Synthese

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1701-3

The essence of grounding

Justin Zylstra1

Received: 26 June 2017 / Accepted: 24 January 2018

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Abstract I develop a reduction of grounding to essence. My approach is to think

about the relation between grounding and essence on the model of a certain concept
of existential dependence. I extend this concept of existential dependence in a couple
of ways and argue that these extensions provide a reduction of grounding to essence
if we use sorted variables that range over facts and take it that for a fact to obtain is for
it to exist. I then use the account to resolve various issues surrounding the concept of
grounding and its connection with essence; apply the account to paradigm cases and
to the impure logic of grounding; and respond to objections.

Keywords Metaphysics · Grounding · Essence · Reduction

How does grounding relate to other core metaphysical concepts such as essence and
causation? Raven (2015) cites this as one of the open problems concerning grounding.
Others have explored the link between grounding and physical causation (Schaffer
2016; Wilson 2017). My focus in this paper is on how the concept of grounding
relates to essence, which has also been explored (Correia 2013; Correia and Skiles
2017; Fine 2012a,b, 2015).
Why is the problem important? When we investigate into the nature of a con-
cept, it pays to think about how that concept relates to its neighbors. For example,
when we investigate into the nature of necessity, it pays to think about how neces-
sity relates to the truth-functions and quantifiers. In fact, we tend to think that these
relations are constitutive of necessity. For example, whether the Barcan Formula
and its converse are true makes a difference to the nature of necessity (Williamson

B Justin Zylstra
zylstrajustin@gmail.com

1 University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA

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2013). As it is with the concept of necessity and its relation to quantification, so it

is with the concept of grounding and its relation to essence. If we can figure out
how grounding relates to essence then we have learned something about the nature
of grounding. Moreover, if essence can be used to make sense of grounding then
we have learned something about the nature and applicability of the concept of
essence.
What is distinctive about my approach to the problem? My approach is to think
about the relation between grounding and essence on the model of a certain concept
of existential dependence. On at least one concept of existential dependence, there is
a strong connection between essence and existential dependence: something existen-
tially depends on something else if and only if there is some relation such that it is
essential to the dependent item that it exists only if it bears that relation to the items
on which it depends and they exist.1 For example, {Socrates} existentially depends
on Socrates in the intended sense, since it is essential to {Socrates} that it exists only
if Socrates is a member of {Socrates} and Socrates exists.2
In this paper I extend this concept of existential dependence in a couple of ways
and argue that these extensions provide an interesting connection between essence
and grounding if we use sorted variables that range over facts and if we take it that
for a fact to obtain is for it to exist. Whether the connection amounts to a reduction
is a further question. But it is tempting to think that it does. For if the connection
does amount to a reduction of grounding to essence then the reduction boasts many
benefits: it handles paradigm cases of grounding; it provides an attractive account of
the grounds of first-order logic, or what has been called the impure logic of ground
(Fine 2012a,b); it allows us to make sense of interdependence, or what I will call
intergrounding, without forfeiting the formal features of grounding such as Non-
Circularity; and it avoids known problems concerning grounding and rival essentialist
accounts of grounding.
In Sect. 1 I introduce the concepts that are central to developing the connection
between essence and grounding: essence and existential dependence. An account of
existential dependence is defined and extended to include cognates that I call Existen-
tially Dependent and Existential Grounding. The concept of Existential Grounding
is key to articulating the connection between grounding and essence. In Sect. 2 I say
more about how I understand the concept of grounding, independently of how it may
or may not relate to essence, and I define a concept of Fact Grounding by replac-
ing the variables in Existential Grounding with sorted variables ranging over facts.
Then I provide the connection between essence and grounding. In Sect. 3 I outline
the benefits to be claimed from taking this connection as a reduction of grounding

1 The predicate ‘exists’ is understood in a non-quantificational way. Although every existing item is such
that there is something identical with it, some items for which there is something identical to them do not
exist.
2 The concept of existential dependence deployed is a hybrid of Lowe and Tahko’s (E D E) and (E DC)
(Lowe and Tahko 2015). If both are genuine concepts of dependence then so too is the hybrid of them. I
remain neutral on what other forms of dependence there may be. Since I am interested in the connection
between grounding and essence, the sorts of dependence I am interested in are broadly essentialist. On the
varieties of dependence, see Correia (2008) and Lowe and Tahko (2015).

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to essence. Finally, in Sect. 4 I deal with some potential objections to the account
provided.

1 Essence and existential dependence

1.1 Essence

Statements of essence are formed using a binary operator that takes a term, be it
singular or plural and constant or variable, and a sentence, or something functioning
syntactically as a sentence, and gives a sentence. I use lowercase x, y, etc. as singular
nominal variables that range over possible items and uppercase X, Y, etc. as plural
nominal variables that range over pluralities of possible items. Finally, A, B, etc.
are sentential variables.3 For example, ‘It is essential to Socrates that Socrates is
human’ and ‘It is essential to conjunction and negation that they are truth-functionally
complete’ are statements of essence, as is the generalization ‘For some X and A, it is
essential to X that A’.4
Philosophically, I deploy the concept of constitutive essence (Fine 1994a,b, 1995a).
The concept of constitutive essence is here regarded as primitive and is not taken to
be closed under logical implication. For example, if it is essential to Socrates that
Socrates is human, and Socrates’ being human logically implies that Plato is a sophist
or Plato is not a sophist, then it is not implied that it is essential to Socrates that Plato
is a sophist or not a sophist. In other words, it is essential to X that A if and only if it
is part of what it is to be X that A.5
The concept of essence under consideration here is the concept of objectual essence,
in contrast to the concept of generic essence (Correia 2006). The distinction can be
given by examples: the statement ‘It is essential to Socrates that Socrates is human’
is a statement of objectual essence whereas the statement ‘To be a prime number is
to be a number with no non-trivial divisors’ is a statement of generic essence. The
essentialist operator takes as indexes only items functioning syntactically as names,
and not predicates and sentences as in Correia (2013). Also, the essentialist operator
is not a variable-binding operator as in Fine (2015) and Correia and Skiles (2017).6

3 I am often sloppy over use/mention when there is little risk of confusion. Also, I assume a necessitist
framework. For challenges to contingentist essentialism, see Teitel (2017).
4 We can form plural names using lists of singular names. For example, given that ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and
‘Aristotle’ are singular names, ‘Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle’ is a plural name. I assume that pluralities are
non-empty but that there may be a single item belonging to some. We can then say that for every x there are
some X such that for any y, y belongs to X if and only if y is identical with x. The predicate ‘belongs to’
is a primitive predicate that takes a singular term and a plural term as arguments. We can form statements
such as ‘X belongs to Y ’ but they are shorthand for ‘For all x, x belongs to X only if x belongs to Y ’.
5 Different glosses get put on constitutive essence: what is essential is directly definitive (Fine 1994a,b;
Correia 2012); or what is essential expresses what something is in its core respects (Dasgupta 2016).
6 There are other distinctions of essence, such as the distinction between mediate and immediate essence
(Fine 1994a,b). What divides mediate from immediate essence concerns dependence. For example, that it
is part of the mediate essence of {Socrates} that Socrates is human but not part of its immediate essence
(Fine 1995a). I will assume an immediate conception of essence. This seems somewhat standard when
considering the concept of constituive essence (Dasgupta 2016; Glazier 2017).

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1.2 Existential dependence and cognates

The kind of existential dependence with which I am concerned can be character-

ized using constitutive essence. Existential dependence is typically characterized as
a binary predicate that takes two singular terms as arguments (Correia 2008; Fine
1995a; Koslicki 2012; Lowe and Tahko 2015). I understand existential dependence as
a binary predicate that takes a singular term and a plural term as arguments. I define
existential dependence as follows.
Existential Dependence x existentially depends on X iffd f (For some R) [It is
essential to x that (x exists only if (Rx X and X exist))].7
The extension of the concept to the plural case is supported by example. For example,
the pair set {Socrates, Plato} existentially depends on Socrates and Plato. This is
because the set exists only if it is related by plural membership to its members and
those members exist, where ‘plural membership’ is defined: X are the members of x
iffd f For all y: y belongs to X iff y is a member of x.
But Existential Dependence covers only rigid cases of existential dependence. For
example, that {Socrates} existentially depends on Socrates, or that the proposition
that Socrates is distinct from Plato existentially depends on Socrates and Plato. But
some items are dependent without exhibiting this kind of rigidity. For example, if
an Aristotelian conception of properties is correct then the property of being human
is not independent of its instances, although it does not existentially depend on any
particular instance in the above sense.
Existentially Dependent x is existentially dependent iffd f
(For some R) [It is essential to x that (x exists only if (For some X ) (Rx X and
X exist))].
The generic concept is typically expressed as being polyadic (Fine 1995a; Lowe and
Tahko 2015). But I prefer to characterize it as monadic. This is because taking it to be
polyadic invokes unnecessary questions. For example, if generic dependence is taken
to be polyadic, statements of generic dependence take the form ‘x depends on the
Fs’ and no interpretation is given of this expression (Lowe and Tahko 2015). If what
is meant is that x depends on the items that satisfy ‘F’, this is false. So if generic
dependence is polyadic, then to what is the dependent item related? It seems much
simpler to take the concept to be monadic. So then on the Aristotelian conception of
properties, the property of being human is existentially dependent, since it is essential
to the property that it exists only if there are some X that instantiate it and X exist.
Some talk about existential dependence as non-factive: dependence may relate
items that do not exist (Fine 1995a). For example, {Socrates} existentially depends on
Socrates in the sense of Existential Dependence, irrespective of whether the set and

7 A few remarks. First, the predicate ‘exists’ is distributive: if X exist then, for every x belonging to X , x
exists. Second, although I write definitions in logicese, full formalizations may in addition be helpful. So let
us follow standard notation and use an indexed box for the essentialist operator and ‘E’ for the distinguished
existence predicate. Then x existentially depends on X iffd f (∃R)[x (E x → (Rx X ∧ E X ))]. The variable
R functions syntactically as a predicate and can be bound by suitable existential quantifiers (Prior 1971).

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member exist. However, nothing prohibits us from defining a factive concept, which
we might aptly call Existential Grounding.
Existential Grounding x is existentially grounded in Y iffd f (For some R) [It is
essential to x that (x exists only if (For some X ) (Rx X and X exist)) and RxY
and Y exist].8
So Existential Grounding adds to Existentially Dependent a conjunct specifying that
the grounding items exist and bear the relevant relation to the grounded item. This
allows items to be contingently related by existential grounding. For example, given
that the property of being human is existentially dependent, suppose that Socrates
and Plato are its existent instances. Then the property of being human is existentially
grounded in Socrates and Plato, and yet it is a contingent matter that they are connected
by existential grounding. If Aristotle and Protagoras had been the existent instances
then the property would have been grounded in them.9
Existential dependence is typically taken to induce a strict partial order on the
domain of items. This extends to the concept of Existential Grounding. Since Exis-
tential Grounding is not defined as a binary predicate that takes a pair of singular
terms as arguments, the concept of a strict partial order does not apply. In general, the
conditions of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity characterize well-defined dyadic
predicates that take singular terms as arguments. Nevertheless, we can give a pair of
structural conditions.
Non-Circularity (E) If x is existentially grounded in X then, for any y belonging
to X : it is not the case that for some Y : x belongs to Y and y is existentially
grounded in Y .

Chaining (E) If x is existentially grounded in X then, for any y belonging to X

and for any Y such that y is existentially grounded in Y : there are some Z to
which Y belong and x is existentially grounded in Z .

Although intuitively the concept of constitutive essence does not allow for circular def-
initions and so satisfies Non-Circularity (E), it is perhaps less obvious that the concept
of constitutive essence satisfies Chaining (E).10 But we might simply take Existen-
tial Grounding to define an immediate concept and then define our target concept as
the closure of the defined immediate concept under Chaining (E).11 This secures the

8 Since Existential Grounding is a crucial component to the reduction, I will provide a formalization of
it: x is existentially grounded in Y iffd f (∃R)[(x (E x → (∃X )(Rx X ∧ E X ))) ∧ (RxY ∧ EY )]. In what
follows, I will talk about existential grounding as being factive, although it may seem unclear how Existential
Grounding implies the existence of the grounded item. See Sect. 4.2.
9 It is worth mentioning that we can from Existential Grounding define a partial concept: x is partially
existentially grounded in Y iffd f For some X , Y belongs to X and x is existentially grounded in X .
10 I can only really stipulate that Existential Grounding obeys Non-Circularity (E). For those who think that
relations of co-dependence are within the realm of theoretical possibility, see Sect. 3.2 on intergrounding.
11 Compare with the case of sets. On an immediate conception, {Socrates} and Aristotle are the members
of {{Socrates}, Aristotle}. But we can define a mediate concept, where X are members of x if and only if for
every y belonging to X , either y is a member of x in the immediate sense, or is a member of a member of x
in the immediate sense, etc. On this mediate concept of membership, Socrates, {Socrates}, and Aristotle are

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desired structure and so we henceforth understand Existential Grounding as closed

under Chaining (E).
Another feature of the account of Existential Grounding requires comment. It is
that the account of Existential Grounding, and in particular the non-factive component
of Existentially Dependent, is conditional in form: it states a condition on which the
existence of the dependent item materially depends, and this conditional is then placed
within the scope of the essentialist operator indexed to the dependent item and prefixed
by an existential predicate quantifier.
This feature—that Existentially Dependent is in conditional form—is indepen-
dent of whether we take a conditional or unconditional approach to essence. On the
conditional approach, it is not essential to Socrates that Socrates is human; it is rather
essential to Socrates that Socrates is human if he exists. On the unconditional approach,
it is essential to Socrates that Socrates is human. Full stop. In either case, the essen-
tialist operator is a factive operator: if it is essential to X that A then A. If we take the
unconditional approach, we will have to tell a story about how Socrates is human even
if non-existent (Fine 2005). For the sake of brevity, I take the unconditional approach
but am anyway inclined to accept it.
Statements of existential dependence are thus a distinctive sort of essentialist state-
ment: they state the relational conditions on which the dependent item materially
depends for its existence, where the material conditional is placed within the scope
of the essentialist operator indexed to the dependent item. The account of existential
dependence on offer takes statements of dependence to explicitly be part of the essence
of the dependent item, as opposed to an abstraction from it (Fine 1994a,b, 1995a). On
Fine’s view, we give the essence of an item without any talk of dependence. Rather,
dependence is abstracted: we look at the set of propositions that are essential to the
item in question and see which items they involve. This determines that on which an
item depends.12
It is important to note that although I deploy the concept of constitutive essence I do
take the logical consequences of some essential truths to themselves be essential. For
example, if we have a statement of existential dependence, such as ‘It is essential to
{Socrates} that {Socrates} exists only if Socrates are the members of {Socrates} and
exist’ then I accept the existential generalization of the consequent of the essential-
ized conditional, the result being ‘It is essential to {Socrates} that {Socrates} exists
only if for some X , X are the members of {Socrates} and X exist’. This secures
the claim that items that existentially depend on something are also existentially
dependent.13

Footnote 11 continued
the members of {{Socrates}, Aristotle}; and it is also the case that {{Socrates}, Aristotle} and {Socrates,
{Socrates}, Aristotle} have the same members, although they are distinct sets.
12 I do not include in this discussion the concept of dependence invoked in Fine’s logic: that x depends on
y if and only if it is essential to x that y = y (Fine 1995b).
13 Further investigation will be required to specify exactly which consequences are essential on this con-
ception.

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2 Grounding

In this section I do two things. First, I clarify what I mean by ‘grounding’. Second, I
state the connection between grounding and essence.

2.1 What is meant by ‘grounding’?

In Sect. 1.2 I defined Existential Grounding. But this is not what I mean by ‘grounding’.
So Existential Grounding does not state the connection between essence and grounding
as I understand the term. So what do I mean by ‘grounding’? I intend by the term what
Kit Fine (2012a) calls strict full mediate grounding.
Syntactically, statements of grounding are formed using a binary predicate that
takes a singular term and a plural term as arguments. The terms are sorted: they
refer to or range over facts. So, grounding is a relation between facts. Let f , g,
etc. be singular nominal variables ranging over possible facts, and let F, G, etc.
be plural nominal variables ranging over pluralities of possible facts. For exam-
ple, ‘The fact that it is sunny and windy is grounded in the fact that it is sunny
and the fact that it is windy’ is a statement of grounding, as is its existential clo-
sure ‘For some f, F: f is grounded in F’. Given that I am working with a concept
of strict full mediate grounding, I take it to satisfy the following pair of structural
conditions.
Non-Circularity (G) If x is grounded in X then, for any y belonging to X : it is
not the case that for some Y : x belongs to Y and y is grounded in Y .

Chaining (G) If x is grounded in X then, for any y belonging to X and for any
Y such that y is grounded in Y : there are some Z to which Y belong and x is
grounded in Z .

To further fix the concept in play, we can borrow a list of paradigms from Koslicki
(2015). Others provide similar lists (Correia and Schnieder 2012).
• Moral/Natural The fact that an act is a telling of a lie grounds the fact that the act
is morally wrong.
• Truthmaking The fact that the proposition that snow is white is true is grounded
in the fact that snow is white.
• Logical Cases The fact that the ball is red grounds the fact that the ball is red or
round.
• Determinate/Determinable The fact that the ball is crimson grounds the fact that
the ball is red.
For more on grounding, see Correia (2013), Correia and Schnieder (2012), deRosset
(2014), Fine (2012a,b, 2015), Rosen (2010, 2015), and Raven (2015). But for my
purposes, this suffices as a statement of the concept of grounding into whose relation
to essence I am inquiring.

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2.2 Fact grounding

In this subsection I define a subrelation of Existential Grounding that I call Fact

Grounding. This is achieved by simply exchanging occurrences of the general vari-
ables x, y, X, Y with the sorted variables f, g, F, G ranging over possible facts and
pluralities of possible facts.

Fact Grounding f is fact grounded in G iffd f (For some R) [It is essential to f

that ( f exists only if (For some F) (R f F and F exist)) and R f G and G exist].14

We typically talk about facts as obtaining. But we do also talk about them existing. So
one assumption I make is as follows: for f /F to obtain is for f /F to exist. Since Fact
Grounding is a subrelation of Existential Grounding, it satisfies the following pair of
conditions.

Non-Circularity (F) If x is fact grounded in X then, for any y belonging to X : it

is not the case that for some Y : x belongs to Y and y is fact grounded in Y .

Chaining (F) If x is fact grounded in X then, for any y belonging to X and for
any Y such that y is fact grounded in Y : there are some Z to which Y belong
and x is fact grounded in Z .

The concept of Fact Grounding is entirely essentialist: it is defined within the essen-
tialist framework. With it, I can state the following connection between essence and
grounding.

Essence-Grounding Connection f is grounded in F if and only if f is fact

grounded in F.

As it stands, the Essence-Grounding Connection says only that grounding is equivalent

to Fact Grounding. But we might consider the stronger thesis: that the Essence-
Grounding Connection states a reduction of grounding to Fact Grounding. I am
inclined toward the stronger reading. In later sections I consider various applications
of Fact Grounding and respond to various objections to grounding and to rival essen-
tialist accounts of grounding. If the Essence-Grounding Connection is not taken to be
reductive then the applications and responses apply only to Fact Grounding, and so,
for example, certain objections to grounding may still hold, even though grounding
would be equivalent to some concept that is impervious to those objections. This is
a good reason to take the stronger connection. I henceforth interpret the connection
reductively.
Let us then see how the reduction works on a paradigm nonlogical case of grounding:
the case of determinables. Suppose we have a blue pen. Let b be the fact that the pen
is blue. The fact b is a determinate fact: it involves the ascription of a determinate
property to an item, namely the pen. Let c be the fact that the pen is colored. The fact c
is a determinable fact: it involves the ascription of a determinable property to an item,

14 Since Fact Grounding is crucial to articulating the connection between grounding and essence, I provide
a full formalization: f is fact grounded in G iffd f (∃R)[( f (E f → (∃F)(R f F ∧ E F))) ∧ (R f G ∧ E G)].

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namely the pen. The pair of facts b and c ascribe properties to the same item, namely
the pen.
We know c is grounded in B, where f belongs to B iff f is identical with b.
Plausibly, it is essential to c that c exists only if there are some F such that F are
determinates of c and F exist; and in fact B are determinates of c and B exist, where
‘are determinates of’ is a relation on facts that holds between f and F iff f and F
ascribe properties to the same item and are connected as determinable to determinate.
So, the Essence-Grounding Connection predicts that c is grounded in B.15

3 The applications

3.1 Impure logic of grounding

I will now apply the Essence-Grounding Connection to the impure logic of grounding.
I focus entirely on the introduction side of the logic and leave the elimination side for
another occasion. I will begin by defining a series of predicates to treat the quantifiers
and binary truth-functional connectives.
• R∀ f F =d f f is a universal fact and for any g, g belongs to F iff g is an instance
of f .16
• R∧ f F =d f f is a conjunctive fact and for any g, g belongs to F iff g is a conjunct
of f .
• R∃ f F =d f f is an existential fact and for any g, g belongs to F iff g is an existent
instance of f .
• R∨ f F =d f f is a disjunctive fact and for any g, g belongs to F iff g is an existent
disjunct of f .
We then use these predicates to express claims of being dependent concerning the
connectives and quantifiers.
• Let u be a universal fact. Then it is essential to u that u exists only if for some F,
R∀ u F and F exist.
• Let c be a conjunctive fact. Then it is essential to c that c exists only if for some
F, R∧ cF and F exist.
• Let e be an existential fact. Then it is essential to e that e exists only if for some
F, R∃ eF and F exist.17

15 This general strategy for treating determinables can be found in Rosen (2010).
16 For example, if we take the statement ‘Every natural number has a successor’ and formalize it
‘(∀x)[xN → (∃y)(Syx)]’ then for any term t ‘tN → (∃y)(Syt)’ expresses a fact that is an instance
of the universal fact. For example, there is the fact that I am a natural number only if I have a successor,
which is an instance of the universal. It is grounded in the fact that I am not a natural number. If a universal
statement ‘(∀x)(F x → Gx)’ is vacuoulsy true because nothing is F, then every instance of the universal
will be grounded at least in the negation of the antecedent. If a universal statement ‘(∀x)[F x]’ is false then
some instance Ft, which expresses a fact, is such that the fact it expresses fails to exist and the fact that
¬Ft exists. Recall that I am operating within a domain of possible facts and a distinguished predicate for
existence that sorts facts into those that obtain and those that do not.
17 There is a bit of redundancy here: the ascription of existence to F can be dropped, since the predicate
‘R∃ ’ holds only between an existential and its existent instances.

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• Let d be a disjunctive fact. Then it is essential to d that d exists only if for some
F, R∨ d F and F exist.18
Grounding claims will add a factivity component to produce statements of Fact
Grounding. For example, suppose we consider the conjunctive fact f ∧ g on the
assumption that both f and g exist. Then it is essential to f ∧ g that it exists only
if its conjuncts exist. In fact, f and g are its conjuncts and they exist. Therefore, the
Essence-Grounding Connection predicts that f ∧ g is grounded in f and g. This is
precisely the introduction rule for conjunction.19
The account does require one slight modification with respect to existential quan-
tification and disjunction. It is that (i) existentially quantified facts are grounded in
all their existent instances together and (ii) disjunctive facts are grounded in all their
existent disjuncts together. However, in each case, any existent instance or disjunct
alone suffices as a ground for the relevant disjunction or existential quantification.
We can distinguish the Distributive Groundings from the Non-Distributive Ground-
ings, where Distributive Groundings are such that any partial ground of a full ground
is a full ground.20 By contrast, Non-Distributive Groundings are not Distributive
Groundings.21 The cases of existential quantification and disjunction are Distribu-
tive Groundings.
A benefit of how the Essence-Grounding Connection handles the impure logic of
grounding is that it does not require totality facts to ground universally quantified facts,
about which some are skeptical. For example, (Carnino 2015, pp. 65–66; Skiles 2015,
§4.2) raise various issues for a predicational account of grounding that requires totality
facts: (i) that such a view violates the general principle that no nonfundamental entity
appears in any ungrounded fact, which would be violated if totality facts are taken
—as they seem to be— as ungrounded; (ii) that positing totality facts is unmotivated;
and (iii) that positing totality facts, if ungrounded, is inconsistent with some plausible
metaphysical positions. But the present account does not require totality facts.

3.2 Intergrounding

Some deny that grounding satisfies Non-Circularity (G) because there are cases of
interdependence (Thompson 2016), or what I will call intergrounding because ‘depen-
dence’ attaches to a non-factive concept on my account. I think the Essence-Grounding
Connection provides a way to accommodate cases of intergrounding while at the same

18 There is a bit of redundancy here: the ascription of existence to F can be dropped, since the predicate
‘R∨ ’ holds only between a disjunctive fact and its existent disjuncts.
19 Negations can then be dealt with in the way suggested in Fine (2012a, pp. 63–64). But the present
suffices to sketch how the account on offer begins to treat the grounds of first-order logic.
20 We can define a concept of partial grounding given the Essence-Grounding Connection and the definition
of partial existential grounding given in connection with Existential Grounding. So f will be partially
grounded in G iff for some F, G belongs to F and f is grounded in F. Similarly for the case of Fact
Grounding.
21 This may require introducing some surprising essential truths that involve somewhat contrived predicates,
such as ‘are a single true disjunct’, and so on. In any case, I am inclined to take the more general rules that
the account provides. For example, that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts together.

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time respecting Non-Circularity (G). Let us first consider an example of intergrounding

from Thompson (2016), which she attributes to Kit Fine.
Consider the case of volume, mass, and density. The volume of a substance is the
quotient of its mass (dividend) and density (divisor). The density of a substance is the
quotient of its mass (dividend) and volume (divisor). Finally, the mass of a substance
is the product of its density and volume.
Suppose that a sample of aluminum has a mass of 27 g, a volume of 10 cm3 , and a
density of 2.7 g/cm3 . Let m be the fact specifying the mass; v be the fact specifying the
volume; and d be the fact specifying the density. For the case to violate Non-Circularity
(G), the following should hold.

(1a) v is grounded in m and d.

(2a) d is grounded in m and v.
(3a) m is grounded in d and v.22

It is clear that (1a)–(3a) directly violate Non-Circularity (G). If true, they present a
case of intergrounding at the cost of Non-Circularity (G). But this is only the case if
cases of intergrounding are merely conjunctions of individual grounding claims. I do
not think that they are.
Alternatively, I deny that (1a)–(3a) are true and account for their seeming to be true
in the following way, which is reminiscent of how Fine deals with cases of so-called
reciprocal essence that would violate non-circularity for dependence (Fine 1994a,b,
§7). The alternative is instead to claim the following.
It is essential to v, d, and m together that:

1b v exists only if for some F: F are the mass dividend and density divisor for which
v is a quotient and F exist.23
2b Similar to (1b).
3b Similar to (1b).

Given the definition of Fact Grounding, (1b)–(3b) do not violate Non-Circularity (F)
because they are not instances of Fact Grounding. This is because (1b)–(3b) take the
collective essence of v, d, and m and not their individual essences. Generalizing from
the present case, we could define a concept of intergrounding along the following
lines.

F are intergrounded iffd f every f belonging to F is such that for some R: it is

essential to F that f exists only if it is related by R to the other facts belonging
to F; and they are so related and the other facts exist.

The definition allows us to maintain instances of intergrounding without giving up

Non-Circularity (F) and therefore Non-Circularity (G) given the Essence-Grounding
Connection.

22 Perhaps these are instances of merely partial grounding. For simplicity, we assume that they are cases
of full grounding if true.
23 The predicate ‘are the mass. . .’ takes a plural and singular argument.

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3.3 The coarse-grainedness of ground

Koslicki (2015) and Wilson (2014) are skeptical about the concept of grounding. This
in part has to do with its broad application to disparate phenomena without any clear
unification. In this regard, Koslicki claims that “the grounding idiom is not sufficiently
fine-grained to shed much light on the nature of the connections that are at play in
putative cases of grounding” (Koslicki 2015, p. 339). For example, it is thought that
conjuncts ground conjunctions; determinates ground determinables; physical facts
ground mental facts; etc. It is all but clear, they say, how these instances are unified
under the concept of grounding in a way that respects the fact that different relations
are at play in different cases.
I think these worries can be alleviated if we accept the Essence-Grounding Con-
nection. This is because Fact Grounding allows different predicates to undergird the
Essence-Grounding Connection in different instances. For example, in the case of
determinables the relevant predicate was ‘are determinates of’. In the case of the
impure logic of grounding, different predicates were defined for each of conjunction,
disjunction, existential quantification and universal quantification. But all are instances
of grounding given the Essence-Grounding Connection because they are instances of
Fact Grounding. So the predicate quantifier allows for different predicates to undergird
different instances of Fact Grounding and the essentialist operator unifies the predi-
cates under those that can undergird instances of Fact Grounding, which is an elite club.

3.4 Unwanted dependencies

Any account of grounding in terms of essence runs the risk of unwanted dependencies.
For example, suppose we thought that when some facts ground another then it is
essential to the grounded fact that the grounds suffice for it. Then the grounds are
involved in the essence of what is grounded and so what is grounded in some sense
depends on what grounds it.
But take the fact that something is a philosopher. It is grounded in the fact that
Socrates is a philosopher. On the account just given, it is essential to the existential
that the existence of this particular instance suffice for the existence of the existential
fact. However, “the existential fact knows nothing of Socrates” and so the dependence
is unwanted (Correia 2013; Fine 2012a).
But if we accept the Essence-Grounding Connection, there are no such unwanted
dependences. Assume Fact Grounding and let e be the fact that something is a philoso-
pher and let s be the fact that Socrates is a philosopher. Suppose further that Socrates
is the only philosopher. Then e will be grounded in S, where f belongs to S iff f is
identical with s, since S are the existent instances of e. Yet S will not be contained
within the essence of e. Given Fact Grounding the essence of e will include only that
e exists only if it has some existent instances. It does not specify what those instances
are. For this reason there are no unwanted dependencies.24

24 It is this aspect of the Essence-Grounding Connection—namely, the definition in terms of Existen-

tially Dependent over something with the rigidity of Existential Dependence— that evades objections that

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4 Objections and replies

4.1 Commitment to facts

The Essence-Grounding Connection takes a relational approach to grounding: state-

ments of grounding are formed, not by a sentential operator, but rather by a predicate
that takes names of facts as arguments. An objection to the view might be that state-
ments of grounding are not, as such, committed to facts but that the Essence-Grounding
Connection is committed to facts, at least if anything is grounded. Therefore, the
Essence-Grounding Connection fails, at least as a reduction.
I think that there a few lines of response to this objection. The first is that part of the
purpose of introducing the concept of grounding is so that we may be ontologically
permissive but fundamentally conservative. In general, grounding theorists are not
worried about ontological commitments (Schaffer 2009; Fine 2001). Given this, it is
consistent with the general metaphysical outlook that there are facts—perhaps proofs
can even be given for them along the lines of Schaffer (2009)— and so it is harmless to
employ them for theoretical purposes. Even if we take a relational approach to ground-
ing, this does not imply that facts are fundamental items, i.e. existentially independent
items. Perhaps the initial claim should be so qualified: statements of grounding, as
such, are not committed to facts being fundamental items. The Grounding-Essence
Connection seems consistent with this view.25
In any event, I think an operational variant on the concept of Fact Grounding can be
given. I will not develop the alternative in detail. But I will walk through one example.
Suppose we follow (Correia 2013) in allowing the essentialist operator to be indexed
to items functioning syntactically as sentences, in addition to names. Suppose further
that we introduce a sentential operator ‘It is a determinate of its being the case that
A that A’ to capture our relation of determination, but we allow the second position
to be occupied by distinctively plural sentential terms for which we use variable ‘A’.
Then the following plausibly holds: It is essential to its being the case that the pen is
colored that it is the case that the pen is colored only if for some A: it is a determinate
of its being the case that the pen is colored that A and it is the case that B, where ‘B’
contains only ‘The pen is blue’. Importantly, I deploy the operator ‘It is the case that’
to play the role of the distinguished predicate ‘exists’ in the relational formulation of
Fact Grounding. The result is devoid of relational predicates and yet it is a relative of
Fact Grounding.

Footnote 24 continued
Schnieder (2017) raises against other theorists, such as Schaffer (2016), who link grounding and existential
dependence.
25 For example, consider the disjunctive fact f ∨ g. Suppose that F are its true disjuncts and so f ∨ g is fact
grounded in F, where g belongs to F iff g = f . Suppose further that f is not fact grounded in anything and
so, for the sake of argument, is a fundamental fact. This does not imply that f is a fundamental item, since
f is plausibly existentially grounded in its constituents X . Since ‘X ’ is not a sorted variable ranging over
pluralities of facts, this is not an instance of fact grounding and so does not disrupt f ’s being a fundamental
fact, even though it is not a fundamental item. For our purposes here, (i) to be a fundamental item is to not be
existentially grounded in anything; and (ii) to be a fundamental fact is to not be fact grounded in anything.

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4.2 What about necessitation?

Many think that grounding satisfies Necessitation (deRosset 2013; Fine 2012a;
Dasgupta 2016).
Necessitation If f is grounded in F then it is necessary that F exist only if f
exists.
An argument against the Grounding-Essence Connection may be as follows.

1. Grounding satisfies Necessitation.

2. Fact Grounding does not satisfy Necessitation.
Therefore, 3. the Essence-Grounding Connection is false.

But it is not clear that (1) holds. There seem to be counterexamples (Leuenberger
2014; Skiles 2015). For example, suppose that every existing chair has four legs and
that this holds because b has four legs and c has four legs and they are the only existing
chairs. Yet possibly, b, c, and d are the existing chairs and b has four legs and c has
four legs but d has two legs, in which case the fact that d is not an existing chair or
has four legs does not exist. So Necessitation fails because b and c having four legs
does not by necessity suffice for the existence of the fact that every existing chair has
four legs.
In any case, it is not clear that (2) holds. First, we need to define one further concept.
Given the definition of Fact Grounding, let us say that it is undergirded by R that f is
fact grounded in G if and only if it is essential to f that f exists only if for some F:
R f F and F exist, and in fact R f G and G exist. For example, it is undergirded by ‘are
the conjuncts of’ that f ∧ g is fact grounded in f and g. Then consider the following
two theses.
Necessitation* If it is undergirded by R that f is fact grounded in F then it is
necessary that if F exist and R f F then f exists.
Potent Grounds If it is undergirded by R that f is fact grounded in F then
necessarily, if F exist then R f F and f exists.
If Fact Grounding satisfies Potent Grounds then together they imply Necessitation.
Potent Grounds is plausible in some cases. For example, it is undergirded by ‘are the
conjuncts of’ that f ∧ g is fact grounded in f and g. Moreover, it is necessary that if
f and g exist then f and g are the conjuncts of f ∧ g and f ∧ g exists. But Potent
Grounds is less plausible in those cases Skiles raises against Necessitation. So one
way to defend Necessitation would be to provide an argument for Potent Grounds.
If (1) does not hold then Necessitation* is plausible in place of Necessitation. For
Necessitation* is not susceptible to Skiles’s counterexample concerning restricted
universal quantification. In the alternative scenario, although the fact that b has four
legs and the fact that c has four legs exist, some instance—the fact that c is an existing
chair only if it has four legs—does not exist, since neither the fact that the c is not
an existing chair nor the fact that it has four legs exists. So the Essence-Grounding
Connection need not decide the issue of Necessitation. But it does help to clarify what
is at stake in that debate.

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All things considered, the Essence-Grounding Connection, and the concept of Fact
Grounding that underwrites it, provide a powerful account of grounding. This makes
some progress towards closing an open problem for grounding.

Acknowledgements Thanks to Louis deRosset, Kit Fine, Kathrin Koslicki, Donnchadh O’Conaill, Mike
Raven, Riin Sirkel, Tuomas Tahko, and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

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