US v.

ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS

s36 Phil. 243

MORELAND, J.:
The appellant here is accused of violating the Internal Revenue Law. He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of P10. He
appealed.
Section 185 of Act No. 2339 (now section 2727 of the Administrative Code) reads as follows:
"A person who violates any provision of the Internal Revenue Law or any lawful regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue made
in conformity with the same, for which delinquency no specific penalty is provided by law, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both."
Pursuant to the authorization in the Internal Revenue Law, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Circular No. 467, the third section
of which reads as follows:
"3. Printers, publishers, contractors, common carriers, etc. Each printer, publisher, contractor, warehouseman, proprietor of a
dockyard, keeper of a hotel or restaurant, keeper of a livery stable or garage, transportation contractor and common carrier by land or
water, and so forth, subject to the tax imposed by sections 42, 43, and 44 of Act No. 2339, shall keep a day book in which he shall
enter in detail, in English or Spanish, each amount of money received in the conduct of his business. Before being used for said
purpose, the pages of the book must be numbered serially in a permanent and legible manner, and the book itself presented to an
internal revenue agent or officer for approval. In this book the cash receipts of the owner thereof shall be entered under the
corresponding date within the twenty-four hours next following the date the money was received. If no money is received on any day,
then that fact shall be noted in the book within the said twenty-four hours under the corresponding date."
The appellant is the owner of a printing establishment called "The Excelsior" and as such was required by law to keep a book in
which he should make the entries required by the above quoted regulation. It is charged in the information that he violated the
provisions of said regulation in that he failed to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating whether any business was
done on that day or not.
We are of the opinion that the accused must be acquitted. It appears undisputed that he regularly employed a bookkeeper who was in
complete charge of the book in which the entries referred to should have been made and that the failure to make the entry required by
law was due to the omission of the bookkeeper of which appellant knew nothing.
We do not believe that a person should be held criminally liable for the acts of another done without his knowledge or consent, unless
the law clearly so provides. In the case before us the accused employed a bookkeeper, with the expectation that he would perform all
the duties pertaining to his position including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It is undisputed
that the accused took no part in the keeping of the book in question in this case and that he personally never made an entry in it. He
left everything to his bookkeeper. Under such circumstances we do not believe that the mere proof of the fact that the bookkeeper
omitted to make the entries required by the Internal Revenue Circular for the 5th day of January, 1915, is an act upon which the
conviction of the accused can be based. No knowledge on his part was shown with regard to the bookkeeper's omission and the
Government does not contend that he had any knowledge. Nor is it contended that the bookkeeper omitted the entry under the
direction of the accused or with his connivance. No connection between the accused and the omission of the bookkeeper is shown or
claimed. On the contrary the broad contention is that the accused is responsible for the acts and omissions of his bookkeeper, and that,
if any act or omission of the bookkeeper violates the criminal law, the principal is responsible criminally.
With this we cannot agree. Neither the statute nor the circular of the Collector of Internal Revenue, nor both together, expressly
require such a result nor can we say from the circular or the law that the intention to do so was so clear as to leave no room for doubt.
Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or consent, unless
there is a statute requiring it so plain in its terms that there is no doubt of the intention of the Legislature. Criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. (S. U. vs. Madrigal, 27 Phil. Rep., 347.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted. Costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.
 VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.

Facts:

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro,
was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage between the
accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since
a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case,
all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez
GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)
En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.

Facts:

Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of
Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate.
When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the
Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November 1955 the Central filed,
through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09
paid (the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request
and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the
importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as
amended by RA 1375.
On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The Central requested the Auditor
to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was
denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the
Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the
importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of
RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of the
Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by
Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).

Held:

The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17%
tax only if the same were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The
exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their
cooperatives. The word “directly” has been interpreted to mean “without anything intervening”.
Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than
his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption.
When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is
that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly
against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes
are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer. Exempting from the 17% tax all
fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would
be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported by
planters or farmers through their cooperatives.
CIR v CA & YMCA (1998)

Digest #1

CIR v CA & YMCA

GR No 124043, October 14, 1998

FACTS:
In 1980, YMCA earned an income of 676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and
canteen operators and 44,259 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment to
YMCA for deficiency taxes which included the income from lease of YMCA’s real property. YMCA formally protested the
assessment but the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. On appeal, the CTA ruled in favor of YMCA and excluded income from lease to
small shop owners and parking fees. However, the CA reversed the CTA but affirmed the CTA upon motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether the rental income of YMCA is taxable

RULING:
Yes. The exemption claimed by YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates
that the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax
imposed by the same Code. While the income received by the organizations enumerated in Section 26 of the NIRC is, as a rule,
exempted from the payment of tax in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to income derived
from any of their properties, real or personal or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of
such income. 

Digest #2

Facts:
The main question in this case is: “is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by Young Men’s Christian Association
of the Philippines (YMCA) – established as “a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation” – subject to income tax
under the NIRC and the Constitution? In 1980, YMCA earned an income of P676,829 from leasing out a portion of its premises to
small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and P44k form parking fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the rental income of the YMCA taxable

Ruling:
Yes. The exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Sec. 27 of the
NIRC; court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at
construction. The said provision mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as YMCA) from any of their properties, real
or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. Private respondent is exempt from the payment of property tax, but nit
income tax on rentals from its property. 
ONG CHIA v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 127240, 2000-03-27
Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the
vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business,
married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor
Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to... present
any witness against him, he remarked:... we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that... petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a
citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the
witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had... been
known; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation... and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his
petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,[5] in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he... had
likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong."
The state also annexed income tax... returns[7] allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could
hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his stay in the Philippines,... the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married
twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in

1. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage contract[8] and a Joint-Affidavit[9] executed by petitioner and his wife.

These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required
in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife
since 1953 without the... benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in
1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,[10] petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street,
Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which... reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising... questions not presented in the lower
court and brought up for the first time on appeal.
Issues:
the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the
basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and... formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"... because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally... offered.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial
court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural
due... process.
the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No.

1.

Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published,[19] with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7.
Ruling:
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which provides that -
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
the rule on formal offer of evidence... is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in... such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is
not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in... naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant
of naturalization on the basis of the same... documents.
We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.[16] Petitioner... cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he,
in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals
, thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under
LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization... is 031767 while the... case
number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered
by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the
part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed... by the Evaluation Sheet[18] of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the
joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have been
executed... under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may
cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.[22]
As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present
and former places of residence.[23] This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization... cases defeat
petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone,
the instant petition ought to be denied.
 Republic vs. Li Yao [October 20, 1992]
Appeal from the order of COFI of Manila

Facts:
William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed for a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949.In the decision of the court it was held
that he possesses all the qualifications necessary to become a naturalized Filipino but the decision shall not become executory until
after 2 years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.

November 20, 1952 – prayed for the execution of the decision of the court and the court allowed him to take his oath of allegiance
as Filipino.

January 5, 1968 – Solicitor General filed a motion to cancel the certificate of naturalization of Yao on the ground that it was
fraudulently and illegally obtained.

Lower court cancelled his certificate of naturalization on the basis that he evaded payment of taxes due to the government by under
declaration of his income. Yao filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

January 7, 1972 -filed a notice of appeal to the SC. After both parties filed their briefs Li Yao died but the case is not moot because
its disposition would have grave implications for the wife and children of Li Yao.

Issue: WON the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of Li Yao made by the government through the office of the Solicitor
General is valid.

Held: Yes.

Ratio:
Based on section 18(a) of Com. Act no. 473 known as the Revised Naturalization Act, which provides that a naturalization
certificate may be cancelled if it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally.

A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to
any matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement
thereof.

Lim Eng Yu vs. Republic – concealment of applicant’s income to evade payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character is
not irreproachable, thus disqualifying him for naturalization.

Even if the Li Yao paid his tax liability via the tax amnesty program its legal effect would merely remove any civil, criminal or
administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned. Tax amnesty does not have the effect of
obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.

Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the government and against the applicant. When the applicant failed to
meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizens.
Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous Judgment : The Colinares vs. People (G.R. No. 182748,
December 13, 2011) Doctrine
DECISION

ABAD, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide for hitting the head of the private
complainant with a piece of stone. He alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him
to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum.  Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him.   His conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

II.    THE ISSUES

Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser] offense [of attempted homicide] and a reduced
probationable penalty, may he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?

III.   THE RULING

[The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal, MODIFIED the CA decision and found Arnel GUILTY of
ATTEMPTED (not frustrated) HOMICIDE and SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months
of arresto mayor as minimum and 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as maximum. The Court also  voted 8-7 to allow
Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to trial
court.]

YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC
convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that
the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum.  With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly
does not have.  What he has is the right to apply for that privilege.  The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years
and 4 months.  If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the
trial court’s annulled judgment against him.  He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment
imposed on him.  More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend
over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error.  And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial
court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation.  Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
  
Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation.   He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation.  He was not in a position to say, “By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation.”  The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice.  Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco.  It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an
original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty.  Had the RTC done him right from the start, it
would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum.  This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
Bello v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 15
G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)

FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should have been taken directly to Respondent
Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) directing the
Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the
dismissal of the appeal.Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and
elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissed the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First
Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did not implead the
Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that
Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”.

ISSUE:W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of

judicial decision.

HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly
interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a
deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an
analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the
same rule.

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an
extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private
cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed
that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in
the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein
assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine
the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for
the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation
to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation
or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts
have the right to inquire to.
 FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE- Transitional
Input Value Added Tax

FACTS:

Petitioner was a real estate developer that bought from the national government a parcel of land that used to be the Fort Bonifacio
military reservation. At the time of the said sale there was as yet no VAT imposed so Petitioner did not pay any VAT on its purchase.
Subsequently, Petitioner sold two parcels of land to Metro Pacific Corp. In reporting the said sale for VAT purposes (because the
VAT had already been imposed in the interim), Petitioner claimed transitional input VAT corresponding to its inventory of land. The
BIR disallowed the claim of presumptive input VAT and thereby assessed Petitioner for deficiency VAT.

ISSUE:

Is Petitioner entitled to claim the transitional input VAT on its sale of real properties given its nature as a real estate dealer and if so
(i) is the transitional input VAT applied only to the improvements on the real property or is it applied on the value of the entire real
property and (ii) should there have been a previous tax payment for the transitional input VAT to be creditable?

HELD:

YES. Petitioner is entitled to claim transitional input VAT based on the value of not only the improvements but on the value of the
entire real property and regardless of whether there was in fact actual payment on the purchase of the real property or not.

The amendments to the VAT law do not show any intention to make those in the real estate business subject to a different treatment
from those engaged in the sale of other goods or properties or in any other commercial trade or business. On the scope of the basis for
determining the available transitional input VAT, the CIR has no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in
Section 105 of the Tax Code without statutory authority or basis. The transitional input tax credit operates to benefit newly VAT-
registered persons, whether or not they previously paid taxes in the acquisition of their beginning inventory of goods, materials and
supplies.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

 Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
 The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
 When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
 Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
 Corpuz  argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different
from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

 ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a
general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court
by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

No.  It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of
July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific
word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. 

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was
tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?

Yes.  Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an
opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.

 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered. 

Case Digest: US v. De Guzman Case No. 297

FACTS:
Defendant De Guzman, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life
imprisonment.

The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, on the day and at place mentioned in the information, De Guzman who was
walking through a field with Pedro and Serapio Macarling and Rufino Garin, deceased, struck the latter on the head, knocked him
down and held him on the ground while Pedro Macarling stabbed him to death.

Information was duly filed charging De Guzman, jointly with the two Macarlings, with the murder of Guzman entered into an
agreement with the fiscal under the terms of which he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government at the trial of
his coaccused, and to tell the truth as to all that occurred, provided the information was dismissed as to him and he himself was not
brought to trial. With the consent of the court, and in pursuance of this agreement, he was not arraigned nor brought to trial, and the
information was dismissed as to him. One of his co-accused pleaded guilty and the other not guilty, and thereafter the case came on
for trial. after several witnesses had been called, De Guzman was placed on the witness stand, and denied all knowledge of the
murder. He denied that he had ever said anything implicating his coaccused, and swore that a statement made by him before a justice
of the peace was false, and that it had been made through fear of certain police officer.

The Solicitor General relying on provisions of General orders recommends the discharge of the appellant.
Section 34, 35, and 36 of General orders No. 58, upon which counsel for defense and the SolicitorGeneral rely, are as follows:
SEC. 34. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, the court, at any time before the defendants have
entered upon their defense or upon the application of the counsel of the Government, may direct any defendant to be discharged, that
he may be a witness for the United States.
SEC. 35. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, and the court shall be of opinion in respect to a
particular defendant that there is not sufficient evidence to put him on his defense, it must order him to be discharged before the
evidence is closed, that he may be a witness for his codefendant.
SEC. 36. The order indicated in sections thirtyfour and thirtyfive shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant discharged, and
shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.

The question raised on this appeal being his right to exemption from prosecution for the crime thus committed, on the ground that a
former information, charging the same offense, had been dismissed as to him in order that he might testify as a witness for the
prosecution.

ISSUE: Should the defendant be discharged from prosecution even if he did not faithfully comply as to the sworn agreement made
prior the trial which entitled him immunity as witness for the States

HELD:

No, the defendant should not be discharged.

General rule of statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of the original and history of the statutes which they are
called upon to construe and administer, and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. Looking at the legislative
history of the statute under the old system of criminal procedure with a system borrowed on large part from English and American
precedents, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the
Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of
his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.
China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts:

On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development
Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the
defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision
on 20 January 1970.

To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier,
disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the
Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to
reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of the
Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank
and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information
required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1]
upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned orders
are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the
position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development
Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforementioned provisions of law.

Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.

Held:
From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in
such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the
execution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not
order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as
contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the
garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal
until further order.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs
against the petitioners.
GR. No. 191890: December 4, 2012 EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners, MANUEL A.
BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and Amado Calderon
(Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress, however, adjourned before the Commission on
Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and
Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more
than four months. Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec,
pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution. However, in its subsequent
resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments study, completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating
that one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall under the provisions of
Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five years salary. Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.
(Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning the assailed subsequent resolution.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum
gratuity;
B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and executory;
C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as
amended. The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the
conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement takes place.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law
and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the
Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino,
Calderon and Barcelona obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year
term of office. While the Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo as a permanent appointment that
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court have
also positively ruled in that case that an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does
not constitute a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation. A simple reading of this provision shows that it
only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings
that precipitated the issuance of the assailed resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section
13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.

Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits. Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as
provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services
performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension
as part of their compensation. DENIED
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY LAGARTO y
PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88         October 12, 1995

FACTS:

The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the respondent judge with the crime of Rape with Homicide of seven-year
old girl. The accused on the incident also caused fatal injuries to the minor child by slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick
peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the direct cause of her immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of
imposing the corresponding death penalty, imposed rather the reclusion perpetua to each accused.

The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be modified that the penalty be death instead of
reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still denied the motion citing religious convictions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he failed
to attach the corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

HELD:

Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the attaching the
proper corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt,
the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs.
Respondent-judge is duty bound to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as penalty in specific and well defined instances. The discomfort
faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but is a matter upon which judges have no choice. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9, that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case back to the respondent-judge for the imposition of death penalty of the
accused.