Obiasca vs.

Basallote
G.R. No. 176707 – February 17, 2010
J. Corona

Topic: Judicial review – Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioner: Arlin Obiasca
Respondent: Jeane Basallote

Summary: Basallote was appointed as Administrative Officer II of Tabaco National High School, and assumed office.
She was then informed that her appointment could not be forwarded to CSC because of her failure to submit a position
description form signed by School Principal Gonzales. She tried to obtain the signature but Gonzales would refuse. She
was advised to return to her former teaching position and she complied. Obiasca was then appointed to the same
position, which was attested by CSC. Basallote then filed a complaint with the CSC Regional Office V, which
dismissed it. Upon appeal to CSC, her appointment was approved and the approval of Obiasca’s appointment was
recalled. Obiasca filed a petition with CA, claiming that he was not allowed to participate in the proceedings in the
CSC. CA denied it. SC ultimately held that since Obiasca did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC
resolution before filing a petition for review in the CA, it allowed the CSC decision to become final and executory.

Doctrine: For reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

Facts:
● City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly Beloso appointed Jeane Basallote as Administrative Officer II of
DepEd, Tabaco National High School in Albay.
● Subsequently, the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy Oyardo, advised School Principal Leticia
Gonzales that the papers of the applicants for the same position, including Basallote’s, were being returned, and
that a school ranking should be submitted to her office for review.
● Basallote assumed office regardless. Thereafter, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa Diaz, Human Resource
Management Officer I of the City Schools Division of Tabaco City, informing her that her appointment could not
be forwarded to CSC because of her failure to submit the position description form duly signed by Gonzales.
● Basallote repeatedly tried to obtain Gonzales’ signature but the latter refused. When she informed Oyardo of the
situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I. She complied.
● Arlin Obiasca was appointed to AO II. The appointment was sent to and attested by CSC. Basallote then filed a
complaint with the Deputy Ombudsman against Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz.
● Ombudsman: Held Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding info from Basallote on her
appointment status. Suspension 3 months. Diaz was absolved.
● Basallote also filed a protest with CSC Regional Office V.
● CSC RO-V: Dismissed. It should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the DepEd.
○ Upon MR, the protest was reinstated but later dismissed for lack of merit. Basallote appealed to CSC
Regional Office, which dismissed it for failure to show that her appointment had been attested by CSC.
○ She elevated the matter to CSC.
● CSC: Granted, approved her appointment and recalled the approval of Obiasca’s appointment.
○ Obiasca filed a petition for certiorari + TRO + WPI with CA, claiming that he had been deprived of his
right to due process when he was not allowed to participate in the proceedings in the CSC.
● CA: Denied, upheld Basallote’s appointment, as she was deemed to have accepted the appointment upon her
assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the position.
○ She was qualified for the position, and due to her valid appointment, no other appointment to the same
position could be made without the position being first vacated, making Obiasca’s appointment void.
○ [TOPIC] Re: due process, Obiasca failed to exercise his right by failing to submit a single pleading
despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in the proceedings in the CSC.
○ MR denied. Hence, this petition.
● Petitioner: Respondent was not validly appointed because her appointment was never attested by the CSC. Hence,
her appointment never vested her a permanent title. Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292
(Omnibus Rules), every appointment must be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, or it is
 ineffective. As respondent’s appointment was not sent to the CSC within the proper period, it ceased to be
effective, and AO II was already vacant when petitioner was appointed to it.
● Respondent: Her appointment was wrongfully not submitted. Oyardo’s reason for not submitting (the alleged
failure of respondent to have her PDF signed by Gonzales) was not valid because the PDF was not even required
for the attestation of respondent’s appointment by the CSC.

Issues + Held:

1. W/N the CSC resolution recalling petitioner’s appointment and approving that of respondent has long become
final and executory – YES
● Secs. 16 and 18, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules provide the proper remedy to assail a CSC decision or resolution:
16. An employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the [Merit System Protection Board] may appeal to
the [CSC] within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no
petition for reconsideration is filed within 15 days from receipt thereof.
18. Failure to file a protest, appeal, petition for reconsideration or for review within the prescribed period shall be
deemed a waiver of such right and shall render the subject action/decision final and executory.
● Here, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution before filing a petition for review
in the CA. Such procedural lapse allowed the CSC resolution to become final and executory. It can no longer
be amended or modified. In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA decision which affirmed the final and
executory CSC resolution, petitioner would want the Court to reverse a final and executory judgment and
disregard the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
● A dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from availing of remedies other than those provided
in Sec. 18 of the Omnibus Rules. This is precisely the purpose of Rule 43 of ROC, which provides for the filing of
a petition for review as a remedy to challenge the decisions of the CSC. While Sec. 18 does not supplant the mode
of appeal under Rule 43, we cannot disregard Sec. 16 which requires that a petition for reconsideration should be
filed, otherwise, the CSC decision will become final and executory.
○ Such are specific remedies as against CSC decisions involving its administrative function on matters
involving “appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service,” as opposed to
its quasi-judicial function.
● The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
○ Orosa v. Roa: If an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.
● Absent any definitive ruling that Sec. 16 is not mandatory and the filing of a petition for reconsideration may be
dispensed with, SC must adhere to the dictates of such provision.

2. [Main issue but not relevant to the topic] W/N the failure of the appointing authority to submit respondent’s
appointment paper to CSC within 30 days from issuance made her appointment ineffective and incomplete – NO
● Petitioner relies on an overly restrictive reading of Sec. 9(h) of PD 807 (CSC Decree) which states, in part, that an
appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise,
the appointment becomes ineffective. This provision is implemented in Sec. 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules.
● It is incorrect to interpret this as requiring that an appointment must be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from
issuance, otherwise, the appointment is ineffective. Such interpretation fails to appreciate the part which states
that “an appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee
assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC].”
● More importantly, Sec. 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Sec. 9 by deleting the 30-day requirement. As a rule, an
amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. The word,
phrase or sentence deleted should accordingly be considered inoperative.
○ A restrictive period of 30 days within which appointments must be submitted to CSC is clearly imposed
Sec. 9, but none was adopted by EO 292. It merely states that the CSC shall periodically monitor, inspect
and audit personnel actions, making it materially inconsistent with Sec. 9.
○ The intention to amend by deletion shows in its legislative history as well.
● Here, respondent promptly assumed her duties as AO II when her appointment was issued by the appointing
authority. Thus, her appointment took effect immediately and would remain effective, until disapproved by
 CSC. Respondent’s appointment was never disapproved by CSC. More importantly, the CSC approved
respondent’s appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall has already become final and executory.
● Such stance by petitioner would also place the appointee at the whim of the appointing authority even after a valid
appointment, as was evident here. Respondent’s appointment was not submitted because of Diaz’s refusal to sign
it on the fallacious ground that the PDF had not been signed by Gonzales. CSC even sanctioned Diaz for her
failure to act in the required manner, while the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable
for withholding info from respondent on the status of her appointment. SC cannot ignore the willful and deliberate
acts of the three which caused undue prejudice to respondent.
● Putting undue importance on the 30-day requirement, as discussed earlier, will even reward wrongdoing in the
appointment process of public officials and employees, through allowing scheming officials to take advantage of
a procedural lapse by merely not submitting the appointment paper to CSC.
● It is true that approval of CSC is required to complete the appointment, in which the appointee acquires a vested
right. Here, respondent’s appointment was in fact already approved by CSC with finality.
○ The purpose of this requirement is for CSC to approve or disapprove depending on eligibility or required
qualifications and whether the laws and rules pertinent to the process of appointment have been followed.
○ With this, respondent’s appointment should all the more be deemed valid. Her papers were in order. The
PDF sought from her was not even a prerequisite before her papers could be forwarded to CSC. And she
was qualified! CSC would have approved it if sent in within the proper period, and in fact, when apprised
of respondent’s prior appointment after she protested, it was her appointment which CSC approved.
● Moreover, respondent was not remiss in following up the status of her appointment. The failure to submit the
appointment to CSC was not her fault, but that of the appointing officials who exercised their power with
arbitrariness, whim and despotism.
○ NCC 1186: The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.
○ Application: Unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment
to CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing
authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment. So, upon such a voluntary prevention, the
condition should be deemed fulfilled.
● SC has already previously ruled that an appointment remains valid in certain instances despite non-compliance of
the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules, if there is a legitimate justification for such delayed observance
of the rule, or if an invalidation would be harsh and arbitrary, considering the factual milieu of the case.
● In appointing petitioner, the appointing authority revoked the previous appointment of respondent and usurped
the power of CSC to revoke an appointment that had already been accepted by the appointee. It is CSC, not the
appointing authority, which has this power. This is clearly provided in Sec. 9 of the Omnibus Rules:
Sec. 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing
authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by CSC.
● Thus, the power to revoke an earlier appointment through the appointment of another may not be conceded to the
appointing authority. It is also a dangerous reading of the law because it expands the discretion given to the
appointing authority and removes the checks and balances that will rein in any possible abuse.
● Petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void, as the position was not vacant. The incumbent must be legally
removed, or her appointment validly terminated, before another can be appointed to succeed her.

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

Dissent (J. Bersamin):

● The petition for review should be granted, because its denial tends to negate the authority of the CSC to scrutinize
and approve appointments to the Civil Service.
● A dissatisfied employee may avail himself of remedies not limited to the petition for reconsideration. Omnibus
Rules recognizes other remedies available to prevent the disputed “action/decision” from becoming final and
executory. Moreover, such petition for reconsideration was not a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of ROC. It was enough that the petition for review was filed within 15 days from notice. In this
regard, the petition for review was timely filed. After receiving a copy of the CSC resolution, he filed a motion for
extension, which the CA granted. The petition for review was eventually filed within the period granted.
● A CSC rule will not prevail over Rule 43 of ROC, which authorizes appeals from the “awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of, or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.”
Rule 43, being issued by SC under its rule-making authority in the Constitution, has the force and effect of law,
supersedes any law or enactment on the manner of appealing the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies.
● CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, has the duty to determine the merit and fitness of the
persons appointed to the Civil Service. An appointment, to be fully effective, must comply with all the legal
requirements. Thus, the appointment must be submitted within the required period to CSC, which shall then
ascertain whether the proposed appointee is qualified and whether the rules were observed.
○ SC cannot interpret EO 292 as having dispensed with the submission requirement to make an
appointment effective. To hold otherwise is to deprive CSC of the opportunity to determine whether or
not an appointee is qualified, which certainly weakens the mandate of CSC as the central personnel
agency of the Government and negates its constitutional objectives.
○ In fact, despite the issuance of EO 292, CSC has continued to require the submission of appointments
within 30 days from the dates of their issuance, as shown in the Omnibus Rules.
● The respondent’s initial appointment was never attested by CSC. Thus, her appointment was not completed, and
she did not acquire any vested right to the position.
● Also, the appropriate disciplining authorities had already held Diaz, Oyardo and Gonzales to account for their
misdeed. It should end there. Such acts do not necessarily constitute reason to validate the respondent’s
appointment, or grant her any right to the position or to the guarantees provided by law.
○ Favis v. Rupisan: Failure of the responsible official to submit for approval an employee’s appointment
did not negate such requirement.
○ Tomali v. CSC: Compliance with the legal requirement for an appointment to a civil service position is
essential in order to make the appointment fully effective. Nothing in Tomali implies that the bad faith on
the part of the appointing authority, causing the delay of the appointment paper to the CSC, is sufficient
excuse to do away with the 30-day period for the submission.
● SC need not distinguish between deliberate or malicious acts and mere tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the
officials that lead to the non-submission of the appointment to CSC. The mere failure to submit the appointment,
regardless of the reason for non-submission, renders the appointment ineffective.
● In CSC v. Joson and Chavez v. Ronidel, legitimate justifications excused the delayed observance of or the non-
compliance with the requirement. However, here, it was a mere ministerial duty. The leniency extended by the
Court in these cases should not be applied to instances where the submission of the appointment is necessary to
complete an appointment, like herein.
● Lastly, the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of RAC provides that it is CSC that is authorized to recall an
appointment initially approved when such appointment and approval are in disregard of applicable provisions of
the civil service law and regulations. It presupposes that the appointment was already initially approved. Since the
appointment, not having been attested to by CSC, did not take place, it cannot hence be disapproved.
● An appointment is essentially a discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according to his
best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee possesses the qualifications. In the absence of any
showing that the respondent is not qualified, courts should not interfere with the prerogative of the appointing
officer.