(9) Freedman v.

Maryland – 380 US 51

Facts of the case

Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The
board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite
crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the
law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior
approval itself was unconstitutional.

Issue
Did the the Maryland law violate the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?

Held
The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the
statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed
overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in
the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate
safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are
to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require
judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination
"within a specified time period."

(10) Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – GR 115444, Oct. 30, 1995

FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the
petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by
the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press.
At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed
freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts
that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered
or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a
definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies
provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a
constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely
subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject.
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license
tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is,
however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To
subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make
the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such
taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the
security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of
another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it
impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that
while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products,
food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of
real property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and
veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services was already exempt under
Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in
error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting
those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality
and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be
taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like
the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive
system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct
taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.” The
mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

(11) Alexander v. US – 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441

Facts. The Petitioner owned 13 adult bookstores throughout Minnesota. He was convicted on 17
obscenity counts and 3 RICO violations. The obscenity convictions were based on the sale of 4
magazines and 3 videotapes. He was sentence to 6 years in prison, fined $100,000 and ordered to
pay the cost of trial and incarceration for the obscenity counts. In addition, he was ordered to
forfeit his businesses and nearly $9 million in profits.

Issue. Is the court order to shut down the adult bookstores an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech?

Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) rejected the argument that
the sentence violated Petitioner’s First Amendment constitutional rights, but remanded for
reconsideration under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
The items were seized as punishment not a prior restraint.

Dissent. This is an authorization to suppress disfavored speech.

Discussion. The majority emphasizes the definition of a prior restraint to distinguish it from a
subsequent judgment. The stores were shut down because they were related to past wrongdoings.
The Petitioner is free to start another adult bookstore chain once he serves his sentence. So, this
action is not a content-based restraint.

(12) INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529 (1996)

THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the

religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by
the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB).
These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial
biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs. 

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The

RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its
TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The
CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV
program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against
another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to
the Supreme Court.

II.    THE ISSUES

(1)  Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2)  Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the
action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119,
and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the
jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1.    YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV

program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986
that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include
religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is
urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on

TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule
that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as
religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he
Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of
religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should
not stand still.
 2.    YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioner’s religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will
be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
“attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the
evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by
the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered
by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by
petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they
may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent
board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks
other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and
the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology.
The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the
spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the

clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court
held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. .
. it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint
on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality
already on ground.

(13) SWS v. COMELEC, GR 147571, May 5, 2001

Facts: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that the
restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise
of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim
that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992,
1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support
the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by
election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from
explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing
articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that
there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which
are relatively objective.

Issue: Whether COMELEC restriction on survey during the Election period constitute a violation
of the Freedom of Expression.

Held: Yes, the court hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and
leaves freedom of speech, expression, and the press with little protection. For anyone who can
bring a plausible justification forward can easily show a rational connection between the statute
and a legitimate governmental purpose.

In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and
individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court
laid the basis for what has been called the “balancing-of-interests”, the “balancing” test requires
a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation or type of situation.
In the actual application of the “balancing-of-interests” test, the crucial question is: how much
deference should be given to the legislative judgment?

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power
restricting the individual’s freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so
restricted, “are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions,” a wide range of
factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are:

(a) the social values and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom
restricted by the legislation;

(b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect,
whether or not the persons affected are few;

(c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation —
the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent;

(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and
necessary for the protection of such public interest; and

(e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by
some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.

(14) Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008

THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact

disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-
President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent
DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he
had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found
to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” 

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV
network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to
them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority
explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or
telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV
stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority.  It warned that their broadcast/airing
of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to
the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement
which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with
sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary

Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

II.    THE ISSUES

1.    Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?

2.    Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution? 

III.   THE RULING

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and
Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro and Velasco in the minority)  in granting the petition insofar as respondent
Secretary Gonzalez’s press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ
Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ.
Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in
granting the same insofar as NTC’s press statement was concerned.]

1.    NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will
NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on

content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger
rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger
test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar
however are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying
the clear and present danger test.  Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the
public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered”
version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The
identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant
proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.  Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets
of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the

exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds
and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have
only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger national
security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without
more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of
law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging
whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the
clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law.  By all means, violations of law should be vigorously
prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence.  But to repeat, the
need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech
and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger
test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.

2.    YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and

the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed
the Constitution.

[I]t  is  not  decisive that the press statements made by respondents were

not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that
the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their
official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as
Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of
media.  Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.  The
concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal
order or official circular.  Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on
prior restraint.  The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as
they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and
press.

(15) Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy, GR 170270 and 179411, April 2, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast
station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela.
Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office,
and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location
is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly
thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning
Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that
petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was
converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s
permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property
from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the
DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the
same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia,
City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus
Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election
period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004,
but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had
no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after
elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts
denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits,
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to
require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However,
nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an
approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime
agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang
Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial.
Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a
commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property
as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the
fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is not
bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts
and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not
bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or
agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and
unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection
and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . .,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against
private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the
government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of
the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there
is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City
government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for
commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001
certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped
from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the
Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence,
which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in
doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to
secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted
from prime agricultural land to commercial land.”
Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners
have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to
have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms
that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial
and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and
suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to
immediately issue petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for 2004 to petitioners.
 (16) MTRCB v. ABS-CBN, GR 155282, January 17, 2005

Facts : On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-
tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to
pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and
some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was
named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft
Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The showing of "The
Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and
Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3
with petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a
formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that
respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited
the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations respondents explained that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power,
authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents

Issue : WON the “inside story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press

Held : Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press
has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from
the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom
bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
 (17) Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. – 137 SCRA 628

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station

DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of national
security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite
people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they
were denied due process. There was no hearing to
establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the
closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression.
Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon
the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights
of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana;
who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite
the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are
no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case)
the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
“RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case
of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the

Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio

Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing
is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down
in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69
Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed
before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay
Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s

case and submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that
is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at
hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent
consideration of law and facts and not simply accept
subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the
proceeding can know the various issued involved and
reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and

precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable
standard that government actions must conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of

the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
expression. The court stresses that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has the
right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the
limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and
present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the
media is used in such nature as to create this danger that
will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to
prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used
to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread
uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The
people continues to have the right to be informed on public
affairs and broadcast media continues to have the
pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible
form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the
the special protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution.

(18) Miriam College Foundation v. CA, GR 127930, December 15, 2000

Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper
were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of
complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains
obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the
defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against
them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee
to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue.
Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and
imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said
Discipline Board over the defendants.
Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the
Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of
the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the
institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and
attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld
the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of
the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act
provides that  the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they
write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to
investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
Constitution. The court held that Miriam Collegehas the authority to hear and decide the cases
filed against respondent students.

(19) Sanidad v. COMELEC – 181 SCRA 529

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
991 to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its
existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions
that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the
citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several
proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16,
and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting
that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of
October 16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised
is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also
asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs
991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3
maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one.
This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments
to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect,
through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment
procedure raises a contestable issue.

(20) Adiong v. COMELEC – March 31, 1992

Facts: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas
that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print
political advertisements.

Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.

Ratio: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places whether public
or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
 (21) Lopez v. CA – 34 SCRA 116
FACTS:
On 23 March 1968, Juliana executed a notarial will,whereby she expressed that she wished to
constitute a trust fund for her paraphernal properties, denominated as Fideicomiso de Juliana
Lopez Manzano (Fideicomiso), to be administered by her husband. If her husband were to die or
renounce the obligation, her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to become administrator and executor
of the Fideicomiso. Two-thirds (2/3) of the income from rentals over these properties were to
answer for the education of deserving but needy honor students, while one-third 1/3 was to
shoulder the expenses and fees of the administrator. As to her conjugal properties, Juliana
bequeathed the portion that she could legally dispose to her husband, and after his death, said
properties were to pass to her biznietos or great grandchildren. Juliana initiated the probate of her
will five (5) days after its execution, but she died on 12 August 1968, before the petition for
probate could be heard. The petition was pursued instead in Special Proceedings (S.P.) No. 706
by her husband, Jose, who was the designated executor in the will. On 7 October 1968, the Court
of First Instance, Branch 3, Balayan,Batangas, acting as probate court, admitted the will to
probate and issued the letters testamentary to Jose. Jose then submitted an inventory of Juliana’s
real and personal properties with their appraised values, which was approved by the probate
court. Thereafter, Jose filed a Report dated 16 August 1969, which included a proposed project
of partition. Jose proceeded to offer a project of partition.Then, Jose listed those properties which
he alleged were registered in both his and Juliana’s names, totaling 13 parcels in all. The
disputed properties consisting of six (6) parcels, all located in Balayan, Batangas, were included
in said list. On 25 August 1969, the probate court issued an order approving the project of
partition. As to the properties to be constituted into the Fideicomiso, the probate court ordered
that the certificates of title thereto be cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, new certificates be issued in
favor of Jose as trustee of the Fideicomiso covering one-half (1/2) of the properties listed under
paragraph 14 of the project of partition; and regarding the other half, to be registered in the name
of Jose as heir of Juliana. The properties which Jose had alleged as registered in his and Juliana’s
names, including the disputed lots, were adjudicated to Jose as heir, subject to the condition that
Jose would settle the obligations charged on these properties. The probate court, thus, directed
that new certificates of title be issued in favor of Jose as the registered owner thereof in its Order
dated 15 September 1969. On even date, the certificates of title of the disputed properties were
issued in the name of Jose. The Fideicomiso was constituted in S.P No. 706 encompassing one-
half (1/2) of the Abra de Ilog lot on Mindoro, the 1/6 portion of the lot in Antorcha St. in
Balayan, Batangas and all other properties inherited ab intestato by Juliana from her sister,
Clemencia, in accordance with the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 706. The disputed lands
were excluded from the trust. Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a holographic will disposing of
the disputed properties to respondents. The will was allowed probate on 20 December 1983 in
S.P. No. 2675 before the RTC of Pasay City. Pursuant to Jose’s will, the RTC ordered on 20
December 1983 the transfer of the disputed properties to the respondents as the heirs of Jose.
Consequently, the certificates of title of the disputed properties were cancelled and new ones
issued in the names of respondents. Petitioner’s father, Enrique Lopez, also assumed the
trusteeship of Juliana’s estate. On 30 August 1984, the RTC of Batangas, Branch 9 appointed
petitioner as trustee of Juliana’s estate in S.P. No. 706. On 11 December 1984, petitioner
instituted an action for reconveyance of parcels of land with sum of money before the RTC of
Balayan, Batangas against respondents. The complaint essentially alleged that Jose was able to
register in his name the disputed properties, which were the paraphernal properties of Juliana,
either during their conjugal union or in the course of the performance of his duties as executor of
the testate estate of Juliana and that upon the death of Jose, the disputed properties were included
in the inventory as if they formed part of Jose’s estate when in fact Jose was holding them only
in trust for the trust estate of Juliana. The RCT dismissed the petition on the ground of
prescription. The CA denied the appeals filed by both parties. Hence, this petition.
 
ISSUE: Whether an implied trust was constituted over the disputed properties when Jose, the
trustee, registered them in his name.
 
HELD:
 
The disputed properties were excluded from the Fideicomiso at the outset. Jose registered the
disputed properties in his name partly as his conjugal share and partly as his inheritance from his
wife Juliana, which is the complete reverse of the claim of the petitioner, as the new trustee, that
the properties are intended for the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso. Furthermore, the exclusion
of the disputed properties from the Fideicomiso was approved by the probate court and,
subsequently, by the trial court having jurisdiction over the Fideicomiso. The registration of the
disputed properties in the name of Jose was actually pursuant to a court order. The apparent
mistake in the adjudication of the disputed properties to Jose created a mere implied trust of the
constructive variety in favor of the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso.

(22) Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak – 137 SCRA 717

Facts : In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to
exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes
and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners
stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on
November 12, 1984, respondent Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion
for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the
sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-
committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further
Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit
until these deficiencies are supplied

Issue : WON the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

 Held : Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
vital problems of human interest and public concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied
contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and
obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the
patronage of the State. Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function
if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys.
There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine
what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal
primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by
an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully
may be considered obscene. On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in
Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of
unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a
fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional
questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the
other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. There can be no valid objection to the
controlling standard. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its
perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH
VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The
supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might
misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove
the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of
obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures
where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is
hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot
be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring
for the welfare of the young.

(23) Fernando v. CA, GR 159751, December 6, 2006

FACT: Acting
on reports of sale and distribution of
pornographic materials, officers of the PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital
Region conducted police surveillance on the store
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair) in Quiapo. A
Search Warrant for violation of Article 201 of RPC against
petitioner and a certain Warren Tingchuy and the seizure of
the following items:

a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene

pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene
pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude
obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.

The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-

five VHS tapes(among of which is “Kahit sa Pangarap Lang”
with Myra Manibog as actress who is naked) and ten
different magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic,
Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI), which they deemed
pornographic. Petitioners were charged and convicted. CA
affirmed the decision hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming RTC’s

decision.

Held: No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which

the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect the public from obscene, immoral and
indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
(Kottinger Rule Applied).

(24) PBM Employees v. PBM – 51 SCRA 189

Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in
protest for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation
of their CBA agreement however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable
assembly to seek redress of their grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their
employer. Respondent dismissed the petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of
bargaining in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the
petitioners.

Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious
purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid
and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the
right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged
police indignities. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well
as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of
the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes
a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. 
 (25) JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing – 125 SCRA 553

FACTS: Petitioners sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally, requesting for the
removal of the foreign military bases in Manila, starting from Luneta park to the gates of the US
Embassy. Respondent Mayor denied the request as recommended by the police authorities and
suggested another area where the safety of the participants and the general public may be
ensured. Petitioner contends that said denial was a violation of free speech and assembly.

ISSUE: WON denial of a public rally on a public park and the US Embassy is a violation of
constitutional guarantee to free speech and assembly.

HELD: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to
public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be
no legal objection, absent of clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta and US Embassy as the place for the peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Moreover, denial of permit for a rally in front of the US Embassy is justified only in
the presence of a clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.

(26) Malabanan v. Ramento – 129 SCRA 359

FACTS:         Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On
the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place
from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a
result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they
were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year.
They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?

Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who
are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time
and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic
personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.
 (27) De la Cruz v. CA, GR 126183, March 25, 1999

FACTS

Petitioners are public school teachers who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended,
and eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was alleged that the teachers
participated in the mass action/ illegal strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also violated the return-
to-work order issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the DECS despite the 5 day
period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and subsequently dismissed from office
by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed upon them the reduced
penalty of six month’s suspension. However in view of the length of time that the teachers had
been out of service due to the dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC likewise ordered their
immediate reinstatement without back wages.

ISSUE

1. Whether the teachers’ conducts are prejudicial to the best interest of service.

2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period of 3 years pending their
appeal deducting the 6 months’ suspension eventually meted out to them.

HELD

1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service servants. Although the
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is guaranteed
by the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within reasonable limits. The public school
teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging the mass protests on
regular school days, abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the return to work
order.
2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the grant of backwages in administrative
disciplinary cases.

(28) Ruiz v. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233

Facts:
Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, filed a
petition for mandamus against Richard Gordon to be allowed to hold a parade/march from
Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M.
The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by stating the request for a
prayer rally was received in the Office of the Mayor and that respondent had repeatedly
announced in his regular program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday
morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees that he would grant the
request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly.
When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned the fact
that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared in the November 22-
28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper.
Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was complied with.

Issue: Can the petition be granted?

Held No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the role of the
judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles.
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.”

(29) BAYAN v. Ermita – GR 169838, April 25, 2006

 FACTS:

Rallies or the right to peaceably assemble to express freedom of expression, to petition for
redress of grievances hounding the government which was co-organized by various mass based
groups, and as Bayan and KMU sometime in September 26 and October 4-6 2005 has been
violently preempted and and forcibly dispersed causing injuries by police and peace keeping
authorities under the “no permit, no rally” policy whereby enforcing the Batasang Pambansa Blg
880, otherwise known as the “Public Assembly Act of 1985” and the Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) Policy recently in force “in lieu of” maximum tolerance under the directive of
the office of the Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita.

ISSUE:

Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can immediately dissuade the courts
in resolving the case?

RULING:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.                       During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. The Court holds that
President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

(30) Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the
purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance,
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and
State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the
aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
 (31) Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were
passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every

fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will
be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor.
The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao
Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the
church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the
replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No.
12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The
priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The
priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that
Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was
violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution

violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody
of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of
the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s
custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the
council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their
property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if
they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the
Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity
which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious
tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money
or property.

(32) Tilton v. Richardson, 403 US 672

Facts of the case

The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-
sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-
religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been
given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.

ISSUE

Did the Act violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?

HELD

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing
that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect
of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not
used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were
"indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also held that the Act did
not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less
susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that
one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.

(33) Zobrest v. Catalina, No. 92-94 June 18, 1993

FACT
James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where
the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send
their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to
provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on
constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school
district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The
District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter
would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious
development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE

May a school district decline to provide an interpreter to a deaf child based on the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment?
HELD
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the
Establishment Clause did not bar the school district from providing the requested interpreter.
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for
parents to choose a sectarian school, the presence of an interpreter is not linked to the state and is
the result of the private decision of individual's parents. "The service at issue in this case is part
of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as
'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature' of the school the child attends," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

(34) Lee v. Welsman, US No. 90-1014, June 24, 1992

FACTS
In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in
Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at
his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the
graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought
a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where
prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence
public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their
schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the
schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.
ISSUE
Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
HELD
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a
state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts
with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect
coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which
establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that
government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on
by government.

(35) Manosca v. CA, 252 SCRA 412

Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by
Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of the
birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the
Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the
expropriation was not for a public purpose.
Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be
granted.

Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking
is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture
and history of the Philippines.

(36) Islamic Dawah v. ES, GR 153888, July 9, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the

Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal

certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to

certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently,

Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and

designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this

petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the

constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded

preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this

preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA

the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious

freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what

food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing

halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the

Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

 The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the

case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to

OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Issue:

Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the

separation of Church and State.

Held:

No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was

accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed

this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA

the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the

religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims

what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of

issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation

of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the

security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the
case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim

organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on

the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to

OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

(37) Taruc v. Dela Cruz, 453 SCRA 123

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,

1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine

Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a

complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the

Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done

without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is

a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said

institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the

performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of

religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not

interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or

property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

(38) UCCP v. Bradford, 674 SCRA 92

FACTS:

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is a national confederation
of incorporated and unincorporated self-governing Evangelical churches of different
denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel and cooperation. Bradford
United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), is likewise a religious corporation with a
personality separate and distinct from UCCP.

UCCP has 3 governing bodies: the General Assembly, the Conference and the Local
Churches. BUCCI belonged to the Cebu Conference Inc. and enjoyed a peaceful co-
existence until late 1989 when the BUCCI constructed a fence that encroached upon the
right of way allocated by the UCCP for CCI.

The General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute and rendered a decision in favor
of CCI. This triggered a series of events, which further increased enmity and led to the
formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP. Consequently, BUCCI filed its amended Articles
of Incorporation and By-Laws, which provided for and affected its disaffiliation from
UCCP. SEC approved the same. UCCP filed a complaint before SEC to reject the same
but SEC dismissed UCCP's petition. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not, SEC has the jurisdiction over matters involving UCCP and BUCCI.

RULING:

YES. Being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that SEC
shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations. Even with
their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal
and corporate. Well-settled is the judicial dictum that factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as SEC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.
They are binding upon this Court which is not a trier of facts. Only upon clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion, or that such factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record will this Court step in and proceed to make its own
independent evaluation of the facts. No cogent reason exists in the instant cases to
deviate from this settled rule. #END
 (39) Victoriano v. Elizalde, 59 SCRA 94
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the
"Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company) since 1958. 

2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as
Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision
which reads as follows: 
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees
workers covered by this Agreement. 

3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day,
March 4, 1964. 

4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as
a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
in any such labor organization". 

5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was
taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he
was resigning from the Union as a member. 

6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee
could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing
Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining
agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no
jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 

CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his
present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500
for attorney's fees and the costs of this action 

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law. 

ISSUE/S:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization" is unconstitutional

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it
"prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such
sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said
members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6)
of the 1935 Constitution

RULING:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict,
the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. 

If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the
labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they
can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and
neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. 

(40) Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296

FACTS
Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly
Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching
people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and
his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors
to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law
breach of the peace.
ISSUE
Did the Cantwells’ convictions violate the First Amendment? 
HELD
In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells’ actions were protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while
general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were
not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and
which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that
while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the
suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to
many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.

(41) American Bible Society v. City of Manila – 104 Phil. 386

Facts: New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of
charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education
contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order
barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members from office for
failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of
textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional.
The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no
standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not
unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in
some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court
believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon
the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of
Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff Society.

WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
 (42) Wisconsin v. Yoder – 406 US 205

FACTS
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin
Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a
Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents
refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school
attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.
ISSUE
Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16
violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their
children to school for religious reasons?
HELD
The Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth
grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values
and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life
mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would
not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice
William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder. Justices
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

(43) German v. Baranganan – 135 SCRA 514

Facts: Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St.
Jude Chapel, which adjoined Malacañang. Respondent barred them for
security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.

Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious

worship but to conduct an anti- government demonstration since they wore
yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- government
slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise
must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was
designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, government
officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices
within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to
prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full
control and had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no
clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security
of Malacanang.

(44) Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – 249 SCRA 628

FACTS Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the

Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings
in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known
as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and
co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that
the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

(45) Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos – 236 SCRA 197

Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for
the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.

In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund
drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.

The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay,
a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.

P.D. 1564 provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan.

In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense
so as to include a religious purpose.

Held/Ratio:

The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately
and independently of each other.

In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that it was
not the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The
world “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.

The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
acquitted of the offense charged.

(46) Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeach – No. 91-948, June 11, 1993
FACTS
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria.
Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would
be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the
announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council
adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession
of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.
ISSUE
Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause?
HELD
Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The
ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly
tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to
the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more
religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious
belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive
the rigors of strict scrutiny.

(47) Lamb’s Chapel v. School Disctrict No.91-2024, June 7, 1993

FACTS
A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and
facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its
property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use
the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child
rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court.
ISSUE
Did the District violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech when it denied Lamb's Chapel
the use of school premises to show religious-oriented films?
HELD
Yes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the District
violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show movies on school premises
solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted
under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker
identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the District's
restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all
other views about family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a
religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the District's premises
would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the
films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.

(48) Estrada v. Escritor – AM P-021651, August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with
him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear
as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

(49) Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 SCRA 488

FACTS
Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but
he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as
the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court
on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.
ISSUE
Does a state requirement that a candidate for public office profess a belief in God in order to be
eligible violate the First Amendment protection of the freedom of religion?
HELD
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that such a
requirement places the state of Maryland firmly on the side of those people who believe in God
and are willing to state their belief. With this requirement, Maryland effectively aids religions
that profess a belief in God at the expense of any other form of belief or disbelief. The First
Amendment expressly prohibits a state from taking this position. Although the candidate has the
option of not pursuing public office rather than declaring a belief in God, the test is an
unconstitutional encroachment on the freedom of religion. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice
John M. Harlan concurred in the result.

(50) Pamil v. Teleron – 86 SCRA 413

FACTS         In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A
petition was filed against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for
public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been
impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.

ISSUE
The 1987 Constitution of the PhilippinesPhilippine government in action and the Philippine
constitution

HELD:  The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no
longer operative. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise
of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice
Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code.  Five justices held
that section 2175 is constitutional. 

(51) McDaniel v. Paty – 435 US 618

FACTS
Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers
from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate
for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a
declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name
remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any
expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation
of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.
ISSUE
Does the Tennessee statute barring “Minister[s] of the Gospel or priest[s] of any denomination
whatever” from serving as legislators violate the free exercise of religion guaranteed through the
First and Fourteenth Amendments?
HELD

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court
held that the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights conditional on the surrender of
religious rights and therefore violated the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of
religion as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court hesitated to
strike down a statute that had such a long and vital national history, Tennessee could not prove
that clergy participation was dangerous to the modern political processes.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Tennessee statute
essentially established a test of religious conviction in order to be eligible for office that
disqualified anyone with a strong enough belief to join the clergy. Government imposition of the
burden to choose between one’s religious beliefs and the desire to seek office is an
unconstitutional restriction on the free exercise of religion. He argued that the Establishment
Clause does not give the government the power to discriminate against religious persons seeking
or holding office. Justice Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.

Justice Potter Stewart separately concurred in the judgment, and wrote that this case was covered
by the ruling in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court held that states may not condition public
office on any type of religious belief.

Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He argued that, rather than
violating the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion, the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the statute is specific to ministers,
it implies that ministers are less able to keep outside interests from interfering with their
governmental service than anyone else. Tennessee was not able to prove the necessity of this
restriction.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

(52) Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, GR 190582, April 8, 2010

Facts

Ang Ladlad was a political organisation composed of members of the Filipino LGBT
community. In 2006, in accordance with Filipino law, Ang Ladlad applied for registration with
the Commission on Elections. The application was denied because the Commission on Elections
found that the organisation lacked a substantial membership base. The group applied again in
2009, but the Commission on Elections again dismissed the application, this time on moral and
religious grounds.

The Commission on Elections found that Ang Ladlad, as an LGBT organisation, “tolerate[d]
immorality which offends religious beliefs”. It cited the Bible and the Koran as proof that
homosexual activity violated standards of morality, and held that it could only recognise law-
abiding parties.

The Commission believed that Ang Ladlad’s support of LGBT issues violated several statutes
(including Articles 201, 695 and 1306 of the Civil Code of the Republic of the Philippines) that
referred to concepts such as “morality,” “mores, good customs,” “public morals,” and “morals”.
Additionally, the Commission believed that approving Ang Ladlad would violate the
constitutional duty to “promote and protect [the youth’s] physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being”.
Issue

Whether the Commission on Elections’ refusal to register Ang Ladlad violated the right of the
organisation and its members to freedom of association, freedom of expression, and political
participation.

HELD

The Supreme Court rejected all the reasons given by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Philippine case law clearly interpreted Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution as a call for
“government neutrality in religious matters”. The Commission on Elections’ use of the Bible and
the Koran was thus a significant constitutional violation.

The Court also rejected any public morals argument. While it recognised prejudice and
discrimination against homosexuals were widespread, it refused to acknowledge that public
sentiment was a source of law, stating: “We recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalise homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these ‘generally accepted public morals’
have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.” The Commission on Elections
had provided no evidence to show that the government had a secular, as opposed to religious or
moral, interest in prohibiting the formation of an LGBT political party.

Further, the Court found that the accusation of unlawful activity by Ang Ladlad was “flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst”. The Commission on Elections’ selective targeting of Ang Ladlad
provided grounds for a claim under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.

(53) Taruc v. Dela Cruz, 453 SCRA 123

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,

1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine

Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a

complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the

Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done

without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:
 No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is

a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said

institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the

performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of

religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not

interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or

property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have

jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

(54) Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778

FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One hundred
and seventy women were deported to Davao without their knowledge and consent. The women
were received as laborers in a banana plantation. Some of the women were able to escape and
return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao

HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high, is above
the law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to punish official
transgressors. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus are to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the
mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they must have the means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts.
The great writ of liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
 (55) Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of
the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and
one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
 The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The
action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor.

— With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation
of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a
department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:
 No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision
is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.