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a.j.wilson@bham.ac.

uk 16/03/17

The Gaps between the Grounds: Schaffer on Grounding Ground


Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham & Monash University)

Plan
- Describe Jonathan Schaffer’s ‘tripartite structure’ for metaphysical explanation.
- Offer a route to simplifying the tripartite worldview.

Schaffer on the Tripartite Structure of Explanation.


“Explanation has a tripartite structure of source, link, and result. With causal explanation, there is the structure of
cause (such as the rock striking the window), law (laws of nature), and effect (such as the shattering of the window).
Metaphysical explanation has a parallel structure, involving ground (the more fundamental source), principle
(metaphysical principles of grounding), and grounded (the less fundamental result). One finds a similar structure with
logical explanation, involving premise, inference rule, and conclusion.” – Schaffer (forthcoming) p.2
“The world for explanation must not just divide into fundamental and derivative items, but it must also host functions
between items.” – Schaffer (MS) p.9

Simplifying the Tripartite Structure


Schaffer maintains that grounds and groundeds (on the one hand) and grounding principles (on the
other) are fundamentally different kinds of thing: there is a deep categorial difference dividing
aspects of reality. But there need be no such categorial difference, if the grounding principles are
themselves the kind of things that can ground and be grounded.
There are two main approaches to what grounds the holding of the grounding relation between a
ground fact [A] and a grounded fact [B]:
Collapse View: [A] grounds [[A] grounds [B]]
Essence View: The nature of [B] grounds [[A] grounds [B]]
Shamik Dasgupta (2014) has criticised the Collapse View on the basis i) that it does not tell us what it
is about [A] that grounds the grounding facts involved, and ii) that it does not distinguish between
explanations for the various grounding facts that involve [A] as ground. The Essence View is
intended to resolve these problems.
Schaffer introduces his categorial difference between ground/grounded and grounding principle to
respond to these objections and redeem the Collapse View: “tripartite structure helps sustain the otherwise
excellent collapse view against Dasgupta’s otherwise compelling objections” – Schaffer (MS) p.12
I want to suggest a third option:
Principle View: [A] and [the grounding principle connecting [A] and [B]] jointly ground
[[A] grounds [B]].
We can go on to ask what grounds (this instance of) the Principle View itself, since it is itself a
grounding fact. But we can continue to give answers of the same sort: the Principle View is jointly
grounded in [A], [the grounding principle connecting [A] and [B]], and [the grounding principle
connecting [A] and [the grounding principle connecting [A] and [B]] to [[A] grounds [B].
What we now obtain is a complex grounding structure in which grounding principles appear both as
grounds and as groundeds. But there is no need for a categorial difference of the kind Schaffer
posits. So the Principle View has a significant advantage in ideological simplicity over Schaffer’s
proposed picture.
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a.j.wilson@bham.ac.uk 16/03/17

The Principle View appears well-motivated. Why is it that the existence of Socrates grounds the
existence of Singleton Socrates? Intuitively: partly because of a principle of set theory. Why is that
the correct answer to our question? Intuitively: partly because of whatever higher-order principle
connects principles of set theory and the existence of set elements on the one hand with the
existence of sets on the other.
What is this higher-order principle? The simplest possible suggestion seems to be:
Conjecture A: The grounding principle of all grounding facts from the second order on upwards is
[grounding principles materially imply the holding of the connections they mediate].
Conjecture B: Nothing grounds [grounding principles materially imply the holding of the
connections they mediate]: it is fundamental.
The intuitive picture here is that the general principle that [grounding principles materially imply the
holding of the connections they mediate] is partly responsible for the holding of all connections
between grounding principle and grounds on the one hand and the resulting grounding facts on the
other – including second-order and above connections where it itself plays the role of grounding principle. (Note that
this is not to say that it grounds itself.)
A potential challenge to the Principle View: the ground and the grounding principle play distinctively different
roles in explaining why the ground grounds the grounded. This is true. But we have the resources to draw this
distinction. The grounding principle will take the form of a conditional connecting the other grounds
to the grounded fact. The grounds will be characterized by the antecedent of this conditional.
Why does Schaffer think the Principle View, with its one ontological category, cannot account for
metaphysical explanation? Perhaps he is moved by an analogy with the logical case. In the case of
logical explanations, as indicated by Lewis Carroll’s parable of Achilles and the Tortoise, we need a
distinction in kind between premises (even conditional premises) and inference rules. Without rules,
all we have is a big bag of premises, but as yet no conclusion. But I think that the analogy breaks
down. (The analogy between grounding and causation remains good, but it gives rise to no problem
of this sort.) Logical explanations do not state objective dependencies at all, but merely reflect
conceptual or representational dependencies: they are unworldly. This is controversial, of course. But if
it is correct, then we have the beginnings of an account of why a distinction between premises and
rules is needed in logic, but no analogous distinction is needed in metaphysics. Logical inference,
unlike metaphysical grounding, is something we do.
Why does Schaffer accept the Collapse View?
“First, it offers an elegant and systematic answer to the question of what grounds the grounding facts. Second, it
discharges any fears about infinities. The infinite sequence is an expansion out from the grounds, that is just as
unproblematic as the infinite sequences of disjunctive expansions (and double-negations etc.) that all come out of a single
starting proposition: p, p⋁q, p⋁q⋁r, p⋁q⋁r⋁s… In particular there is no threat of a limitless regression of ever deeper
grounds. It all just comes down to the very facts that one had designated as fundamental already. Thirdly—and to my
mind most saliently—the collapse view befits a fundamentalist image, on which “all God would need to do” is to put
the fundamentals in place, and these (given the grounding principles) would be enough to generate the rest…” –
Schaffer (MS) p.15 (n.b. this is an early draft of Schaffer’s; please do not quote or cite further.)
All these reasons, so far as I can see, carry over to the Principle View. And the Principle View has the
further advantage of not requiring a categorical distinction between facts and grounding principles.

References
Dasgupta, S. (2014). “The Possibility of Physicalism”, Journal of Philosophy 111: 557–92.
Schaffer, J. (Forthcoming). “The Ground Between the Gaps”, Philosophers’ Imprint.
Schaffer, J. (MS). “The World for Explanation”. In preparation.

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