Low-Profile Versus High-Profile Private Security Detail

Motorcade Tactics in Iraq: Preventing Attack by Stealth or by Deterrence?

Section one: Introduction

Introduction
This extended essay will attempt to measure the merits of Personal Security
Details (PSDs) using either low-profile motorcade tactics or high-profile motorcade
tactics when operating in Iraq. This introductory section will describe the background
to the research subject, the aims and objectives of the research question; it will outline
the main research findings and also present the structure of the extended essay.

The Personal Security Detail in Iraq

There are at least 36 international and 16 Iraqi Private Security Companies
(PSCs) registered to operate with the Iraqi Interior Ministry, another estimated 50
unregistered PSCs working illegally (Finer, 2005), and approximately 25,000 private
security contractors operating in Iraq employed within these PSCs at the present time
(Poole, 2005; Finer, 2005; Solis & Cooper, 2005). These contractors provide a
number of important services within Iraq, which include; Static security, or Key Point
(KP) protection of installations; Convoy Security; and Close Protection carried out by
Personal Security Details (PSDs) charged with protecting high ranking officials (or
High Value Targets), government staff and contractor employees working on
reconstruction projects. Avant (2005:239) claims that anyone working in Iraq requires
private security.
This project will focus on the Private Security Detail (PSD), i.e. those
providing armed escort and protection to personnel in Iraq, and in particular the PSD
motorcade. Generally, PSDs use what might be called high-profile Close Protection
(CP) motorcade tactics as taught by specialist government, police and military CP
units (Consterdine, 1995:31). These high-profile CP motorcade procedures were
formulated to provide effective dignitary protection within both high and low threat
environments primarily through a mixture of deterrence and target hardening.
However, the task of providing security in Iraq has proved extremely difficult, as the
number of fatalities shows, and there is a great deal of debate amongst security
contractors working on the ground in Iraq as to whether these high-profile tactics are
bringing unwanted attention to the PSD and therefore encouraging attack. Those
arguing for covert or low-profile tactics claim that if the terrorists do not recognise the
PSD for what it is there is less likelihood of an attack in the first place. However,
those who support high-profile tactics, argue that the high profile tactics act as a
deterrent to the terrorists, reducing the frequency of attack. To date over two hundred
contractors have been killed by terrorist attack in Iraq (Solis & Cooper, 2005), the
vast majority of these attacks have been carried out against contractors whilst
travelling in motorcades or convoys (Lunaville, 2005; Brookings Institute). It is also
true to say that, as time goes by these attacks have grown more sophisticated and
more effective.

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 The PSD is a close protection team assigned to provide protective services to
individuals within the high threat environment, such as Iraq. George & Button
(2000:65) define close protection as ‘the provision of protective services … for
individuals vulnerable to attack, by specially trained personnel’. The PSD may be
responsible to one High Value Target principle or client, such as a diplomat or
government official, or may be used for a number of clients, such as contractors
engaged in reconstruction work. The primary role of the PSD operating within Iraq is
the safe movement of the principle within the theatre of operations. Within Iraq, and
elsewhere, three vehicles are considered standard for ‘most full-scale protective
efforts’ (Thompson, 2005:97), with the lead escort vehicle at the front, the principle’s
vehicle in the middle, and the third vehicle to the rear, carrying a Counter Assault
Team (CAT). The CAT, a four-man team carrying automatic weapons, is used when
required, to lay down heavy firepower enabling the motorcade to break away from an
ambush (Thompson, 2005:114). Some teams may vary this approach and place the
principles vehicle at the front of the motorcade, with the second vehicle acting as a
‘chase’ car, which places itself between the principles car and any potential threat
(Thompson, 2005:110). Some teams also utilise a fourth Security Advance Party
(SAP) vehicle – often manned by locally employed nationals, which travels in
advance of the main party to clear the route and to inform the main party of any
security problems on that route. However, low-profile PSDs in Iraq are now
beginning to keep the motorcade vehicles further apart to remain inconspicuous, only
closing the gap when required. Generally, the PSD consists of two operators in each
of the lead and principle cars, four operators in the CAT and up to four operators in
the SAP, if used.

The Threat to PSDs in Iraq

Before considering the merits of PSDs using low or high profile tactics the
essay will discuss the various threats that are ranged against PSD motorcades in Iraq.
The insurgency in Iraq began shortly after the coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and
has steadily grown in both size and potency since. At the beginning of 2004 there
were approximately 25 attacks in Iraq every day; by the beginning of 2005 the
frequency of attacks had risen to approximately 60 per day. These attacks are directed
at the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNFI), the Iraqi security forces and
infrastructure, and against civilian contractors and aid workers in an attempt to
undermine the reconstruction process and to destabilise the country
(Globalsecurity.org, 2005; Wikipedia, 2005). The insurgency is not in itself a unified
movement, but is comprised of at least 40 different groupings with different
ideologies, methodologies and various objectives. There are numerous estimates of
the numbers of active insurgents in Iraq, numbering between 3,500 and 40,000
fighters (Cordesman, 2005). The primary groupings within this insurgency are the
Ba’athists, the Sunni Islamists, foreign Jihadists, Nationalists, criminal insurgents and
militant Shia Islamist groups (Wikipedia, 2005).
Travel by road in Iraq is extremely dangerous, and there have been a number
of attacks against civilian vehicles, with PSDs in particular being targeted by
insurgents (U.S. Department of State, 2005; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2005;
Wikipedia, 2005). The predominant threats against civilian vehicles in Iraq are

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roadside devices, mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Vehicle Borne
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), ambushes, and also criminal attacks such
as car jacking and hi-jacking. Roadside devices have become increasingly
sophisticated since the start of the insurgency. During the early part of the insurgency
home-made roadside devices, often made from redundant Iraqi munitions
(Cordesman, 2005), were initiated by simple command wires, then as these became
less successful initiation was triggered by Radio Frequency devices such as garage
door openers or by cell phone. More recently, passive infrared devices such as those
used in security systems have been used as triggers. Also, throughout this period the
size and effectiveness of the devices themselves have increased to combat the
increasing capabilities of the vehicle armour being used in Iraq by both PSDs and the
coalition forces (Wikipedia, 2005; Harding & Harris, 2005; Sherwell, 2005; Ware,
2005). The roadside device has emerged as the most frequent and lethal method of
attack in use by the insurgents, with the number of attacks steadily increasing (U.S
Department of State, 2005; Wikipedia, 2005), with a reported 30 attacks per day by
May 2005 (Cordesman, 2005). Similarly, the VBIED is another preferred tactic of the
insurgency, particularly when used in conjunction with the suicide bomber
(Wikipedia, 2005; Cordesman, 2005). The ambush is another favoured tactic of the
insurgent, which is devastating against the soft-skinned un-armoured vehicle. A
frequent tactic in use by insurgents is the complex ambush, which involves multiple
weapon systems; roadside device or mine, automatic weapons and rocket propelled
grenades, designed to defeat the armoured vehicles often used by PSDs and by MNFI
in Iraq (Cordesman, 2005; Etherington, 2005:58). Finally, car jacking, hi-jacking and
kidnap by armed criminals is common in Iraq (U.S Department of State, 2005;
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2005), as is ‘blue on blue’ friendly fire incidents
between PSDs and MNFI (Solis & Cooper, 2005).

The Research Question

This research sets out to evaluate the tactics being used currently by PSDs in
Iraq, and more specifically to compare the high-profile motorcade approach against
the low-profile motorcade approach. The study is prompted by two main factors:
firstly, the researcher’s own experiences working as a PSD operator and Team Leader
in Iraq; and secondly, the ongoing debate regarding the pros and cons of this subject
within the PSD community. The subject evokes strong feeling amongst operators on
both sides of the argument because it is felt that the wrong tactics can result in lethal
attack. The aim of the research is to stimulate this debate and to provide an insight
into the effectiveness of each method through statistical analysis. The research is
important because, as already discussed, the tactics used by PSDs can make the
difference between life and death in Iraq, especially with the current rising number of
attacks. This research may be able to determine a best practice for PSDs both in Iraq
and within other high threat environments. In order to do this the essay will test three
related propositions regarding the frequency of attacks and the merits of both profile
types when operating in Iraq:

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1. That high-profile motorcade tactics deter attack.
2. That low-profile motorcade tactics reduce the incidence of attack through
deception and camouflage.
3. That low-profile motorcade tactics increase the risk of ‘blue on blue’, or ‘friendly
fire’ incidents with MNFI, Iraqi security forces or other PSDs operating in Iraq.

With these questions in mind the researcher attempted to explore the tactics being
used by PSDs operating in Iraq and how effective these tactics are in preventing
attack by insurgents. The most effective method of gaining this information was
judged to be a survey or questionnaire aimed at the employing PSCs. The
questionnaire itself was broken down into questions relating to the dress, vehicles and
tactics being used by PSDs, i.e. high or low profile, and the number of incidents,
including ‘blue on blue’ incidents, as a ratio of missions carried out by PSDs.

Structure
The First section, the introduction, describe the background to the research subject,
the aims and objectives of the research question, it will outline the main research
findings and also present the structure of the extended essay. The second section, the
literature review provides a summary of the existing research on the subject of low-
profile and high-profile motorcade tactics, including some discussion regarding risk
management, threat assessment and policy design relevant to the research question.
The third section will be a review of the methodology used including ethics, research
design and methodology choice, anticipated problems, and the survey conduct,
population and response. The fourth section will show the results of the research,
suggesting that the low-profile motorcade approach is less likely to experience
terrorist attack than the high profile approach. However, it also suggests that the low-
profile approach is more likely to experience a ‘blue on blue’ incident with friendly
forces. The fifth section will be an analysis of those results. The project will finish
with a summary, a conclusion and some recommendations.

Conclusion
In this initial introductory section the background to the research subject, the aims and
objectives of the research question, an outline of the main research findings and the
structure of the extended essay were. In the following section, the researcher briefly
describes the literature available on the research subject.

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 Section Two: Literature Review

Introduction
This section presents an overview of the present state of the literature
regarding the research subject. The aim of this section is to present a framework of the
current literature in such a manner as to enable the researcher to place the research
findings into context and therefore provide some basis for analysis. The literature
review relied extensively upon Internet research, and a few core professional books
dealing with risk management and close protection. There was a body of literature
available detailing the subject of low-profile and high-profile motorcades. The
literature generally made reference to the existence of high and low-profile tactics,
often referring to the merits of one side of the argument or the other. However, the
researcher was unable to find any previous research or analysis into the effectiveness
of either low-profile or high-profile tactics, particularly in relation to one another. The
review will begin with a discussion of risk management and planning relevant to the
subject under review, it will then outline the arguments for and against high and low-
profile motorcade tactics.

Risk Management and Policy Design & Planning

If PSDs operating within high-risk environments such as Iraq do not manage
the risks of that environment correctly the results can be, as already shown in the
previous section, highly unforgiving. It is imperative, therefore for the PSD to carry
out an effective assessment of the risks and to design policy in such a way as to
ensure that the procedures in use are the most effective available to them. In order to
manage any kind of disaster a process of ‘data collection, analysis and assessment’
(International Institute of Security, 2000a:1) must be carried out. This process is
known as risk management. A key part of risk management is the threat assessment.
Consterdine (1995:49) states that the threat assessment is the basis for all planning
regarding the protective effort – it ‘defines the current situation, the historic
development, the methodology or MO of the terrorist group’. Broder (2000:4-5)
argues that three factors - type of threat, probability of occurrence, and quantifying
the loss potential – must be ‘identified and evaluated’ in order to identify any
necessary corrective actions. Adjustments to internal procedures, to provide ‘good
practice as well as a deterrent element’, may be necessary in order to reduce or
eliminate identified risk factors (The Institute of International Security, 2000b:4). The
threat assessment is a continuous process, which ‘allows the protective team to
allocate its assets most effectively’ (Thompson, 2005:22 ; International Institute of
Security, 2000c:5). The process will result in one of four methods of risk
management; elimination, reduction, transfer or acceptance (international Institute of
Security; 2000a:1).
A major identified factor within the commission of any crime (including
terrorism) is that of ‘opportunity’ (International Professional Security Association,
2000:2; Doherty, 2001:127). The aim of prevention is, therefore, the removal of that
opportunity by the use of effective security measures, which include target hardening
and target removal (Harris, 1997:324). Kain (1996:273) argues that terrorists must be
presented with a ‘weak spot’ or opportunity with which they can exploit. The job of

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the security professional is to attempt to make this as difficult as possible by making
the target as difficult to hit as possible. Thompson (2005:8) states that preventative
planning is a large part of the protective effort and that this planning will help prevent
‘the need for evasive driving or engaging in gunfights with assassins or kidnappers’.
Wilcox (2003:15), Thompson (2005:97) and Consterdine (1995:113) agree
that, from a security point of view, travelling by car is when the protective detail and
principle are at their most vulnerable, and therefore, the protective team should be
especially vigilant whilst on the move. Protective operators must be constantly aware
of the ‘vehicle’s attractiveness as a target’, and the restricted ability to react to attack
due to difficulties with freedom of movement and maneuverability. For the protective
detail, according to Wilcox (2003:15) the car is a ‘safehaven, weapon, and target’. An
important aspect of planning and policy design for the PSD is deciding which tactics
to use. Both high profile and low-profile tactics aim to eliminate or reduce the risk as
far as possible through different means, which will be discussed next.

High-Profile Motorcades
Sellens (2005) defines the high-profile motorcade by its reliance on an
obvious ‘show of force, heavy weapons and armor to defeat potential threats’. The
high-profile motorcade will have vehicles blocking intersections and traffic in order to
enable the principle’s vehicle to move smoothly through. Sometimes helicopters will
be used to escort the motorcade. PSD motorcades have become a common sight in
Iraq over the past two years. The common view of these PSDs is one of security
teams, easily recognizable by their quasi military khaki uniforms, web gear, body
armour, and Oakley sunglasses; they travel in brand new SUVs -often white or black,
and now widely associated with the coalition forces and PSDs in particular (Dickson,
2003) - with weapons protruding from the windows pointing at the local population,
barging through traffic and running other vehicles off the road (Poole, 2005; Singer,
2004; Scott Tyson; Finer, 2005; Duffy, 2004). Consterdine (1995:6, 31, 43) states that
most official close protection procedures are high-profile, which he contends,
indicates the presence of protection and therefore acts as a deterrent to any would-be
attacker. Thompson (2005:10), whilst arguing for the low-profile approach in general,
claims that in some third world environments, the deterrent factor of the high-profile
approach - obvious displays of firepower with ‘gun jeeps’ and open displays of
bodyguards with assault rifles - may be necessary. He (Thompson, 2005:97) goes on
to claim that experiences of operating high-risk motorcades in Iraq have led some
operators to reconsider the merits of low-profile tactics. He states that some PSDs
‘have found that high-visibility motorcades with windows open and rifles or light
machineguns protruding ready to engage attackers may actually be safer because of
the deterrent effect’. He also argues the use of large four wheel drive SUVs is
preferred by these PSDs because they are more maneuverable, with the ability to drive
over medians and curbs enabling them to escape from ambushes more effectively, and
they also provide the teams with greater visibility because of the vehicles height.
Some PSDs use extremely high profile tactics, such as those from the US based PSC
Blackwater that use South African built Mamba armoured vehicles and armed top
cover provided by its own fleet of helicopters (Scott Tyson, 2005; Poole, 2005).

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Similarly, Aegis Defence Services, a UK based PSC has, according to Swain ‘just
taken delivery of three Revas, fearsome South African-designed troop carriers with a
machinegun mounted on a swivel turret on the roof’. These vehicles make the PSDs
appear more like combat troops, but Swain (2005) argues that ‘they will save lives’.
However, Scotti (2004) argues that the theory behind high-profile tactics is no longer
relevant. He writes that the greater threat in Iraq is assassination rather than kidnap.
Therefore, the motorcade has become a target and an elevated profile may add to the
problem. Brand new SUVs can act as magnets for ambush (Singer, 2004).
Consterdine (1995:197-198) adds that high-profile tactics will also draw attention to
the principle and may become a ‘challenge to the determined terrorist’ rather than a
deterrent.

Low-Profile Motorcades
The low-profile motorcade ‘relies more on stealth and its ability to blend into
the environment’. The Low profile motorcade does not use vehicles that are obvious
security vehicles and uses a ‘blend of different makes and models’ (Sellens, 2005).
Thompson (2005:98), in voicing the opinion of some PSDs operating in Iraq, states
that motorcades using vehicles that are not so obvious, with weapons kept out of sight
and personnel not wearing sunglasses may be safer. He (Thompson, 2005:10) adds
that ‘the protective team should attempt to dress in a manner that will allow them to
blend in to their surroundings as much as possible’. Hughes (2005) opines that such
things as operators not wearing sunglasses, especially those which are obviously
expensive, such as the Oakleys that are favoured by PSDs in Iraq, will lower the
details signature. Others argue that operators should grow their beards in order to
blend in more with the locals (Roberts, 2004). Hughes (2005) writes that aggressive
driving and blocking tactics will advertise the PSDs presence to an adversary.
The International Institute of Security (2000d:3) states that ‘the first breach of
security occurs when it becomes known that a target exists’. The University of
Leicester (2004a:30) corroborates this viewpoint when it argues that targets that are
hidden from sight, or that are not obvious as targets, should be safer than those in
plain view. A new Suburban or SUV, for instance, is out of the price range of the
average Iraqi, and therefore cries out ‘high value target’ (Hughes, 2005). A relatively
common vehicle, that can blend in is preferred (Thompson, 2005:97). Dickson (2003)
maintains that teams using a lower profile will probably never get attacked. Sellens
(2005) opines that many of the attacks in Iraq are against ‘targets of opportunity’ and,
therefore the low-profile PSD will not be recognised as such by an adversary until it is
too late and the PSD has moved ‘out of the kill zone’. Writing about the advantages
of using the low-profile option in Iraq, Feeney (2005) states that ‘if they can’t see
you, they can’t kill you’. He claims that his team has carried out over 1500 missions
in Iraq without coming under any form of attack, whilst other ‘PSD teams are
engaged by insurgents and end up in firefights on almost every mission’.

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‘Blue on Blue’ Incidents
One obvious disadvantage of the low-profile motorcade is that in becoming
less visible to insurgents the vehicle also becomes less recognisable to friendly forces
and may be mistaken for a threat to those forces (Roberts, 2004; Feeney, 2005). In
this situation it is not uncommon for the PSD to come under ‘blue on blue’ (also
referred to as ‘blue on white’ or ‘blue on green’) friendly fire. There have been
incidents, however, of high-profile motorcades coming under fire from MNFI
elements (Scott Tyson, 2005). There were twenty ‘blue on blue’ incidents reported
between January and May 2005, although the actual figure is estimated to be higher
than this with many going unreported (Solis & Cooper, 2005). The ‘blue on blue’ type
of incident occurs most frequently at military checkpoints (Sellens, 2005; Solis &
Cooper, 2005). Sellens (2005) writes that ‘when operating low-profile the PSD must
approach all checkpoints with caution. In December 2004 MNFI produced procedures
for PSDs approaching both military convoys and checkpoints. Firstly, non-tactical
vehicles (i.e. PSD vehicles) were prohibited from passing military convoys. Secondly,
the military were to fire warning shots, where necessary, away from the vehicle
concerned, and that all vehicles were to maintain a distance of 200 metres from any
military convoys.

Conclusion
In this section, the literature available on the subject of high and low-profile
motorcade tactics has been discussed. Despite the limited research available, the
literature has shown that risk management, threat assessment, policy design and
planning are vital elements for the security detail to consider, thus ensuring use of the
most effective procedures. Both high-profile and low-profile tactics have their own
individual merits. High-profile tactics, it is argued, will provide a deterrent to any
attack, whilst low-profile tactics will enable the protective effort to go unnoticed and,
therefore, unmolested. However, the literature also shows that PSDs using low-profile
tactics may be more susceptible to ‘blue on blue incidents’. In the next section, the
methodology of the research will be described.

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 Section Three: Methodology

Introduction
In the previous section, the available literature on the subject of high-profile
and low-profile motorcades was reviewed. This section will describe the ethical
considerations of the research, the factors influencing the research design and
methodology choices, any anticipated problems, and the survey conduct, population
and response.

Ethical Considerations
Gilbert (quoted in Wilcox, 2003:27) noted that ‘Social research is not always
welcomed in all quarters’. This is especially true of the private security industry. A
study of this nature, requiring proprietary information regarding the operating
procedures of PSDs employed in high risk protection tasks in Iraq required a great
deal of trust on the part of respondents. Obviously, information revealing the number
of incidents against a specific security organisation could attract unwanted attention
from the media and impact the confidence of current and potential clients. Also, there
is a very real danger that disclosure of operating procedures could come to the
attention of those hostile persons or organisations that the PSDs are protecting
against, thus leaving those procedures open to attack. With this in mind, it was
decided that any information collected would remain anonymous. The method of
dissemination and receipt of the survey, i.e. by email, dictated that the researcher
would be aware of the identity of respondents and be able to tie them to a specific
returned questionnaire. Therefore, it was important for the researcher to ensure that
this information could not be abused in any way.

Research Design and Methodology Choice

The research was designed to use an opening-out model (University of
Leicester, 2004b:6), beginning with an outline of the rationale behind the research,
followed by the empirical data, and an analysis of this data in relation to the initial
outline. The researcher decided upon data collection in the form of a survey. The aim
of the survey, according to Bell (1999:13-14) is to ‘obtain information which can be
analysed and patterns extracted and comparisons made … In most cases, a survey will
aim to obtain information from a representative selection of the population and from
that sample will then be able to present the findings as being representative of the
population as a whole’. The survey was aimed at those PSCs that operate PSDs within
Iraq, in order to gain ‘positive’ information of the actual operating procedures being
used, rather than a ‘normative’ view of which operating procedures the respondents
think should be used. This data was expected to reveal the various operating
procedures in use within Iraq and also give an indication of the tactical effectiveness
of these procedures by comparing the number of attacks carried out against PSDs
using low-profile tactics against those using high-profile tactics. It was felt that this
information could be useful to PSCs both in Iraq and elsewhere insofar as it could
indicate a best practice for reducing attacks against PSDs in the high threat
environment.

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 The questionnaire itself was designed in such a manner to enable the
researcher to answer specific questions in the most economical manner. This was in
part because of restrictions in the permitted word count of the extended essay and also
because there was more likelihood of those approached participating in a concise
survey. The questionnaire was, in effect, divided in two parts. The first part was
concerned with the way that PSDs in Iraq conduct their operations; specifically, their
dress, their vehicles and their motorcade tactics. The answers to these questions were
used to create groups using comparable methods. The second part of the questionnaire
was concerned with the number of missions completed by the PSDs and the number
of hostile incidences directed at those PSDs. This information was used to measure
the ratio of different incident types against the number of missions carried out for
each group type and finally calculate the number of incidents as a percentage of
missions. The researcher decided on a survey - a questionnaire in particular - because
of the available time allocated to this research. Interviews were discounted because of
potential problems of gaining access to respondents. (Bell, 1999:13-14). Despite the
known low response rates of postal surveys (Bell, 1999:129) the researcher decided
that a postal type questionnaire was the only realistic method of obtaining the data
within the allocated timeframe. Specifically, a questionnaire distributed by email,
which Sheehan (2001) argues has ‘demonstrated superiority over postal surveys in
terms of response speed and cost efficiency’.

Anticipated Problems
As already discussed the main issue of concern was that of confidentiality and
the respondents trust in the researcher’s integrity. The researcher attempted to
alleviate this through the careful wording of an introductory email prior to
dissemination of the questionnaire. This introductory email guaranteed the anonymity
of all respondents, introduced the researcher as a PSD practitioner and gave potential
respondents the opportunity to conduct checks of the researcher’s credentials through
the University of Leicester. A further concern was that individual PSCs may have
PSDs on different contracts working with different equipment and with different
operating procedures. In order to circumvent this potential problem a request was
made within the covering email for the PSCs to complete additional questionnaires
where this was the case. As already mentioned, at the time of the research, the
researcher was employed full time in Iraq as a PSD team leader. This made certain
aspects of the research difficult. Firstly, there was limited access to the postal system,
which was why all correspondence was conducted by email with both the respondents
and the university. Secondly, there was no access to libraries; therefore most research
was completed on the Internet.

Survey Conduct, Population and Response

The survey was conducted in two phases. A pilot survey, which was
completed by three of the researchers colleagues, was conducted in order to check that
all questions were clear and relevant (Bell, 1999:127-128). No changes were made to
the questionnaire as a result of the pilot survey. The final survey was then emailed to
the target population with a covering letter over-viewing the aims and objectives of
the research, and its importance. The covering letter also explained that all

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respondents would remain anonymous. The final survey was distributed to 33 Private
Security Companies that operate PSDs in Iraq. Only eight completed questionnaires
were returned detailing the tactics of eight separate PSD operations in Iraq. This
equates to a 24.2% of total surveys distributed, much lower than the 34-76% average
response rate suggested by Mentor (2002).
The term PSD, for the purposes of the survey results, is used to denote a
security operation or contract with or without subordinate security teams, rather than
an individual team or detail of four to eight operators. Each respondent was tagged
with an individual identifier; PSD A to PSD H. Questions one to three was concerned
with establishing the level of profile of each PSD. In order to establish this, the survey
asked three questions regarding the PSDs dress, vehicles and tactics. The answer to
each question would give the respondent a weighting of one to three depending upon
level of profile. Weighting of one equates to low-profile, two to mid-profile, and three
to high-profile. The final weighting at the end of question three would determine the
profile of the PSD. The last two questions were concerned with determining the
effectiveness of that PSDs profile. This was done by; firstly, obtaining an estimate of
the total missions carried out by the team, and then by obtaining an estimate of the
number of hostile incidents carried out against the PSD. The number of missions
could then be divided by the number of individual incident types to obtain a ratio of
missions per incident type. Incident to mission percentages would also be calculated.
The final profile weighting along with those ratios and percentages could then be
evaluated to determine, if possible, which profiles experienced the least number of
incident types as a ratio of missions carried out, in order to test the three propositions
detailed in the introductory section of this essay. Due to the small scale of the research
all data analysis was conducted manually.

Conclusion
In this section, we reviewed the ethical considerations of the research, factors
influencing the research design, methodology choices, anticipated problems, the
actual survey conduct, and the population and response. In the following section, the
results of the data collection effort will be examined.

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 Section Four: Statement of Results

Introduction
In the previous section, the research methodology was described. In this
section, the results of the survey will be presented on a question-by-question basis.

Question One:
How do your Personal Security Detail (PSD) Operators dress? (Mark as appropriate)

In local style dress____

In khaki____
Other (Please Specify)__________________________

In this first question, the researcher was attempting to discover the

fundamental level of the PSDs profile by identifying the usual working dress of the
operators. As seen in the literature Survey, dress and demeanour is considered an
important aspect of the PSDs profile. As a result of the researcher’s personal
knowledge of the industry, it was decided to narrow the potential answers down to
three options. Firstly, PSDs using low profile tactics are known to wear local style
clothing, often wearing Arab ‘man-dresses’, local ‘shamagh’ headscarves and
sporting beards. Secondly, PSDs using a high-profile often wear a quasi military style
khaki uniform consisting of ‘cargo pants’ and ‘gilets’. The final option was left open
with the ‘other’ option. In the researcher’s experience ‘other’ would equate to normal
western style dress - which would be regarded as a mid-level profile in the
researcher’s opinion - however, because the term ‘normal’ can be open to
interpretation, it was decided to give respondents the opportunity to specify any
‘other’ style of dress.
Two respondents chose the low profile ‘local style dress’ option giving them a
weighting of one. One of the respondents chose the high-profile ‘khaki’ option with a
weighting of three. The other five respondents chose the ‘other’ option, four PSDs A,
B, C & D, specified ‘long sleeved dressed down shirt, cargo trousers, no sunglasses or
caps’, and the fifth, PSD E, specified ‘non descript civilian dress, covert weapon
carriage’. The researcher decided to give all five respondents a weighting of two
points.
Table One: Profile Weighting for Dress
PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
A B C D E F G H
Low X X
Mid X X X X X
High X
Points: 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 3

Question Two:
Which of the following vehicle types do your PSDs use? (Mark as appropriate)

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Sport Utility Vehicles____
Executive Sedans____
Mixture of vehicle types____
(Please specify)__________________________

The vehicles being used by PSDs are the most obvious aspects of profile.
High-profile teams can be seen from a distance in their new SUVs, whereas low-
profile sedans that blend in with the local traffic are not so obvious. Two of the
respondents were using high-profile SUVs and were given a weighting of three. One
respondent was using low-profile Sedans and was given a weighting of one. Mixed
vehicle motorcades can be an indicator of low-profile, however, it was decided that
profile would be based on the vehicle types used, and on an answer-by-answer basis.
The last five respondents indicated that they were using a mixture of vehicle types.
PSD B specified one local national SAP vehicle, two sedans and one SUV CAT
vehicle, which was given a low-profile weighting of one. PSD D specified one sedan
and two SUVs, and was given a mid-profile weighting of two. PSD E specified SUVs
with Suburbans used as support (CAT) vehicles, and was given a high profile
weighting of three. PSD F specified a mixture of old suburbans and other unspecified
vehicles, and was given a low-profile weighting of one. Finally, PSD G specified a
mixture of suburbans, mini-busses, local SUVs and local trucks, and was given a low-
profile weighting of one.

Table Two: Profile Weighting for Vehicles

PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
A B C D E F G H
A. Low X X X X
B. Mid X
C. High X X X
Points: 1 1 3 2 3 1 1 3

Question Three:
Which motorcade (convoy) tactics do your PSDs utilise? (Mark as appropriate)

Vehicles travelling further apart, attempting to blend in with local traffic, providing
mutual support only when needed____
‘Traditional’ Close Protection tactics, i.e. travelling close together with at least one
vehicle blocking for the other____
Use of weapons and vehicles in an overt manner to create a protective buffer between
the motorcade and local traffic ____
Other (Please specify)__________________________

The final identified aspect of profile is tactics. This question aimed to identify
the tactics being used by the respondents. Again tactics are an important aspect of
profile, from covert unnoticed low-profile motorcades to aggressive high-profile
motorcades or somewhere in-between. Two of the respondents indicated that they

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were using ‘traditional’ Close Protection tactics and were given a mid-profile
weighting of two. Six of the respondents indicated that they used low-profile tactics,
and were given a weighting of one. None of the respondents indicated that they used
high-profile tactics.

Table Three: Profile Weighting for Tactics

PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
A B C D E F G H
A. Low X X X X X X
B. Mid X X
C. High
Points: 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2

Question Four:
How many missions, in your estimation, have your PSDs completed in Iraq?
________

It was important for the researcher to get an estimate of the number of

missions carried out by the PSDs in order to be able to establish the ratio of missions
to incidents and to be able to establish the percentages of incident to missions carried
out for each PSD. Respondents reported figures as low as ten missions and as high as
12,000 missions.

Table Four: Number of Missions completed by PSDs

PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
A B C D E F G H
Missions 170 700 120 10 1500+ 12000+ 3800+ 10000+
0

Question Five:
How many of the following types of incident have been directed at your PSD vehicle
motorcades whilst operating in Iraq? (Please indicate the frequency of each type of
incident)

Terrorist / Insurgent Attack____

Criminal Attack i.e. Hijacking____
‘Blue on Blue’ Friendly Fire____

In this final question, the researcher was interested in finding out the number
of incidents aimed at the PSDs. The options available included both terrorist and
criminal attack, which were included in order to test the propositions that PSDs using
high-profile tactics were less likely to come under hostile attacks because of the
deterrent factor, and that PSDs using low-profile tactics were less likely to come
under hostile attack because of the covert nature of their tactics. The researcher also

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included ‘blue on blue’ incidents in order to evaluate the proposition that PSDs using
low-profile tactics were more likely to be subjected to friendly fire.
Table Five: Number of Incidents Experienced by PSDs
PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
A B C D E F G H
Terrorist 0 0 0 0 12 9 0 28
Attack
Criminal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack
‘Blue on 3 2 2 0 1 50 2 0
Blue’

Conclusion
In this section the researcher has described, question by question, the findings
of the survey of PSCs operating PSDs within Iraq. The next section will be an
analysis and discussion of those results.

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 Section Five: Analysis & Discussion

Introduction
The previous section showed the results of the research survey, on a question-
by-question basis, and the accumulated results of those questions. In this section, the
results of the survey will be analysed and discussed in order to be able to test the three
propositions discussed in the introductory section; that high-profile motorcade tactics
deter attack; that low-profile motorcade tactics reduce the incidence of attack through
deception and stealth; and that low-profile motorcade tactics increase the risk of ‘blue
on blue’, or ‘friendly fire’ incidents with MNFI, Iraqi security forces or other PSDs
operating in Iraq.

Analysis
In order to test those propositions the analysis will be broken down into three
parts. Firstly, the total weighting for each PSD will be calculated and a profile level
assigned. Next, the formula; missions divided by incidents, will be calculated for each
incident type to provide a ratio (rounded up to the next whole number), and also a
percentage of incidents to missions will be calculated for each incident type. Both
calculations will be conducted, firstly by individual PSD and then by profile
grouping. Finally, the resulting mission to incident ratios and incident percentages for
each profile type will then be compared with each other. The comparison figures for
terrorist incidents will be used to assess the first and second propositions. The
comparison figures for ‘blue on blue’ incidents will be used to assess the third
proposition.

Table Six: Total Weighting from Questions One, Two & Three
PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
A B C D E F G H
Q1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 3
Q2 1 1 3 2 3 1 1 3
Q3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
Total 4 4 7 5 6 3 3 8
It was possible for the respondents to get a profile weighting between the
range of three and nine. A total of five respondents had a final weighting of three, four
and five, which would be classed as low-profile. Three respondents had final
weightings of six, seven and eight, which would be classed as high-profile.
The following table shows the overall results, with the PSDs grouped by total
profile weighting, with the number of missions and incident percentages per single
incident type shown for each PSD.

Table Seven: Final Results per PSD

PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD
F G A B D E C H
Total Profile 3 3 4 4 5 6 7 8
Weighting LP LP LP LP LP HP HP HP

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Missions 12,00 3800+ 1700 700 10 1500+ 120 10,000+
0+
Terrorist 9 0 0 0 0 12 0 28
Incidents
‘Blue on 50 2 3 2 0 1 2 0
Blue’
Incidents
Mission : 1334 0 0 0 0 125 0 358
Terrorist
Incident
Ratio
Terrorist 0.075 0 0 0 0 0.8% 0 0.28%
Incidents as a %
Percentage
of Missions
Mission : 240 1900 567 350 0 1500 60 0
‘Blue on
Blue’
Incident
Ratio
‘Blue on 0.416 0.52 0.176 0.285 0 0.066 1.66 0
blue’ % % % % % %
Incidents as a
Percentage
of Missions

The following chart shows the incident percentages per PSD in a graphic
form.

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Chart One: Incidents shown as a percentage of missions:

1.8

1.6

1.4

The next table shows the total number of missions, the total number of
individual incidents and the total mission to incident ratios for the PSDs by profile
group.
1.2
Table Eight: Final Results per Profile Group
Low-Profile High Profile
PSDs A,B,D,F,G PSDs C,E,H
Total Mission 18210 11620
Total Terrorist Incidents 12 37
Total ‘Blue on Blue’ Incidents 57 3
1
Mission : Terrorist Incident Ratio Total 1518 315
Terrorist Incidents as a Percentage of Missions 0.065% 0.318%
Mission : ‘Blue on Blue’ Incident Ratio Total 320 3873
‘Blue on blue’ Incidents as a Percentage of 0.313% 0.025%
Missions
The following chart shows the incident percentages per profile group in a
graphic form.
0.8

0.6 - 18 -
Chart Two: Incidents shown as a percentage of missions:

0.35

0.3

Discussion
Despite the low response rate for the survey the results would suggest that the
0.25
high-profile motorcade is more likely to experience a terrorist attack in Iraq than the
low-profile motorcade. The high-profile group experienced one terrorist incident
every 315 missions (0.318%), against one terrorist incident every 1518 missions
(0.065%) for the low-profile grouping. On an individual basis, the survey results show
that of the five PSD that were classified as low-profile; A, B, D, F & G, only PSD F
(with a low-profile weighting of three) had experienced any type of terrorist attacks.
In fact, PSD F had experienced nine terrorist incidents in over 12,000 missions
(0.075%), equating to one terrorist incident per 1334 missions. In contrast, of the
three PSDs classified as high-profile; C, E & H, two had experienced terrorist attacks.
0.2
PSD E (with a high-profile weighting of six) had experienced 12 terrorist attacks in
over 1500 missions (0.8%), and PSD H (with a high-profile weighting of eight) had
experienced 28 terrorist attacks in over 10,000 missions (0.28%). These two results
equate to one terrorist incident per 125 missions and 358 missions respectively.
The results also suggest that that the low-profile motorcade is more likely to
experience a ‘blue on blue’ encounter than their high-profile counterparts. The low-
profile PSDs surveyed had experienced one ‘blue on blue’ incident every 320
missions (0.313%), whereas the high-profile group had experienced a ‘blue on blue’
incident every 3873 missions (0.025%). Of the eight PSDs surveyed, six had
experienced ‘blue on blue’ incidents. Of the two that had not experienced ‘blue on
0.15
blue’, PSD D (with a low-profile weighting of 5) had only carried out ten missions
and PSD H, which was the most high-profile of the respondents with a weighting of
eight. The four low-profile PSDs that had experienced ‘blue on blue’ incidents; PSDs

- 19 -

0.1
F, B, A & G (with low-profile weightings of three & four), had experienced one ‘blue
on blue’ incident per 240 (0.416%), 350 (0.285%), 567 (0.176%) and 1900 (0.52%)
missions respectively. Against this, there were two high-profile PSDs that had
experienced ‘blue on blue’ incidents; PSDs C & E (with high-profile weightings
seven and six respectively), had experienced one ‘blue on blue’ incident per 60
(1.66%) and 1500 (0.066%) missions respectively.

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 Section Six: Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction
In the previous section the results were analysed and discussed. In this final
section, we will discuss any conclusions that may be drawn from the survey findings,
and from any associated research. There will also be some recommendations, both as
to how the results and conclusions may best be used, and as regards possibilities for
further research in this area.

Conclusions
The essay has shown that it is vital for the PSD operating in Iraq to use the
most effective tactics available to them because of the evolving threats within that
environment and because the PSD and the principle are at their most vulnerable when
travelling by car within that environment. Therefore, research into the merits of both
low and high-profile motorcade tactics is an important one. We have seen from the
limited literature and research available that there are two schools of thought
regarding this subject. On the one hand there are those that argue for the deterrent
effects of high-profile tactics, preventing attacks through aggression and target
hardening. On the other there are those who believe that low-profile tactics will
prevent any terrorist threat locating or observing the motorcade, and therefore
preventing an attack through stealth. Those proponents of the high-profile option also
argue that low-profile tactics are more prone to coming under ‘blue on blue’ or
friendly fire incidents with coalition military, Iraqi security forces or other PSDs. The
survey results, despite a low response rate, suggested that the low-profile approach to
motorcades in Iraq was less likely to encounter a terrorist incident than the high-
profile approach, reinforcing the theory of stealth over deterrence. The results also
suggested that the low-profile approach was more likely to experience ‘blue on blue’
incidents.

Recommendations
The results suggest that in preventing terrorist attack the low-profile approach
is generally more successful than the high-profile approach. Therefore, it is suggested
that individual PSDs consider this approach or at least aspects of it. However, when
using these tactics it would be advisable to consider a strategy to avoid ‘blue on blue’
incidents. This could entail, in the first place, a careful approach to security
checkpoints and convoys, a method of identification for the motorcade, and finally,
good communication with the military, where possible. The importance of this
research and a lack of previous research into this subject prompt the researcher into
recommending further, more detailed research into this subject by the stakeholders’,
i.e. the PSC industry itself.

Conclusion
In this final section, conclusions and recommendations were drawn from the
survey findings and associated research. It is hoped that this research will prove useful

- 21 -
and that it may prompt further more detailed research in the future. However, it is
worth noting that the low response rate of the survey makes judgement on this issue
open to question. Therefore, any decisions based on this research regarding the use of
high-profile or low-profile tactics should be tempered with common sense and be
based on a sound threat assessment.

- 22 -
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