Taxation

SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD.,

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

G.R. No. 166482

Petitioner Silkair (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign corporation duly licensed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to do business in the Philippines as an on-line international carrier
operating the Cebu-Singapore-Cebu and Davao-Singapore-Davao routes. In the course of its
international flight operations, petitioner purchased aviation fuel from Petron Corporation (Petron) from
July 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998, paying the excise taxes thereon in the sum of P5,007,043.39. The
payment was advanced by Singapore Airlines, Ltd. on behalf of petitioner.

On October 20, 1999, petitioner filed an administrative claim for refund in the amount of P5,007,043.39
representing excise taxes on the purchase of jet fuel from Petron, which it alleged to have been
erroneously paid. The claim is based on Section 135 (a) and (b) of the 1997 Tax Code, which provides:

SEC. 135. Petroleum Products Sold to International Carriers and Exempt Entities or Agencies. –
Petroleum products sold to the following are exempt from excise tax:

(a) International carriers of Philippine or foreign registry on their use or consumption outside the
Philippines: Provided, That the petroleum products sold to these international carriers shall be stored in
a bonded storage tank and may be disposed of only in accordance with the rules and regulations to be
prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner;

(b) Exempt entities or agencies covered by tax treaties, conventions and other international agreements
for their use or consumption: Provided, however, That the country of said foreign international carrier
or exempt entities or agencies exempts from similar taxes petroleum products sold to Philippine
carriers, entities or agencies; and

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

We rule for the respondent.

The core issue presented is the legal personality of petitioner to file an administrative claim for refund of
excise taxes alleged to have been erroneously paid to its supplier of aviation fuel here in the Philippines.

Excise taxes, which apply to articles manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sale or
consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported into the Philippines,9 is basically an
indirect tax. While the tax is directly levied upon the manufacturer/importer upon removal of the
taxable goods from its place of production or from the customs custody, the tax, in reality, is actually
passed on to the end consumer as part of the transfer value or selling price of the goods, sold, bartered
or exchanged.10 In early cases, we have ruled that for indirect taxes (such as valued-added tax or VAT),
the proper party to question or seek a refund of the tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom
the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even when he shifts the burden thereof to another.11
Thus, in Contex Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,12 we held that while it is true that
petitioner corporation should not have been liable for the VAT inadvertently passed on to it by its
supplier since their transaction is a zero-rated sale on the part of the supplier, the petitioner is not the
proper party to claim such VAT refund. Rather, it is the petitioner’s suppliers who are the proper parties
to claim the tax credit and accordingly refund the petitioner of the VAT erroneously passed on to the
latter.

CRIMINAL

TAGS: QUALIFIED THEFT, PENALTY

ANITA L. MIRANDA,

Petitioner,

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent

G.R. No. 176298

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 3089 of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things.
Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 31011 is present: (1) the
theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3)
the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioner’s guilt, a modification is called for
as regards the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado is
instructive. Pursuant to said case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of
the value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00,
the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum
period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty, the amount of
P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of P775,187.85. This amount is then
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years
should be added to the basic penalty. However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not
exceed 20 years. Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of
reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court, as well as the
appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CIVIL LAW

TAGS: DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and/or WASTFEL-LARSEN MANAGEMENT A/S,

Petitioners,

OBERTO S. LOBUSTA,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 177578

On the matter of attorney’s fees, under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees can be recovered
in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer’s liability laws.
Attorney’s fees are also recoverable when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest.34 Such conditions being present here, we affirm the award of
attorney’s fees, which we compute as US$3,103 or 5% of US$62,060.

CRIMINAL LAW

TAGS: ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, PRESUMPTION OF AUTHORSHIP

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,

Petitioner,

-versus-

ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 177780

January 25, 2012

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification
of public documents through the following information,14 viz:

xxx

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of Malabon, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense,
fraudulent acts and misrepresentation executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud,
represented to METROBANK, as represented by MS. ROSELLA S. SANTIAGO, that he is the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented to be true and genuine
when he knew the Certificate of Title No. M-16751 is fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Metrobank and offered the same as collateral for a loan and Rosella S. Santiago
relying on said misrepresentation gave to accused, the amount of P20,000,000.00 and once in
possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously failed to deliver
the land covered by spurious title and misappropriate, misapply and converted the said amount of
P20,000,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to return the amount to complainant METROBANK, and/or delivered
the land covered in the spurious title in the aforementioned amount of P20,000,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a)
the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b) such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because
of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.36 It is required that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the
very cause or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.

METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having
offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no
requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid explanation from
the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document.

We cannot sustain METROBANK’s urging.

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State.38 The effect is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the
absence of proof to the contrary.39 As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of
the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made
should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so in
a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima
facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court.41

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no
evidence upholds the contention for which it stands.42 It is not correct to say, consequently, that the
investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during preliminary
investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the evidence
submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary
of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of probable cause,43 a discretion that must
be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation.44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred
in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he
came to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of
discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the
duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity
and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.46 Its duty included the responsibility of
dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and
condition, and of investigating who was its real owner.47 Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not
diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had
offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise
greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public
interest.48 Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.49