Madras High Court

M.Baskar vs The Sub Registrar on 10 December, 2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Dated : 10.12.2014

CORAM:

The Honourable Mr. Justice S.VAIDYANATHAN

Writ Petition No.4023 of 2011

And M.P.Nos. 1 & 2 of 2011 & 1 to 3 of 2014

RESERVED ON 25.09.2014

M.Baskar
.. Petitioner

Vs.

1. The Sub Registrar,

Padappai,
Sriperambudur Taluk,
Kanchipuram District.

2. The Tahsildar,
Office of the Tahsildar,
Tambaram,
Chennai-600 065.

3. M.Parameshwari
4. E.Rajakumari
5. Sampath
6. Mrs.Selvamani ..
Respondents

Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India, for the issuance of a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus,
to call for the records pertaining to the proceedings of the 1st
respondent, in registering Doc.No.6775 of 2010 dated 24.12.2010
so as to quash the same and further direct the first respondent
to delete the registration of the same since the same is against
the orders of this Court made in CMA No.2785 of 2010 dated
230.11.2010.

For Petitioner : Mr.N.Jothi for

M/s.M.C.G
ovindan

For Respondents : Mr.R.M.Muthukumar, GA for R1&2

Mr.V.Raghavachari for R3 & R4
Mr.M.Balasubramanian for R5&R6

ORDER

Aggrieved over the registration of the document bearing Doc.No.6775 of 2010 dated 24.12.2010 in respect
of the property which is the subject matter of a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in CMA No.2785 of 2010
pending on the file of this Court and contrary to the orders made by this Court therein, dated 30.11.2010,
the petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition, seeking to quash the same.

2. The brief facts are that the respondents 3 and 4 herein have filed a suit in O.S.No.141 of 2009 on the file
of the Principal District Court, Chengalpattu against the respondents 5 and 6 herein, seeking a
preliminary decree for partition of the plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allot each share
to the respondents 3 to 6. Pending disposal of the above said suit, the respondents 3 and 4 filed another
suit in O.S.No.91 of 2007 in respect of the same property, on the file of the District Munsif, Tambaram,
against the respondents 5 and 6 herein and also against the writ petitioner and others, seeking
declaration, to declare the sale deed in document No.4177 of 2006, dated 19.7.2006 executed by one
A.V.Padmanabhan in favour of the writ petitioner is illegal, null and void and permanent injunction
restraining the writ petitioner and others from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment
of the property. Thereafter, while the suit in O.S.No.91 of 2007 was in pending for trial, the respondents
have filed a joint memo of compromise on 28.1.2008 in O.S.No.104 of 2007 and sought for decreeing the
suit pursuant to the terms of compromise. Accordingly, while recording the same, the said suit OS 104 of
2007 was decreed preliminarily in terms of the compromise. The respondents 3 and 4 continued to
proceed with the suit in O.S.No.91 of 2007 filed by them against the writ petitioner and others. After
obtaining the final decree for partition, the respondents 3 and 4 moved E.P.No.19 of 2009 for taking
delivery of possession of the suit property, along with execution applications in E.A.Nos.228 to 231 of
2010, seeking for police protection, break open the lock, demolition of compound wall and disconnection
of electricity service connection and for removal of the writ petitioner, who had been mentioned as an
obstructer. It appears that all the above said four execution applications were ordered by the executing
Court. Pursuant to the same, while the bailiff was effecting the execution of the order, dated 8.9.2010 in
E.A.No.231 of 2010 in E.P.No.19 of 2009 for removal of the obstructor/writ petitioner, he rushed to this
Court by filing CMA No.2785 of 2010, claiming that he has been in possession of the property and the
respondents 3 to 6 have colluded and obtained fraudulent decree of compromise and since his right and
title is involved in the suit property by virtue of sale deed, a notice under Form No.40 of Appendix E as
per the provisions under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC ought to have been ordered to the writ petitioner and after
serving such notice, the executing Court ought to have adjudicated the proceedings under Order 21 Rule
101 CPC. By judgment, dated 30.11.2010, this Court allowed the said civil miscellaneous appeal, while
setting aside the impugned order of removal of obstructor and directed the executing court to issue notice
to the writ petitioner and as per Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and decide all the questions relating to right, title
or interest of both parties over the suit property.

3. While that be so, it appears that the respondents 3 to 6, pursuant to the compromise decree in the suit
in OS 104 of 2007, got registered the final decree proceedings in respect of the suit property under
Document No.6775 of 2010 on 24.12.2010. Aggrieved over the registration of the above said document,
the petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition.

4. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent, inter alia, stating that being a
Registering Authority, he is bound to register the document presented before him for registration and as
such, he registered the copy of the decree in question dated 28.2.2008 in accordance with the provisions
of the Registration Act. Rule 55 of the Act specifically prohibits the Registering Authority to enquiry into
the right and title of the parties over the property. There is a catena of decisions of this Court and the Apex
Court that the Registrar cannot hold enquiry regarding right and title of the parties over the property.
Registration of documents by the Registrar, is not an administrative function, but it is a statutory
function. It is further stated that Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act states that registration is only a
notice to the public and the same will not confer any title. Though the petitioner made representation
dated 22.12.2010 raising objections for registration of the disputed document, however, in the absence of
any provision restraining the Registrar from proceeding with the registration, he cannot keep the
document pending the same. If at all the petitioner is aggrieved by virtue of registration of the document,
his rights were infringed, he could file a suit to set aside the same and to get declaration as null and void.
Further, no direction is required from the Court which granted the decree to register such decree.
Therefore, it is stated that there is no violation of the orders of this Court in CMA No.2785 of 2010 and
hence, sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

5. Respondents 3 and 4 have also filed a counter affidavit, wherein, they stated that the petitioner
obstructed the execution of the decree obtained by them against the judgment debtors on the basis of a
sale deed dated 19.07.2006 said to have been purchased from A.N.Padmanabhan, who is grandson of
A.Veeraghava Iyengar. Padmanabhan did not have any title to the property and he could not have
conveyed a marketable title to the petitioner. It is further stated that they filed a suit in O.S.No.91 of 2007
for declaration to declare the document relied upon by the petitioner as null and void and obtained
interim injunction in IA No.432 of 2007 and it is in force. These facts have been suppressed by the
petitioner. If the petitioner is in possession, he could not have suffered an order of interim injunction that
was passed on merits. There are no merits in the writ petition and it is liable to be dismissed.
6. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the entire materials available on record.

7. While highlighting the manner by which the respondents 3 to 6 in colluding each other and obtaining
the decree in a suit for partition on filing a joint memo of compromise, Mr.N.Jothi, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner would contend that absolutely, the respondents 3 to 6 have no right or title
over the property, but colluded together and filed a suit and obtained a compromise decree by playing
fraud on the Court and by virtue of the said fraudulent decree of compromise, filed execution petition
which itself does not arise for execution since the decree itself based on a compromise and obtained the
orders therein and finally got registration of the document after a lapse of 18 months from the date of so-
called decree, by giving scant regard to the orders of this Court and while the matter relating to the rights
of the parties over the property is sub judice before the executing Court pursuant to the orders of this
Court in CMA No.2785 of 2010, dated 30.11.2010 wherein, the executing Court was directed to issue
notice in Form No.40 as per Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and decide all the questions relating to right and title
over the property in dispute and thereby, they committed abuse of process of court.

8. Questioning the registration of the document, the learned senior counsel would contend that the
petitioner made a detailed representation on 22.12.2010 to the first respondent/Sub Registrar, raising
objections regarding the registration of the compromise decree purported by the respondents 3 to 6 and
specifically requested to refuse the registration, however, despite receiving the same, the first respondent,
contrary to the provisions of the Registration Act, resorted to register the same. He would contend that as
per Section 23 of the Registration Act, copy of the decree or order should be presented within four months
from the day on which the decree or order was made for the purpose of registration, whereas, in the
present case, the respondents have presented the decree after a lapse of more than 18 months and
thereby, the said registration cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be cancelled. He pointed out
that in case there was delay in presenting the document under unavoidable circumstances as envisaged
under Section 25 of the Act, the Registrar has to exercise his discretionary power and impose fine not
exceeding ten times the amount of proper registration fee or if he is satisfied with the urgent necessity or
unavoidable delay, he can condone the same. However, in the present case, no such exercise was done by
the first respondent though there was enormous delay in presenting the document.

9. He further contended that a decree as defined in Section 2(2) of the CPC, is a conclusive one
determining the rights of the parties with regard to all the matters in controversy and in the present case,
no finality regarding the determination of the rights of the property over the disputed property, was
reached by virtue of the orders of this Court in CMA 2785 of 2010 and where the execution proceedings
are still pending for final disposal and hence, it cannot be termed as a conclusive one and has no
enforceability and therefore, registration of the same, would be a nullity.

10. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions, viz.,

a) (1981) 1 SCC 510 (Sadhu Singh and another versus Dharam Dev and others), wherein, the Honble
Supreme Court held that as under in para 2:

Where a decree was passed by the trial Court prior to coming into force of the Act, but was challenged in
appeal after the Act was passed and affirmed on appeal, that would fall within the mischief of  Section
3 while the case pends in the High Court. A decree challenged in appeal is reopened and the appellate
hearing is a rehearing of the whole subject-matter and when a decree is passed in appeal the first decree
merges in the appellate decree and it comes within the scope of Section 3.Relying on this, the learned
senior counsel contended that admittedly, this Court allowed the appeal preferred by the petitioner in
CMA No.2785 of 2010 against the E.P. proceedings raised over the compromise decree and when once a
decree was passed in appeal, the first decree merges in the appellate decree, i.e. in CMA 2785 of 2010 and
hence, the appellate decree becomes decisive. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would contend that
the appellate decree will operate till the final adjudication takes place pursuant to the directions of this
Court made in the above said appeal and therefore, the registration effected on the compromise decree,
would not stand in the eye of law.
b) AIR 2010 Allahabad 151 (Vipin Kumar Goel and others versus State of U.P. and others)wherein, it has
been held as under in para 10:

10. The submission of the petitioner, which is to be considered, is as to whether the documents of which
registration is optional are also required to be presented within time as prescribed in  Section 23 or
whether for such documents there is no time limit for presentation. Section 23 provides that subject to
provision contained in Sections 23, 24, 25and 26 of the Act no document other than will shall be accepted
for registration unless presented for that purpose within four months from the date of execution.  Section
23 itself provides exceptions which are documents referred to in Sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Act. Section
25 provides a circumstance when Registrar in cases where delay in presentation does not exceed four
months may direct on payment of fine for registration of the documents. Section 26 deals with the
documents which are executed out of India. A plain reading of Section 23 clearly indicates that except for
circumstances as mentioned in Sections 24, 25 and 26 all other documents are required to be presented
within four months from the date of execution. Had the Legislature intended that documents registration
of which is optional need not be presented within four months from the date of execution, mention
of Section 18ought to have been made in Section 23. Non-mention of Section 18 in Section 23 clearly leads
to the inference that documents registration of which is optional are also required to be presented within
time as prescribed in Section 23. Even in Section 25 the maximum period for which Registrar can accept
delay in presentation is four months.

c) 2008 (2) ALD 662 (Smt.G.Kadambari versus District Registrar), wherein, the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh has held as under in para 13:

13. In the present case, the petitioner kept quite for a period of two years, after the Sub Registrar refusing
to register the document. In filing the suit and the decree in the said suit is not binding on the
respondents to execute the terms of the decree in violation of the provisions of the Act. When the party
fails to present a document for registration within four months after the execution, it cannot be registered
and if there is any delay in presentation of the document, an application may be made to the Registrar for
condonation of the delay and if the Registrar condones the delay, when such application is made within a
period of further four months, the registration can be done irrespective of the fact whether the process of
registration is done beyond the period of eight months. When once the party fails to present the document
within eight months, it cannot be presented at any time subsequently. The petitioner once again presented
the document after the expiry of 24 years, which is beyond the scope of Sections 23 and 25 of the
Act.Relying on this, the learned senior counsel would contend that has though the registration of the
documents listed under Section 18 of Registration Act is optional, however, such documents are required
to be presented within time of four months as prescribed in Section 23 and in the present case, it is
admitted fact that the respondents 3 to 6 have presented the document of compromise decree after lapse
of 18 months which is beyond the time limit prescribed in the statute and further, the Registering
authority is not empowered to condone the delay and therefore, the registration of said document cannot
be sustained and it is liable to be cancelled.

d) (1994 ) 1 SCC 1 (S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs., versus Jagannath (dead) by LRs., and
others);

e) (2000) 3 SCC 581 (United India Insurance Co.Ltd. versus Rajendra Singh & Others);

f) (2003) 8 SCC 311 (Ram Preeti Yadav versus U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education &
others);

g) (2004) 6 SCC 325 (Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & another versus Girdharilal Yadav);

h) (2005) 6 SCC 149 (State of A.P. & Another versus T.Suryachandra Rao);

i) (2008) 12 SCC 481 (K.D.Sharma versus Steel Authority of India Ltd., & others);
j) (2010) 8 SCC 383 (Meghamala and others versus G.Narasimha Reddy and others), wherein, the Honble
Supreme Court has held as under in para 33 to 36:

33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn
proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something,
which is otherwise not due. The expression fraudinvolves two elements, deceit and injury to the person
deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. [Vide Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn.25, Indian Bank
v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd.26, State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao27, K.D. Sharma v.
SAIL28 and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir29.] 34. An act of fraud on court is
always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in
relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable
principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any
equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has
been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or
false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu13, Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust30, Ram Chandra Singh v.
Savitri Devi31, Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal32, Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School &
Intermediate Education33 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N.34) 35. In Kinch v. Walcott35 it has
been held that:

mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such a judgment will not be set
aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury.

Thus, detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much belated stage may not be sufficient to set aside
the judgment procured by perjury.

36. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages
gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the
statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any
material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its
own order obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est. Relying on the above decisions, the
learned senior counsel would contend that judgment or decree obtained by fraud, shall be treated as
nullity, can be questioned even in collateral proceedings and once it is proved, it will deprive the person of
all advantages or benefits obtained thereby and that it is an act of deliberate deception with the design of
securing something by taking unfair advantage of another and in fraud, one gains at the loss and cost of
another. Applying the ratio enunciated in the above decisions, he would contend that the respondents 3 to
6 have colluded together and filed a frivolous suit between themselves behind the rightful owner of the
property, i.e. the petitioner and obtained the decree by filing a joint memo of compromise by playing
fraud on the Court and also registered the same contrary to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the
learned senior counsel would urge this Court to cancel the registration of the document, by taking note of
the fraud played by the respondents 3 to 6.

j) (2008) 4 LW 411 (S.Rangarajan versus The District Registrar, Tiruchirappalli and another);

k) 2012-2-L.W.873 (Rajambal versus The Inspector General (Registration), Chennai and others);

l) Common order in W.P.Nos.5908 of 2012, etc., (Ramasamy versus State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by
Secretary, Revenue Department, Chennai).

Relying upon the above decisions, the learned senior counsel would contend that though the registering
authority cannot conduct a roving enquiry regarding title and ownership of the property for which
document was presented for registration, however, the registering authority can atleast hold a reasonable
enquiry regarding the genuineness of the document presented before him for the purpose of registration.
He also contended that this Court in Ramasamys case (cited supra) upheld the Circular No.67 of 2011
issued by the Inspector General of Registration, laying down that the Registering Authority is bound to
enquiry into the issues whether the documents are fraudulent in nature and in case it is so, to cancel the
registration. He pointed out that though the petitioner has made a detailed representation to the first
respondent raising objections for registering the document of compromise decree presented by the
respondents 3 to 6 even prior to presentation of the document, without conducting the enquiry regarding
the genuineness of the document or complying the directions of this Court, the first respondent registered
the document, which is liable to be cancelled.

11. On the other hand, Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 3 and 4 would
contend that absolutely there are no merits in the writ petition and the petitioner, without having valid
title or right over the disputed property, has been agitating by filing numerous petitions at every stage
with baseless claims in order to frustrate the respondents 3 and 4 to enjoy the fruits of the decree. As
regards the registration of the document, i.e. compromise decree, he would contend that it is the
prerogative of the parties whose interest and title declared by a Court of law, to get the registration of the
document/compromise decree which confers their shares in order to safeguard their interest and if at all
the petitioner is aggrieved over by the registration of the same, he could very well file a suit for declaration
that the said decree is null and void and not amenable to registration or prefer an appeal, challenging the
said decree. Without resorting to this, making a representation to the Registering Authority, who is bound
to register the document when presented to him, and filing the present writ petition, cannot serve the
purpose unless the petitioner establishes his right and title. He pointed out that no averment was made in
the writ petition by the petitioner regarding his title and as to how and when he acquires the disputed
property and further, he has not filed any appeal challenging the decree in O.S.No.104 of 2007.

12. The learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 also contended that it is the bounden duty of the
Registering Authority under Section 52 of the Act to register the document when it is presented before
him and unless a fraud is brought to his notice, he cannot keep the document is pending. He pointed out
that the respondents 3 and 4 have presented the document, i.e. decree of compromise granted by the
Court of law, for registration and there was no fraud at all in registering the same as alleged by the
petitioner and while exercising powers conferred under Section 52 of the Act, the first respondent has
rightly registered the said document, which cannot be found fault with. He also contended that as per
Rule 55 of the Registration Rules, it is not the duty of the Registering Authority to enquiry into the validity
of a document brought to him for registration, however, he is bound to consider the objections raised
mentioned in a) to d) of Rule 55, which admittedly, the petitioner has not made any of the objection
mentioned above. The only objections raised by the petitioner by way of representation is that the matter
is sub judice before the Court and the decree is not a conclusive and has no enforceability, which are all
the matters for consideration by the Court of law, not by the Registering Authority. He referred to Section
17 of the Act, which prescribes the documents of which registration is compulsory, and contended that the
decree of a Court is a document which does not require compulsory registration, but it is an optional as
envisaged under Section 18 of the Act and it is settled law that the limitation of four months prescribed for
presenting documents does not apply to decree since it is a permanent record of Court to register.

13. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4, relied the following
decisions, viz.,

a) CDJ 1948 MHC 050 (H.Shiva Rao versus Collector of Madras)

b) CDJ 2008 MHC 3100 (P.V.Kariravan versus Kallar Kalvi Kazhagam & others)wherein, it has been held
by this Court in para 35 as under:

35. Power to issue a Writ of Certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and
only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act so. Acceptance
of Form No.VII is a ministerial act. We are in respectful agreement with the decision of the First Bench in
R.Muralidarans case (cited supra) and the act of the Registrar accepting Form No.VII being a ministerial
act is not amenable for writ jurisdiction. Relying on the above, the learned counsel would contend that
writ jurisdiction has to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience
of the writ Court dictates it to act so and the Registrars act in registering document in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, is not amenable for writ jurisdiction.

c) 2009-2-L.W.546 (Anthula Sudhakar versus P.Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs. & others), wherein, it has
been held by the Honble Supreme Court as under in para 11.

11. . Where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in dispute or under a cloud, or
where the defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from defendant, the
plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction. Where the title
of plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession,
necessarily the plaintiff will have to file a suit for declaration, possession and injunction.Relying on this,
the learned counsel would contend that if at all the petitioner claims that he is in possession, but his title
to the disputed property is in dispute, he ought to have sued the respondents 3 to 6 for declaration of title
and establish the same. He pointed out that for the reasons known to him, the petitioner has not ventured
to file a suit against anyone in order to establish his title.

d) MANU/RH/004/1977 (Balu Mal versus J.P.Chandani and others)wherein, the High Court of
Rajasthan, has held as under in para 26 and 30:

26. Thus in each one of the above cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the
procedure prescribed under Section 25 of the Registration Act was not at all followed and as the document
in question was presented for registration after the period of four months prescribed in  Section 23 of the
Registration Act, it was held that there was lack of jurisdiction and the registration was void. In my view,
the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as in the
present case recourse was taken to proceedings under Section 25 of the Registration Act. The two
arbitrators presented an application before the District Registrar purporting to be under Section 25 of the
Registration Act and the District Registrar passed an order thereon condoning the delay in the
presentation of the award after imposition of fine and ordered that proceedings for registration be taken
on payment of the amount of fine. 30. .. In my humble opinion, the provisions of Sections 23 and 25 of the
Registration Act, in so far as they make a provision of limitation for presenting a document for
registration and another provision allowing a discretion to the District Registrar to accept a document for
registration even if the same is filed after the expiration of the time limit prescribed in Section 23 but
within a further period of four months, are of the nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act
respectively. Thus the decision of the question as to whether the delay in presenting the document could
be condoned by the District Registrar under Section 25 of course, if the delay is not for a period of more
than four months from the State of the expiry of the time limit prescribed in Section 23 of the Registration
Act, is one which is entirely within the jurisdiction of the District Registrar and even an erroneous
decision in that matter will not oust the jurisdiction of the District Registrar from passing an order
directing the registration of the document. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the order passed
by the District Registrar under Section 25 of the Registration Act in the present case was a nullity or
suffered from lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the question of condonation of delay was erroneously
decided by him.Relying upon the above decision, the learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 would
contend that the Registrar is empowered under Section 25 of the Act, to condone the delay in presenting
the document for a period of more than four months and in the present case, the first respondent while
exercising his power under Section 25 of the Act, condoned the delay on payment of penalty by the
respondents 3 and 4. Therefore, he contended that once the Section 25 has been complied with, it cannot
be held that the registration of the document is void.

e) (2008) 13 SCC 102 (K.Raghunandan and others versus Ali Hussain Sabir & others)wherein, the Honble
Supreme Court has held as under in para 38 as under: 38. A statute must be construed having regard to
the purpose and object thereof. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act makes registration of the
documents compulsory. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act excludes only the applications of Clauses
(b) and (c) and not clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17. If a right is created by a compromise decree
or is extinguished, it must compulsorily be registered. Clause (vi) is an exception to the exception. If the
latter part of Clause (vi) of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act applies, the first part thereof shall not
apply. As in this case not only there exists a dispute with regard to the title of the parties over the passage
and the passage, itself, having not found the part of the compromise, we do not find any infirmity in the
impugned judgment.

f) (2006) 10 SCC 788 (Som Dev and others versus Rati Ram & another), wherein, it has been held by the
Honble Supreme Court in para 12 as under:

12. On a plain reading of Section 17 of the Registration Act, with particular reference to clause (vi) of sub-
section (2) it is clear that a decree or order of a court and a compromise decree that relates only to the
subject-matter of the suit need not be registered on the ground that it is a non-testamentary instrument
which purports to or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right to or in immovable
property or which acknowledges receipt or payment of any consideration on account of a transaction
which brings about the above results. But if a suit is decreed on the basis of a compromise and that
compromise takes in property that is not the subject-matter of the suit, such a compromise decree would
require registration. .Relying upon the above, the learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 would
contend that if a right is created by a compromise decree or is extinguished, it must compulsorily be
registered if the compromise decree comprises immovable property which was not the subject matter of
the suit or proceeding and therefore, the respondents 3 and 4 have rightly registered the compromise
decree as per the provisions of the Act and hence, it cannot be held that the in a compromise suit, decree
need not be registered.

14. Though both parties have canvassed regarding their respective right and title over the disputed
property, this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution, cannot venture to determine the same in writ proceedings. The issue revolves only is,
whether the registration of the so-called document, i.e. compromise decree, is required to be cancelled?

15. It is not in dispute that the respondents 3 and 4 herein filed a suit in O.S.No.141 of 2009 on the file of
the Principal District Court, Chengalpattu against the respondents 5 and 6 herein, seeking a preliminary
decree for partition of the plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allot each share to the
respondents 3 to 6 and pending disposal of the above said suit, they also filed another suit in O.S.No.91 of
2007 in respect of the same property, on the file of the District Munsif, Tambaram, against the
respondents 5 and 6 herein and also against the writ petitioner and others, seeking declaration, to declare
the sale deed in document No.4177 of 2006, dated 19.7.2006 executed by one A.V.Padmanabhan in favour
of the writ petitioner is illegal, null and void and for permanent injunction restraining the writ petitioner
and others from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. Consequently, a
joint memo of compromise on 28.1.2008 came to be filed by the respondents 3 and 4 in O.S.No.104 of
2007, pursuant to which, a compromise decree was passed. Thereafter, the respondents 3 to 6, pursuant
to the compromise decree in the suit in OS 104 of 2007, got registered the compromise decree under
Document No.6775 of 2010 on 24.12.2010.

16. The main contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that when the matter
relating to the rights of the parties over the property is sub judice before the executing Court pursuant to
the orders of this Court in CMA No.2785 of 2010, dated 30.11.2010 wherein, the executing Court was
directed to issue notice in Form No.40 as per Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and decide all questions the relating
to right and title over the property in dispute and without reaching finality, the compromise decree cannot
be registered and such registration is invalid and requires to be cancelled. Though the contention of the
learned senior counsel is logically reasonable, but it is to be noted that the registration of the document
has been done by the first respondent in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act and
admittedly, the matter is still under consideration since the suit in OS 91 of 2007 as well as the execution
petition filed by the respondents 3 and 4 both were clubbed together and pending disposal before the
District Judge-II, Kancheepuram. Therefore, it is needless to mention that if the petitioner who raised
objections as an obstructor, succeeds in the proceedings, certainly, the so-called compromise decree
whose registration is questioned in this writ petition will merge into the subsequent decree that would be
passed in OS 91 of 2007 and EP 19 of 2009 by the District Court-II, Kancheepuram and thereby, the
compromise decree will automatically lose its validity and the registration thereof. Though a document
which requires compulsorily to be registered as per the Act, if not registered, it fails to confer any title
given by the document. However, mere registration of the document itself does not confer any valid right
or title of a person over the property unless the same is proved in accordance with law as and when it is
challenged. In this case, the respondents 3 to 6 who claims the property in dispute, have settled the same
by entering into compromise, whereas, the writ petitioner who alleged that the respondents 3 to 6 have no
right or title, but obtained the decree by playing a fraud on the Court, claims that the disputed property
has been in possession and enjoyment and thereby, as an obstructer, he raised objections to the execution
proceedings. Therefore, even assuming for a moment, without cancellation of the registration of the so-
called compromise decree, the petitioner can work out his remedy in OS 91 of 2007 and EP 19 of 2009,
which are yet to be decided and the petitioner is also one of the parties to the above said proceedings.

17. As regards to the registration of the document is concerned, this Court does not find any illegality or
irregularity thereof, in order to quash the same. Section 17 of the Registration Act deals with documents of
which registration is compulsory, and inter alia states that the sale of immovable property of the value of
one hundred rupees and upwards, has to be registered compulsorily. Therefore, every immovable
property, whose value is one hundred and upwards, requires compulsory registration under
the Registration Act. No doubt, the compromise decree is going to confer the right, title and interest in
favour of the respondents 3 to 6 to their respective shares in respect of the immovable property and its
value is more than Rs.100/- and Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act makes registration of the
documents compulsory and Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act excludes only the applications of
Clauses (b) and (c) and not clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 and if a right is created by a
compromise decree or is extinguished, it must compulsorily be registered, which was rightly done by the
respondents 3 and 4 by complying with the Section 25 of the Act.

18. The object of registering the document is, to give notice to the public at large that the document has
been executed to prevent fraud and forgery and to secure a reliable and complete amount of all the
transactions affecting the title to the property. The purpose of registration of the documents is to ensure
that whoever deals with the property of which, registration is compulsory, can authorizedly rely on the
statement contained in the register, as being a full and complete account of all transactions by which the
title may be affected. A certificate of Registration is sufficient evidence that the document has been
registered and it is not proof that it has been executed without there being any dispute thereof. Therefore,
when the execution of a document is in dispute between two parties, the registration of the said document
will be valid unless it is set aside by the competent Court. The apprehension of the petitioner that if the
registration of the compromise decree is not cancelled, he will lose his right and interest over the disputed
property and cannot claim the same and hence he sought for cancellation of the document. As already
stated above, registration of a document itself does not confer any right or title in favour of the party who
intends to register the same and it is always subject to establishment in accordance with law and
therefore, the petitioner is always at liberty to prove his right and title over the disputed property in the
manner known to law and if he succeeds, it is needless to state that the registration of the compromise
decree which was challenged in this writ petition will automatically become null and void.

19. It is contended that despite the petitioner raised objections and intimated the first respondent by way
of a detailed representation dated 22.12.2010 prior to the registration of the document and specifically
requested to refuse the registration, however, the first respondent, contrary to the provisions of
the Registration Act, resorted to register the same. In fact, there is no provision in the Registration Act,
1908 which enables the Registering Authority to refuse registration of the document presented for
registration, but under Section 71 of the Registration Act, the registering authority is duty bound to
consider the objections raised by the party opposing the registration and pass appropriate orders by
recording his reasons which is appealable under Section 72 of the Registration Act. Of-course it is true
that the Registering Authority is bound to enquire into the issues whether the documents presented
before it for registration purpose, are fraudulent in nature and in case it is so, to cancel the registration.
But in this case, before the first respondent, the document, i.e. a compromise decree granted by a Court of
law was placed before him for registration and he cannot be expected to go into the veracity of the said
document. A perusal of the representation made to the first respondent, dated 22.12.2010 would show
that the petitioner has raised objection, stating that the matter is absolutely sub-judice and the title to the
property in dispute is yet to be decided afresh by the Additional District Judge, Chengalpattu as per the
judgment given by this Court in CMA 2785 of 2010. These are all the matters concern with the Court of
law and not with the Sub Registrar and he cannot act as an judicial authority to probe the legal matters
which are exclusively within the domain of a Court of law. It is settled law that the Registering Authority is
not empowered to go into the title disputes, except to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the
persons who are party to the document that has been presented to him for registration. This Court, by
judgment dated 2785 of 2010 in CMA No.2785 of 2010 has recognized the petitioner as an obstructer and
protected his right and interest over the disputed property and specifically directed the Court below to
decide all the questions relating to right, title or interest arising between the parties and decide the same
afresh after giving notice to the petitioner. Therefore, it is for the petitioner to get along with the matter
sub judice before the Court below and thereafter work out his remedy, if he succeeds in the manner
known to law.

20. For the reasons mentioned supra, I am of the view that the petitioner has not made out the case for
issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records pertaining to the registration of the
document in Doc.No. 6775 of 2010 dated 24.12.2010 and to cancel the registration of the same.

In the result, the Writ Petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MPs are closed.

Suk
10-12-2014
Index: Yes
Internet: Yes
S.VAIDYANATHAN, J.
suk

PRE DELIVERY ORDER IN

W.P.NO.4023 OF 2011
10-12-2014