Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Report Part Title: The Origin of R2P

Report Title: Stronger or more controversial than claimed?

Report Subtitle: Ten Years of Diplomatic Controversy About Responsibility to Protect Report Author (s): Gregor P.
Hofmann
Published by: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2014) Stable URL:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14377.5

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4th Gregor P. Hofmann

associated expectations of action must not be neglected. Different actors use their own cultural background
knowledge - national and regional social norms and practices, values, ideas of justice - to assess the legitimacy
of a norm (Acharya 2004; Wiener 2008; Müller 2013). Since controversy is a discursive phenomenon, the
controversy of a standard can primarily be examined through debates about the standard and its application.
There are different forms of the dispute (based on Wiener 2008; Deitelhoff 2013; Deitelhoff / Zimmermann 2013):

Is the Applicability of a norm controversial, it can be expected that the standard will be questioned by a critical
number of states. A critical mass is considered to be a third of the international community, including influential
actors - major powers, emerging powers or important regional organizations (Finnemore / Sikkink 1998: 901-902;
Deitelhoff 2013: 21). Is the Meaning of a norm or their interpretation is controversial, it can be expected that
different states, including influential actors, will present different interpretations of their content. However, there is
a dispute over the Applicability and the scope of a standard is controversial whether a standard is applicable to a
specific situation and whether there is a rule violation at all. Last but not least, that too Implementation of a norm lead
to clashes. This happens when there are different opinions about the “correct” application of a standard in a
particular situation, for example to what extent the means used to sanction a rule violation were appropriate.

The last two types of disputes can lead to a specification of a standard or the instruments that can be used to
enforce it and thus even strengthen the standard (Badescu / Weiss 2010; Deitelhoff / Zimmermann 2013).
Disputes about the importance of the norm can also lead to its strengthening if it leads to a shared interpretation
of the norm among the actors (Wiener 2008). Only "when the dispute becomes radicalized, that is, from the
application to the core of the normative obligation and / or limited in time, does the validity of the norm erode
visibly" (Deitelhoff 2013: 19).

In the following section, I first deal with the development process of the R2P, since the later conflicts emerged
from the start. In the further course I orient myself on the indicators of the recognition and controversy of norms
presented here in order to examine the complex development of the R2P and its components.

3. The emergence of R2P

The Responsibility to Protect is part of a global informal protection regime that began to develop in the early
1990s. From the lessons and failures of the blue helmet operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, the practice
developed as early as 1999, peacekeeping missions of the United Nations (UN) also with the protection of

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Stronger or more controversial than claimed in the dispute? 5

To commission civilians in armed conflicts (see, for example: Peou 2002). 4th
At the same time, the debate on humanitarian interventions and the NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict that
was not mandated by the UN led to the emergence of the bundle of norms of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
(see the development of the concept: Brock 2013; Loges 2013). The debate at the time was determined by a
tension between state rights to sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs on the one hand and
international humanitarian law and human rights on the other: Can people also be protected in a domestic conflict
and possibly against the will of the current government? What is happening, if the Security Council cannot agree
on activation of the collective security system? For many developing and emerging countries, the
non-intervention norm in the debate is a moral imperative and not just a legal inconvenience that can be
overridden by the West at will (Thakur 2006: 279). They see their claim to self-determination and equality in
contrast to the colonial past at risk from demands for the legal and moral admissibility of humanitarian
interventions (Thakur 2006: 266).

Canada set up an expert group as a result of NATO's controversial Kosovo intervention and a sovereignty
debate launched by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. These International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty
(ICISS) should bring together the different perspectives on sovereignty and human rights protection. In 2000 and
2001 she developed the concept of
Responsibility to protect. The ICISS final report of the same name identified three interlinked governmental and
international responsibilities with regard to the protection of the civilian population from atrocities - for prevention,
response and reconstruction (ICISS 2001: XI). He formulated a commitment by the international community to
intervene in cases of mass murder when a state cannot or does not want to protect its people. The ICISS report
also identified a number of criteria that should guide the use of violence. The debate should thus move away from
a right to humanitarian intervention and focus more on a duty to prevent atrocities associated with the right to
sovereignty. Sovereignty rights should not be restricted, rather the states should be encouraged to 5

4th The principle of non-interference is the starting point of the UN's collective security system. Poses
however, if the Security Council identifies a threat to international peace or security in accordance with Article 39 of the
UN Charter, it can adopt preventive measures, economic coercive measures or the use of air, sea or land forces under
Chapter VII of the Charter. While blue helmets often used to deal with Chapter VI and were therefore not allowed to
influence domestic affairs, many UN missions now have Chapter VII mandates: only with such a mandate can they fulfill
their surveillance function and protect civilians from violence .

5 At the same time as the ICISS process, a more far-reaching development was already taking place in Africa:
African Union (AU) had already included the AU's right to intervene in the founding file adopted in 2000 in the face of
serious atrocities (Dembinski / Reinold 2011: 8-10).

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6 Gregor P. Hofmann

However, the anti-terrorist struggle that followed on September 11, 2001 and the war on Iraq that violated
international law in 2003 had negative consequences for the reception of the ICISS report by those who see
liberal and humanitarian norms as the back door for interventionism by the major powers. Kofi Annan used this
deadlocked situation for a reform initiative. A summit of heads of state and government for the implementation of
the Millennium Development Goals from 2000 had already been scheduled for 2005. Annan has now
supplemented the agenda of this summit with the topic of UN reform and thus also with peace and security
issues. One that he installed in September 2003 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change ( HLP) on
challenges for international security supported “the emerging norm, according to which there is a collective
international responsibility for protection” (High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change 2004: §202). 6 Kofi
Annan took almost all of the panel's recommendations in his report published in March 2005 In larger freedom in
preparation for the World Summit on (Annan 2005).

Ultimately, after intensive debates (see Hofmann / Wisotzki 2014; Bellamy 2009: 66-91), the R2P became part
of the summit final document (resolution 60/1: §138-139). Many states defended their right to equal sovereignty
under the non-interference norm and raised concerns about the potential for abuse of an R2P. The compromise
found leaves responsibility primarily with the individual state, limits the scope to genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity and binds international interference in extreme cases to a decision of the
Security Council (resolution 60/1: § 138-140).

With the decision on the R2P, the informal humanitarian protection regime was specified by those standards that UN Secretary-General Ban

Ki-Moon later described as the three pillars of the R2P (Ban Ki-Moon 2009). As a resolution of the General Assembly, it was not a question of new

international norms, but rather a formulation of moral norms. The R2P is therefore a bundle of behavioral expectations directed towards states. First, it

includes the responsibility standard, the expectation of the individual state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity

and ethnic cleansing (pillar 1). This can be seen as a norm in the international legal sense, since there is a universally recognized international

convention with the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions and a contractual international legal basis with the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court. Second, the R2P includes the support standard, an expectation of the international community to support the state on

request in fulfilling the expectation addressed to it (2nd pillar). Thirdly, it includes the reaction standard, i.e. an expectation of the international

community to react promptly and decisively in the event of a government's failure or unwillingness (pillar 3). With the support of the Special Adviser on

Genocide Prevention, the UN's early warning function is also recognized. an expectation of the international community to support the state upon

request in fulfilling its expectations (2nd pillar). Thirdly, it includes the reaction standard, i.e. an expectation of the international community to react

promptly and decisively in the event of a government's failure or unwillingness (pillar 3). With the support of the Special Adviser on Genocide

Prevention, the UN's early warning function is also recognized. an expectation of the international community to support the state upon request in

fulfilling its expectations (2nd pillar). Thirdly, it includes the reaction standard, i.e. an expectation of the international community to react promptly and

decisively in the event of a government's failure or unwillingness (3rd pillar). With the support of the Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention, the UN's

early warning function is also recognized.

6 With Gareth Evans, one of the HLP members came from the ranks of ICISS members. Also
Canada - ultimately successful - tried to convince the entire group of experts to include the R2P in their recommendations
(Bellamy 2009: 75f).

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