Stilgrove v.

Sabas (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act RA 3019)

Doctrine:
Jurisprudence enumerates the elements of Sec. 3(e):
1. The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
2. The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or
her public positions;
3. That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Facts:
(1) Background of the case:
a. Geronimo Gacot filed a detainer suit, subsequently amended into an action for recovery of possession of Lot 18553 (“Lot
A”), against Joaquin Montero and Emilio Batul (defendants) with MTC Puerto Princesa. Lot 18556 (“Lot B”) which was
adjacent to Lot A, was occupied and possessed by Sps Stilgrove.
b. During pendency of the case, Lot A was sold to Cresensia del los Santos, who was able to secure a TCT. Subsequently, the
MTC decision was rendered in favor of Gacot. Thus, a WOE was issued and served on defendants. However, instead of
complying with the order to vacate, they remained on the land and built new structures.
c. Thus, a Special Order for Demolition was issued, commanding the Ex Officio Sheriff and/or Deputy Sheriff to cause the
demolition of all structures including fences built or erected by defendants or any other persons claiming rights under
such, within the premises forming part of plaintiff’s property.
d. Respondents Sablas (COC and Ex Officio Sheriff of MTC) and Simpliciano (Deputy Sheriff) with a demolition team,
proceeded to execute the demolition order. The demolition team proceeded to demolish the houses of defendants.
e. Upon being asked by Arthur Stilgrove, Sablas confirmed that the demolition will include a portion of Lot B. Thus, Stilgrove
demanded the demolition team to desist from carrying out the demolition. However, demolition continued and a fence
and 1/2 of Stilgrove’s house were demolished.
(2) The said demolition, as well as Sablas’ alleged shouting at Stilgrove the words: “Return to (his) country, for (he) is not welcome
here!”, prompted Stilgrove to file an administrative case against respondents herein.
(3) Another complaint was also filed with the OMB for violation of Sec. 3(a), 3(e), and Sec. 4(b) of RA 3019, accusing respondents of
violating the pertinent provisions for allowing themselves to be “influenced and induced” by De Los Santos and Gacot.
(4) Respondents alleges as defenses:
a. That the said demolition was carried out by virtue of the Special Order for Demolition issued
b. That the markers that were placed along the boundary line of Lot A were placed at the surveyor’s initiative based on a
relocation survey conducted by a licensed geodetic engineer
c. The Stilgroves were mere trespassers or squatters with respect to Lot B’s 10m wide encroachment on Lot A
d. To be liable under Sec. 3(a) and 3(e) of RA 3019, the act of the accused must be done in bad faith, which was not
attendant in this case.
(5) The case was referred to Judge Pe for further investigation of the alleged violations of Sec. 3(a), 3(e), and Sec. 4(b) of RA 3019. The
investigations ensued and the results became the focus of the ruling of this case. Judge Pe’s recommendations, which discussed
only Sabas’ liability, and not Simpliciano’s, are as follows:
a. Absolved from violation of Sec. 3(a), finding that there was no evidence pointing Sabas to have persuaded of induced or
influenced other public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of the rules or allowed himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
b. Exculpated as to Sec. 3(e). Under said provision, the offender must be an officer and EE of govn corps charged with the
grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions. Sabas was an ex officio sheriff by virtue of being a COC, such functions do
not include the granting of licenses, permits, or other concessions.
c. No basis to hold him liable under Sec. 4(b) bec Sabas was actually the one who demolished the property and did not
induce nor cause any public official to commit the same.

Issue: W/N defendants are guilty for violating Sec. 3(a), 3(e), and Sec. 4(b) of RA 3019. (Only Sablas, and only as to Sec. 3(e) for simple
neglect of duty)

Held:
(1) The Court notes that Simpliciano has decided to die. While his cessation from office by death does not warrant the dismissal of the
admin case against him, aside from his mere presence at the time of the demolition, he did NOT participate in the actual
demolition of Stilgrove’s fence and house. Thus, Simpliciano is cleared of liability.
(2) With respect to Sabas, the Court ruled that he is not liable under Sec. 3(a) of RA 3019 1. He did not induce any public officer to
perform an act violating rules and regulations. Neither was there evidence that Sabas allowed himself to be “influenced or
induced” to commit the act which became the root cause of this administrative case. Sabas, on his own volition, committed the
acts complained of. Consequently, there is no reason to find him administratively liable under the said provision. As there was no
proof of the alleged inducement to or by respondents, there was likewise be no liability under Sec. 4(b). 2

(3) As to the alleged violation under Sec. 3(e)3:

a. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan explained that the last sentence of Sec 3(e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers
and employees of offices or government corporations which under ordinary concepts of public officers, may not come
within the term.
b. Jurisprudence enumerates the elements of Sec. 3(e):
1. The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
2. The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation
to his or her public positions;
3. That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
c. Santiago v. Garchitorena: 2 alternative ways whereby Sec. 3(e) may be committed—
1. By giving undue injury to any party including the government, or
2. By causing any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference.

(4) Applying the aforesaid herein, Sabas has caused undue injury to complainants. However, Sabas’ acts were not sufficiently proven
as acts of ill-will against the Stilgroves, but are apparently due to his overzealousness in the performance of his functions, albeit
done in a discourteous manner. His negligence was not such nature and degree as to be considered brazen, fragrant and palpable.
Thus, Sabas is still liable for neglect in the performance of official duties, but it is not the kind punishable under Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019.

a. The sheriff’s duty to execute a judgment is ministerial. Need not look outside the plain meaning of the WOE

b. When a sheriff is faced with an ambiguous execution order, prudence and reasonableness dictate that he seek
clarification from a judge. However, Sabas took it upon himself to execute the order even if it entails the destruction of a
property belonging to a person not a party to the case. By doing so, the sheriff went beyond the terms of the demolition
order as it only ordered the demolition to apply only to “defendants x x x as well as all persons claiming rights under
them x x x.”

Fallo: Eriberto Sabas is guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposes on him a fine equivalent to his salary for 1 month, to be deducted
from his retirement pay. Charges of Sec. 3(a), 3(e), and Sec. 4(b) of RA 3019 against Ernesto Simpliciano are dismissed.

1
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

2
Section 4(b) declares as unlawful for any person to knowingly induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined
in Section 3 of the same law.
3
Section 3(e) declares as unlawful the act of:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices of government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.