The Linguistic Background Intellectual R PDF

The
linguistic background, intellectual range and theological significance of the Leitmotif

‘hebel’ in the book of Ecclesiastes and its secondary reception.

by
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College
University of Oxford

March 2018
The linguistic background, intellectual range and theological significance of the Leitmotif
‘hebel’ in the book of Ecclesiastes and its secondary reception.
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College
“Vanity of vanities, says the Teacher, vanity of vanities! All is vanity.”

Thus translate most standard English translations the introductory proclamation of the book
of Ecclesiastes. The Hebrew term ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬in it, usually transliterated as ‘hebel’, is an enigmatic
motif which is key to a proper understanding of the contents of the biblical book of
Ecclesiastes. The word, presented either as a noun (‫ ) ֶ֫הבֶל‬or in a verbal form (‫) ָהבַל‬, occurs in 66
verses throughout the Hebrew Bible, the majority of those attestations is found in the biblical
book in which its meaning is pondered upon in the context of Qoheleth’s quest for the purpose
and meaning of life.
As the title suggests, this extended essay shall contain three parts. Firstly, I am going to discuss
the Hebrew term at hand from a linguistic perspective, i.e. pondering the use, etymology and
semantic field of ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬from a perspective, in which the theological points, which are made in
the Hebrew Bible by usage of this word, are not yet of primary significance.
Secondly, it is necessary to broaden the focus of literary interpretation beyond the book of
Ecclesiastes, in order to be qualified to subsequently distinguish the nuances and focuses,
which the Preacher applies whilst making the term at hand the centre and Leitmotif of his
intellectual world. This range shall not limit itself to exegetical analysis of Hebrew scripture
but shall include theological points made through secondary translation and interpretation in
subsequent periods of history. Scholarship often considers the contributions of Saint Jerome
and Martin Luther as particularly worthwhile, whom I have hence chosen to be the two focal
points of the respective discussion in this essay’s encounter with hebel’s reception history.
Lastly, I shall bring those considerations together and discuss the relevance and significance
for modern theological scholarship, which the motif ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬offers in the thought that Qoheleth
left for posterity. This section conjoins the contents of the previous two and extrapolates not
only an analysis as to the appropriateness of applications of the discussed meanings of ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬to
the book of Ecclesiastes but also how and in which categories this Leitmotif is significant to
Qoheleth’s thought.

I. Linguistic considerations

In order to understand the literal meaning of a word, the consultation of a critical dictionary
is an appropriate starting point. The attestations of ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬indicate that the term arose relatively
late in the development of Semitic languages, as for instance Akkadian, here being used as
representative of the East Semitic languages, lacks a cognate.1 Notably, hebel’s triliteral root
1
cf. J. Hehn, ‘Zum Problem des Geistes in Alten Orient und im AT’, Zeitschrift für die
Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 43 [1925], pp. 210-25, here: p. 210ff.; O. Loretz, Qohelet und
1
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

h-b-l is not attested as a common verbal root in any Semitic language.2 Among the West
Semitic languages, there are a number of attestations of the term, most of them however
relatively late. These include a use of the root in Jewish Aramaic, Syrian, Mandean, and
Nabatean; moreover, South Semitic languages such as Late Egyptian, Ethiopic, Old Arabic and
Modern High Arabic have similar attestations.3 The majority of these carry rather similar
connotations. For example the Jewish Aramaic (Babylonian) hebel is commonly translated as
“warm breath or breeze, vapour”, the Mandean habla or hbila as “breath, vapour” and the
Arabic hibāl and habalat as “wind” and “vapour” respectively.4 Therefore many agree that
“breath” or “vapour” in English and “Windhauch” in German are to be understood as the
standard translation of ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬. However, in this word’s attestations in other Semitic languages
there are deviations from this general pattern. For instance the same root is used for a rain-
deity called Hubal, who was worshipped in pre-Islamic Mecca, similarly it is argued that the
root hblw in Nabatean designates the name of a local deity.5 Briefly returning to the previous
observation that hebel is not used in Akkadian, it may be noted that the notion which was
expressed by the previously mentioned West and South Semitic terms found representation
in the Akkadian synonym šāru, which is etymologically unrelated to any of the previously
mentioned forms.
It stands to reason that the origins of the term hebel are primarily onomatopoeic. Comparison
with similar terms in numerous language families shows that terms designating the semantic
range of breath or vapour often exhibit such features; exemplarily, the Greek “ἀτμίς/ἀτμός”
or the German “Atem/Odem” may be considered here.
Narrowing down to the Hebrew Bible, it is reasonable to consider the contexts in which hebel
is used in the Old Testament as a whole. Klaus Seybold highlights that in many instances in the
Tanakh it indicates a negative qualification of persons or things.6 Usually it is supplemented
by either the particles min, le or be; alternatively, it is used in an adverbial sense. Examples
for this are Ps 144:4, “Man is like a breath, his days are like a passing shadow”, or Isa 49:4, “I
have spent my strength for nothing and vanity.”7 There are a number of words in its semantic
8
fields, which are also used in scriptural contexts. Among them are ‫ ריק‬riq “vain” ִ , ‫ תּ ֹהוּ‬tohu
֫
8
“emptiness, formlessness, nothing” , ‫שׁקֶר‬ ֶ ֫ sheqer “deceit, falsehood”, ‫שׁוְא‬
ָ shav‘ “deceit,
der Alte Orient: Untersuchungen zu Stil und theologischer Thematik des Buches Qohelet
[Habilitationsschrift, Münster 1964], p. 126f.
2
cf. A. Lauha, ‘Omnia vanitas. Die Bedeutung von hbl bei Kohelet’; in: Glaube und
Gerechtigkeit. In memoriam Rafael Gyllenberg, eds. J. Kiilunen, W. Riekkinen, H. Räisänen
[Finnische Exegetische Gesellschaft, Helsinki 1983], p. 19
3
cf. K. Seybold, ‘‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬hebhel; ‫ ָהבַל‬hābhal’; in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (vol.
3), eds. G. J. Botterweck, H. Ringgren [Eerdmans; Grand Rapids 1978], pp. 313f.
4
cf. Seybold, ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬hebhel; ‫ ָהבַל‬hābhal, pp. 313f.
5
cf. ibid.
6
cf. ibid, p. 314f.
7
cf. also Ps 62:10[9], 78:33, Prov 13:11, Eccl 6:4 and Zec 10:2, Job 9:29, 21:34, 27:12, 35:16
respectively
8
used together with hebel i.a. in Isa 30:7 and 49:4
2
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

falsehood, vanity”, a negated form of the verb ‫ יָעַל‬ya’al “to be of no value, to be of no profit,
to be good for nothing” or some meanings of ‫רוּ ַח‬9 ruach “wind, breath, storm, breath of life.”10

The first prominent example in the Tanakh, in which hebel can be arguably traced is the
narrative of Genesis 4, which describes the activities of the first humans whose existence came
about through reproduction rather than creation. The relationship between the biblical books
of Genesis and Ecclesiastes is generally an interesting one, as there are fourteen instances in
which the two books, despite their very different theological agendas, intertext, for instance
elsewhere with regard to the unhappy toil of man in Eccl 1:13 and 3:10 as well as Gen 3:19 or
the role of the divine spirit in creation in Eccl 12:7 and Gen 2:7. While the Yahwist makes the
effort to explain the etymology of the names of the first three human beings, rather
surprisingly this information is lacking for the fourth. Each of the humans is given a name
which represents their distinctive features within the narrative of the Urgeschichte, e.g. Eve
(‫ ) ַחוָּה‬literally chavvah as the mother of life or Cain (‫ ) ַ֫קי ִן‬qayin, whose name echoes the Hebrew
(‫ ) ָקנָה‬qanah “to get, acquire, obtain”, indicating him to be the first born human being. Abel,
(‫ ) ֶ֫הבֶל‬hebel, is given a name strikingly familiar to the discussion at hand. As this name is, unlike
the others in the section of the book of Genesis, not immediately explained and moreover, as
we have noted previously, there is no old Semitic root to hebel, the literal meaning of Abel’s
designation remains enigmatic for the time being. A useful contribution to the matter at hand
has been made by Nahum M. Sarna in his commentary on Genesis in the JPS series. He
suggests the name Abel to have been given retrospectively in reflection of the fate that he
was subject to in the following course of the narrative. He argues that this term, given to an
individual whose lifetime was by far the shortest among the figures of the primeval history,
was a common expression to express the “fleeting nature of life”.11 This insight and its
attestation, especially given the notion of transience in it, is very useful and I shall return to it
in due course. However it is furthermore worthwhile to note in this section’s linguistic
comments that certainly similar and potentially related terms within the Semitic language
family had quite different meanings, for instance the Syriac hablâ meaning “herdsman”,
perhaps reflecting upon Abel’s occupation during his short stay on the earth. I.a. Gunkel,
Ewald and Wellhausen have also argued for the term relating to the semantic field of
stockbreeding,12 however this notion is unconvincing as the names in this part of the Hebrew
Bible seem to reflect rather on the persons’ purpose and distinctive role than on their
occupation. Such arguments could, if at all, indicate an early use of these terms, while this
translation of hebel can hardly be seen as of any use for the further development of the term
in the course of the Old Testament. We shall consider examples of them in the following.
The two examples I have previously given from Ps 144:4 and Isa 49:4 indicate a meaning of
the term hebel, which in many ways seems to follow the notion of the “fleeting nature of
9
note that, for technical reasons, it needs to be highlighted that the vocalisation underneath
the last consonant is of course a Furtive Patach, as the used font cannot display this clearly
10
cf. Seybold, ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬hebhel; ‫ ָהבַל‬hābhal, pp. 314f.
11
N. M. Sarna, Genesis = Be-reshit: The Traditional Hebrew Text with New JPS translation
[Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia 1989], p. 32
12
cf. J. Skinner, A critical and exegetical commentary on Genesis [Clark, Edinburgh 1910], p.
103
3
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

life”.10 Before we approach the use of this term in Ecclesiastes itself, it is worthwhile to
exegetically consider some external passages in order to qualify oneself to recur to them
comparatively, enabling one to identify contextual influences more clearly.
The Deuteronomistic history contains four attestations of the term at hand, all of which
appear to relate to idolatrous religious practice, such as 1 Kgs 16:13, “[…] they sinned and
which they made Israel to sin, provoking the Lord God of Israel to anger with their idols
(‫) ְבּ ַהי ֵל ְבם ֶה‬.”13 However, the understanding of hebel only referring to idolatry is misleading.
Stuart Weeks has argued that this common translation into English is not comprehensive and
proposed to understand the term, following 1 Kgs 16:2, as rather indicating sinfulness in
general.14
Elsewhere, a rather multifaceted range of possible meanings of hebel becomes evident. Isa
30:7 uses this term with reference to the useful-, or rather uselessness of foreign aid, here
Egypt in particular: “Egypt is hebel and offers empty help.” Prov 13:11 rather argues for the
ephemerality and dissipation of it: “Wealth dissipates [faster] than hebel, but he who sets
[some] aside will prosper”, and Job 27:12, “Behold, all of you have seen it yourselves; why
then have you become altogether hebel?”, is described by Weeks as suggesting that Job’s so-
called friends are “misguided or intellectually confused.”15 He argues that Isa 57:13 ,“The wind
will carry them all off, a hebel will take them away”, and Job 35:16 “Job opens his mouth in
hebel; he multiplies words without knowledge”, come closest to the literal meaning of the
motif, playing with the image of moving, sometimes exhaled, air.16 This list of different
readings in the Old Testament could be continued at quite significant length.
Intriguingly, the usually very literal translation of the Old Testament into Greek in the
Septuagint is surprisingly inconclusive. There is a rather broad variety of terms used to transfer
perhaps the abstract rather than the literal meaning into the Greek language in many
instances. The by far most common translation into Greek is the term ματαιότης, most
accurately translated as “futility”, occasionally other terms such as καταιγίς, “storm”, e.g. in
Isa 57:13 or κενός, “empty”, in Job 27:12. 17 ‘Ματαιότης’ is a very odd choice on the part of
the translator, as Jerome notes “In Hebraeo pro vanitate vanitatum abal abalim scriptum est,
quod exceptis Septuaginta interpretibus omnes similiter transtulerunt ἀτμός ἀτμίδων sive
ἀτμῶν.“18 The Greek ἀτμός carries much greater similarity in meaning to hebel than ματαιότης
as I have previously set out in this section by referring to its onomatopoetic value and is used
in the other major Greek translations of the Hebrew Bible, i.e. Aquila, Symmachus and
Theodotion.
13
also Deut 32:21, 1 Kgs 16:26, 2 Kgs 17:15
14
cf. S. Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism [T&T Clark, New York 2012], p. 107
15
ibid.
16
cf. ibid., p. 105
17
cf. Seybold, ‫ ֶ֫הבֶל‬hebhel; ‫ ָהבַל‬hābhal, p. 315
18
E. Birnbaum, Der Koheletkommentar des Hieronymus: Einleitung, revidierter Text,
Übersetzung und Kommentierung [De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2014], p. 99; R. J. Goodrich, D. J.
D. Miller, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes [Newman Press, New York 2012], p. 36; “In
Hebrew, vanity of vanities is written abal abalim, which, apart from the Septuagint, everyone
has translated similarly as ἀτμός ἀτμίδων or ἀτμῶν.”
4
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

Very regularly it appears as if the choice of a synonym for hebel in English has strongly been
influenced by the decisions which were made whilst translating the Hebrew into Greek or
indeed based on the Vulgate, in which the Septuagint translation is echoed in the translation
of ματαιότης as vanitas, as the vast majority of variations of meaning in English correspond
with the respective choices made in those early translations. Therefore such deviations should
be treated with caution in an attempt to reconstruct the meaning of the original Hebrew term
or in subsequent exegetical comments.

II. The Intellectual Range of Hebel in Qoheleth

From among the 38 verses, in which our enigmatic motif occurs, one has gained particular
prominence and distinguishes itself from the others not only in its special position but also in
style. Eccl 1:2, which the NRSV translation renders as “Vanity of vanities, says the Teacher,
vanity of vanities! All is vanity.”, is the one key programmatic statement, which encompasses
essentially the entirety of the argument set out in the following twelve chapters and hence
very appropriately brackets the entire book in content and structure by appearing both in the
beginning of the book as well as in its very end.19 Besides these framing occurrences of the
term, it appears to characterise the following things, primarily circumstances affecting human
existence by being hebel: pleasure (2:1), human toil (2:11,23), death, i.e. the same outcome
of life, irrespective of the individual (2:15, 3:19), undeserved inheritance to the following
generation (2:19,21), the purpose of human toil (4:7, 8), human aspirations (5:7), greed (5:10),
the lack of joy (6:2), nothing of one’s existence remains (6:12, 11:8,10), and suffering of the
righteous (7:15, 8:14).
“All is vanity”, hakol hebel in Hebrew, is in many ways the key to the intellectual trajectory of
Qoheleth. John Jarick has set out not only the intellectual point made in this statement that,
in a less literal translation ‘everything is nothing’, but also the stylistic beauty underlying it.
The close visual, though not linguistic, proximity in Hebrew between ‫ הכל‬and ‫הבל‬, where
everything and nothing, if translated in a less literal way, are different in writing by nothing
more than a small stroke to the bottom right corner of the second letter, kaph and bet
respectively, indicates that essentially anything between these absolutes lies within this
seemingly marginal stroke which repeatedly has been misapplied by Hebrew scribes.20 In
order to understand this system between ‫ הכל‬and ‫ הבל‬correctly, and apply it to the following
thought in the biblical book at hand, Jarick deems it appropriate to consider other ancient
philosophical systems which are comparable to Qoheleth’s, such as an aphorism by the Greek
philosopher Heraclitus, “πάντα ῥεῖ”, ‘everything flows’ in English.21 It is worthwhile to explore
whether this comparison is appropriate in order to understand how Qoheleth understands his
Leitmotif in order to further explore its subsequent use in the book of Ecclesiastes.
19
cf. E. Christianson, Ecclesiastes through the Centuries [Blackwell, Malden/Oxford 2007], p.
98
20
cf. J. Jarick, ‘The Hebrew Book of Changes: Reflections on Hakkōl Hebel and Lakkōl Zemān
in Ecclesiastes’, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, 25(90) [2000], pp. 79-99, here: pp.
79-83
21
cf. ibid., p. 84f.
5
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

Certainly a central factor to grasping the meaning and importance of hebel in Qoheleth’s mind
is to contextualise it in experiential dimensions. Michael V. Fox argues that according to this
term, encompassing multifarious facets of reflections upon one’s experiences, “what is
fleeting may be precious, what is frustrating may be no illusion, what is futile may endure
forever.”22 When it comes to the problem of representing such a notion in an English term,
however, Fox’s rather lengthy interpretation needs to be narrowed down; Douglas Miller has
suggested three options for such an endeavour, which I shall briefly quote here. He favours
an abstract meaning, such as ‘incongruous’ or ‘absurd’, being used in translation, a use of
different terms, taking the context into consideration whilst making situational choices as to
the most accurate translation, or a single metaphor, such as the term ‘Bubble’, prominently
used in numerous Elizabethan paraphrases,23 as the three possible ways of translating this
enigmatic motif.24 I shall return to and assess modern responses to it later in this section.

In the history of theological reception of the book of Ecclesiastes and the motif at hand in
particular, there are two key writers, whose reflections shall predominantly be of concern in
this extended essay: The first of the two is Saint Jerome (347-420), the second is Martin Luther
(1483-1546). It is helpful to consult reception history in this essay, as most readings of the
book of Ecclesiastes, including those based on modern higher biblical criticism, are not
exclusively rooted in the primary text, but suppose or at least implicitly acknowledge
intellectual steps which lie between the original Hebrew source and contemporary
interpretation. Besides the self-evident pre-eminence of both scholars in their own time, it is
widely agreed that their interpretations of hebel stand at the outset of historical eras which
generally followed their thought, or at least the general categories underlying it, on this
Leitmotif, namely the Patristic period, as well as, by extension, Scholasticism, as there is little
divergence in the thought with regard to the example at hand, and the Renaissance
respectively.

a) Jerome’s Understanding of Hebel

The standard English translation of hebel, which is used in the vast majority of Bibles, such as
the NRSV, is ‘vanity’. This term is etymologically derived from the Latin ‘vanitas’, which is an
interpretative translation made in the Early Church. Probably the first one to intellectually
pursue this interpretative thread was Origen, however no copy of his commentary on
Ecclesiastes has remained over the centuries and the limited information that is accessible to
scholarship constitutes itself in brief references to Ecclesiastes in his other commentaries and
general published works. Thus the Church Father to turn to is Jerome, who, probably
influenced by Origen, set out his understanding of hebel in his own commentary on Qoheleth,
which was written approximately 388 or 389 CE.
22
M. V. Fox, Qoheleth and his Contradictions; [JSOT Supplement 71, Almond Press, Sheffield
1989], p. 36
23
cf. F. C. Burkitt, Ecclesiastes: Rendered into English Verse [Macmillan, London 1936], p. 9
24
cf. D. B. Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes: The Place of Hebel in Qohelet’s Work
[Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta 2002], pp. 2-14
6
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

Preliminarily, it is worthwhile to quote a longer passage from this commentary, as it is well
suited to understand his key point.

“Vanity of vanities [vanitas vanitatum] said Ecclesiastes, Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.
If all things that God made are truly good then how can all things be considered vanity,
and not only vanity, but even vanity of vanities? [...] [H]eaven, earth, the seas and all
things that are contained within its compass can be said to be good in themselves, but
compared to God they are nothing. And if I look at the candle in a lamp and am content
with its light, then afterwards when the sun has risen I cannot discern anymore what
was once bright; I will also see the light of the stars by the light of the setting sun, so
in looking at the world and the multitudinous varieties of nature I am amazed at the
greatness of the world, but I also remember that all things will pass away and the world
will grow old, and that only God is that which has always been. On account of this
realisation I am compelled to say, not once but twice: Vanity of vanities, all is vanity
[...] All things are and will be vain, until we find that which is complete and perfect.”25

The key term applied to this system of thought is ‘contemptus mundi’, i.e. disdain of the world,
due to its necessary imperfection in contrast to the divine. This system of postulating
qualitative categories for ontological realities is inherently connected to the cosmological
mindset of ancient Israelite thought in general. It is best contrasted with the notion of every
created thing being ‘good’ in the first creation account in the book of Genesis. This apparent
contrast needs resolution as the theological thought of the Early Church required scripture to
be thought of as infallible and therefore without contradiction. This hermeneutical principle
is, as Elisabeth Birnbaum argues, here referred to by understanding the matter at hand as of
particular importance, which scripture highlights by interjecting a stumbling block and
demanding of the reader to intellectually come to terms with it.26 In order to understand this
matter in terms of hebel, Jerome’s argument manifests itself in modes of comparison. For
instance, he refers to Moses’ encounter with God, which, as reported in Ex 34:29ff., caused
his face to shine. However, it is important that his face did not perpetually remain in its shining
state after the encounter with God but rather faded subsequently. Hence, he deduces, human
capacities, even if in contact with the divine, are inherently transient and therefore
qualitatively inferior. It is crucial to be aware that this argument is an entirely comparative
one. Jerome does not question that every created thing is by necessity ‘good’, however such
things are nevertheless nothing compared to the divine, which is by definition axiomatically
perfect.27

Here a key distinction between Jerome’s reading and the previously spread Greek term
ματαιότης must be drawn. One has to understand his point as one which does not carry ethical
connotations but rather disposes the world in relative categories in comparison to the divine.
Ματαιότης on the other hand has an ethical dimension to it. The Cappadocian Church Father
St. Gregory of Nyssa explains this in the following terms in his first homily on Ecclesiastes:
25
translation as in: Christianson, Ecclesiastes through the Centuries, p. 101
26
cf. Birnbaum, Der Koheletkommentar des Hieronymus, p. 491f.
27
cf. ibid.
7
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

“‘Futility’ [i.e. ‘ματαιότης’] is either a meaningless word or an unprofitable activity, or
an unrealised plan, or unsuccessful effort, or in general what serves no useful purpose
at all.”28

One can find a clear focus on the world being inherently good in Jerome’s commentary, yet
limited through the contrast of its transient state. This is supported by scriptural references
from the New Testament, establishing a specification of his thought, of which two are
particularly useful.
The first is 2 Corinthians 4:18: “We look not to the things that are seen but to the things that
are unseen. For the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are
eternal” which reflects upon the underlying reality of the ontological divide between the
created and the divine as the foundation of Jerome’s thought.
The other is 1 Corinthians 13:9f.: “For we know in part and we prophesy in part, but when the
perfect comes, the partial will pass away.” This reference adds an epistemological dimension
to Jerome’s reflection upon hebel, as it supplements the limitations of experientially perceived
worldly circumstances with the affirmation of human limitations to comprehend them.
The last notion of the three at hand is particularly interesting, as it, to some extent, resembles
the idea brought forward by Diethelm Michel in his article from 1989 that the passages about
hebel in Ecclesiastes carry the notion of ‘epistemological scepticism.’29 Michel’s idea is that
this term reflects upon a crisis of Israelite wisdom, failing to comprehend the things taking
place ‘under the sun’ and reappearing at every instance where Qohelet proves the claim of
wisdom to be able to do so to be wrong or inadequate, and corresponds with Jerome’s
reference to the limitation of humanity.30
These notions lead one back to the preliminary observations which have been made about
the linguistic dimensions of the term hebel. As we have noted that ‘breath’ or ‘vapor’, both
describing things which are not palpable and only perceptible for short timespans, are
probably most indicative of where this word came from, the idea of emphasising transience is
very close to the presumed intention, which the author of Ecclesiastes had whilst authoring
the book.
Yet there are vast incongruences when it comes to allocating hebel in a greater scheme and
drawing concluding advice from it, as Jerome seems to understand ‘everything is hebel’ to be
limited to the worldly sphere insofar as it is opposed to his Christian soteriological
expectations. Already the next but one verse from the key programmatic statement in the
prologue to Ecclesiastes indicates very different understandings of eternity by postulating in
Eccl 1:4 that “A generation goes, and a generation comes, but the earth remains forever.” The
problem for an interpretation like Jerome’s, which is by necessity primarily rooted in the
Christian religion, is that the book of Ecclesiastes contains very different thought on
metaphysic in general. Essentially this matter can be narrowed down to Israelite thought
28
translation as in: S. G. Hall, St. Gregory of Nyssa; Homilies on Ecclesiastes [de Gruyter, Berlin
1993], p. 35
29
in German: ‘erkenntnistheoretischer Skeptizismus’, cf. D. Michel, Untersuchungen zur
Eigenart des Buches Qohelet [BZAW 183, de Gruyter, Berlin 1989], passim
30
cf. ibid, pp. 40-51
8
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

about existence, which generally lacked transcendental notions, due to, among other factors,
a “lack of sustained, systematic, thematic treatment”31 of concepts about e.g. death and
salvation, and is in almost diametrical opposition to the fundamental suppositions of early
Christian thought, as e.g. Jerome’s in this case. Therefore, Jerome, although correct in his
assertions, often struggles with the differences between his own beliefs and the contents of
the text. Elsewhere he also makes the rather crude attempt to overcome contradictions by
presenting them as opinions of other schools of thought, i.e. Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc.32
Although modern scholarship rejects this exegetical method, one must not make the mistake
to deny that Jerome made correct observations, although he developed them into incorrect
conclusions.

In order to further understand the specificities of the reception that Jerome’s commentary
provides, it is helpful to categorise the previous observations in a systematic manner. The key
points which he makes are the transient nature of worldly realities, limited through the
fundamental circumstances necessitated by the ontological divide, and epistemological
scepticism. His response to this matter is however not properly understood by primarily
considering his decisive role in the formation of asceticism in the context of Christianity, which
originated in his idea that due to the transience and limitations of this world, due to its relative
inferiority as compared to the things beyond it, it was better not to actively engage in it but
rather contemplate one’s role in the light of the expectation of an eschatological judgement,
which he believed to best occur through the study of scripture and one’s own sinfulness rather
than the shortcomings of the world as a whole, which he suggested to abandon due to the
superior coming kingdom.33 However, this conclusion must, again, not lead one into
concluding a negative evaluation of the world in absolute terms, but rather Jerome’s
prioritisation of heaven relative to earth, as I have highlighted earlier.

Moreover, it is necessary to see that Jerome did not think about Ecclesiastes exclusively when
he pondered upon the philosophical categories which he deduced from this book. Rather he
juxtaposed the three books in the Hebrew Bible, which are, pseudepigraphically, as we know
today, attributed to king Solomon. He argues that the insights about the world, which we
might categorise in the area of natural philosophy, are prefaced by the ethical instructions of
Proverbs and supplemented by the theological amalgamation of the bridegroom ‘Christ’ and
the bride ‘humanity’ in Canticum Canticorum. Thus the contemptus mundi is not a contemptus
in its own right but is placed within a larger consideration of the human condition. Jerome
places this succession of ‘Solomonic’ books in the course of the biblical king’s life. Here he
links his contemptus mundi to humanity’s hybris, which becomes evident from the
enumeration of matters pertaining to their existence described as hebel. The notion of a
relationship between the so-called ‘Solomonic Books’ is not original to Jerome. It links back to
the thought of Origen and allows one to further locate the Patristic perspective on hebel. The
31
L. R. Bailey, ‘Death as a Theological Problem in the Old Testament’, Pastoral Psychology, 22
[1971], pp. 20-32, here: p. 22
32
cf. K. Dell, Interpreting Ecclesiastes: Readers Old and New [Eisenbrauns, Winona Lake 2013],
p. 14
33
cf. Birnbaum, Der Koheletkommentar des Hieronymus, p. 67
9
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Mansfield College

argument made with regard to the attribution of Ecclesiastes to Solomon and linking it to his
biography is that Solomon was believed to have lost his divinely imparted wisdom and thus
presented his search for wisdom as a transient endeavour. Therefore, as not even the wisdom
of Solomon was exempt from being transient, the universality of transience on earth appeared
very evident to him. Unfortunately, no further commentaries by Jerome on the ‘Solomonic
Books’ have survived to further specify this intellectual trajectory.

Jerome’s reading of hebel, which accumulates all the notions previously set out in the Latin
term vanitas, has been chosen as the first key theological response to the book of Ecclesiastes
as it has decisively influenced the thought about this biblical book and the theme of hebel in
particular as the most important source for approximately the next 1,100 years. Among the
most useful responses further qualifying the notions expressed by Jerome is the commentary
by Bonaventure, written in the 13th century, which considers the notion of contemptus mundi
as the book’s purpose and responds with an intriguing metaphor comparing the world and its
creator to a bridegroom and a wedding ring:

“It should be said [...] that this world is like a ring given by the bridegroom to the soul
itself. Now the bride can love the ring given her by her husband in two ways. […] The
love is chaste when she loves the ring as a memento of her husband and on account
of her love for her husband. The love is adulterous when the ring is loved more than
the husband, and the husband cannot regard such love as good [...] Contempt for a
ring by treating it as a poor and ugly gift reflects on the husband, but contempt of a
ring by regarding it as almost nothing compared to the love of a husband, gives glory
to the husband [...] It is of such contempt that we are speaking, and so the matter is
clear.”34

This qualification of Jerome’s point is a very crucial one and solves numerous
misunderstandings which scholars had concerning the translation of hebel as ‘vanity’,
although some of them have remained until modernity. Useful examples showing this are for
instance Russell L. Meek’s article or Fredericks’ commentary on Ecclesiastes, in which they
argue that Jerome translated hebel “according to the one connotation pertaining to value,”35
insinuating that he omitted all others which were inherent to the Hebrew term. Admittedly,
the onomatopoetic notion which both the Hebrew hebel and the Greek ἀτμός carry is not
upheld in the Latin, however Jerome makes a clearly visible effort to incorporate these into
his rendition, most obviously in his references to Exodus and 2 Corinthians. There is a key
difference between something being vain and something connoting the evaluative description
‘bad’, namely the one which Bonaventure highlights, i.e. the necessity that the nature of
creation reflects upon the nature of the creator. Elisabeth Birnbaum has very concisely
34
translation as in: C. Murray, R. J. Karris, Works of St. Bonaventure: Commentary on
Ecclesiastes [Franciscan Institute Publications, Saint Bonaventure 2005], p. 77-79
35
D. C. Fredericks, ‘Ecclesiastes’, in Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs, Apollos Old Testament
Commentary, eds. D.C. Fredericks and D.J. Estes [InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove 2010], p.
46, also in: R. L. Meek, ‘Twentieth- and Twenty-first-century Readings of Hebel in Ecclesiastes’,
Currents in Biblical Research, Vol. 14(3), [2016], pp. 279-97, here: p. 283
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Mansfield College

summarised Jerome’s point that “the reason for this vanity is transience.36” Jerome himself
expressed awareness of this seemingly existing problem in his letter to Pammachius in 394 CE
stating “If the earth is vanity, are the heavens vanity, too? […] No.”37

b) Martin Luther’s Perspective on Hebel

The second key figure, whom I shall consider in this extended essay due to his contributions
on the book of Ecclesiastes and the reading of hebel in particular is Martin Luther, who held
the position of professor of biblical interpretation at the University of Wittenberg from 1512
until his death, gaining particular prominence i.a. due to his decisive role in the German
reformation. From among his numerous contributions to theology, his work “Notes on
Ecclesiastes”, based on his lectures on this biblical book held between 30th July and 7th
November 1526, is relevant to this essay. The ‘notes’, essentially a transcript of this set of
lectures, contains a very short introduction and then comments on the individual verses of
the book, however offers no systematic conclusion or abstract thought about its contents
besides that which is evident from the statements made about particular verses. Hence such
overarching insights about Luther’s thought on hebel must be formulated in a derivating
manner.
Perhaps the most useful starting point for this section is Luther’s direct response to the
thought of St. Jerome, which has been discussed above. To enable oneself to spot the key
points of disagreement before considering Luther’s own treatment of the text, again a rather
lengthy, however comprehensive, quote from his introduction shall be given here:

“No less noxious for a proper understanding of this book has been the influence of
many of the saintly and illustrious theologians in the church, who thought that in this
book Solomon was teaching what they call ‘the contempt of the world’, that is, the
contempt of things that have been created and established by God. Among these is St.
Jerome, who by writing a commentary on this book urged Blesilla to accept the
monastic life. From this source there arose and spread over the entire church, like a
flood, that to be a Christian meant to forsake the household, the political order, even
the episcopal (or, rather, the apostolic) office, to flee to the desert, to isolate oneself
from human society, to live in stillness and silence; for it was impossible to serve God
in the world. As though Solomon were calling ‘vanity’ the very marriage, political office,
and office of the ministry of the Word which he praises here in such a wonderful way
and calls gifts of God! Although Solomon teaches that men themselves and their
counsels are vain, they reverse everything; and following their notions completely
contrary to Solomon, they call the things themselves vain, while they regard
themselves and their ideas as correct and solid.”38
36
in German: “Der Grund dieser Nichtigkeit ist die Vergänglichkeit.”, Birnbaum, Der
Koheletkommentar des Hieronymus, p. 492,
37
letter 49, translation as in: Christianson, Ecclesiastes through the Centuries, p. 101
38
translation as in: J. Pelikan, ‘Notes on Ecclesiastes’, in Luther’s Works (vol. 15), ed. J. Pelikan
[Concordia Publishing, Saint Louis 1972], p. 4
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Mansfield College

The key difference, which Luther presents, is the differentiation as to what is to be considered
as vain and what is not vain. He supposes that Jerome’s point on this matter is that vanity is a
category applicable to essentially everything that exists in the worldly sphere and responds
with a more anthropocentric perspective. When he first introduces the term ‘vanity of
vanities’, it must be noted that he is employing the same vocabulary here, he states that “men
are extremely vain in all their endeavours, because they are not content with the things that
are in the present; because they neither use these nor are able to enjoy the things that are in
the future, they turn even the best things to misery and vanity by their own fault and not by
that of the things themselves.”39 Essentially Luther argues that humanity’s inherent vanity is
a result of their condition in response to the circumstances of the worldly sphere.
Moreover, he argues a case which is only in part appropriate in response to the church’s
previous thought on hebel. In reiterating earlier criticisms that Jerome’s thought suggested
the contempt of those things which were part of God’s good creation, a charge he himself had
refuted in his letter 49, Luther to some extent misses the trajectory of the argument, although
Jerome’s role with regard to monasticism could lead one to think otherwise at first glance. His
focus on the state of humanity rather than the state of things is an incorrect yet not
unexpected one, as his reading of the characterisations as hebel in Ecclesiastes pertains to
aspects of the human condition rather than the general nature of things, at least insofar as
their ‘vanity’ is influenced by one’s responses rather than the circumstances themselves. This
is also concurrent with the environment in which Luther places the larger Sitz im Leben of
Ecclesiastes. Katharine Dell has rightly noted that Luther’s approach distinctly varies from that
of his predecessors, for the purposes of this essay most noteworthily Jerome. For Luther, the
addresses of the Preacher are not removed from his worldly life or reflecting of the transience
of his once imparted wisdom, but a proclamation made in the environment of his royal court,
thus very much within the circumstances of worldly existence and not removed from them.40
Thus he does not follow the idea of monasticism as an appropriate response to the hebel-ness
of things but supposes the condition as something which was inflicted onto humanity by itself.

Luther’s concept of self-inflicted vanity has to be understood as, in a way, self-serving in his
larger intellectual system. In his own time, he embodied the developments of the renaissance
with its emphasis on humanism emphasising the human as the focal point of consideration
and the role of humanity itself as an active cognitive agent rather than a passive object of
external circumstances. Hence the shift from monasticism to an urge for a reflection of human
vanity neatly corresponded with the fashionable thought of the time.41 However this approach
is problematic because it asserts an activity in that which is hebel. The problems of this
argument arise at those instances in the commentary in which no active role on the part of
humanity can be taken as a justification for the ‘vanity’ of the result, as for instance in his
remarks on Eccl 8:14, in which Luther fails to systematically respond to the problem of the
39
ibid. p. 13
40
cf. K. Dell, ‘Ecclesiastes as Wisdom: Consulting Early Interpreters’, Vetus Testamentum
44(3), [1994], pp. 301-29, here: p. 324
41
cf. E. Cameron, Early Modern Europe: An Oxford History [Oxford University Press, Oxford
2001], p. 88
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Mansfield College

righteous being treated according to the conduct of the wicked and vice versa and provides
little further explanation than that this is the problematic state of the world,42 or in Eccl 2:15,
in which he suddenly presents the result of wise or foolish dealing in a deterministic sense, as
influenced by one’s role as given by God, however maintaining the response to it resulting in
human vanity.43
The arising problem is to bring into line whether hebel results from the circumstances of
existence or is based on conscious decisions in which humans act vainly, as he asserts in his
commentary on Eccl 1:2, to which I referred previously, or in the one on Eccl 4:8 when the
emphasis of the toil without enjoyment of pleasures is related to humans’ attitude rather than
the role of toil and enjoyment as two different aspects of life.44 The problem here extends to
the internal cogency of Luther’s argument; with regard to his conclusion to reject Jerome’s
reading, the difficulty arises that it is hard to maintain that the rejection of one’s interest in
worldly things is wrong when the hebel-ness is exclusively a matter of the human condition
rather than a reflection about the circumstances affecting life. If human vanity was guided by
an unreasonable understanding of things, i.e. not appreciating them, it is hard to argue that
the things themselves must have been inherently good, as otherwise their goodness would
have been evident. Also, if this vanity was universal, the extent of humanity’s
misapprehension of things is vast, as the contempt of them, as Luther argues, pertains not to
some specific instances but to many, if not all. The difficulty lies in the dichotomy of content
and misery, which are the categories Luther applies with regard to human responses to things.
As those qualify the responses in positive or negative terms respectively, it is problematic to
align them with hebel, on the grounds that, as it has previously been noted, hebel carries no
connotations pertaining to value and interpretations arguing otherwise are unfaithful to the
Hebrew meaning of this motif. Therefore asserting determinism and man’s attitude to things
as the key perspectives on hebel causes much difficulty to maintain that Luther’s responses
were guided by exegetical observations rather than his own agenda.

c) Modern Readings of Hebel

After the discussion of those two important figures as to the reception history of the motif
hebel in Ecclesiastes, it is now necessary to incorporate the findings gained from them into
the larger intellectual range of the topic at hand.
In order to do so, I shall return to the exegetical strands to which I had previously alluded. The
first insight gained was the semantic emphasis on the notions of ‘transience’ and ‘fleetingness’
expressed in the Hebrew term hebel, which was evident from both Semitic cognates and the
wider usage of it in the Old Testament. It has become very clearly evident that this notion was
only very scarcely made use of at least with regard to the choice of vocabulary in subsequent
translations, most noteworthily the Septuagint and the Vulgate, however not the other early
Greek translations. Jerome, despite his role in asceticism, made significant reference to this,
as is evident from his comparative readings with other biblical passages, emphasising that
things are hebel compared to God, not as an intrinsic quality of themselves, thereby
42
cf. Luther, as in: Pelikan, Notes on Ecclesiastes, pp. 141-142
43
cf. ibid., pp. 41-42
44
cf. ibid., pp. 67-68
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Mansfield College

attributing to ‘vanitas’ a different meaning from its lexical one, which reads as “emptiness,
untruthfulness, futility”.45 His perspective of relating the transience of things to the eternity
of qualities pertaining to the nature of the divine is helpful, as it appropriately represents the
role of God in the book of Ecclesiastes. For instance, Eccl 5:2 establishes that “God is in heaven,
and you upon earth”, asserting not only a local but also an ontological and epistemological
separation between human and divine. As this God, like in the vast majority of wisdom
literature, remains transcendent and does not provide insights into his perspective on worldly
matters, the divine remains obscure and the world cannot be comprehended further than by
asserting that its intrinsic matters are only known to the divine. Humanity thus cannot proceed
further than to observe, which indeed leads them to the observation that no worldly thing is
eternal. The repeated formula that Qoheleth’s thought was a consideration of things “under
the sun”46 and regularly regarded activities as “striving after wind”47 relates to this, as those
formulae accentuate in which way their hebel-ness is to be understood as well as where they
need to be located.

With regard to modern scholarship, three options as to an appropriate representation of the
meaning of hebel shall be considered here. Those have been presented by Michael V. Fox, and
Stuart Weeks, the former of which has been briefly alluded to previously.
The term chosen by Michael V. Fox to represent hebel is ‘absurd’ or ‘absurdity’, which he
defines in the following terms: “The quality of absurdity does not inhere in a being, act, or
event in and of itself […] but rather in the tension between a certain reality and a framework
of expectations.”48 Fox rejects an overly literal reading of hebel as ‘vapour’, as it does not
entail a category which can apply to all attestations of the text while the Hebrew term is used
for the purpose of a metaphorical interpretation in a sense beyond the literal one. He rather
highlights the frustration which is expressed throughout the book, which is based on the
inequity becoming evident in Qoheleth’s observation. A helpful example which he considers
central to the text is again Eccl 8:14. The discrepancy between actions and their consequences
is indeed a central problem of wisdom literature, it obviously is vastly more voluminously
exerted in the book of Job. With regard to Ecclesiastes, Fox’s considerations rest not on the
circumstances which this problem relates to but how they are to be read with regard to
responses to them. He rejects the qualification of this example as ‘nothing’ or ‘vain’, as the
reality itself is quite substantive, which would either be marginalised or trivialised if
represented by either of these terms.49 Instead he supposes the situation to be “contrary to
reason”50, thus absurd, rather than incomprehensible. However, Qoheleth postulates a
scheme of things which indeed is beyond reason, as he proclaims that “[God] has made
45
The Oxford Latin Dictionary, entry on: ’vanitas’, online website (last access: 24.02.2018,
15:42)
46
a formula occurring 26 times
47
a formula occurring 8 times (1:14,17, 2:11,17,26, 4:4,6,16, 6:9)
48
M. V. Fox, ‘The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet’, Journal of Biblical Literature, 105(3) [1986],
p. 409
49
cf. ibid, p. 412
50
ibid, p. 413
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Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

everything suitable for its time, moreover he has put a sense of past and future in [humans’]
minds, yet they cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end.” The
tension arises that comprehension is indeed an impossibility which Qoheleth considers
frustrating, however it is evident that there is an order of things beyond understanding,
therefore rendering human concepts of reason at least incomplete, if not unsuitable to fathom
the circumstances of realities, making their expectations by definition fallible. Stuart Weeks
articulates the discrepancy between what the text conveys and what Fox interprets as “not
[…] the failure of an absurd world to meet reasonable human expectations, but about the
failure of human expectations to comprehend the realities of the world.”51
In a way, Fox assumes Qoheleth to have a worldview very similar to the paradigmatic wisdom
thought of Proverbs, affirming the doctrine of retribution. By emphasising rationality and the
decisive role of an action’s outcome rather than its performance,52 he supposes wisdom to
provide humanity a generally consistent system, whose application however only leads to the
frustrating realisation that is inappropriate. There is indeed another system actually inherent
in the book of Ecclesiastes itself, which quite ably allows one to bring the book’s observations
together without the need to introduce external ideas such as reason or a general correlation
between actions and their consequences,53 namely the general transience of things.
Though Fox attempts to relate all attestations of hebel to perceived absurdity, it is quite
evident that this is neither linguistically nor contentually warranted. As section I. of this essay
has shown, there is no justification whatsoever to translate hebel as “absurdity”. Indeed none
of the Semitic cognates or other biblical attestations show any relation of this Hebrew term
to emotional or intellectual capacities; even in English or another translation the correlation
between ‘breath’ and a person’s frustration over the disparity of action and result cannot be
consistently supported. It appears as though Fox superimposed this reading onto the book of
Ecclesiastes, although his assumption is not applicable to all attestations of the motif, as I
demonstrated above, and also often developed his argument from the assertion of supposed
underlying intellectual principles such as reason rather than from the literal arguments of the
text itself.
Further one ought to note Mark Sneed’s recent article in response to Fox, in which he
particularly emphasises incongruences between the reading of hebel as ‘absurd’ and other
writings with similar intellectual trajectories, suggesting that Fox’s thesis is, besides its
shortcomings which I highlighted above, also intellectually anachronistic to the thought of the
time in which the book of Ecclesiastes was written.54

A perhaps more nuanced perspective is offered by Stuart Weeks, who, whilst rejecting Fox’s
views on hebel, suggests to retain ‘vanity’ as the best representation of the term, however
clearly rejecting the modern connotations of this English word. As opposed to the previously
51
Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, p. 113
52
cf. Fox, The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet, p. 425
53
for a further discussion of this system, cf. K. Koch, ‘Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten
Testament?’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 52 [1955], pp. 1-42, introducing the term
‘Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang’
54
cf. M. Sneed, ‘(‫ ) ֶ֫הבֶל‬as “Worthless” in Qoheleth: A Critique of Michael V. Fox’s “Absurd”
Thesis’, Journal of Biblical Literature, 136(4) [2017], pp. 879-894, here: pp. 883-889
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Mansfield College

discussed perspectives, Weeks characterises hebel as “something which humans may both
encounter and produce”55, as opposed to an exclusively external state of things to which
humans are subjected, as in Jerome as well as Michael Fox, or solely an aspect of the human
condition, as Luther maintained. He correctly asserts that there is a variety of meanings to the
motif and that to translate it using a number of terms would undermine the scope and the
semantic implications of the thematic statement that ‘everything is hebel’.56 Rather he
suggests, using almost Trinitarian language, that the term’s intellectual range extends to it
being “simultaneously misleading, insubstantial and ineffective, [yet these being] not distinct
qualities, but different ways of regarding hebel’s basic nature, and the ways of interacting with
it.”57 This is exemplified in the observations which closely follow each other in Eccl 2:21 and
2:23 in which both the external necessity of having to leave the result of one’s work to another
and the implication of work being a vexation for the one who toils are juxtaposed.
This relation is important as it re-emphasises the universality of that which is characterised as
hebel, as opposed to only a limited number of things being qualified as such, which is also
stylistically manifest in the text, as I previously indicated in my reference to John Jarick’s
article.
This universality is evident because hebel exists in both ontological and epistemological terms.
It is particularly clear with regard to concepts of time. Although not all instances in the book
of Ecclesiastes are explicitly narrated in such terms, they all relate to elements related to it,
namely life and death, expectations of a correlation between present and future, and most
clearly the programmatic poem of time in chapter 3. The literary genre helps to elucidate the
matter at hand. As Qoheleth presents his case in a narrative, which features general assertions
as well as first-person accounts and second-person admonitions, he distinctly links the
relationship of his personal insights, which by necessity carry experiential connotations with
abstract considerations about the nature of the hebel he encounters.

The key question which results from this observation is whether the narrative account of a
perceived hebel is a substantial part of it or whether it is but a tool used to express the general
exposition of this motif in a form allowing for it to be treated as authoritative. Here the role
of pseudepigraphy features in an important way. As has been pointed out in the discussion
of early reception history, the Solomonic authorship of the book of Ecclesiastes was widely
agreed on and only rather recently has ceased in academic discourse. Scholarship often
assumes that the attribution to Solomon, besides the more traditional statements about the
divine in the subsequently added appendix, which earlier exegetes did not consider as a
separate section, are the main reasons for Ecclesiastes to be included in the canon, which
probably would not have been the case if the book had not had this genre. With regard to the
hebel-motif the importance of the human perspective on it to some extent blurs its proper
meaning. Although there is great value to Weeks’ argument, I shall contend that the
circumstance of hebel takes precedence over humans producing it themselves.

55
56
cf. ibid. p. 118f.
57
ibid. p. 119
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Mansfield College

III. The Meaning and Theological Significance of Hebel

The programmatic statement “everything is hebel” in itself describes a condition rather than
an activity. Almost all attestations of it occur as a pre- or suffix to the description of a situation,
that is as the conclusion which can be derived from it. The absence of a verbal form expressing
the verb ‘to be’ in these Hebrew phrases allows one to interpret ‫ זֶה ֶ֫הבֶל‬in a sense beyond the
literal characterisation of things as “this is hebel”. In that regard it is necessary to note that
the common translations of Qoheleth’s statements into English are misleading, as the
insertion of a form of the verb ‘to be’ suggests that there is an inherent qualitative relationship
between the observation and the characterisation, i.e. that what is observed necessarily has
to be hebel. In many instances in which a form of ‘to be’ is inserted into a verbless clause, it is
best to argue that it functions as being but semantically empty. In his work ‘Introduction to
Theoretical Linguistics’ John Lyons argues that a form of ‘to be’ “is not itself a constituent of
deep structure, but a semantically empty ‘dummy verb’ [used] for the specification of certain
distinctions.”58 This allows the translator of ‫ זֶה ֶ֫הבֶל‬phrases a liberty to understand the
proclamations made in them in a wider semantic range than just the common meaning of ‘to
be’ as ‘occurrence’, ‘existence’ or ‘being’.59 Hence it can be argued that something observed
by Qoheleth and supplemented by the conclusion ‫ זֶה ֶ֫הבֶל‬certainly indicates hebel-ness but
does not need to be hebel itself.
I shall demonstrate this in my exposition that hebel ought best be translated as ‘transience’.
This English term is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “passing by or away with time,
not durable or permanent, brief, momentary, fleeting”.60

An argument which is regularly made in support of the traditional translation of hebel as
‘vanity’ is that only this term could represent the meaning of the Hebrew term in all
circumstances in which it is employed. Generally, all approaches, as I have demonstrated in
my considerations of a number of perspectives on hebel, must be measured by the standard
of not only being able to abstractly explain the proper meaning of the term but also be
applicable in all attestations of it in the book of Ecclesiastes. Therefore it is necessary to apply
the proposed reading of hebel as ‘transience’ to all attestations in the book and justify how it
is appropriate to read the motif in this way. Given the quantitative restrictions of this essay, I
shall exemplarily consider four pericopes, including some which appear most problematic at
first glance.

58
J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics [Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
1968], p. 322-323
59
cf. C. Sinclair, ‘Are Nominal Clauses a Distinct Clausal Type?’; in Verbless Clause in Biblical
Hebrew: Linguistic Approaches, ed. C. L. Miller [Eisenbrauns, Winona Lake 1999], pp. 51-75,
here: p. 54
60
The Oxford English Dictionary, entry on ‘transient’, online website (last access: 24.02.2018,
16:35)
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Mansfield College

While the initial proclamation that all is hebel in 1:2 taken for itself remains inconclusive, it is
necessary to exemplify how everything is hebel, nevertheless the thematic statement allows
one to establish the extent of the motif.
The first pericope61 in which hebel-ness is exemplified is 1:12-15. In it, Qoheleth discusses the
work of humankind and them being busy with it. Particularly noteworthy is the assertion that
humans have no influence on the circumstances they encounter, neither by being able to
change the situation nor by adding value to their work. Therefore human work must
necessarily be like “a chasing after wind” (1:14), as one can neither expect nor ascertain the
result of it. Hence, as the further elaboration of the book will explicate, it is subject to decay
in itself and is also not something remaining of value for the worker until eternity, and is thus
transient. The transience becomes even clearer if one considers that this passage intertexts
with Gen 3:19, in which, as divine punishment subsequent to the fall of humanity, toil and
eventual death are juxtaposed, indicating the temporal limitations of human life as well as the
need for them to engage in hard work regardless.
Another enlightening pericope is Eccl 4:17-5:6, designated 5:1-7 in the English translation,
which discusses the transience of human words. In it, Ecclesiastes’ theology becomes evident,
which calls for reverence and humility towards God. Verse 6, i.e. verse 7 in the translation, is
one of the few exceptions in which a hebel statement is not added to an observation as an
apposition but is syntactically included into a main clause indicating a causal relationship. This
verse depicts hebel as the result of dreams and many words; the latter of these is
characterised as foolish in verse 3, and is contrasted with fear of God. On a more abstract
level, the distinction is drawn between those thoughts and activities pertaining to human life
and thought and those relating to the divine. As the deity is generally understood as
transcendent and beyond comprehension (cf. 3:11), the implication for this pericope is that
words and dreams, and by extension all ways of addressing the divine, i.a. vows or sacrifices,
are inefficacious, as their effects do not exceed the immediate realm of the sound of the vow
or the odour of the sacrifice, as likewise dreams are immaterial. Hence their ramifications are
limited to them occurring without hope for any response on the part of the divine, which leads
Qoheleth to suggest to rather listen in reverent silence, as all things which humans could
possibly do, do not lead to necessary consequences, leaving them to be transient.
Perhaps the most overarching aspect of the hebel-ness as set out in the book of Ecclesiastes
is the discrepancy of human expectations and the realities of the world. Qoheleth presents it
regularly throughout the book, perhaps most interestingly in 8:14-15. Here two typical
features of wisdom literature, an observation and an admonition, are juxtaposed in a way that
has sparked widespread debate as to the overall meaning and purpose of the book as a whole.
Qoheleth first presents a situation which appears to be a blatant contradiction of the doctrine
of retribution and thus worthy of being characterised as hebel. However the following verse,
in which he commends enjoyment, shows that the contradiction of v. 14 is not the key aspect
of the pericope. Rather this commendation shows that the desired response to the situation
is not an intellectual grappling with it but the insight that it is incomprehensible and that
undesired things cannot be avoided and instead should be alleviated by joy whenever
possible. Hence the overall situation ought not be seen as something frustrating or vain, as
61
here I refer to pericopes according to the distinctions within the book as suggested by D.
Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes, pp. 181-185
18
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

such evaluations insinuate a qualitative judgement, but as a dynamic unpredictable set of
changing, thus transient, circumstances, especially given that this seeming injustice is not
professed to be a necessity, on which humans have no influence and should respond in an
equanimous way. Here my linguistic observation about ‫ זֶה ֶ֫הבֶל‬statements is relevant, as the
context of this passage indicates that not the subject of the observation itself is transient but
that this circumstance signifies the general transience of affairs,62 within which the given
situation is but one example within the overall state of things.

The last pericope, to which I shall draw particular attention is Eccl 12:1-8, which is the
concluding poem of the book and the last part of the presented argument proper. This highly
metaphorical passage contains numerous symbolic descriptions of decay at old age, often in
an enigmatic way, leaving the interpreter puzzled as to the meaning of many of the images.63
Although Qoheleth had previously asserted that the future outcome of events cannot be
anticipated by human comprehension, this passage however highlights a necessity, namely
humans being subject to deterioration and eventual death. He makes this argument, as
opposed to elsewhere in the book, not in relation to practical matters whose transience is
evident from the circumstance that their results can only affect one temporarily, but as an
overarching statement about the human condition. The reference to God as the creator is
interesting, as Qoheleth, in the tradition of wisdom thought, has a distinct theology which
avoids all thought about the deity expressed in terms that indicate continuity beyond the span
of a human life, such as covenant, law, nation or history. In his thought creation theology
remains the only central traditional theological category which he incorporates into his
thought and is decisive to understand the meaning of hebel. Creation theology in Ecclesiastes
is central because of its implications on ontology, as it depicts the creator, God, as the
transcendent other to whom humans have no access in any form but are the passive object
of his work. Therefore factors such as life and death, or indeed anything which either of them
entails, are beyond human control and cannot be articulated in systematic coherent schemes.
In the period in which the book of Ecclesiastes was approximately written, i.e. the middle of
the third century BCE, thought about death as expressed in Israelite writings underwent
decisive change, as is evident from the roughly contemporary Isa 25-26 or the slightly later
Daniel 12, which are the first to express concepts of afterlife. Although Ecclesiastes does not
follow this development and he clearly argues for death to be the end of existence because of
which all activities have no lasting benefit, he stands very much in contrast with the vast
majority of other books of the Hebrew Bible, as he has no notion of deserved inheritance but
rather believes the fact that a generation will profit from the work of its ancestors to be “a
great evil” (3:21). Therefore the role of death and decay is crucial because it depicts the
transience not only of things in human life but also of life itself. In the individualistic frame of
Qoheleth’s thought the necessity of death thus is the only certainty in life which affects all
62
cf. the programmatic statement (1:2, 12:8), which asserts general, not specific, hebel-ness
63
cf. also J. Sawyer, ‘The Ruined House in Ecclesiastes 12: A Reconstruction of the Original
Parable’, Journal of Biblical Literature, 94 [1975], pp. 519-31, for an alternative reading
suggesting the pericope to more literally refer to an estate falling into ruin, which would allow
the reader to further see the transience expressed in it with regard to worldly matters as well
19
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

aspects of it and, in the light of its inevitability, no other alternative remains other than to
keep in mind the origin of this transience, i.e. the creator.

All these pericopes indicate that it is indeed most appropriate to represent hebel as
‘transience’ in English translations. This is the case because the essence of the hebel
statements in the book of Ecclesiastes is that all external circumstances ‘under the sun’,
especially insofar as they affect human lives and decisions, are utterly unpredictable and the
result of a puzzling and transcendent God whose work cannot be anticipated, most
importantly because nothing can be expected to be lasting. Hence human expectations of
things prove to be incapable of comprehending such matters and, on the one hand, lead to
views and attitudes based on supposedly appropriate worldviews, such as the expectation of
a correlation between actions and their consequences, which, if these attempts prove futile
appear to be frustrating, and, on the other hand, leave humanity in a state of uncertainty due
to such ignorance. The quality, worth or profit of such things is only secondary to this overall
reality, leaving ‘vanity’ to be a perceived aspect of the overall condition, however not its
essence. As quality, worth and profit, all of which appear in the definition of the term ‘vanity’
in the Oxford English Dictionary,64 require to be part of an intellectual system which humans
apply to things, they cannot be indicative of the proper meaning of hebel, as the properties
and purposes of all things are established by the divine, while humans are ignorant of it. The
exhortation to enjoy oneself is particularly indicative of it, as it calls for equanimity in the light
of humanity’s passive role in the world. If everything was vanity, such a response would be
very inappropriate, as indifference about such a universal matter which carried a clearly
negative connotation would be inappropriate.
It is helpful to distinguish that the essence of hebel is transience, it is perceived however as
vanity. A consideration of all hebel statements in the book shows that the instances in which
the observation closes with only the ‫ זֶה ֶ֫הבֶל‬statement ponder a circumstance while those in
which they are supplemented by the phrase “and a chasing after wind” reflect on an activity.
As there is an apparent necessity to further specify those passages in which activities are
discussed, this indicates that no activity, thought or evaluation for itself can be the essence of
hebel, but only the circumstance which is pondered upon. These ‫ זֶה ֶ֫הבֶל‬phrases are thus better
translated as “this [signifies] transience and is a chasing after wind”. Besides the argument
that ‘transience’ best represents the content of the book of Ecclesiastes it has the further
benefit that it directly relates to the metaphor in the original Hebrew. Although the
onomatopoeia linking hebel to the insubstantiality and fleetingness of breath or vapour
cannot be mimicked in English, its semantic trajectory is retained without adding substantial
other dimensions of meaning, as is the case with all other suggested translations, which
superimpose an interpretative dimension onto the term which is not inherent in the word
itself.
64
cf. The Oxford English Dictionary, entry on ‘vanity’, online website (last access: 24.02.2018,
16:57)
20
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

IV. Conclusion

Based on the previous discussion in this extended essay, the following conclusions can be
drawn. This essay has delineated the linguistic representations of the word hebel, both in its
usage in the Hebrew Bible, in the original Hebrew as well as in translation, and cognates in
other Semitic languages, as well as perspectives on it throughout the history of interpretation.
Each of these considerations contribute elements which result in the final argument that it is
most appropriate to represent the motif by the English term ‘transience’.
With regard to the linguistic considerations of section I. of this essay, the central insight is the
onomatopoetic value of the term hebel and its original meaning in the semantic range of
‘breath’ or ‘vapour’, elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible also ‘ephemerality’ or ‘dissipation’. For
much of the reception of the book of Ecclesiastes it is central to note that the most commonly
adopted translation into Greek, ματαιότης, which is used in the LXX, disagrees with all three
other traditional Greek translations, i.e. Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion, indicating that
those interpretations which predominantly consulted the Septuagint must be treated with
caution in exegetical endeavours, hence also those interpretations preferring the Latin vanitas
or its English derivative ‘vanity’, which is, at least with regard to its usage in translations of
Ecclesiastes, more closely influenced by the Greek than the Hebrew.
The value of the earliest Christian interpreters, of whom I chose to discuss Jerome’s
commentary as the earliest surviving and arguably most influential work, is, despite the
differences from modernity in method and purpose, the helpful approach to read Ecclesiastes
in the context of the overall circumstance of transience under the sun and the perspective of
epistemological scepticism. These two concepts, especially given that Jerome’s interpretation
of vanitas varies from the literal meaning of the word with regard to the notion of value which
is not of relevance for him, are fundamental and indicate the key categories based on which
Ecclesiastes ought to be interpreted. If his thought is abstracted and read with a distinction
between his overall intellectual points on the one hand and his interpretative style and
practical conclusions, both of which are rather rooted in the predispositions of his time and
faith, he offers an outset for a proper understanding of hebel.
Martin Luther, also writing as a man of his time with his own perspectives, is of less use when
it comes to immediately applying his thought to a proper reading of Ecclesiastes’ Leitmotif.
Rather Luther displays the most common misunderstanding of the book of Ecclesiastes by
applying it solely to the human condition due to the humanist agenda of his thought.
Modern scholarship, of which I exemplarily discussed the approaches of Michael V. Fox and
Stuart Weeks, helps to support the overarching aspects of the motif, which originated in its
earlier reception history, with methods and insights of modern higher biblical criticism.
Enabling one to remove the predispositions of earlier thought, Fox’s suggestion of ‘absurdity’
as a helpful translation of hebel, and indeed my criticism of it, display the impossibility to read
the motif hebel based on human systems of thought, as the impossibility to comprehend the
worldly realities in such schemes, most notably reason or ideas pertaining to reward and
punishment, becomes evident from the problems one encounters when attempting to
systematise the observations made in the book of Ecclesiastes. If one makes the necessary
additional intellectual step from Fox’s thought and argues that the circumstances of the world
in Ecclesiastes are not contrary to reason but beyond it, a clearer understanding of humanity’s
intellectual limit becomes evident, as frustration because of the limits of comprehension is
21
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

attested in Ecclesiastes (1:13), however rather a response than the essence of the
circumstance itself.
Subsequently, Stuart Weeks’ argument that hebel is something “which humans may both
encounter and produce”65 helps to think of it less in dichotomous terms but rather to see that
also a human activity can be indicative of an overall hebel-ness, insofar as the transient state
of things and humanity’s inability to understand it leads to humans “striving after wind”, thus
making their actions indicative of the transience of that which they encounter and toil with.
Especially the notion of the universality of hebel is important, both expressed in ontology and
epistemology, i.e. that relation of the transience of things and the limits of knowledge in
reciprocity, sets the frame of the motif, particularly highlighted in the opening and closing
proclamation of the book (1:2, 12:8).
All these lead to and feed into my argument that it is indeed best to understand hebel as
signifying transience, which shows itself, among other things, in the uncertainty of the result
of one’s work and words, the unpredictability of the actions of an unknowable transcendent
God, the call for enjoyment whenever possible in the light of the unpredictability of the future
and the prospect of death as the only certainty in an individualistic world, and, just like the
metaphor in Hebrew suggests, indicating that no thing nor activity is of more lasting
significance than breath or vapour.
Thus it is to be concluded that, based on the insights gained from this essay, the translator
and interpreter of the book of Ecclesiastes ought to let the speaker proclaim:

“Transience of transiences, says Qoheleth, transience of transiences! All is transience!”

65
22
Moritz F. Adam
Mansfield College

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Mansfield College

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Meek, R. L.
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linguistic background, intellectual range and theological significance of the Leitmotif

“Vanity of vanities, says the Teacher, vanity of vanities! All is vanity.”

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