LABOR CASE DIGEST

BY: CAPADOSA, RENZY

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JA
NE P. DULAY VS
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.

G.R. No. 172642, 13 June 2012
FACTS:

Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-
petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. 25 days after the completion of his employment c
ontract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of hi
s death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seama
n’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s wid
ow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure 
of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, the grievance procedure was “declar
ed deadlocked” as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. The wif
e then filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration against GCI for death a
nd medical benefits and damages. Nelson’s brother, only received P20,000.00 from res
pondents pursuant to the CBA. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggre
gate sum of $90,000.00 instead.

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basica
lly involves the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As su
ch, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not claim for death benefits of an overseas employee should be with the Lab
or Arbiter considering that such granting involves interpretation and application of the pr
ovisions in the CBA.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court held that it is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing ove
rseas Filipino workers. However, a careful reading of this special law would readily sho
w that there is no specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over dispu
tes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. S
ection 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of “claims 
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract invol
ving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exempl
ary and other forms of damages.” On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Lab
or Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases 
arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. St
ated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 804
2) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particu
lar.
Furthermore, Article 13.1 of the CBA provides that in case of dispute or conflict in the int
erpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or enforcement of 
Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntar
y arbitration. Therefore, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really intended to bri
ng to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or a
pplication of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly a
greed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbit
ration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZENAROSA VS. FELICIANO Z.
PAJARON AND LARRY A. CARBONILLA

G.R. NO. 207156.

JANUARY 16, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and Larey
A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. Both Pajaron and Carbonilla
claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal and petitioners
also failed to comply with the requirements of due process. On April 15, 2010, they filed
their respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of
overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated.
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they averred that they
actually abandoned their work. They likewise failed to substantiate their claims that they
were not paid labor standards benefits.

The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them
constructively and illegally dismissed. Then, petitioners appealed before the NLRC.
However, Zefiarosa failed to post in full the required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners'
appeal was dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, the CA rendered a
Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the NLRC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-perfection. Hence,
this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’
appeal for non-perfection

HELD:

No. The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal
for non-perfection.
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do
so, the right to appeal is lost."

It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 223) and the NLRC Rules of Procedure
(Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI) that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly
apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this
intention."21

The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to
comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and
executory.22 This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure
the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to
them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further meant to discourage
employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their obligations to the
employees.

Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even if we are to allow their
appeal to be given due course. After scrupulously examining the contracting positions
and arguments of the parties, we find that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron
and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. All told, we
find no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for no perfection due to noncompliance with
the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 130866

SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner

St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for
allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed
away, so the latter took over the management of the business.

Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his
wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated
his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring
that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and therefore his
office had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC
were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use
of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have
been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari
are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned
here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption
that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert,
the intention of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill
No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and
refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO T.

MAGLAYA, SR.
G.R. NO. 212774
JANUARY 23, 2017

“For this Court's resolution is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) assailing the Resolution1 dated January 20,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied its petition for certiorari.”

FACTS:
WUP is a non-stock, non-profit, non-sectarian educational corporation duly organized
and existing under the Philippine laws. Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. was
appointed as a corporate member and was elected as a member of the Board of
Trustees, both for a period of five (5) years. He was elected as President of the
University for a five-year term. He was re-elected as a trustee.

In a Memorandum, the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist Church apprised all
the corporate members of the expiration of their tenns on December 31, 2008, unless
renewed by the former. The said members, including Maglaya, sought the renewal of
their membership in the WUP's Board, and signified their willingness to serve the
corporation.
Dr. Dominador Cabasal, Chairman of the Board, informed the Bishops of the cessation
of corporate terms of some of the members and/or trustees since the by-laws provided
that the vacancy shall only be filled by the Bishops upon the recommendation of the
Board. Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the
efficient and orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of the alleged
"gentleman's agreement", and that the Bishops have appointed the incoming corporate
members and trustees. He clarified that there was no agreement and any discussion of
the turnover because the corporate members still have valid and existing corporate
terms.
In this case, the Bishops, through a formal notice to all the officers, deans, staff, and
employees of WUP, introduced the new corporate members, trustees, and officers. In
the said notice, it was indicated that the new Board met, organized, and elected the new
set of officers. Manuel Palomo, the new Chairman of the Board, informed Maglaya of
the termination of his services and authority as the President of the University.
Thereafter, Maglaya and other fonner members of the Board filed a Complaint for
Injunction and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.The RTC
dismissed the case declaring the same as a nuisance or harassment suit prohibited
under Section l(b), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules for Intra-Corporate Controversies. The
RTC observed that it is clear from the by-laws of WUP that insofar as membership in
the corporation is concerned, which can only be given by the College of Bishops of the
United Methodist Church, it is a precondition to a seat in the WUP Board. Consequently,
the expiration of the terms of the plaintiffs, including Maglaya, as corporate members
carried with it their termination as members of the Board. Moreover, their continued stay
in their office beyond their terms was only in hold-over capacities, which ceased when
the Bishops appointed new members of the corporation and the Board.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by the plaintiffs for being the improper remedy.
Thereafter, Maglaya filed the present illegal dismissal case against WUP, Palomo,
Bishop Lito C. Tangonan and Bishop Leo A. Soriano. He claimed that he was
unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton, reckless, oppressive and malevolent manner.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of WUP. The LA held that the action between
employers and employees where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The National Labor Relations Commission reversed and set aside the Decision of the
LA ruling that the illegal dismissal case falls within the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
Since the reasons for his termination cited by WUP were not among the just causes
provided under Article 282 (now Article 297) of the Labor Code, Maglaya was illegally
dismissed.
Thereafter, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by WUP and the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by WUP. The CA noted that the decision and
resolution of the NLRC became final and executor.

ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals committed an error of law when it summarily dismissed the
special civil action for certiorari raising lack of jurisdiction of the NLRC filed by [WUP]
where it was very clear that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case involving a
corporate officer and where the nature of the controversy is an intra-corporate dispute.

RULING:
The Court find the instant petition impressed with merit.
WUP alleges that while the NLRC decision became final and executory, it did not mean
that the said decision had become immutable and unalterable as the CA ruled. WUP
maintains that the remedy of the aggrieved party against a final and executory decision
of the NLRC is the filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As such, it was able to meet the conditions set forth in filing the said remedy before the
CA.
"Corporate officers" in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902- A are those officers
of the corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the
corporation's by-laws. There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have
under Section 25 of the Corporation Code. These are the president, secretary and the
treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to these three. A corporation may have
such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vice-
president, cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of corporate officers is thus
limited by law and by the corporation's by-laws.

Since this Court is now reversing the challenged decision of the CA and affirming the
decision of the LA in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, Maglaya is not entitled
to collect the amount of ₱2,505,208.75 awarded from the time the NLRC decision
became final and executory up to the time the CA dismissed WUP's petition for
certiorari.

In sum, this Court finds that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over, and
thereafter in failing to dismiss, Maglaya's complaint for illegal dismissal against WUP,
since the subject matter of the instant case is an intra-corporate controversy which the
NLRC has no jurisdiction.