as the same was an evidence
against appellant; that when he met Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, appellant's counsel at the Angeles
City Court on January 14, 1980, he told the latter about the envelope received from appellant
containing the passport, visa and the one hundred peso bill inserted with said documents and
intimated to the lawyer that the client should not have inserted said one hundred peso bill (pp.
46-57, t.s.n. September 16, 1980).

Ocampo further declared that the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was prepared by Mrs.
Francisco who conducted the investigation; that the first time he saw appellant was on December
10, 1979, when the latter was seeking permission to go to Baguio City and being a foreigner, he
required him to submit to his office copies of the latter's passport and visa; that the second time
he met appellant was in March, 1980, when the hearing of appellant's application for probation
was conducted at Branch I of the Angeles City Court; that he never required appellant to give
money, so that when he saw the one hundred peso bill (Exh. "A") in the envelope handed him by
Manalo, he was very much surprised; that he intended to confront appellant but was unable to do
so but was able to inform Atty. Suarez, appellant's lawyer, about the matter when he met him at
the City Court; that at the time the envelope containing the documents and money was handed to
him on, December 19, 1979, the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was not yet finished and that
the same was submitted to the City Court by Mrs. Francisco on February 5, 1980; that the fact
that appellant enclosed a one hundred peso bill in the envelope was mentioned in said report (pp.
60-73, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).

Ocampo further testified that at the time of the hearing of appellant's application or petition for
probation, the Presiding Judge of Branch I of the City Court held a conference in the court's
chamber with appellant's counsel the trial fiscal and himself, during which they discussed the
bribery incident mentioned in the report; that the presiding judge of Branch I, after some
clarifications regarding the incident in question, suggested that coplainant should lodge a
complaint against appellant and the all should conduct the corresponding preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was a prima facie case (pp. 75-76, 82-86, t.s.n.,
September 16, 1980).

Finally, Ocampo declared that he approved the Post-Sentence Investigation Report

recommending the granting of appellant's application for probation, notwithstanding the bribery
or corruption incident mentioned in said report, because appellant's act was not yet a
disqualification under the law, as he was still presumed innocent until he is found guilty by the
court (pp. 90-91, t.s.n. December 8, 1980).

The appealed decision tersely cited the evidence for the defense in the following manner: têñ.
£îhqwâ£

The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the
envelope delivered to the Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses
in the xerox copying or reproduction of documents that may be needed by the Probation Office.
(p. 7, CA Decision).

Considering that the findings of fact in the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the
decision of the trial court, do not mention nor indicate the circumstances surrounding the
incident and the filing of the information against the petitioner other than the admitted fact that
the one hundred peso bill was placed in the envelope together with the visa and passport of the
petitioner which he handed on December 17, 1979 to Mr. Ricardo Manalo and which the latter in
turn handed on December 19, 1979 to Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo, in fairness to the
petitioner, We quote hereunder the decision of the trial court which recited the said
circumstances that led to the filing of the Information against the petitioner, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£

From the evidence presented, the following facts appear to the court to be indubitable; That the
accused was convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical Injuries, and the crime of Oral
Defamation of the City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, and the said accused was sentenced to
an imprisonment of 15 days of Arresto Menor and to pay a fine of P50.00 and to pay the
complaining witness the amount of P500.00 as moral and exempt damages. After he was
sentenced, he, on November 28, 1979 filed an Application for Probation. That after filing the
application for Probation, the accused, together with his lawyer Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, went to
the Probation Office purposely to inquire for the requirements need for his client's petition for
probation. Unfortunately, Atty. Suarez and his client did not reach the Probation Officer Mr.
Danilo Ocampo. It was Mr. Manalo, a clerk of the Probation Office, whom they reached, and
they were re. requested to come back to the office regarding their inquiry inasmuch as the
Probation Officer was not in the office. Later, Atty. Suarez called through the telephone the
Probation Office, and, on that occasion he was able to talk with the Probation Inspector, Mrs.
Primitiva Francisco. He was inquiring from Mrs. Francisco the necessary documents regarding
the application for probation of his client and Mrs. Francisco suggested that he would come over
the office in order to give him all the necessary information. The lawyer just instructed Mrs.
Francisco to give a list of the requirements to Mr. Pozar, the accused, who was then in the,
Office of the Probation Officer, and accordingly, Mrs. Francisco handed to Mr. Pozar a list of the
documents needed in his probation (see Exhibit E for the prosecution, and Exhibit 3 for the
defense). It also appears that all the re. requirements listed in the list given by Mrs, Francisco
were given to Mrs. Francisco, and at times to Mr. Manalo. The person who conducted the
investigation was actually Mrs. Francisco. On December 10, 1979, Pozar had an occasion to see
the Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and in that meeting, aside from the fact that he was
asking permission from the Probation Officer to go to Baguio, the Probation Officer required
him to furnish the Probation Office the xerox copy of his visa, and his I.D. picture, inasmuch as
it was explained to him these were needed, he being a foreigner. On December 17, 1979 Mr.
Pozar went to the Probation Office looking for the Probation Officer, and when the Probation
Officer was not there, he handed to Mr. Manalo an envelope address to the Probation Of officer
and asked and requested Mr. Manalo to give the same to Mr. Ocampo. It was on December
19,1979 when Mr. Manalo handed the envelope given by Mr. Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and
when Danilo Ocampo opened it in the presence of Mr. Manalo, he found enclose in the envelope
a xerox copy of the applicant's passport, xerox copy of his visa, and attached also with the same
document was a one hundred peso bill It would seem that Mr. Ocampo asked Mr. Manalo to
keep the one hundred peso bill and return it to Mr. Pozar, but when Mr. Pozar did not arrive to
the office, Mr. Manalo gave it back to Mr. Ocampo Mr. Danilo Ocampo kept the one hundred
peso bill but made it a point that this incident regarding the receiving of the one hundred peso
being be included in the post-sentence investigation report which was being prepared by Mrs.
Francisco. At that time when the one hundred peso bill was given, the post-sentence
investigation report was not yet finished. The record shows that the same was submitted to the
court only on February 8, 1980. At the hearing of the application for probation in March 1980,
when the Presiding Judge of City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, noted and saw from the
report the alleged incident of the accused's giving the one hundred peso bill he called for a
conference and in that conference, he suggested that the manner should be investigated by the
Office of the City F'iscal Acting upon such suggestion Danilo Ocampo formally filed an
Information Sheet against the accused Gregory Pozar (Exhibit 2). It is also a fact admitted by the
defense that after the one hundred peso bill was handed and the Probation Officer was not able to
return the same, he informed Atty. Suarez at the sala of City Court Branch II sometime on
January 14, 1980. (pages 8-9)
As stated earlier, petitioner was found guilty of the offense of Corruption of Public Official as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penn Code as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 212. Corruption of Public Officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer
corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person
who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the
preceding articles.

The preceding Articles of the Revised Penal Code are Articles 210 and 211 which define and
penalize the offenses of direct bribery and indirect bribery, and they provide as follows: têñ.
£îhqwâ£

Art. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who will agree to perform an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another,
shag suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of
not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value, in addition to the
penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, ff the same shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in
the preceding paragraph, and if said shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift
and not more than twice such value,

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain
from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not less than the value of the gift and not
more than three times such value.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification.

The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors,
arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts, or any other persons performing public
duties.

Art. 211. Indirect Bribery. — The penalties of arresto mayor, suspension in its minimum and
medium periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept
gifts offered to him by reason of his office.

It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both crimes, the public
officer receives gift. While in direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and
the giver of the gift or present, in indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exist. In direct
bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from doing something,
because of the gift or promise in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do
any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him
by reason of his office. (The Revised Penal Code by Luis P. Reyes, 1975 Ed., p. 332).

In the case at bar, We find that the Information against the petitioner charged that the accused
"did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo
Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with
serial No. BC530309, under circumstances that would make the said City Probation Officer, Mr.
Danilo Ocampo, liable for bribery.

The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official as
charged in the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised
Penal Code, sentenced the accused to an imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor and public censure. This is erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official as consummated offense (which is affirmed
by the respondent appellant court) for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited
in both decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not
accept the one hundred peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public
official. (See The Revised Penal Code by Justice Ramon Aquino, 1976 Ed., Vol. II, p. 1168,
citing the cases of Uy Matiao, 1 Phil. 487; Camacan 7 Phil. 329; Tan Gee, 7 Phil. 738; SyGuikao
18 Phil. 482; Te Tong, 26 Phil. 453; Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562; Ching, CA-G.R. No. 439-R, July 31,
1947). Attempted corruption of a public official is punished with destierro and is cognizable by
inferior courts (See Revised Penal Code by justice Aquino, Vol. II, 1976 Ed., citing the cases of
Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617; Santos y Bautista, 87 PhiL 687; Dalao v. Geronimo, 92
Phil. 1942; Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562).

Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the one hundred peso bill was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or
that it will be used to defray expenses in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by
the Probation Office in connection with petitioner's application for probation then pending in
said office.
The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation
Officer, Primitive Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation application the Court
Information ( complaint) Court decision, Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances
from the Police, the Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence certificate,
and told to report once a week on Mondays. (Exhibit "E"). This was on December 7, 1979.

Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner on December 10,
1979 when the latter was asking permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his
visa and passport. Mrs. Francisco to testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her
to leave for Baguio. And according to the petitioner, "during all the time he was applying for
probation, he made more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to report every Monday
at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times
that he went there unscheduled for conference and clarification of the various re. requirements he
needed. During all the time he went there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo
himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo interviewed him He submitted all the requirements to
the Probation Officer; at times, he submitted them directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times
to Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr. Ocampo. Other than those listed in the list given by Mrs.
Francisco, he was required to submit xerox copy of his passport, his visa and his pictures. He
explained that he gave the requirements to the person who was interviewing him, primarily Mrs.
Francisco, of the documents needed. Later, he submitted to the office xerox copy of the original
He likewise submitted his two passports, and later xerox copy of his passports. When Mrs.
Francisco was asking for the original, which documents are in the possession of his lawyer at his
office, he had to return to get the originals." (Decision of Trial Court, p. 5). Petitioner's travail is,
therefore, quite evident.
From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's
application for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and
clear cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules
and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that
his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further
to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not
criminal.
In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the claim of the defense
as against the conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the decision of the trial court
and quoted with approval in the appealed decision under review. The Government's own
evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the one
hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent.
There being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled
to acquittal of the crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is not that moral certainty required to convict
him. Even the complainant himself, the Probation Officer, filed the complaint only on the
suggestion of the presiding judge of the Angeles City Court during the hearing on petitioner's
application for probation, the complaint having been filed in the City Fiscal's Office on June 10,
1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED. The accused petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

1.) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 538 (2002)

PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be
unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause
of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the
respondent Ombudsman.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito

Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the
former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed
with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution1 finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder
under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional
liberty was fixed.

On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on
the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged
more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.

On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-
accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion2 alleging that: (1) no
probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or
criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from
custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to
be fixed by respondent court.3cräläwvirtualibräry

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To
Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its
Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To
Him.4cräläwvirtualibräry

On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To
Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve
Pending Incidents.5cräläwvirtualibräry

On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to

Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.6 Petitioners alternative prayer to post
bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the
following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused
Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph
Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April
2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the
information for plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately
which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND
is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to
post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the
accused.7cräläwvirtualibräry

The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution.
Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to
make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of not guilty for
him.8cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:

1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner,
and denying him the equal protection of the laws;

2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;

3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators,
with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;

4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information
which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of
proportionality.9cräläwvirtualibräry

We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.

I.

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and
denies him the equal protection of the laws.10cräläwvirtualibräry

The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-
Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the
Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E.
Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie Atong Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the
crime of plunder as follows:
AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
ASIONG SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie
Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane
Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN

THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50]
AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON
OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE
VELARDE;

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17]
AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 200112cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally
perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one
offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.

Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will
show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph
E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in
general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the
following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the
crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the
accused who committed each act.

Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,
money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a),
petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or
collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several
instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in
series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of
only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel
interpretation.

It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series as
they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two
terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is synonymous
with the clause on several instances. Series refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any
of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word combination contemplates the commission of
at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same
predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.

Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was
alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum
of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4,
2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and
his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:

xxx

Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have
also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is
gleaned from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least
two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor,
jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in
February, 2000. An alleged listahan of jueteng recipients listed him as one Jingle Bell, as
affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI].14cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2
million was delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul on at least two occasions. The P2 million is,
therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further
confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:

xxx

It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of
P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit
Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x
x.15cräläwvirtualibräry

To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to
establish any probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has
found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against
him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of
probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this
petition.

II.

Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards
to guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense.16 Thus, he
posits the following questions:

For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do
we impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua?
Or should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three
of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have
been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or
specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say
what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have
intended.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he
is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused
named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on
him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy
on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however,
overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation
consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be
no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the
other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:

Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

III.

Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge against petitioner
for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even
remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results
in the denial of substantive due process.18cräläwvirtualibräry
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the
predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c)
& (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is
purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended
Information.19cräläwvirtualibräry

For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information
vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-
accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second
paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements
of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute
the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each
predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of
receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of
the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not
mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph
(c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation,
and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which
became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was
allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does.
Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and
deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused
named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President
Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain
whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former
President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot
be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as
related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b)
to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly
done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth
amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the
predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in
four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was
crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law
was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed
against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no
appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the
former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing laws
such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws,
the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every
transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy
had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent
cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No.
7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This
is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic
treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts
done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so
many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts
and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public
funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in
Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the
possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with
similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.

There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to
the national economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of
plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the
different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The
gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation
and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly
involves two structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single
person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the
spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other
contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way
as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23cräläwvirtualibräry
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim
that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

IV.

Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the
ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is
even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be
inspired by American law and jurisprudence.

We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in
common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general
rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law
fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and
sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the
gravamen of the offense.24The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons,
by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.25 Its elements are: agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal
purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive
offense.26cräläwvirtualibräry

A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes
of conspiracy27conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy
to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is
penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as follows:

Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:

Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory,
Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from
accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from
discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to
leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in
his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while
engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt,
hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.

Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the
United States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The
conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States refers to an act made a crime by
federal laws.29 It refers to an act punished by statute.30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the
whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover criminal
offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank
robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright
violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate
commerce and other areas of federal regulation.32 Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to
commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and
distinct from the substantive offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the substantive
count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy.34cräläwvirtualibräry

The conspiracy to defraud the government refers primarily to cheating the United States out of
property or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental
functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends
defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or
not.36cräläwvirtualibräry

The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case
law on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to
include particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means
of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill
of particulars.37 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement;
(2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed
in furtherance of the agreement.38 To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state
that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To
allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful
agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object
with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive
offense.40cräläwvirtualibräry

In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American
courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated,
conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be
alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the
sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this
crime must contain the following averments:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the
offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the
offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the
offense was committed.

Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense
should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be
designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.41 The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information.45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.46 The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.47cräläwvirtualibräry

To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of
said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of
conspiracy to commit treason is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to
an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them
aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement
to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and
comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement.
These elements must be alleged in the information.

The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a
crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen
of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal
liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others,50 for the act of
one is the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth
the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so
that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite
unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or
others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v.
Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all
the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable
a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the
accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient if it follows the words of the
statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with
conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of
an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-
844).

xxx

x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it.
Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that
there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony
among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words conspired
or confederated or the phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in the information in the
form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the
unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either
by the use of the term conspire or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on
which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or
likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy
when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof
but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.

xxx.
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a
mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word
conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc;53 or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the
accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts.54cräläwvirtualibräry

The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual
cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action
or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it.55 A statement of this
evidence is not necessary in the information.

In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms
how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy
with his co-accused. Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.

V.

We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the
instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons. Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail
due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place
of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.

For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted
hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical
Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.

On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion for
Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations. Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan.56cräläwvirtualibräry

On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for
resolution and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of
December 21, 2001.

On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioners motion for bail for lack of factual
basis.57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found
that petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical
condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be
allowed to post bail.58cräläwvirtualibräry
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to
wit:

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.59cräläwvirtualibräry

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial
court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to
show strong evidence of guilt.60cräläwvirtualibräry
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary
hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court
based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and
which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that
evidence on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to
petitioner.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

1.) Ganaden v. Balasco, 64 SCRA 50 (May 16, 1975)

MAKASIAR, J:
Respondent Gregorio N. Bolasco, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Branch I, Olongapo City, is charged by complainant, Soledad V. Ganaden
Stenographer of the same court, with:têñ.£îhqwâ£

(1) Dishonesty by demanding P13.00 as sheriff's fee in civil case No. 711-0, entitled "Carmen
Flores vs. Leonardo Frondarina," but issuing therefor a receipt for a lesser amount; and by
issuing a private receipt for P50.00 to plaintiff Paulino Padua in Civil Case No. 427-0 for the
service of a writ of execution but failed to make a return of said writ; and

(2) Misconduct by delaying the service of summons upon Paulita Esteban, defendant in Civil
Case No. 684-0, and entrusting its service to her nephew, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, Jr.

Respondent denied the charges, stating among others:têñ.£îhqwâ£

1. ... [T]hat on February 3, 1971, Atty. Demetrio Leaño entrusted the sum of P12.60 to the
respondent for Sheriff's Fees of the summons in Civil Case No. 711-0 of this Court, entitled
"Carmen Flores, versus Leonardo Frondarina et al."; however, when the summons was issued on
February 4, 1971, it turned out that the Sheriff's Fees was only P4.20 considering that the
defendants are husband and wife and that they reside at Olongapo City and not residents of San
Felipe, Zambales as originally alleged by Atty. Demetrio Leaño. Therefore, the sum of P8.40
was returned by the respondent to Atty. Demetrio Leaño on February 10, 1971, together with the
official receipt for the aforesaid Sheriff's fee. ... Carmen Flores nor her counsel has never
complained about the matter.

2. ... [T]hat complainant could have merely heard what the respondent said over the telephone in
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance in Olongapo City, when the latter
was attempting to serve the summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 684-0 of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales, Branch I, Olongapo City, entitled "Rosario vda. de Salcedo, versus
Paulita Esteban" to the defendant Paulita Esteban through her nephew, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing,
since the defendant Paulita then was not in her residence and, per reliable information, said
defendant was then in Manila. Truth to tell, neither the plaintiff, Rosario Esteban vda. de
Salcedo, nor her lawyer in said Civil Case No. 684-0 ever complained about the matter;

3. ... [T]hat respondent merely received the sum of P50.00 as a deposit and to accommodate Mr.
Paulino Padua, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 427-0 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
Branch I, Olongapo City, entitled "Paulino Padua, et al., versus Romeo Punzalan," upon his
(Padua's) own request in order to save him (Padua) time and expense which he will otherwise
incur in coming back to the Office of the Provincial Sheriff at Olongapo City and in going to the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Zambales at Iba, for the sole purpose of paying the necessary
expenses for the service of the Writ of Execution issued in the aforementioned case such as the
Registration of Levy, should there be properties levied upon, Guard Fees and other incidental
expenses since he (Padua) was and still is an employee at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay,
Philippines, who cannot easily leave his place of work for any appreciable period of time:

4. That said sum of money has never been misappropriated nor misapplied by or for the benefit
of the respondent; and the said Paulino Padua never complained about the matter, ... .

During the formal investigation of this case, complainant admitted that she had no personal
and/or direct knowledge of the charges and that she had no evidence to substantiate the same,
claiming that her sole motive in filing the complaint is for the proper authority to find out the
truth or falsity of respondent's alleged irregular activities.
The Investigating District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, in his investigation
report dated March 24, 1973 recommended the dismissal of the complaint in view of
complainant's admission that she had no direct and personal knowledge of respondent's irregular
actuations and that the interested parties mentioned by her, allegedly complaining against
respondent, failed to appear and support the charges.

The Investigating District Judge is in error.

The following facts are undisputed:têñ.£îhqwâ£

On two occasions, respondent received certain amounts in connection with the performance of
his duties as deputy sheriff without issuing the corresponding official receipts therefor.

1. On February 31, 1971, counsel for plaintiff in civil case 711-0 gave respondent P12.60 for
sheriff's fee for service of the complaint and summons thereof upon the defendants. Respondent
received said amount before the summons to be served were delivered to him for service, in spite
of the standing instruction from the clerk of court and the provincial sheriff not to accept any
payment if no official receipts are available. Respondent did not issue the official receipt even
after he had received on February 5 or 6, 1971, the booklet of official receipts; and

2. Respondent also received, again without issuing the corresponding official receipt, P50.00
from plaintiff for service of a writ of execution issued in connection with civil case 427-0. Proof
of receipt of said amount is respondent's private receipt marked Exhibit B.

Respondent committed illegal exaction penalized by paragraph 2(b) of Article 213 of the
Revised Penal Code for failure to issue receipts for money collected by him officially.

Respondent likewise violated Section 113 of Article III, Chapter V of the National Accounting
and Auditing Manual, providing that no payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting
officer without immediately issuing an official receipt in acknowledgment thereof.

The acts and/or omissions of respondent are patent violation of law. They disturb the ethics of
public life and vitiate the integrity of the court personnel as well as the court itself. Public service
requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity. This yardstick has been imprinted in the New Constitution
under Section 1 of Article XIII which stressed that "Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees shall observe with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people." Proclamation No. 1081 pointed out that
all public officials and employees whether of the national or local government, must conduct
themselves in the manner of the new and reformed society. Respondent's conduct is highly
prejudicial to the interest of the service. It is classified as a grave offense under subparagraph A,
paragraph III of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 1970.

It is worthy to add, at this juncture, that Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 6, promulgated on
September 27, 1972, provides for the immediate removal or dismissal of a respondent under any
of the following circumstances, among others, which is present in this case, namely: (a) when the
charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; and (b) when respondent is a recidivist or
has been repeatedly charged, and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the
present charge.

Respondent's 201 file shows that he was repeatedly charged with delay in the service of
summons and the execution of decisions as well as abuse of authority and ignorance in the
execution of a writ of preliminary injunction.1 WE also take note of a December 5, 1972
Department of Justice communication sent to respondent, with the information that the said
Department holds in abeyance action on respondent's letter of resignation submitted pursuant to
Letter of Instruction No. 14-A and awaits the outcome of this administrative case.

WE are inclined to believe that there was no undue delay in the service of summons upon
defendant Paulita Esteban in Civil Case No. 684-0 as she was in Manila between December 10,
1970 and February 27, 1971. Although her maid was left in the house, there was no showing that
she was a person of suitable discretion who could appreciate the importance of a summons. The
charge that respondent entrusted the service of the said summons to defendant's nephew was not
substantiated.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY OF DISHONESTY, OR

CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, AND IS
ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT HEREOF.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

1.) U.S. v. Udarbe, 28 Phil 382 (1914)

DECISION
ARAULLO, J. :
This case was instituted against the defendant by virtue of an information filed in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, under date of March 25, 1914, of the following
purport:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned fiscal of the Province of Ilocos Sur charges Clemente Udarbe with violation of
section 28 of the Municipal Code, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Said Clemente Udarbe, the defendant above named, being municipal president in the
municipality of Magsingal of the Province of Ilocos Sur, P. I., did in January, 1913, and prior
and subsequent thereto, become interested and take direct part willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally in the fishery business of the municipality of which he was president, having at said
time and place leased various fishponds In violation of law."cralaw virtua1aw library

After trial, judgment was rendered by said Court of First Instance, under date of April 4 of the
same year, sentencing the defendant, as guilty of the violation of said section 28 of the Municipal
Code, to six months’ imprisonment and payment of the costs. Said defendant has appealed
therefrom, alleging as his defense in this instance that the court erred in making various findings
of fact in the judgment and in declaring that such facts constituted a clear violation of the section
cited and in imposing upon the defendant the penalty set forth.

"No municipal officer," says said section 28 [as amended by section 1 of Act No. 663], "shall be
directly or indirectly interested in any contract work, or cockpits, or any other permitted games
and amusements, or business of the municipality, or in the purchase of any real estate or any
other property belonging to the corporation," and further states that violation of said provision
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years.

It is plainly proven: (1) That the defendant was appointed municipal president of the
municipality of Magsingal on October 28, 1912, on which date he entered upon the duties of his
office, and while on duty as said president, the municipal council on December 9 of the same
year, 1912, and under his presidency, approved and passed Regulation No. 7, for the leasing of
fishponds in the said municipality, article 10 whereof provided that the lease holders of various
sections of said fishponds, among which was section 102, should continue in their leases so long
as they paid the rental fixed for each of the respective sections, without prejudice to granting
them to others who might desire to bid for them, in case such lease holders should waive their
preferential right (Exhibit 1 of the defense); (2) that on the 16th of the said month of December,
when the auction or bidding for the different sections of said fishponds was held in the town hall
of said municipality, it was recorded in Minute No. 54, series of 1912, entered for that purpose
(folio 13, back of 13 and folio 14 of the Minute Book, Exhibit A of the prosecution), that the
accused, who participated therein and moreover presided over the auction, took part in the
bidding for the said section No. 102 of the fishpond of Pagsanaan, and that that section was
adjudicated to him as the highest bidder for the sum of two pesos a year; (3) that said defendant
paid the municipal treasurer of Magsingal on January 10 of the following year, 1913, the sum of
P2 as the price of the lease for the said section No. 102 up to the close of that year; (4) that said
defendant, who held the office of president of the said municipality from October 28, 1912, as
has already been stated, and who still held it on March 30, 1914, when this case was tried,
continued in the lease of the said section No. 102 of said fishpond, which was awarded to him on
December 16, 1912, until the same month of December of said year 1913, that is, for a period of
one year.

Defendant attempted to exculpate himself by saying that when he was appointed municipal
president of Magsingal in October, 1912, and began to discharge the duties of said office, he
already held in lease the said section 102 of the fishpond of Pagsanaan, belonging to that
municipality, and that he did not take part in the bidding held in the month of December of the
same year for securing said lease, but that he continued in the enjoyment of this right by virtue of
a resolution of the municipal council, which has been mentioned above, whereby it was provided
that those who, like himself, held fishponds of the municipality on lease should continue in the
same, provided they offered the rental fixed at the bidding that would take place. But what the
defendant says in his defense is not sufficiently proven, for it does not appear in the Minute Book
presented at the trial, nor from any fact submitted thereat, that before he became municipal
president of Magsingal he held the lease of section 102, already set forth. On the contrary, it
appears, as has been stated above, in Minute No. 54, series of 1912, of the auction or bidding
held on December 16 of the same year that the defendant was then awarded the lease of the said
section 102 for the sum of P2 a year as the highest bidder. His allegations in that connection
cannot, therefore, favor him in any way, or constitute ground of defense to relieve him of the
responsibility he has incurred, for whether or not he held the lease of the said property of the
municipality of Magsingal before entering upon the duties of his office as president of that
municipality, the concrete and definite fact proven at the trial is that while he was municipal
president of Magsingal he was interested in business of said municipality by leasing on
December 16, 1912, a piece of property belonging thereto and continued in the lease he had held
of that same property before assuming said office, which in this case amounts to the same thing,
for such action is definitely prohibited by section 28 of the Municipal Code. The defendant’s
conduct is so much the more censurable, if it be accepted as true that before becoming municipal
president of Magsingal he already held the said property of that municipality in lease and merely
continued in the enjoyment of said right after entering upon the duties of the office and for a year
longer, that is, all of the year 1913, in so far as it appears by the Minute of December 9, 1912,
that the municipal council, on that date and under his presidency, passed the resolution regarding
the preference to be given to the then lease holders of various sections of said fishpond, among
which was No. 102, over any other bidders at the auction to be held, as it was held on the 16th of
the same month, provided that they paid in the rental fixed therefor, for the defendant took
advantage of said preference in the bidding when it was he who, as president of the municipality,
in connection with the other members of the council, had adopted that resolution. This very fact
ought to have obligated him for reasons not only of legality but of delicacy and morality not to
continue in the lease and not to become interested again in that business of the municipality, and
yet he did become interested therein until the end of December of the following year, 1913, thus
openly violating the law, which has attempted by means of the precept contained in said section
28 of the Municipal Code to prevent the interests of the municipality or the town intrusted to the
administration of the municipal officers from suffering detriment by coming into conflict with
the interests of such administrators, which would doubtless occur if said officers should lease
property of their respective municipalities, as they are the very persons whose duty it is to set or
fix the price of the lease, the time of its payment, and the conditions of the corresponding
contract. The defendant himself must have so understood it, although tardily, as is demonstrated
by the fact that he excused himself on grounds of delicacy, for the reason that he was one of the
then lease holders of the fishponds of the municipality, that is, section No. 102, from taking part
in Resolution No. 202, adopted at the session of December 15, 1913, Exhibit 2 of the defense,
with reference to the concession to those who then held leases of various sections of the
fishponds, among which was included the said No. 102, of the right to transfer the enjoyment of
the lease, a right that the defendant made use of five days later, that is, on the 20th of the same
month of December, by transferring the lease he had to section No. 19, as appears in Resolution
No. 206 (back of folio 85 of the Minute Pook, Exhibit A), to one Miguel Udarbe, really a
nephew of his. This section must be the same as No. 102, for in addition to being in the
Pagsanaan Lake, it does not appear that the defendant held any other section of that lake in lease,
and thus he has given to understand by his defense in first instance, presenting as Exhibit 4
thereof the said resolution.
Nevertheless, to maintain that the fact alleged in the complaint does not constitute a crime or a
violation of section 28 of the Municipal Code, the defense has in its brief cited two opinions
rendered by the Attorney-General in connection with said section, one of May 5, 1909 (Opinions
of the Attorney-General, vol. 5, p. 70), and another on the 22d of the same month of 1902 (ibid.,
vol. 1, p. 204).

The first was in reply to the question whether said section, as amended by Act No. 663, should
be construed in the sense that it prohibited municipal officers from attending the cockfights or
public billiard rooms, to participate in said games and not to perform there their official duties.
The Attorney-General said no, for the reason that, while the purpose of the law was to secure the
faithfulness of said officers in the performance of their official duties, it could not interfere in
matters connected with the strictly private rights of those same officers, whose responsibility in
the case of a charge of gambling, he added, would be a question of fact to be determined in each
particular instance, since the status of a municipal councilor under the law is the same as that of
any other private party.

The second opinion of the Attorney-General cited by the defense refers to a query submitted to
him with reference to whether the municipal officers, by election or by appointment, could enter
into contracts with the municipal council regarding the lease of realty belonging to them for the
use of their municipality, without infringing section 28 of the Municipal Code.

In reply to that query the Attorney-General very correctly stated that the purpose of such legal
provision was to prevent fraud; that to permit the municipal officers to become directly or
indirectly interested in the contracts or commercial transactions of the municipality could easily,
in view of their influence, operate to the effect that such contracts or business should be awarded
to them under conditions less advantageous for the municipality by preventing competition on
the part of others, and besides, after the contracts had been awarded to them, they might not
fulfill the conditions therein stipulated, in this way prejudicing the municipality’s interests. He
added that the leasing of realty to the municipality could not be regarded as embraced in the
contracts and business mentioned in sections 39 and 40 of the Municipal Code, such as
construction of buildings, installation and maintenance of lights, etc., for the reason that in such
contracts of lease that fraud which the law seeks to prevent could not take place. And finally,
noting that article 397 of the Penal Code punishes as guilty of fraud the public officer who
becomes directly or indirectly interested in any kind of contract or operation in which he has to
intervene because of his office, he concluded by saying that in order to be included in this legal
provision it was merely necessary that the officer intervene in the contract or transaction by
reason of his office, and therefore, as the leasing of any property by the municipality for its own
use must be the subject of a resolution of the municipal council, all the officers who take part in
the deliberations of said council, to wit, the president, vice president, and the councilors, are
prohibited from leasing their property to the municipality.

If the citation of the first opinion of the Attorney-General, made by the defense, is absolutely
inapplicable to the instance dealt with in this case, the second is also, but in the opposite sense to
that claimed by the defense itself, for the same reason exists why a municipal officer cannot
lease property of his own to the municipality as why he cannot lease property from the
municipality.

Article 397 of the Penal Code punishes the same thing as is penalized by subsection (b) of
section 28 of the Municipal Code, to wit, the action, of a public official in the former and of a
municipal officer in the latter, of becoming interested in any kind of contract or operation in
which he must intervene by reason of his office. In performing such an action, as Viada says in
his commentaries on the Penal Code, the officer does nothing more than violate a prohibition;
hence no fraud exists therein, but there does exist the possibility that he may perpetrate fraud, or
at least that he may subordinate the state’s interest to his own. In connection with the
municipality, this is certainly the reason why said section 28 of the Municipal Code prohibits
municipal officers from taking part directly or indirectly in contracts, cockpits, or other permitted
games and amusements or in business of the municipality.

The defendant became interested and took direct part in the leasing of property of the
municipality of Magsingal, wherein he had to intervene by reason of his office as president of
said municipality, and he has therefore openly violated the provisions of said section of the
Municipal Code.

The lower court did not, therefore, incur any error in holding in the judgment appealed from that
the guilt of the defendant had been proven and in imposing upon him the corresponding penalty,
in accordance with the provision in said section.

Wherefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from, with the costs against the Appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.