VALMONTE v.

BELMONTE

FACTS:
Petitioner Velmonte, who is a lawyer and a media practitioner, sent a letter to GSIS General
Manager Belmonte, requesting that they be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members
of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic)
of Mrs. Imelda Marcos, invoking their right to information.

A reply was sent to Velmonte saying that GSIS has a duty to preserve confidentiality to its
customers. Hence, Velmonte filed this suit.

Petitioners, who are media practitioners, in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners
access to the public records for the subject information. On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are
now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by
the GSIS.

HELD:
YES. Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press
and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to
information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing
pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue
or process of communication between the government and the people.
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure* and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the
constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's
right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law."
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of
the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had
been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in
Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by
implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
 THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, et al. 
FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad
to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its
Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect;
b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect.

Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
In its body, it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. The sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in
favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It
describes it as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including
the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority
between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as
associative.

With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the
MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by
Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution
and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and right to information.

HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Intended as a splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of
public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions
are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people. 

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for reasonable
safeguards. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both
provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public
concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions
involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law.

Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in

not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue
or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public
consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the marching orders to respondents.
The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the
peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No.
3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive
peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and shall be
defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as
one community. Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building
and empowerment for peace, which includes continuing consultations on both national and local levels
to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s
participation in the peace process.

Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”
consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek
relevant information, comments, and recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely
reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment
of the NPF to be the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult
with and seek advice from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on
both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as
for government civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine,
E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any
local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be
useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-
AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to
this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is
referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 
 ECHEGARAY v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection and passed Republic Act No. 8177.
Petitioner was subject to such lethal injection.

Echegaray’s counsel filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying
out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as
these are unconstitutional and void. These are the questioned provisions:

"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during and
after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by
the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events
before and after execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the
intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to
authorized prison personnel."

ISSUE:
W/N the 2nd paragraph of Section 19 unduly suppress the convict’s and his counsel’s
constitutional right to information and as parties in interest.

RULING:
YES. Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because Section 19 unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to
interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.

It was held that Sec. 19 of the rules and regulations implementing RA 8177, which provides that
the manual setting forth the procedure for administering the lethal injection shall be confidential, was
unduly suppressive, because the contents of the manual are matters of public concern affecting the
lives of the people and such matters naturally arouse the interest of the individual citizen.

Public Interest – those which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.

As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of
the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal
impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the
manual are matters of public concern "which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."

The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is

recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way
that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
 Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action
were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These
news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in
various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that
would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.

ISSUE:
W/N the Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution guarantees access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement

RULING:
YES. This same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional
commissioners during their deliberations. The "transactions" used here is generic and it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract. This contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. But it is subject to reasonable safeguards
on the national interest.

Moreover, the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.

Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence,

closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of public
concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure
extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law."

Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and
its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage
when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage.
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier — such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.
 Chavez v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
FACTS:
On April 25, 1995, Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI), a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands without public bidding. On 28 April 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA confirmed the
JVA. On 8 June 1995, President F.V. Ramos, through the Executive Secretary, approved the JVA.

The Senate conducted an investigation and concluded that the JVA itself is illegal.
Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations
between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by President F. V. Ramos.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus praying that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

ISSUE:
W/N the constitutional right to information include official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract.

RULING:
YES. Petition is GRANTED. The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." A consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the
right to information. But the information must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

The right to information covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions
and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers
to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials.
The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming,
supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.