XI.

ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS (RULES 99 AND 100)

CASES:

1. Cang vs CA, 296 SCRA 128

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not
one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.

This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners."

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not
long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite 3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu 4 which rendered a decision5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." They further
agreed:

(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly

support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from
the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall constitute a first
lien on the net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the
parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
 (d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or
agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical without
the written consent of the husband; or any undertaking or acts that
ordinarily requires husband's consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated; 6

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that
also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In
1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.

While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 a month8 a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his children's
expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.

Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and
sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that
because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the
children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and
that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children for the following
reasons:

1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract
without the written consent of her husband;

2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States
and had been transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by
Immigration authorities, and

3. Her husband had divorced her.

Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too
meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
parental authority over his beloved children."

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody
of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody
over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court
then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors

Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioner-
spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted
and approved. These children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D.
Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively.
Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
 (1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties
as though they were in fact the legitimate children of the
petitioners;

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the

children; and,

(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this
Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:

(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed "close filial ties
with the Clavano family, especially their maternal uncle," petitioner
Ronald Clavano.

(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their
printing press, real estate business, export business and gasoline
station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had
substantial assets and income.

(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed

"Menchu," approved of the adoption because of her heart ailment,
near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she could not provide
them a secure and happy future as she "travels a lot."

(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual
direction as they would go to church together and had sent the
children to Catholic schools.

(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted

by the Clavanos — Keith had testified and expressed the wish to
be adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger ones were
observed by the court to have "snuggled" close to Ronald even
though their natural mother was around.

On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on "a very
shaky foundation" because of its findings that:

(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of his children" on

account of his being "an improvident father of his family" and an
"undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is based on the testimony
of his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend
of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived
as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao,
Mandaue City.

(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of

"comparatively recent dates" were "attempts at verisimilitude" as
these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could not be
verified.

(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of his

reconciliation with Anna Marie was "dim if not nil" because it was
petitioner who "devised, engineered and executed the divorce
proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court."
 (4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner "is now an
alien from the standpoint of Philippine laws" and therefore, how
his "new attachments and loyalties would sit with his (Filipino)
children is an open question."

Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:

Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a
ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal.
514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be
allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against his
opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re
Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83
Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing
R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441;
Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4
Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) 9

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it
would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to
the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly
give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study
report required by law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:

Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of
the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent
who has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729;
Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not
oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption
cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego
parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their
children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent's
presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of
abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.

Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and
has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide
support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-
707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second
is mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which
orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not
submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB,
but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the
children's names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987
(Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce decree
on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53
remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown
to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was
woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was
totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is
oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his
protestations.
 True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different
banks, as follows —

Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank

———— —————— ———— ——————

1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,

Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.

2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank

Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West

Virginia, U.S.A.

3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National

Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,

U.S.A.

The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's name as trustee
for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the
accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it
cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The second is an "or" account, in
the names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the
Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the funds
withdrawable by him alone.

The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of
evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a better future and security of his
family."10

Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the
decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a
manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he
and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the
fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's parents.
Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the
"joint complaint" for divorce.

Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was belied
by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to
the appellate court's findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody
over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he "is still a father to
his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he had always
denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it
true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in
Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City.
Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it
was only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald,
came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for
monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos
to claim that they could love the children much more than he could. 11

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court, alleging
that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a
natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —

Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the following to

the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or, over;

(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the

Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement
agency under whose care the child may be;

(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)

On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:

Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the following to

the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after

receiving counselling and appropriate social services from the
Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly
licensed child-placement agency;

(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly

licensed child-placement agency under whose care and legal
custody the child may be;

(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such,
when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable
law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.

During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which
amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides
for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the

proper government instrumentality;

(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over,
of the adopting parent or parents;

(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the

adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse,
if any; and
 (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
(Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:

Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and
not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned
the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not
been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
(Emphasis supplied)

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent
is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case
even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition
for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thus, the Court declared:

. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption

proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain
facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those
interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is
generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with
the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
father as follows:

3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has

given her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent,
Annex "A". Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age
appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert
Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already divorced the former,
as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the
County of Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the
instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in the United
States as an illegal immigrant. 15

The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by
his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for
determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. 17 This Court
is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. 18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority
to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that these do not conform to
the evidence on record. 19

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the
following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.

In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis
is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another,
hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or
interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." 23

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care
and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the

following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:

1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to "Dear
Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that
it had been "a long time since the last time you've heard from me excluding that
of the phone conversation we've had." She discussed petitioner's intention to buy
a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could be
engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the "last phone conversation"
she had with petitioner on the birthday of "Ma," she forgot to tell petitioner that
Keith's voice had changed; he had become a "bagito" or a teen-ager with many
"fans" who sent him Valentine's cards. She told him how Charmaine had become
quite a talkative "almost dalaga" who could carry on a conversation with
her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress when she won among the
candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She
informed him, however, that she was worried because Charmaine was vain and
wont to extravagance as she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she
told petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the
youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol
with whom he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said so much about the
children-because they might not have informed petitioner of "some happenings
and spices of life" about themselves. She said that it was "just very exciting to
know how they've grown up and very pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic)
different characters." She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at
the best of health." After extending her regards "to all," she signed her name after
the word "Love." This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner
whose address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).

2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of "a
note from Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that "we" wrote to
petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when
petitioner "called up last time." She told him how Joeton would grab the phone
from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine,
who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioner's call because
she also wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that
Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking
shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were
growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be "very fatherly"
about the children's needs because those were expensive here. For herself,
Anna Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that
whatever expenses he would incur, she would "replace" these. As a postscript,
she told petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider
shoes."

3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:

Dear Herbert,

Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.

By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to be thought of at
X'mas. Thanks again.

Sincere
ly,

Menchu

4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano,

Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they tried to tell their
mother "to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes start(s)" on June
16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the
motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and "we'll see what
you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and
shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He
told petitioner that they had been going to Labug with their mother picking them
up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his
mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening.
He wished his father "luck and the best of health" and that they prayed for him
and their other relatives. The letter was ended with "Love Keith."

5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the
Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of Joeton with
$5.00 inside." He told petitioner the amounts following his father's instructions
and promise to send money through the mail. He asked his father to address his
letter directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He informed
petitioner of activities during the Christmas season — that they enjoyed eating,
playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily
schedule and that their mother had been closely supervising them, instructing
them to fold their blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that
Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was also smart, was very
demanding of their mother. Because their mother was leaving for the United
States on February 5, they would be missing her like they were missing
petitioner. He asked for his "things" and $200.00. He told petitioner more
anecdotes about Joeton like he would make the sign of the cross even when they
would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not
dead because he had seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine
had become "very maldita" who was not always satisfied with her dolls and
things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter with "Love your son,
Keith." The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).

6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing
suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She
reminded him of her birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old.
She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They
had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9 although
Keith's classes had started on January 6. They would feel sad again because
Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them.
She signed, "Love, Charmaine."

7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had
not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila —
they went to Malacañang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He
informed him that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton
had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he was
glad they would be together in that school. He asked for his "reward" from
petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and
dollars that he could save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money he
had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner and wished him the best.
He added that petitioner should call them on Sundays.

8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the
latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the school and
"something else." She, promised not to spend so much and to save some. She
said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!" to petitioner. After
ending the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for her prize for
her grades as she got seventh place.

9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been
writing him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them; that
he learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around; that he
would be going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his Mommy had
just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar boy." He
asked petitioner to write them soon.

10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner
that he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the only
one in his group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become
naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He
advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of
topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he was a member of the
basketball team and that his mom would drive for his group. He asked him to call
them often like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so
that they could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger
and heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken
him so long to write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked
petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that
the latter should buy something for Mommy.
 11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated October 8,
1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.

12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the year '83
written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine
and Joeton.

13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even
when their Mom "was there" where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith
asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to buy him a
motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed
petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their grades
were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence. Keith wanted a bow
and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner
would come and visit them someday.

14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date
January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that the
latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery
items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled
shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make
her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was
already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even though his
mother had told him not to be shy about it.

Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing
that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit
of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from
1985 to 1989.

These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts below
simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards
the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below
attached a high premium to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally brushed aside
the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the
children.

True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings
towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that
Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would
certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to
sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.

The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children. This is hardly
surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their presence.
Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to private
respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their father.
Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor
when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his
hospital bills.

In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his mother.
The Court said:
 Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according
to her means.

In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award custody
of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:

This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived
mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories
engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away
from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of
extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may
be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and
her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We
should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not
natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its
foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic)
all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a
dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child
into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never
counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations
with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . .
.

In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said:

A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her
counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a, result of her
character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the
best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother
and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his
or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the
suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child
which is the paramount consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29

Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. 30 The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not
miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received
from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him
and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but
also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and
triumphs.

The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's "meager"
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his
family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to
the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not
exactly the "paramount consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the country, as
she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking
abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because
Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. 31 In his testimony, private
respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and came
home twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her
children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when
he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed
the adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's
brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the
task upon private respondents. 33

This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman,
private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could "take care of the children while their parents are away," 35 thereby
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the children's surname changed
to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be
difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also
testified that he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.

Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister Anna
Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep
the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was
allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and
suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not
that serious as she could still take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to
physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38 —
she could not have been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the
Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their
notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children
would "never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39

Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to
the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine
society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in
orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the
baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a
premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting them.
Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken
as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit
father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a "bad" husband does
not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly
speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority
over the children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he
took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose
the adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the
case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in
the United States. 44

Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement with
his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As
such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute
petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal
home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case.
Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of
his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample
evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and
sent his family money, no matter how "meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of
the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court's
position, should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not
to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural
rights of the parents over the child. 47

In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the manifestation/compromise
agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal
separation. According to private respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by
that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and,
therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however,
anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into
contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements
leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private
respondents' apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's
consent to the adoption.

The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of
placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."

If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the "exercise" of
parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to
the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions
regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. 50

In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of which is
vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as

. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses. As
regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights,
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only
in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 52 (Emphasis supplied)

As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of
parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation
case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of
the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, 53 there
was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible
person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the
law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court
thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner.
The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon.
The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such
that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them. 54

The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for
adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the
issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.

As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not
recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.

Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established customs
and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial
rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for
their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and
welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents;
neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and
their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow this affinity to
suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well being of
the child.

Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and
care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code,
the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino
children. 59

The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":

(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody
of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding
and security towards the full and harmonious development of
his/her personality. 60

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a

child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in
accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61

(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her

biological parent(s). 62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular
relevance to instant case are the following provisions:

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . .
to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child,
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present Convention. 63

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or
both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents
on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests. 64

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain
on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and
direct contacts with both parents . . . 65

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide
direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with
the evolving capacities of the child. 66

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with
respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of
the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent
or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their
children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to
the fullest extent possible.

Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legal
age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be
endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding
their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said
petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law
and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine
and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Serafin E. Camilon and concurred in by Associate

Justices Celso L. Magsino and Artemon D. Luna.

2 Presided by Judge Renato C. Dacudao.

3 Docketed as Civil Case No. JD-707.

4 Presided by Judge Maura C. Navarro.

5 Original Records, pp. 39-40.

6 Exh. H-2.
7 Original Records, pp. 5-7.

8 RTC Decision, p. 3.

9 RTC Decision, pp. 7-8.

10 CA Decision, pp. 16-17. Penned by Justice Serafin E. Camilon, Celso L. Magsino and
Artemon D. Luna, JJ., concurring.

11 Record of CA-G.R. CV No. 27108, pp. 46-53.

12 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205
SCRA 356, 362.

13 AQUINO, CIVIL CODE. Vol. 1, 1990 ed., p. 299 citing Santos v. Aranzanso, 123 Phil.
160, 167 (1966).

14 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra, at p. 365.

15 Exh. A.

16 Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, L-30576, February 10, 1976, 69 SCRA 298; Santos v.
Aranzanso, supra.

17 Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 463, 471 (1996).

18 Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102037, July 17, 1996, 259 SCRA 65, 71.

19 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, L-43972, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 735,
739 citing Ongsiako v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69901, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA 627.

20 258 SCRA 651 [1996].

21 P.M. Pastera Brokerage v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113657, January 20, 1997,
266 SCRA 365, 371.

22 De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 130 Phil. 324 (1968).

23 Duncan v. CFI of Rizal, supra at p. 304; Santos v. Aranzanso, supra at p. 168.

24 De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, supra.

25 Exhs. 15 to 17.

26 250 SCRA 82 [1995].

27 86 Phil. 554, 559-560 (1950).

28 312 Phil. 431 (1995).

29 Ibid., at p. 439.

30 See; Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014, 1020 (1996).

31 TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 38.

32 Ibid., p. 22.
33 RTC Decision, pp. 1-2.

34 TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 13.

35 TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 24.

36 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

37 TSN, January 12, 1988, p. 10.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 6.

40 TSN, December 8, 1987, p. 12.

41 Silva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997.

42 Chua v. Cabangbang, 137 Phil. 204 (1969).

43 Exh. 18.

44 TSN, December 8, 1987, pp. 47-48; February 11, 1998, p. 6.

45 TSN, December 8, 1987, p. 20.

46 Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606 (1996).

47 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles, supra.

49 Atty. Ricardo Padilla.

49 TSN, November 17, 1987, p. 37.

50 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Felix V. Makasiar in Luna v. Intermediate Appellate

Court (G.R. No. 68374, June 18, 1985, 137 SCRA 7) citing 59 Am. Jur. 2d 107.

51 Art. 211, Family Code.

52 Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 31
7, 322-323 citing Santos, Sr., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995,
242 SCRA 407.

53 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 491 citing 4

Salvat 383.

54 TSN, February 11, 1988, pp. 9-12.

55 Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, 169 SCRA 575, 579.

56 122 Phil. 752 (1965).

57 Supra.

58 The law was approved on June 7, 1995.

59 The law was approved on February 25, 1998.

60 Art. 1, Sec. 2(a), R.A. No. 8552.

 61 Art. 1, Sec. 2(b), Ibid; adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
November 20, 1989 and ratified by the Philippines in July 1990 by virtue of Senate
Resolution No. 109.

62 Art. 1, Sec. 2(c), ii, Ibid.

63 Art. 5, Convention on the Rights of the Child.

64 Art. 9, parag. 3, ibid.

65 Art. 10, parag. 2, ibid.

66 Art. 14, parag. 2, ibid.

67 See: Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 441.

2. Vda. De Jacob vs CA, 312 SCRA 772

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 135216           August 19, 1999

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased

Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document
itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the
marriage contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998,
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more
consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April
1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.2

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein
Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:

a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract" excluded

under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and
non-existent.

b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.

c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier
issued; and

d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.

And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.

Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo.

In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case
No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-
appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate
as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of
the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal
heir of Alfredo.

The following issues were raised in the court a quo:

a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo

Jacob was valid;

b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating
that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of
the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
 1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;

2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
"thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa
and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;

3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the

loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he
allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who
allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he
was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
it was one "Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of
the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;

4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered
in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally
adopted son of Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in

the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at
his residence on 01 October 1990.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding
judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document

Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and
compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant
fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the
questioned and the "standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the
standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former
NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32)
specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined
by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant
similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing
characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that
the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the
petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
 Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty.
Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and
authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining
his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring
the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."4 (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1
of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take
each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties
as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.

And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

xxx     xxx     xxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original

document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established
by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is
the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such
document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of
the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of
the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish
the circumstances of the loss of the original document.

With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine,
suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the
presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of
his regular duties.

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a
rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of
Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not
upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and
 discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing of which would
ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final
analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a relative one,
depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the particular witness.
Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on account of a
mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of this
case.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court.
Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the
court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist
cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the
trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established
by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the
original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6

The Issues

In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not
been sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be
assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil
contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this
contention.

To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties
had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr.
Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to
this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved
by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost,
without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the
following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the
letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the
Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of
Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the
evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez
v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:

. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary
evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact,
such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight
of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence."17

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who
ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where
the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and
documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain
irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with
the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this
certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.

Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias,  21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent
and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the

marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to

present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this
principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we
accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25

Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in
the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years
before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the
first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not
invalidate the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing
officer.29

Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)

This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a

man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner
lived together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted
in this case.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate
court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the
assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial
court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule,
however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not
the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined
the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the
present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in
petitions under Rule 45.37

Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were
presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on
respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 Respondent
Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He
contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and
cites the following portion as proof:39

Q. What was you[r] response, sir?

A: I said I do not remember.

Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its
context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no
ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. What else did she tell you[?]

A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.

Q. What was your response sir[?]

A. I said I do not remember.40

The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was
declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the
Deposition:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether
you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is
your signature.

A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading
Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my
signature.41

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.

The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of
the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and
the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.

Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner
Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
 Atty. Paraiso

Q   And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this
document?

A   Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard
signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of
my findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics
[was] in the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the
photograph as the capital letter "J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought
without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent
Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did
not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts
that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that
there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption
of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U.

1

Amin (ponente), and J. Hector L. Hofileña.

2
 CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 59.

3
 Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several judges; namely,
Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas, Bonifacio C. Initia,
and Augusto O. Cledera.

4
 CA Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 52-56.

5
 CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 56-58.
 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon receipt by the
6

Court of respondent's Memorandum.

7
 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 11; rollo, p. 83.

8
 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1987
ed., p. 265.

9
 Respondents' Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.

10
 See note 34, infra.

11
 See CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 54.

12
 Art. 76 of the Civil Code provides:

No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oath. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

 De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7, 1996, per Mendoza, J. See Rule
13

130, § 5, Rules of Court.

14
 See De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602, February 9, 1993.

15
 91 Phil. 565, 573, July 9, 1952, per Tuason, J.

16
 66 SCRA 425, August 29, 1975.

17
 Ibid., p. 469, per Barredo, J.

 De Vera v. Aguilar, supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87,

18

89-90, December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v. CA, supra.

19
 Ibid., p. 607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, supra. (emphasis ours)

20
 CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 53-54.

21
 4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.

22
 Ibid., citing 55 CJS, p. 900.

23
 269 SCRA 259, 266, March 7, 1997; per Mendoza, J.

24
 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998.

25
 Ibid., p. 204, per Panganiban, J.

26
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.

27
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 122.

 See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1, 3, October 6, 1930; cited in Jones v. Hortigüela,

28

64 Phil. 179, 184, March 6, 1937. Article 53 of the New Civil Code. Cf. Petition, p.
22; rollo, p. 29.
29
 Art. 68, Civil Code.

 Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 103, March 12, 1975, per Makalintal, CJ, citing Adong
30

v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56, March 3, 1922.

 See Trinidad v. CA, supra; Balogbog v. CA, supra; People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA

31

110, October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.

 Sec. 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Sec. 5 (bb), Rule 131, 1964 Rules of Court
32

and Article 220 of the Civil Code.

33
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 124.

 This is evidenced by the "Affidavit of Marriage Between a Man and Woman Who Have
34

Lived for at Least Five Years," the authenticity of which was not questioned by
respondent.

35
 CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.

36
 Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

 Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25, 1996; Cayabyab v. IAC,
37

232 SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.

38
 See RTC Decision, p. 11; Records, Vol. III, p. 1,506.

39
 Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 125-126.

40
 Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 2, October 1, 1990; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,128.

41
 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied)

42
 Ibid., p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.

43
 TSN, p. 9, May 3, 1991; Records, p. 1,266, vol. 3.

44
 TSN, p. 7, December 8, 1992; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,422.

45
 Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.

46
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 31-36; rollo, pp. 103-108.

47
 Records, Vol. I, p. 40.

48
 Records, Vol. I, p. 41.

49
 Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, May 31, 1955.

3. Republic vs Hon. Jose Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 117209             February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON
y ANDRADE, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet?

This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure
questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, dated
September 13, 1994 1 in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the
petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer
therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.

The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson
y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition 2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the
circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought.
In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said
minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives
and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence. 3

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner
reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as
two separate proceedings.

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in
favor of herein private respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal
intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally
adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition
on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it
shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of
Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this
case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of
this Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its appropriate action
consisten(t) herewith. 5

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the
fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of
adoption rendered in their favor. The records show that the latter have commendably
established their qualifications under the law to be adopters, 6 and have amply complied with the
procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, 7 with the findings of the trial court being
recited thus:
 To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16,
1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was published in the March 31, April 6
and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs.
"B" to "E" and submarkings). . . .

xxx       xxx       xxx

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record
(Exhs. "K" to "V"); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child
Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds
support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social
Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly
individuals. They are found physically healthy; mentally fit, spiritually and
financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph.

"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly
share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to
continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.

"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the
Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the
Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond
with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.

"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl
Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8

It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently
buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. 9 Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the
order of the court below granting the petition, for adoption.

The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows. (1)
whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2)
whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.

I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a
petition for adoption.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each
other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to
both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or proper name
of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the
substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code
in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil
Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be
complied with. 10

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption
have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. 11 Petitioner further
contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of
right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this
would involve a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor
being conformably satisfied. 12
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for
change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder
of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in
a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e.,
jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. 13

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of
the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the
orderly administration of justice. 14 Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal
construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the
primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding. 15

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that -

Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron
Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by
said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud,
ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the
petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.

The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin
Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither
can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit
purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that
the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earl's
first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer
for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption. 16

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and
be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court,
in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee

must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption
proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and
shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper
name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal
name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and
in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should
normally make its decree recording such change. 18

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds
therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the
province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall
state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed
for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought,
and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and
published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the
Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations
in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may
adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said
judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in
the civil register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. 19 It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed
by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law
system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it
seeks the change of name of the adoptee, 20 all of which taken together cannot but lead to the
conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as
would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for
the latter relief at law.

Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be
justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by
private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et al. 21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et
al. 22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action
would, therefore, appear to be called for.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of
two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of
action in a declaration. 23 It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could
be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff
may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action
in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in
one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where
allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision,
even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under
applicable joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended
to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this
may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are
liberally construed. 26

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2
of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the
following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties;
and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties
and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to
expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as
to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of
a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related
controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made
effectual as far as practicable, 27 with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of
justice. 28

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder
of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the
courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a
rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or
equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. 29 While the rule allows a plaintiff
to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in
the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the
restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
authorized. 30

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the

correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in
the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against
the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any
relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do
they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In
short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to
sanction their joinder under our Rules.

As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings
which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is
individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve
disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the
proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee
properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change
of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the
propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name
(Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).

xxx       xxx       xxx

. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and
determined for neither action is dependent on the other. 33

The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only
if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
 These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition
(pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and
purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the
parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter's fitness
and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon
proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness
to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name.
And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the
proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can
connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.

In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition,
private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)

We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of
intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to
pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer
the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of
heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject
of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which
stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and
change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.

Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz,
declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead
remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and
implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the controversy
(Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that
although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions are
not satisfactorily met. 34

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete
determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name
of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in
form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of
avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of
action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and
dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just
one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding
reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.

In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of
causes of action:

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no
positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his
causes of action and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules, the
provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of
action although they may be included in one of the classes specified. This, therefore,
leaves it to the plaintiff's option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same
action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so.
He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action
within the prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy
of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by
private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes
at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 36 It has long
been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 37

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. 38

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order
to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. 39 We have been cautioned and reminded
in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that: 40

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has
often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if
it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give
both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally
guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution
itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

xxx       xxx       xxx

. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. . . .
While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the
Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly
presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews
anarchy.

Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application
thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant
consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules. 41

We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by
following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek
for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first
name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that
would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be
prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the
methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of
identification of its citizens.

The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply
with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised
by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the
first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down
for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. 42 They are matters of
public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between
or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience. 43

In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and
the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:

. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply
one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of the proper
remedy.

Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of

procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of
name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of
the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.

II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name
without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the
change of name was the fact of the adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by
which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents. 45

Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of
adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and designation,
that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the
change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely
echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of
naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural
parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child. 46

The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this
manner:

As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given
to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. .
..

xxx       xxx       xxx

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for
identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving
him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of
their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. 47

We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent
judge and must thus set it aside.

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or combination of

words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience
of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an
individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The giver
or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which
he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 48

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The official
name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the
law. 49 And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the
same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the
State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 50

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 51 For purposes of an
application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively
implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites
therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the
proceedings a nullity. 52

It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of
right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the
consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that
which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. 53

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a
change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is
based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest. 54

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another
name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the
use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua
non to a change of name. 56 Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different
name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize
a change of name. 57 A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which
be is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. 58

The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long
accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name
prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the
religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and
known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to live with private
respondents. 59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for
compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or
established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have
long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein
to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. 60

The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that -

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed
by law. . . .

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for
identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of
giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of
their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo
Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.

The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In
the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he
acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change
his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced
proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends
and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his
surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This Court granted the
petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of,
the adoption.

It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal
consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly
and precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves
to reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed
procedures.

Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being

named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is
previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently
sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is
no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the child's first
name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A.,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In
the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities
as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the
child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents have not been
conferred such right by law, hence, the right assertes by private respondents herein
remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a
privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. 61

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out
the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges
arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, 62 should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence.

The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of
the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register.
Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely
for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively
authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most
compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.

While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected
under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or
as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of
the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not
lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.

Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to,
private respondents' privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child,
provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of
course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements
and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known
as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance
with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
Annex A, Petition, Rollo, 37-40; per Presiding Judge Jose R. Hernandez.

2 
Annex B, id.; ibid., 44-45.

3 
Id., id; ibid., 44-45.

4 
Annex C, id; ibid., 47-50.

5 
Annex A, id.; ibid., 40.

6 
See Art. 183 in relation to Art. 185, Family Code.

See Art. 188, Family Code; Arts. 32-38, child and Youth Welfare Code; Secs. 1-5, Rule
7 

99, Rules of Court.

8 
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37, 38.

FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990 192 SCRA
9 

514; Donato, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102603, January 18, 1993, 217
SCRA 196; Isabelo, Jr, vs. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 103142,
November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591.

10 
Rollo, 18-19.

11 
Ibid., 20-23.

12 
Ibid., 16.

13 
Ibid., 63, 65-66.

14 
Ibid., 24-27.

15 
Ibid., 70-71.

16 
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 39.

17 
Cruz vs. Republic, L-20927, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 693.

18 
See Art. 412, Civil Code; Re Ross. 8 Cal 2d 608, 67 P2d 94, 110 ALR 217.
 Yu Chi Han vs. Republic, L-22040, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 454; Cruz vs.
19 

Republic, supra, fn. 17; Republic vs. Tañada, etc., et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971,
42 SCRA 419; Secan Kok vs. Republic, L-27621, August 30, 1973, 52 SCRA 322.

20 
Rollo, 21-22.

21 
43 Phil. 763 (1922).

22 
88 Phil. 72 (1951).

23 
1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 61, 1181.

24 
1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 81, 776.

25 
Ibid., id., Sec. 85, 778.

26 
Ibid. id., Sec. 86, 779.

27 
Francisco, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol I, 1973 ed., 186.

28 
1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 86, 779.

29 
Ibid., id., Sec. 89, 781.

30 
Francisco, V.J., op. cit., 185-189.

Union Glass & Container Corp. et al. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et
31 

al., G.R. No. 64013, November 28, 1983, 126 SCRA 31.

See Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps, et al., G.R. No. 66620, September 24, 1986, 144
32 

SCRA 377.

33 
Rollo, 18-19.

34 
Ibid., 86-88.

G.R. No. 91670, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 732; Baldovi vs. Sarte, 36 Phil. 550
35 

(1917). Cf. Hicks vs. Hilario, et al., 40 Phil. 576 (1919) and Insurance Company of North
America vs. United States Lines Co., et al., L-21839, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 438.

36 
Young vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993, 228 SCRA 718.

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 99357, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA
37 

537.

Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92862, July 4, 1991, 198 SCRA 806;
38 

Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

39 
Vasco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46763, February 28, 1978, 81 SCRA 762.

L-44642, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 367. See also Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate
40 

Court, et al., G.R. No. 75041, November 13, 1989, 179 SCRA 344.

Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
41 

56077, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 165; Yong Chan Kim vs. People, et al., G.R. No.
84719, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 344; Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr.,
etc., et al., G.R. 73210, February 10, 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Buan, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101614, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 424.

42 
Sanidad vs. Cabotaje, 5 Phil. 204 (1905).
43 
Arzadon vs. Arzadon, 15 Phil. 77 (1910).

44 
L-16085, November 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 519.

45 
Rollo, 28.

46 
Ibid., 67-68.

47 
Ibid., 39.

Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I,
48 

1993 ed., 672.

Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 (1956); Ng Yao Siong vs.
49 

Republic, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 483.

50 
Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 864.

51 
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra, fn. 49.

Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49; Republic vs. Tanada, etc., et al., supra, fn.
52 

19; Secan Kok vs. Republic, supra, fn. 19. See Tan vs. Republic, L-16384, April 26,
1962, 4 SCRA 1128.

Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic. 102 Phil. 460 (1957); Nacionale vs. Republic, L-18067,
53 

April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 636; Yu vs. Republic, L-20874, May 25, 1966, 17 SCRA
253; Calderon vs. Republic, L-18127, April 5, 1967, 19 SCRA 721.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189,
54 

199 and cases therein cited. See also Republic vs. Avila, etc., et al., L-33131, May 30,
1983, 122 SCRA 483.

55 
Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra fn. 49.

56 
Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 484.

Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic, supra, fn. 53; Grant vs. Republic, L-23609, March 31,
57 

1966, 16 SCRA 517.

58 
Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49.

59 
Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 44, 67.

60 
Cruz vs. Republic, supra, fn. 17.

61 
Rollo, 31-32.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA
62 

356.

4. Republic vs CA, 255 SCRA 99

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P.
CARANTO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the
decision of Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private respondents' petition for the adoption of Midael C.
Mazon with prayer for the correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael."

The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old,
who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon
stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be
rendered:

a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;

b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and

c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and
that the first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to
"MICHAEL."

The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon
the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the
child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only
a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina
Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez,
social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the
adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.

On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the
Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status
of persons. It cited Rule 108, §1, which provides that any person interested in an act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto." It held that the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters
enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries subject to cancellation or correction." According to the
trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and

declaring that:

1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by and option
of petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;

2. Henceforth, the minor's name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his original
name of Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his record of birth;

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is hereby
directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate of said minor; and

4. This judgment shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of the
herein petition.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.

On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, 2 invoked by the petitioner in support of its
plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that
case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a
separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as
well as for the Government and the Courts."

Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to comment. Despite
opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any comment.

The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private
respondents' petition for adoption. Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by publication did not state the true
name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic.3 There the petition for
adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child
("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was
held that this was a "substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing."
Indeed there was a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well
be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.

The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought
to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for
the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the
Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child
from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because
both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
publication of notice in this case.

For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor
Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly
did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the
name of the child in the civil registry.

Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and
because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered
the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect.

The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of
errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, §2 plainly states:

§2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds,

the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births;
(b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.

This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it has been the uniform
ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code — to implement which Rule 108 was inserted
in the Rules of Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as
correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."4 Thus, in Yu v. Republic5 it was held that "to
change "Sincio" to "Sencio" which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel "i" in the first
name into the vowel "e" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe
v. Republic6 it was held that "the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is
appropriate."

Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this Rule provides:

§3 Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had.7 As he was
not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of
the complaint including the judgment.8

Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by Rule 108, §4
which reads:

§4. Notice and publication. — Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor
was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil
registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for
lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the local civil registrar to
change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. In other respects
relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Per Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Justices Serafin E. Camilon,

chairman, and Celso L. Magsino.

2 17 SCRA 693 (1966).

3 Id.

4 Ansaldo v. Republic, 102 Phil. 1046 (1958); Barillo v. Republic, 113 Phil. 695 (1961);
Tan v. Republic, 114 Phil. 1070 (1962); Yu v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1018 (1967); Labayo-
Rowe v. Republic, 168 SCRA 294 (1988).

5 Supra note 4 at 1020.

6 Supra note 4 at 300.

7 Republic v. Belmonte, 158 SCRA 173 (1988).

8 Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728 (1993); Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 58 SCRA
195 (1974).

9 Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
93 SCRA 238 (1974).

5. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorgia-Garcia, 454 SCRA 541

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of
any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he
is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner's care and custody of the child since her birth
up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED."4

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother
as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having
a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence,
her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name "Garcia" (her mother's surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother."7

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law '

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.9

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use
of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or
a widow, thus:

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally
use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as 'Mrs.'

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name
and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname,
unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to
use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word 'Junior' can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall
either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x"

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name '

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known
as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to
what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mother's surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter."
Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the

adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;

x x x"

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father's surname indicates the family to which he
belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father's surname by the child
but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the
case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa's point is covered by the present Article 364, which
reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce
Enrile's correct surname is Ponce since the mother's surname is Enrile but everybody calls him
Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David's family name is Gutierrez and his mother's surname
is David but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they
take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered
in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which
is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly
allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child '

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges
for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section
1722 Article V of RA 8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship
with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption '

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination
of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname "GARCIA" as her middle
name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo at 34-36.

2
 Annex "C", id. at 33.

3
 Annex "F", id. at 41-43.

4
 Rollo at 42-43.

5
 Annex "G", id. at 44-48.

6
 Annex "H", id. at 49.

7
 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10, 1985,
p. 8.

8
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA
189, citing 38 Am Jur, Name 594-595.

9
 Republic v. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing
Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993
ed., 672.

10
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.

11
 "Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child."

12
 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10, 1985,
pp. 16-18.

13
 Article 365 of the New Civil Code.

14
 Republic v. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong,
supra.

15
 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.

16
 Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4
Valverde, 473.

17
 Paras, supra, citing Prasnick v. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.

18
 Lahom v. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United Nation
General Assembly/44/49 (1989).

19
 "Sec. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To
this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and support in keeping with the means of the
family."
20
 Id.

21
 "Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;"

22
 Supra.

23
 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

24
 "Sec. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if
the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession
shall govern."

25
 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205
SCRA 356, citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.

26
 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.

27
 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing Bobanovic, et al. v. Montes,
etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).

28
 Paras, supra, p. 91.

6. SSS vs Aguas, 283 SCRA 383

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 165546             February 27, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by
her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on
December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise
survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.2 Her claim for monthly
pension was settled on February 13, 1997.3

Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter4 dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia
Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged
that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived
with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo
had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo
dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth
certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996
to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two were married on
November 1, 1990.

As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in
September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations. In a
Memorandum6 dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security Officer who conducted the
investigation reported that, based on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin
and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no
legal children with Rosanna; Jenelyn7 and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo C.
dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo
while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita also
confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was under treatment.

On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that
Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their
pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of ₱10,350.00
representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to
August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per month.8

Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said
decision.9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim.10

This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of
Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998.11 Janet H. Aguas,
who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant.
The case was docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.

The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo
and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of
live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death.

In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and documentary evidence
showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren of
factual and legal basis; as such, it was justified in denying their claims.12

In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as
evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father. They asserted
that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under one roof.
In support thereof, they attached a Joint Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla
and Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband
and wife until the latter’s death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Civil
Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna.
As to the alleged infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the
opinion precisely because he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the
deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the information the SSS
gathered from the doctor was privileged communication.14
In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured Confirmation Reports15 signed by clerks
from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage between Pablo and
Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996;
(3) the fact of Jeylnn’s birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s death on December
8, 1996.

The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the authenticity
of Pablo’s signature as appearing on Jeylnn’s birth certificate from his claim records, particularly
his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit application.16 The SSS complied with said directive
and manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s signature
in the birth certificate was made by the same person who signed the member’s record and other
similar documents submitted by Pablo.17

The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for
clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn affidavits.18 Vivencia testified that
she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years already; the couple were married
and lived in Macabacle, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the
spouses, but four years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Niño
Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially during Christmas
or fiestas; the spouses’ real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an adopted child; the spouse later
transferred residence, not far from their old house, and Janet, together with her husband and
son, remained in the old house.19

On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for
15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were
still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not
know whose child Jefren is.20

According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just taken in
by the spouses because for a long time they could not have children;21 however, there were no
legal papers on Janet’s adoption.22 Later on, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s
baptism, there was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he
was the father of the child and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the latter
also got mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them away from the house; since
then, Pablo and Rosanna separated;23 she knew about this because at that time their mother
was sick, and she would often visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were
also staying; Rosanna was no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided therein;
she did not know where Rosanna was staying now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela
Peña were still living together.24

Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for clarificatory
questions.25 During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal
certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas,26 child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on
October 29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn H. dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna
Hernandez, born on January 29, 1992.

On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and
ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of ₱10,350.00 erroneously paid
to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The SSC likewise directed the SSS
to pay the death benefit to qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their
absence, to his legal heirs.28

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that
she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to
Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his
mother, Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC
declared that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Peña while she was still married to Pablo
(as evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Peña showing that she was the
child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and that she was born on January 29,
1992). The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to
his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth
certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn
was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was
one and the same person and concluded, based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she
was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also gave credence to the testimonies
of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. As for
Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was only adopted by Pablo and
Rosanna.29

The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their motion was denied
by the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.30 The claimants then elevated
the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one is entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby REMANDED to public respondent
for purposes of computing the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the
same was cut and suspended in September 1997.

SO ORDERED.31

In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were
the children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, these
records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries made in public
documents may only be challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may
not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found
no evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s
alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna
married Romeo dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void
marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent for support upon Pablo and
negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her
husband.32

The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA denied for lack of
merit.33 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending that it

GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS ACTUALLY

DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER DURING HIS LIFETIME TO
QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION
8(e), IN RELATION TO SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.

II

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO
THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS.34

Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
735, which defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon
the employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo
when she engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and married the
latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which divested her of
the right to receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident from
the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela Peña showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to
Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot be considered as a
dependent spouse of Pablo; consequently, she is not a primary beneficiary.35
As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the pension because,
based on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the
legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under
Section 5(a) of the Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents’
relationship with the member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even
without correcting their birth certificates.36

Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna committed acts of
adultery or that she married another man after the death of her husband. They contend that
Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the
Family Code, none of which were proven in this case.37

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the
SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by
the Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.38 In an appeal via certiorari,
the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA.39 It is not the Court’s function under
Rule 45 to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.40 However, the Court may review findings of facts in some instances, such as, when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.41 The
Court finds these instances present in this case.

At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to death
benefits:

Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employee’s death, (a) his
primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the
dependent’s pension: Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to
the semester of death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if he
has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however, That the death benefit
shall not be less than the total contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor less
than five hundred pesos: Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the month of
coverage shall be entitled to the minimum benefit.

Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member
as follows:

SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:

xxxx

(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon
the covered employee for regular support.

xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall
be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children
who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other
person designated by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.

Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact
in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.42

The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently
established her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that
she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December
8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan
Gamboa Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption –

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration
of the periods set forth in Article 170,44 and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.46

Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs.47 In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can
no longer be contested.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth
certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.48

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her
date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married
and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.49 It should
be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate.
However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s
because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy,
without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact
of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.

In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.50 Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but
merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not
undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent
children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider
her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she
must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The
claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate
spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna
presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their
marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not
Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his
death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each
other,51 but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has
to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.

In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a
dependent as "one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or
subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything
without the will, power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise
defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for

support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who
abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men,
was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period.
Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for
support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been complied with,
particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time of his death. Aside from her
own testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived
together as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita
Yangu where they made such declaration.

Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC will not
prevail over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who testified
that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for almost six years before the latter died.
Except for the bare assertion of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there was no further
statement regarding the witnesses’ assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until
Pablo’s death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated after Jeylnn’s baptism as
a result of an argument regarding Romeo dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a
commotion at their ancestral house because Romeo dela Peña was grumbling why Jeylnn was
named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove them away. The SSC’s
observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces
this Court to further believe Leticia’s testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted
by the SSC:

It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are one and the same
person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of
San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna
Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to spouses
Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted
that Jenelyn dela Peña was born approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It
is physically impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in so short
a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that Rosanna was driven away by
Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of the commotion that was created by Romeo dela
Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again
baptized in the Parish of Sto. Niño in San Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Peña. They
changed her date of birth also to make it appear in the record of the parish that she is another
child of Rosanna.53
On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer living at Pablo’s
house even before he died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the present.
Mariquita testified as follows:

Hearing Officer:

Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?

Mrs. Dizon:

Ngayon at kahit na noon.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan namatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

1996.

Hearing Officer:

Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.

Hearing Officer:

So, buhay pa si Pablo ……

Mrs. Dizon:

…. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.

Hearing Officer:

Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay na yung nanay ni
Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung
nanay ni Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.

Hearing Officer:

Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:
Oo.

Hearing Officer:

Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.

Hearing Officer:

Saan naman?

Mrs. Dizon:

Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54

In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there
are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while
Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary
since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still
dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H.
Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes

* On leave.

 Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased), with Associate Justices

1

Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-29.

2
 Records, p. 27.

3
 Id. at 98.

4
 Id. at 31.

5
 Id. at 32.

6
 Id. at 33.

7
 Referring to Jeylnn.

8
 Records, p. 34.

9
 Id. at 12.

10
 Id. at 17.

11
 Id. at 3-4.

12
 Id. at 29.

13
 Id. at 51.

14
 Id. at 47-49.

15
 Id. at 55-58.

16
 Id. at 59-60.

17
 Id. at 236.

18
 Id. at 59.

19
 Id. at 67-70.

20
 Id. at 72-74.

21
 Id. at 11.

22
 Id. at 18.

23
 Id. at 12.

24
 Id. at 27-28.

25
 Id. at 187.

26
 Id. at 233.

27
 Id. at 232.
28
 Rollo, pp. 49-50.

29
 Id. at 47-49.

30
 Id. at 52.

31
 Id. at 28.

32
 Id. at 26-27.

33
 Id. at 33.

34
 Id. at 9.

35
 Id. at 10-13.

36
 Id. at 14-16.

37
 Id. at 68-70.

 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160890, November 10,
38

2004, 441 SCRA 637.

39
 Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 144 (2002).

 Asia Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading Corporation, 452 Phil. 552, 567
40

(2003).

41
 Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 258 (2003).

42
 Anflo Management & Investment Corp. v. Bolanio, 439 Phil. 309, 316 (2002).

43
 418 Phil. 768 (2001).

 Article 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one
44

year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband
or, in proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two
years if they reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the
child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the
period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child
or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

 Article 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
45

period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted
therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

46
 De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, supra note 43, at 773-774.

47
 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005.
  See Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005; Reyes v. Court of
48

Appeals, 220 Phil. 116 (1985).

49
 Angeles v. Maglaya, supra.

50
 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.

51
 Article 195, Family Code.

 Re: Application for Survivor’s Benefits of Ms. Maylenne G. Manlavi, Daughter of the
52

Late Ernesto R. Manlavi, A.M. No. 10019-Ret., February 22, 2001, 352 SCRA 518.

53
 Rollo, pp. 48-49.

54
 Records, pp. 222-223.

7. Landingin vs Republic, 493 SCRA 415

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition
for Adoption of the petitioner herein.

The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA),
of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for the adoption of minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors
are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the
children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8 to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor
children’s name follow the family name of petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.10

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial
hearing of the petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance12 but
deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was
unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner
marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol,
Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam,
USA, as proof of said consent.16

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III,
Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos,
eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:

1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the
paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental
care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the
mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be
adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent
is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they
regarded her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to
look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and
support to ensure their protection and well being.

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos,
Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin.
Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are
close relatives and that close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and
the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks
vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her
children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after
the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the
petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-
being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has
a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental
love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her
children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good
hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to
her children.18

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance
from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the
children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-
children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive parents.
Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to
effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned
minors.

SO ORDERED.19

The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for
the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE
LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE
LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY
LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
 On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that
petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s
natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be
admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26 on September 7, 2004,
assigning the following errors:

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED

SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE
AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.

2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE
THREE CHILDREN.27

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is
entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia
Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is
financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society
and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for
the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this
Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that
the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court’s position should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored
solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.31

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent
of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living
with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree
of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos
who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was
in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not
require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children.
Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came
back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is
the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial needs.
Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further
contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was
pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting,
Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by
the petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act
No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors
will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33 The term means neglect
and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown
to have existed at the time of adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her
claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that matter
follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated
with the family?

A None, sir.

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.

Q From whom did you learn that?

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.

Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

A Two years old, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?

A No, sir.38

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

IV. Background of the Case:

xxxx

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their
maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased
father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other
relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that
they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very
minimal.39

xxxx

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

xxxx

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in
their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems
and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her
mother and petitioner-aunt.40

xxxx

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they
had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the
petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending
on the support of her husband’s relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged
their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of
her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in
partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of
his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents
who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and
other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of
minors up to present.41

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country
by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her
motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed
by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise,
Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as
compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of
severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if
they are given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.44

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The
joint written consent of petitioner’s children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA;
for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this
country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country

shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary
public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or
an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to
which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his
official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the
office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the
law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the
acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-
cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support
the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children
and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she
has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with
tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment,
banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income."
Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in
order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should
be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support
the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public Health
& Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting
her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the
time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a
waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention
in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua
Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that
the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job,
and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing
of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees
is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings
and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The
Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and
nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any
case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices

1

Mario L. Guariña III and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-35.

2
 CA rollo, p. 25.

3
 Records, pp. 1-4. The Rule on Adoption was approved by the Court in A.M. No. 02-6-
02-SC and took effect on August 22, 2002.
4
 Id. at 6.

5
 Id. at 7.

6
 Id. at 8.

7
 Id. at 5.

8
 Id. at 9.

9
 Id. at 24.

10
 Id. at 3.

11
 Id. at 21.

12
 Id. at 40.

13
 Id. at 41.

14
 Id. at 22.

15
 Supra note 8.

16
 Supra note 9.

17
 Records, pp. 43-47.

18
 Id. at 47.

19
 CA rollo, p. 27-28.

20
 Records, p. 78.

21
 CA rollo, p. 15.

22
 Rollo, p. 23-35.

23
 Id. at 35.

24
 CA rollo, p. 55.

25
 Rollo, p. 22.

26
 Id. at 3-20.

27
 Id. at 5.

28
 153 Phil. 339 (1973).

29
 Id. at 346-347.

30
 G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 128.

31
 Id. at 157.

32
 Re Adoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa 828, 53 N.W.2d 877.

33
 Matter of Adoption of Eder, 312 Or. 244, 821 P.2d 400 (1991).
34
 In Re: McLean, 179 N.Y.S. 182,183, 109 Misc. 479.

35
 Truelove v. Parker, 132, S.G. 251, 191 N.C. 430.

36
 Slattery v. Hartford v. Connecticut Trust Co., 254 Mich. 671, 236 N.W. 902 (1931).

37
 TSN, April 4, 2002, pp. 9-10.

38
 Id. at 21.

39
 Records, p. 44.

40
 Id. at 45.

41
 Id. at 46.

42
 Republic Act No. 8552, Sec. 16.

43
 Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at 153.

44
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 438.

45
 Supra note 9.

46
 Enacted on January 26, 1912.

47
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132-B, Section 20.

48
 Rollo, p. 34.

49
 Records, pp. 62-73.