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Gilchrist vs.

Cuddy
G.R. No. L-9356, February 18, 1915
FACTS:
Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar” and he rented it to Petitioner Gilchrist for a week for P125 in April
24, and it was to be delivered on the May 26. After a few days, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist because
that he had made other arrangements with his film. The other arrangements were made in favor to rent it to
defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these
parties from showing it for the week beginning the 26th of May.
Cuddy, as it appears in the testimony, willfuly violated his contract with the Petitioner because the defendants
had offered him more for the same period. Mr. Espejo at the trial on the permanent injunction admitted that he
knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film and was to get it through his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila. There
is in evidence that letters showing that the Pathe Brothers in Manila advised this man on two different occasions
not to contend for this film Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive and assured him also that he could
not get the film for about six weeks. These letters was written on the 26th of April, which implies that that he
knew they had to get this film from Cuddy and knew he could not get it, but made an offer to Cuddy which he
accepted because it was three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for.
There is no doubt that on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for the lease of the film must
be fully recognized and admitted by all and Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that
contract
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of appellants Espejo and Zaldriga be liable for damages though they do not know the
identity of Petitioner Gilchrist
RULING:
In the case at bar, the appellants desire, in the Gilchrist-Cuddy, contract was to earn profit. But even if they wish
no malice other than to earn, it still does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract
and causing its breach. It is clear that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their desire. Not
unless they, by reason of the fact, did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the
film.
Their liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such
obligations to induce nor coerce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. The action of Gilchrist is to claim
for damages, as stated in Article 1902 of that civil code where it provides that a person who, by act or
omission, causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort feasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is
found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the
damage suffered.
But the interference with lawful contracts by strangers (Espejo and Zaldriga) does not of itself give the injured
person (Gilchrist) a remedy by injunction. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
states, that before an injunction may issue restraining the wrongful interference with contracts by strangers, the
strangers must know the identity of both parties. Injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate remedy
at law. Where the choice is between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, and the former are
sufficient, the rule will not permit the use of the latter.|
But Gilchrist was facing the immediate danger of losing profits by reason of the fact that the appellants had
induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to
estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would
be quite difficult if not impossible.The preliminary injunction issued against the appellants, which prohibited
them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion
that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court
Dauden-Hernaez vs. Delos Angeles
G.R. No. L-27010, April 30, 1969
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against herein private respondents to recover P14,700 representing a balance due for
her services as a leading actress in two motion pictures and to recover damages. Upon the motion of the
defendants, respondent court ordered the complaint be dismissed because the claim of the plaintiff was not
evidenced in a written document, either public or private and complaint itself is defective on its face due to
being violative against Art. 1356 and 1358 of the Civil Code. Petitioner sought for a reconsideration but was
dismissed and again filed another reconsideration but dismissed due to being Pro forma.
Petitioner then resorted to the Supreme Court and Respondent then answered as a defense that the proposed
amended complaint did not vary in any material aspect from the original complaint except in minor details and
suffers from the same vital defect of the original complaint (which is violation of Art. 1356) and that contract
sued upon was not alleged in writing (writing was absolute and indispensable because the amount involved
exceeds P500)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint on its face is violative of Art. 1356 and 1358 of the Civil Code
RULING:
The contractual system of the Civil Code still follows that of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and of the
"Ordenamiento de Alcala" of upholding the spirit and intent of the parties over formalities. Thus contracts are
valid and binding from their perfection regardless of form, whether they be oral or written.
The general rule that the form, whether oral or written, is irrelevant to the binding effect inter-partes of a
contract that possesses the three validating elements of consent, subject matter and causa, Article 1356 of the
Civil Code establishes only two exceptions, to wit: (a) Contracts or which the law itself requires that they be in
some particular form (writing) in order to make them valid and enforceable (the so-called solemn contracts). An
example of this exception is the donation of immovable property (Article 749) and donation of movables worth
more than P5,000.00 (Article 743 and (b) Contracts that the law requires to be proved by some writing
(memorandum) of its terms, as in those covered by the old Statute of Frauds, now Article 1403(2) of the Civil
Code. Their existence not being provable by mere oral testimony (unless whooly or partly executed), these
contracts are exceptional in requiring a writing embodying the terms thereof for their enforceability by action in
court.
The contract sued upon by petitioner is for compensation and need not be in written form. It is true that it
appears included in Article 1358 (all other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos
must appear in writing, even a private one.) But in Article 1358 it nowhere provides that the absence of written
form in this case will make the agreement invalid or unenforceable. Also it is clear that Article 1357 indicates
that contracts covered by Article 1358 are binding and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of
writing.
WHEREFORE, the order dismissing the complaint is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings not at variance with this decision
Roblett vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116682, January 2, 1997
FACTS:
Respondent instituted an action for a sum of money (P342,909.38) against the petitioner before the RTC
because it alleged that it leased the petitioner various construction equipment to be used in its projects.
Petitioner entered into an agreement with respondents where they agreed that respondent shall lease
construction equipment worth P115,000 thus reducing balance to P227,909. A day before the execution of the
agreement, petitioner’s check bounce thus increasing his debt to P237,909.
A few months later, respondent then sent a demand letter to the petitioner regarding the overdue account of
P237,909 and sought for its settlement. Petitioner then traversed the allegations and found that after deliberation
it appeared that petitioner overpaid the respondent by P12,000 on the basis of the Equipment Daily Reports
which reflected a total obligation of P102,000 and also claimed that the agreement was not approved by the
board.
Respondent, on rebuttal, declared the petitioner had received a statement of account in a certain amount which it
never questioned. Based from the respondent’s account with the petitioner and a certain P30,000, it represented
payments made by the latter.
RTC rendered judgement ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent. Petitioner appealed to the CA and
imputes that the RTC committed errors that the agreement is unenforceable for being an unauthorized contract
and not holding the petitioner’s obligation to respondent had been fully paid and that petitioner even overpaid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed errors in rendering judgement
RULING:
In the first error, petitioner asserts that the Agreement is unenforceable for having been executed. without
authority.
Significantly, in the proceedings before respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned a lone error allegedly
committed by the trial court in the topic of Full payment, if not overpayment by P12,000.00, of the obligation
referred to in the second issue raised in the petition therein. Having limited itself to that particular issue to the
exclusion of any other, petitioner can no longer be permitted to assail the finding of the trial court on the
validity of the Agreement.
As regards the factual issue on the correctness of the amount of petitioner's obligation, or whether it has been
fully paid, petitioner insists that from respondent's Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985, it
was established that the equipment leased was actually used for only 191 hours. Multiplying 191 hours by the
rental rate of P540.00 per hour will amount to P103,140.00 which is petitioner's correct rental obligation to
respondent. Taking into account the construction materials worth P115,000.00 received by respondent from
petitioner an overpayment of P12,000.00 more or less results. In the absence of any showing that the trial court
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, no
compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge upon matters more appropriately within its province.
Furthermore, estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. This doctrine obtains in the present case. A statement of account
for P376,350.18 covering the period above mentioned was received from respondent by petitioner. Neither did
petitioner controvert the demand letter concerning the overdue account of P237,909.38; on the contrary, it asked
for ample time to source funds to substantially settle the account. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Binua vs. Ong
G.R. No. 207176, June 18, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of real estate mortgages executed by petitioner Victor in favor of the
respondent. On the ground that it was executed under fear, duress and threat.
RTC then found petitioner Edna guilty of estafa and was ordered to pay the respondent P2,285,000 with 10%
interest and damages. Petitioner Edna then sought to avoid criminal liability by settling her indebtedness though
execution of separate real estate mortgages over the petitioner Victor’s properties. Petitioner Edna then filed a
motion for a new trial and RTC rendered a decision ordering Petitioner Edna to pay the respondent. But she
failed to settle her obligation forcing the respondent to foreclose the mortgage on the properties.
Petitioners then filed for an action for then nullity of mortgage because according to them, they “were still
suffering from the effect of the conviction of Edna and could not have been freely entered into said contracts.”
The petitioners also allege that the respondent subsequently “rammed the two (2) mortgage contracts involving
two (2) prime properties on petitioner Victor’s throat, so to speak ,just so to make him sign the said documents,”
and that the respondent took advantage of the misfortune of the petitioners and was able to secure in her favor
the real estate mortgages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgage contracts were executed under fear, duress and threat
RULING:
Article 1390 of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud are voidable or annullable. Article 1335 of the Civil Code, meanwhile,
states that "there is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his
spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent." The same article, however, further states that "a threat
to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent."
According to jurisprudence (De Leon v. CA) the Court held that in order that intimidation may vitiate consent
and render the contract invalid: (1) intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have
caused the consent to be given; (2) threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) threat be real and serious, there
being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice
of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that
the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.
In cases involving mortgages, a preponderance of the evidence is essential to establish its invalidity, and in
order to show fraud, duress, or undue influence of a mortgage, clear and convincing proof is necessary.
Based on the petitioners' own allegations, what the respondent did was merely inform them of petitioner Edna's
conviction in the criminal cases for estafa. It might have evoked a sense of fear or dread on the petitioners' part,
but certainly there is nothing unjust, unlawful or evil in the respondent's act. The petitioners also failed to show
how such information was used by the respondent in coercing them into signing the mortgages. The petitioners
must remember that petitioner Edna's conviction was a result of a valid judicial process and even without the
respondent allegedly "ramming it into petitioner Victor's throat," petitioner Edna's imprisonment would be a
legal consequence of such conviction. In Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court stated
that the threat to prosecute for estafa not being an unjust act, but rather a valid and legal act to enforce a claim,
cannot at all be considered as intimidation. As correctly ruled by the CA, "[i]f the judgment of conviction is the
only basis of the [petitioners] in saying that their consents were vitiated, such will not suffice to nullify the real
estate mortgages and the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. No proof was adduced to show
that [the respondent] used [force], duress, or threat to make [petitioner] Victor execute the real estate
mortgages."
Finally, the petitioners assail the ten percent (10%) imposed by the RTC-Branch 2 in the criminal cases for
estafa. As previously stated, however, the decision in said case is already final and executory. The Court will
not even consider the petitioners' arguments on such issue for to do so would sanction the petitioners' act of
subverting the immutability of a final judgment.
Averia vs Averia
G.R. No. 141877. August 13, 2004
FACTS:
Macaria contracted a marriage with Marcos but the latter died and the former became a widow. Later she then
contracted a second marriage with Romero. The latter died which left 3 adjoining residential lots and in the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Summary Settlement., it stated that it was apportioned to Macaria.
Macaria alleged that co-heirs (Heirs of Filemon) of the employed the means of fraud in the partition of the
estate thus prompting her to file an action for annulment of title and damages before the CFI of Manila. Case
was pending for litigation for about 10 years until the Court of Appeals ruled in adding 30 sqm to Macaria and
become final and executory.
Macaria and her children Gregorio and Teresa lived with her at Extramadura. Macaria died in the later years
and Heirs of Filemon filed before the RTC a complaint against Gregorio (Son of Macaria) for judicial partition
of the Extramadura Property inclusive of the 30 sqm judicially awarded. Gregorio, in his defense, answered that
one half of her Extramadura property was sold to him out of “kindness in caring her while she was bed ridden
and litigation expenses” and Domingo (Heirs of Filemon) assigned Gregorio his one sixth share in the
remaining portion of the said property.
The Trial court ruled in favor of Gregorio. Heirs then filed an appeal to the CA to which in reversed the
decision of the trial court on the ground that the sale executed by Macaria in favor of Gregorio was in violation
of the statute of frauds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parol evidence may be admitted in proving partial performance
RULING:
Gregorio contends that the same refers only to purely executory contracts and not to partially or completely
executed contracts as in the case at hand. The finding of the CA that the testimonies of Gregorio‘s witnesses
were timely objected to by Domingo is not, as Gregorio insist, borne out in the records of the case except with
respect to his testimony.
Indeed, except for the testimony of petitioner Gregorio bearing on the verbal sale to him by Macaria of the
property, the testimonies of Gregorio‘s witnesses Sylvanna Vergara Clutario and Flora Lazaro Rivera bearing
on the same matter were not objected to by respondents. Just as the testimonies of Gregorio, Jr. and Veronica
Bautista bearing on the receipt by respondent Domingo on July 23, 1983 from Gregorio‘s wife of P5,000.00
representing partial payment of the P10,000.00 valuation of his (Domingo‘s) 1/6 share in the property, and of
the testimony of Felimon Dagondon bearing on the receipt by Domingo of P5,000.00 from Gregorio were not
objected to. Following Article 1405 of the Civil Code, the contracts which infringed the Statute of Frauds were
ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of parol evidence, hence, enforceable.
In any event, the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts which are either
partially or totally performed. In the case at bar, petitioners claimed that there was total performance of the
contracts, full payment of the objects thereof having already been made and the vendee Gregorio having, even
after Macaria‘s death in 1983, continued to occupy the property until and after the filing on January 19, 1989 of
the complaint subject of the case at bar as in fact he is still occupying it.
However it is not enough for a party to allege partial performance in order to render the Statute of Frauds
inapplicable; such partial performance must be duly proved. But neither is such party required to establish such
partial performance by documentary proof before he could have the opportunity to introduce oral testimony on
the transaction. The partial performance may be proved by either documentary or oral evidence.

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