De Castro v JBC

GR No. 191002
March 17, 2010
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
The case at hand is actually a consolidation of petitions for certiorari and mandamus with
regard to the selection for the next Supreme Court Chief justice after then-Chief Justice Reynato
Puno.
Then-Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s compulsory retirement was on May 17, 2010, a few days
after the coming Presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Given such, it has produced legal
dilemmas, given the prohibition of the incumbent President to appoint two months
immediately before the Presidential elections until the end of his/her term by virtue of Section
15, Article VII, and that Section 4, Article VIII also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.

The following are the Petitioners and their petitions:

De Castro and Peralta Certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to
the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next
Chief Justice Jaime N. Soriano Petition for prohibition to prevent JBC from conducting its search,
selection, and nomination proceedings for the position of CJ.
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) Mandamus for the JBC to submit its list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by
the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department.
Estelito Mendoza (Former Solicitor General) a ruling from the Court for the guidance of
the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr and Roland B. Inting (IBP Governors for Southern Luzon and
Eastern Visayas, respectively) want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment during the period
provided for in Section 15, Article VII.

ISSUE: (with regard to Art VIII, Sec 5)

1. W/N the petitioners have locus standi?
2. W/N there is a justiciable controversy?
3. W/N the incumbent President can appoint the successor of CJ Puno upon his retirement?

HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioners have locus standi, having demonstrated adequate interest in the
outcome of the controversy. The issue at hand is of transcendental importance to the people as
a whole and to the petitioners, in particular. The issue affects everybody, regardless of their
personal interest, because there is great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President
to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who
may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the
ranks of trial judges throughout the country. In any event, the Court retains the broad
discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter
involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.

2. Yes, there is a justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that
the JBC already commenced with the proceedings. Following the proceedings by the JBC are the
next steps for the candidates to be appointed.

3. YES. The court agrees that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against
presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of
this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only
be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC;
Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to
impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes
on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme
Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so
will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1),
Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special
provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot
be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article
VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Such interpretation even
turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commissions
deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

RULING:
The case is dismissed.