Burns V Taurus Brief of Appellants

Case: 19-6383 Document: 19 Filed: 01/21/2020 Page: 1
Case No. 19-6383
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA BURNS, as Surviving Parent of Paula Smith, Deceased, and

Also as Representative of the Heirs, Minor Children and Estate of
Paula Smith, Deceased, and/or For the Use and Benefit of the Heirs,
Minor Children of Paula Smith, Deceased; DELONDRE HARRIS,
Individually and as Surviving Father/Representative of Minor Children
of Paula Smith, Deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
TAURUS INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING, INC.; TAURUS

HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr. Richard D. Underwood

John F. Weeks IV Patrick G. Walker
Benjamin E. Reed FARRIS BOBANGO BRANAN PLC
SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP 999 S. Shady Grove Rd, Suite 500
Suite 3100, Promenade II Memphis, Tennessee 38120
1230 Peachtree Street, N.E. (901) 259-7100
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3592
(404) 815-3500 Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations

and Financial Interest
Sixth Circuit
Case Number: 19-6383 Burns et al. v. Taurus Int’l Mfg. et al.
Name of counsel: Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr.
Pursuant to 6th Cir. R. 26.1, Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc.

and Taurus Holdings, Inc. make the following disclosure:
1. Is said party a subsidiary or affiliate of a publicly owned

corporation? If Yes, list below the identity of the parent
corporation or affiliate and the relationship between it and the
name party:
Taurus Armas, S.A., a company publicly traded in Brazil, owns

100% of the shares of Taurus Holdings, Inc., which in turn owns
100% of the shares of Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc.
2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, not a party to the appeal,

that has a financial interest in the outcome? If yes, list the
identity of such corporation and the nature of the financial
interest:
No.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr.

Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................. 1
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ...................................................... 2
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................... 2
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ........................................................ 3
A. Background Facts .................................................................... 3
B. What Happened in this Case ................................................... 5
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................... 11
VI. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY ......................... 12
A. The Standard of Review ......................................................... 12
B. Tennessee Law Should Apply; Therefore, The Denial of

Summary Judgment Was Error and Dismissal Caused
the Taurus Parties Plain Legal Prejudice............................. 12
1. Tennessee law governs this case .................................. 14
2. Because Tennessee’s statute of repose applies, the

Taurus Parties have a conclusive legal defense
and they should have received summary
judgment........................................................................ 25
3. Because Tennessee law barred the claims of

Plaintiffs-Appellees, the dismissal of the case
caused the Taurus Parties plain legal prejudice. ........ 28
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 30
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l , Inc., No. 3:09-CV-01035, 2010 WL

1223936 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2010) ....................................................... 22
Blane v. Am. Inventors Corp., 934 F. Supp. 903 (M.D. Tenn.

1996) .......................................................................................................... 19
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc.,

583 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 2009) .................................................................... 12
Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995) ........................................ 26
Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354, 1359 (8th Cir.

1994) .......................................................................................................... 19
Grant v. Kia Motors Corp., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (E.D. Tenn.

2016) .......................................................................................................... 26
Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d

882 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) .............................................................................. 26
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994)…….13, 28, 29
Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992) .......................... 15, 16
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2003) .......................................................................................................... 16
Lemons v. Cloer, 206 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) .......................... 17
Masters v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No. 2:11-CV 2451, 2012 WL

13020816 (W.D. Tenn. May 9, 2012)........................................................ 23
McKinnie v. Lundell Mfg. Co., 825 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tenn.

1993) .......................................................................................................... 22
McMahan Jets, LLC v. Roadlink Transp., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d

817 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) .............................................................................. 19
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McMillan v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-194,

2011 WL 12088 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2011) ............................................... 27
Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257
(8th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................... 29
Montgomery v. Wythe, 580 F.3d

455 (6th Cir. 2009) ..................................................... 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21
Moore v. Gen. Mot. Co., No. 2:15-CV-02816-STA-dkv, 2016 WL

1268312, (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2016) ...................................................... 27
Penley v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 31 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tenn.

2000) .......................................................................................................... 27
Phillips v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1989) .......... 29
Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272 (11th

Cir. 1999)................................................................................................... 23
Power-Tek Sols. Servs., LLC v. Techlink, Inc., 403 F.3d 353

(6th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................... 12
Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp.

2d 1198 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 257 (11th Cir.
2009) .......................................................................................................... 23
Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2000) .................... 18
Sterchi v. Savard, No. E2015-00928-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL

943529 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016) ................................................... 17
Torres v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 498 S.W.3d

565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) ........................................................................ 16
United States v. True, 250 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2001) ............................... 12
Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co., 786 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2015) ........................ 21, 22
Winningham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 156 F.3d 1234, 1998 WL

432472 (6th Cir. July 14, 1998)................................................................ 27
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Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 477 F.3d 924 (7th Cir
2007) .......................................................................................................... 29
Woods v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-363, 2010 WL

2010850 (E.D. Tenn. May 19, 2010) ........................................................ 27
STATUES AND RULES
28 U.S.C. §1291........................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1332.......................................................................................... 1
27 C.F.R. §§ 478.124 and 478.129(b) ......................................................... 7
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.10 .............................................................................. 25
Fla. Stat. Ann. §95.031(b) .......................................................................... 9
T.C.A. §29-28-103(a) ............................................................................. 5, 28
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) ............................................................................. 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ............................................... 15
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Defendants-Appellants respectfully request oral argument. This
case raises significant legal issues regarding choice of law principles,
and Defendants-Appellants believe that oral argument would afford the
Court a fuller opportunity to explore those issues with counsel.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1291. This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the
District Court on November 20, 2019. Judgment, R. 56, Page ID# 770.
Appellants timely filed their notice of appeal on December 6, 2019.
Notice of Appeal, R. 57, Page ID# 771-73.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiffs-Appellees are citizens of the State of
Tennessee. When the case was filed, Defendants-Appellants were both
Florida corporations with their principal places of business in Florida.
Amended Complaint, R. 12, Page ID# 53 ¶ 9. The amount in controversy
is greater than $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Id. ¶8.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the District Court err in granting the Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice of Plaintiffs-Appellees because it
concluded that dismissal would not cause the Taurus Parties plain legal
prejudice?
2. Did the District Court err in denying the Motion for
Summary Judgment of Defendants-Appellants when it concluded that
the claims at issue were not subject to Tennessee's statute of repose?
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellees filed their initial complaint on January 25,
2019 in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee. Complaint, R. 1, Page ID# 1-31. Prior to the filing of an
answer, Plaintiffs-Appellees amended their complaint. Amended
Complaint, R. 12, Page ID# 51-81. The Defendants-Appellants
(collectively “the Taurus Parties”) answered both the original complaint
and the amended complaint. Answers, R. 13, Page ID# 82-102; R. 14,
Page ID# 103-22; R. 19, Page ID# 130-49; and R. 20, Page ID# 150-69.
On June 20, 2019, Plaintiffs-Appellees filed a Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice. R. 41, Page ID# 200-03. Eight
days later, the Taurus Parties filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
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R. 43, Page ID# 216-18.
On November 20, 2019, the District Court denied the Motion for
Summary Judgment. Order, R. 54, Page ID# 737-59. Then, having
concluded that the Taurus Parties had failed to establish a legal
defense, the District Court granted the Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss
Without Prejudice, imposing no conditions on the dismissal. Order, R.
55, Page ID# 760-69. The District Court entered final judgment that
same day. Judgment, R. 56, Page ID# 770. The Taurus Parties timely
filed this appeal.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This appeal focuses on the application of Tennessee's ten-year
statute of repose to Plaintiffs-Appellees’ product liability claims.
Therefore, this description of the facts focuses on those facts relevant to
that issue.
A. Background Facts
On January 27, 2018, Paula Smith passed away in Fayette
County, Tennessee as a consequence of an alleged unintentional
discharge of a Taurus PT 145 Millennium Pro pistol. Amended
Complaint, R. 12, Page ID# 51-52 ¶ 1, Page ID# 55 ¶ 12. Ms. Smith
resided in Fayette County, Tennessee. Id. at Page ID# 51-52 ¶ 1.

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Plaintiff-Appellee Pamela Burns is the decedent's mother. Id. at Page
ID# 52 ¶ 1. Plaintiff-Appellee Delandre Harris is the father of a minor
child that he fathered with decedent. Id. at Page ID# 52 ¶ 2. Ms. Burns,
Mr. Harris and the children of the late Ms. Smith all reside in
Tennessee. Id. at Page ID# 51-52 ¶¶ 1-2.
Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. (TIMI) bought the
subject pistol and imported it into the United States from Forjas
Taurus, S.A., in Brazil on October 4, 2007. Declaration of Massiel Loo,
R. 43-2, Page ID# 224-25 ¶¶ 6, 12, Page ID# 228-73 (Exhibits A and B).
TIMI sold it to Sports South, a firearms distributor located in
Shreveport, Louisiana, on May 30, 2008. Id. at Page ID# 225 ¶ 12, Page
ID# 273 (Exhibit B). In turn, Sports South sold the subject pistol to a
firearms retailer in Memphis, Tennessee called Guns & Ammo on July
21, 2008. Id. at Page ID# 225 ¶ 14, Page ID# 275 (Exhibit C).
On December 24, 2008, Michael Alexander purchased the subject
pistol from Guns & Ammo in Memphis. Declaration of Special Agent
Ronnie Faulkner, R. 43-4, Page ID# 309 (Exhibit C). Plaintiff-Appellee
Delandre Harris in turn purchased that pistol from Mr. Alexander, his
father, on December 31, 2017. Amended Complaint, R. 12, Page ID# 58
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¶23.
B. What Happened in this Case
Plaintiffs-Appellees filed their products liability lawsuit against
the Taurus Parties on January 25, 2019. Complaint, R. 1, Page ID# 1-
31. Because the Taurus Parties knew that TIMI had sold the pistol to a
distributor more than ten years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the
application of Tennessee's ten-year statute of repose for product liability
claims quickly became the focus of the case. T.C.A. §29-28-103(a). In
answering the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, the Taurus
Parties asserted the statute of repose as a defense:
All or part of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the

applicable statutes of limitations and/or repose.
Specifically, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
T.C.A. §29-28-103(a) because the subject pistol
was first purchased for use or consumption more
than ten years before the Complaint was filed.
Answers, R. 13, Page ID# 83; R. 14, Page ID# 104; R. 19, Page ID# 131-
32; R. 20, Page ID# 151-52.
Only a month after the Taurus Parties answered the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellees acknowledged that the application of
Tennessee's statute of repose potentially barred their claims. In asking
to continue a court-mandated scheduling conference, Plaintiffs-
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Appellees admitted that the Tennessee statute of repose could bar their
claims.
Plaintiffs are trying to establish the original

purchase date of the subject Taurus PT 145
Millennium Pro .45 caliber weapon involved in
this case before going forward with discovery in
order to ensure that it was purchased within the
ten-year statute of limitations for product
liability cases.
Motion to Continue Scheduling Conference, R. 28, Page ID# 180 ¶ 1.
They further admitted that “[i]f the weapon in question was purchased
outside the ten year time period, Plaintiffs will be unable to proceed
further with their cause of action.” Id. at Page ID# 181 ¶ 2. The Taurus
Parties agreed that the statute of repose was a central issue in the case
and joined in the request to continue the scheduling conference while
the parties determined the retail sale date for the pistol. Id. at ¶ 5. The
District Court continued the scheduling conference and reset it for May
30, 2019. Text Order, R. 29; Text Order, R. 30.
The parties focused their attention on determining the date of the
first retail sale of the pistol. Plaintiffs-Appellees served a subpoena on
the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) seeking its report on the
investigation of the death of Ms. Smith. Subpoena, R. 45-1, Page ID#
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355. Plaintiffs-Appellees also served a subpoena on Guns & Ammo in
Memphis, the first retail seller of the pistol. Subpoena, R. 45-2, Page
ID# 359. On about April 16, 2019, counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees
received an answer that was not the one they were looking for. Email,
R. 45-3, Page ID# 363. The TBI’s subpoena response established that
the first retail sale of the pistol was more than ten years before suit was
filed. Id. at Page ID# 363, 365.
TBI Special Agent Ronnie Faulkner participated in an
investigation of the decedent's death. Declaration of Special Agent
Ronnie Faulkner, R. 43-4, Page ID# 300 ¶ 4. As a part of that
investigation, he submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms a request for the ownership history of the pistol involved. Id.
at Page ID# 300 ¶ 5. Federal firearms licensees generate and maintain
records of every firearms transaction. 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.124 and
478.129(b). Using the serial number of the firearm, any law
enforcement agency can submit a form to ATF to request a history of a
particular firearm. The resulting firearms trace summary for the
subject pistol showed that Mr. Alexander first purchased it from Guns
& Ammo in Memphis, Tennessee on December 24, 2008. Id. at Page ID#
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309 (Exhibit C). On its face, the TBI report established that the first
retail purchase of the pistol of issue in this case was more than ten
years before Plaintiffs-Appellees filed their lawsuit.1
On May 21, 2019, shortly before the scheduling conference, the
parties filed a joint motion to again reset the scheduling conference.
Joint Motion to Continue Scheduling Conference, R. 31, Page ID# 183-
85. The parties stated that they were now in receipt of the information
they were looking for about the original retail purchase date of the
weapon involved in the case and that the Taurus Parties were in the
process of preparing a “dispositive motion based on the information
learned." Id. at Page ID# 183-84.
The District Court went forward with the May 30 status
conference. Order, R. 32, Page ID# 186. The Taurus Parties believed
that the statue of repose was a dispositive issue. Motion to Set
1
Plaintiffs-Appellees were the first parties to file with the District Court
the portions of the TBI investigation report that included the ATF trace
information, questioning only the report’s “authenticity.” Plaintiffs’
Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss, R. 41, Page ID# 202 ¶ 6; Exhibit A,
R.41-2, Page ID# 211-12. The Taurus Parties subsequently provided a
declaration from a TBI Special Agent authenticating the report and
explaining how he obtained the information and routinely included such
information in TBI investigation reports. Declaration of Special Agent
Ronnie Faulkner, R. 43-4, Page ID# 300-01.
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Scheduling Conference, R. 40, Page ID# 197. Recognizing that their
case was barred by Tennessee's statute of repose, Plaintiffs-Appellees
raised at the status conference the issue of whether the case should
proceed under Florida law. Minute Entry, R. 38. The District Court set
a deadline of June 28 for the filing of dispositive motions. Id.
On June 20, 2019, Plaintiffs-Appellees filed a Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice. R. 41, Page ID# 200-03.
Plaintiffs-Appellees now argued that the case should be governed by
Florida law and Florida's 12-year statute of repose for product liability
claims. Id. at Page ID# 202; Fla. Stat. Ann. §95.031(b). They stated a
desire to refile their case in the Florida courts because other cases were
pending against the Taurus Parties in Florida. Id. On June 28, 2019,
the Taurus Parties filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing
that Tennessee’s statute of repose barred all claims based on the fact
that the pistol at issue had been first purchased more than ten years
before the filing of the complaint. Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment R. 43, Page ID# 216-18; Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 43-5, Page ID# 312-13.
The District Court held another scheduling conference on July 25,
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2019. Text Entry, R. 39; Transcript, R. 58, Page ID# 774-90. At the
conference, the District Court correctly summarized the new strategy of
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
But really we’ve delayed the case because both of

y’all were trying to get this information about --
and in essence, the document, correct me if I’m
wrong, sets out the date of purchase. Both of y’all
were trying to get that, and then when you saw
it, you said, well, gosh, maybe I’m out of here, and
I need to file this motion to dismiss.
Transcript, R. 58, Page ID# 784-85. The District Court stayed further
discovery while it considered the parties’ competing motions. Order, R.
49, Page ID# 391.
The District Court first addressed the Motion for Summary
Judgment. Despite the fact that the decedent was a Tennessee resident,
that the accident occurred in Tennessee, that all the Plaintiffs-
Appellees reside in Tennessee, and that the only retail sales of the
pistol occurred in Tennessee, the District Court concluded that this case
was governed by Florida law. Order, R. 54, Page ID# 737-59. Although
the pistol was not manufactured in Florida, that Florida was the
principal place of business of TIMI and Taurus Holdings and their state
of incorporation led the District Court to believe that Florida had a
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greater interest in having its laws apply in this case. Id.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Before this Court for review are orders disposing of two motions:
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice and
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. But, the outcome of that
review turns on a single legal issue: does the law of Tennessee or
Florida apply in this product liability case?
The decedent in this wrongful death case resided in Tennessee,
and the accident at issue occurred in Tennessee. The product at issue
was only ever sold at retail in Tennessee, and the final sale to Plaintiff-
Appellee Harris occurred in Tennessee. Plaintiffs-Appellees reside in
Tennessee. Under Tennessee’s choice-of-law rules, as applied by this
Court and others, Tennessee has the most significant relationship to
this case, and its law should apply. That the Taurus Parties, who did
not manufacture the product, were Florida corporations, headquartered
in Florida, is a fortuitous circumstance.
If Tennessee law applies, the denial of Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment was error because the product liability claims are
barred by Tennessee’s ten-year statute of repose. Further, because the
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dismissal of the case without prejudice deprived the Taurus Parties of
that complete defense, the dismissal caused plain legal prejudice to the
Taurus Parties and was in error.
VI. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY
A. The Standard of Review
This Court will review the granting of a motion to voluntarily
dismiss without prejudice for abuse of discretion. Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009).
A district court abuses its discretion when it “improperly applies the
law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” United States v. True, 250
F.3d 410, 422 n.9 (6th Cir. 2001).
This Court will review de novo a district court's choice-of-law
determination. Power-Tek Sols. Servs., LLC v. Techlink, Inc., 403 F.3d
353, 357 (6th Cir. 2005).
This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Montgomery v. Wythe, 580 F.3d 455, 459
(6th Cir. 2009).
B. Tennessee Law Should Apply; Therefore, The Denial of

Summary Judgment Was Error and Dismissal Caused the
Taurus Parties Plain Legal Prejudice
A district court should not allow a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss

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a case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) if doing so would cause a
defendant to suffer “plain legal prejudice." Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33
F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994).
In determining whether a defendant will suffer

plain legal prejudice, a court should consider such
factors as the defendant's effort and expense of
preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of
diligence on the part of the plaintiff in
prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation
for the need to take a dismissal, and whether a
motion for summary judgment has been filed by
the defendant.
Id. This Court has noted that plain legal prejudice results when the
district court permits voluntary dismissal “[a]t the point when the law
clearly dictates a result for the defendant...." Id. at 719.
Here, the District Court rejected any finding of plain legal
prejudice to the Taurus Parties because it had denied their Motion for
Summary Judgment based on the Tennessee statute of repose by
concluding that Florida law and not Tennessee law governed the claims
in this case. Order, R. 55, Page ID# 765-66. In addition, the District
Court rejected the contention that Plaintiffs-Appellees were attempting
to forum shop unfairly by seeking to refile this case in Florida because
Florida law governed Plaintiffs-Appellees’ claims. Id. at Page ID# 765.
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Therefore, the District Court's analysis of the factors that
governed whether to grant the Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss was built
on its conclusion that Florida law governed this case and that
Tennessee 's statute of repose would not bar Plaintiffs-Appellees’
claims. If that legal judgment was in error, the law clearly would
dictate a result for the Taurus Parties, and Plaintiffs-Appellees would
have engaged in forum shopping in seeking to dismiss their case and
refile in Florida. Therefore, the crux of this case was the District Court’s
decision that Florida law governed this case.
1. Tennessee law governs this case
Because review of a choice of law question is de novo, no deference
is due the decision of the District Court. The accident at issue occurred
in Tennessee, decedent resided in Tennessee, Plaintiffs-Appellees
resided in Tennessee, and the pistol was first purchased at retail in
Tennessee and later resold in Tennessee. Under Tennessee choice of law
principles, Tennessee law applies to this case.
When a federal court applies state law, it follows the choice-of-law
rules of the forum state. Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 459. The Tennessee
Supreme Court adopted the choice-of-law rule that governs this case in
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Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992). In that case, the
Tennessee Supreme Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws for choice-of-law determinations in Tennessee. Under the
Restatement, a court must presumptively apply “‘the law of the state
where the injury occurred… unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship… to the occurrence
and the parties.’” Id. at 57 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws §§ 146 and 175 (1971)).
To determine whether such a significant relationship exists, a
court must evaluate the following contacts “‘according to the relative
importance with respect to the particular issue’”… “‘(a) the place where
the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties; (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.’” Hataway, 830
S.W.2d at 59 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145).
The Hataway court described the Restatement test as creating a
“default rule" obligating courts to apply the law of the place where the
injury occurred “when each state has an almost equal relationship to
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the litigation." Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 59. The Tennessee Supreme
Court emphasized that “generally the law of the state where the injury
occurred will have the most significant relationship to the litigation."
Id.
Guided by Hataway and the principles of the Restatement,
Tennessee courts have followed the default rule and generally applied
the law of the state where the accident occurred. In Torres v.
Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 498 S.W.3d 565, 573-74 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2016), the court was presented with product liability claims
arising out of car accidents and injuries that occurred in Mexico.
Although the defendant maintained its principal place of business in
Tennessee, the court held that such contacts were not sufficient to
overcome the default rule. In an earlier case, In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), the court
similarly applied the default rule and held that Mexican law controlled
the product liability claims of residents of Mexico involved in accidents
in Mexico even though the defendant-manufacturer had its principal
place of business in Tennessee. Id. at 208.
An understanding of how Tennessee's default rule applies can be
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gleaned from looking at the circumstances in which Tennessee courts
have refused to apply the default rule. Lemons v. Cloer, 206 S.W.3d 60
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), involved a collision between a school bus and a
freight train in Tennessee, just north of the Georgia state line. The bus,
owned by a Georgia school district, was picking up Georgia children and
taking them to a Georgia school. Id. at 67. The court concluded that
Georgia had the most significant relationship with the litigation,
applying the Restatement test. Id. Under the circumstances, that the
accident occurred in Tennessee was merely fortuitous.
In Sterchi v. Savard, No. E2015-00928-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL
943529 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016), a husband and wife were
involved in a car accident while in Florida on a vacation. The wife was
killed. Id. at *1. Both the husband and wife were Tennessee residents.
Id. A son subsequently brought a wrongful death claim against the
husband. Id. The Court concluded that Tennessee had the greater
interest in the case exclusively involving Tennessee residents because
the occurrence of the accident in Florida while the parties were
temporarily there was fortuitous. Id. at * 5.
Cases such as Lemons and Sterchi show that Tennessee courts
17
SGR/22140913.2
will not apply the default rule when the location of the accident or
injury is merely fortuitous and the parties, considered as a whole, have
a stronger relationship with a different forum.
In this case, the default rule should apply. Tennessee's contacts
with the matter at issue are strong and in no sense fortuitous. The
deceased resided in Tennessee, and the incident occurred in Tennessee.
Plaintiffs-Appellees reside in Tennessee, and the children who would
benefit from the lawsuit reside in Tennessee. The pistol was first
purchased at retail in Tennessee and later resold in Tennessee. To the
extent the parties have a relationship, it is based in Tennessee where
the pistol was first purchased at retail, came into the possession of
Plaintiff-Appellee Harris, and was used by the decedent.
Courts, including this one, have rejected the idea that the
residence of a manufacturer or distributor controls a choice of law
determination. See Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 461; Spence v. Glock,
Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2000) (calling district court’s
determination “clearly wrong” that Georgia, as the state of firearm
distributor’s incorporation and principal place of business, was the place
of injury and place where the conduct causing injury occurred because
18
SGR/22140913.2
the allegedly defective firearms were designed and primarily
manufactured in Austria); Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354,
1359 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Missouri
location of electric saw’s design had a more significant relationship than
that of Canada where the injury occurred); see also McMahan Jets, LLC
v. Roadlink Transp., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 817, 824 (W.D. Tenn. 2014)
(stating that the only connection the litigation had to Mississippi was
that defendant was a Mississippi legal entity, and that fact was not
enough to overcome the default rule); Blane v. Am. Inventors Corp., 934
F. Supp. 903, 909-10 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that although
“Defendants reside, are domiciled, and/or are incorporated in
Massachusetts, Plaintiff resides in Tennessee” and the injury occurred
in Tennessee, thus Tennessee law applies).
This Court’s decision in Montgomery is instructive in this case.
The issue before the Court in that case was whether Tennessee’s
statute of repose extinguished a Tennessee domiciliary’s product
liability action based on the diet drug Fenphen, which had been
prescribed in Georgia. Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 458. This Court
affirmed the trial court’s determination that Tennessee had “the most
19
SGR/22140913.2
significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence at issue.” Id.
at 460. In doing so, it rejected the appellant’s argument that “all the
wrongful acts were consummated in Georgia” and so Georgia law should
apply. Id. at 461. The Court further rejected “the proposition that
Georgia law should apply simply because the product was sold there.”
Id. at 462. The reasoning in Montgomery forecloses any claim that
Florida has a more significant relationship to this dispute than
Tennessee. Indeed, the facts in this case more strongly militate in favor
of applying Tennessee law because the only retail sales of the pistol at
issue occurred in Tennessee.
Montgomery also forecloses any argument that Florida law should
apply because the product liability claim of Plaintiffs-Appellees is
barred by Tennessee law but not Florida law. Here, the District Court
noted that tort law serves to deter wrongdoers and compensate the
injured and that applying Florida’s longer statute of repose would
better serve those policies. Order, R. 54, Page ID# 748-49. But, in
Montgomery, this Court stated that “[t]he primary flaw in [appellant’s]
argument is that it focuses on the outcome of applying Tennessee’s
statute of repose rather than on the significance of Tennessee’s
20
SGR/22140913.2
relationship to the parties and the place of injury as required by
Hataway.” Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 462. Importantly, this Court wrote
“Tennessee’s choice-of-law analysis does not turn on whether a plaintiff
has a viable claim in one state but not another.” Id. This Court
concluded its choice-of-law determination in Montgomery by stating: “In
short, as the district court held, Tennessee has a strong interest in
applying its statute of repose in products liability actions, even when
that forecloses a claim by a Tennessee plaintiff.” Id. at 463.
Also instructive is this Court’s decision in Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
786 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2015). That product liability case involved a
contrasting agent used during an MRI. Id. at 493. The plaintiff was a
Tennessee resident and had received the contrasting agent during MRI
procedures in Tennessee. Id. The manufacturer argued that Tennessee’s
statue of repose barred the plaintiff’s claims. Id. The district court
agreed, and this Court affirmed. Id. at 494. The parties disputed
whether Ohio or Tennessee choice-of-law rules should control. But, this
Court recognized that Ohio applied the same Restatement “most
significant relationship” test as did Tennessee. Id. at 499-500. The
contrasting agent had been manufactured in Ireland and the
21
SGR/22140913.2
manufacturer was headquartered in New Jersey. Id. at 500.
Nevertheless, this Court applied Tennessee law. Tennessee was where
the plaintiff resided, where the agent was used and the injury occurred.
Id. Tennessee law applied because “Tennessee has a far greater interest
in a lawsuit by one of its own injured citizens against a drug
manufacturer than does New Jersey.” Id. at 499-500.
In multiple cases, Tennessee federal district courts have followed
the Hataway default rule and applied Tennessee law to accidents that
occurred in Tennessee and involved Tennessee residents, even when the
defendant was a corporation headquartered in another state. See
Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-01035, 2010 WL 1223936,
at *7-8 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2010) (Tennessee law applies where
plaintiff resides in Tennessee, goods purchased and installed in
Tennessee, and injury occurs in Tennessee, but defendant
headquartered in New Jersey); McKinnie v. Lundell Mfg. Co., 825 F.
Supp. 834, 835-36 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (Tennessee law applies in
wrongful death case where plaintiff and decedent resided in Tennessee
and accident occurred in Tennessee, but defendant resided in Iowa).
Tennessee federal courts also have followed the Hataway default rule to
22
SGR/22140913.2
apply the law of another jurisdiction when a Tennessee defendant was
sued over an accident that occurred in another jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Masters v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-2451, 2012 WL
13020816 (W.D. Tenn. May 9, 2012) (UK law applies in product liability
case against Tennessee corporation when device was sold, implanted
and failed in the UK, causing injury in the UK).
Moreover, no Florida policy supports the application of Florida
law. As federal courts in Florida have held:
Although Florida’s policy of protecting consumers

and users from non-economic damages caused by
dangerous products will seemingly be advanced
by application of its laws, the Eleventh Circuit
has held that “the purpose underlying Florida
law is to provide an adequate remedy for its own
domiciliaries.” [Piamba Cortes v. American
Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1301 (11th Cir.
1999).] Therefore, “Florida . . . possesses no
interest in compensating domiciliaries of other
jurisdictions more richly than they would receive
in their own courts.” Id.
Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198,
1231 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 257 (11th Cir. 2009).
In finding that Florida law should govern this case, the District
Court focused on the presence of the Taurus Parties in Florida where
they were incorporated and had their principal places of business.

23
SGR/22140913.2
However, as it relates to this case, that presence in Florida is merely
fortuitous. The pistol was manufactured in Brazil. Plaintiffs’ Statement
of Material Facts, R. 50-2, Page ID# 417-18. Any interest of Florida in
protecting Florida manufacturers with a statue of repose is irrelevant to
this case. The Taurus Parties served as intermediaries between the
foreign manufacturer and the retail seller. Whether the Taurus Parties
are found in Miami, New Orleans, or Atlanta is incidental to this case.
Regardless of where the Taurus Parties are found, this case involves an
incident that occurred in Tennessee involving a Tennessee resident and
a pistol first sold at retail in Tennessee. Tennessee law should apply.
The District Court supported its conclusion by citing to
proceedings in two cases pending in Florida against the Taurus Parties.
Order, R. 54, Page ID# 754. However, at issue in those cases were
motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds where the
accidents in dispute occurred outside Florida. The analysis used to
determine if a Florida case should be dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds is not the same as the Hataway court’s choice-of-law
analysis. That Florida is not an inconvenient forum does not mean that
its law controls. A forum can be a viable forum and still be required to
24
SGR/22140913.2
apply the law of another state. Indeed, Florida has a borrowing statute
that requires Florida courts to apply the shorter limitations period of
another state to a cause of action that arose in that other state. Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 95.10.
The District Court also cited to cases in which courts have found
that the Taurus Parties were not subject to personal jurisdiction in
states other than Tennessee. Order, R. 54, Page ID# 755. The Taurus
Parties have not made such a motion in this case. Neither the Hataway
decision nor the Restatement uses a personal jurisdiction inquiry as a
factor for determining choice-of-law.
No reason exists in this case to apply any law other than the law
required by the Hataway default rule. Tennessee law should govern a
case filed by Tennessee residents, involving an accident in Tennessee
and a pistol sold at retail twice in Tennessee.
2. Because Tennessee’s statute of repose applies, the

Taurus Parties have a conclusive legal defense and
they should have received summary judgment
Applying Tennessee law in this case fundamentally changes the
analysis of the Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss and the Motion for
Summary Judgment. If Tennessee’s statue of repose applies in this
25
SGR/22140913.2
case, the Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted, and
the Taurus Parties were unfairly prejudiced by dismissal of this case.
Tennessee’s statute of repose imposes “an absolute time limitation
upon the filing of product liability actions.” Greene v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
As explained by the Eastern District of Tennessee:
Unlike with a statute of limitations where the time within

which legal proceedings must be commenced begins with the
accrual of the cause of action, a statute of repose begins
running on the date of a triggering event. Oftentimes the
triggering event occurs before, and is entirely unrelated to
the accrual of a cause of action. A statute of repose,
therefore, can bar a plaintiff’s cause of action before it even
accrues. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
has explained that statutes of repose “are substantive
and extinguish both the right and the remedy, while
statutes of limitation are merely procedural,
extinguishing only the remedy.”
Grant v. Kia Motors Corp., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1042 (E.D. Tenn.
2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913
(Tenn. 1995)). “Tennessee courts have consistently read all statutes of
repose literally, and have declined to read equitable exceptions into
them.” Greene, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 888. The purpose of the repose statute
is to provide manufacturers “with some certainty about potential tort
liability by blocking liability after ten years from the sale or bailment of
26
SGR/22140913.2
a product.” Winningham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 156 F.3d 1234, 1998 WL
432472, at *3 (6th Cir. July 14, 1998) (citing Tennessee Products
Liability Act, Preamble, Ch. 703, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 468, 469). Such
certainty is called for in this case.
Tennessee courts frequently apply the TPLA’s statute of repose to
bar claims on summary judgment. See, e.g., Penley v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 31 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tenn. 2000) (affirming grant of summary
judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s products liability lawsuit based on
an all-terrain vehicle as barred by TPLA statute of repose where
lawsuit was filed thirteen days too late); Winningham, 1998 WL
432472, at *6-7 (affirming grant of summary judgment based on
Tennessee’s ten-year statute of repose in bailor-bailee context); Moore v.
Gen. Mot. Co., No. 2:15-CV-02816-STA-dkv, 2016 WL 1268312, at *2
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2016) (granting summary judgment on claim
barred by TPLA statute of repose); McMillan v. Janssen Pharmaceutica,
Inc., No. 3:10-CV-194, 2011 WL 12088, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2011)
(granting summary judgment when action was brought more than one
year after expiration of statute of repose); Woods v. Remington Arms
Co., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-363, 2010 WL 2010850, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. May 19,
27
SGR/22140913.2
2010) (granting summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff’s products
liability lawsuit based on a Remington Model 760 rifle as barred by
TPLA statute of repose).
The first retail sale of the pistol at issue occurred on December 24,
2008. This lawsuit was filed January 25, 2019, more than a month after
the deadline fixed by Tennessee’s 10-year statute of repose. T.C.A. § 29-
28-103(a). Therefore, Plaintiffs-Appellees’ product liability claims fail as
a matter of law.
3. Because Tennessee law barred the claims of Plaintiffs-

Appellees, the dismissal of the case caused the Taurus
Parties plain legal prejudice
As this Court has previously noted,
At the point when the law clearly dictates a result for the
defendant, it is unfair to subject him to continued exposure
to potential liability by dismissing the case without
prejudice.
Grover, 33 F.3d at 719. That describes the exact circumstances of this
case. From the time Plaintiffs-Appellees filed this case, the parties
focused their efforts on determining the date of the first retail sale of
the pistol at issue, understanding that if it had been sold more than ten
years before the filing of the lawsuit, Tennessee law would bar the
claims at issue. Plaintiffs-Appellees served subpoenas to determine that

28
SGR/22140913.2
sale date. But, after the parties got their answer and it became
apparent that Tennessee law foreclosed Plaintiffs-Appellees’ claims,
Plaintiffs-Appellees adopted a new, alternative strategy. They sought to
dismiss this case and refile it in a different forum, Florida, one in which
they believed the law would not foreclose their claims.
Many appellate courts have recognized that forum shopping to find a
more favorable statute of limitations would inflict the “plain legal
prejudice” that prevents the voluntary dismissal of a case. Wojtas v.
Capital Guardian Tr. Co., 477 F.3d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2007) (loss of
statute of limitations defense would be plain legal prejudice); Metro.
Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262-63
(8th Cir. 1993) (same); Phillips v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984,
987 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). In Grover, the Court recognized that a
plaintiff’s effort to voluntarily dismiss a case to avoid an unfavorable
legal precedent inflicted plain legal prejudice on a defendant. Grover, 33
F.3d at 719.
Plaintiffs-Appellees understood from the beginning that their
claims potentially were foreclosed by Tennessee’s statute of repose.
When that potentiality became a reality, Plaintiffs-Appellees should not
29
SGR/22140913.2
have been allowed to change their minds about their choice of forum
and deprive the Taurus Parties of the protection of Tennessee’s statute
of repose.
VII. CONCLUSION
Defendants-Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse
the Judgment of the District Court, set aside the dismissal of the case,
and direct the entry of judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellants.

Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr.
John F. Weeks IV
Benjamin E. Reed
SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
Suite 3100, Promenade II
1230 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3592
(404) 815-3500
ewasmuth@sgrlaw.com
jweeks@sgrlaw.com
breed@sgrlaw.com
Richard D. Underwood
Patrick G. Walker
FARRIS BOBANGO BRANAN PLC
999 S. Shady Grove Road, Suite 500
Memphis, Tennessee 38120
(901) 259-7100
runderwood@farris-law.com
pwalker@farris-law.com
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
30
SGR/22140913.2
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE
REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENTS
1. This Brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed.
R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because this Brief contain 5,954 words, excluding
the parts of the Brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).
2. This Brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed.
R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(6) because this Brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 pt. Century Schoolbook.

January 21, 2020

Date
SGR/22140913.2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., hereby certify that on January 21,
2020, a copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically. Notice of
this filing will be sent to the following parties by operation of the
Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through
the Court’s system.
Craig V. Morton
craig@mortongermany.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees

SGR/22140913.2
Addendum
Designation of Relevant District Court Documents
Sixth Circuit
Case Number: 19-6383 Case Name: Pamela Burns et al. v.
Taurus Int’l Mfg., Inc., et al.
Lower Court Case No.: 2:19-cv-02071
Western District of Tennessee
R. Page ID # Description of Pleading

1 1-31 Complaint
12 51-81 Amended Complaint
13 82-102 Answer to Complaint by Taurus Holdings, Inc.
14 103-122 Answer to Complaint by Taurus International Mfg.,
Inc.
19 130-149 Answer to Amended Complaint by Taurus Holdings,
Inc.
20 150-169 Answer to Amended Complaint by Taurus
International Mfg., Inc.
28 180-182 Motion to Continue Scheduling Conference
31 183-185 Joint Motion to Continue Scheduling Conference
32 186 Order Denying Motion to Continue
40 197-199 Motion to Set Scheduling Conference
41 200-212 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Without
Prejudice
43 216-322 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
45 334-379 Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss
SGR/22140913.2
49 391 Order Staying Discovery

50 392-700 Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment
54 737-759 Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment
55 760-769 Order Granting Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss
Without Prejudice
56 770 Judgment
57 771-773 Notice of Appeal
58 774-790 Transcript of July 25, 2019 Status Conference
SGR/22140913.2

Burns V Taurus Brief of Appellants

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Burns V Taurus Brief of Appellants

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Case: 19-6383 Document: 19 Filed: 01/21/2020 Page: 1

Case No. 19-6383

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

PAMELA BURNS, as Surviving Parent of Paula Smith, Deceased, and

TAURUS INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING, INC.; TAURUS

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr. Richard D. Underwood

Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations

Name of counsel: Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr.

Pursuant to 6th Cir. R. 26.1, Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc.

1. Is said party a subsidiary or affiliate of a publicly owned

Taurus Armas, S.A., a company publicly traded in Brazil, owns

2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, not a party to the appeal,

/s/ Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr.

I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................. 1

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ...................................................... 2

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................... 2

IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ........................................................ 3

A. Background Facts .................................................................... 3

B. What Happened in this Case ................................................... 5

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................... 11

VI. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY ......................... 12

A. The Standard of Review ......................................................... 12

B. Tennessee Law Should Apply; Therefore, The Denial of

1. Tennessee law governs this case .................................. 14

2. Because Tennessee’s statute of repose applies, the

3. Because Tennessee law barred the claims of

VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 30

Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l , Inc., No. 3:09-CV-01035, 2010 WL

Blane v. Am. Inventors Corp., 934 F. Supp. 903 (M.D. Tenn.

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc.,

Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995) ........................................ 26

Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354, 1359 (8th Cir.

Grant v. Kia Motors Corp., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (E.D. Tenn.

Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d

Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992) .......................... 15, 16

In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Lemons v. Cloer, 206 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) .......................... 17

Masters v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No. 2:11-CV 2451, 2012 WL

McKinnie v. Lundell Mfg. Co., 825 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tenn.

McMahan Jets, LLC v. Roadlink Transp., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d

McMillan v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-194,

Montgomery v. Wythe, 580 F.3d

Moore v. Gen. Mot. Co., No. 2:15-CV-02816-STA-dkv, 2016 WL

Penley v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 31 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tenn.

Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272 (11th

Power-Tek Sols. Servs., LLC v. Techlink, Inc., 403 F.3d 353

Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp.

Sterchi v. Savard, No. E2015-00928-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL

Torres v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 498 S.W.3d

Winningham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 156 F.3d 1234, 1998 WL

Woods v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-363, 2010 WL

STATUES AND RULES

27 C.F.R. §§ 478.124 and 478.129(b) ......................................................... 7

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.10 .............................................................................. 25

Fla. Stat. Ann. §95.031(b) .......................................................................... 9

T.C.A. §29-28-103(a) ............................................................................. 5, 28

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) ............................................................................. 13

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ............................................... 15

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Defendants-Appellants respectfully request oral argument. This

case raises significant legal issues regarding choice of law principles,

and Defendants-Appellants believe that oral argument would afford the