1. G.R. No.
168164               July 5, 2010 Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
VICENTE ADRIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALICE TANCO, GERALDINE TANCO, RONALD
TANCO, and PATRICK TANCO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor
the poor and the underprivileged. They apply with equal
force to those who, notwithstanding their more
comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of
protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license
to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of
defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is
being committed against them.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
October 12, 2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74465 which reversed and set aside
the June 17, 1998 Decision3 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The
DARAB Decision affirmed the Decision 4 of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) which declared
and recognized petitioner Vicente Adriano (Vicente) as
tenant/lessee of the landholding subject matter of this
case. Also assailed is the May 4, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration
Factual Antecedents
On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco (Alice)
purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692
hectares located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. 5 The land was
devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned
among the respondents (Alice and her three children,
namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick), each receiving
7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692
hectare.
Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a
letter6 dated January 16, 1995 informing him that subject
landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to
vacate the property as soon as possible.
Proceedings before the PARAD
Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful
possession of subject farmland which might impair his
security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the
regional office of DARAB in Region III a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Injunction.7 He averred that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco
(Arsenio),8 the husband of Alice, instituted him as
tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since
then, he has been performing all phases of farm works,
such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of
the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally
between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to
improve and establish his home at the old building left
by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the
plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession of and
continues to cultivate the land.
In their Answer,9 respondents denied having instituted
any tenant on their property. They stressed that Vicente
never worked and has no employer-employee
relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar
as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that
Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker.
They claimed that in April 1994 and April 1995, upon the
intercession of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), Alice agreed to avail the services of Vicente for
the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees. In
consideration thereof, Alice also agreed to pay Vicente
an amount equivalent to 50% of the produce, which was
then the prevailing practice in Bulacan. Respondents
maintained that Alice agreed to this setup since the
MARO made it clear to both parties that the contract
was for the specific purpose of spraying the mango
trees only and that the same will not ripen into tenancy
relationship.
Respondents likewise alleged that it was impossible for
the late Arsenio to institute Vicente as tenant in 1970
since the Tanco family acquired the mango plantation
from Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. only in December
1975.
On April 23, 1996, the PARAD rendered a Decision 10 in
favor of Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was
performing functions more than just a mere caretaker
and was even allowed to live in subject landholding with
his family, he is therefore a tenant. The dispositive
portion of the PARAD’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring and recognizing plaintiff Vicente
Adriano as tenant/lessee of subject landholding;
(2) Ordering the MARO of Norzagaray to cause
the preparation of an Agricultural Leasehold
Contract between the plaintiff and the
defendants;
(3) Plaintiff must be maintained in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the landholding.
SO ORDERED.11
Respondents moved for reconsideration which was
denied.12
Proceedings before the DARAB
Thus, respondents appealed to the DARAB which
affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the
landholding is an agricultural land, that respondents
allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees, and
that they divided the fruits equally between them, then
an implied tenancy was created.
Proceedings before the CA
Twice rebuffed but still undeterred, respondents
elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Review13 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They
contended, among others, that the essential elements of
tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant
controversy. They claimed that their property is not an
agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized area; Alice
hired Vicente as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature
of their relationship is that of an employer-employee
relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties share
in the harvest. With regard to DARAB’s theory of implied
lease, respondents maintained that they never
authorized Vicente to spray the mango trees.
Respondents insisted that Alice agreed to engage the
services of Vicente for the specific purpose of spraying
the mango trees in 1994 and 1995 for humanitarian
reasons in order to recompense him for the expenses
he had already spent for the unauthorized spraying. The
agreement was made upon the intercession of the
MARO, who emphasized that the same would not ripen
into tenancy relationship.
Respondents further contended that, if at all, Vicente’s
claim should be limited to the property assigned to Alice
because she was the only one who hired him as a
caretaker. In fact, he had been consistently receiving a
monthly salary as a hired caretaker, as well as bonuses,
as shown by several cash vouchers 14 attached to their
petition. Furthermore, it is impossible for Vicente, who is
already old, to personally cultivate the entire 28.4692
hectares of land all by himself.
Impressed with respondents’ arguments, the CA
rendered a Decision in their favor. Thus:
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 June 1998
and the Resolution dated 28 November 2002 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another judgment is entered, declaring respondent
Vicente Adriano NOT a tenant of respondents Alice K.
Tanco [TCT-No. T-93.233 (M)-7.4692 hectares],
Geraldine Tanco [TCT No. 93.230 (M)-7 hectares],
Ronald Tanco [TCT No. T-93.232 (M)-7 hectares], and
Patrick Tanco [TCT No. T-93.231 (M)-7 hectares],
whose subject landholdings are all located at San
Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, respondent being a mere
employee or hired caretaker/overseer/worker of
petitioner Alice K. Tanco with respect to her property in
question, covering 7.4692 hectares, and thus
respondent is NOT entitled to security of tenure under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act
No. 6657).
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.15
Vicente sought reconsideration, which the CA denied in
its May 4, 2005 Resolution.16
Issues
Hence, this petition. From the parties’ exchange of
pleadings, it appears that the fundamental issues to be
resolved in this petition in the order of their importance
are as follows:
I
WHETHER THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE
PETITIONER ARE QUESTIONS OF LAW WHICH CAN
BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT.17
II
WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF THE PARAD AND THE
DARAB THAT VICENTE IS A BONA FIDE TENANT IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 18
Our Ruling
This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme
Court may review factual issues.
Respondents, who put forward the first issue, contend
that Vicente is actually raising factual issues which is not
allowed in a petition for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They maintain that under
Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised as issues
and resolved by this Court.
Vicente, on the other hand, concedes that the issues set
forth in his petition are not questions of law.
Nevertheless, he counter-argues that this case falls
under the exceptions where this Court may pass upon
questions of fact.1avvphi1
We agree with Vicente. The determination of whether a
person is an agricultural tenant is basically a question of
fact.19 And, as a general rule, questions of fact are not
proper in a petition filed under Rule 45. 20 But since the
findings of facts of the DARAB and the CA contradict
each other, it is crucial to go through the evidence and
documents on record as a matter of exception 21 to the
rule.22
The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy
relationship exists are not supported by substantial
evidence.
Vicente posits that the CA erred in substituting its own
findings with the unanimous findings of the PARAD and
the DARAB. He asserts that factual findings of
administrative agencies are entitled to great respect and
even finality since they have acquired expertise on the
field for which they were created. The only requirement
is that said findings must be supported by substantial
evidence. Vicente believes that the findings of the
agrarian tribunals are supported by substantial evidence
since he did not observe regular working hours, handles
all phases of farm works, and lives in an old building
located at the middle of the plantation.
We are not persuaded.
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises
between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of
which relationship the tenant acquires the right to
continue working on and cultivating the land.23
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. 24 For
tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential
requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there
is sharing of the harvests between the parties. 25 All the
requisites must concur in order to establish the
existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of
one or more requisites is fatal.26
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case,
we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential
requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
The essential element of consent is sorely missing
because there is no proof that the landowners
recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their
legitimate tenant. And, although Vicente claims that he
is a tenant of respondents’ agricultural lot in Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and
openly occupied it, no evidence was presented to
establish the presence of consent other than his self-
serving statements. These cannot suffice because
independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove
consent of the landowner.27
Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is
lacking. Independent evidence, such as receipts, must
be presented to show that there was sharing of the
harvest between the landowner and the tenant. 28 Self-
serving statements are not sufficient. 29
Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing
of harvest in the context of a tenancy relationship
between Vicente and the respondents. The only
evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of
harvests were the allegations of Vicente which, as
discussed above, were self-serving and have no
evidentiary value. Moreover, petitioner’s allegations of
continued possession and cultivation do not support his
cause. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of
an agricultural land does not automatically convert a
tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws.30 It is essential that,
together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he
transmitted the landowner’s share of the harvest.31
Neither can we agree with the DARAB’s theory of
implied tenancy because the landowner never
acquiesced to Vicente’s cultivating the land. Besides, for
implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the
essential requisites of tenancy must be present. 32
Lastly, it is well to stress that Vicente has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of tenancy. It is
elementary that he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof. And if the petitioner upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondents are under no
obligation to prove their exception or defense. In the
case at bench, aside from being self-serving, some of
the allegations of Vicente are contradicted by the
evidence on record. While he claims that Arsenio
instituted him as tenant in 1970 and has since then
occupied and cultivated respondents’ landholdings, the
Deed of Absolute Sale presented by the latter
indubitably shows that Alice (or the Tanco family)
acquired the same only in 1975.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
assailed October 12, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74465 declaring petitioner
Vicente Adriano not a tenant of the respondents and
thus not entitled to security of tenure under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and the May 4,
2005 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 165676               November 22, 2010
JOSE MENDOZA,* Petitioner,
vs.
NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO
GERMINO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by
petitioner Jose Mendoza to challenge the decision 2 and
the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 48642.4
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are
briefly summarized below.
On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C.
Mendoza5 (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against
respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry.6
The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered
owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime in 1988,
respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject
property by means of strategy and stealth, and without
their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs’
repeated demands, respondent Narciso refused to
vacate the subject property.7
On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer,
claiming, among others, that his brother, respondent
Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs’ agricultural lessee
and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a
member of the immediate farm household.8
After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion
to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the
tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.
Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent
Narciso’s objection, the MTC issued an order on
October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB,
Cabanatuan City for further proceedings.9
On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs 10 filed an amended
complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno
as additional defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the
agricultural lessee of the subject property. Respondent
Benigno unlawfully entered the subject property in 1982
or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and without their
knowledge or consent. He withheld possession of the
subject property up to 1987, and appropriated for
himself its produce, despite repeated demands from the
plaintiffs for the return of the property. In 1987, they
discovered that respondent Benigno had transferred
possession of the subject property to respondent
Narciso, who refused to return the possession of the
subject property to the plaintiffs and appropriated the
land’s produce for himself. The subject property was
fully irrigated and was capable of harvest for 2 cropping
seasons. Since the subject property could produce 100
cavans of palay per hectare for each cropping season,
or a total of 500 cavans per cropping season for the five-
hectare land, the plaintiffs alleged that the respondents
were able to harvest a total of 13,000 cavans of palay
from the time they unlawfully withheld possession of the
subject property in 1982 until the plaintiffs filed the
complaint. Thus, they prayed that the respondents be
ordered to jointly and severally pay 13,000 cavans of
palay, or its monetary equivalent, as actual damages, to
return possession of the subject property, and to pay
₱15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.11
On January 9, 1996, the respondents filed their answer
denying the allegations in the complaint, claiming,
among others, that the plaintiffs had no right over the
subject property as they agreed to sell it to respondent
Benigno for ₱87,000.00. As a matter of fact, respondent
Benigno had already made a ₱50,000.00 partial
payment, but the plaintiffs refused to receive the
balance and execute the deed of conveyance, despite
repeated demands. The respondents also asserted that
jurisdiction over the complaint lies with the Regional
Trial Court since ownership and possession are the
issues.12
THE PARAD RULING
In a March 19, 1996 decision, PARAD Romeo Bello
found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the
subject property, noting that they failed to prove that
respondent Benigno was the plaintiffs’ bona fide
agricultural lessee. The PARAD ordered the
respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the
plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages.13
Not satisfied, the respondents filed a notice of appeal
with the DARAB, arguing that the case should have
been dismissed because the MTC’s referral to the
DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657,14 which repealed the rule on referral
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316.15
THE DARAB RULING
The DARAB decided the appeal on July 22, 1998. It
held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended
complaint that sufficiently alleged an agrarian dispute,
not the MTC’s referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the
PARAD decision.16
The respondents elevated the case to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 17
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the appeal on October 6, 2003. 18 It
found that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the
DARAB since the material allegations of the complaint
and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not
an agrarian dispute. It noted that the subsequent filing of
the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon
the DARAB. Thus, the CA set aside the DARAB
decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further
proceedings.
19
When the CA denied  the subsequent motion for
reconsideration,20 the petitioner filed the present
petition.21
THE PETITION
The petitioner insists that the jurisdiction lies with the
DARAB since the nature of the action and the
allegations of the complaint show an agrarian dispute.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that R.A. No. 6657 abrogated
the rule on referral previously provided in P.D. No. 316.
Moreover, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP) provides that
forcible entry cases can be referred to the DARAB.
THE ISSUE
The core issue is whether the MTC or the DARAB has
jurisdiction over the case.
OUR RULING
We deny the petition.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter
is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 22 It is
determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law.
It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement
of the parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged
or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by
the acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is
neither for the court nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in
character.23
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 24 as amended by R.A.
No. 7691,25 the MTC shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. The RRSP26 governs the remedial aspects of
these suits.27
Under Section 5028 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section
3429 of Executive Order No. 129-A,30 the DARAB has
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to,
among others, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture.31 For a case to involve an agrarian dispute,
the following essential requisites of an agricultural
tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation;
and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental.321avvphil
In the present case, the petitioner, as one of the
plaintiffs in the MTC, made the following allegations and
prayer in the complaint:
3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title Numbered 34267, with an
area of five (5) hectares, more or less situated at
Bo. Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. x x x;
4. That so defendant thru stealth, strategy and
without the knowledge, or consent of
administrator x x x much more of the herein
plaintiffs, unlawfully entered and occupied said
parcel of land;
5. Inspite of x x x demands, defendant Germino,
refused and up to the filing of this complaint, still
refused to vacate the same;
 6. The continuos (sic) and unabated occupancy
of the land by the defendant would work and
cause prejudice and irreparable damage and
injury to the plaintiffs unless a writ of preliminary
injunction is issued;
7. This prejudice, damage or injury consist of
disturbance of property rights tantamount to
deprivation of ownership or any of its attributes
without due process of law, a diminution of
plaintiffs’ property rights or dominion over the
parcel of land subject of this dispute, since they
are deprived of freely entering or possessing the
same;
8. The plaintiffs are entitled to the relief
demanded or prayed for, and the whole or part
of such relief/s consist of immediately or
permanently RESTRAINING, ENJOINING or
STOPPING the defendant or any person/s
acting in his behalf, from entering, occupying, or
in any manner committing, performing or
suffering to be committed or performed for him,
any act indicative of, or tending to show any
color of possession in or about the tenement,
premises or subject of this suit, such as
described in par. 3 of this complaint;
9. Plaintiffs are ready and willing to post a bond
answerable to any damage/s should the
issuance of the writ x x x;
10. As a consequence of defendant’s malevolent
refusal to vacate the premises of the land in
dispute, plaintiffs incurred litigation expenses of
P1,500.00, availing for the purpose the
assistance of a counsel at an agreed
honorarium of P5,000.00 and P250.00 per
appearance/ not to mention the moral damages
incurred due to sleepless nights and mental
anxiety, including exemplary damages, the
award and amount of which are left to the sound
discretion of this Honorable Court.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that pending the resolution of the issue
in this case, a restraining order be issued
RESTRAINING, ENJOINING, or STOPPING the
defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from
ENTERING OR OCCUPYING the parcel of land, or any
portion thereof, described in paragraph 3 of this
complaint, nor in any manner committing, performing or
suffering to be committed or, performed for him, by
himself or thru another, any act indicative of, or tending
to show any color of possession in or about the
premises subject of this suit;
THEREAFTER, making said writ of preliminary
injunction PERMANENT; and on plaintiffs’ damages,
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay to
the plaintiffs the sum alleged in paragraph 10 above.
GENERAL RELIEFS ARE LIKEWISE PRAYED FOR.33
Based on these allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear
that the action in the MTC was for forcible entry.
Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of
jurisdiction
Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an
affirmative and/or special defense in his answer, this did
not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the
complaint. It continued to have the authority to hear the
case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to
dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. 34 After all,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to
dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.35
Under the RRSP, the MTC is duty-bound to conduct a
preliminary conference36 and, if necessary, to receive
evidence to determine if such tenancy relationship had,
in fact, been shown to be the real issue. 37 The MTC may
even opt to conduct a hearing on the special and
affirmative defense of the defendant, although under the
RRSP, such a hearing is not a matter of right. 38 If it is
shown during the hearing or conference that, indeed,
tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.39
In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary
conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to
the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules. Besides,
Section 240 of P.D. No. 316, which required the referral
of a land dispute case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform for the preliminary determination of the
existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has
indeed been repealed by Section 76 41 of R.A. No. 6657
in 1988.
Amended complaint did confer jurisdiction on the
DARAB
Neither did the amendment of the complaint confer
jurisdiction on the DARAB. The plaintiffs alleged in the
amended complaint that the subject property was
previously tilled by Efren Bernardo, and the respondents
took possession by strategy and stealth, without their
knowledge and consent. In the absence of any
allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties,
the action was for recovery of possession of real
property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.42
The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in
setting aside the DARAB decision. While we lament the
lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending
resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute
between the parties since the evidence required in
courts is different from that of administrative agencies. 43
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 6,
2003 Decision and October 12, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48642
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 168164               July 5, 2010
VICENTE ADRIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALICE TANCO, GERALDINE TANCO, RONALD
TANCO, and PATRICK TANCO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor
the poor and the underprivileged. They apply with equal
force to those who, notwithstanding their more
comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of
protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license
to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of
defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is
being committed against them.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the
October 12, 2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74465 which reversed and set aside
the June 17, 1998 Decision3 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The
DARAB Decision affirmed the Decision 4 of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) which declared
and recognized petitioner Vicente Adriano (Vicente) as
tenant/lessee of the landholding subject matter of this
case. Also assailed is the May 4, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration
Factual Antecedents
On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco (Alice)
purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692
hectares located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. 5 The land was
devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned
among the respondents (Alice and her three children,
namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick), each receiving
7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692
hectare.
Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a
letter6 dated January 16, 1995 informing him that subject
landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to
vacate the property as soon as possible.
Proceedings before the PARAD
Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful
possession of subject farmland which might impair his
security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the
regional office of DARAB in Region III a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.7 He averred that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco
(Arsenio),8 the husband of Alice, instituted him as
tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since
then, he has been performing all phases of farm works,
such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of
the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally
between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to
improve and establish his home at the old building left
by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the
plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession of and
continues to cultivate the land.
In their Answer,9 respondents denied having instituted
any tenant on their property. They stressed that Vicente
never worked and has no employer-employee
relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar
as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that
Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker.
They claimed that in April 1994 and April 1995, upon the
intercession of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), Alice agreed to avail the services of Vicente for
the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees. In
consideration thereof, Alice also agreed to pay Vicente
an amount equivalent to 50% of the produce, which was
then the prevailing practice in Bulacan. Respondents
maintained that Alice agreed to this setup since the
MARO made it clear to both parties that the contract
was for the specific purpose of spraying the mango
trees only and that the same will not ripen into tenancy
relationship.
Respondents likewise alleged that it was impossible for
the late Arsenio to institute Vicente as tenant in 1970
since the Tanco family acquired the mango plantation
from Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. only in December
1975.
On April 23, 1996, the PARAD rendered a Decision 10 in
favor of Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was
performing functions more than just a mere caretaker
and was even allowed to live in subject landholding with
his family, he is therefore a tenant. The dispositive
portion of the PARAD’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring and recognizing plaintiff Vicente
Adriano as tenant/lessee of subject landholding;
(2) Ordering the MARO of Norzagaray to cause
the preparation of an Agricultural Leasehold
Contract between the plaintiff and the
defendants;
(3) Plaintiff must be maintained in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the landholding.
SO ORDERED.11
Respondents moved for reconsideration which was
denied.12
Proceedings before the DARAB
Thus, respondents appealed to the DARAB which
affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the
landholding is an agricultural land, that respondents
allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees, and
that they divided the fruits equally between them, then
an implied tenancy was created.
Proceedings before the CA
Twice rebuffed but still undeterred, respondents
elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Review13 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They
contended, among others, that the essential elements of
tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant
controversy. They claimed that their property is not an
agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized area; Alice
hired Vicente as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature
of their relationship is that of an employer-employee
relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties share
in the harvest. With regard to DARAB’s theory of implied
lease, respondents maintained that they never
authorized Vicente to spray the mango trees.
Respondents insisted that Alice agreed to engage the
services of Vicente for the specific purpose of spraying
the mango trees in 1994 and 1995 for humanitarian
reasons in order to recompense him for the expenses
he had already spent for the unauthorized spraying. The
agreement was made upon the intercession of the
MARO, who emphasized that the same would not ripen
into tenancy relationship.
Respondents further contended that, if at all, Vicente’s
claim should be limited to the property assigned to Alice
because she was the only one who hired him as a
caretaker. In fact, he had been consistently receiving a
is monthly salary as a hired caretaker, as well as bonuses,
as shown by several cash vouchers 14 attached to their
petition. Furthermore, it is impossible for Vicente, who is
already old, to personally cultivate the entire 28.4692
hectares of land all by himself.
Impressed with respondents’ arguments, the CA
rendered a Decision in their favor. Thus:
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 June 1998
and the Resolution dated 28 November 2002 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another judgment is entered, declaring respondent
Vicente Adriano NOT a tenant of respondents Alice K.
Tanco [TCT-No. T-93.233 (M)-7.4692 hectares],
Geraldine Tanco [TCT No. 93.230 (M)-7 hectares],
Ronald Tanco [TCT No. T-93.232 (M)-7 hectares], and
Patrick Tanco [TCT No. T-93.231 (M)-7 hectares],
whose subject landholdings are all located at San
Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, respondent being a mere
employee or hired caretaker/overseer/worker of
petitioner Alice K. Tanco with respect to her property in
question, covering 7.4692 hectares, and thus
respondent is NOT entitled to security of tenure under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act
No. 6657).
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.15
Vicente sought reconsideration, which the CA denied in
its May 4, 2005 Resolution.16
Issues
Hence, this petition. From the parties’ exchange of
pleadings, it appears that the fundamental issues to be
resolved in this petition in the order of their importance
are as follows:
I
WHETHER THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE
PETITIONER ARE QUESTIONS OF LAW WHICH CAN
BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT.17
II
WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF THE PARAD AND THE
DARAB THAT VICENTE IS A BONA FIDE TENANT IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 18
Our Ruling
This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme
Court may review factual issues.
Respondents, who put forward the first issue, contend
that Vicente is actually raising factual issues which is not
allowed in a petition for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They maintain that under
Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised as issues
and resolved by this Court.
Vicente, on the other hand, concedes that the issues set
forth in his petition are not questions of law.
Nevertheless, he counter-argues that this case falls
under the exceptions where this Court may pass upon
questions of fact.1avvphi1
We agree with Vicente. The determination of whether a
person is an agricultural tenant is basically a question of
fact.19 And, as a general rule, questions of fact are not
proper in a petition filed under Rule 45. 20 But since the
findings of facts of the DARAB and the CA contradict
each other, it is crucial to go through the evidence and
documents on record as a matter of exception 21 to the
rule.22
The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy
relationship exists are not supported by substantial
evidence.
Vicente posits that the CA erred in substituting its own
findings with the unanimous findings of the PARAD and
the DARAB. He asserts that factual findings of
administrative agencies are entitled to great respect and
even finality since they have acquired expertise on the
field for which they were created. The only requirement
is that said findings must be supported by substantial
evidence. Vicente believes that the findings of the
agrarian tribunals are supported by substantial evidence
since he did not observe regular working hours, handles
all phases of farm works, and lives in an old building
located at the middle of the plantation.
We are not persuaded.
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises
between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of
which relationship the tenant acquires the right to
continue working on and cultivating the land.23
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. 24 For
tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential
requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there
is sharing of the harvests between the parties. 25 All the
requisites must concur in order to establish the
existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of
one or more requisites is fatal.26
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case,
we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential
requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
The essential element of consent is sorely missing
because there is no proof that the landowners
recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their
legitimate tenant. And, although Vicente claims that he
is a tenant of respondents’ agricultural lot in Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and
openly occupied it, no evidence was presented to
establish the presence of consent other than his self-
serving statements. These cannot suffice because
independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove
consent of the landowner.27
Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is
lacking. Independent evidence, such as receipts, must
be presented to show that there was sharing of the
harvest between the landowner and the tenant. 28 Self-
serving statements are not sufficient. 29
Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing
of harvest in the context of a tenancy relationship
between Vicente and the respondents. The only
evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of
harvests were the allegations of Vicente which, as
discussed above, were self-serving and have no
evidentiary value. Moreover, petitioner’s allegations of
continued possession and cultivation do not support his
cause. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of
an agricultural land does not automatically convert a
tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws.30 It is essential that,
together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he
transmitted the landowner’s share of the harvest.31
Neither can we agree with the DARAB’s theory of
implied tenancy because the landowner never
acquiesced to Vicente’s cultivating the land. Besides, for
implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the
essential requisites of tenancy must be present. 32
Lastly, it is well to stress that Vicente has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of tenancy. It is
elementary that he who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof. And if the petitioner upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondents are under no
obligation to prove their exception or defense. In the
case at bench, aside from being self-serving, some of
the allegations of Vicente are contradicted by the
evidence on record. While he claims that Arsenio
instituted him as tenant in 1970 and has since then
occupied and cultivated respondents’ landholdings, the
Deed of Absolute Sale presented by the latter
indubitably shows that Alice (or the Tanco family)
acquired the same only in 1975.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
assailed October 12, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74465 declaring petitioner
Vicente Adriano not a tenant of the respondents and
thus not entitled to security of tenure under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and the May 4,
2005 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
are AFFIRMED.
4. G.R. No. 196598
EDITHA B. ALBOR, Petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NERY A MACASIL joined by
her husband RUDY MACASIL and NORMA BELUSO,
joined by her husband NOLI BELUSO, Respondents
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse and set aside the 24 September
20091 and 15 February 20112 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03895. The assailed
CA Resolutions dismissed herein petitioner Editha B.
Albor's (Editha) appeal from the 8 October 2008
Decision3 of the Department of Agrarian Refo1m
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No.
13162, for having been filed out of time.
ANTECEDENTS
Editha was the agricultural lessee of a 1.60 hectare
riceland portion and a 1.5110 hectare sugarland portion
of Lot 2429 located at Barangay Dinginan, Roxas City.
Lot 2429 was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. RT-108 (522),4 registered in the name of
Rosario Andrada (Rosario), married to Ramon Gardose.
As agricultural lessee, Editha had been paying rent to
the agricultural lessors, the heirs of Rosario. On 22
September 2000, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Roxas City, invited Editha to appear
before the MARO office on 20 October 2000. Editha
heeded the invitation and there met respondents who
informed her that they had purchased Lot 2429 from the
heirs of Rosario. No Deed of Sale, however, was shown
to Editha.
On 7 November 2000, Editha was able to obtain from
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Roxas City, a document entitled "Extra-Judicial.
Settlement with Deed of Sale," purportedly executed by
the heirs of Rosario. It appears that on 6 June 1997, the
heirs of Rosario adjudicated unto themselves Lot 2429
and thereupon sold the same to respondents for
₱600,000.00. Asserting that she had the right to redeem
Lot 2429 from respondents, Editha lodged a complaint
for redemption of landholding and damages before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).
In the main, Editha alleged that under Section 12 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,5 as amended by R.A. No.
6389, she had the right to redeem Lot 2429 within 180
days from notice in writing of the sale which shall be
served by the vendee on all lessees affected and on the
Department of Agrarian Reform upon registration of the
sale. Considering that the said extrajudicial settlement
with deed of sale had not yet been registered with the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City, her 180-period for
redemption did not commence. Thus, she prayed that
judgment be rendered declaring her entitled to redeem
the said lot, at the price of ₱60,000.00.
On their part, respondents asserted that prior to the
actual sale of Lot 2429, Editha knew that the selling
price was ₱600,000.00 and not ₱60,000.00, as
misleadingly alleged in her complaint. Respondents
stated that on 21 April 1997, 6 a certain Atty. Alejandro
Del Castillo, together with Eva Gardose-Asis,
representing the heirs of Rosario, conferred with Editha
and her son Bonifacio Albor about the impending sale of
Lot 2429. During the conference, Editha was apprised of
her right of preemption, and Lot 2429 was offered to her
for the price of ₱600,000.00. This notwithstanding,
Editha did not exercise her preemptive right to buy the
lot; consequently, the sale was consummated between
the heirs of Rosario and respondents on 6 June 1997.
Respondents further claimed that Editha was well-
informed in writing regarding the sale of Lot 2429. They
alleged that Felisa Aga-in and Teresita Gardose, acting
in behalf of the other heirs of Rosario, executed a
notice, dated 16 March 1998, informing Editha that
respondents were interested in buying Lot 2429; and
that if she so desired, she could still repurchase the
property from respondents.
Finally, respondents averred that they sent Editha a
written demand for payment of rentals reckoned from
1998. Instead of complying, Editha instituted the
complaint for redemption. Accordingly, respondents
prayed for collection of back rentals, termination of the
agricultural leasehold agreement, moral damages,
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
In its 30 June 2003 decision, 7 the PARAD found that
Editha was not properly notified of the sale. It observed
that the 16 March 1998 notice which respondents
presented failed to indicate the terms and particulars of
the sale. As such, it ruled that Editha's right of
redemption did not prescribe for want of a valid written
notice.
While the PARAD sustained Editha's right of
redemption, it nevertheless resolved to dismiss her
complaint after finding that only ₱216,000.00 was
consigned as redemption price. Citing jurisprudence on
the matter, the P ARAD opined that tender of payment
must be for the full amount of the repurchase price;
otherwise, the offer to redeem would be held ineffectual.
It noted that in the extrajudicial settlement and deed of
sale which Editha herself procured, the purchase price
stated was ₱600,000.00, and that such price was never
disputed. Hence, absent evidence to the contrary, there
can be no doubt that ₱600,000.00 was the actual
amount that respondents paid for Lot 2429. The decretal
portion of the PARAD's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is
hereby rendered as follows:
1) DISMISSING the complaint for redemption;
2) ORDERING the defendants, their agents or
representatives and any other persons acting for and in
their names to maintain the complainant and the
immediate members of her family in peaceful
possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the subject
land;
3) ORDERING the complainant to pay the defendants
ONE HUNDRED (101) CAVANS of clean palay as back
rentals for the riceland portion and TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED (₱2,500.00) PESOS as back rentals
for the sugarland portion representing the rentals in
arrears for agricultural crop years 1998-1999 to 2001-
2002, and thereafter, 50 cavans of palay and ₱1,000.00
pesos annually until the execution of this decision;
4) ORDERING the parties to seek the assistance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal
Office concerned and execute an agricultural lease
contract over the subject land;
5) DIRECTING the Department of Agrarian Reform
through its Provincial and/or Municipal Offices to initiate
and conduct mediation between the parties, assist them
in the determination and fixing of agricultural lease
rentals and in the execution of agricultural lease
contract; and
6) DIRECTING further the Department of Agrarian
Reform through its Provincial and/or Municipal Offices to
conduct a survey on the sugarland portion for the
determination of its exact area in aid of their fixing of
rentals.
All claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for
lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Editha filed an appeal before the DARAB.
On 10 November 2008, Editha's erstwhile counsel, Atty.
Fredicindo A. Talabucon (Atty. Talabucon), received a
copy of the DARAB's 8 October 2008 decision which
affirmed in toto the PARAD's ruling.
On 25 November 2008, Editha filed before the CA a
motion for extension of time9 to file a Rule 43 petition for
review. She prayed for an additional fifteen (15) days, or
from 25 November 2008 until 10 December 2008.
Shortly thereafter, on 3 December 2008, a motion to
withdraw as counsel,10 dated 28 November 2008, was
filed by Atty. Talabucon. It was alleged that Editha
decided to engage the services of another counsel and
for said reason, Atty. Talabucon was withdrawing his
appearance. Editha signified her conformity to the
motion to withdraw as counsel.
On 9 December 2008, Editha's new counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Y. Samillano (Atty. Samillano ), filed with the
CA a notice of appearance11 and at the same time
moved for an extension of thirty (30) days, or from 10
December 2008 until 9 January 2009, within which to file
the petition for review. The second motion for extension
of time was grounded on heavy workload and the need
for more time to study the case.
Eventually, Editha's petition for review was filed on 5
January 2009.
The Assailed CA Resolutions
In the assailed resolution, dated 24 September 2009,
the CA dismissed Editha's petition for review for having
been filed out of time. The appellate court ratiocinated
that while it may grant Editha's first motion for extension
of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition, it was
devoid of authority to grant her second motion for
extension which asked for an additional time of thirty
(30) days.
Editha filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
likewise denied by the CA in its 15 February 2011
resolution. Both resolutions denying Editha's petition for
review were anchored on Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. Period of appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its
effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new
trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1)
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.
In her bid to undo the CA resolutions, Editha comes
before this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING
EDITHA'S PETITION FOR REVIEW FOR HAVING
BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.
OUR RULING
Editha's petition fails. Editha availed of the wrong mode
of appeal in bringing her case before this Court.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of
the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45; and such
is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA
in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by
filing a petition for review, which in essence is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original
case.12
On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is
a limited form of review and is a remedy of last
recourse.13 It is an independent action that lies only
where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the
findings or conclusions of the lower court. 14 As long as
the court a quo acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.15
The 24 September 2009 and 15 February 2011
resolutions of the CA were final and appealable
judgments. In particular, the resolution dated 24
September 2009 dismissed Editha's Rule 43 petition for
review, while the resolution dated 15 February 2011
denied her motion for reconsideration of the earlier
resolution. The assailed resolutions disposed of Editha's
appeal in a manner that left nothing more to be done by
the CA with respect to the said appeal. 16 Hence, Editha
should have filed an appeal before this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.17
Editha received the 15 February 2011 resolution
denying her motion for reconsideration on 28 February
2011. Under the rules, she had until 15 March 201 l to
file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
Editha allowed the period to lapse without filing an
appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on 29
April 2011. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is
available but was lost through fault or
negligence.18 Where the rules prescribe a particular
remedy for the vindication of rights, such remedy should
be availed of.19 Accordingly, adoption of an improper
remedy already warrants outright dismissal of this
petition.20
Even if the Court looks beyond Editha's procedural
misstep, her petition must fail.
Editha imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CA and argues that it was too technical and
constricted in applying the rules of procedure. She
insists that Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
admits of an exception, as the said provision states that
a second extension may be granted for compelling
reason.
Editha posits that there is a compelling reason to grant a
second extension of time because on 3 December 2008,
Atty. Talabucon suddenly withdrew as her counsel. It
was only on 9 December 2008 that she hired a new
counsel, Atty. Samillano. Having just entered the
picture, Atty. Samillano needed more time to study the
case, and he could not be expected to finish drafting the
petition for review in just one (1) day before the
expiration of the 15-day extension granted by the CA. In
this accord, Editha contends that the filing of the second
motion for extension of time was justified; and that the
CA's dismissal of her petition for review impinged on her
substantive right to due process.
The arguments proffered are specious and deserve
scant consideration.
It is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and the one who seeks to avail of that
right must comply with the statute or rules. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the
perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period
set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as
well.21 The failure to perfect the appeal within the time
prescribed by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders
the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court
from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment. 22
It bears stressing that the statutory nature of the right to
appeal requires the appealing party to strictly comply
with the statutes or rules governing the perfection of an
appeal, as such statutes or rules are instituted in order
to promote an orderly discharge of judicial business. In
the absence of highly exceptional circumstances
warranting their relaxation, the statutes or rules should
remain inviolable.23
The Court quotes the relevant portion of Section 4, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court:
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount
of the docket fee before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
The provision is straightforward. While the CA enjoys a
wide latitude of discretion in granting a first motion for
extension of time, its authority to grant a further or
second motion for extension of time is delimited by two
conditions: First, there must exist a most compelling
reason for the grant of a further extension;
and second, in no case shall such extension exceed
fifteen (15) days.
So narrow is the discretion accorded to the CA in
granting a second extension of time that the word "most"
was utilized to underscore the compelling reason
demanded by the rule. Editha maintains that the filing of
the second motion for extension of time was prompted
by the sudden withdrawal of her previous counsel. The
CA, however, did not appreciate such predicament as a
most compelling reason to grant her plea for further
extension of time. On this score, the Court similarly finds
no compelling reason to deviate from the sound
conclusion of the CA.
Editha's situation is not unique. In Spouses Jesus
Dycoco v. CA,24 petitioner-spouses (Sps.
Dycoco) received on 3 April 2000, a copy of the DARAB
decision they sought to assail. Thus, the Sps. Dycoco
had until 18 April 2000 to file an appeal. They filed a
motion in the CA praying for an extension of thirty (30)
days within which to file their intended petition. The CA
granted them an extension of fifteen (15) days, or until 3
May 2000 to file their petition. Despite the extension, the
Sps. Dycoco filed their petition by registered mail only
on 8 May 2000. Not surprisingly, their petition was
denied due course and dismissed by the CA.25
Like Editha, the Sps. Dycoco erroneously elevated their
case to the Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Seeking liberality, the Sps. Dycoco contended that their
appeal was filed after the extension granted by the CA
because, on 10 April 2000, they secured the services of
a new counsel who still had to study the voluminous
records. In dismissing the Sps. Dycoco's petition
for certiorari, the Court held that:
Petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament when
they decided to change horses in midstream and
engaged the services of their present counsel on April
10, 2000 or just a week before the expiration of the
period to appeal in the Court of Appeals, discharging the
services of their former counsel who handled the case
from the level of the Provincial Adjudicator to the
DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences of a
belated appeal caused by the need of their new counsel
for more time to study voluminous records and
familiarize himself with the case.26
In juxtaposition, it was alleged in the motion to withdraw
as counsel that Editha had decided to engage the
services of another counsel; and that for said reason,
Atty. Talabucon was withdrawing his appearance. The
Court notes that the motion to withdraw as counsel bore
Editha's signature27 which signified her conformity. At
this point, the striking parallelism between the present
petition and the case of the Sps. Dycoco becomes
manifest. The records reveal that it was Editha herself
who caused her predicament. As such, her petition
for certiorari cannot escape the same outcome entered
by the Court in Spouses Jesus Dycoco v. CA.
Also, it may be well to recall the Court's pronouncement
in Cesar Naguit v. San Miguel Corp. 28 The petitioner
Cesar Naguit (Naguit) failed to timely file before the CA
his petition for certiorari against an adverse decision
rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission.
In his Rule 45 petition for review, Naguit invoked
liberality in the construction of the rules. He argued that
the CA should not have dismissed his petition by simply
denying his motion for extension of time to file the same.
To support his plea, Naguit asserted that due to the
unavailability of his former lawyer, he retained the
services of a new counsel who had a heavy workload;
and that the records were forwarded to the latter only a
week before the expiration of the period for filing of the
petition with the CA.29
The Court, unconvinced by Naguit's explanation,
reiterated:
Suffice it to say that workload and resignation of the
lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to
justify the relaxation of the procedural rules.
In addition, it is also the duty of petitioner to monitor the
status of his case and not simply rely on his former
lawyer whom he already knew to be unable to attend to
his duties as counsel. It is settled that litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome
of their case. They should give the necessary
assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest
in the case.30
Apropos, even if the Court were to believe that Atty.
Talabucon's withdrawal was "sudden" as alleged by
Editha, it cannot be gainsaid that the corresponding
motion to withdraw as counsel was filed with at least
seven (7) days remaining from the 15-day extension
granted by the CA. Ordinary prudence should have
impelled Editha to seek the assistance of a new counsel
immediately after signing her conformity to Atty.
Talabucon's motion to withdraw as counsel. Yet,
regrettably, she hired her new counsel only one (1) day
before the expiration of the 15-day extension granted to
her. Hence, for failure to exercise vigilance in the
prosecution of her case, Editha must be prepared to
accept whatever adverse judgment may be rendered
against her.
Finally, even on the merits, Editha's petition has no leg
to stand on.
Both the PARAD and the DARAB found that Editha only
consigned the amount of ₱216,000.00 as redemption
price for Lot 2429. As aptly observed in the PARAD's
decision, it was Editha herself who secured a copy of
the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale from the
Clerk of Court of the RTC in Roxas City. The purchase
price stated in the deed of conveyance was
₱600,000.00, and the administrative tribunals correctly
held that absent sufficient evidence to the contrary, it
must be accepted the reasonable price of the land as
purchased by the respondents.
The full amount of the redemption price should be
consigned m court.31 As explained in Quiño v. CA:
Only by such means can the buyer become certain that
the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good
faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of
redemption without the attendant evidence that the
redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the
repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the
buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots,
as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the
redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in
fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-
economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold.
Consignation of the entire price would remove all
controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at
the proper time.32
The redemption price Editha consigned falls short of the
requirement of the law, leaving the Court with no choice
but to rule against her claim.
In fine, there is an abundance of reasons, both
procedural and substantive, which has proved fatal to
Editha's cause.33
WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed CA
Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 03895 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. 180013               January 31, 2011
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
COOPERATIVE (DEARBC), Petitioner,
vs.
JESUS SANGUNAY and SONNY
LABUNOS, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the
Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 01715, which dismissed the petition filed by Del
Monte Philippines Inc. Employees Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative (DEARBC), challenging the
May 12, 2006 Decision3 of the Central Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB). For lack of jurisdiction, the DARAB
reversed and set aside the ruling of the DARAB
Regional Adjudicator (Adjudicator) who ordered the
respondents to peacefully vacate certain portions of the
subject landholding.4
The Court is now urged to rule on the issue of
jurisdiction of regular courts over petitions for recovery
of possession vis-à-vis the original, primary and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) and the DARAB over agrarian disputes
and/or agrarian reform implementation as provided for
under Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. 6657).
The Facts
The property subject of this case is a portion of an entire
landholding located in Sankanan, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, with an area of 1,861,922 square meters,
more or less, covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
AO-3 [Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA)].5 The said landholding was awarded to
DEARBC, an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Subsequently, DEARBC leased a
substantial portion of the land to Del Monte Philippines,
Inc. (DMPI) under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657 through a
Grower’s Contract dated February 21, 1989.
On July 7, 1998, DEARBC filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance with
Damages6 with the DARAB Region 10 Office against
several respondents, among whom were Jesus
Sangunay (Sangunay) and Sonny Labunos (Labunos).
Essentially, DEARBC claimed that both Sangunay and
Labunos illegally entered portions of its property called
"Field 34." Sangunay utilized approximately one and a
half (1 ½) hectare portion7 where he planted corn, built a
house and resided from 1986 to the present. Labunos,
on the other hand, tilled an area of approximately eight
(8) hectares where he planted fruit trees, gmelina,
mahogany and other crops as a source of his
livelihood.8 Both respondents refused to return the
parcels of land notwithstanding a demand to vacate
them. This illegal occupation resulted in the deprivation
of the proper and reasonable use of the land and
damages.
On December 11, 1990, the Adjudicator ruled in favor of
DEARBC on the ground that the respondents failed to
present proof of ownership over the subject portions of
the landholding. According to the Adjudicator, their bare
allegation of possession, even prior to the award of the
land to DEARBC, did not suffice as proof of ownership.
Thus:
In the series of hearing conducted by this Adjudicator
and in the position papers submitted by some of the
defendants, none of them was able to present proof,
either documentary or otherwise, that they owned the
areas they respectively occupied and cultivate[d], or that
their occupation and cultivation was with the consent
and authority of the complainant.
X x x against all reasons, the fact remains that their
occupation and cultivation thereof, granting it is true,
have not been validated by the DAR and they were not
among the identified FB’s over the said subject
landholding.9
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the
DARAB Central Office before which Sangunay filed his
position paper. He claimed that the subject property was
located along the Maninit River and was an accrual
deposit. He inherited the land from his father in 1948
and had since been in open, public, adverse, peaceful,
actual, physical, and continuous possession thereof in
the concept of an owner. He cultivated and lived on the
land with the knowledge of DEARBC. Sangunay
presented Tax Declaration No. 15-018 and Real
Property Historical Ownership issued by the Municipal
Assessor of Manolo Fortrich, showing that he had
declared the property for taxation purposes long before
DEARBC acquired it. In sum, Sangunay asserted that,
as a qualified farmer-beneficiary, he was entitled to
security of tenure under the agrarian reform law and, at
any rate, he had already acquired the land by
prescription.
For his part, Labunos reiterated the above arguments
and added that the subject portion of the landholding
was previously owned by one Genis Valdenueza who
sold it to his father, Filoteo, as early as 1950. Like
Sangunay, he asserted rights of retention and
ownership by prescription because he had been in
open, public, adverse, peaceful, actual, physical, and
continuous possession of the landholding in the concept
of an owner.10
In its May 12, 2006 Decision, 11 the DARAB dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the issue of
ownership of the subject land classifies the controversy
as a regular case falling within the jurisdiction of regular
courts and not as an agrarian dispute. 12 Thus:
X x x the plaintiff-appellee’s cause of action is for the
recovery of possession and specific performance with
damages with respect to the subject landholding. Such
cause of action flows from the plaintiff-appellee’s
contention that it owns the subject landholding. On the
other hand, defendant-appellants refuted and assailed
such ownership as to their respective landholdings.
Thus, the only question in this case is who owns the
said landholdings. Without doubt, the said question
classified the instant controversy to a regular case. At
this premise, We hold that the only issue to be resolved
by this Board is whether or not the instant case presents
an agrarian dispute and is therefore well within Our
jurisdiction.
xxx
In the case at bar, petitioner-appellants wanted to
recover x x the subject landholding on the premise of
ownership xxx. Defendants-appellants assail such
allegations saying that the landholdings are accrual
deposits and maintaining their open, peaceful and
adverse possession over the same. Indubitably, there
assertions and issues classify the present controversy
as a regular case. As such, clearly, this Board has no
jurisdiction to rule upon the instant case. Obviously, the
dispute between the parties does not relate to any
tenurial arrangement. Thus, this Board has no
jurisdiction over the same.
DEARBC challenged the DARAB Decision in the CA
through a petition for review filed under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Resolution dated June
27, 2007,13 the CA dismissed the petition for procedural
infirmities in its verification, certification and
attachments, viz:
1) The Verification and Certification is defective
due to the following reasons:
a) There is no assurance that the
allegations in the petition are based on
personal knowledge and in authentic
records, in violation of Section 4 par. (2),
Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure;
b) The Community Tax Certificate Nos.
of the affiant therein are not indicated;
c) The affiant is not authorized to sign
the same for and in behalf of the
petitioner cooperative;
2) The attached copies of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the DARAB
Quezon City and the Complaint filed before the
DAR, Region XD, and the Decision and
Resolution rendered therein are mere plain
photocopies, in violation of Sec. 6 par. (c), Rule
43, supra.
In a motion for reconsideration, DEARBC invoked
substantial compliance with the pertinent procedural
rules, pointing to the attached Secretary’s Certificate as
sufficient proof of authority given to the President and
Chairman of the Board, Dennis Hojas (Hojas), to
represent DEARBC. On August 24, 2007, 14 the CA
denied the motion because DEARBC failed to attach a
copy of the board resolution showing Hojas’ authority to
file the petition. This was a fatal error that warranted
dismissal of the petition, according to the appellate
court.
Hence, this petition for review.
With regard to the dismissal of the case by the CA on
technical grounds, the Court is of the view that it was
correct. DEARBC clearly failed to comply with the rules
which mistake was a fatal error warranting the dismissal
of the petition for review. However, it has been the
constant ruling of this Court that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
constraints of technicalities.15 Rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid
application of the rules that would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be
avoided.16 Thus, the Court opts to brush aside the
procedural flaw and resolve the core issue of jurisdiction
as it has been discussed by the parties anyway.
Position of the Parties
DEARBC claims that the action it filed for recovery of
possession falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB
because it partakes of either a boundary dispute, a
correction of a CLOA or an ouster of an interloper or
intruder found under Section 1 of Rule 11 of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure 17 and Administrative Order
03 Series of 2003.18 Under those rules, any conflict
involving agricultural lands and the rights of
beneficiaries is within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In his Comment,19 Labunos argues that only questions
of law may be resolved in appeals under Rule 45 and
that it is the decision of the CA which must be
challenged and not the DARAB decision. On the merits,
he cites cases where this Court ruled that the jurisdiction
of the DARAB is limited only to agrarian disputes and
other matters relating to the implementation of the
CARP. The subject land has not been transferred,
distributed and/or sold to tenants, and it is obvious that
the complaint is not for the correction of a title but for the
recovery of possession and specific performance.
Issues of possession may be dealt with by the DARAB
only when they relate to agrarian disputes. Otherwise,
jurisdiction lies with the regular courts.
Sangunay prays that he be declared as the owner of the
land, particularly his area in Field 34, based on the
following grounds: 1] that the tax receipts and Tax
Declaration No. 15-018 were issued in his name; 2] that
R.A. No. 6657 provides that farmers already in place
and those not accommodated in the distribution of
privately-owned lands must be given preferential rights
in the distribution of lands from the public domain (to
which the subject land as an accretion belongs); and 3]
that acquisitive prescription had set in his favor.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Where a question of jurisdiction between the DARAB
and the Regional Trial Court is at the core of a dispute,
basic jurisprudential tenets come into play. It is the rule
that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial office or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for 20 irrespective of
whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any
or all such reliefs.21 In the same vein, jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in
an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
will become dependent almost entirely upon the whims
of the defendant.22
Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 23 and as held in a
string of cases, "the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program."24 The DARAB was created, thru
Executive Order No. 109-A, to assume the powers and
functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases. Hence, all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform are within the DAR’s
primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction. At the first
instance, only the DARAB, as the DAR’s quasi-judicial
body, can determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the CARP.25 An agrarian
dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’
associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.26
The following allegations were essentially contained in
the complaints filed separately against the respondents
before the DARAB with some variance in the amount of
damages and fees prayed for:
1. The complainant is an agrarian cooperative
duly registered and organized under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines xxx.
2. Complainant is an awardee of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP), situated at Limbona, Bukidnon under
Original Certificate of Title A-3 as evidenced by
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
xxx.
xxxx
5. The defendant illegally entered and tilled the
land owned by the complainant, inside the
portion of Field 34, with an area of one and a
half (1 ½) hectares, more or less, located at
Sankanan, Manolo Fortrich, Bukidnon xxx.
xxxx
8. Demands were made by the complainant for
the defendant to vacate the premises but the
latter adamantly refused and did not vacate the
area xxx.
9. The defendant has caused actual damages in
the amount of xxx in the form of back rentals
and an estimated amount of xxx brought about
by the defendant for all his unlawful acts towards
the land and the owner of the land.
10. To recover the possession of the land and to
protect and vindicate its rights, the complainant
was compelled to engage the servces of a legal
counsel x x x
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Board, that a
decision be rendered:
Ejecting the defendant from the subject landholding
and/or causing him to cede possession of the land to
complainant. [Emphasis ours]
xxxx
Verily, all that DEARBC prayed for was the ejectment of
the respondents from the respective portions of the
subject lands they allegedly entered and occupied
illegally. DEARBC avers that, as the owner of the
subject landholding, it was in prior physical possession
of the property but was deprived of it by respondents’
intrusion.
Clearly, no "agrarian dispute" exists between the RESOLUTION
parties. The absence of tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, cannot be CARPIO, J.:
overlooked. In this case, no juridical tie of landownership
and tenancy was alleged between DEARBC and The Case
Sangunay or Labunos, which would so categorize the
controversy as an agrarian dispute. In fact, the
This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45
respondents were contending for the ownership of the
of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 29
same parcels of land.27
August 2008 Decision2 and 16 October 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
This set of facts clearly comprises an action for recovery 95554. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 1 March 2006
of possession. The claim of being farmer-beneficiaries Decision4 and 28 June 2006 Resolution 5 of the
with right of retention will not divest the regular courts of Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
jurisdiction, since the pleas of the defendant in a case (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 10659. The DARAB
are immaterial. affirmed the 29 December 2000 Decision 6 of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in
The ruling in DAR v. Hon. Hakim S. Abdulwahid and DARAB Case No. 05261 ‘SNE’ 00.
Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc.28 is inapplicable to the
present case. The complaint in Abdulwahid "impugn(ed) The Facts
the CARP coverage of the landholding involved and its
redistribution to farmer beneficiaries, and (sought) to
Joaquin Garces (Garces) owned two parcels of land in
effect a reversion thereof to the original owner,
Barangay Pambuan, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The
Yupangco" and essentially prayed for the annulment of
properties were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
the coverage of the disputed property within the CARP.
Nos. NT-22566 and NT-7737-A and tenanted by
The dispute was on the "terms and conditions of transfer
Cervando Garcia (Garcia), Pedro Fajardo (Fajardo), and
of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform
Felicidad Vda. de Dela Cruz (Vda. de Dela Cruz).
beneficiaries over which DARAB has primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1(f),
Rule II, DARAB New Rules of Procedure." 29 Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the Department
of Agrarian Reform identified Garcia, Fajardo and Vda.
de Dela Cruz as qualified tenant-farmers. On 5 April
Although the complaint filed by DEARBC was similarly
1999, the heirs of Garces filed with the Regional Trial
denominated as one for recovery of possession, it
Court (RTC), Judicial Region 3, Branch 23, Cabanatuan
utterly lacks allegations to persuade the Court into ruling
City, acting as special agrarian court, a petition for
that the issue encompasses an agrarian
judicial determination of just compensation and payment
dispute.1âwphi1
of lease against Garcia, Fajardo and Vda. de Dela Cruz.
DEARBC’s argument that this case partakes of either a
On 28 March 2000, during the pre-trial, the heirs of
boundary dispute, correction of a CLOA, and ouster of
Garces entered into a compromise agreement with
an interloper or intruder, as found under Section 1, Rule
Garcia, Fajardo and Vda. de Dela Cruz. In its 28 August
11 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, 30 is
2000 Decision,7 the RTC approved the compromise
unavailing. Nowhere in the complaint was the correction
agreement. The dispositive portion of the Decision
or cancellation of the CLOA prayed for, much less
states:
mentioned. DEARBC merely asserted its sole ownership
of the awarded land and no boundary dispute was even
hinted at. WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding these
"Transfers under PD No. 27" not contrary to law, morals,
public order or policy and, further, the same having the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
approval of the defendant Land Bank and the defendant
DAR, the foregoing compromise agreement, otherwise
SO ORDERED. called "Deed of Transfer under P.D. No. 27," are hereby
APPROVED, and judgment is hereby rendered in
6. G.R. No. 184966               May 30, 2011 accordance with the terms and conditions thereof.

HEIRS OF FELICIDAD VDA. DE DELA CRUZ namely: The parties are hereby enjoined to comply strictly and in
VIOLETA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIANA GARCIA good faith with all the terms set forth in the aforesaid
SECRETARIO, and GRACE "Compromise Agreement."
FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs. SO ORDERED.8
HEIRS OF PEDRO T. FAJARDO, Respondents.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Garcia, Fajardo
and Vda. de Dela Cruz were issued their corresponding
certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents.
The 28 August 2000 Decision became final and
executory.
Vda. de Dela Cruz filed with the PARAD a petition for
cancellation of Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H
issued to Fajardo. Vda. de Dela Cruz alleged that she,
not Fajardo, was the actual tenant and possessor of the
619-square meter parcel of land covered by the
emancipation patent.
The PARAD’s Ruling
In his 29 December 2000 Decision, the PARAD
dismissed the petition for cancellation of emancipation
patent because Vda. de Dela Cruz failed to adduce
substantial evidence. The PARAD held that:
In view of these, the questioned emancipation patent
was regularly been [sic] issued under the disputable
presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed by the employees/officials of the Department
of Agrarian Reform as the same was made an integral
part of the Deed of Transfer under PD 27 dated March
28, 2000 in favor of private respondent. The claim of the
petitioner that the questioned emancipation patent has
been erroneously issued in the name of the private
respondent miserably failed to impress this Board. The
burden of proof to show that the questioned
emancipation patent was erroneously issued in the
private respondent [sic] is on the petitioner. Absent
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions has to
be upheld. (People vs. Lapura, 255 SCRA 85) Although
it is admitted that the questioned emancipation patent is
covered by the homelot [sic] of the petitioner where her
house is erected, the same was not meant that [sic] the
said EP was erroneously issued in the name of the
private respondent. This Board sees no errors
whatsoever in the issuance of the said patent for the
subject lot is indeed meant for the private respondent as
the same was transferred by the former landowner,
Joaquin Garces in his favor with the intervention of the
DAR and LBP, which transfer was duly approved by a
regular court. While it is true that private respondent has
other lands (in the minimum ceiling required by law)
including a homelot covered under OLT, herein
petitioner also has other lands, which should also
include her homelot. Hence, what should be enforced
was the one that was given or allocated by the
landowner to the petitioner, which is the area containing
2.100 has., as the 0.619 ha. is excluded from the said
area. The 0.619 ha. is within the coverage of 2.0964
has., which is therefore indeed part and parcel of the
land of the private respondent. Petitioner is estopped to
state that she is entitled for an additional area of 0.619
ha. as the same was excluded or was never stated in
her Deed of Transfer under PD 27.9
Vda. de Dela Cruz appealed to the DARAB.
The DARAB’s Ruling
In its 1 March 2006 Decision, the DARAB affirmed the
PARAD’s 29 December 2000 Decision. The DARAB
held that:
At the outset, it must be stressed that before an
Emancipation Patent is issued to a farmer-beneficiary,
procedures such as surveys, inspection, investigation,
evaluation and endorsements are conducted (15
September 1976 Memorandum). Only after this rigorous
and exhaustive procedure will the Department of
Agrarian Reform issue Emancipation Patents. Strong
evidence is necessary in order to claim that these
procedures have not been complied with. As held in the
case of Tatad vs. Garcia, government officials are
presumed to perform their functions with regularity and
strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption.
Petitioner did not present strong evidence to rebut such
presumption, the EP issued in favor of respondent
Fajardo is presumed to have been issued validly and
with regularity.
Moreover, an Emancipation Patent holder acquires the
vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding —
a right which has become fixed and established and is
no longer open to doubt or controversy. Thus,
respondent Fajardo, being an emancipation patent
holder, has absolute ownership over the subject
landholding.
Finally, well-entrenched is the rule that an EP is a title
that has the force and effect of a Torrens Title, and as
such it is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of
the DAR and its instrumentalities like the court, is to see
to it that this title is maintained and respected unless
challenged in a direct proceeding. Needless to state, a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year
period from the issuance of the decree of registration
upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. 10
Vda. de Dela Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration. In
its 28 June 2006 Resolution, the DARAB denied the
motion. Vda. de Dela Cruz appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In its 29 August 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the DARAB’s 1 March 2006 Decision. The
Court of Appeals held that:
The Court notes that the subject matter of the
Compromise Agreement between Joaquin Garces and
private respondent set forth in the Decision in said
Agrarian Case No. 132 (AF) specifically mentions 0.619
has. as one of the parcels of land transferred to private
respondent. This was relied upon by PARAD when he
ruled that —
"After a careful perusal of the aforementioned Decision
particularly the Deeds of Transfer under PD 27 enetered
into and executed by the petitioner and private
respondent, it revealed that the lots allocated to the
private respondent consist of 0.4163 ha. and 0.619 or
2.0964 has. While to the petitioner, 2.0354 ha. and
0.0646 ha. or 2.100 has. So the area of 0.619 ha., which
is the lot in question is a part and parcel of the lands of
the private respondent, being awarded by the DAR thru
Operation Land Transfer, which consequently been [sic]
covered by TCT EP No. 1879."
Petitioners never raised an issue as to the identity of the
land acquired by private respondent. Further, the Court
noted that in the cited Decision in Agrarian Case No.
132 (AF), Felicidad vda. de De la Cruz and Joaquin
Garces likewise executed a Compromise Agreement
and the subject matter were parcels of land with total
area of 2.180 has. No evidence was presented by
petitioners that the subject landholding is embraced
within the area covered by the Compromise Agreement
of petitioner vda. de Dela Cruz with Joaquin Garces.
The Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, was relied in turn
by DARAB in ruling that the subject landholding was
acquired by private respondent.
When a compromise agreement is given judicial
approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon
the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is
entered as a determination of a controversy and has the
force and effect of a judgment.
The bare allegation of petitioner Felicidad vda. Dela
Cruz that she occupied a portion of the disputed subject
landholding does not prove that she is the rightful and
legal farmer-beneficiary of the subject landholding under
P.D. No. 27 as supplemented by Letter of Instructions
No. 705. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof under our Rules.lawphi1
Moreover, it appears that the certification issued by the
BARC Chairman Roberto Ramos of Pambuan, Gapan
City, dated March 29, 2000, presented by petitioner
Felicidad vda. Dela Cruz to prove that she is the tenant
of the subject landholding was obtained through fraud
and deceit as evidenced by the Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by BARC Chairman Roberto Ramos
of Pambuan, Gapan City, dated June 29, 2000. 11
Vda. de Dela Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration. In
its 16 October 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Petitioners heirs of Vda. de Dela Cruz raise as issue
that Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H was
erroneously issued to Fajardo because Vda. de Dela
Cruz, not Fajardo, was the actual tenant and possessor
of the 619-square meter parcel of land covered by the
emancipation patent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
First, questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on
certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People,12 the
Court held that:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are
not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable
of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. The issue to be
resolved must be limited to determining what the law is
on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review
of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.13
Whether Vda. de Dela Cruz, not Fajardo, was the actual
tenant and possessor of the 619-square meter parcel of
land covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H
is a question of fact. Thus, it is not reviewable.
The factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on the Court. In Gandara Mill Supply v.
NLRC,14 the Court held that, "In a long line of cases, the
Court has consistently ruled that findings of fact by
quasi-judicial agencies x x x are conclusive upon the
court in the absence of proof of grave error in the
appreciation of facts."15
The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded
on speculation; (3) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case
and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the
parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked
undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth
by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent;
and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. 16 The heirs of
Vda. de Dela Cruz fail to convince the Court that any of
these circumstances is present.
Second, the RTC’s 28 August 2000 Decision has long
become final and executory, thus, it can no longer be
disturbed. Vda. de Dela Cruz entered into a compromise
agreement with the heirs of Garces. There is no
question that under the compromise agreement, the
619-square meter parcel of land covered by
Emancipation Patent No. A-051521-H was given to
Fajardo. The RTC approved the compromise
agreement. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding these
"Transfers under PD No. 27" not contrary to law, morals,
public order or policy and, further, the same having the
approval of the defendant Land Bank and the defendant
DAR, the foregoing compromise agreement, otherwise
called "Deed of Transfer under P.D. No. 27," are hereby
APPROVED, and judgment is hereby rendered in
accordance with the terms and conditions thereof.
The parties are hereby enjoined to comply strictly and in
good faith with all the terms set forth in the aforesaid
"Compromise Agreement."
SO ORDERED.17
In Inaldo v. Balagot,18 the Court held that:
A compromise agreement is final and executory. Such a
final and executory judgment cannot be modified or
amended. If an amendment is to be made, it may
consist only of supplying an omission, or striking out a
superfluity or interpreting an ambiguous phrase therein
in relation to the body of the decision which gives it life. 19
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The
Court AFFIRMS the 29 August 2008 Decision and 16
October 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95554.
SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 184369               October 23, 2013
HEIRS OF FLORENTINO QUILO, NAMELY:
BENJAMIN V. QUILO, JAIME V. QUILO, CELEDONA
Q. RAMIREZ, IMELDA Q. ANCLOTE, ZENAIDA Q.
BAITA, ORLANDO V. QUILO, EVANGELINE Q.
PALAGANAS, ARTURO V. QUILO and LOLITA Q.
SEISMUNDO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES-
DAGUPAN BRANCH and SPOUSES ROBERTO DEL
MINDO and CARLINA DEL MINDO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 dated 17 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100542, which reversed and
set aside the Decision2 dated 30 September 2002 of the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (RARAB)
of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and the Decision 3 dated
19 December 2006 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
In reversing the RARAB and DARAB Decisions, the CA
found that petitioners had failed to prove that their
predecessor-in-interest was a bona fide tenant of the
predecessor-in-interest of respondents; hence,
petitioners cannot claim any right of redemption under
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known
as the Agricultural Land Reform Code. 4 The provision
gives agricultural tenants the right to redeem the
landholdings they are cultivating when these are sold to
a third person without their knowledge.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
The spouses Emilio Oliveros and Erlinda de Guzman
(spouses Oliveros) owned four parcels of land. 5 In 1966,
Florentino Quilo (Quilo) started planting vegetables
thereon.6 Sometime in 1975, Quilo filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a Complaint
against the spouses Oliveros regarding unspecified
issues in their alleged agrarian relations. 7 Hence, on 12
September 1975, a Notice of Conference was sent to
the spouses by a DAR Team Leader. 8 However, the
Complaint did not prosper.
The spouses Oliveros later on mortgaged the parcels of
land to the Development Bank of the Philippines,
Dagupan City Branch (respondent bank) to secure a
loan, for which they executed an Affidavit of Non-
Tenancy.9 Since they were unable to pay the loan, the
mortgage was foreclosed, and the title to the
landholding consolidated with respondent bank. 10
On 15 April 1983, respondent bank sold the parcels of
land to the spouses Roberto and Carlina del Mindo
(respondent spouses) for ₱34,000. 11 Respondent
spouses began to fence the subject landholding shortly
after.12
Upon learning about the sale, Quilo filed a Complaint for
Redemption with Damages against respondents with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan
(RTC). He alleged that as an agricultural tenant of the
land, he had the preference and the priority to buy
it.13 He further said that he was ready to repurchase it,
and that he had deposited with the Clerk of Court the
amount of ₱34,000 and other necessary expenses as
redemption price.14
However, on 6 May 1991, the RTC dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction in view of the passage of Republic
Act No. 6657,15 which created the DARAB and gave the
latter jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. 16 The RTC
further directed the parties to litigate their case before
the DARAB through the RARAB.17 On 22 August 1992,
Quilo died.18 Hence, his heirs (petitioners) substituted for
him in the pending case before the RARAB. 19 The
RARAB dismissed the case "for lack of interest of the
parties to proceed with the case," 20 after which Quilo’s
heirs filed an appeal with the DARAB.21
On 29 April 1996, the DARAB promulgated a Decision
granting the appeal and remanding the records of the
case to the RARAB for its resolution on the merits. 22
In the course of the trial before the RARAB, petitioners
presented the records of Quilo’s testimony, which was
corroborated by former Barangay (Brgy.) Captain
Norberto Taaca (Taaca), incumbent Brgy. Captain
Hermogenes delos Santos (Delos Santos), Rufino
Bulatao (Bulatao), and Gerardo Obillo (Obillo). 23 Taaca
and Delos Santos confirmed that the parcels of land in
question had been tilled by Quilo and owned by the
spouses Oliveros. They further swore that Quilo had
delivered a share of the produce to the said
spouses.24 Bulatao and Obillo, neighbors of Quilo,
testified that he had planted on the land. 25 In addition to
the testimonies, the DAR Notice of Conference dated 12
September 1975 was offered as evidence. 26
On the other hand, respondent spouses and respondent
bank averred that Quilo was not a tenant, but a squatter
on the land; thus, he was not entitled to redeem the
property.27 To support their claim, they presented the
Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by the spouses
Oliveros and the records of the Agrarian Reform Team.
These records certified that Quilo was not an agricultural
lessee of the properties, nor was the subject landholding
within the scope of a leasehold or of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT).28
The RARAB ruled for petitioners. 29 It said that Quilo was
a bonafide tenant based on his testimony that he had
been in possession of the land and had been cultivating
it since 1975, a claim corroborated by other
witnesses.30 It also gave no weight to the Affidavit of
Non-Tenancy issued by the spouses Oliveros, since it
was common knowledge that landowners routinely
execute such affidavits to enable them to mortgage their
lands to banks.31 Furthermore, the Certification that the
subject landholding was not within the scope of an OLT
was not final, because not every tenancy relationship
was registered.32 The dispositive portion of the
Decision33 dated 30 September 2002 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby issued as follows:
1. DECLARING the deceased complainant
Florentino Quilo as the bonafide tenant of the
subject landholding, hence, his heirs are entitled
to the right of redemption on said land;
2. DECLARING that the reasonable redemption
price of the said landholding is Thirty [sic] Four
Thousand (₱34,000.00) pesos as appearing in
the Deed of Absolute Sale;
3. ORDERING the spouses-respondents
Roberto and Carlina del Mindo to execute a
Deed of Reconveyance or Deed of Sale of
subject landholding in favor of the Heirs of
Florentino Quilo, the complainant.
4. DISMISSING the complaint with regard to
respondent DBP; and
5. DISMISSING the ancillary claims of
complainants and the counterclaims of
respondents for lack of evidence and merit. SO
ORDERED.34
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the DARAB,
which upheld the RARAB ruling. 35 The DARAB ruled
that Quilo was a tenant, because the records showed
that he had been cultivating the subject landholding as
early as 1975.36 The tenancy was further bolstered by
the Notice of Conference sent by DAR to the spouses
Oliveros, informing them that Quilo had sought the
assistance of the office regarding aspects of their
agrarian relations.37 Lastly, the DARAB said that the
element of sharing was established, because Quilo had
been depositing his lease rentals with the RTC Clerk of
Court, and there were withdrawals of the deposits by
respondent spouses.38
Undaunted, respondents filed a Rule 43 Petition for
Review39 with the CA, questioning the basis of both the
RARAB and the DARAB rulings in fact and in law. 40
The CA in its Decision41 dated 17 June 2008 held that
the RARAB and the DARAB were mistaken in finding
the existence of a tenancy relationship, as the quantum
of proof required for tenancy – substantial evidence –
had not been successfully met. 42 It said that there was
no evidence that the spouses Oliveros had given their
consent to the tenancy relationship; and that although
the corroborating witnesses testified that Quilo was
cultivating the land, this did not necessarily mean that
he was doing so as a tenant.43 In addition, the element
of sharing was not proven, because the DARAB’s
finding that Quilo had been depositing his lease rentals
and that there had been withdrawals therefrom had no
basis on the records.44 Petitioners then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,45 which was denied by the CA.46
Hence, the instant Petition47 in which petitioners contend
that a factual review by this Court is proper, because the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the DARAB
and the RARAB.48 We asked respondents to file a
Comment,49 and petitioners a Consolidated Reply 50 –
requirements they both complied with. 51 The parties also
filed their respective Memoranda in compliance with the
Court’s Resolution dated 8 July 2009. 52
Petitioners, in their Memorandum, 53 reiterated the
arguments in the earlier Petition they had filed. On the
other hand, respondent bank and respondent spouses
said in their respective Memoranda 54 that petitioners
only raised factual issues, which were improper in a
Rule 45 Petition.55 Also, the CA’s findings did not
warrant a factual review as an exception to the general
rule for Rule 45 Petitions. 56 According to respondents,
the CA never deviated from the facts gathered and
narrated by the DARAB. It merely exercised its sound
judicial discretion in appreciating the facts based on
existing laws and jurisprudence. 57
The main issue before us is whether a tenancy
relationship existed between Quilo and the spouses
Oliveros.
We DENY the Petition.
Propriety of a Factual Review
As respondents question the propriety of a factual
review of the case, the Court shall resolve this matter
first.
The determination of whether a person is an agricultural
tenant is basically a question of fact.58 As a general rule,
questions of fact are not proper in a petition filed under
Rule 45. Corollary to this rule, findings of fact of the CA
are final, conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal,
provided that they are borne out by the records or based
on substantial evidence. 59 However, as we held in
Adriano v. Tanco,60 when the findings of facts of the
DARAB and the CA contradict each other, it is crucial to
go through the evidence and documents on record as
an exception61 to the rule.
We now rule on the main issue.
Failure to Establish the Tenancy Relationship
A tenancy relationship is a juridical tie that arises
between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of
which relationship the tenant acquires the right to
continue working on and cultivating the land. 62 The
relationship cannot be presumed. 63 All the requisite
conditions for its existence must be proven, to wit:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant.
(2) The subject is agricultural land.
(3) There is consent by the landowner.
(4) The purpose is agricultural production.
(5) There is personal cultivation.
(6) There is a sharing of harvests.64
We stress that petitioners have the burden of proving
their affirmative allegation of tenancy. 65 Indeed, it is
elementary that one who alleges the affirmative of the
issue has the burden of proof. 66 Petitioners in the instant
case failed to prove the elements of consent and
sharing of harvests.
There is no evidence that the spouses Oliveros
consented to a tenancy relationship with Quilo.
There is no evidence that the spouses Oliveros agreed
to enter into a tenancy relationship with
Quilo.1âwphi1 His self-serving statement that he was a
tenant was not sufficient to prove consent. 67 Precisely,
proof of consent is needed to establish tenancy.
Independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove
consent of the landowner. 68 Although petitioners
presented the Affidavits of Obillo and Bulatao, as well as
the DAR Notice of Conference 69 dated 12 September
1975, these documents merely established that Quilo
occupied and cultivated the land. 70 Specifically, the
Notice of Conference and the affidavits only showed that
first, Quilo filed a Complaint against the spouses
Oliveros regarding the land he was cultivating; and
second, the affidavits confirmed merely that Quilo had
been planting on the land. These documents in no way
confirm that his presence on the land was based on a G.R. No. 209384
tenancy relationship that the spouses Oliveros had
agreed to. URBANO F. ESTRELLA, Petitioner,
vs.
Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land PRISCILLA P. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
does not automatically convert the tiller into an
agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian DECISION
laws.71 Despite this jurisprudential rule, the DARAB
chose to uphold the finding of the RARAB that there was BRION, J.:
a tenancy relationship between Quilo and the spouses
Oliveros. Hence, the CA committed no error in reversing
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
the DARAB Decision.
and set aside the November 28, 2012 resolution 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121519. 2 The
On the matter of the existence of a sharing agreement CA dismissed petitioner Urbano F.
between the parties, the pieces of evidence presented Estrella's (Estrella) appeal from the Department of
by petitioners to show the sharing agreement were Agrarian Reform Adjudication
limited to Quilo’s self-serving statement and the Affidavit Board's (DARAB) February 23, 2009
of Bulatao. Bulatao was Quilo’s neighbor who stated decision 3 in DARAB Case No. 13185 which denied
that the latter had given his share of the harvest to the Estrella's right of redemption over an agricultural
spouses Oliveros.72 These are not sufficient to prove the landholding.
existence of a sharing agreement, as we have held in
Rodriguez v. Salvador:73
ANTECEDENTS
The affidavits of petitioners’ neighbors declaring that
Lope Cristobal (Cristobal) was the owner of a twenty-
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received
three thousand nine hundred and thirty-three square
their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners
meter (23,933 sqm.) parcel of agricultural
should have presented receipts or any other evidence to
riceland (subject landholding) in Cacarong
show that there was sharing of harvest and that there
Matanda, Pandi,
was an agreed system of sharing between them and the
landowners.
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-248106 of the Register of Deeds of
The CA was also on point when it said that nothing in
Bulacan. Estrella was the registered agricultural tenant-
the records supported the DARAB finding that a sharing
lessee of the subject landholding.
agreement existed because of Quilo’s deposited rentals
with the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 46. 74 Firstly, we do not see how On September 22, 1997, Cristobal sold the subject
that deposit can prove the existence of a sharing landholding to respondent Priscilla Francisco
agreement between him and the spouses Oliveros. (Francisco) for five hundred thousand pesos
Secondly, a perusal of the findings of fact of the (₱500,000.00),4 without notifying Estrella.
RARAB, as affirmed by the DARAB, reveals that there
was never any allegation from any of the parties, or any Upon discovering the sale, Estrella sent Cristobal a
finding by the RARAB, that Quilo had deposited his demand letter dated March 31, 1998, for the return of
rentals with the branch Clerk of Court, much less, that the subject landholding. 5 He also sent Francisco a
there were withdrawals therefrom. The only mention of a similar demand letter dated July 31, 1998. Neither
deposit of any kind can be found in the RARAB Decision Cristobal nor Francisco responded to Estrella’s
and Quilo’s Complaint where it was merely claimed that demands.6
Quilo was willing and able to pay the redemption price of
₱34,000, and that he had deposited the amount with the On February 12, 2001, Estrella filed a complaint 7 against
branch Clerk of Court.75 Cristobal and Francisco for legal redemption, recovery,
and maintenance of peaceful possession before the
WHEREFORE, In view of the foregoing, we AFFIRM in Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
toto the Decision76 dated 17 June 2008 of the Court of Adjudicator (PARAD). His complaint was docketed
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100542. as DCN. R-03-02-2930’01.

SO ORDERED. Estrella alleged that the sale between Cristobal and

Francisco was made secretly and in bad faith, in
8. June 27, 2016 violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3844, the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (the Code).8He insisted
that he never waived his rights as a registered tenant
over the property and that he was willing to match the
sale price. Estrella concluded that as the registered
tenant, he is entitled to legally redeem the property from
Francisco. He also manifested his ability and willingness
to deposit the amount of ₱500,000.00 with the PARAD
as the redemption price.9
Cristobal did not file an answer while Francisco denied
all the allegations in the complaint except for the fact of
the sale.10 Francisco claimed that she was an innocent
purchaser in good faith because she only bought the
property after: (1) Cristobal assured her that there would
be no problems regarding the transfer of the property;
and (2) Cristobal personally undertook to compensate
Estrella. Therefore, Estrella had no cause of action
against her.
On June 23, 2002, the PARAD rendered its decision
recognizing Estrella’s right of redemption. 11 The PARAD
found that neither Cristobal nor Francisco notified
Estrella in writing of the sale. In the absence of such
notice, an agricultural lessee has a right to redeem the
landholding from the buyer pursuant to Section 12 of the
Code.12
Francisco appealed the PARAD’s decision to the
DARAB where it was docketed as DARAB Case No.
13185.
On February 23, 2009, the DARAB reversed the
PARAD’s decision and denied Estrella the right of
redemption.13 Citing Section 12 of the Code as
amended, the DARAB held that the right of redemption
may be exercised within 180 days from written notice of
the sale. Considering that more than three years had
lapsed between Estrella’s discovery of the sale and his
filing of the case for redemption, the DARAB concluded
that Estrella slept on his rights and lost the right to
redeem the landholding.
Estrella moved for reconsideration but the DARAB
denied the motion.
On September 30, 2011, Estrella filed a motion before
the CA to declare himself as a pauper litigant and
manifested his intention to file a petition for review of the
DARAB’s decision.14 He alleged that he was living below
the poverty line and did not have sufficient money or
property for food, shelter, and other basic necessities.
On October 17, 2011, Estrella filed a petition for
review15 of the DARAB’s decision before the CA. The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 121519.
Estrella emphasized that the purpose of the State in
enacting the agrarian reform laws is to protect the
welfare of landless farmers and to promote social justice
towards establishing ownership over the agricultural
land by the tenant-lessees.16 He insisted that the
DARAB erred in denying him the right of redemption
based on a technicality and that the redemption period
in Sec. 12 of the Code does not apply in his case
because neither the lessor nor the vendee notified him
in writing of the sale.17
On November 28, 2012, the CA dismissed Estrella’s
petition for review for failure to show any reversible error
in the DARAB’s decision. 18 Estrella received a copy of
the CA’s resolution on April 10, 2013.19
On April 11, 2013, Estrella filed a motion for a twenty-
day extension of time (or until April 31, 2013) to file his
motion for reconsideration of the November 28, 2012
resolution.20
On April 30, 2013, Estrella requested another ten-day
extension of time (or until May 9, 2013) to file his motion
for reconsideration.21
On May 9, 2013, Estrella filed his Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that his right of redemption had
not yet prescribed because he was not given written
notice of the sale to Francisco.22
On May 30, 2013, the CA denied Estrella’s motions for
extension of time, citing the rule that the reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. 23 The CA likewise denied Estrella’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
On August 23, 2013, Estrella filed a motion for extension
of time to file his petition for review and a motion to be
declared as a pauper litigant.24 We granted both motions
on October 13, 2013.
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Estrella argues that an agricultural tenant’s right of
redemption over the landholding cannot prescribe when
neither the lessor-seller nor the buyer has given him
written notice of the sale.
On the other hand, Francisco counters that Estrella
failed to make a formal tender of or to consign with the
PARAD the redemption price as required in Quiño v.
Court of Appeals.  25 She also questioned the
genuineness of Estrella’s claim to be a pauper litigant.
Francisco points out that a person who claims to be
willing to pay the redemption price of ₱500,000.00 is
not, by any stretch of the imagination, a pauper. 26
OUR RULING
We find no merit in the petition.
The use and ownership of property bears a social
function, and all economic agents are expected to
contribute to the common good. 27 To this end, property
ownership and economic activity are always subject to
the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and
intervene when the common good requires.28
As early as 1973, the Philippines has already declared
our goal of emancipating agricultural tenants from the
bondage of the soil. 29 The State adopts a policy of
promoting social justice, establishing owner
cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of
Philippine agriculture, and providing a vigorous and
systematic land resettlement and redistribution
program.30
In pursuit of land reform, the State enacted
the Agricultural Land Reform Code in 1963. The Code
established an agricultural leasehold system that
replaced all existing agricultural share tenancy systems
at that point.
The existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship
between the lessor and the lessee gives the latter rights
that attach to the landholding, regardless of whoever
may subsequently become its owner. 31 This strengthens
the security of tenure of the tenants and protects them
from being dispossessed of the landholding or ejected
from their leasehold by the death of either the lessor or
of the tenant, the expiration of a term/period in the
leasehold contract, or the alienation of the landholding
by the lessor.32 If either party dies, the leasehold
continues to bind the lessor (or his heirs) in favor of the
tenant (or his surviving spouse/descendants). In case
the lessor alienates the land, the transferee is
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the lessor-transferor. The agricultural
leasehold subsists, notwithstanding the resulting change
in ownership of the landholding, and the lessee’s rights
are made enforceable against the transferee or other
successor-in-interest of the original lessor.
To protect the lessee’s security of tenure, the Code
grants him the right of pre-emption – the preferential
right to buy the landholding under reasonable terms and
conditions if ever the agricultural lessor decides to sell
it.33 As an added layer of protection, the Code also
grants him the right to redeem the landholding from the
vendee in the event that the lessor sells it without the
lessee’s knowledge.34
Originally, the lessee had a redemption period of two
years from registration of the sale:
Sec. 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption – In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding
sold must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where
there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of
the area actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be exercised within
two years from the registration of the sale, and shall
have priority over any other right of legal redemption. 35
In Padasas v. Court of Appeals,36 we held that a
lessee’s actual knowledge of the sale of the landholding
is immaterial because the Code specifically and
definitively provides that the redemption period must be
counted from the registration of the sale. This ruling was
subsequently affirmed in Manuel v. Court of Appeals.37
In 1971, R.A. 6389 amended Section 12 of the Code
and shortened the redemption period:
Sec. 12. Lessee’s right of Redemption. – In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price
and consideration: Provided, That where there are two
or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to
said right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under
this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty
days from notice in writing which shall be served by the
vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and
shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request
with the department or corresponding case in court by
the agricultural lessee or lessees, the period of one
hundred and eighty days shall cease to run.
Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved
within sixty days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the
said period shall start to run again.1âwphi1
The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while
the Land Bank shall finance, said redemption as in the
case of pre-emption. 38 [emphases and underscoring
supplied]
In Mallari v. Court of Appeals,39 we held that the lessee’s
right of redemption will not prescribe if he is not served
written notice of the sale. We affirmed this ruling
in Springsun Management Systems v.
Camerino40 and Planters Development Bank v.
Garcia.  41
More recently in Po v. Dampal,42 we held that the failure
of the vendee to serve written notice of the sale to the
lessee and the DAR prevents the running of the 180-day
redemption period; the lessee’s constructive knowledge
of the sale does not dispense with the vendee’s duty to
give written notice.
Simply put, Section 12 expressly states that the 180-day
period must be reckoned from written notice of sale. If
the agricultural lessee was never notified in writing of
the sale of the landholding, there is yet no prescription
period to speak of.43
As the vendee, respondent Francisco had the express
duty to serve written notice on Estrella, the agricultural
lessee, and on the DAR. Her failure to discharge this
legal duty prevented the commencement of the 180-day
redemption period. Francisco only gave written notice of
the sale in her answer 44 before the PARAD wherein she
admitted the fact of the sale. 45 Thus, Estrella timely
exercised his right of redemption. To hold otherwise
would allow Francisco to profit from her own neglect to
perform a legally mandated duty.
However, despite the timely filing of the redemption suit,
Estrella did not validly exercise his right to redeem the
property. As early as 1969 in Basbas v. Entena,46 this
Court had already held that the valid exercise of the
right of redemption requires either tender of the
purchase price or valid consignation thereof in Court:
x x x the right of legal redemption must be exercised
within specified time limits: and the statutory periods
would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion
unless the redemptioner is required to make an actual
tender in good faith of what he believed to be the
reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed.
The existence of the right of redemption operates to
depress the market value of the land until the period
expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting
the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party
unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate the
action, would render nugatory the period of two years
[now 180 days] fixed by the statute for making the
redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the
landowner to realize the value of his land. No buyer can
be expected to acquire it without any certainty as to the
amount for which it may be redeemed, so that he can
recover at least his investment in case of redemption. In
the meantime, the landowner’s needs and obligations
cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such result was
intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that
effect.
The situation becomes worse when, as shown by the
evidence in this case, the redemptioner has no funds
and must apply for them to the Land Authority, which, in
turn, must depend on the availability of funds from the
Land Bank. It then becomes practically certain that the
landowner will not be able to realize the value of his
property for an indefinite time beyond the two years
redemption period.47
After the amendment of Section 12 of the Code, a
certification from the Land Bank that it will finance the
redemption will also suffice in lieu of tender of payment
or consignation.48
In the present case, Estrella manifested his willingness
to pay the redemption price but failed to tender payment
or consign it with the PARAD when he filed his
complaint. To be sure, a tenant’s failure to tender
payment or consign it in court upon filing the redemption
suit is not necessarily fatal; he can still cure the defect
and complete his act of redemption by consigning his
payment with the court within the remaining prescriptive
period.49
Ordinarily, the 180-day redemption period begins to run
from the date that the vendee furnishes written notice of
the sale to the lessee. The filing of a petition or request
for redemption with the DAR (through the PARAD)
suspends the running of the redemption period.
However, as the cases of Basbas and Almeda v. Court
of Appeals50 – as well the amendment to Section 12 of
the Code – evidently show, Congress did not intend the
redemption period to be indefinite. This 180-day period
resumes running if the petition is not resolved within
sixty days.51
Because Francisco failed to serve Estrella written notice
of the sale, Estrella’s 180-day redemption period was
intact when he filed the complaint before the PARAD.
The filing of the complaint prevented the running of the
prescription period and gave Estrella time to cure the
defect of his redemption through consignment of the
redemption price.
After the lapse of sixty days, Estrella’s 180-day
redemption period began running pursuant to Section 12
of the Code. Nevertheless, Estrella could still have
consigned payment within this 180-day period.
The exercise of the right of redemption must be made in
accordance with the law. Tender of the redemption price
or its valid consignation must be made within the
prescribed redemption period. 52 The reason for this rule
is simple:
x x x Only by such means can the buyer become certain
that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in
good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an
offer of redemption without attendant evidence that the
redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the
repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the
buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots
as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the
redemption period, contrary to the policy of the
law. While consignation of the tendered price is not
always necessary because legal redemption is not
made to discharge a pre-existing debt, a valid tender is
indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of
course, consignation of the price would remove all
controversy as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the
proper time. 53 [emphasis supplied]
Unfortunately, even after the lapse of the 240 days (the
60-day freeze period and the 180-day redemption
period), there was neither tender nor judicial
consignation of the redemption price. Even though
Estrella repeatedly manifested his willingness to consign
the redemption price, he never actually did.
While Estrella exercised his right of redemption in a
timely manner, the redemption was ineffective because
he failed to exercise this right in accordance with the
law. Notably, he had also repeatedly manifested his
inability to even pay judicial costs and docket fees. He
has been declared (twice) as a pauper litigant who was
"living· below the poverty threshold level because of
limited income." 54 This casts considerable doubt on
Estrella's ability to pay the full price of the property. In
sum, we have no choice but to deny the petition.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code is a social
legislation designed to promote economic and social
stability. It must be interpreted liberally to give full force
and effect to its clear intent, which is "to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers" and to make
them "more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our
democratic society."55 Nevertheless, while we endeavor
to protect the rights of agricultural lessees, we must be
mindful not to do so at the expense of trampling upon
the landowners' rights which are likewise protected by
law.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of
merit; accordingly, we AFFIRM the November 28, 2012
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
121519. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
9. April 20, 2016
G.R. No. 199628
HEIRS OF EXEQUIEL HAGORILES, NAMELY,
PACITA P. HAGORILES, CONSEJO H. SABIDONG,
CESAR HAGORILES, REYNALDO HAGORILES,
ANITA H. GERONGANI, LOURDES H. CAPISTRANO,
ANA LINA H. BOLUSO, and SUZETTE H.
PENAFLORIDA, all represented by ANA LINA H.
BOLUSO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO HERNAEZ, MILAGROS VILLANUEVA,
CRISANTO CANJA, NENA BAYOG, VENANCIO
SEMILON, GAUDENCIO VILLANUEVA, VIRGINIA
DAGOHOY, VIRGILIO CANJA, FELIX CASTILLO and
TEOFILO HERNAEZ, GAUDENCIO ARNAEZ,
BENJAMIN COSTOY, ERMIN VILLANUEVA,
MARCELINO AMAR, and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the .July 30, 2010 decision2 and the November 25, 2011
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85600. The CA affirmed with
modification the decision of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case
No. 6561, and declared the respondents, who were
found bona fide tenants of their respective landholdings,
to be entitled to the continuous peaceful possession of
their home lots.
Facts of the Case
The present petition stemmed from a Complaint 4 to
Maintain Status Quo (which was later amended) filed by
respondents Romeo Hernaez, Felix Castillo, Gaudencio
Arnaez, Teofilo Hernaez, Benjamin Costoy, Virgilio
Canja, Nena Bayog, Venancio Semilon, Gaudencio
Villanueva, Ermin Villanueva, Marcelino Amar, Milagros
Villanueva, Virginia Dagohoy and Crisanto Canja, with
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD),
Negros Occidental, on March 8, 1996.
The complainants (the present respondents) claimed
that, as far back as 1967, they have been tenant-tillers
and actual occupants of parcels of land located at
Binalbagan and Himamaylan, Negros Occidental.The
lands, which were administered by Milagros Ramos,
belonged to different owners. Most of the lands were
owned by Timoteo Ramos. Among the respondents,
Timoteo’s tenants are Milagros Villanueva, Teofilo
Hernaez, Crisanto Canja, Nena Bayog, Virginia
Dagohoy, Venancio Semilon, Gaudencio Villanueva,
and Marcelino Amar.
Apart from their respective areas of tillage, 5 the
respondents claimed to be in possession of individual
home lots6 situated on separate parcels of land in Brgy.
Libacao, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, designated as
Lot No. 2047. Title to Lot No. 2047 was originally
registered under the name of Engracia Ramos, the
spouse of landholder Timoteo Ramos.
In 1990, the late Exequiel Hagoriles bought a portion of
Lot No. 2047 from Amparo Ramos-Taleon, daughter of
Timoteo Ramos.
In 1993, Exequiel successfully caused the ejectment of
respondent Marcelino Amar from his home lot. This
prompted the other respondents to file with the PARAD
a complaint against Exequiel and Amparo to refrain from
disturbing them in their peaceful possession of their
home lots.
In their answers to the complaint, Exequiel and Amparo
denied the existence of tenancy relations between
themselves and the respondents.
Thus, they contended that since the respondents are not
tenants, they were not entitled to home lots.
In a decision7 dated May 19, 1997, the PARAD partly
dismissed the respondents’ complaint for lack of
evidence to support the existence of tenancy -
specifically on the element of sharing of
harvests. However, the PARAD did not dismiss the
complaint with respect to respondents Milagros
Villanueva (who pursued the case in behalf of her
husband Ernesto Villanueva), Virginia Dagohoy and
Crisanto Canja who were found to be lawful tenants of
their respective landholdings based on the emancipation
patents (EPs) already issued to Ernesto Villanueva and
Virginia Dagohoy and receipts issued by Milagros
Ramos for payments of lease rentals made by Crisanto
Canja. The PARAD held that, as bona fide tenants of
their landholdings, respondents Villanueva, Dagohoy
and Canja were entitled to the continuous peaceful
possession of their home lots.
Exequiel filed a partial appeal of the PARAD’s decision
ordering him not to disturb the possession of
respondents Villanueva, Dagohoy and Canja of their
home lots. The aggrieved respondents, likewise,
appealed the case to the DARAB.
In its decision8 dated November 7, 2003, the DARAB
affirmed the PARAD’s ruling with respect to respondents
Villanueva, Dagohoy and Canja, but reversed the
PARAD’s ruling as to respondents Romeo Hernaez,
Felix Castillo, Gaudencio Arnaez, Teofilo Arnaez,
Benjamin Costoy, Virgilio Canja, Nena Bayog, Venancio
Semilon, Gaudencio Villanueva, Erwin Villanueva, and
Marcelino Amar.
Significantly, the DARAB declared all the respondents to
be bona fide tenants of their respective landholdings. It
discovered that EPs were soon to be issued to the rest
of the respondents, which meant that these respondents
had already been properly identified as tenant-
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Also, it found that said respondents
had not been remiss in their obligations to deliver lease
rentals, which fact was evidenced by receipts from the
respondents’ landowners. The DARAB, however,
refused to rule on whether the respondents were entitled
to the possession of their home lots. It considered the
issue as a proper subject of an agrarian law
implementation case over which the DARAB has no
jurisdiction.
Exequiel and Amparo moved for the reconsideration of
the DARAB ruling but the latter denied their motion in a
resolution dated July 27, 2004. 9 Exequiel, now
substituted by his heirs (the present petitioners),
appealed to the CA.
The petitioners insisted before the CA that respondents
were not agricultural lessees or tenants. And even if the
respondents were tenants, the petitioners claimed not to
be bound by any tenancy agreement because Exequiel,
their predecessor-in-interest, was an innocent purchaser
in good faith. The petitioners further claimed that, at the
time Exequiel bought a portion of Lot No. 2047 from
Amparo, it was annotated on the lot’s title that the land
was not tenanted.
In its assailed decision,10 the CA did not accord merit to
the petitioners’ arguments. It held that the petitioners, as
transferees of Lot No. 2047, were bound by the tenancy
relations between the respondents and the lot’s previous
owners (referring to the spouses Engracia and Timoteo
Ramos), thus, they should maintain the respondents’
peaceful possession of their home lots.
The CA agreed with the DARAB in finding the
respondents to be bona fide tenants of their respective
landholdings, but disagreed with the DARAB’s
"restrictive interpretation" of the latter’s jurisdiction to
decide on the issue of whether the respondents were
entitled to remain in their home lots. The CA ruled that
since a home lot is incidental to a tenant’s rights, the
determination of the respondents’ rights to their
respective home lots is a proper agrarian dispute over
which the DARAB has jurisdiction. Thus, the CA
affirmed the DARAB’s decision in favor of the
respondents, with modification that the same
respondents were, likewise, entitled to the continuous,
peaceful possession of their respective home lots.
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration
before the CA, the petitioners filed the present petition
for review on certiorari with this Court.
The Petition
The petitioners argue that the CA erred in awarding
home lots to the respondents and in ordering them to
maintain the respondents’ peaceful possession of these
home lots; that the CA was in no position to determine
whether the respondents were entitled to their home lots
as this determination requires processes that the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) must first
undertake as the agency with the technical expertise to
perform. For this reason, they contend that the DARAB
instead of ruling on the issue, advised the parties to
submit the matter to the DAR Secretary for proper
resolution.
The petitioners maintain that the respondents are not
their tenants, thus, they are not obligated to provide the
latter with home lots. They posit that the respondents’
houses should be transferred to the farmlands they are
actually cultivating or to other lands owned by their
respective landlords.
And should the respondents opt to retain their houses
on petitioners’ land, then they must pay the petitioners
reasonable rent.
Notably, the petitioners point out that in 2004, the
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement that
could have put an end to the present case if not for the
failure of the respondents’ counsel to affix her signature
to the document. Under the Compromise Agreement,
the petitioners offered to sell and the respondents
agreed to buy in installments, portions of Lot No. 2047
that corresponded to the respondents’ respective home
lots. This agreement, however, was not submitted for
the court’s approval due to the absence of respondents’
counsel’s signature.
The petitioners state that they attached a copy of the
Compromise Agreement in their motion for
reconsideration before the CA, but the latter did not
consider their submission in resolving their motion.
Our Ruling
We find MERIT in the present petition.
The obligation to provide home lots to agricultural
lessees or tenants rests upon the landholder. Section
26(a) of R.A. No. 1199 or the "Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines," as amended by R.A. No.
2263,11 provides:
Sec. 26. Obligations of the Landholder:
(a) The landholder shall furnish the tenant with a home
lot as provided in section 22 (3): Provided, That
should the landholder designate another site for such
home lot than that already occupied by the tenant, the
former shall bear the expenses of transferring the
existing house and improvements from the home lot
already occupied by the tenant to the site newly
designated by the former: Provided, further, That if the
tenant disagrees to the transfer of the home lot, the
matter shall be submitted to the court for determination."
Under Section 22(3) of RA No. 1199, as amended, a
tenant is entitled to a home lot suitable for dwelling with
an area of not more than three percent (3%) of the area
of his landholding, provided that it does not exceed one
thousand square meters (1,000 sq.m.). It shall be
located at a convenient and suitable place within the
land of the landholder to be designated by the latter
where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may
raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and
engage in minor industries, the products of which shall
accrue to the tenant exclusively. 12 The agricultural
lessee shall have the right to continue in the exclusive
possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have
occupied, upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 3844, 13 which
shall be considered as included in the leasehold. 14
In this case, the subject home lots were designated on a
parcel of land separate from the farmlands cultivated by
the respondents. Title to such parcel of land,  i.e.,  Lot
No. 2047, was originally registered under the name of
Engracia Ramos, the wife of Timoteo.15 Lot No. 2047
was not Timoteo’s property.
The property relations of spouses Timoteo and Engracia
Ramos were governed by the old Civil Code 16 that
prescribed the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains. By means of the conjugal
partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and
the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.17 Under Article 148 of the old Civil Code, the
spouses retain exclusive ownership of property they
brought to the marriage as his or her own; they
acquired, during the marriage, by lucrative title; they
acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with
other property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
property they purchased with the exclusive money of the
wife or the husband.18
Considering that Lot No. 2047 was originally registered
under Engracia’s name, it is presumed that said lot is
paraphernal, not conjugal, property. Paraphernal
property is property brought by the wife to the marriage,
as well as all property she acquires during the marriage
in accordance with Article 148 (old Civil Code). 19 The
wife retains ownership of paraphernal property. 20
Significantly, in 1976, Lot No. 2047 became subject of
estate settlement proceedings and was partitioned and
distributed to Engracia’s heirs, namely: Timoteo Sr.,
Timoteo Jr., Milagros, Ubaldo, Andrea and Amparo, all
surnamed Ramos.21 Entries of the approved project of
partition and declaration of heirship were annotated at
the back of the lot’s title. 22 Timoteo (Sr.)’s exact share of
the lot, however, was not identified in the records.
In 1993, Amparo Ramos-Taleon, Timoteo’s daughter,
sold a portion of Lot No. 2047 (her share of the lot) to
Ezequiel Hagoriles.
Since Timoteo Sr. merely owns a portion of Lot No.
2047, it was error for the CA to subject the whole of Lot
No. 2047 for the use of the respondents’ home
lots. Only Timoteo Sr., being the named landowner
of most of the respondents’ landholdings, has the
obligation to provide home lots to his tenants. There is
no obligation from the other co-owners of Lot No. 2047,
including the petitioners who were transferees of
Amparo’s share of the lot, to provide home lots to the
respondents.
Given the limited information in the records, we cannot
definitely rule on the rights of all the respondents to their
home lots. There is need to delineate the portion of Lot
No. 2047 belonging to Timoteo Sr., if there is still any,
and determine whether the respondents’ home lots fall
within Timoteo’s share of the lot. Only those
respondents who are Timoteo’s tenants (namely:
Milagros Villanueva, Teofilo Hernaez, Crisanto Canja,
Nena Bayog, Virginia Dagohoy, Venancio Semilon,
Gaudencio Villanueva, and Marcelino Amar 23) and
whose home lots are located within Timoteo’s portion of
Lot No. 2047 can be guaranteed to the peaceful
possession of their home lots.
For the other respondents who are not tenants of
Timoteo, and those who are Timoteo’s tenants but
whose home lots do not fall within Timoteo’s share of
Lot No. 2047, their continuous possession of their home
lots cannot be guaranteed. We reiterate that it is the
landholder who, among the coowners of Lot No. 2047 is
Timoteo, Sr., is obligated by law to provide his tenants
home lots within his land. The petitioners are not
transferees of Timoteo Sr. but are transferees of
Amparo who is not a landholder of the respondents;
thus, the petitioners may not be compelled to maintain
the home lots located within their acquired portion of Lot
No. 2047.
At best, the issue on the respondents’ entitlement to
their home lots should be referred to the DARAB for
proper determination. The CA was correct in holding
that jurisdiction over this matter is with the DARAB, not
with the Office of the DAR Secretary, because it
involves an agrarian dispute. Jurisdiction over agrarian
disputes lies with the DARAB.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.24 Undeniably, the present case involves
a controversy
regarding tenurial arrangements. The right to a home lot
is a matter arising from a landlord-tenant relationship.
In the event that the respondents are found not to be
entitled to possess their present home lots, they can
demand from their landholders to designate another
location as their home lot. The landholder’s obligation to
provide home lots to his tenants continues for so long as
the tenancy relations exist and has not yet been
severed.
With respect to the parties’ alleged Compromise
Agreement, we rule that this "agreement" has no effect
to the resolution of the present case.1âwphi1
Parties to a suit may enter into a compromise
agreement to avoid litigation or put an end to one
already commenced.25 A compromise agreement
intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is a
judicial
compromise, which has the force and effect of a
judgment of the court. However, no execution of the
compromise agreement may be issued unless the
agreement receives the approval of the court where the
litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of
the agreement is decreed.26
In this case, the petitioners admitted that their
compromise agreement was not submitted for court
approval for failure of the respondents’ counsel to sign
the agreement. The parties, however, are not prevented
from pursuing their compromise agreement or entering
into another agreement regarding the subject matter of
this case provided that their stipulations are not contrary
to law, morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy.27
We conclude that the CA erred in ordering the
petitioners to maintain the peaceful possession of all of
the respondents to their home lots. The petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest in (a portion of) Lot No.
2047 was not a landholder of the respondents, thus,
they cannot be compelled to maintain the home lots
located within their portion of Lot No. 2047.
The obligation to provide home lots to the respondents
rests upon their respective landholders, not with the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition
for review on certiorari and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the decision dated July 30, 2010 and resolution
dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City in CA-G.R. SP No. 85600.
Accordingly, we refer the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to resolve with
dispatch the respondents' rights, if any, to their
respective home lots.
SO ORDERED.
10. July 1, 2015
G.R. No. 155580
ROMEO T. CALUZOR, Petitioners,
vs.
DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE
LATE LORENZO LLANILLO, and MOLD EX REALTY
CORPORTATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed. It is established
only by adducing evidence showing that all the essential
requisites of the tenancy relationship concur, namely:
(a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (b) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (c) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (d) the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;(e) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.1
Antecedents
Lorenzo Llanillo (Lorenzo) owned the parcel of land
(land) with an area of 90, 101 square meters, more or
less, known as Lot 4196 and situated in Loma de Gato,
Marilao, Bulacan. The land was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25864 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan.
The petitioner averred that Lorenzo took him into the
land as a tenant in 1970, giving to him a sketch that
indicated the boundaries of the portion he would be
cultivating. To effectively till the land, the petitioner and
his family were allowed to build a makeshift shanty
thereon. Even after the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner
continued giving a share of his produce to the family of
Lorenzo through Ricardo Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzo’s
overseer. In 1990, respondent Deogracias Lanillo
(Deogracias), the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the
petitioner P17,000.00/hectare of the cultivated land in
exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias. In
the end, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead,
on August 5, 1994, Deogracias and persons acting
under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner and his
family by levelling their shanty and plantation with the
use of a bulldozer. The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Council to conciliate failed; hence, the authority
to file a case was issued to the petitioner.
On September 9, 1994, the petitioner instituted this case
against Deogracias in the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in Malolos,
Bulacan,2 demanding the payment of disturbance
compensation. He amended his complaint to implead
Moldex Realty Corporation (Moldex) as an additional
defendant upon discovering that the latter had entered
the land to develop it into a residential subdivision. He
prayed for the restoration of his possession of the tilled
land, and the payment of disturbance compensation.
In his answer,3 Deogracias denied that any tenancy
relationship between him and the petitioner existed; and
that to show that the land in controversy had not been
tenanted, he presented several documents, namely:
(1) the certification dated May 26, 1994 issued by
Municipal Agrarian Region Office (MARO) Eleanor T.
Tolentino;4 (2) the certification dated September 13,
1978 issued by Team Leader I Armando C. Canlas of
Meycauayan, Bulacan;5 (3) the Masterlist of Tenants
and Landowners as of March 1984; 6 and (4) the Letter
dated July 17, 1981 of Lorenzo Llanillo to the Provincial
Assessor’s Office requesting a change in the
classification of the land7
Meanwhile, on April 12, 1995, the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted the
application for the conversion of the land from
agricultural to residential and commercial uses filed by
Deogarcias, through Moldex as his attorney-in-fact.
Ruling of the PARAD
On December 13, 1996, the PARAD dismissed the
complaint of the petitioner,8 pertinently ruling:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship x x x
are as follows:
1. [There] is consent given
2. The parties are landholder and tenants
3. There is personal cultivation;
 4. The subject is agricultural land;
5. The purpose is agricultural production;
6. There is showing of harvest or payment of
fixed amount in money or produces.
xxxx
After a perusal of the records and evidence presented
by both parties, requisites No. 1 and 6 are wanting.
Complainant failed to submit any evidence to prove that
the landowners gave their consent for him to work on
the land except the sketch of the land (Exh. "A") which
he alleged that Lorenzo Llanillo gave him. A careful
scrutiny of the sketch, however, show that it may be
prepared by a surveyor because even the technical
description of the land were indicated therein and the
allegation of Romeo Calusor that the landowner drew
the sketch before him is therefore untenable.
Complainant failed to submit any certification from the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer that he is listed as
tenants [sic] of the landowners. He also failed to submit
any evidence that he has a leasehold contract with the
landowners. Complainant also failed to submit any
receipt of payments of his alleged leasehold rentals. The
house of the complainant which he alleged to have been
destroyed by the respondent is a makeshift shanty.
It is a well settled doctrine that mere cultivation without
proof of the conditions of tenancy does not suffice to
establish tenancy relationship. (Gepilan vs. Lunico, CA-
G.R. SP No. 06738, CAR June 5, 1978). In the case at
bar, complainant Romeo Calusor marked on the land
without the express consent of the landowners,
represented by Deogracias Llanillo and without the
benefit of any leasehold agreement between the
landowners and the complainant. Consequently, there is
a complete absence of landlord-tenant relationship. In
the case of Gonzales vs. Alvarez (G.R. No. 77401,
February 1, 1990), the Supreme Court held that:
"The protective mantle of the law extending to legitimate
farmers is never meant to cover intruders and squatters
who later on claim to be tenant on the land upon which
they squat."
The mere fact that Romeo Calusor works on the land
does not make him ipso facto a tenant. It has been ruled
that tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what
the alleged tenant does on the land.
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful landholders through lawful
means and not by imposition or usurpation (Hilario vs.
IAC, 148 SCRA 573).9
Decision of the DARAB
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB),10 which, on June 26,
2000, reversed the PARAD,11 opining and holding
thusly:
The vortex of the controversy is the issue of whether or
not tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
We rule in the affirmative. Complainant-Appellant
Romeo Calusor is a de jure tenant of a portion of the
subject land with an area of three (3) hectares thereof.
In the case at bar, Complainant-Appellant maintained
that he has been instituted as an agricultural lessee of
the subject land by the landowner Deogracias Llanilo;
that he has been delivering the landowner’s share
through an overseer in the person of Ricardo Martin. A
receipt is presented to bolster Complainant-Appellant’s
claim (Annex "B", p. 127, rollo); that he has been in
peaceful possession of the subject parcel of land until it
was disturbed by herein Respondent-Appellees by
bulldozing and levelling the subject land thereby
destroying the fruitbearing trees planted by herein
Complainant-Appellant.
Justifying his position, Respondent–Appellees argued
that Complainant-Appellant is a mere squatter in the
subject landholding; that there is no sharing of the
produce between the parties; that the subject property is
untenanted as certified by Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) for Marilao, Bulacan.
After weighing the parties’ contrasting arguments and
after a close scrutiny of the pieces of evidence adduced,
we are constrained to rule in favor of Complainant-
Appellant.
In the case at bar, Complainant-Appellant is a
tenant\cultivator of the subject property, having been
verbally instituted as such by Deogracias Llanillo. Sec.
166 (25) R.A. 3844, as amended provides:
(25) shared tenancy exists whenever two persons agree
on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein
one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
either or both contributing any one or several of the
items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with the aid available from members of his
immediate household and the produce thereof to be
divided between the landholder and the tenant.
Clearly, the institution of Complainant-Appellant as a
tenant in the subject land by Deogracias Llanillo and the
sharing of the produce between the parties sufficiently
established tenancy relation between the parties.
The subsequent conveyance or transfer of legal
possession of the property from Deogracias Llanillo in
favor of his children does not extinguish Complainant-
Appellant’s right over his tillage. Section 10, R.A. 3844,
as amended finds application in this case, it provides:
Sec. 10 Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by the Expiration of Period, etc.- the
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not
be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In
case the agricultural lessor, sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser
or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligations of agricultural lessor.
Again, the Supreme Court in several cases has
sustained the preservation of an agricultural leasehold
relationship between landholder and tenant despite the
change of ownership or transfer of legal possession
from one person to another.
Verily, Complainant-Appellant cannot be validly ejected
from the subject premises. It may be worthy to
emphasize that Respondents-Appellants act in
bulldozing and levelling the subject property without
securing the prior approval/clearance from the
government agencies concerned (HLURB, DENR, DAR)
tantamounts to illegal conversion. Hence, Respondent-
Appellees are criminally liable for such act. Since, there
is no legal conversion in the present case, it would be
futile to dwell on the issue of award of just
compensation.
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing premises, the
appealed decision dated December 13, 1996 is hereby
REVERSED ad SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
rendered:
1. Ordering the reinstatement of Complainant-
Appellant to the subject premises; and
2. Ordering Respondents-Appellees to maintain
Complainant- Appellant in peaceful possession
and cultivation of tillage.
SO ORDERED.12
Decision of the CA
On appeal by Deogracias and Moldex, the CA reversed
the ruling of the DARAB and reinstated the PARAD’s
decision through the decision promulgated on August
30, 2002,13 viz.:
Per Order of Conversion dated April 12, 1995, the DAR,
through then Undersecretary Jose Medina, approved
the application for conversion of the subject landholding
(ANNEX ‘E" petition, Rollo, pp. 56-58). The application
was granted based on the facts that 1.) the property is
no longer suitable for agricultural production as p
tification dated 8 November 1994 issued by Mr. Renato
N. Bulay, Regional Director, Department of Agriculture,
sa Fernando, Pampanga; 2.) the area where the
property is located had already been classified as
residential/commercial as per Municipal Ordinance No.
43, Series of 1988; and 3) the MARO, PARO, RD and
CLUPPI recommended its approval.
xxx
In fact the subject property is now a developed
subdivision (ANNEXES "G", - "G-1" & "H" – "H-1") with
individual lots having been sold to different buyers
(ANNEXES ""I"-"I-1"). Under such circumstances, there
can be no agricultural tenant on a residential land.
On the issue of whether or not respondent is entitled to
disturbance compensation under Section 36(1) of
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, he
must be an agricultural lessee as defined under Section
166 (2) of R.A. 3844. However, the records are bereft of
any evidence showing that he is a tenant of petitioner
Llanilo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
DARAB dated 26 June 2000 and its Resolution dated 20
December 2001 are reversed and set aside.
Accordingly, the Decision of the PARAB dated
December 13, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (citations omitted)
Issues
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari commenced
by the petitioner on the ground that the CA had gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when: firstly, it heavily relied on documents
that had not been presented in the PARAD proceedings;
and, secondly, it disregarded altogether the evidence on
record proving his tenancy and entitlement to
disturbance compensation.14 He points out that the CA
gravely abused its discretion in considering the order of
conversion as its basis for concluding that there was no
agricultural tenant on the land despite the order being
presented for the first time only on appeal; and in
denying his right to the disturbance compensation
despite abundant showing that he was a tenant.
In its comment,15 Moldex insists that the petitioner
resorted to the wrong remedy, arguing that the assailed
decision of the CA, being one determining the merits of
the case, was subject to appeal by petition for review on
certiorari within 15 days from notice of the decision; that
the petition for certiorari was an improper remedy; that
after the lapse of the 15- day period, he could not
substitute his lost appeal with the special civil action for
certiorari; and that the CA did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction considering that he had not been a tenant on
the land.
On his part, Deogracias adopted the comment of
Moldex.16
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is bereft of merit.
First of all, we declare to be correct the respondents’
position that the petitioner should have appealed in due
course by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead
of bringing the special civil action for certiorari.
It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed decision
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to review and
pass upon the DARAB’s adjudication by of the
petitioner’s appeal of the PARAD’s ruling. As such, his
only proper recourse from such decision of the CA was
to further appeal to the Court by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 17 Despite
his allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the
CA, he could not come to the Court by special civil
action for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special civil
action for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is
available only if there is no appeal, or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.18 In certiorari, only errors of jurisdiction are to be
addressed by the higher court, such that a review of the
facts and evidence is not done; but, in appeal, the
superior court corrects errors of judgment, and in so
doing reviews issues of fact and law to cure errors in the
appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. 19 Based on
such distinctions, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal.
It is obvious that all that the petitioner wants the Court to
do is to revisit and review the facts and records
supposedly substantiating his claim of tenancy and his
demand for consequential disturbance compensation.
He has not thereby raised any jurisdictional error by the
CA, and has not shown how the CA capriciously or
whimsically exercised its judgment as to be guilty of
gravely abusing its discretion. It is not amiss to point out
that the settled meaning of grave abuse of discretion is
the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law.20 In that regard, the abuse of discretion must be
shown to be patent and gross in order for the act to be
struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion.21 Yet, none of such categories characterized
the act of the CA.
Neither did the petitioner’s averment of the denial of due
process – predicated on the CA’s reliance on the
conversion order despite said order not being among
the documents presented during the trial 22 – justify the
resort to certiorari. It appears that the CA cited the
conversion order not to deny his claim of being the
tenant but only to accent the land conversion as a fact.
Indeed, as the CA found, he presented nothing to
substantiate his claim of having been the tenant of
Leonardo. Under the circumstances, the CA did not act
either arbitrarily or whimsically.
Secondly, the petitioner’s insistence on his being the
tenant of Leonardo and on his entitlement to disturbance
compensation required factual and legal bases. The
term tenant has a distinct meaning under the law.
Section 5 subparagraph (a) of R.A. No. 1199 provides:
A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm household
cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by
another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or
in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following
elements must be shown to concur, to wit: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose is of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.23 The presence of all these elements must be
proved by substantial evidence; 24 this means that the
absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure
tenant.25 Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or
to be covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.26
Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy
relationship, the petitioner carried the burden of proving
the allegation of his tenancy.27 According to Berenguer,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,28 to wit:
It is a matter of jurisprudence that tenancy is not purely
a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land but more importantly a legal
relationship. (Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA
484) Under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act, the
term "agricultural tenancy" is defined as –
[T]he physical possession by a person of land devoted
to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by,
another for the purpose of production through the labor
of the former and with the members of his immediate
farm household, in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in
money, or in both.
In establishing the tenancy relationship, therefore,
independent evidence, not self-serving statements,
should prove, among others, the consent of the
landowner to the relationship, and the sharing of
harvests.29
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy
were not shown to be presented in this case.
To prove the element of consent between the parties,
the petitioner testified that Lorenzo had allowed him to
cultivate the land by giving to him the sketch 30 of the
lot31 in order to delineate the portion for his tillage.
Yet, the sketch did not establish that Lorenzo had
categorically taken the petitioner in as his agricultural
tenant. This element demanded that the landowner and
the tenant should have agreed to the relationship freely
and voluntarily, with neither of them unduly imposing his
will on the other. The petitioner did not make such a
showing of consent.
The sixth element was not also established. Even
assuming that Lorenzo had verbally permitted the
petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy relationship
between them thereby set in because they had not
admittedly discussed any fruit sharing scheme, with
Lorenzo simply telling him simply that he would just ask
his share from him.32 The petitioner disclosed that he did
not see Lorenzo again from the time he had received
the sketch until Lorenzo’s death. 33 Although the
petitioner asserted that he had continued sharing the
fruits of his cultivation through Ricardo, Lorenzo’s
caretaker, even after Lorenzo’s death, producing the list
of produce to support his claim, 34 the list did not indicate
Ricardo’s receiving the fruits listed therein. The
petitioner did not also contain Ricardo’s authority to
receive Leonardo’s share.
We underscore that harvest sharing is a vital element of
every tenancy. Common sense dictated, indeed, that the
petitioner, if he were the de jure tenant that he
represented himself to be, should fully know his
arrangement with the landowner. But he did not
sufficiently and persuasively show such arrangement.
His inability to specify the sharing arrangement was
inconceivable inasmuch as he had depended on the
arrangement for his own sustenance and that of his own
family. The absence of the clear-cut sharing agreement
between him and Lorenzo could only signify that the
latter had merely tolerated his having tilled the land sans
tenancy. Such manner of tillage did not make him a de
jure tenant, because, as the Court observed in Estate of
Pastor M. Samson v. Susano:35
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and
cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make
one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete
evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation,
sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner.
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of
sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible
evidence must be presented, because selfserving
statements are inadequate. Tenancy relationship cannot
be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit
in law and cannot be done away with by conjectures.
Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere
congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the
mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be
primordial. For implied tenancy to arise it is necessary
that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be
present.
Consequently, the CA rightly declared the DARAB to
have erred in its appreciation of the evidence on the
existence of the tenancy relationship.
With the restoration of his possession having become
physically impossible because of the conversion of the
land being already a fact, could the petitioner be granted
disturbance compensation?
If tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, the dispossessed tenant is entitled to the
payment of disturbance compensation. 36 Reflecting this
statutory right, the conversion order presented by
Moldex included the condition for the payment of
disturbance compensation to any farmerbeneficiary
thereby affected.
Yet, the query has to be answered in the negative
because the petitioner was not entitled to disturbance
compensation because he was not the de jure tenant of
the landowner.
It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance
compensation to be validly made by a de jure tenant
must meet the procedural and substantive conditions
listed in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844, to wit:
Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The
agricultural lessee shall have the right to be indemnified
for the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation,
planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to
the improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or
abandons his landholding for just cause or is eje ition,
he has the right to be indemnified for one-half of the
necessary and useful improvements made by him on
the landholding: Provided, That these improvements are
tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time of
surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at
which time their value shall be determined for the
purpose of the indemnity for improvements. (Emphasis
supplied)
In short, the de Jure tenant should allege and prove,
firstly, the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation,
planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to
the improvement of his crop; and, secondly, the
necessary and useful improvements made in cultivating
the land. Without the allegation and proof, the demand
for indemnity may be denied.
In fine, the CA did not err in reversing and setting aside
the decision of the DARAB and reinstating the decision
of the PARAD.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
11. G.R. No. 185838               February 10, 2014
RICARDO V. QUINTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD AND KANLURANG
MINDORO FARMER'S COOPERATIVE,
INC., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 is the
Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution 3 dated
December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44430 which affirmed with modification the
Decision4 dated March 20, 1997 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
DARAB Case No. 1883.
The Facts
Subject of the instant case is a 604.3258 hectare (ha.)
land situated in Tayamaan, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro (subject property), covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11639 5 in the name of
Golden Country Farms, Incorporated (GCFI), which
consists of: (a) a 249 ha. mango orchard (mango
orchard); and (b) a 355 ha. riceland (riceland). 6
GCFI is a domestic corporation organized for the
purpose of engaging in poultry and livestock production,
processing, and trading. 7 Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos
(Quintos) is the majority stockholder 8 of GCFI who
managed its properties until 1975 when management
was taken over by Armando Romualdez (Romualdez).
Under Romualdez’s management, GCFI contracted
substantial loans with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP),9 which were secured by several real estate
mortgages over GCFI properties, 10 including the subject
property.11 In 1981, Romualdez abandoned the
management of the GCFI properties, 12 afterwhich DBP
took over.13 Sometime during the same year, certain
people started to plant palay on the subject property,
eventually covering the riceland. 14
After the EDSA revolution, the possession and
management of the GCFI properties were returned to
GCFI. However, in July 1987, the properties were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government,15 albeit, eventually cleared. In the
meantime, PNB and DBP transferred their financial
claims against GCFI to the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT).16
For GCFI’s continuous failure to pay its loans, PNB and
DBP initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
against the GCFI properties, which were, however,
enjoined by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134 (RTC) at Quintos’s instance. 17
In 1989, APT Officer-in-Charge Cesar Lacuesta
(Lacuesta) entered into a verbal agreement with 53
members of private respondent Kanlurang Mindoro
Farmers’ Cooperative, Inc. (KAMIFCI), allowing the
latter to tend the standing mango trees, induce their
flowering, and gather the fruits at ₱300.00 per tree, the
payment of which was to be remitted to Quintos.18
Subsequently, Quintos reacquired the possession and
management of the GCFI properties, including the
subject property, through a Memorandum of Agreement
dated February 26, 1992 between him and APT, which
was further approved by the RTC.19
Thereafter, Quintos was informed by APT of the notice
from the Department of Agrarian Reform 20 (DAR)
placing the riceland under compulsory acquisition
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government. 21 This prompted
Quintos to file a petition for exemption before the Office
of the DAR Secretary (exemption case). In the main,
Quintos cited the Court’s ruling in Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform 22 (Luz
Farms) wherein it declared as unconstitutional the
inclusion of lands devoted to commercial raising of
livestock, poultry, and swine under the CARP. To this
end, Quintos claimed that GCFI was organized for the
primary purpose of buying, selling, importing, exporting,
improving, preparing, processing, producing, dealing,
and trading-in cattle, swine, poultry, stock, meat, dairy
products, etc., warranting the exemption of its
properties, including the subject property, from CARP
coverage.23
In an Order24 dated October 5, 1993 (October 5, 1993
DAR Order), then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
(DAR Secretary) ruled that the exemption enumerated in
Luz Farms applies only to poultry, livestock, or swine
farms existing as of June 15, 1988, the effectivity date of
Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, 25 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988." Thus,
considering that GCFI had ceased operations as such
before the said date, or in May 1988, and that the
subject property continued to be devoted to agricultural
uses, including rice production and operation of groves
of mango trees, the DAR Secretary denied Quintos’s
petition for exemption, and ordered the Regional
Director to place under CARP coverage26 the area
actually cultivated to the extent of 558.9657 has.27
The Proceedings Before the PARAD
Meanwhile, on October 12, 1992, KAMIFCI filed an
action for the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
subject property (tenancy case) against Quintos before
the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, asserting its rights under an
agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement it purportedly
entered into with Lacuesta. In his answer, Quintos
denied the personality of KAMIFCI as a registered
cooperative as well as the existence of any tenancy
agreement covering the subject property.28
On November 3, 1993, the PARAD rendered a
Decision29 (November 3, 1993 PARAD Decision),
holding that there was a verbal lease tenancy
agreement entered into by Lacuesta with the 53
KAMIFCI members with respect to the mango orchard,
and such was binding upon APT and
GCFI30 notwithstanding the Certification31 dated August
25, 1993 issued by APT denying Lacuesta’s authority to
enter into any tenurial relation and to issue GCFI official
receipts. As such, the PARAD directed the
reinstatement of the 53 KAMIFCI members previously
tending the mango trees during the 1990 to 1991 and
1991 to 1992 seasons, and ordered them to pay the
corresponding consideration of ₱300.00 per mango tree
per season. The PARAD likewise held that the riceland
had already been placed under CARP coverage and
acquired for disposition by the DAR.32 Accordingly, it
enjoined Quintos or any person acting in his behalf from
disturbing the peaceful occupation of the farmer
occupants in the subject property. Aggrieved, Quintos
appealed to the DARAB.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President (OP) rendered a
Decision33 dated February 21, 1995 (February 21, 1995
OP Decision) in the exemption case, ruling that the
cessation of poultry and livestock activities on the GCFI
properties, including the subject property, a month prior
to the effectivity of RA 6657, does not a priori convert
the properties to agricultural lands.1âwphi1 In this
relation, the OP concluded that the act of the DAR in
declaring the said properties as covered by the CARP
without affording GCFI the opportunity to contest the
supposed conversion was arbitrary and
confiscatory.34 Hence, it set aside the October 5, 1993
DAR Order, and granted the petition for exemption,
except with respect to the mango orchard, the coverage
and compulsory acquisition of which was deferred
pursuant to Section 1135 of RA 6657.
The DAR filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied with finality in a Resolution 36 dated
December 20, 1995 for being filed out of time. Because
of this, the February 21, 1995 OP Decision became final
and executory.
The DARAB Ruling
On March 20, 1997, the DARAB rendered a
Decision37 in the tenancy case, respecting the findings
and conclusions made in the February 21, 1995 OP
Decision. It also (a) declared that the farmers in the
"palayan area" covering 355 has. (i.e., the Riceland)
may qualify as farmer-beneficiaries in the mango
orchard as may be determined by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer; (b) held that Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) should be generated
immediately and distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries; and (c) affirmed the directive for Quintos
not to disturb the peaceful possession and cultivation of
the farmers in the mango orchard.
Dissatisfied, Quintos appealed to the CA, claiming that
GCFI never consented to any tenancy relationship with
the KAMIFCI members. It also argued that Lacuesta
could not have established a valid tenancy relation with
the KAMIFCI members covering the mango orchard on
account of APT’s: (a) admission and acknowledgment
that GCFI remains the owner of the subject property,
which means that, APT cannot exercise any of the
attributes of ownership until foreclosure thereof is
effected; and (b) denial of Lacuesta’s authority to enter
into any tenurial agreement with any individual or
farmers’ cooperative for the use/lease of the subject
property.38
Quintos further contended that the immediate
generation of CLOAs is improper without payment of
just compensation and affording GCFI the opportunity to
exercise its right of retention. 39
The CA Ruling
On July 31, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision, 40 holding
that the tenancy agreement entered by APT with the 53
KAMIFCI members on the mango orchard was binding
upon GCFI since all its business concerns and
transactions were coursed through APT at that time. It,
however, declared as premature the generation of
CLOAs in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries pending
exercise of the landowner’s right of retention and absent
payment of just compensation. Considering that the
February 21, 1995 OP Decision had already attained
finality, the CA no longer tackled the issues posed with
respect to the riceland.
Unperturbed, Quintos filed a motion for partial
reconsideration41 which was denied in a become the owner of the mortgaged property until he
Resolution42 dated December 17, 2008. In addition, the
CA directed the DAR to conduct the appropriate survey
to ascertain the actual surface area of the mango
orchard. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether
or not the CA correctly sustained the validity of the
tenancy agreement purported in this case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the
existence of particular facts as required by law. 43 For a
tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the
following essential elements must be shown: (a) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent between
the parties; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there
is sharing of the harvests between the parties. 44 All the
above elements must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship. Thus, the absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant entitled to security of
tenure under existing tenancy laws.45
The burden of proof rests on the one claiming to be a
tenant to prove his affirmative allegation by substantial
evidence. His failure to show in a satisfactory manner
the facts upon which he bases his claim would put the
opposite party under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense. The rule applies to civil and
administrative cases.46
In this relation, it bears stressing that the right to hire a
tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner,
except as may be provided by law.47 Hence, the consent
of the landowner should be secured prior to the
installation of tenants.48
In the present case, the PARAD, the DARAB and the
CA all held that a tenancy relationship exists between
GCFI and the 53 KAMIFCI members who were allegedly
installed as tenants by APT, the "legal possessor" of the
mango orchard at that time. Records are, however,
bereft of any showing that APT was authorized by the
property’s landowner, GCFI, to install tenants thereon.
To be sure, APT only assumed the rights of the original
mortgagees in this case, i.e., PNB and DBP, which,
however, have yet to exercise their right to foreclose the
mortgaged properties due to the RTC’s order enjoining
the same. It is settled that a mortgagee does not
has foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter, purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale.49 With the
foreclosure proceedings having been enjoined, APT
could not have been regarded as the "landowner" of the
subject property. Thus, since the consent of the
standing landowner, GCFI, had not been secured by
APT in this case, it had no authority to enter into any
tenancy agreement with the KAMIFCI members.
It is well to note that a reliance on Section 6 50 of RA
3844,51 as amended, does not dilute the propriety of this
conclusion. In Valencia v. CA (Valencia), 52 the Court
illumined that the said section – contrary to the milieu of
the present case – already "assumes that there is
already an existing agricultural leasehold relation,"
consistent with the "personal character" of the tenancy
relationship, viz.:53
When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold
relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is
already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., a
tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The
epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to
Agricultural Leasehold Relations," which assumes that
there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; x x x.
To better understand Sec. 6, let us refer to its precursor,
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended. Again, Sec. 8 of
R.A. No. 1199 assumes the existence of a tenancy
relation. As its epigraph suggests, it is a "Limitation of
Relation," and the purpose is merely to limit the tenancy
"to the person who furnishes the land, either as owner,
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the
person who actually works the land himself with the aid
of labor available from within his immediate farm
household." Once the tenancy relation is established,
the parties to that relation are limited to the persons
therein stated. Obviously, inherent in the right of
landholders to install a tenant is their authority to do so;
otherwise, without such authority, x x x landholders
cannot install a tenant on the landholding. Neither Sec.
6 o(R.A. No. 3844 nor Sec. 8 o(R.A. No. 1199
automatically authorizes the persons named therein to
employ a tenant on the landholding.
xxxx
[N]oted authority on land reform, Dean Jeremias U.
Montemayor, explains the rationale for Sec. 8 of R.A.
No. 1199, the precursor of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844:
Since the law establishes a special relationship in
tenancy with important consequences, it properly
pinpoints the persons to whom said relationship shall
apply. The spirit of the law is to prevent both landholder
absenteeism and tenant absenteeism. Thus, it would
seem that the discretionary powers and important duties
of the landholder, like the choice of crop or seed, cannot
be left to the will or capacity of an agent or overseer, just
as the cultivation of the land cannot be entrusted by the
tenant to some other people. Tenancy relationship has
been held to be of a personal character. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution dated December 1
7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
44430 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE since no valid
tenancy agreement exists over the mango orchard
subject of this case.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 190276               April 2, 2014
EUFROCINA NIEVES, as represented by her
attorney-in-fact, LAZARO VILLAROSA,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO DULDULAO and FELIPE
PAJARILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated June 4, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated
November 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 105438 which set aside the
Decision4 dated December 13, 2007 and the
Resolution5 dated March 13, 2008 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
DARAB Case No. 14727, holding that the tenancy
relations between petitioner Eufrocina Nieves
(petitioner) and respondents Ernesto Duldulao (Ernesto)
and Felipe Pajarillo (Felipe) remain valid and
enforceable.
The Facts
Petitioner is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice land
with an area of six (6) hectares, more or less, located at
Dulong Bayan, Quezon, Nueva Ecija (subject land).
Ernesto and Felipe (respondents) are tenants and
cultivators of the subject land6 who are obligated to each
pay leasehold rentals of 45 cavans of palay for each
cropping season,7 one in May and the other in
December.8
Claiming that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay their
leasehold rentals since 1985 which had accumulated to
446.5 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, petitioner
filed a petition on March 8, 2006 before the DARAB
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), seeking
the ejectment of respondents from the subject land for
non-payment of rentals.9
Prior to the filing of the case, a mediation was
conducted before the Office of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer and Legal Division in 2005 where
respondents admitted being in default in the payment of
leasehold rentals equivalent to 200 and 327 cavans of
palay, respectively, and promised to pay the
same.10 Subsequently, however, in his answer to the
petition, Ernesto claimed that he merely inherited a
portion of the back leasehold rentals from his deceased
father, Eugenio Duldulao, but proposed to pay the
arrearages in four (4) installments beginning the
dayatan cropping season in May 2006. 11 On the other
hand, Felipe denied incurring any back leasehold
rentals, but at the same time proposed to pay whatever
there may be in six (6) installments, also beginning the
dayatan cropping season in May 2006. 12 Both
respondents manifested their lack of intention to renege
on their obligations to pay the leasehold rentals due,
explaining that the supervening calamities, such as the
flashfloods and typhoons that affected the area
prevented them from complying. 13
The PARAD's Ruling
In a Decision14 dated July 6, 2006, the PARAD declared
that the tenancy relations between the parties had been
severed by respondents’ failure to pay their back
leasehold rentals, thereby ordering them to vacate the
subject land and fulfill their rent obligations.
With respect to Ernesto, the PARAD did not find merit in
his claim that the obligation of his father for back
leasehold rentals, amounting to 446 cavans of palay,
had been extinguished by his death. It held that upon
the death of the leaseholder, the leasehold relationship
continues between the agricultural lessor and the
surviving spouse or next of kin of the deceased as
provided by law; hence, the leasehold rent obligations
subsist and should be paid.15
As for Felipe, the PARAD found that his unpaid
leasehold rentals had accumulated to 327 cavans of
palay, and that his refusal to pay was willful and
deliberate, warranting his ejectment from the subject
land.16
Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the case on appeal.
The DARAB Proceedings
On April 16, 2007, the DARAB issued an
Order17 deputizing the DARAB Provincial Sheriff of
Nueva Ecija and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
of Talavera, Nueva Ecija to supervise the harvest of
palay over the subject land. However, when the Sheriff
proceeded to implement the same on April 27, 2007, he
found that the harvest had been completed and the
proceeds therefrom had been used to pay respondents’
other indebtedness.18
On December 13, 2007, the DARAB issued a
Decision19 affirming the findings of the PARAD that
indeed, respondents were remiss in paying their
leasehold rentals and that such omission was willful and
deliberate, justifying their ejectment from the subject
land.20
Unperturbed, respondents elevated the matter to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated June 4, 2009, the CA granted
respondents’ petition for review, thereby reversing the
ruling of the DARAB terminating the tenancy relations of
the parties. While it found respondents to have been
remiss in the payment of their leasehold rentals, it held
that the omission was not deliberate or willful.
Notwithstanding the DARAB’s findings with respect to
the amounts of respondents’ rental arrearages, the CA
gave full credence to their assertions and observed that
Felipe failed to pay only 293 cavans of palay or 16.28%
of the total leasehold rentals due from 1985 to 2005,
while Ernesto failed to pay only 107.5 cavans of palay or
6% of the total leasehold rentals. 22 Relying on the
Court’s ruling in the case of De Tanedo v. De La
Cruz23 (De Tanedo), the CA then concluded that
respondents substantially complied with their obligation
to pay leasehold rentals, and, hence, could not be
ejected from the subject land despite their failure to
meet their rent obligations as they became due.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution24 dated November 5, 2009, hence this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or
not the CA correctly reversed the DARAB’s ruling
ejecting respondents from the subject land.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure,
may be ejected from their landholding only on the
grounds provided by law.25 These grounds – the
existence of which is to be proven by the agricultural
lessor in a particular case26 – are enumerated in Section
36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, 27 otherwise known as
the "Agricultural Land Reform Code," which read as
follows:
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. -
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other
urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the
average of the gross harvests on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years; (as
amended by RA 6389)
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially
comply with any of the terms and conditions of
the contract or any of the provisions of this Code
unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or
force majeure;
 (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used
the landholding for a purpose other than what
had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven
farm practices as determined under paragraph 3
of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged
or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the
lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if
the non-payment of the rental shall be due to
crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per
centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the
rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his
landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
(Emphases supplied)
To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the
leasehold rentals under item 6 of the above-cited
provision, jurisprudence instructs that the same must be
willful and deliberate in order to warrant the agricultural
lessee’s dispossession of the land that he tills. As
explained in the case of Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo: 28
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, coupled with the fact that the respondents are
the complainants themselves, the burden of proof to
show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment
of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the
respondents as ag-ricultural lessors. This proceeds from
the principle that a tenancy relation-ship, once
established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure.
Petitioner can only be ejected from the agricultural
landholding on grounds provided by law. Section 36 of
the same law pertinently provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. –
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
xxxx
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of
the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event,
the non-payment shall not be a ground for disposses-
sion, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished;
xxxx
Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The
agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease rentals must
be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his
dispossession of the land that he tills.
Petitioner’s counsel opines that there appears to be no
decision by this Court on the matter; he thus submits
that we should use the CA decision in Cabero v.
Caturna. This is not correct. In an En Banc Decision by
this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al., 29 we
held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure
of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not
necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former
when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the
tenant to pay. This ruling has not been overturned.
x x x x30 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
In the present case, petitioner seeks the dispossession
of respondents from the subject land on the ground of
non-payment of leasehold rentals based on item 6,
Section 36 of RA 3844. While respondents indeed admit
that they failed to pay the full amount of their respective
leasehold rentals as they become due, they claim that
their default was on account of the debilitating effects of
calamities like flashfloods and typhoons. This latter
assertion is a defense provided under the same
provision which, if successfully established, allows the
agricultural lessee to retain possession of his
landholding. The records of this case are, however,
bereft of any showing that the aforestated claim was
substantiated by any evidence tending to prove the
same. Keeping in mind that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof,31 the Court cannot therefore lend any credence to
respondents’ fortuitous event defense.
Respondents’ failure to pay leasehold rentals to the
landowner also appears to have been willful and
deliberate. They, in fact, do not deny – and therefore
admit32 – the landowner’s assertion that their rental
arrearages have accumulated over a considerable
length of time, i.e., from 1985 to 2005 but rely on the
fortuitous event defense, which as above-mentioned,
cannot herein be sustained. In the case of Antonio v.
Manahan33 (Antonio), the Court, notwithstanding the
tenants’ failure to prove their own fortuitous event
theory, pronounced that their failure to pay the leasehold
rentals was not willful and deliberate. The records in
said case showed that the landowner actually rejected
the rentals, which amounted only to 2 years-worth of
arrearages, i.e., 1993 and 2001, tendered by the tenants
therein due to their supposed poor quality. This
circumstance was taken by the Court together with the
fact that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up for
the rejected rentals through the payments made for the
other years. In another case, i.e., Roxas v.
Cabatuando34 (Roxas), the Court similarly held that the
tenants therein did not willfully and deliberately fail to
pay their leasehold rentals since they had serious
doubts as to the legality of their contract with respect to
their non-sharing in the coconut produce, which thus
prompted them to withhold their remittances in good
faith. In contrast to Antonio and Roxas, the landowner in
this case never rejected any rental payment duly
tendered by respondents or their predecessors-in-
interest. Neither was the legality of their agricultural
leasehold contract with the landowner ever put into
issue so as to intimate that they merely withheld their
remittances in good faith. Thus, with the fortuitous event
defense taken out of the equation, and considering the
examples in Antonio and Roxas whereby the elements
of willfulness and deliberateness were not found to have
been established, the Court is impelled to agree with the
DARAB that respondents herein willfully and deliberately
chose not to pay their leasehold rentals to the
landowner when they fell due. The term "willful" means
"voluntary and intentional, but not necessarily
malicious,"35 while the term "deliberate" means that the
act or omission is "intentional," "premeditated" or "fully
considered."36 These qualities the landowner herein had
successfully established in relation to respondents’
default in this case. Accordingly, their dispossession
from the subject land is warranted under the law.
At this juncture, the Court finds it apt to clarify that
respondents’ purported substantial compliance – as
erroneously considered by the CA to justify its ruling
against their dispossession – is applicable only under
the parameters of item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844, which
is a separate and distinct provision from item 6 thereof.
Item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844 applies to cases where
the agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with
any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of
the provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure; whereas item 6 refers to cases where the
agricultural lessee does not pay the leasehold rental
when it falls due, provided that the failure to pay is not
due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per
centum as a result of a fortuitous event.
As the present dispute involves the non-payment of
leasehold rentals, it is item 6 – and not item 2 – of the
same provision which should apply. Examining the text
of item 6, there is no indication that the agricultural
lessee’s substantial compliance with his rent obligations
could be raised as a defense against his dispossession.
On the other hand, item 2 states that it is only the
agricultural lessee’s "failure to substantially comply" with
the terms and conditions of the agricultural leasehold
contract or the provisions of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code which is deemed as a ground for
dispossession. Thus, it may be reasonably deduced that
the agricultural lessee’s substantial compliance negates
the existence of the ground of dispossession provided
under item 2. While the failure to pay leasehold rentals
may be construed to fall under the general phraseology
of item 2 – that is a form of non-compliance "with any of
the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code,"37 it is a long-standing rule in
statutory construction that general legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and
generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable - lex
specialis derogat generali. 38 In other words, where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed therefor
should prevail.39 Thus, consistent with this principle, the
Court so holds that cases covering an agricultural
lessee’s non-payment of leasehold rentals should be
examined under the parameters of item 6, Section 36 of
RA 3844 and not under item 2 of the same provision
which applies to other violations of the agricultural
leasehold contract or the provisions of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, excluding the failure to pay rent. In
these latter cases, substantial compliance may – as
above-explained – be raised as a defense against
dispossession.
In this relation, the Court observes that the CA’s reliance
in the De Tanedo ruling was altogether misplaced for
the simple reason that the substantial compliance
defense in that case was actually invoked against a
violation of a peculiar term and condition of the parties’
agricultural leasehold contract, particularly requiring the
payment of advance rentals "pursuant to [the
agricultural lessee’s] agreement with the
landholders,"40 and not his mere failure to pay the
leasehold rentals regularly accruing within a particular
cropping season, as in this case.
In fact, the Court, in De Tanedo, applied the substantial
compliance defense only in relation to Section 50(b) of
RA 1199,41 otherwise known as the "Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines," which is the
predecessor provision of item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844.
Section 50(b) of RA 1199 states that:
Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. -
Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the
dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
xxxx
(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply
with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however,
That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has
substantially complied with the contract or with the
provisions of this Act.
On other hand, the predecessor provision of item 6,
Section 36 of RA 3844 is Section 50(c) of RA 1199,
which reads as follows:
Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. -
Any of the following shall be a sufficient cause for the
dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
xxxx
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to
deliver the landholder's share: Provided, however, That
this shall not apply when the tenant's failure is caused
by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
The Court’s application of the substantial compliance
defense in relation to Section 50(b) of RA 1199, as well
as the agricultural lessors’ failure to actually raise in
their ejectment complaint the ground of failure to pay
leasehold rentals, is evident from the following excerpt
of the De Tanedo Decision:42
In the decision appealed from as well as in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals forwarding this case
to us, it has been found that the rentals for the
agricultural years 1958 to 1961, inclusive, had all been
fully satisfied, although not in advance as agreed upon.
This is admitted by the petitioners-appellants. We agree
with the Court a quo that the delay in payment does not
justify the drastic remedy of ejectment, considering
Section 50(b) of Republic Act 1199, which states that
while violation by the tenant of any of the terms and
conditions of the tenancy contract shall be a ground to
eject him, yet this provision shall not apply where there
has been substantial compliance. With reference to the
rental for the crop-year 1962-63, failure to pay the same
was not alleged in the original or amended complaints
below, and hence may not be considered for the first
time on appeal. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In any case, the Court never mentioned Section 50(c) of
RA 1199 in De Tanedo.1âwphi1 Thus, a reading thereof
only shores up the point earlier explained that the
substantial compliance defense is only available in
cases where the ground for dispossession is the
agricultural lessee’s violation of the terms and conditions
of the agricultural leasehold contract or the provisions of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, and not in cases
where the ground for dispossession is the agricultural
lessee's failure to pay rent. Verily, agricultural leasehold
rentals, as in rentals in ordinary lease contracts,
constitute fixed payments which the lessor has both the
right and expectation to promptly receive in
consideration of being deprived of the full enjoyment
and possession of his property. Unless caused by a
fortuitous event, or reprieved by virtue of a finding that
the non-payment of leasehold rentals was not actually
willful and deliberate, there appears to be no credible
justification, both in reason and in law, to deny the
agricultural lessor the right to recover his property and
thereby eject the agricultural lessee in the event that the
latter fails to comply with his rent obligations as they fall
due. Indeed, while the Constitution commands the
government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and
the underprivileged whenever doubt arises in the
interpretation of the law, the jural postulates of social
justice should not sanction any false sympathy towards
a certain class, nor be used to deny the landowner's
rights,43 as in this case.
In fine, the Court affirms the DARAB Decision granting
the petition for dispossession with the modification,
however, on the amount of rental arrearages to be paid
considering that an action to enforce any cause of action
under RA 3844 shall be barred if not commenced within
three (3) years after it accrued.44 Accordingly,
respondents are held liable to pay petitioner only the
pertinent rental arrearages reckoned from the last three
(3) cropping years prior to the filing of the petition before
the Office of the PARAD on March 8, 2006 45 or from the
May 2003 cropping season, until they have vacated the
subject land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated June 4, 2009 and the Resolution dated November
5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No.
105438 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated December 13, 2007 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 14727
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION ordering respondents Ernesto Duldulao
and Felipe Pajarillo to pay petitioner Eufrocina Nieves
the pertinent rental arrearages reckoned from the May
2003 cropping season, until they have vacated the
landholding subject of this case.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. 180476               June 26, 2013
RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M.
CODERIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its
Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Court cannot sanction the use of force to evict
beneficiaries of land reform. Eviction using force is
reversion to the feudal system, where the landed elite
have free rein over their poor vassals. In effect, might is
right.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks the reversal
of the April 27, 2007 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and its November 5, 2007 Resolution 3 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 4 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 86149.
Factual Antecedents
The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-
hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the farm). As tiller
of the farm,5 petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued
a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974. 6
In 1980, individuals connected with Chioco – who was a
former Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill
petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops
(corn and vegetables) and house were bulldozed. For
fear of his life, petitioner, together with his family, left the
farm.7
In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner and
his family re-established themselves on the farm. 8 On
March 9, 19959 petitioner filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
Talavera, Nueva Ecija a Petition 10 against respondent
Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and
cultivation of the farm be respected; that the
corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between
them be executed; that he be awarded actual damages
for the destruction of his house, his standing crops,
unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993, attorney’s fees
and costs of litigation. 11 The case was docketed as
DARAB Case No. 1572-NNE-95.
Respondent moved to dismiss12 the Petition, contending
that petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed under
Section 3813 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, 14 as
amended, since the alleged dispossession took place in
1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond
the statutory three-year period for filing such claims.
Petitioner filed an opposition 15 arguing that his
tenure/tillage should be deemed uninterrupted since his
departure was due to threats made by Chioco’s
henchmen; thus, the three-year prescriptive period
should not be applied to his case.
Ruling of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD)
On September 10, 1996, the PARAD issued a
Decision16 dismissing the Petition on the ground of
prescription. It adopted respondent’s argument, adding
that although petitioner was forcibly evicted from the
farm, he was not without remedy under the law to assert
his rights. Yet, he filed the Petition only after 14 years,
or in 1995. He is thus guilty of laches and is deemed to
have abandoned his rights and privileges under the
agrarian laws.
Ruling of the DARAB
Petitioner appealed17 to the DARAB, which appeal was
docketed as DARAB Case No. 6066.
On December 8, 2003, the DARAB issued a
Decision,18 decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set
aside. A new judgment is entered:
1. Ordering the Respondent-Appellee to respect
and maintain the Petitioner-Appellant in his
peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject landholding; and
2. Ordering the Respondent-Appellee to
reimburse Raymundo Coderias of the money
equivalent representing the latter’s unrealized
harvest from 1980 to 1993 or if he has not been
allowed to re-enter up to the time this decision is
rendered then his share from the harvest should
be computed from 1980 to the present, and
ordering the MARO of the municipality to assist
the parties in the computation thereof.
SO ORDERED.19
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 which,
in an August 3, 2004 Resolution,21 the DARAB denied.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent went up to the CA by Petition for
Review,22 insisting that petitioner’s cause of action has
been barred by prescription and laches.
On April 27, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision,
dated December 8, 2003, and the Resolution, dated
August 3, 2004, of the DARABCentral Office in DARAB
Case No. 6066 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision,
dated September 10, 1996 of the Provincial Adjudicator
in DARAB Case No. 1572 ‘NNE’ 95 is ordered
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA held that undoubtedly, a tenancy relation
existed between Chioco and petitioner under RA
3844.24 Nevertheless, it found that petitioner’s action
had prescribed, in that the complained acts occurred in
1980 but petitioner filed DARAB Case No. 1572-NNE-95
only in 1995, or beyond the three-year prescriptive
period under Section 38 of RA 3844. The CA held that
this delayed action by petitioner amounts to laches as
well.25
On May 23, 2007, petitioner filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Reconsideration. 26 However, the CA denied
the same via the assailed November 5, 2007
Resolution.
Petitioner thus timely filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
Issue
In this Petition which seeks a reversal of the CA
pronouncement and reinstatement of the December 8,
2003 DARAB Decision, petitioner submits this lone
issue for the Court’s resolution:
AS A RULE, THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE
AND CANNOT BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT. HOWEVER, THE FINDINGS OF
FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY BE
REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT ON APPEAL
BY CERTIORARI WHERE THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION. AT BAR, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT PRESCRIPTION HAD SET IN
SINCE IT DISREGARD [sic] THE PRINCIPLE LAID
DOWN IN SECTIONS 3, 3.1, AND 3.2, RULE I OF THE
2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE.27
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner contends in his Petition and Reply 28 that the
three-year prescriptive period under Section 38 of RA
3844 should be counted from the time that the
intimidation by Chioco ceased upon his death. Petitioner
argues that while the intimidation and threats against
him and his family continued, the prescriptive period to
file a case under RA 3844 should not run.
Petitioner adds that Section 38 should not be applied to
his case, as Sections 3, 3.1 and 3.2, Rule I29 of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure allow for the relaxation of
technical rules, procedures, and evidence, as well as
the adoption of measures that are appropriate and
applicable to agrarian disputes. He likewise cites the
pronouncement of the DARAB to the effect that Section
38 is not applicable because the case filed was
precisely to obtain security and protection from Chioco’s
acts of intimidation against him, which continued until
Chioco’s death in 1993. Since it was Chioco’s threats
and intimidation which drove him away and kept him
from returning to the farm and filing the appropriate
case, petitioner suggests that the applicable prescriptive
period should be reckoned from the time that he
returned to the farm when the threats and intimidation
ceased.
Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent, in its Comment, 30 insists that petitioner’s
cause of action had prescribed. It also argues that, as
correctly found by the CA, Section 38 of RA 3844 should
apply in determining whether petitioner’s cause of action
has prescribed. RA 3844 is a special law and its
provisions on prescription – not those of the Civil Code,
which is a general law – should apply to the parties’
agrarian dispute.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Petitioner availed of the remedy of Petition for Review
on Certiorari, but claimed that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion, which accusation properly pertains
to an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
However, this should not affect his case for the CA
committed a glaring error on a question of law which
must be reversed.
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been
placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is also
undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between
Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in
favor of the petitioner; thus, petitioner already had an
expectant right to the farm. 31 A CLT serves as "a
provisional title of ownership over the landholding while
the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just
compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an
amortizing owner. This certificate proves inchoate
ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to
rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the
tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling." 32 Since
the farm is considered expropriated and placed under
the coverage of the land reform law, 33 Chioco had no
right to evict petitioner and enter the property. More
significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that
petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed.
x x x The Land Reform Code forges by operation of law,
between the landowner and the farmer — be he a
leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a
vinculum juris with certain vital consequences, such as
security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's right to
continue in possession of the land he works despite the
expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the
land to third persons, and now, more basically, the
farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates
under Section 11 of the Code, as well as the right to
redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his
knowledge, under Section 12 of this Code.
To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section
10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the agricultural
leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. With unyielding consistency, we have held
that transactions involving the agricultural land over
which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in
change of ownership, such as the sale or transfer of
legal possession, will not terminate the rights of the
agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by
making such rights enforceable against the transferee or
the landowner's successor in interest. x x x
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle
of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes
that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only
be terminated for causes provided by law. x x x Security
of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees
which they value as life itself and deprivation of their
landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the
leasehold relationship can take place only for causes
provided by law. x x x34 (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)
The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this
juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and
Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold
relation shall be extinguished only under any of the
following three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment
of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of
which shall be served three months in advance; or (3)
absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the
lessee x x x." None of these is obtaining in this case. In
particular, petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned
the landholding. It will be recalled that Chioco forcibly
ejected him from the property through threats and
intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops
were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and
returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death.
Two years after, or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that
"an action to enforce any cause of action under this
Code shall be barred if not commenced within three
years after such cause of action accrued." In this case,
we deem it proper to reckon petitioner’s cause of action
to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of
Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was forcibly
ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as the
intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb
existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco
to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. Since the
threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death,
petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert his rights as
grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the
prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as
enumerated above, include the right to security of
tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or
transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive
right to buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the
land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.
Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after Chioco
passed away for his life and the lives of members of his
family are not worth gambling for a piece of land. The
bulldozing of his house – his castle – is only an example
of the fate that could befall them. Under the
circumstances, it is therefore understandable that
instead of fighting for the farm, petitioner opted to leave
and keep his family safe. Any man who cherishes his
family more than the most valuable material thing in his
life would have done the same.
Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of
the will, and so long as they exist, petitioner is deprived
of his free will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his
crops, tend to them, and harvest them. He could not file
an agrarian case against Chioco, for that meant having
to return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case
anywhere else; any other agrarian tribunal or agency
would have declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Notably, on various instances, we have set aside
technicalities for reasons of equity. We are inclined to
apply the same liberality in view of the peculiar situation
in this case.35
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that respondent had
no right to claim prescription because a CLT had
already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is
considered expropriated and placed under the coverage
of the land reform law. As such, respondent had neither
the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. In
Catorce v. Court of Appeals,36 this Court succinctly held:
Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the
landholding in question. Not only did respondent fail to
controvert this fact, but he even impliedly admitted the
same in his Answer to petitioner’s Complaint when he
raised, as one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary
surrender of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent
Court should have taken this fact into consideration for
tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the
continued enjoyment and possession of their
landholding except when their dispossession had been
authorized by virtue of a final and executory judgment,
which is not so in the case at bar.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed
to promote economic and social stability. Being a social
legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full
force and effect to its clear intent, which is ‘to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers’ and to make
them ‘more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our
democratic society’.37
At any rate, respondent cannot legally invoke the strict
application of the rules on prescription because the
failure of petitioner to immediately file the Petition was
due to its own maneuvers.38 This Court should not allow
respondent to profit from its threats and intimidation.
Besides, if we subscribe to respondent’s ratiocination
that petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed,
it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a tenant
who was unlawfully deprived of his landholding would be
barred from pursuing his rightful claim against the
transgressor.39
We have ruled time and again that litigants should have
the amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition
of their cause – free, as much as possible, from the
constraints of procedural technicalities. In the interest of
its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard
procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its
merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat,
substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply
the Rules liberally to resolve substantial issues raised by
the parties.
Rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid
application of the rules that would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be
avoided.40
"It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute
of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice would result." 41 It must also
be emphasized that "the statute of limitations has been
devised to operate primarily against those who slept on
their rights and not against those desirous to act but
cannot do so for causes beyond their control."42
Petitioner’s tenure on the farm should be deemed
uninterrupted since he could not set foot thereon. And if
he could not make the required payments to Chioco or
the Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner should not
be faulted. And, since his tenure is deemed
uninterrupted, any benefit or advantage from the land
should accrue to him as well.
Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to
emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the
soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same
spirit, with mechanisms which hope to forestall a
reversion to the antiquated and inequitable feudal
system of land ownership. It aims to ensure the
continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the
beneficiary of the land that he tills which would certainly
not be possible where the former owner is allowed to
reacquire the land at any time following the award – in
contravention of the government’s objective to
emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the
soil.43
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The April 27,
2007 Decision and November 5, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86149 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The December 8, 2003
Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board is ordered REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
15. G.R. No. 160882               March 7, 2012
FELICIDAD STA. MARIA VILLARAN, WILFREDO
STA. MARIA VILLARAN, DEOGRACIAS STA. MARIA
and ROLANDO STA. MARIA, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD and LORENZO
MARIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the October 20, 2003 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72388, as well as
the November 25, 2003 Resolution2 which denied
reconsideration. The assailed decision dismissed the
Rule 65 petition filed before the Court of Appeals by
herein petitioners who sought to set aside the January
16, 2001 decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 7365.
In turn, the latter assailed decision affirmed the ruling of
the Office of the Regional Adjudicator in favor of
respondent Lorenzo Mariano in DARAB Case No. IV-
DCN-R1-006-95 – one for the disqualification of herein
petitioners as agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The facts follow.
Bernardo Sta. Maria had been a tenant-tiller in Hacienda
Jala-Jala of the estate of the spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefina Tangco. By virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, he was issued Certificates of
Land Transfer in 1973 covering the three (3) parcels of
riceland subject of this case. These certificates would
then be the basis for the issuance of Emancipation
Patent Nos. A-035687, A-035685 and A-035159 and the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. M-1677,
M-1679 and M-1680 in the Register of Deeds of
Rizal.3 Bernardo died on April 5, 1988, yet the said TCTs
were issued in his name only in December 1988.
The controversy arose when Lorenzo allegedly entered
the subject property following the death of Bernardo,
cultivated the same and appropriated the harvest all to
himself. Petitioners claimed they had learned of it only in
1989, and that in the intervening period they admittedly
had left the subjects lands idle because of lack of
enough rainfall that season.4 Lorenzo, however,
asserted his entry was not illegal, because he
supposedly had been a long-time sub-tenant of
Bernardo even until the latter’s death. 5 Sometime in
1990, the conflict was brought to the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC) of Poblacion, Jala-Jala,
Rizal. No compromise emerged; hence, the BARC
referred the matter to the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) before which, however, no conciliation
was likewise reached.6 Exasperated, petitioners, on May
21, 1990, formally demanded that Lorenzo vacate the
subject property within 30 days from notice. 7 Lorenzo did
not heed the demand.
On February 21, 1995, Lorenzo filed before the DARAB
Regional Office No. 4 a petition 8 for the disqualification
of petitioners as farmer-beneficiaries and for the
cancellation of the pertinent emancipation patents and
transfer certificates of title issued to Bernardo. He
alleged sub-tenancy in his favor which had begun in
1980 until Bernardo’s death in 1988, and claimed that,
as affirmed by the BARC, he had during that period
even undertaken to deliver crop remittances to
Bernardo. He asserted too that after Bernardo’s death,
petitioners had left the lands sitting idle.9
Addressing the petition and moving for dismissal
thereof, petitioners countered that Lorenzo had on
several occasions been merely hired by their late father
to haul and spread seedlings on the subject property;
that they had left the lands idle as alleged but that the
same was due to the unexpected lack of rain during the
planting season; that on the contrary, Lorenzo, after
Bernardo’s death, had entered the subject property by
stealth and strategy and cultivated the same for his
exclusive benefit; and finally, that it was the regular
courts, not the DARAB, which had jurisdiction over the
instant dispute inasmuch as Lorenzo was a mere
"squatter" or usurper.10
On September 4, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator,
disposing the petition in favor of Lorenzo, ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Directing the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal to effect the immediate
cancellation of the following Transfer Certificates
of Title covering the subject lots more
particularly described in Paragraph 3 of the
petition, to wit:
Lot. No. Area EP No. TCT No.
102 15,640 sq.m. A-035159 M-1680
85 7,977 sq.m. A-035685 M-1679
83 19,215 sq.m. A-035681 M-1677
of the Subdivision Plan Psd-04-030752
(OCT), all located at 1st District, Jala-
Jala, Rizal which are registered in the
name of Bernardo R. Sta. Maria;
2. Directing the local MARO (Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer) of Jala-Jala, Rizal and PARO
(Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) of Rizal to
reallocate the aforementioned lots described in
the preceding paragraph to other qualified
beneficiaries pursuant to existing law and
pertinent guidelines;
3. Maintaining the petitioner in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the subject
premises as a qualified potential PD 27
beneficiary [thereof];
4. Perpetually enjoining the respondents, Heirs
of the late Bernardo R. Sta. Maria from
disturbing the petitioner’s peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject premises.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners elevated the case to the DARAB, which, on
January 16, 2001, adopted and affirmed the findings
and ruling of the Regional Adjudicator as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the herein
assailed decision of September 4, 1998, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, alleging a denial
of due process and partiality to their disadvantage and,
accordingly, sought that the decision of the Regional
Adjudicator be declared void upon those grounds. 13 The
motion was denied on June 25, 2002.14
Petitioners then turned to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Certiorari15 under Rule 65. In it, they alleged
that the DARAB in this case had exhibited a want or
excess of jurisdiction, first, in entertaining the instant suit
involving a "squatter" on one hand and agrarian reform
beneficiaries on the other; and, second, in affirming a
void decision that had been promulgated in violation of
the due process clause. They likewise fault the DARAB
in its erroneous appreciation of the evidence and its
manifest bias in favor of Lorenzo.16
On October 20, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision dismissing the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.17
The focal ground for the dismissal of the petition was the
modality of recourse taken by petitioners. The Court of
Appeals observed that the correct remedy from an
adverse decision of the DARAB is an appeal by petition
for review, not a petition for certiorari, to be taken within
15 days from notice.18 It likewise affirmed the uniform
findings of the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB that
the dispute arose from the supposed tenancy
relationship which existed between Bernardo and
Lorenzo, hence, it came under the competence of the
DARAB to resolve. Moreover, it noted that said relations
between Lorenzo and Bernardo, as well as the
established fact that the supposed agrarian reform
beneficiaries had failed to personally cultivate the
subject lands, were all contrary to the mandate of the
land grant. Finally, it dismissed the claim of denial of
due process.19
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration 20 was
21 
denied. Hence, this recourse to the Court.
Petitioners’ stance is unchanged. They hinge the
present petition on their obstinate notion that Lorenzo
was a mere "squatter" or usurper of the subject property
and that, therefore, the dispute is removed from the
jurisdiction of the agrarian agency which has thus
rendered a void decision on the controversy. They also
reiterate their supposed prejudice as they were allegedly
denied due process and yet were bound by the assailed
decisions which had been rendered without basis in the
evidence on record.22
In its abbreviated Comment 23 on the petition, the DAR
stands by the dismissal of the petition by the Court of
Appeals and prayed that inasmuch as petitioners
resorted to an improper mode of appeal from the
DARAB, the instant petition deserves an outright
dismissal.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners
have resorted to a wrong mode of appeal by pursuing a
Rule 65 petition from the DARAB’s decision. Section
6024 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 clearly states that
the modality of recourse from decisions or orders of the
then special agrarian courts is by petition for review. In
turn, Section 6125 of the law mandates that judicial
review of said orders or decisions are governed by the
Rules of Court. Section 60 26 thereof is to be read in
relation to R.A. No. 7902, 27 which expanded the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions.28 On this basis, the Supreme Court issued
Circular No. 1-9529 governing appeals from all quasi-
judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for
review regardless of the nature of the question raised.
Hence, the Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that must
govern the procedure for judicial review of decisions,
orders, or resolutions of the DAR as in this case. Under
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, 30 moreover, an appeal
taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by a
wrong or inappropriate mode warrants a dismissal.
Thus, petitioners should have assailed the January 16,
2001 decision and the June 25, 2002 resolution of the
DARAB before the appellate court via a petition for
review under Rule 43. By filing a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory
petition for review, petitioners have clearly taken an
inappropriate recourse. For this reason alone, we find
no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
dismissing the petition before it. While the rule that a
petition for certiorari is dismissible when availed of as a
wrong remedy is not inflexible and admits of exceptions
– such as when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; or when the broader interest of
justice so requires; or when the writs issued are null and
void; or when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority 31 – none of
these exceptions obtains in the present case.
Be that as it may, we shall address the peripheral issues
raised in the present petition for clarity and perspective.
Petitioners insist that a certiorari petition is the proper
relief from the assailed decision and resolution of the
DARAB inasmuch as the latter allegedly has gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the non-agrarian dispute in
this case – where the disputants are agrarian reform
beneficiaries and a mere usurper or "squatter." 32
Concededly, the true nature of this case seems to have
been obscured by the incidents that ensued between
the formal demand to vacate was made by petitioners
on respondent on May 21, 1990, and the filing by
respondent of the petition for disqualification against
petitioners on February 21, 1995. The records bear that
on July 3, 1990, herein petitioners had instituted an
action for forcible entry/unlawful detainer against
respondent involving the subject property.33 The case,
however, had been dismissed because it was filed
beyond the reglementary period, as well as on ground of
forum shopping in view of the then pendency of the
dispute with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO). Petitioners appealed to the regional trial court
and then to the Court of Appeals which both rendered a
dismissal for lack of merit. The dismissal had attained
finality.34 Then, sometime between May and June 1993,
herein petitioners had filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against respondent respecting the subject
properties.35 In these cases, petitioners uniformly
characterized respondent as a mere usurper or
"squatter" who, by strategy and stealth and by taking
advantage of the supposed illiteracy of their
predecessor, succeeded in taking possession of the
subject property.36 Also, in 1998, petitioners had
instituted a complaint at the provincial prosecution office
ascribing criminal trespass to respondent also relative to
the subject farmlands.37
Thus, we revert to the origins of the controversy at the
BARC level, where the conflict between petitioners and
respondent has encountered a first attempt at
resolution. We recall that at the said forum, respondent
has already sought validation of his rights as Bernardo’s
sub-tenant. This fact is affirmed in the June 25, 1990
Report38 of the BARC. Significantly, the committee
affirmed that even during Bernardo’s lifetime and prior to
the issuance of the emancipation patents and TCT’s in
his name, he had already committed several violations
of the terms of his certificates of land award and of the
provisions of P.D. No. 27. These violations include his
entrusting his landholding, between 1974 until 1988, to
the able hands of several sub-tenants who undertook to
personally and actually cultivate the property and
obliged themselves to deliver crop remittances to him.
Indeed, Lorenzo was among these sub-tenants.39
The Report also told that the property had outstanding
tax obligations in favor of the local government for which
both Bernardo and petitioners as his heirs should be
held responsible.40 Quite striking is the finding that for
more than ten (10) years – or the period during which
Bernardo’s landholdings were being farmed by his own
tenants – none of herein petitioners had manifested to
the agrarian department their intention to take on and
continue carrying out the obligations attaching to the
land grant.41 In fact, none of them had coordinated with
the DAR even after Bernardo’s death on April 5,
1988.42 Accordingly, the BARC recommended the
cancellation of Emancipation Patent Nos. A-035685, A-
035687 and A-035159 in the name of Bernardo, in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 27. It
declared petitioners unqualified to become agrarian
reform beneficiaries for failure to signify their intent to
step into the shoes of their predecessor. 43 It was also
recommended that respondent, who has been actually
tilling the lots covered by the subject emancipation
patents and TCTs, be allowed to carry on the rights and
obligations of Bernardo.44
The findings contained in the said BARC Report
indisputably place the present controversy within the
class of disputes over which the DAR exercises primary
jurisdiction as provided in Section 50 45 of R.A. No. 6657.
Agrarian disputes refer to any controversy relating to
tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture, among
others.46 The statutory vesture of power in the DAR is to
be read in conjunction with Section 3 (d) of R.A. No.
6657, which defines an agrarian dispute as any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating
to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. 47
We need not belabor this point, inasmuch as jurisdiction
is vested by law and is determined by the material
allegations in the complaint. 48 Indeed, when a court,
tribunal or officer has jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction and, hence, all errors committed in the
exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and
jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper
subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.49
Thus, armed with the BARC Report which itself states
that no conciliation has been arrived at by the parties
previously, and following a failed attempt at conciliation
before the MARO, Lorenzo filed a petition against
petitioners for their disqualification to become agrarian
reform beneficiaries with the Office of the Regional
Adjudicator of the DAR. Relying on the BARC’s findings,
the Regional Adjudicator noted that, indeed, Bernardo
had violated the terms of his land grant when he
employed sub-tenants in the cultivation of the subject
landholding50 – a direct contravention of the prohibitions
instituted in Section 2751 of R.A. No. 384452 and in
Section 24 (2)53 of R.A. No. 1199, 54 as amended. These
two provisions prohibit an agricultural lessee or tenant
from, among others, employing a lessee on the
landholding except in case of illness or incapacity where
laborers may be employed but whose services shall be
on his account. It turned out also that the Regional
Adjudicator had found meritorious the BARC findings
that Lorenzo was only among other third parties in favor
of whom the usufructuary rights over the landholding
had been surrendered by Bernardo; and that since
Lorenzo was the last sub-tenant to take possession of
the landholding in the series of relinquishments made by
Bernardo following the issuance of his certificates of
land transfer in 1973, it was deemed proper to protect
Lorenzo’s security of tenure on the subject
property.55 This, especially since Lorenzo’s unrebutted
evidence is to the effect that he has been in continuous
and actual possession and cultivation of the disputed
lands.56
These findings have been affirmed in the ordinary
course by both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals
and, hence, are no longer bound to be reevaluated by
this Court. For, in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may
be raised. We have time and again ruled that the factual
findings by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts
because of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling under
their jurisdiction.57
Finally, anent petitioners’ lamentation that they had
been denied due process, we differ.1âwphi1 In
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process.58 As we held in Casimiro
v. Tandog:59
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in
the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the
case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.60
We, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals that –
Petitioners’ contention x x x is bereft of merit. From the
proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) up to the DARAB, petitioners were
given all notices and chances to submit all necessary or
required pleadings. From the Regional Adjudicator, they
appealed to the DARAB and thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration x x x. All these show that they were
given ample opportunity to present their side. Due
process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and
this opportunity was not denied petitioners.61
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated October 20, 2003, as well as
its Resolution dated November 25, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72388, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. 178622               November 12, 2012
LUCIANO LADANO,1 Petitioner,
vs.
FELINO NERI, EDWIN SOTO, ADAN
ESPANOLA,2 and ERNESTO BLANCO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A person who is not agricultural tenant cannot claim the
right to security of tenure under the Code of Agrarian
Reforms of the Philippines3 or Republic Act (RA) No.
3844, as amended.4 Moreover, he cannot pursue his
complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) whose jurisdiction lies over
agrarian disputes between parties in a tenancy
relationship.5
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,6 assailing the February 14, 2007 Decision 7 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93819, as
well as its May 9, 2007 Resolution, 8 which denied
reconsideration of its Decision. The fallo of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 6, 2005
Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, in DARAB Case No. 13172, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING the April 1, 2004 complaint filed
by respondent Luciano Ladano.
SO ORDERED.9
Factual Antecedents
This case originated from a Complaint 10 filed by
petitioner Luciano Ladano (Ladano) before the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator against respondents Felino Neri
(Neri), Edwin Soto, Adan Espanola and Ernesto Blanco.
Ladano alleged that on May 7, 2003, the respondents
forcibly entered the two-hectare land, located in
Manalite I, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which he
and his family have been peaceably occupying and
cultivating since 1970. The said respondents informed
him that the property belongs to Neri and that he should
vacate the same immediately. Not too long afterwards,
the respondents fenced the property and destroyed
some of the trees and kawayan planted thereon. Ladano
prayed that he be declared the rightful "occupant/tiller"
of the property, with the right to security of tenure
thereon. In the alternative that the judgment is in the
respondents’ favor, he prayed that the respondents
compensate him for the improvements that he
introduced in the property.
Respondents countered that Ladano’s Complaint should
be dismissed for lack of merit. 11 He is not entitled to the
reliefs he sought because he does not have, as he did
not even allege having, a leasehold arrangement with
Neri, the supposed owner of the land he is occupying. 12
Instead of arguing that he has a right to remain on the
property as its bona fide tenant, Ladano maintained that
he has been its possessor in good faith for more than 30
years. He believed then that the property was part of the
"public land and was open to anybody." 13 As a
possessor and builder in good faith, he cannot be
removed from the subject property without being
compensated for the improvements that he had
introduced.14 He prayed for an award of P100,000.00 as
disturbance compensation.15
Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator
On June 23, 2004, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed
Ladano’s Complaint.16 She determined that the two-
hectare property, while agricultural, is not covered by
RA No. 6657, as amended, 17 which only covers
agricultural properties beyond five
hectares.18 Presidential Decree No. 27, as
amended,19 does not apply either because the property
was not planted with rice and corn. Neither is it covered
by other agrarian tenancy laws because Ladano had not
presented any evidence of his tenancy relationship with
the landowner.20 The Provincial
Adjudicator disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view therefrom, JUDGMENT is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21
Ladano appealed to the DARAB Central Office
(DARAB).22 He questioned Neri’s title to the property and
Neri’s right to eject him therefrom. He maintained that,
for more than 30 years, he believed that the land was
part of the public domain because no one disturbed his
possession thereof. He continued cultivating and
possessing the same in good faith. Under Article 1678
of the Civil Code, 23 Ladano averred that he is entitled to
be compensated for the improvements that he
introduced.24
DARAB Decision
The DARAB determined that the only issue to be
resolved is whether Ladano is a tenant on the subject
landholding.25 If he is a tenant, he is entitled to security
of tenure and cannot be removed from the property. 26
The DARAB held that Ladano’s 30-year occupation and
cultivation of the land could not have possibly escaped
the landowner’s notice. Since the landowner must have
known about, and acquiesced to, Ladano’s actions, an
implied tenancy is deemed to exist between them. 27 The
landowner, who denied the existence of a tenancy
relationship, has the burden of proving that the occupant
of the land is a mere intruder thereon. 28 In the instant
case, respondents failed to discharge such burden. The
fallo of the DARAB Decision29 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated June 23, 2004 rendered by the Honorable
Adjudicator a quo is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A NEW JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring x x x Luciano Ladaño a bonafide
tenant on the subject landholding;
 2. Ordering respondents to respect Ladano’s
peaceful possession of the subject landholding;
3. Directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Brg. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City
to assist the parties in the execution of an
Agricultural Leasehold Contract in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.30
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 31 They
assailed the DARAB’s finding of a tenancy relationship
as having no factual basis. Ladano himself never
claimed sharing his harvests with, or paying rentals to,
the landowner. Without such an arrangement, no
tenancy relationship can exist between them 32 and
Ladano cannot claim rights under the agrarian laws. 33
The DARAB denied reconsideration on March 17,
2006.34
Respondents appealed to the appellate court.35
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court reversed the DARAB Decision and
dismissed Ladano’s Complaint.36
Contrary to the DARAB’s ruling, the CA held that the
burden lies on the person who is asserting the existence
of a tenancy relationship to prove that all the elements
necessary for its existence are present. These requisites
are: "(a) the parties [must be] landowner and tenant; (b)
the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is
consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural
production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the
tenant; and (f) there is sharing of harvests between the
landowner and the tenant."37
The CA concluded that there is no evidence supporting
the DARAB’s conclusion that a tenancy relationship
exists between Ladano and Neri. 38 In fact, Ladano
himself admitted that he entered and tilled the subject
property without the knowledge and consent of the
landowner. Such admission negates the requisites of
consent and of an agreement to share harvests. 39
The CA also faulted the DARAB for considering
Ladano’s lengthy occupation of the land as an indication
of the existence of a leasehold relationship. A person’s
tillage of another’s landholding, without anything else,
will not raise the presumption of an agricultural
tenancy.40
In seeking a reconsideration41 of the CA Decision
Ladano alleged, for the first time, that he indeed shared
a portion of his harvest with the landowner’s
caretaker.42 He prayed that the CA reverse itself and that
the DARAB Decision be reinstated in toto.43
The CA denied44 Ladano’s motion, hence the latter filed
this Petition.
Proceedings before this Court
Petitioner filed a Motion for Urgent Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order TRO45 before the Court.
He alleged that, despite the pendency of his appeal,
respondents bulldozed the subject land and destroyed
petitioner’s trees.46 Since respondents did not deny
petitioner’s factual allegations,47 the Court granted
petitioner’s motion and issued a TRO on February 18,
2009.48 The TRO enjoined the respondents from
immediately implementing the appellate court’s Decision
and removing petitioner from the subject property until
further orders from the Court.49
On July 20, 2009, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To
Cite Private Respondents Felino Neri and Edwin Soto in
Contempt of Court.50 He alleged that these respondents
defied the Court’s TRO by bulldozing the subject
property on July 10, 2009. He had the incident blottered
with the Office of the Barangay Captain and with
Precinct 2 of the Philippine National Police in Antipolo
City.51 He attached pictures of bulldozed earth to his
motion.52
Respondents denied the allegations. They maintained
that the pictures attached to petitioner’s motion were
taken way back in 2003 and were not truthful
representations of the current state of the subject
property.53
Issues
(1) Whether respondents are guilty of indirect
contempt;
(2) Whether the CA erred in giving due course to
respondents’ appeal; and
(3) Whether petitioner is an agricultural tenant
on the subject property.
Our Ruling
Anent the issue of citing respondents in
contempt of court
A charge for indirect contempt, such as disobedience to
a court’s lawful order,54 is initiated either motu proprio by
order of or a formal charge by the offended court, or by
a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements
for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned.55 It cannot be initiated by a mere
motion,56 such as the one that petitioner filed.
Further, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation
that respondents violated the TRO. The entries in the
barangay and police blotters attached to his motion
carry little weight or probative value as they are not
conclusive evidence of the truth thereof but merely of
the fact that these entries were made.57 The pictures
depicting bulldozing activities likewise contained no
indication that they were taken after the Court’s
issuance of the restraining order. Simply, the Court has
no way of gauging the veracity of petitioner’s factual
allegations. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court
resolves to deny petitioner’s motion.
Procedural aspects; improper
verification and incomplete payment of
docket fees before the CA
Petitioner assails the CA for giving due course to
respondents’ appeal despite the latter’s failure to pay
the complete docket fees when they filed their motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review and to
properly verify their petition for review. These omissions
were allegedly sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the
petition.58
The Court finds the allegations of procedural missteps
unfounded. It appears from the CA rollo that the
respondents paid the complete docket fees on the day
that they filed their motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review on March 28, 2006. 59 There was also
a proper verification of the petition for review. Contrary
to petitioner’s allegation that the verification was based
on "knowledge and belief," 60 which is violative of Section
4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the verification actually
stated that it was based on "own personal
knowledge,"61 which complied with the requirements of
the said provision.
The CA Decision correctly ruled that
there is no tenancy relationship between
the parties
Ladano faults the CA for ruling that there was no
tenancy relationship between himself and landowner
Neri. He avers that they have an implied tenancy
arrangement as shown by his delivery of the
landowner’s agricultural share to the latter’s caretaker.
Such actual sharing of harvest creates a tenancy
relationship despite the absence of a written leasehold
contract. The same has been pronounced in Santos v.
Vda. De Cerdenola,62 which states that an implied
contract of tenancy is created if the landowner,
represented by his overseer, permits the tilling of the
land by another for a period of six (6) years.
The Court notes petitioner’s sudden change of thesis in
the case. He insisted in his Complaint and in the
proceedings before the Provincial Adjudicator, as well
as before the DARAB, that the property is a public land
and that no one has ever claimed ownership over the
same. He maintained that he was in good faith when he
cultivated the land because he believed that the land
does not belong to anyone. This contention is in stark
contrast with his new assertion, raised for the first time
in his Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, that he
consistently paid rentals to the landowner’s caretaker.
The belatedness of the factual assertion raises doubts
as to its truthfulness. Moreover, his bare assertion is
bereft of evidentiary support. He did not name the
alleged caretaker or the landowner for whom the
caretaker was allegedly collecting rentals. He did not
state the quantity of harvests collected as rental or the
terms of payment. Given the belatedness 63 and
flimsiness of petitioner’s factual allegation, the CA
cannot be faulted for not accepting it in its assailed
Decision and Resolution.
"A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and
a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to
undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to
the landholder, as a result of which relationship the
tenant acquires the right to continue working on and
cultivating the land."64 For a tenancy relationship,
express or implied, to exist, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the parties must be landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is
sharing of harvests between the landowner and the
tenant.65 Independent and concrete evidence of the
foregoing elements must be presented by the party
asserting the existence of such a relationship. 66 They
cannot be arrived at by mere conjectures or by
presumptions.67 "Unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program
of the Government under existing tenancy laws."68
In the case at bar, the DARAB held that there is an
implied tenancy because Ladano had been occupying
and cultivating the subject property for more than 30
years. From such a lengthy occupation, the DARAB
concluded that the landowner must have consented to
petitioner’s occupation.
The CA rightfully reversed this conclusion. The DARAB
failed to consider that one’s occupancy and cultivation of
an agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso
facto make him a de jure tenant. 69 It should not have
considered such occupation as a basis for assuming the
landowner’s consent, especially when the occupant
himself never alleged that he obtained the landowner’s
consent. Petitioner did not even allege in his Complaint
that he is a tenant of the landowner. Neither did he
allege that he shared his harvests with the landowner.
Without such factual assertions from Ladano, the
DARAB arrived at a conclusion that is utterly bereft of
factual bases. Petitioner is not a tenant on the land and
is not entitled to security of tenure nor to disturbance
compensation. His Complaint was properly dismissed
for lack of merit.
There is another ground for dismissing Ladano’s
Complaint. The Department of Agrarian Reform and its
adjudication boards have no jurisdiction over Ladano’s
Complaint. "For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over
the case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties."70 But a careful reading of Ladano’s
Complaint shows that Ladano did not claim to be a
leasehold tenant on the land. The Complaint reads:
COMES NOW, the Complainant, most respectfully avers
and states:
1. That complainant is of legal age, a resident of
Manalite I, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City; while
respondent, Felino Neri is also of legal age, with
principal office address at Uni Rock, Bagong
Nayon I, Antipolo City; respondents Edwin Soto,
Adan Española and Ernesto Blanco are likewise
of legal age, with principal office at Uni Rock,
Bagong Nayon I, Antipolo City, where they may
be served with summons and other legal
Board’s processes;
2. That complainant is an actual occupant/tiller
in a parcel of land having an area of
approximately two (2) hectares, more or less,
located at Manalite I, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo
City since 1970 up to present, having introduced
substantial improvements thereat;
3. That complainant and his family have been in
peaceful possession and occupation, open,
exclusive and uninterrupted from any claimants
or intruders for several years, HOWEVER, on
the 7th day of May 2003, respondents (Edwin
Soto and Adan Espanola) upon strength [sic]
instruction of respondent, Felino Neri, claiming
ownership over the subject property, forcibly
entered thereon and strongly threatened herein
complainant and his family to vacate
immediately thereat, otherwise, any members
[sic] of the complainant [sic] might be killed;
4. That immediately thereafter, complainant
sought the assistance of the DAR Municipal
Office of Antipolo City, HOWEVER, pending
mediation-conference proceedings, purposely to
exhaust possible settlement, the
RESPONDENTS on the 29th day of May 2003
at 9:00 in the morning, in a total wanton
disregard of the complainant’s rights,
destroyed/cut down several guava trees and
kawayans [sic], with force and threat,
respondents constructed a fence purposely to
deprive herein complainant from ingress and
egress on the subject property;
5. That as a result, complainant and his family
could hardly move freely, they are terribly and
seriously disturbed from their peaceful and
enjoyment [sic] possession causing so much
irreparable damage and injury;
6. That for the protection of the complainant’s
existing rights, there is an extreme urgency to
prevent herein respondents from further doing
unlawful acts, hence compelled to file a case
against the respondents for Injunction, Damages
and Payment of the improvements before this
Honorable Adjudicator;
7. That complainant is earnestly praying that he
be exempted from paying the required docket
fees in filing of the instant case due to financial
difficulties as his means of livelihood is
farming.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Adjudicator, that
judgment be rendered in favor of the complainant and
against the respondents:
1. Declaring the complainant to be a bonafide
occupant/tiller in the subject property and is
entitled to security of tenure;
2. Ordering the respondents to respect the rights
and interest of the complainant as a legitimate
occupant/tiller thereat and to pay the
improvements destroyed;
3. Or in the alternative, ordering the respondents
to pay the complainant of all the improvements
he introduced in the subject property.
Other reliefs that are just and fair are likewise prayed for
under the premises.
Bagumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
LUCIANO LADANO
Complainant71
Petitioner never alleged that he had any agreement with
the landowner of the subject property.1ªvvph!1 Indeed
Ladano’s Complaint did not assert any right that arises
from agrarian laws. He asserted his rights based on his
prior physical possession of the two-hectare property
and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The
issues that he wanted resolved are who between
himself and the respondents have a better right to
possess the property, and whether he has a right to be
compensated for the improvements he introduced on
the property. Clearly, the nature of the case be filed is
one for forcible entry72 and for indemnification,73 neither
of which is cognizable by the DARAB, but by the regular
courts. While neither of the parties challenged the
jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court can consider the
issue of jurisdiction motu proprio. 74
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS the dismissal of
petitioner’s Complaint in the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93819. The Court
further DISSOLVES the temporary restraining order it
issued on February 18, 2009 against the respondents,
and DENIES petitioner’s Urgent Motion To Cite Private
Respondents Felino Neri and Edwin Soto in Contempt
of Court for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
17. G.R. No. 185669               February 1, 2012
JUAN GALOPE, Petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIA BUGARIN, Represented by CELSO
RABANG, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Juan Galope appeals the Decision 1 dated
September 26, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated December
12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97143. The CA ruled that there is no tenancy
relationship between petitioner and respondent
Cresencia Bugarin.
The facts and antecedent proceedings are as follows:
Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. NT-229582.3 Petitioner farms the land.4
In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that
she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an
agreement, that what she receives in return from
petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover
the land to farm it on her own. Petitioner countered that
respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been
farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging
from ₱4,000 to ₱6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per
harvest. The case was not settled. 5
Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a
petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and
payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as
DARAB Case No. 9378. Rabang claimed that
respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that
the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or
monetary consideration for the use of the land. Rabang
also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose
Allingag who allegedly possesses the land. 6
After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator
dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a
tenant entitled to security of tenure. The Adjudicator said
substantial evidence prove the tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondent. The Adjudicator
noted the certification of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) that petitioner is the registered farmer of
the land; that Barangay Tanods said that petitioner is
the tenant of the land; that Jose Allingag affirmed
petitioner’s possession and cultivation of the land; that
Allingag also stated that petitioner hired him only as
farm helper; and that respondent’s own witness, Cesar
Andres, said that petitioner is a farmer of the land. 7
On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator
and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The
DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the
land, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer to
assist in computing the rentals.
The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the
parties and stressed that the elements of consent and
sharing are not present. The DARAB noted petitioner’s
failure to prove his payment of rentals by appropriate
receipts, and said that the affidavits of Allingag, Rolando
Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and are
not concrete proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment
of rentals. The DARAB added that respondent’s
intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot be taken
as implied tenancy for such lending was without
consideration.8
Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARAB’s ruling
that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of
consent and sharing are not present; that respondent’s
act of lending her land without consideration cannot be
taken as implied tenancy; and that no receipts prove
petitioner’s payment of rentals. 9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner
alleges that the CA erred
[I.]
x x x IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION
OF THE DARAB AND IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER THAT HE IS
INDEED A TENANT[;]
[II.]
x x x IN RELYING MAINLY ON THE ABSENCE
OF RECEIPTS OF THE PAYMENTS OF LEASE
RENTALS IN DECLARING THE ABSENCE OF
CONSENT AND SHARING TO ESTABLISH A
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT[; AND]
[III.]
x x x WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE
PETITIONER HAS NOT DISCHARGED THE
BURDEN [OF] PROVING BY WAY OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HIS ALLEGATIONS
OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
RESPONDENT.10
The main issue to be resolved is whether there exists a
tenancy relationship between the parties.
Petitioner submits that substantial evidence proves the
tenancy relationship between him and respondent.
Specifically, he points out that (1) his possession of the
land is undisputed; (2) the DAR certified that he is the
registered farmer of the land; and (3) receipts prove his
payment of irrigation fees. On the absence of receipts
as proof of rental payments, he urges us to take judicial
notice of an alleged practice in the provinces that
payments between relatives are not supported by
receipts. He also calls our attention to the affidavits of
Jose Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz
attesting that he pays 15 cavans of palay to
respondent.11
In her comment, respondent says that no new issues
and substantial matters are raised in the petition. She
thus prays that we deny the petition for lack of merit. 12
We find the petition impressed with merit and we hold
that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no
tenancy relationship between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy
relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter
of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.13
The CA and DARAB ruling that there is no sharing of
harvest is based on the absence of receipts to show
petitioner’s payment of rentals. We are constrained to
reverse them on this point. The matter of rental receipts
is not an issue given respondent’s admission that she
receives rentals from petitioner. To recall, respondent’s
complaint in Barangay Case No. 99-6 was that the
rental or the amount she receives from petitioner is not
much.14 This fact is evident on the record15 of said case
which is signed by respondent and was even attached
as Annex "D" of her DARAB petition. Consequently, we
are thus unable to agree with DARAB’s ruling that the
affidavits16 of witnesses that petitioner pays 15 cavans of
palay or the equivalent thereof in pesos as rent are not
concrete proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of
rentals. Indeed, respondent’s admission confirms their
statement that rentals are in fact being paid. Such
admission belies the claim of respondent’s
representative, Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid
nothing for the use of the land.
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement,
respondent’s act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate
her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show
her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An
agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the
explicit provisions of a written contract alone. 17 Section
518 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an
agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral
agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy
relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner;
petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their
relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. 19 They
mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by
petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their
relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural
production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental
consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash.
Respondent’s motion20 to supervise harvesting and
threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms
the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioner’s
personal cultivation of the land 21 is conceded by
respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they
share in the harvest.
Petitioner’s status as a de jure tenant having been
established, we now address the issue of whether there
is a valid ground to eject petitioner from the land.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the
burden to prove the existence of a lawful cause for the
ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural
lessee.22 This rule proceeds from the principle that a
tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the
tenant to a security of tenure. 23 The tenant can only be
ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds
provided by law.24
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds,
to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.–
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of
his immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital
or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding
in addition to his rights under Sections [25] and
[34], except when the land owned and leased by
the agricultural lessor is not more than five
hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advance notice of at least one agricultural year
before ejectment proceedings are filed against
him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three
years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the
tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially
comply with any of the terms and conditions of
the contract or any of the provisions of this Code
unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or
force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used
the landholding for a purpose other than what
had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven
farm practices as determined under paragraph 3
of Section [29];
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged
or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the
lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if
the non-payment of the rental shall be due to
crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per
centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the
rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his
landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section [27].
Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of
any consideration, (2) lack of tenancy relationship, (3)
petitioner mortgaged the land to Allingag who allegedly
possesses the land, and (4) she will manage/cultivate
the land.25 None of these grounds were proven by the
respondent.
As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioner’s
payment of rentals. We also found that a tenancy
relationship exists between the parties.
On the supposed mortgage, Allingag himself denied it in
his affidavit.26 No such a deed of mortgage was
submitted in evidence. Rabang’s claim is based on a
hearsay statement of Cesar Andres that he came to
know the mortgage from residents of the place where
the land is located.27
That Allingag possesses the land is also based on
Andres’s hearsay statement. On the contrary, Allingag
stated in his affidavit that he is merely petitioner’s farm
helper.28 We have held that the employment of farm
laborers to perform some aspects of work does not
preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold
relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does
not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of
hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires
the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work
on the land, we have nevertheless declared that the
hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary,
occasional, or emergency basis does not negate the
existence of the element of "personal cultivation"
essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold
relationship.29 There is no showing that petitioner has left
the entire process of cultivating the land to Allingag. In
fact, respondent has admitted that petitioner still farms
the land.30
On respondent’s claim that she will cultivate the land, it
is no longer a valid ground to eject petitioner. The
original provision of Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844 has
been removed from the statute books 31 after its
amendment by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 32 on
September 10, 1971, to wit:
SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head
upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.
Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals,
petitioner may not be ejected from the
landholding.1âwphi1 We emphasize, however, that as
long as the tenancy relationship subsists, petitioner
must continue paying rentals. For the law provides that
nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground
to dispossess him of respondent’s land. Henceforth,
petitioner should see to it that his rental payments are
properly covered by receipts.
Finally, the records show that Allingag, petitioner’s co-
respondent in DARAB Case No. 9378, did not join
petitioner’s appeal to the CA. If Allingag did not file a
separate appeal, the DARAB decision had become final
as to him. We cannot grant him any relief.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE
the Decision dated September 26, 2008 and Resolution
dated December 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97143.
The petition filed by respondent Cresencia Bugarin in
DARAB Case No. 9378 is hereby DISMISSED insofar
as petitioner Juan Galope is concerned.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 191660               December 3, 2012
DELIA T. SUTTON, Petitioner,
vs.
ROMANITO P. LIM, EFREN C. LIM AND ALLAN C.
LIM, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFROM OFFICER OF
AROROY, MASBATE, PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER OF MASBATE, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF
MASBATE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, Delia Sutton (petitioner) seeks to
reverse and set aside the July 23, 2009 Decision 2 and
March 23, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91971, which dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Regional
Adjudicator Case No. 05-004-98 and DARAB Case No.
8902 for cancellation of the Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00122354 and Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA 0-1615 4 issued in
the names of private respondents Romanito P. Lim and
his sons, namely: Efren C. Lim and Allan C. Lim (private
respondents).
The Factual Antecedents
On December 7, 1993, private respondents applied for
the issuance of a CLOA over a parcel of land with an
area of 73,105 square meters located in Barangay
Amotag, Aroroy, Masbate, described as Lot No. 1493 of
Cadastral Survey No. Pls-77of Aroroy Public
Subdivision, before the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Secretary.5 Upon the recommendation of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Aroroy,
Masbate, the application was granted and they were
issued CLOA No. 00122354. Subsequently, on January
31, 1994, the Register of Deeds of Masbate issued the
corresponding OCT No. CLOA 0-1615.
On November 23, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the
cancellation of the said CLOA and title before the Office
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD),
docketed as DARAB Case No. 05-077, assailing the
validity of the said issuances on the ground that the
subject parcel of land is a private land devoted to cattle
raising which she inherited from her deceased father,
Samuel Sutton, who, in turn, previously bought the
subject parcel of land from RomanitoP. Lim and his wife,
Lolita L. Cedillo, on August 7, 1958. 6 Petitioner also
claimed to have been denied due process for not
receiving any notice of private respondents’ application
proceedings for CLOA. On March 5, 1998, the petition
was amended7 to include the MARO of Aroroy, Masbate,
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Masbate
and the Register of Deeds of Masbate as additional
respondents, and was re-docketed as DARAB Case No.
05-004-98.
In their answer,8 private respondents averred that, being
the actual occupants and qualified beneficiaries of the
subject lot which formed part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain, the DAR
Secretary correctly issued the CLOA in their favor. While
admitting having sold a lot in favor of Samuel Sutton
from whom petitioner purportedly inherited the subject
parcel of land, they asserted that the lot sold was
different from Lot No. 1493. Moreover, they interposed
the defense of prescription since the petition for
cancellation was filed after the subject title became
indefeasible.
On the other hand, the MARO and PARO, in their
Answer with Motion to Dismiss,9 invoked the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official functions in issuing the CLOA, which according
to them was issued in accordance with the implementing
rules and regulations of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657.10 They also clarified that the subject parcel of land
has been classified as Government Owned Land (GOL)
or Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) areas
pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
2282,11 hence, subject to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program’simmediate coverage (CARP
coverage). Moreover, petitioner was not able to prove
that she is the registered owner of the subject parcel of
land and that it is exempt from the CARP coverage.
The RARAD Ruling
In its May 4, 1999 Decision, 12 the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD)ordered, among others,
the cancellation of CLOA No. 00122354 and the
corresponding OCT No. CLOA 0-1615 issued in the
names of private respondents. The RARAD found that
public respondents failed to exercise due care in
identifying the lots of the public domain and their actual
occupants, and accordingly, restored the ownership and
possession of the subject parcel of land to petitioner.
The DARAB Ruling
In its December 29, 2004 Decision, 13 the DARAB
reversed the ruling of the RARAD. It found no
irregularities in the issuance of the subject CLOA or
lawful ground to warrant its cancellation, under
Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994. 14 It did not
find the issue of ownership consequential in the
implementation of the land reform program and brushed
aside petitioner’s claim that since the landholding is
devoted to cattle raising, it is exempt from the CARP
coverage. It also emphasized that the issue of whether
or not the landholding is exempt from the CARP
coverage falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Office of the DAR Secretary in the exercise of its
administrative function to implement R.A. No. 6657.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA on
petition for review.
The CA Ruling
In its July 23, 2009 Decision, the CA denied the petition
on jurisdictional grounds and dismissed the case without
prejudice to its re-filing. It held that the DARAB does not
have jurisdiction over the instant controversy due to the
absence of a landlord-tenant relationship or any
agrarian relations between the parties. It also ruled that
since the issuance of the subject CLOA was made in the
exercise of the DAR Secretary’s administrative powers
and function to implement agrarian reform laws, the
jurisdiction over the petition for its cancellation lies with
the Office of the DAR Secretary.
The Issues
Hence, the instant petition ascribing to the CA the
following errors:
I. WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DAR
PROVINCIAL/ REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR
(PARAD/RARAD) AND DARAB DO NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF THE
CLOA AND CORRESPONDING TITLE ISSUED
THEREFOR;
II. WHEN IT FOUND THAT SINCE NO
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THERE IS
NO "AGRARIAN DISPUTE" INVOLVED; and
III. WHEN IT DISREGARDED PETITIONER’S
UNDISPUTED OWNERSHIP AND
POSSESSION OVER LOT 1493 AND DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS OVER SAID LOT.15
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing of the
petition, provides:
Section 1.Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically,
such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases
involving following:
xxx
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority;
xxx
While the DARAB may entertain petitions for
cancellation of CLOAs, as in this case, its jurisdiction is,
however, confined only to agrarian disputes.As
explained in the case of Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of
Cruz16 and reiterated in the recent case of Bagongahasa
v. Spouses Cesar Caguin, 17 for the DARAB to acquire
jurisdiction, the controversy must relate to an agrarian
dispute between the landowners and tenants in whose
favor CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary,
to wit:
The Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that,
under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However,
for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they
must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner
and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the
DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance,
correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in
the administrative implementation of agrarian reform
laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not
agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction
of the DAR and not the DARAB.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is not sufficient that the controversy involves the
cancellation of a CLOA already registered with the Land
Registration Authority. What is of primordial
consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute
between the parties.
As defined in Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657, an agrarian
dispute relates to" any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’
associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Based on the above-cited provision, however, petitioner
posits that an agrarian dispute can be dissected into
purely tenurial (paragraph 1 of Section 3d) and non-
tenurial arrangements (paragraph 2, Section 3d). This
theory deserves no credence.
Verily, an agrarian dispute must be a controversy
relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture.18 Tenurial arrangements pertain to
agreements which set out the rights between a
landowner and a tenant, lessee, farm worker or other
agrarian reform beneficiary involving agricultural land.
Traditionally, tenurial arrangements are in the form of
tenancy19 or leasehold arrangements.20 However, other
forms such as a joint production agreement to effect the
implementation of CARP have been recognized as a
valid tenurial arrangement.21
Accordingly, paragraph 2 of Section 3(d), by its explicit
reference to controversies between landowners and
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries with respect to the compensation of lands
acquired under R.A. No. 6657 or other terms and
conditions relating to the transfer of such lands,
undoubtedly implies the existence of a tenurial
arrangement.1âwphi1 Also, the phrase "whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee" in paragraph 2 lists certain forms of
tenurial arrangements consistent with the phrase
"whether leasehold, tenancy or stewardship, or
otherwise" stated in paragraph 1 of the same section.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context – particularly, that every part of the statute
must be interpreted together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.22
Therefore, in line with the purpose of recognizing the
right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners under the
agrarian reform program, both paragraphs 1 and 2of
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 should be understood
within the context of tenurial arrangements, else the
intent of the law be subverted.
To be sure, the tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations
referred tomay be established with the concurrence of
the following: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the agricultural relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.23
In this case, a punctilious examination reveals that
petitioner’s allegations are solely hinged on the
erroneous grant by the DAR Secretary of CLOA No.
00122354 to private respondents on the grounds that
she is the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot
and that it is exempt from the CARP coverage. In this
regard, petitioner has not alleged any tenurial
arrangement between the parties, negating the
existence of any agrarian dispute and consequently, the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Indisputably, the controversy
between the parties is not agrarian in nature and merely
involves the administrative implementation of the
agrarian reform program which is cognizable by the
DAR Secretary. Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB
Rules of Procedure clearly provides that "matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of
R.A. No. 6657, and other agrarian reform laws and
pertinent rules, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the DAR Secretary."
Furthermore, it bears to emphasize that under the new
law, R.A. No. 9700, 24 which took effect on July 1, 2009,
all cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other
titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary. Section 9 of the said law provides:
Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, is further amended to read as follows:
xxx
All cases involving the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership
award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform
program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the DAR.
Consequently, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to
entertain the herein controversy, rendering its decision
null and void. Jurisdiction lies with the Office of the DAR
Secretary to resolve the issues of classification of
landholdings for coverage (whether the subject property
is a private or government owned land), and
identification of qualified beneficiaries. Hence, no error
can be attributed to the CA in dismissing the case
without prejudice to its re-filing, in accordance to DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed July 23, 2009 Decision and March 23, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
91971 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 219670, June 27, 2018
J.V. LAGON REALTY CORP., REPRESENTED BY
NENITA L. LAGON IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF LEOCADIA VDA.
DE TERRE, NAMELY: PURIFICACION T. BANSILOY,
EMILY T. CAMARAO, AND DOMINADOR A. TERRE,
AS REPRESENTED BY DIONISIA T.
CORTEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed, and claims that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the 23 March 2015 Decision2 and 29 July 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 05331-MIN. The assailed issuances affirmed in
toto the 13 April 2012 Decision 4 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
DARAB Case No. 14553.
THE FACTS
The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal
ejectment, payment of disturbance compensation, and
damages filed by Leocadia Vda. De Terre (Leocadia)
against petitioner J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation (J V.
Lagon) before the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD),
docketed as DARAB Case No. R-1205-0001-97.
It was alleged in the complaint that sometime in 1952,
Antonio Pedral (Pedral) instituted Leocadia and her
spouse, Delfin Terre (the spouses Terre)),5 to work as
share tenants over his 5-hectare agricultural landholding
known as Lot 587 located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.
Three (3) years later, Pedral sold the land to Jose Abis
(Abis) who, in turn, sold the same to Augusto Gonzales
(Gonzales) in 1958.
During the said transfers of ownership, the spouses
Terre were allegedly retained as tenants of the entire 5-
hectare landholding. In the 1960s, Gonzales reduced
their tillage to 2.5 hectares, and the other half of the land
was given to Landislao Bedua and Antonillo Silla to till.
On their 2.5 hectares, the Spouses Terre constructed a
house and that of their daughter's.
In 1988, the spouses Terre were surprised when they
were informed that J.V. Lagon had already bought the
entire 5-hectare land from the heirs of Gonzales. Later
on, J.V. Lagon constructed a scale house within the 2.5
hectare land tilled by the spouses Terre. In 1989, J.V.
Lagon warned the spouses to stop cultivating the land
because the whole lot was to be developed for
commercial or industrial use. In that same year, Delfin
died, purportedly due to mental anguish over the turn of
events. In 1990, J.V. Lagon filled the eastern portion of
the land with earth and boulders.
On 7 May 1991, Leocadia filed a complaint before the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC). The
following day, on 8 May 1991, a complaint was also
lodged before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO). No appropriate action, however, was taken on
the said complaints until the dispute was eventually
brought before the PARAD on 19 June 1997.6
Leocadia claimed that the works done by J.V. Lagon
were tantamount to conversion of the land for non-
agricultural purposes. Also, Leocadia averred that she
was not duly notified in writing about the sale between
Gonzales and J.V. Lagon. Thus, her 180-day right of
redemption pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, 7 did not
commence. Accordingly, it was prayed that she be
allowed to exercise her right of redemption over the
land, the expenses thereof to be shouldered by the Land
Bank of the Philippines.
In her bid to prove the existence of tenancy, Leocadia
relied, inter alia, on the following documents: (a) 23 April
1997 Certification issued by Geronimo P. Arzagon,
Municipal Mayor of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, certifying
that the spouses Terre were actual tenants of the
land;8 (b) Pedral's affidavit dated 4 July 1987, confirming
his consent for the spouses Terre to be his agricultural
tenants at a 70-30 sharing of harvest in their favor; 9 (c)
affidavit dated 28 July 1997, executed by MARO
Perfecto Bergonia, Jr. stating that Terre, a tenant, filed a
complaint on 7 July 1991, concerning her illegal
ejectment.10
On the other hand, J.V. Lagon countered that Leocadia
had no cause of action simply because there was no
tenancy to speak of. J.V. Lagon asseverated that Lot
587 had ceased to be agricultural and was already
classified as commercial, the same having been utilized
as the site of the Rural Bank of Tacurong. Also, at the
time the landholding was purchased from Gonzales in
1988, no tenant was found cultivating the land.
Further, J.V. Lagon argued that there was a dearth of
evidence to prove the allegation of tenancy, in that it
was not even established as to whom Leocadia had
paid rentals to. In the same vein, it raised the affirmative
defense of prescription, contending that the complaint
was filed more than three (3) years after the cause of
action accrued in 1988.
The PARAD Ruling
In its 3 April 2002 decision, 11 the PARAD ruled in favor
of J.V. Lagon. It opined that Leocadia's complaint was
already barred by prescription and laches, as the cause
of action accrued in 1988 when J.V. Lagon constructed
a scale house in the allegedly tenanted area. Also, the
PARAD ruled that the filing of the complaint with the
MARO in 1991 did not toll the running of the prescriptive
period because it was the DARAB that had jurisdiction
over agrarian disputes.
With respect to the issue on redemption, the PARAD
observed that as vendee, J.V. Lagon failed to give
Leocadia a written notice of the sale. Nevertheless, it
resolved to deny the claim for redemption on the finding
that Leocadia had actual knowledge of the sale as early
as 1988 when she confronted J.V. Lagon about the
scale house.
Anent the question of whether there was tenancy, the
PARAD held that Leocadia failed to establish her status
as a de jure tenant. It found scant evidentiary value on
the documents she presented. In so ruling, the PARAD
pointed out that Pedral, as former owner, could attest to
the condition of the land only from 1947 to 1955 when
he was still the owner thereof, and not after he had
already sold the property. Moreover, the PARAD was of
the view that certifications issued by administrative
agencies or officers as regards tenancy relations are
merely provisional in nature.
Finally, the PARAD was convinced that the disputed real
property was not an agricultural land. It noted that the
Rural Bank of Tacurong was situated at the heart of the
subject landholding; and that per photocopy of the
Urban Land Use Plan as certified by the Office of the
City Planning and Development Coordinator, the said
land was already classified as commercial.12 The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgement
is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the herein complaint filed on
June 17, 1991 barred by prescription;
2. Complainant's claim for disturbance
compensation is denied for lack of merit;
 3. Complainant's right to redeem the
property is also denied for lack of merit;
and,
4. Other claims are likewise denied for lack
of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Leocadia filed an appeal before the DARAB.
The DARAB Ruling
In its 13 April 2012 decision, the DARAB reversed and
set aside the PARAD's ruling. It held that Leocadia's
action was not barred by prescription because the filing
of the complaint with the BARC on 7 May 1991 tolled
the running of the prescriptive period.
In contrast to the PARAD's analysis, the DARAB found
probative value on the documents Leocadia presented.
It concluded that tenancy existed, as evinced by the fact
that Leocadia's house was erected inside the subject
landholding; and such fact was attested to by the
affidavits of the former MARO Perfecto Bergonia and of
Mayor Geronimo P. Arzagon of Tacurong City.13
Similarly, the DARAB opined that Pedral's affidavit
declaring that he installed the Spouses Terre as share
tenants sufficiently proved the existence of tenancy
relationship. Citing Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844, 14 it held
that tenancy is attached to the land regardless of
whoever may have become the owner thereof. Thus,
Leocadia's status as a tenant was not extinguished by
the successive transfers of ownership from Pedral to
Abis, and then to Gonzales, and finally to J.V. Lagon, as
the latter assumed the rights and obligations of the
preceding transferors.
The DARAB further ruled that Leocadia was entitled to
redeem the land from J.V. Lagon. It cited Section 12 of
R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389 15 which
provides that the right of redemption may be exercised
within 180 days from notice in writing which shall be
served by the vendee on all lessees affected and on the
DAR upon registration of the sale. In view of the
PARAD's finding that J.V. Lagon failed to give notice in
writing of the sale, the DARAB declared that Leocadia's
right of redemption did not prescribe, a written notice of
the sale being an indispensable requirement of the law.
Lastly, Leocadia's prayer for disturbance compensation
was granted. The DARAB ratiocinated that J.V. Lagon
merely alleged that the land was no longer agricultural;
and that J.V. Lagon failed to support its allegation as no
tax declarations, DAR certification or city zoning
certification were shown to prove the land's
classification as commercial. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision dated April 3, 2002 and Resolution dated
December 13, 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered:
1. Declaring herein complainant a bona
fide tenant over the lot in suit entitled to
security of tenure;
2. Upholding complainant's right of
redemption and for this purpose, the
Land Bank of the Philippines, thru its
Regional branch or office concerned is
directed to finance her right of
redemption;
3. In case the land in suit had already been
lawfully converted to commercial use,
complainant is entitled to payment of
disturbance compensation pursuant to
Section 36, par. 1 of RA 6389.
No pronouncement as to claims and counterclaims for
insufficient evidence.
Dissatisfied, J.V. Lagon filed a Rule 43 petition for
review before the CA. Meanwhile, on 18 October 2013,
Leocadia died, prompting her heirs to file a
manifestation with motion for substitution16 before the
CA.
The CA Ruling
In the assailed 23 March 2015 decision, the CA
affirmed in toto the DARAB's ruling. It held that Leocadia
was able to establish that she was the tenant of the
subject landholding. Such tenancy commenced in 1952
when Pedral, the original owner, installed her and Delfin
as share tenants. The appellate court espoused a
similar view that the documents Leocadia presented
substantiated her claim of tenancy.
Considering that there was tenancy between Pedral and
Leocadia, the CA decreed that there was subrogation of
rights to Abis, then to Gonzales, and finally to J.V.
Lagon, as landowners. The tenancy relationship was not
terminated by changes of ownership pursuant to Section
10 of R.A. No. 3844. 17 Likewise, the CA sustained the
DARAB's finding that, as a tenant, Leocadia was entitled
to redeem the land consequent to the lack of written
notice of the sale. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated April 13, 2012 and the Resolution dated
September 13, 2012 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 14553
declaring Leocadia V da. De Terre as bona fide tenant
under Republic Act No. 3844 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.18
In the assailed 29 July 2015 Resolution, the CA
resolved to deny J.V. Lagon's motion for
reconsideration, and to grant the motion for substitution
filed by the heirs of Leocadia.19
The Present Petition
J.V. Lagon submits in this petition for review on
certiorari, that the subject landholding is no longer
agricultural; that Leocadia's cause of action has already
prescribed; and that she has no right to redeem the
property nor to receive disturbance compensation.
Stripped to its core, the petition before the Court posits
the kernel argument that there is no tenancy relation
between J.V. Lagon and Leocadia.
In their comment, the heirs of Leocadia contend that
there is no need to adduce evidence to prove
Leocadia's status as a bona fide tenant because
tenancy is attached to the land irrespective of whoever
becomes its subsequent owner. Taking cue from the
DARAB's findings, they maintain that the filing of the
complaint with the BARC on 7 May 1991 tolled the
running of the prescriptive period. As a final point, the
heirs of Leocadia assert that she is entitled to redeem
the landholding because the law speaks of written notice
of the sale and not actual or personal knowledge
thereof.
The pleadings and the arguments proffered beckon the
Court to examine a singular point of law on which all the
matters raised are inevitably hinged.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN J.V. LAGON REALTY AND
LEOCADIA.
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is impressed with merit.
There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential
elements concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is
shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.20
All of the above requisites are indispensable in order to
create or establish tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of at least one requisite does not
make the alleged tenant a de facto one, for the simple
reason that unless an individual has established one's
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure guaranteed by agricultural tenancy laws.21
The onus rests on Leocadia to prove her affirmative
allegation of tenancy.22 It is elementary that one who
makes an affirmative allegation of an issue has the
burden of proving the same; and in the case of the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.
The same rule applies in proceedings before the
administrative tribunals. In fact, if the complainant, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.23
To recapitulate, Leocadia presented the following
documents to prove the existence of tenancy: (a) 23
April 1997 certification issued by Geronimo P. Arzagon,
Municipal Mayor of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, that the
Spouses Terre were actual tenants of the land; (b)
Pedral's affidavit dated 4 July 1987 confirming his
consent for the Spouses Terre to be his agricultural
tenants at a 70-30 sharing of harvest in their favor; (c)
affidavit dated 28 July 1997, executed by MARO
Perfecto Bergonia, Jr. stating that Terre, a tenant, filed a
complaint on 7 July 1991, concerning her illegal
ejectment.
The issue of tenancy, whether a person is an
agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of fact.
To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy
relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts
presented corresponding to the statutory elements of
tenancy.24 Both the DARAB and the CA appreciated the
aforementioned pieces of evidence as sufficient to prove
Leocadia's de jure status as a tenant in the subject
landholding.
This is untenable.
Accordingly, it is crucial to go through the evidence and
documents on record in order to arrive at a proper
resolution of the case.
Pedral's affidavit does not prove that there is tenancy
between Leocadia and J.V. Lagon.
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify
only on the facts that are of his own personal
knowledge; that is, those which are derived from his
own perception.25 Therefore, even if the Court were to
take hook, line, and sinker Pedral's declaration that he
installed Leocadia and Delfin as tenants, such
declaration may be accorded probative value only
during the interim period within which he was the owner
of the land. The logic behind is simple, i.e., Pedral
ceased to have any personal knowledge as to the status
and condition of the land after he had sold the same to
Abis. Put differently, absence of personal knowledge
rendered Pedral an incompetent witness to testify on the
existence of tenancy from the moment the land was
passed on to Abis and his subsequent transferees.
To recall, the land was involved in three transfers over
the course of 33 years, to wit: Pedral to Abis, Abis to
Gonzales, and finally from Gonzales to J.V. Lagon. This
series of transfers shows that Pedral was not J.V.
Lagon's immediate predecessor-in-interest. When J.V.
Lagon became the absolute owner of the land, it was
subrogated to the rights and obligations of Gonzales,
not Pedral 's. Gonzales was the person privy to the sale
that brought forth J.V. Lagon's ownership. In short, title
to the land was derived from Gonzales. This being the
case, the DARAB and the CA erred when they relied
upon Pedral's affidavit to support the conclusion that
J.V. Lagon acquired a tenanted land. Whether or not the
land was tenanted at the time of J.V. Lagon's entry is a
matter already beyond the competence of Pedral to
testify on.
Leocadia anchors her claim against J.V. Lagon on
Section 10 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code which,
in essence, states that the existence of an agricultural
leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes in
ownership in case of sale or transfer of legal
possession.26 The fundamental theory of her case
parlays the notion that she was an agricultural lessee
during the period of Abis' and Gonzales' respective
ownership of the land spanning from 1955-1988; such
that at the time J.V. Lagon came into possession, there
was a subsisting tenancy which the latter assumed by
operation of law.
The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any
affirmative and positive showing that tenancy was
maintained on the land throughout the three decades
leading to J.V. Lagon's acquisition in 1988. Before
Leocadia's claims against J.V. Lagon can prosper, it
must first be established that the latter acquired land
which was tenanted. On this premise, the scope of
judicial inquiry inexorably backtracks to Gonzales'
epoch. Were there agricultural tenants on the land
during Gonzales' ownership? The answer could have
easily been supplied by none other than Gonzales
himself who was in the best position to attest on the
status of the land acquired by J.V. Lagon. A testimony
or an affidavit from Gonzales would have served to
substantiate Leocadia's allegation that she had been a
tenant on the land prior to J.V. Lagon's entry.
Unfortunately, the record only contains an affidavit from
Pedral, a person whose ownership of the land is,
borrowing Justice Leonen's term, "thrice-removed" from
J.V. Lagon.
Being the party alleging the existence of tenancy
relationship, Leocadia carried the burden of proving her
allegation. With only Pedral's affidavit as proof, the
Court is unable to agree with the DARAB and the CA
that tenancy was established by substantial evidence.
As explained above, Pedral's affidavit leaves much to be
desired, and it is inadequate basis to support a
conclusion that Leocadia remained as a tenant on the
land throughout the three decades preceding J.V.
Lagon's ownership. Agricultural tenancy is not
presumed.27 It is a matter of jurisprudence that tenancy
is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenant does upon the land. 28 More
importantly, it is a legal relationship the existence of
which must be proven by the quantum of evidence
required by law.
Absence of harvest sharing belies claim of tenancy
relationship.
In Landicho v. Sia,29 the Court declared that
independent evidence, such as receipts, must be
presented to show that there was a sharing of the
harvest between the landowner and the tenant. Bejasa
v. CA30 similarly held that to prove sharing of harvests, a
receipt or any other evidence must be presented, as
self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. Proof
must always be adduced.31 In another case, the Court
ruled against the existence of tenancy for failure of the
alleged tenant to substantiate the element of sharing of
harvest, viz:
Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing
of harvest in the context of a tenancy relationship
between Vicente and the respondents. The only
evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of
harvests were the allegations of Vicente which, as
discussed above, were self-serving and have no
evidentiary value. Moreover, petitioner's allegations of
continued possession and cultivation do not support his
cause. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of
an agricultural land does not automatically convert a
tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws. It is essential that,
together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he
transmitted the landowner's share of the harvest.32
The DARAB and the CA committed reversible error
when they failed to notice that not a single receipt or any
other credible evidence was adduced to show sharing of
harvest in the context of tenancy. The record only
contains the allegation that there is a 1/3-2/3 system of
harvest sharing with Pedral, and 70-30 for Abis and
Gonzales.33 Substantial evidence necessary to establish
the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla
of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. 34 As
reiterated in VHJ Construction v. CA,35
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
respondents' self-serving statements regarding tenancy
relations could not establish the claimed relationship.
The fact alone of working on another's landholding does
not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural
tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record
adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.
xxx
To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any
other evidence must be presented. Self-serving
statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof
must be adduced.
Further to the lack of receipts, the record is likewise
devoid of testimony from either Pedral, Abis or Gonzales
acknowledging the fact that they received a share in the
harvest of a tenant. In the absence of receipts or any
concrete evidence from which it can be inferred that
Leocadia transmitted the landowner's share of her
produce, the Court is constrained to declare that not all
elements of tenancy relationship are present.
The MARO's affidavit and the municipal mayor's
certification do not prove tenancy.
It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that
certifications of administrative agencies and officers
declaring the existence of a tenancy relation are merely
provisional. They are persuasive but not binding on the
courts, which must make their own findings. 36 As held
in Soliman v. PASUDECO (Soliman):37
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status
as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the
certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
or an authorized representative, like the MARO or the
BARC, concerning the presence or the absence of a
tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is
considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence,
such certification does not bind the judiciary.
The ruling in Soliman was echoed in the later case
of Automat Realty v. Spouses Dela Cruz,38viz:
This court has held that a MARO certification concerning
the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, is considered merely
preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does
not bind the judiciary.
Several elements must be present before the courts can
conclude that a tenancy relationship exists. MARO
certifications are limited to factual determinations such
as the presence of actual tillers. It cannot make legal
conclusions on the existence of a tenancy agreement.
The Court's pronouncement in the foregoing cases
applies with equal force to the certification issued by the
municipal mayor of Tacurong. Like the MARO's affidavit,
the municipal mayor's certification deserves scant
consideration simply because the mayor is not the
proper authority39 vested with the power to determine
the existence of tenancy. Besides, the MARO and the
mayor merely affirmed the fact that Leocadia lived in a
hut erected on the subject landholding. 40 If we subscribe
to the DARAB's fallacy, then anyone who squats on an
agricultural land or constructs a hut with the consent of
the owner becomes a tenant. It bears to stress that
mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land
does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into
an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws.41
While tenancy presupposes physical presence of a tiller
on the land, the MARO's affidavit and the mayor's
certification fall short in proving that Leocadia's
presence served the purpose of agricultural production
and harvest sharing. Again, it cannot be
overemphasized that in order for a tenancy to arise, it is
essential that all its indispensable elements must be
present.42
All told, the evidence on record is inadequate to arrive at
a conclusion that Leocadia was a de jure tenant entitled
to security of tenure. The requisites for the existence of
a tenancy relationship are explicit in the law, and these
elements cannot be done away with by conjectures. 43
As a final word, the Court sees no more reason to
belabor the other points raised by the parties,
particularly on the right of redemption and entitlement to
disturbance compensation. It is the juridical tie of
tenancy relationship that breathes life to these kindred
rights provided for by our agricultural laws. There being
no tenancy relationship, the issues raised on these
points have thus become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
23 March 2015 Decision and 29 July 2015 Resolution of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 05331-MIN are
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner
J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 191694               December 3, 2014
NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND
CLARITA CAPULONG, Petitioners,
vs.
CO KING KI as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact
WILLIAM CO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition 1 for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the November 20, 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 106882 which dismissed the petition3 for certiorari
filed by herein petitioners Narciso Zapanta, Edilberto
Capulong and Clarita Capulong (petitioners) together
with Ernesto de Guzman (Ernesto) and Marciano Martin
(Marciano). Also assailed is the CA Resolution 4 dated
March 22, 2010 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The essential facts follow:
On September 7, 2000, respondent Co King Ki
(respondent), through his Attorney-in-Fact William Co,
filed a Complaint5 for Ejectment against petitioners,
Ernesto, Marciano and one Lawrence Smith
(defendants) before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga.
Respondent alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-501
(90470)6 and located at Barangay San Francisco,
Lubao, Pampanga, with an area of 68,483 square
meters more or less (subject property).
The defendants filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim,7 averring, among others, that they are
qualified farmer beneficiaries of the subject property and
that respondent was no longer the owner thereof as
early as August 15, 1983 as the samewas already
foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans Bank.
On December 27, 2007, the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered a Decision 8 in favor of
respondent, declaring defendants as illegal occupants
and not tenants of the subject property, and directing
them to vacate the same. The said decision was
received by the defendants’ former counsel, Atty.
Rolando Miranda (Atty. Miranda) on February 15, 2008.
On February 29, 2008, defendants filed their Motion for
Reconsideration9 which the RARAD, however, denied in
his Order/Resolution10 dated June 5, 2008. Said
Order/Resolution was received by Atty. Miranda on June
18, 2008.
On June 30, 2008, defendants’ new counsel Atty. Marc
Terry C. Perez (Atty. Perez) filed a Notice of Appeal and
Formal Entry of Appearance, 11 attaching therewith the
Withdrawal of Appearance12 of Atty. Miranda as
defendants’ counsel. Respondent moved to dismiss said
appeal for being filed out of time. Defendants opposed
the motion to dismiss appeal.13
On September 18, 2008, the PARAD issued an
Order,14 denying the notice of appeal filed by defendants
for having been filed out of time. Invoking the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) Rules of Procedure, the PARAD opined that
the period within which defendants should have
interposed their appeal expired on June 23, 2008. Thus,
the notice of appeal filed by the defendants on June30,
2008 was filed out of time.
Defendants sought reconsideration of the September
18, 2008 Order while respondent moved for the
execution of the December 27, 2007 Decision. In his
Joint Order15 dated November 17, 2008, the PARAD
denied the defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and
granted respondent’s Motion for Execution. On
December 4, 2008, the PARAD issued the Writ of
Execution.16
Petitioners, together with Ernesto and Marciano, filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA on January 9,
2009.17
On November 20, 2009, the CA issued a
Resolution,18 dismissing the petition for certiorari
because petitioners failed to append a clearly legible
duplicate original/certified true copy of the assailed
PARAD Order dated September 18, 2008 and PARAD
Joint Order dated November 17, 2008 in violation of
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. Likewise, the CA held that petitioners
should have elevated their case before the DARAB on
appeal as provided by Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure.
The CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in
its Resolution19 dated March 22, 2010.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
1. Whether the CA committed a serious
reversible error in dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the basis of a strict application of
Section 3, Rule46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, on the attachment of
clearly legible duplicate original/certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling
subject thereof; and
 2. Whether the CA committed a serious
reversible error in ruling that petitioners’ remedy
was to elevate their case to the DARAB and not
through the petition for certiorari filed before the
CA.20
Petitioners assert that what was attached to the petition
for certiorari which they filed before the CA was the copy
of the September 18, 2008 Order that was furnished to
them by the PARAD through registered mail. They also
assert that the attached November 17, 2008 Joint Order
had been signed by the officer having custody thereof.
Thus, they submit that said petition for certiorari
substantially complied with the requirements of the
rules. Moreover, petitioners opine that appeal would be
slow and inadequate in their case as they are under
threat of the immediate execution of the assailed orders
and of the demolition of their properties. Hence, they
resorted to certiorari. Lastly, petitioners appeal for the
liberal construction of the rules because they will suffer
insurmountably if the case would be dismissed based on
a technicality.21
On the other hand, respondent avers that petitioners
had ample time to appeal the December 27, 2007
Decision to the DARAB in accordance with the latter’s
rules. Since petitioners failed to file their appeal on time,
respondent submits that said decision has become final
and executory. Respondent also relies on the CA’s
ruling that the special civil action of certiorari cannot be
a substitute for an appeal.22
We deny the petition.
The complaint in this case was filed on September 7,
2000, during the effectivity of the 1994 DARAB New
Rules of Procedure which is applicable in this case. It
bears noting that the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure,
which was effective at the time when petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal,
expressly provides in Section 1, Rule XXIV
(Miscellaneous Provisions) thereof that "[a]ll cases
pending with the Board and the Adjudicators, prior to the
date of effectivity of these Rules, shall be governed by
the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing."
Pertinently, the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure
provides:
Rule XIII
APPEALS
SECTION 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be
taken from an order, resolution or decision of the
Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both,
orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision
appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the
adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the
Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a copy
thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within
ten (10) days from the taking of the oral appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
However, petitioners failed to consider the effect on their
appeal of the motion for reconsideration which they filed
to assail the December 27, 2007 Decision. Section 12,
Rule VIII of the same DARAB Rules clearly provides
that if a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant
shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the
remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial, to wit:
SECTION 12. Motion for Reconsideration. Within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution
or decision of the Board or Adjudicator, a party may file
a motion for reconsideration of such order or decision,
together with the proof of service of one (1) copy thereof
upon the adverse party. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed a party which shall be
and based on the ground that: (a) the findings of facts in
the said decision, order or resolution are not supported
by substantial evidence, or (b) the conclusions stated
therein are against the law and jurisprudence.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend
the running of the period within which the appeal must
be perfected. If a motion for reconsideration is denied,
the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal
during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned
from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is
reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall
have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of
reversal within which to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, petitioners received a copy of the
December 27, 2007 Decision on February 15, 2008.
They filed their Motion for Reconsideration thereof on
February 29, 2008 or 14 days from their receipt of a
copy of the Decision. On June 18, 2008, they received
the Order/Resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration. Hence, petitioners only had one more
day or until June 19, 2008 within which to file their
Notice of Appeal before the PARAD. However, it is
evident that their new counsel Atty. Perez belatedly filed
said Notice of Appeal on June 30, 2008. Clearly,
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal in this case was filed out of
time.23
While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval
of a notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or
tribunal which rendered the decision, it is required,
however, that said appeal must have been filed on WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The
time.24 It bears reiterating that appeal isnot a assailed Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and
constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply No. 106882 are AFFIRMED.
with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by No pronouncement as to costs.
law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements
for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly SO ORDERED.
followed. Such requirements are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial
business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a
losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. 25

Petitioners’ resort to certiorari before the CA is also

proscribed because they lost their remedy of appeal due
to their own negligence. Aproposis our ruling in
Espinoza v. Provincial Adjudicator of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office of Pampanga: 26

A special civil action of certiorari is an independent

action, raising the question of jurisdiction where the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of
such action is to keep an inferior tribunal within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary
acts of courts.

A petition for certiorari was never meant as a mode of

reviewing errors of judgment committed by an inferior
tribunal.1âwphi1 Thus, it has been settled that the
remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal lost
by the party entitled thereto especially if the right of
appeal was lost through negligence. When the remedy
of appeal is available but is lost due to petitioner's own
negligence or error in the choice of remedies, resort to
certiorari is precluded.27 (Emphasis supplied)

Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for

a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the
guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such
purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as
mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation;
they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors
may be heard following judicial procedure and in the
correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are
well served by a conscientious observance by the
parties of the procedural rules.28