IX.

GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP (RULES 92-97)

CASES:
1. Goyena vs Ledesma-Gustilo, G.R. No. 147148

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 147148 - January 13, 2003

PILAR Y. GOYENA, Petitioner, v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the Court of Appeals June 19, 2000 Decision which affirmed that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149 in Special Proceeding No. N-4375 appointing herein
respondent Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as guardian over the person and property of her sister
Julieta Ledesma, Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta's close friend and companion of more than 60 years,
comes to this Court on petition for review on certiorari.

On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
GUARDIANSHIP"1 over the person and properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations
of which read:

2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in
the Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility,
and a "mini"-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early 1995;

3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside
assistance, and she has to be moved by wheel chair;

4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in
Western Visayas, with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;]

5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the
assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural
enterprises;

6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner
Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the
Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to the filing of this
petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom of this petition[;]

7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial, agricultural

and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where Julieta Ledesma holds
an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed
medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship. She later filed an
Amended Opposition on August 15, 1996 reading in part:

2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane
and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property.
She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her letters to the
petitioner. Copies of her recent letters are herewith attached as Annexes "A" to "E."

xxx - xxx - xxx

2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests
are antagonistic (Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46. 49 L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol. V-B Francisco
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 93, Section 4, p. 414).

xxx - xxx - xxx

3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter lack of legal and/or factual
basis.

3.02 In the remote event that this Honorable Court should find that Julieta Ledesma is
incompetent and resolve that there is need to appoint a guardian over her person and property,
this Honorable Court should appoint as such guardian:

1. Oppositor Goyena;

2. Bart Lacson;

3. Fely Montelibano;

4. Jose T. Revilla; or

5. a qualified and reputable person as may be determined fit by this Honorable Court.

By Decision2 of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of
taking care of herself and her property" and appointed respondent as guardian of her person
and properties, ratiocinating as follows:

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the youngest sister
of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years of age has been the close friend
and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she suffered her first
stroke in Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the management of
their hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her
second stroke in the U.S. In short, the special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and
the Oppositor cannot be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life and
business concerns due to senility and "vascular dementia," the oppositor wants to be appointed
her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.

It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the appointment of
Amparo as guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. She further added that there
were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta to Amparo which showed Julieta's
sentiments regarding certain matters. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta
opposed the petition. As a matter of fact, her sisters signified their conformity thereto. Thus, Ms.
Goyena's mere conjecture that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition
should be denied. Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a
guardian. On the contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse
interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's holdings at the Makati Medical Center
has been transferred to her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A.

By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and properties of
Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she can best take care of Julieta's concerns and
well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her family should be given the
opportunity to show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena
access to her considering the special bond of friendship between the two. Needless to say, the
oppositor at 90 years of age could not be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of
Julieta.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Amparo Gustilo, is hereby appointed guardian over the person and
property of Julieta Ledesma, an incompetent with all the powers and duties specified under the
law.
Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon her filing of a bond in the amount
of P200,000.00 to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision was, by Order of November
4, 19963 , denied in this wise:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor thru counsel, and finding no
merits on the ground stated therein, considering that petitioner appears to be most qualified and
suitable to act as Julieta Ledesma's guardian after taking into consideration the qualifications of
the oppositor and her other recomendees [sic], aside from the fact that petitioner's appointment
as such was not objected to by any of her nearest kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of
oppositor, the same is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the following
ratiocination:4

Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the authenticity and due execution of the
letters which purport to show the existence of a rift between Julieta and her family and
dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed. At any rate, while it is correct to say
that no person should be appointed guardian if his interest conflict with those of the ward
(Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212), there are really no antagonistic interests to speak of between
petitioner [Amparo] and Julieta, they being co-owners of certain properties. There is also no
showing that petitioner's business decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.

While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient showing that
petitioner is hostile to the best interests of the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who,
realizing the need for the appointment of a person to guard her sister's interests, initiated the
petition for guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated by a desire to
prejudice Julieta's health as well as financial interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-
appellant who had initially concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the
court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years also militate against her assuming the
guardianship of the incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not interested to
be appointed legal guardian (p. 21[,] Appellant's Brief, Rollo, p. 59). But the persons that
she points to as being better choices as Julieta's guardian over the appellee have not acted, nor
even indicated, their desire to act as such. In any case, We see no cogent reason why We
should reverse the well-reasoned disquisition of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied,
she filed the present petition which proffers that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED
OCTOBER 4, 1996 AND IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED JUNE 29, 2000 AND
FEBRUARY 9, 2001.

The petition fails.

It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of
law.5 The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is question of fact.6

In the case at bar, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the appellate court and the
trial court erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the
person and properties of Julieta. In support of an affirmative answer, petitioner posits as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals' basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests between
[her] and [respondent] is contrary to the evidence on record,7

2. The Court of Appeals' erred in holding that there is no showing that [respondent] is hostile to
the best interest of Julieta,8 and

3. Julieta Ledesma's appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as her

guardian.9

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioner's position require a review of
the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. This Court cannot thus
be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them
to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.10

That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner in her Reply dated August 30,
2001:11

Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing and revising only errors of law, it is nonetheless subject to the following
exceptions which have been laid down in a number of decisions of this Honorable Court:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and

conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
When there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellants and appellee; (7) When the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Emphasis supplied); (Rollo, 350-351)

Petitioner claims that "there is no doubt that the instant petition falls within the above-stated
exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on
record."12

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly
with the parties.13 As this Court said:

As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are
urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very
clear that he has fallen into grievous error.14

In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.

Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo15 with respect to the existence of antagonistic

interests between respondent and Julieta. In that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as
creditor and mortgagee of the minor-wards' properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the
interest of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment as guardian was erroneous.
For while he sought to foreclose the wards' properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand,
he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian. Added to
that was Gabriel's appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he
held a mortgage on the properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that
the first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None of the said
circumstances obtain in the present case.

Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed16 a
rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic interests. The first letter17 sent by Julieta to
respondent which reads:

x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree with me (Julieta) my decision is right to let us divide as
soon as possible, so we will have capital each of us to work, and keep the Hda, for [sic]
generation to generation.

xxx - xxx - xxx

For the last time I will repeat even if I have to kneel before you and Carlos I have no interest
anymore in any future investment due to my age and being single and alone in life. I would like
to be able to enjoy whatever monies that correspond to me. I would like to have enough money
as a reserve for any future need that I might have like hospitalization, travel, buying whatever I
like, etc. etc. (Letter to appellee; Exhibit "2")

merely shows Julieta's lack of interest in future investments, not necessarily a business
disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting to antagonistic interests between her and
respondent to render the latter unsuitable for appointment as guardian.

The second letter18 which reads:

My mind is still clear to tell you about Fortuna when I had my stroke I was confined in MMC
for one month. If I am not mistaken you did not visit me. One day Carlos came to visit me
and asked me this question. Do you think you will be able to continue managing the Hda? I
answered him I don't know it all depends on my sickness. Carlos said who do you want to take
your place? I said I want Cheling Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said O.K. He asked Pilar can you
contact Cheling? Tell him to call me or see me. The nephew of Cheling was a resident in MMC
through him Pilar was able to contact Cheling and gave him Carlo's message. So I thought all
the time it was agreeable. I left for USA for treatment. To my surprise when I came back from
USA it was not Cheling, but you (appellee) took over the management as you requested.
Carlos did not tell me but decided in your favor. . . . (Letter to appellee; Exhibit "3"; emphasis
supplied)

shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at the Makati Medical
Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was disagreement as to who should run the hacienda,
with Julieta favoring a certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management
of the hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No inference as to the
existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta can thus be made.

The third letter19 which reads:

. . . Carlos went to the house before I left and asked from me twenty thousand (20,000) shares
of San Carlos Milling which you gave because I wanted to sell all. . . . If he does not sell or
cannot sell, just arrange to send them back to me. Amparing since I came here to America and
Vancouver my requests have been ignored. Everyone is suspecting that Pilar is the one
ordering or commanding me that is not true. What I asked from Julio is just to report to me or
send me reports so I can follow up from here. But up to now he has ignored my requests x x x .
(Letter to appellee Exhibit "4")

has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in finding that respondent
is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian. The letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta's
nephew Julio Ledesma, and not respondent, who ignored the "request."

As for the fourth letter20 which reads:

I want all of you to know that whatever decision now and in the future I want to do nobody can
stop me especially regarding my properties, money, etc. I will be the only one to dispose of it
because it is mine. You said to Raul you are going to court, you are most welcome x x x . (Letter
to Connie, Exhibit "5")

it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not even addressed to
respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of Julieta).

Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to

take control of Julieta's properties and use them for her own benefit21 is purely speculative and
finds no support from the records.

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That
respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined after she
suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation
by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of
doctors22 after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she suffered another
stroke.

Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the
petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among
other reasons, she felt she was disliked by respondent,23 a ground which does not render
respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the
deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, 24 which is reflective of a lack of good
faith.

Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the suitability of Amparo for appointment as
guardian not having been successfully contested.

ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ ., concur.

Endnotes:
1
 Records, pp. 1-3.

2
 Id. at 303-308.

3
 Records at 321.

4
 CA Rollo, pp. 197-201.

5
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 1; See Perez v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 43, 61 (1999)
(citation omitted); Chan Sui Bi v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 364, 372 (2000).

6
 China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 401, 411 (2000) (citation omitted).

7
 Rollo, p. 20.

8
 Id. at 28.

9
 Id. at 34.

10
 Chan Sui Bi v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 364, 372-373 (2000) (citation omitted).

11
 Rollo at 350-351.
12
 Id. at 351.

13
 Feliciano v. Camahort, 22 Phil. 235, 235-236 (1912).

14
 Id. (emphasis supplied).

15
 74 Phil. 25, 29-30 (1942).

16
 Rollo at 22.

17
 Id. at 20-21.

18
 Id. at 21.

19
 Id.

20
 Id.

21
 Rollo at 23; See also at 53.

22
 Rollo at 31.

23
 Records at 307.

24
 CA Rollo, pp. 200-201.

2. Cañiza vs CA, G.R. No. 110427

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO

EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife,
LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a spinster, a
retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the
University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 107,2 in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista.3 She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which
included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed
legal guardian of her person and estate.

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17,
1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from
said premises.4 The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff,
suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.

The amended Complaint5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the
property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the
Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her
house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance
and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and
in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they . . (were) enriching
themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they . . . (were) saving money by
not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . . . (was) losing much money as her house
could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1)
year from the date of of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."

In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's
house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered
by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on
September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.

Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza's favor,6 the Estradas being
ordered to vacate the premises and pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.

But on appeal,8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch
96.9 By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, 10 the RTC held that the "action by which the
issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual
and legal situation . . demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."

Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but failed
in that attempt. In a decision 11 promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court 12 affirmed the
RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion
publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not
been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there
as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the
holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by
the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of
intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to
continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening
incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out." 13

Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court's
judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she should have
pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a
xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case." 14

In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, 15 the Estradas insist that
the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession
of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises
could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful)
within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of forcible
entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the
"real owner," Carmen Cañiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on those
postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed
premises.

Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs — the aforementioned guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively — were by
this Court's leave, substituted for her. 17

Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate
judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to
be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said
action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista
may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. 18 An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in
order. 19

The amended Complaint alleges: 20

6. That the plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house

and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of
this complaint;

xxx xxx xxx

9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were

allowed to live temporarily in the house of plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, for free, out of
her kindness;

10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants,
for them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored
and the defendants refused to vacate the same. . .

11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista,

made another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises,
before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon
City, but after two (2) conferences, the result was negative and no settlement
was reached. A photocopy of the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990,
issued by said Barangay Captain is attached, marked Annex "D" and made an
integral part hereof;

12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to
vacate the house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up
to this time residing in the said place;

13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the
defendants, by her legal guardian — Amparo Evangelista;

14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of
the house in question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintiff because, while they are saving money by not paying any
rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others;
 15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and
medical treatment;

16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to
go to court for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Its prayer 21 is quoted below:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen

Cañiza, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, respectfully
prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
the defendants as follows:

1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other

persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 6 1 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the
plaintiff Carmen Cañiza; and

2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;

3. To pay the costs of the suit.

In essence, the amended complaint states:

1) that the Estradas were occupying Cañiza's house by tolerance — having been
"allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness;"

2) that Cañiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health . . (was) failing
and she . . (needed) funds . . to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance
and medical treatment;"

3) that through her general guardian, Cañiza requested the Estradas several
times, orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;

4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to
Cañiza, to her continuing prejudice; and

5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate.

Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in
an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 23

The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when
"the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend that
since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract,
express or implied" — they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for
free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness" — in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of
. . (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an
action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Cañiza)
of the possession of . . (her property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house,
rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor.
Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of
liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the
Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court
adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission
without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. 24 The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who
continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. 25 In
other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land or property the moment he is required to leave. 26 Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust
vs. Court of Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon
its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment
despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . . (its) continuing
possession . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.

It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one
demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be
reckoned from the date of the last demand, 28 the reason being that the lessor has the option to
waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the
premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by Cañiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed
within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." Although
this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to
vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was
actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last) written
demand to vacate.

The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That
permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that
the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with
authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will
bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right
to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become
owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being
possible unless and until the will is duly probated.

Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to
the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not
claim the right of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended. They could not assert
any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is
dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been
bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place; in other words, prior to the probate
of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.

In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that
involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is
therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion
publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.

II

The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention
that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the
ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; 30 and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). 31 An
owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is
not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship 32 dated
December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the
incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other
acts necessary for the management of her properties . . " 33 By that appointment, it became
Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to
assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and
friends. 34 It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over,
Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no
right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. 35 That right to manage
the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone
who retains it, 36 and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose. 37

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to
attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by
Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of

ward. — A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without
waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to
the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be
any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian
may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so,
and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.

Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the ejectment action, that
as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to
resolve "the issue of ownership . . only to determine the issue of possession." 38

III

As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The
Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically
terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and
ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without
merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule affords no advantage to
the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2)
surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal
at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, viz.: 41

Sec. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
 specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and
on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not extinguish
the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely
personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her
interests in the appeal at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's
petition for certiorari — is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 41-43

2 Presided over by Judge Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis

3 Docketed as SP. PROC. No. Q-89-2603 of Branch 107, entitled "Petition for
Guardianship of the Person and Estate of the Incompetent Carmen Caniza,
Amparo A. Evangelista, Petitioner."

4 Docketed as Civil Case No. 3410 for Ejectment with Damages

5 Petition, Annex "K", Rollo, pp. 55-59

6 Petition, Annex "B," Rollo, pp. 33-35

8 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12554

9 Presided Over by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin

10 Rollo pp. 36-40

11 Rollo, pp. 27-32

12 Special First Division composed of Vailoces, J., ponente, with Lantin and

Mabutas, Jr., JJ., concurring

13 CA Decision, p. 4, Rollo, p. 30

14 Petition, p. 11, Rollo p. 18

15 Rollo, pp. 97-112

16 Manifestation dated March 25, 1994

17 Second Division Resolution dated June 20, 1994

18 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 [1994], citing Abrin vs.
Campos, 203 SCRA 420 (1991); Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 337
[1992); Abad vs. Court of First Instance, 206 SCRA 567 [1992]; Del Castillo vs.
Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169 [1992); Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 162
[1992]; Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 6132 (1980); Ramirez v. Chit, 21 SCRA
1364 [1967]; Mediran vs. Vilanueva, 37 Phil. 752 [1918]

19 Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 108 [1995]

20 Rollo, pp. 56-57, emphasis in original text

21 Rollo, pp. 57-58

22 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 [1994], citing Maddamu vs.
Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 230 [1943]

23 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672

[1946]; Valderama Lumber Manufacturer's Co. vs. L.S. Sarmiento Co., 5 SCRA
287 [1962]; Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136 [1972]

24 Yu vs. de Lara, 6 SCRA 785 [1962]; Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136
[1972]; Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877 [1983]; Peran vs. Presiding
Judge, Br. II, CFI, Sorsogon, 125 SCRA 78 [1983]; Banco de Oro Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 464 [1990].

25 Vda. de Catchuela vs. Francisco, 98 SCRA 172 [1980] citing Calubayan vs.

Pascual 21 SCRA 146, 148 [1967]

26 Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]

27 229 SCRA 627, 636 [1994]

28 Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 [1995] citing Sarona, et al vs.

Villegas, et al, 22 SCRA 1257 [1968]

29 Penas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 744 [1994] citing Racaza vs.
Susana Realty, Inc. 18 SCRA 1172 [1966].

30 ART. 828, Civil Code

31 ART. 838, Civil Code

32 Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, p. 44

33 Emphasis supplied

34 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Ed., Vol. V-B,
p. 457, citing Ex-parte Fletcher, 142 So. 30; 39 C.J.S. 86

35 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970 Ed. Vol. V-B,
p. 458, citing 39 C.J.S. 114-115.

36 Castillo V. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 [1937], cited in Moran, Comments on the

Rules of Court, Vol. 3, 1980 ed., p. 570

37 Conchita Juachon vs. Felix Manalo, G.R. No. L-42, 77 Phil. 1092, [January
20, 1947, unreported], cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of court, 1979
Ed., Volume I, p. 176
 38 Sec. 3, R.A. No. 7691, amending Sec. 33 of B.P. 129; SEE Wilmon Auto
Supply Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108 [1992].

39 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Phils., Vol. V-B, 1970
Ed., citing 25 Am. Jur. 37

40 Second Division; SEE footnote 17, supra

41 Emphasis supplied

42 Vda. de Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 250 SCRA 305 (Nov. 23, 1995)
citing Vda. de Haberes vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534 [1981]; Republic vs.
Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242 [1962]; Florendo Jr. vs. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304 [1984].

3. Vancil vs Belmes, 358 SCRA 757

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 132223            June 19, 2001

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P.
Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29,
1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the said Decision.

The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:

"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of

the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time,
Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the
petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate
consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of
P100,000.00.
 "Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-
consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.

"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian
over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an
opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already
filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for
the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the
natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject
minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing;
that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was
filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado,
U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.

"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr.
and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties
as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for
a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of
October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.

The Court of Appeals held:

"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in
the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental
authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of
the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the
Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may
another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any
reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal
rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen
would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil
law and the constitution on family solidarity."2

On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the
following "legal points":

"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to
be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to
existing jurisprudence.

"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the
biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the
undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped
seven times by Oppositor’s live-in partner.

"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner
Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998,
respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2,
1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate.3 Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed
with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The
said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998.

Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect to
her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.

The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent
should be his guardian.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of
the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds
support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:

"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural
and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent
one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship."

Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.

Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:

"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent."

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive
and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian
of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie
considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident
of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations
required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the
duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties
to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the
Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioner’s old age and her
conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-
168846 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her
coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is
not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are
not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held:

"Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that
her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators
or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements
upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates
of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with
this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to
their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who
are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that
Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of
respondent Helen Belmes.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

2
 Rollo, p. 47.

3
 Rollo, p. 127.

4
 266 SCRA 317 (1997).

5
 242 SCRA 407 (1995).

6
 Sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 4 months and 1 day of prision
correcional as maximum and a fine of P3,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify offended party in the sum of P200,000.00 as moral
damages. See p. 118, Rollo.

7
 13 Phils. 212 , 217 (1909).

4. Paciente vs Dacuycuy, 114 SCRA 924

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982

PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA CALLE, court-appointed guardian of the
minors Shirley and Leandro, both surnamed HOMERES; the SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE
CITY FISCAL OF TACLOBAN; and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban
City, respondents.

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an April 24, 1981 order
of the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte which required the petitioner
and Conchita Dumdum to —

give and deposit with the clerk of this court the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (PI0,000.00) more as additional consideration of Lot No. 3085-G of the
Tacloban Cadastre which the court believes to be fair and reasonable price of the
property. This amount should be deposited with the clerk of this court on or
before June 24, 1981; otherwise TCT No. T-13238 in the name of Patria
Paciente now subject of a mortgage in favor of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to guarantee an obligation in the amount of P30,000.00, dated
December 27, 1978, will be cancelled.

as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum of the aforesaid order and directed the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City —

to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and issue in lieu thereof a new
transfer certificate of title to the following present owners of Lot 3085- G of the
Tacloban Cadastre: Patria Paciente, of legal age, Filipino, married, residing in
Tacloban City, 1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban City, 1/3;
and, Leandro Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban City, Philippines, 1/3,
subject to the mortgage lien of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.

because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order. The facts of the case are as
follow:

In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor
children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3085-G situated in Sagkahan,
Tacloban City, covered by TCT No. 12138. This lot which he had inherited from his deceased
father, Felizardo Homeres, has an area of one thousand seven hundred one (1,701) square
meters.

On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita Dumdum for
P10,000.00.
On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and
estate of the minors. The petition was granted on August 9, 1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her
oath as guardian on September 13, 1977,

On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had been titled in her
name under TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00.
Consequently, Patria Paciente was issued TCT No. T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City.

On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation for P30,000.00.

On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, filed a
manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is the subject of the
guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of the petitioner under TCT No. T-
13238 and that it was mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee
petitioner's loan of P30,000.00.

Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued an order on
November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation to appear before the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why TCT
No. T-13238, covering a parcel of land co-owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres,
should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court.

When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation did not appear before the court. Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and
explained to the respondent court that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres
to the petitioner without obtaining the approval of the court because she was not aware of such
requirement regarding the properties of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court
again issued an order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation to explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be cancelled for their failure to
first secure judicial authority before disposing of the said property.

At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband, apprised the court that
the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question. Respondent court then
issued the questioned order.

A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having been denied, petitioner
filed the present petition.

The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship court has
jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner
and to order the issuance of a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the petitioner for
her having failed to comply with the court's order directing her to pay the minors the reasonable
price of their property that their mother alienated without authority of a competent court.

Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and Parco and Bautista vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, petitioner contends that respondent
court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a
Torrens Title. In the Cui case, this Court ruled:

... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some relevancy is that
of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In this case, the court made a distinction
between the provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which now correspond to section 6, Rule 88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the
Rules of Court. This Court in that case said in effect that while in administration
proceedings the court under section 709 may only question the person
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away property
belonging to the estate, section 593 of the same Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes the Judge or the court to issue such orders as maybe necessary to
secure the estate against concealment, embezzlement and conveyance, and this
 distinction is now given emphasis by respondents' counsel. the way we interpret
section 573 of the Code of Civil Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97, section
6 of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid down in the case of Castillo
vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court may issue an order directing the delivery
or return of any property embezzled, concealed or conveyed which belongs to a
ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and indisputable.

xxx xxx xxx

In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his
order of September 5, 1951, in the guardianship proceedings requiring the
petitioners to deliver the rentals collected by them to the guardian and
authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to
the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in action
later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only
in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
the guardian.

and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:

In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the
purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually
order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed,
or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases,
where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been
already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary
action and not in a guardianship proceedings.

Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or return of the
property conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the respondent court valid. The
petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do
not support her argument. While it is true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to
any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not
in guardianship proceedings, We also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the
property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.

In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and indisputable.
They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they
are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson
de Pua vs. San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).

In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did not exceed its
jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.

The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional consideration of P10,000.00
is a different matter. It was issued without a hearing to determine not only the valuation of the
property but the time frame for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null
and void.

It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the additional amount, the
second order directing the cancellation of the petitioner's title may be said to have superseded
or cancelled the first order. The second order directed the issuance of a new title over the land
inherited by Leandro Homeres from his late father with each heir getting title to one-third of the
property. Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of violations of due process and
the guardianship court's unusual procedures in dealing with the properties under guardianship,
the respondent court is directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the
reasonable price of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is found to be in the best interests of the
wards and consistent with the rights of all parties involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in Special Proceedings No. JP-
0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte is hereby ordered to conduct further
hearings of the case as above indicated.

SO ORDERED,

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

5. Abad vs Biason, 687 SCRA 368, December 5, 2012

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 191993               December 5, 2012

EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April
19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No; 90145.

The facts show that on March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for
guardianship over the person and properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Dagupan City, Branch 42, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2007-0050-D. In
support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, who is
single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to
her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself
and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.3
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to the same and
scheduled it for hearing. When the petition was called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody
entered an opposition and Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. After Abad formally
offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Oppositionin- Intervention. Subsequently, on
June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the
Petition and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian
of the Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a
nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the
appointment of the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as
Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon
City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be
appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of
attorney to manage her properties.4

On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 denying Abad’s petition and appointing
Biason as Maura’s guardian. The RTC disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. Petitioner Eduardo T. Abad is found to be

disqualified to act as guardian of incompetent Maura B. Abad. Oppositor Leonardo A. Biason is
established by this Court to be in a better position to be the guardian of said incompetent Maura
B. Abad.

The Court hereby fixes the guardianship bond at [P]500,000.00 and the letters of guardianship
shall be issued only upon the submission of the bond, conditioned on the following provisions of
the Rule 94[,] Section 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

a. To make and return to the Court within three (3) months true and complete inventory
of all the estate, real and personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any other person for him;

b. To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate
according to these rules for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper
care, custody x x x of the ward;

c. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of all
proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the
same, at the time designated by these rules and such other times as the court directs,
and at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay
over all the estate, effects, and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from him on such
settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;

d. To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.

SO ORDERED.6

Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied
the same in an Order dated December 11, 2007.

Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the RTC erred in disqualifying him from being
appointed as Maura’s guardian despite the fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the
Rules. That he was not a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground for his
disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt
even if he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her
guardian.7

Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications of Biason
prior to his appointment as guardian. He claimed that the RTC also overlooked Maura’s express
objection to Biason’s appointment.8
On August 28, 2009, the CA issued a Decision,9 affirming the decision of the RTC, the pertinent
portions of which read:

The petitioner-appellant may have been correct in arguing that there is no legal requirement that
the guardian must be residing in the same dwelling place or municipality as that of the ward or
incompetent, and that the Vancil vs. Belmes case cited by the court a quo which held that
"courts should not appoint as guardians persons who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts" pertains to persons who are not residents of the country.

However, we do not find that the court a quo, by deciding to appoint the oppositor-appellee as
guardian, has fallen into grievous error.

For one, the oppositor-appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is also a relative, a nephew of the
incompetent. There are no vices of character which have been established as to disqualify him
from being appointed as a guardian.

xxxx

Anent the claim of the petitioner-appellant that he has been expressly chosen by her aunt to be
her guardian as evidenced by her testimony, although it could be given weight, the same could
not be heavily relied upon, especially considering the alleged mental state of the incompetent
due to her advanced age.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 42 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[10

Dissatisfied, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in a
Resolution11 dated April 19, 2010, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.12

On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. Subsequently,
Maura filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene,13 together with a Petition-in-Intervention.14

The instant petition raises the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE

PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DESPITE
VERY CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS, DISREGARD OF THE RULES, AND
IRREGULARITIES IN THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT BIASON AS
GUARDIAN;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE

PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND ERRONEOUSLY UPHELD RESPONDENT BIASON’S
APPOINTMENT AS GUARDIAN BASED ON SOLE GROUND OF RESIDENCE, AND
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED
BY THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN.15
Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not
hold any hearing to determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as
provided by law. Further, he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert
Biason’s appointment.16

Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence. He
emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a guardian to be a resident of the same locality as
the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in order to qualify for the
appointment. The more significant considerations are that the person to be appointed must be
of good moral character and must have the capability and sound judgment in order that he may
be able to take care of the ward and prudently manage his assets.17

Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11, 2012,
Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion,18 informing this Court that Biason passed away on April
3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center, Marikina City due to multiple organ failure, septic shock,
community acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with metastasis, and attached a copy of
his Death Certificate.19 Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the
issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the
guardianship be terminated.

On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution,20 requiring Abad to comment on the
manifestation filed by Maura. Pursuant to the Resolution, Abad filed his Comment21 on August 9,
2012 and expressed his acquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss the petition. He
asseverated that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in the appointment of
Biason as guardian which he believed had been rendered moot and academic by the latter’s
death. He also supported Maura’s prayer for the termination of the guardianship by asseverating
that her act of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact that she is of sound mind
and that she can competently manage her business affairs.

We find Maura’s motion meritorious.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In
such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.22

In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and
Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated
September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Basically, he was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC
appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become
impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established
rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either
the guardian or the ward.23 The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the
propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already
been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else
for that matter, any substantial relief.
1âwphi1

Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its purpose
and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is

hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached ih
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting member per Special Order No. 1385 dated December 4, 2012 vice Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.

Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Estela M.

1 

Perlas-Bemabe (now member of this Court) and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; rolla, pp.

37-51.

2 
1d. at 52-53.

3 
Id. at 38.

4 
Id. at 39-40.

5 
Id. at 83-86.

6 
Id. at 85-86.

7 
Id. at 43.

8 
Ibid.

9 
Supra note 1.

10 
Id. at 47-48, 50; citation omitted.

11 
Supra note 2.
 12 
Id. at 53.

13 
Id. at 68-70.

14 
Id. at 71-80.

15 
Id. at 21.

16 
Id. at 22-23.

17 
Id. at 29.

18 
Id. at 254-255.

19 
Id. at 256.

20 
Id. at 260.

21 
Id. at 261-262.

Roxas v. Tipon, G.R. No. 160641, June 20, 2012, citing Romero II v. Estrada, G.R. No.
22 

174105, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 404.

Cañiza v. CA, 335 Phil. 1107, 1120 (1997), citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of
23 

Court in the Phils., Vol. V-B, 1970 Ed., citing 25 Am. Jur. 37.

6. Oropesa vs Oropesa, 671 SCRA 174, 2012

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184528               April 25, 2012

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of
the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008,
both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs.
CIRILO OROPESA." The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order3 dated September 27,
2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo
Oropesa’s petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa
(a widower), and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, a
petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of
his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016
and raffled off to Branch 260.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with
several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke
on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has
been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was
observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his
property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid,
manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people
around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for
hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report
thereon.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case
study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently
submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to
the social worker.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On
August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of
his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his
case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived
the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they
were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and
(3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondent’s) Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.5 (Citations
omitted.)

The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27,
2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to
establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer
his properties, Oppositor’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.6

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to
provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms
its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.

Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed
through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of
the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals
in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was
filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED

UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED
UNDER GUARDIANSHIP9

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals
should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the
erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence
presented by him showing respondent’s incompetence.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the
following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
"guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing
his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the
guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that
the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care
and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.11

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is
proven to be a minor or an incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking
care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who
may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on
clear, positive and definite evidence."12 We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and,
thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum13 the following factual matters:

a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten
(10) years already;
 b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Luke’s Medical Center
after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting
him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children
knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his
medical expenses;

c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and
management;

d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties remain unpaid and therefore
petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;

e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason
that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold,
respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned
from the sale of the old car;

f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his
daughter’s without the latter’s knowledge or consent;

g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab
himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of their fights;

h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and
furniture, despite protests from his children.14

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioner’s lack of material
evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant
documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition.
In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves
that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of
the said document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by
respondent in his Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondent’s claim
of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated
meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test
items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.

xxxx

General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He
was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a
task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical
designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock
Drawing Test. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to
problem situations. x x x.17

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were
claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver
(who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any
expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of
action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in
any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical
document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which
was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered
as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for
although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it
also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion
is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."18

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court
highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its
case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s physical and
mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo
O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own
affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that
were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem
situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning,
except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis
supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts."20 We only take cognizance of
questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in
the instant case. It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower
courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this
Court when supported by the evidence on record."22 We therefore adopt the factual findings of
the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to
evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true
or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
"authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is
not entitled to the relief sought."24 
1âwphi1

There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship
without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of
granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to
preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision

dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 72-83; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate
1 

Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring.

2 
Id. at 85-86.

3 
Id. at 457-460.

4 
Id. at 468-469.

5 
Id. at 73-75.

6 
Id. at 460.

7 
Id. at 469.

8 
Id. at 82.

9 
Id. at 667.

10 
212 Phil. 346 (1984).
11 
Id. at 352.

Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, 164 Phil. 55, 70 (1976), citing Yangco v. Court of First
12 

Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190 (1915).

13 
Rollo, pp. 653-682.

14 
Id. at 659.

15 
Records, pp. 10-13.

16 
Rollo, pp. 684-705.

17 
Records, pp. 11-12.

Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 and 169217, August 7, 2009, 595
18 

SCRA 464, 473-474.

19 
Rollo, p. 468.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA
20 

148, 155.

21 
Heirs of Jose Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 141, 147.

Maxwell Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 179395, December 15, 2010,
22 

638 SCRA 653, 658.

Republic v. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 404,
23 

422.

24 
Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 806, 822.