Analytic Philosophy Vol. 59 No. 2 June 2018 pp.

193–207

ESSENCE WITH GROUND

JUSTIN ZYLSTRA X
University of Vermont

Many metaphysicians would like to have both essence and ground in

their toolkit.1 Applications of one concept often invoke the other.
For example, in articulating physicalism as a grounding thesis, Das-
gupta calls on essential truths to play a crucial role (2014, 580–586).
Furthermore, in articulating the essentialist questions that are cen-
tral to philosophy Rosen calls on the concept of ground to play a
crucial role (2015, 200). But just as the screwdriver and screw are
only useful together in the worker’s toolkit if the head of the screw
and the blade of the screwdriver are compatible, so too essence and
ground are only useful together in the metaphysician’s toolkit if they
are compatible: if the principles governing them and how they inter-
act are consistent.
In this paper, I argue that the compatibility of essence and
ground is not simply given. I do this by first giving a pentad of
claims that plausibly govern the concepts of essence and ground,
and how they interact. I argue that each claim in the pentad has
independent albeit defeasible support but that they are jointly
inconsistent. I then offer a way out of inconsistency by expanding
our ideology: I introduce a non-factive operator that expresses the
sort of thing an item is, in a distinctive sense of the term. The
upshot is that we can make sense of the idea that something per-
tains to the essence of an item but involves contingency.

1. Essence and Ground

First I will say more about how the concepts of essence and ground
are understood. Statements of essence are formed using a binary
operator that takes a name, and a sentence, and gives a sentence. I
write statements of essence symbolically using a box subscripted with
something nominal and concatenated with something sentential. For

1
They include but are certainly not restricted to (Correia 2013), (Dasgupta 2016),
(Fine 2012, 2015), (Rosen 2010, 2015), and (Raven 2015a, 2015b).

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example, ‘hx A’ is a statement of essence, expressing that it is essential
to x that A.2
I take the subscripted box to express the concept of constitutive
essence (1994a, 1995a). The concept of constitutive essence is
here regarded as primitive and is not taken to be closed under
logical implication. For example, if it is essential to Socrates that
Socrates is human, and Socrates’ being human logically implies
that Plato is a sophist or Plato is not a sophist, then it is not
implied that it is essential to Socrates that Plato is a sophist or
Plato is not a sophist. In general, it is essential to x that A if and
only if ‘A’ pertains to what it is to be x in its most core respects
(Dasgupta 2016, 388).3
Statements of ground are formed using a binary operator that
takes a pair of sentences and gives a sentence. I write statements of
ground symbolically using the less than sign in infix notation
between two sentential items that point in the direction of the
grounds. For example, ‘A < A ˄ B’ is a statement of ground,
expressing that A grounds A ˄ B. I take the less than sign to
express only a binary concept of partial ground that is irreflexive,
asymmetric, and transitive.4 However, this is merely for the sake of
simplicity: it is simpler to work with a binary concept and this does
not affect the results.

2. The Inconsistent Pentad

In this section, I give a pentad of claims that plausibly govern the con-
cepts of essence and ground, and how they interact. I will then argue
that the claims making up the pentad are jointly inconsistent. In the
next section I offer independent albeit defeasible support for each
claim in the pentad.

2
The variable x is taken to range over possible items and A is a sentential variable: it
keeps a place for a sentence (Prior 1971). I allow for quantification into sentential
position. Fine (2015) regiments statements of essence using a variable-binding essen-
tialist arrow and Correia (2006, 2013) allows the essentialist operator to be indexed
with predicates and sentences. Neither of these suit my purposes, since my primary
concern is with the concept of objectual essence, on which see (Fine 1994b). In addi-
tion, a full conception of essence would deploy both singular and plural terms. For
simplicity, I stick to the singular case.
3
I here take the expressions ‘what x is’ and ‘what it is to be x’ to be synonymous.
4
On ground, see (deRosset 2015), (Fine 2012), and (Raven 2015a). For dissent
from ground as a strict partial order, see (Jenkins 2011) and (Schaffer 2012). For
a defense of ground as a strict partial order, see (Raven 2013).

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 1 Factivity: If hx A then A.
2 Ground and Truth-Functions: If A ˅ B then A < (A ˅ B) or B <
(A ˅ B).5
3 Closure under Ground: If hx A and B < A then hx B.
4 Accident and Contingency: If it is contingent that A then it is
not the case that for some x: hx A.6
5 Essence and Contingency: For some x, A, B: hx ðA _ BÞ and it is
contingent that A and it is contingent that B.

Claim. (1) through (5) are jointly inconsistent.

Proof
Suppose Essence and Contingency and that it is essential to a that
φ ∨ w and that it is contingent that φ and it is contingent that w. By
Factivity, φ ∨ w. From Ground and Truth-Functions, either φ grounds
φ ∨ w or w grounds φ ∨ w. Suppose that φ grounds φ ∨ w. Then by
Closure under Ground, it is essential to a that φ. But by Accident and
Contingency, it is not essential to a that φ. Contradiction. Suppose
instead that w grounds φ∨ w. Then by Closure under Ground, it is
essential to a that w. But by Accident and Contingency, it is not essen-
tial to a that w. Contradiction.

3. Independent Support

In this section, I offer independent albeit defeasible support for each

claim in the inconsistent pentad. This helps to establish that the com-
patibility of essence and ground is not simply given.

3.1 Factivity

Denying Factivity is difficult. This would amount to saying that something

is essential to some item but false. For example, it is essential to Socrates
that Socrates is human but that Socrates is not human.
An argument for Factivity might run as follows: (1) Essence implies
necessity; (2) Necessity is factive; therefore, (3) Essence is factive.

5
I take statements of material implication to be equivalent to disjunctions, both logi-
cally and ground-theoretically. Also, the disjunction in the consequent of Ground and
Truth-Functions is to be read inclusively.
6
It is contingent that A = df it is possible that A and it is possible that ¬A. Note that be-
ing contingent and being contingently true are different conditions: the former can apply
truly to falsehoods.

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Equivalently: (1) If hx A then hA; (2) If hA then A; therefore, (3) If
hx A then A (i.e. Factivity).7

3.2 Ground and Truth-Functions

Denying Ground and Truth-Functions is difficult but it is denied

(e.g.) by Audi (2012). Such a philosopher believes that ground is a
relation among facts, and that there are no disjunctive facts. But
ground is here construed as a sentential operator. If one denies
Ground and Truth-Functions, they are working with a very different
conception of ground.
Correia (2013) distinguishes between logical, conceptual, and meta-
physical ground. But, he thinks, an asymmetric inclusion relation
holds between the three concepts in that order. Ground and Truth-
Functions is the disjunction of Correia’s ( ∨ 2) and ( ∨ 3), which are
simply the grounding analogs of the introduction rules for disjunc-
tion in classical logic. If our conception of ground is metaphysical
then it includes logical ground, and hence Ground and Truth-Func-
tions. So the principle holds for a conception of ground that has
been rigorously developed.

3.3 Closure under Ground

Denying Closure under Ground probably seems like the best option.
But the thesis is actually quite compelling. For its denial implies that
something true solely in virtue of what it is to be x may have grounds
in something that does not pertain to what it is to be x. This seems
like it should be implausible.
An analogy might be helpful. A rough characterization of an intrin-
sic property is as follows. An intrinsic property “is a property that
characterizes something as it is in itself. What intrinsic properties
something has in no way depends on what other things exist (things
other than it or its parts) or how it is related to them’’ (Skow 2007,
111).8 To keep things sentential, let us say that it is intrinsic to x that
A iff ‘A’ is a truth ascribing some intrinsic property to x or its parts.
Consider the principle Closure under Intrinsicality: If it is intrinsic
to x that A and B < A then it is intrinsic to x that B. This principle
7
Factivity is independent of whether we take a conditional or unconditional approach
to essential truths. On the conditional approach, it is not essential (e.g.) to Socrates
that Socrates is human; it is rather essential to Socrates that Socrates is human if he
exists. On the unconditional approach, it is essential to Socrates that Socrates is
human. Full stop. In any case, the essentialist operator satisfies Factivity.
8
Gideon Rosen gives a similar gloss on intrinsic properties: “a property F is intrinsic iff
whether or not X is F depends entirely on how things stand with X and its parts, and
not on X’s relations to things distinct from X” (Rosen 2010, 112).

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seems good. For example, take the case of shape properties, such as
sphericality. Following Skow, suppose we discover that dualism—the
view that material objects and regions of space are substantially differ-
ent—is correct, and thus that “[e.g.] spherical material objects are
spherical because they are located at spherical regions of space”.
Then we should be compelled to conclude that “[s]phericality is not
intrinsic”, precisely because we uncovered grounds for the putative
intrinsic truth that are in fact extrinsic (Skow 2007, §5). Matters seem
similar with respect to Closure under Ground.
Someone might try to resist Closure under Ground by citing
Rosen’s principle of essential grounding (Rosen 2010, 119): If hx A then
hx A\A.9 It is good enough, they will say, if every essential truth has
at least one fully essential ground; and they will add that this is
secured by Rosen’s principle. From this they infer that there is no
need to be moved by the above considerations in favor of Closure
under Ground.
But let us look more carefully at what this response implies. Sup-
pose for example that it is essential to Socrates that Socrates is
human: hs Hs. Rosen’s principle implies that hs Hs\Hs. If Rosen’s
principle is supposed to provide at least one essential ground for
‘Hs’, then we need to ask ourselves: Is it the case that hs hs Hs? If it
is not the case, then the relevant ground (i.e., hs Hs) is not essential
to Socrates, and so the response citing Rosen’s principle is no
good. Yet, if it is the case that hs hs Hs, then the iterations go on
ad infinitum, which has costs to be stacked up against the intuitive
pull of Closure under Ground. For one, it is often held that the
constitutive essence of an item excludes iterations of the essentialist
operator (Dasgupta 2014), (Glazier 2017). The thought is that in
returning an answer to the question ‘What is Socrates?’ it is appro-
priate to say ‘Socrates is human’ but not ‘It is essential to Socrates
that Socrates is human’. All things considered, Rosen’s principle
does not seem to offer a clear way around Closure under Ground.
Someone might also think that Closure under Ground is suscepti-
ble to counter example. It is plausible that h8 ; ¼ ð8xÞðx ¼ xÞ and that
(a = a) < (8x)(x = x) but not that h8 , = (a = a).10
However, this depends on one’s views about universally quantified
truths. Some think that the proposition that (∀x)(x = x) just is the
(possibly infinitary) conjunction of instances plus a totality fact: the
proposition that (a = a ˄. . .s (a, . . .)).11 But if this is the case, then
9
In discussion of Rosen’s principle, assume the intended grounding connection to be
full.
10
For the purposes of considering this counterexample, I allow the essentialist operator
to be indexed to several items; that is, I allow for the concept of collective essence (Fine
1994b). I also allow the symbols for the logical constants to function both as names for
the constants as well as polyadic predicates, variable binders, or truth-functions.
11
For example, one version of Fine’s truth-maker semantics for universally quantified
sentences suggests this view (Fine 2017).

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it is certainly plausible that h8 ; ¼ ða ¼ aÞ if h8 ; ¼ ða ¼ a˄. . . ˄,s
(a = . . .)).
Even if universally quantified truths are not just conjunctions, it still
seems that the semantics for first-order logic makes a reasonable case
that—by the nature of the quantifiers—quantified statements are
truth-evaluable only relative to a domain.
We might then modify our view to accommodate this fact. On one
way of carrying this out, we might add the items of the domain to the
index of the essentialist operator and make quantified statements
restricted to a domain using totality statements. Our previous example
would then come out as follows.

h8 ; ¼; a; b; ½sða; b; Þ ! ð8xÞðx ¼ xÞ:

On this view, it is plausible that h8 ; ¼; a; b; ða ¼ aÞ given that

(a = a) < (∀x)(x = x), since every item will contribute its self-identity
to the collective essence under consideration.12 But then we no
longer see a counterexample to Closure under Ground. So the sup-
posed counterexample is not straightforward once we consider more
closely the essence of the universal quantifier.
There is another style of counterexample that arises with respect to
Closure under Ground. It concerns either existential quantifications
or disjunctions. Let us take the disjunctive case. Take any contingent
proposition p. You might think that it is essential to p that either p is
true or p is not true, at least assuming the law of excluded middle.
Now suppose that in fact p is true. Then p is true and grounds p is
true or p is not true. By Closure under Ground, it is essential to p that
p is true. However, we have assumed that p is contingent, and so it is
not plausibly essentially true. Closure under Ground must fail.
But this is not so straightforward. Granted, one conclusion to draw
from the above reasoning is that Closure under Ground fails. How-
ever, an alternative conclusion to draw from the above reasoning is
that it is not essential to p that p is true or p is not true. And similarly
for other cases of the sort. Admittedly, something has to give when
we consider cases like the one involving the contingent proposition.
However, it is not decided that Closure under Ground must fail. If simi-
lar cases are treated similarly, we might instead deny Essence and
Contingency

3.4 Accident and Contingency

Denying Accident and Contingency is difficult, although it is denied

(e.g.) by Almog (2003). This amounts to taking some essential truths
12
What might then be distinctive about logical truths like (∀x)(x = x) is that they are
domain invariant: 8y1 ; y2 ; h8 ; ¼; y1 ; y2 ; ½sðy1 ; y2 ; Þ ! ð8xÞðx ¼ xÞ.

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as contingent, which seriously blurs the distinction between essence
and accident.13 Such a theorist would be working with a radically dif-
ferent conception of essence.
Some think that we can tie the notion of an essential truth (of
an item) to its being explanatorily basic or ungrounded (for that
item), and from this we can give up on the claim that essential
truths are necessary without blurring the distinction between
essence and accident (Gorman 2014). But explanatory basicness
seems neither sufficient nor necessary for essence. (1) Suppose
Socrates is now located at place P. This does not seem to be
explainable in terms of other features of Socrates. Yet it is not essen-
tial to Socrates that he is at P. (2) Fido is an animal because Fido
is a dog. Yet Fido is essentially an animal.14

3.5 Essence and Contingency

Denying Essence and Contingency is difficult. For various paradig-

matic essentialist claims appear to witness it.

(1) It is essential to Socrates’ paleness trope that it exists only if

Socrates exists (Fine 1995a).
(2) It is essential to the chair that it exists if these particles are
arranged in a certain way (Dasgupta 2014).15
(3) It is essential to contingent proposition p that p is true or p is
not true (Glazier 2017).16

13
This is because we tend to think that necessity is a necessary condition on some-
thing’s being essential to an item. As a result, one way to establish that something is
not essential is to show it to be contingent. However, if we deny Accident and
Contingency, then we cannot use contingency to establish nonessentiality.
14
Some might try to resist this claim by invoking Fine’s (1994b) distinction between
immediate essence and mediate essence, claiming that the concept of essence in play
is immediate and the genus-specifying statements are only mediately essential. I dis-
agree. The difference between the genus-specifying statement and the species-specify-
ing statement is not a difference in status but rather a difference in specificity.
Moreover, the distinction between immediate essence and mediate essence does not
track specificity. For what is included in the mediate essence of (e.g.) {Socrates} is
that Socrates is human. But there seems to be a difference between ‘Socrates is a
member of {Socrates}’ and ‘Socrates is human’ concerning the essence of {Socrates}
(i.e., the latter does not specify what {Socrates} is in a less specific way), and
‘Socrates is human’ and ‘Socrates is an animal’ concerning the essence of Socrates.
This marks a departure from (Dasgupta 2016, §4), who thinks that constitutive essen-
tialist truths (i.e., truths of the form ‘It is essential to x that A’) are such that it is
not apt that they be grounded.
15
Recall that material conditionals are treated as both logically and ground-theoreti-
cally equivalent to disjunctions.
16
Glazier uses the example of a Boolean variable. But the present case is similar
enough.

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Keep in mind that Essence and Contingency is an existentially quanti-
fied principle. As a result, it requires only a single witness to be true.
So it is true if any of (1) through (3) are true.
To recapitulate, §2 gave a pentad of claims concerning essence and
ground and proved that they are jointly inconsistent. §3.1 – §3.5 have
then made a case that each claim in the pentad has independent
albeit defeasible support. So we have a puzzle. If both essence and
ground are to be included in the metaphysician’s toolkit, then we
have to go to work.

4. A Way Out of Inconsistency

For Aristotle, what pertains to the essence of an item is necessary. At

the same time, he also somewhat takes exception to this fact. For
example, Aristotle thinks that one way to define human being is as two-
footed animal, which leads us to believe that two-footed pertains to the
essence of human being, and thus to any individual human being such
as Socrates. Yet possibly, there is a human being with fewer than two
feet.
How does Aristotle reconcile these views? In Topics he introduces
the idea of a property being had naturally. For example, he claims
that human beings are naturally two-footed. What does this mean? A
precise account is far beyond the scope of this paper. But we can say
that it at least implies that an item can have a property naturally, even
if it in fact lacks that property: “he makes a mistake if he has failed to
add the word ‘naturally’ (because what belongs naturally may fail to
belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs
to human being to have two feet)” (Topics V, 134b 5–10).
What might then be said to pertain to the essence of human being is
not being two-footed but rather being naturally two-footed. My suggestion is
that something similar should be introduced into our essentialist
framework to handle the inconsistent pentad. First, I will introduce
the idea and try to get clearer on its nature and scope. Then I will
apply it to the pentad.

4.1 The Sortal Operator

Some things seem to pertain to the essence of an item but also involve con-
tingency, where the condition involves contingency is a complex disjunc-
tive condition: it includes being contingent but also being grounded in
something contingent.
For example, it pertains to the essence of the chair that some-
thing sits on it. This is what distinguishes the essence of the chair

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from other artifacts, such as cups and computers.17 But that some-
thing sits on the chair is contingent. Similarly, it pertains to the
essence of the chair that it is shaped (i.e. that it has some shape).
This is necessary, at least in the weak sense of necessity: it is neces-
sary that the chair exists only if it is shaped. But that it is shaped is
grounded in the fact that it has the particular shape it does, which
is contingent. For example, the chair could have been warped, and
so differently shaped.
Let us introduce a binary operator Σ that takes a name and a sen-
tence and gives a sentence. In this respect, it is like the essentialist
operator. We shall use an old term for a new concept and call the
operator the sortal operator. Thus, ‘ΣxA’ is a sortal statement, which says
that it is the sort of thing x is that A. For example, it is the sort of
thing the chair is that something sits on it. Moreover, it is the sort of
thing the chair is that it is shaped. From a logical point of view, part
of what is distinctive about the operator is that it is non-factive: it may
truly apply to false prejacents. For example, possibly, it is the sort of
thing the chair is that something sits on it but nothing sits on it.
Since the essentialist operator implies necessity given the contraposi-
tive of Accident and Contingency,18 the condition pertains to the essence
of an item but involves contingency cannot simply be the result of apply-
ing the essentialist operator to something contingent.
Nor can it be the result of considering what is strictly implied by
the existence of the relevant item—a strategy employed in modal con-
texts to deal with the necessary features of contingent existents—since
in general this will not apply. For example, possibly, the chair exists
but nothing sits on it.
The role of the sortal operator is to serve as a buffer between
essence and contingency. We understand the category pertains to the
essence of an item but also involves contingency by prefixing a sortal truth
with the relevant essentialist operator. For example, it is essential to
the chair that the chair is the sort of thing on which something sits.
This gets the right result, since we can assume that it is necessary that
it is the sort of thing the chair is that something sits on it.

17
A few remarks. (1) This is an ideologically lightweight way of saying what distin-
guishes chairs from other artifacts. It is lightweight since it does not invoke any dis-
tinctively teleological vocabulary in contrast to the sentence ‘chairs are for sitting’.
This is for the sake of simplicity. It may well be that, at the end of day, some distinc-
tively teleological vocabulary will be required to say what distinguishes chairs from
other artifacts. (2) We assume that items such as artifacts have essences. In fact, we
assume that for every x, there is some A such that hx A. In other words, we assume
that essence is unrestricted. We will anyway use examples other than artifacts. For
the reader who denies that artifacts have essences, they may use other examples.
18
Suppose it is essential to x that A. By Factivity, A. Since there is something to which
it is essential that A, applying modus tollens to Accident and Contingency gives us: it
is not the case that it is contingent that A. So either it is not possible that A or it is
not possible that ¬A. Since A, it is possible that A, and so not not possible that A. By
disjunctive syllogism, it is not possible that ¬A. Therefore, it is necessary that A.

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 On its intended interpretation, the sortal operator is intimately
bound up with essence: it is the sort of thing x is that A if and only
if it is essential to x that it is the sort of thing x is that A. In sym-
bols: Rx A $ hx Rx A. The right-to-left direction of implication is
guaranteed by Factivity. The left-to-right direction of implication is
built in to the role of the sortal operator as a buffer between
essence and contingency; in other words, by its role in articulating
the sense in which something pertains to the essence of an item but also
involves contingency.
If the sortal operator is intimately bound up with essence, then
how do sortal truths relate to nonsortal essential truths? It seems on
the basis of examples that there are two ways in which sortal truths
may relate to nonsortal essential truths. The first is by way of ground
and the second is by way of real definition (for short: definition). I
will explain each in turn.

(1) Ground: On this way of relating sortal truths to nonsortal essen-

tial truths, it is the sort of thing x is that A and for some B, it is
essential to x that B and B grounds its being the sort of thing x is
that A. Take the example of the chair. It is the sort of thing the
chair is that it is shaped. It is also essential to the chair that it is a
material object. Moreover, its being a material object grounds its
being the sort of thing that is shaped. (Note that we must read
the grounding connection in Ground in terms of full ground.)
(2) Definition: On this way of relating sortal truths to nonsortal
essential truths, it is the sort of thing x is that Fx and for some
G, it is essential to x that Gx and to be G is at least in part to
be ky.ΣyFy, that is, to be a y such that y is the sort of thing that
is F, where the ‘to be . . . is at least in part to be’ locution
expresses real definition. For example, it is the sort of thing
the chair is that something sits on it. Also, to be a chair is at
least in part to be the sort of thing on which something sits.19

I take Ground and Definition as exhaustive, in the sense that any sortal
truth relates to some nonsortal essential truth either by way of Ground or
by way of Definition. Then Ground and Definition help to fix the scope
of the sortal operator. For example, it is not the sort of thing the chair is
that it has the particular shape that it does, even though it is the sort of
thing the chair is that it is shaped (i.e., has a shape). This can be shown
by considering how the one is related to some nonsortal essential truth,
whereas the other is not. Let us examine.
The chair is the sort of thing that is shaped in virtue of its being a
material object.20 Moreover, the chair is essentially a material object.

19
At any rate, this will be case if we think that it is in connection with sitting that
chairs are distinguished essentially from other artifacts, such as cups and computers.
20
I use ‘in virtue of’ to express the inverse of the grounding operator.

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So, the chair’s being the sort of thing that is shaped is related to
some nonsortal essential truth (i.e., the chair’s being a material
object) by way of Ground. In contrast, nothing about the chair’s
being a material object, or anything else essential to it, grounds its
having the particular shape it has. Moreover, it does not seem to be
the case that for some G: it is essential to the chair that it is G and to
be G is to be the sort of thing that has the particular shape of the
chair. So in cases like these, determinables are sortals in the intended
sense but determinates are not. Given that determinates ground
determinables, we can safely say that the sortal operator is not closed
under ground.

4.2 Sortals and the Inconsistent Pentad

To escape the inconsistent pentad, we must deny one of its claims.

But we also must explain away the appearance of any claim in the
pentad that we deny, since each claim in the pentad has some defeasi-
ble support.
The considerations that have motivated the introduction of the sor-
tal operator do not have anything in particular to do with the pentad.
They are, in this sense, independent of the inconsistency. Yet, the sor-
tal operator, along with the essentialist operator, provides us with a
successful way out of inconsistency.
Recall from §3.3 the putative counterexample we considered
against Closure under Ground: that it is essential to contingent
proposition p that p is true or p is not true but p is true and grounds
p is true or p is not true, and yet it is not essential to p that p is true. I
noted that there are two different conclusions we might draw from
this case. First, that Closure under Ground fails. Second, that it is not
essential to p that p is true or p is not true. If the second conclusion
is drawn from this and similar cases, the general conclusion may be
that Essence and Contingency fails.
This is the view I adopt here: that Essence and Contingency is false.
To explain away the appearance of Essence and Contingency I will
use the sortal operator. To show how this general strategy works with
the sortal operator, I will work through each of the examples cited in
support of Essence and Contingency from §3.5: rigid dependence;
macrophysical objects; and contingent propositions.

4.2.1 Rigid Dependence

Some cases of rigid dependence are modally asymmetric: it is neces-
sary that the dependent item exists only if the dependee item exists
but it is possible that the dependee item exists but the dependent
item does not exist. In at least these cases, Fine claims that “given that
one object is ineliminably involved in the nature of another, then it is

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not compatible with the nature of the second that it should exist with-
out the first” (1995a, 279). In other words, in at least these cases, it is
essential to the dependent item that it exists only if the dependee
item exists.21
For example, consider Socrates’ paleness trope. Socrates’ paleness
trope depends on Socrates, in the sense of being essentially related to
Socrates: it is essential to the trope that it is particularized to
Socrates.22 Fine (1995a) would thereby want to say that it is essential
to the trope that it exists only if Socrates exists. However, Socrates
and the trope are contingent existents. But then by Closure under
Ground, it is either essential to the trope that it does not exist or
essential to the trope that Socrates exists. Neither holds given Acci-
dent and Contingency. An alternative is that it is the sort of thing
Socrates’ paleness trope is that it exists only if Socrates exists. Then
the trope’s being of this sort must satisfy either Ground or Definition.
In this case, the connection would seem to be by Ground. For it is
essential to Socrates’ paleness trope that it is a trope. What is it to be a
trope? To be a trope is at least in part to be a property particularized to
some item. In other words, it is to be a certain sort of dependent item.
Thus, we might say that it is in virtue of being a trope that Socrates’s
paleness trope is the sort of thing that exists only if Socrates exists.
But then the inconsistency does not arise because the sortal opera-
tor is not closed under ground. We witnessed this with the case of the
chair and its shape at the end of §4.1. So even if it is in virtue of
Socrates’ existence that Socrates’ paleness trope exists only if Socrates
exists, it does not follow that Socrates’ paleness trope is the sort of
thing such that Socrates exists.
Thus, the putative case of Essence and Contingency is explained
away: what is essential is not the conditional ‘Socrates’ paleness trope
exists only if Socrates exists’ but rather the sortal ‘it is the sort of
thing Socrates’ paleness trope is that it exists only if Socrates exists’.
To echo Aristotle: we make a mistake if we omit the sortal operator.

21
A few remarks. (1) I restrict to modally asymmetric cases to avoid the sorts of objec-
tions raised by Correia (2005). A discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of
this paper. (2) If Fine is correct, then it would seem that the reading of the essential-
ist operator in ‘it is essential to the dependent item that it exists only if the depen-
dee item exists’ is constitutive. For if it were consequential then the dependent
item’s existing only if the dependee item exists would follow logically from some-
thing essential to the dependent item. But since the items are contingent, nothing
about existence is involved in the essence of the dependent item from which the
conditional claim—that the dependent item exists only if the dependee item exists—
would follow logically.
22
For the purposes of this example, I assume a conception of tropes as particularized
properties, as well as being contingent beings and accidents. As such, there is no trope
of Socrates’ humanity, and we can express Socrates’ paleness trope using the predi-
cate ‘[kx.Pale(x) ˄ x = s]’. This conception of tropes fits with the restriction to mod-
ally asymmetric cases.

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4.2.2 Macrophysical Objects
Consider the chair. If Dasgupta is right, and the following is a “per-
fectly legitimate statement of what my chair is (whether or not it is
true): it is something that exists if these particles are arranged in a
certain way”, then particle arrangements pertain the essences of chairs
and involve contingency.
Now suppose it is in virtue of the chair’s existing that it exists if these
particles are arranged in a certain way. Then by Closure under Ground it
is essential to the chair that it exists. However, given Accident and Contin-
gency, this cannot be the case. Again, there is inconsistency. However, an
alternative is that it is the sort of thing the chair is that it exists if these par-
ticles are arranged in a certain way. If this is the case, then the inconsis-
tency does not arise because the sortal operator is not closed under
ground: it is not the case that because it is in virtue of the chair’s existing
that it exists if these particles are arranged in a certain way that the chair
is the sort of thing that exists.23
Thus, the putative case of Essence and Contingency is explained away:
what is essential is not the conditional ‘the chair exists if these particles
are arranged in a certain way’ but rather the sortal ‘it is the sort of thing
the chair is that it exists if these particles are arranged in a certain way’.
To echo Aristotle: we make a mistake if we omit the sortal operator.

4.2.3 Contingent Propositions

Consider some contingent proposition p. It seems to be essentially
truth-apt: it is essential to p that either p is true or p is not true. By
Factivity, either p is true or p is not true. Whichever value p happens
to have, its having that value grounds the disjunction but is not essen-
tial, according to Accident and Contingency. This is inconsistent with
what Closure under Ground predicts. An alternative is that it is not
essential to p that p is true or p is not true.24 Rather, it is essentially
the sort of thing p is that it is true or it is not true. If this is the case,
then p’s being an item of this sort satisfies either Definition or
Ground. In this case, it plausibly satisfies Definition: to be a proposi-
tion is at least in part to be the sort of thing that is true or false.
This avoids inconsistency, and for the same reasons as the previous
two cases: the sortal operator is not closed under ground. Moreover,
it explains away the appearance of Essence and Contingency because
23
Why is it not the sort of thing that exists? Because if it were, then it would have to
satisfy either Ground or Definition. Neither is plausible for the chair’s existence. By
contrast, it seems that ‘the chair exists if these particles are arranged in a certain
way’ satisfies Definition, if indeed Dasgupta is correct that particle arrangements per-
tain to the essences of chairs. For if this is correct, then it is plausible that to be the
chair is at least in part to be the sort of thing that exists if these particles are
arranged in a certain way.
24
You might think that it is essential to disjunction and negation that p is true or p is
not true. But recall that the preferred reading of the essentialist operator is as consti-
tutive. Following Correia (2012), the disjunction is part of the consequentialist
essence of disjunction and negation only.

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the disjunction ‘p is true or p is not true’ is not essential to p; it is
instead the sortal that is essential. To echo Aristotle: we make a mis-
take if we omit the sortal operator.
In sum, our way out of the inconsistent pentad is by denying
Essence and Contingency while preserving Closure under Ground.
With the introduction of the sortal operator, we are able to explain
away the appearance of putative cases of Essence and Contingency.
The sortal approach also has other benefits: it allows us to make sense
of the idea that something might pertain to the essence of an item
and yet involve contingency. Perhaps there are alternative ways out of
the inconsistent pentad. But the proposal on offer involving the sortal
operator warrants consideration.25

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